United States Copyright Office
Library of Congress · 101 Independence Avenue SE · Washington, DC 20559-6000 · www.copyright.gov

August 21, 2013

IP Horgan Ltd.
Attn: Jeannine Rittenhouse
1130 Lake Cook Road, Suite 240
Buffalo Grove, IL 60089

Re: ManpowerGroup & Progress Device
Correspondence ID: 1-ERL9S3


Dear Ms. Rittenhouse:

The Review Board of the United States Copyright Office (the "Board") is in receipt of your second request for reconsideration of the Registration Program's refusal to register the work entitled: *ManpowerGroup & Progress Device*. You submitted this request on behalf of your client, Manpower Inc., on May 14, 2013.

The Board has examined the application, the deposit copies, and all of the correspondence in this case. After careful consideration of the arguments in your second request for reconsideration, the Board affirms the Registration Program's denial of registration of this copyright claim. The Board's reasoning is set forth below. Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(g), this decision constitutes final agency action on this matter.

I. DESCRIPTION OF THE WORKS

ManpowerGroup & Progress Device (the "Work") is a logo that consists of four quadrilateral shapes with rounded edges. The largest shape has an orange hue, the second largest shape has a green hue, the third largest shape has a light-blue hue, and the smallest shape has a dark-blue hue. The shapes are arranged from left to right, by order of height, so that the smallest shape appears on the left and the largest shape appears on the right. The word "ManpowerGroup" appears directly below the shapes. The below image is a photographic reproduction of the Work:



ManpowerGroup

II. ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

On August 15, 2012, the United States Copyright Office (the "Office") issued a letter notifying Manpower Group Inc. (the "Applicant") that it had refused registration of the above mentioned Work. *Letter from Registration Specialist, Robin Jones, to Carlynn Davis* (August 15, 2012). In its letter, the Office stated that it could not register the Work because it lacks the authorship necessary to support a copyright claim. *Id.*

In a letter dated October 19, 2012, you requested that, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(b), the Office reconsider its initial refusal to register the Work. *Letter from Jeannine Rittenhouse to Copyright RAC Division* (October 19, 2012) ("First Request"). Your letter set forth your reasons as to why the Office improperly refused registration. *Id.* Upon reviewing the Work in light of the points raised in your letter, the Office concluded that the Work "does not contain a sufficient amount of original and creative artistic or graphic authorship" and again refused registration. *Letter from Attorney-Advisor, Stephanie Mason, to Jeannine Rittenhouse* (February 15, 2013).

Finally, in a letter dated May 14, 2013, you requested that, pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(c), the Office reconsider for a second time its refusal to register the Work. *Letter from Jeannine Rittenhouse to Copyright R&P Division* (May 14, 2013) ("Second Request"). In arguing that the Office improperly refused registration, you claim that the Work, as a whole, includes at least the minimum amount of creativity required to support registration under the standard for originality set forth in *Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co.*, 499 U.S. 340 (1991). *Second Request* at 1-3. In support of this argument, you claim the selection and arrangement of the Work's constituent elements is sufficiently creative to warrant copyright registration. *Id.* Specifically, you maintain that the Work, as a whole, possesses creativity that is not present when its elements are evaluated independently. *Id.*.

In addition to *Feist*, your argument references several cases supporting the general principle that, in order to be sufficiently creative to warrant copyright protection, a work need only possess a "modicum of creativity." *Second Request* at 1-4. You also reference several cases that demonstrate designs comprised of otherwise unprotectable elements are acceptable for copyright protection if the selection and arrangement of those elements satisfies the requisite level of creative authorship. *Id.* at 1-5.

You also claim that, in its previous decisions to reject the Work, the Office "has not made any showing as to why the claimed work does not meet the 'extremely low' quantum of creativity required under *Feist* and progeny and has merely restated the applicable case law and Federal Regulations." *Second Request* at 6.

III. DECISION

A. *The Legal Framework*

All copyrightable works must qualify as "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). As used with respect to copyright, the term "original" consists of two components: independent creation and sufficient creativity. *See Feist*, 499 U.S. at 345. First, the work must have been independently created by the author, *i.e.*, not copied from

another work. *Id.* Second, the work must possess sufficient creativity. *Id.* While only a modicum of creativity is necessary to establish the requisite level, the Supreme Court has ruled that some works (such as the telephone directory at issue in *Feist*) fail to meet this threshold. *Id.* The Court observed that "[a]s a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a work that possess more than a *de minimis* quantum of creativity." *Id.* at 363. It further found that there can be no copyright in a work in which "the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be nonexistent." *Id.* at 359.

The Office's regulations implement the long-standing requirements of originality and creativity set forth in the law and, subsequently, the *Feist* decision. *See* 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (prohibiting registration of "[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, slogans; familiar symbols or designs; [and] mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring"); *see also* 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (stating "[i]n order to be acceptable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, the work must embody some creative authorship in its delineation or form").

Of course, some combinations of common or standard design elements may contain sufficient creativity, with respect to how they are juxtaposed or arranged, to support a copyright. Nevertheless, not every combination or arrangement will be sufficient to meet this grade. *See Feist,* 499 U.S. at 358 (finding the Copyright Act "implies that some ways [of selecting, coordinating, or arranging uncopyrightable material] will trigger copyright, but that others will not"). Ultimately, the determination of copyrightability in the combination of standard design elements rests on whether the selection, coordination, or arrangement is done in such a way as to result in copyrightable authorship. *Id.*; *see also Atari Games Corp. v. Oman*, 888 F.2d 878 (D. D.C. 1989).

To be clear, the mere simplistic arrangement of unprotectable elements does not automatically establish the level of creativity necessary to warrant protection. For example, the Eighth Circuit upheld the Copyright Office's refusal to register a simple logo consisting of four angled lines which formed an arrow and the word "Arrows" in a cursive script below the arrow. *See John Muller & Co.*, 802 F.2d 989 (8th Cir. 1986). Likewise, the Ninth Circuit held that a glass sculpture of a jellyfish that consisted of elements including clear glass, an oblong shroud, bright colors, proportion, vertical orientation, and the stereotypical jellyfish form did not merit copyright protection. *See Satava v. Lowry*, 323 F.3d 805, 811 (9th Cir. 2003). The court's language in *Satava* is particularly instructional:

> [i]t is true, of course, that a combination of unprotectable elements may qualify for copyright protection. But it is not true that *any* combination of unprotectable elements automatically qualifies for copyright protection. Our case law suggests, and we hold today, that a combination of unprotectable elements is eligible for copyright protection only if those elements are numerous enough and their selection and arrangement original enough that their combination constitutes an original work of authorship.

Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).

Finally, Copyright Office Registration Specialists (and the Board, as well) do not make aesthetic judgments in evaluating the copyrightability of particular works. They are not influenced

by the attractiveness of a design, the espoused intentions of the author, the design's uniqueness, its visual effect or appearance, its symbolism, the time and effort it took to create, or its commercial success in the marketplace. *See* 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); *see also Bleistein v. Donaldson*, 188 U.S. 239 (1903). The fact that a work consists of a unique or distinctive shape or style for purposes of aesthetic appeal does not automatically mean that the work, as a whole, constitutes a copyrightable "work of art."

B. ***Analysis of the Works***

After carefully examining the Work, and applying the legal standards discussed above, the Board finds that the *ManpowerGroup & Progress Device* fails to satisfy the requirement of creative authorship.

First, the Board has determined that none of the Work's constituent elements, considered individually, are sufficiently creative to warrant protection. As noted, 37 C.F.R § 202.1(a), identifies certain elements that are not copyrightable. These elements include: "[w]ords and short phrases such as names, titles, slogans; familiar symbols or designs; [and] mere variations of typographic ornamentation, lettering, or coloring." *Id.* Here, the Work consists of four quadrilateral shapes with rounded edges, the word "ManpowerGroup" appearing in an ordinary font, and four colors. Consistent with the above regulations, neither the shapes, the word, the font used to create the word's lettering, nor the Work's simple color scheme are eligible for copyright protection. *See Id.* (prohibiting the registration of basic symbols or designs); *see also Racenstein & Co., Inc. v. Wallace dba ABC Window Cleaning Supply*, 51 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (indicating a word or short phrase, alone, generally cannot support a copyright claim); *see also Coach, Inc. v. Peters*, 386 F. Supp 2d 495, 498-99 (indicating mere variations in typographic ornamentation or lettering cannot support a copyright claim); *and see Boisson v. Banian, Ltd.*, 273 F.3d 262, 271 (2d Cir. 2001) (indicating mere coloration cannot support a copyright claim). Thus, we conclude that the Works' constituent elements do not qualify for registration under the Copyright Act.

Second, the Board finds that the Work, considered as a whole, fails to meet the creativity threshold set forth in *Feist*. 499 U.S at 359. As explained, the Board accepts the principle that combinations of unprotectable elements may be eligible for copyright registration. However, in order to be accepted, such combinations must contain some distinguishable variation in the selection, coordination, or arrangement of their elements that is not so obvious or minor that the "creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be nonexistent." *Id.*; *see also Atari Games,* 888 F.2d at 883 (finding a work should be viewed in its entirety, with individual noncopyrightable elements judged not separately, but in their overall interrelatedness within the work as a whole).

Viewed as a whole, the Work consists of four ordinary rounded-edged rectangles (one green, one orange, one light-blue, one dark-blue) stacked from smallest to largest, with the word "ManpowerGroup" printed below them. This basic arrangement of four familiar shapes, a word, and a simple color scheme is, at best, *de minimis*, and fails to meet the threshold for copyrightable authorship. *Feist,* 499 U.S at 359; *see also Atari Games,* 888 F.2d at 883. Despite your repeated assertions that the Work, in its entirety, "moves across the threshold for authorship," (*Second Request* at 6), the fact remains that the Work includes a basic configuration of four unprotectable

shapes and four unprotectable colors. Accordingly, we conclude that the Work, as a whole, does not possess the requisite "creative spark" necessary for registration. *Feist,* 499 U.S at 359; *Satava*, 323 F.3d at 811.

Finally, your assertion that the Work is unique does not add to your claim of sufficient creativity. *Second Request* at 3. As discussed above, the Board does not assess a work's novelty or uniqueness in determining whether it contains the requisite minimal amount of original authorship necessary for registration. Thus, even if accurate, the mere fact that the Work consists of never-before seen arrangement of familiar shapes would not make the Work, as a whole, copyrightable.

In sum, the Board finds that the Applicant's selection and arrangement of the common elements that comprise the Work lacks a sufficient level of creativity to make the Work registerable under the Copyright Act.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Review Board of the United States Copyright Office affirms the refusal to register the work entitled: *ManpowerGroup & Progress Device.* This decision constitutes final agency action on this matter. 37 C.F.R. § 202.5(g).

Maria A. Pallante
Register of Copyrights

BY: [redacted]
William J. Roberts, Jr.
Copyright Office Review Board