Copyright Royalty Tribunal

NOTICES
 
COPYRIGHT ROYALTY TRIBUNAL
 
[Docket No. CRT 79-1]
 
1978 Cable Royalty Distribution Determination
 
Tuesday, September 23, 1980
 
*63026 AGENCY: Copyright Royalty Tribunal.

 ACTION: Notice of final determination.

 SUMMARY: The Copyright Royalty Tribunal (Tribunal) announces the adoption of its final determination in the proceeding concerning the distribution to certain copyright owners of royalty fees paid by cable systems for secondary transmissions during 1978.

 FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

   Mary Lou Burg, Chairman, Copyright Royalty Tribunal, (202) 653-5175.

   (17 U.S.C. 111(d) and 803(b))

 Introduction

  17 U.S.C. 111(d)(5)(B) requires the Tribunal after the first day of August to determine whether a controversy exists concerning the distribution of cable royalty fees deposited by cable systems with the Copyright Office. Upon determination that a controversy exists, 17 U.S.C. 804(d) requires the Chairman of the Tribunal to publish in the Federal Register a notice announcing the commencement of distribution proceedings.

 In a public meeting on September 6, 1979, after giving claimants the opportunity to appear and present arguments, the Tribunal determined that a controversy did exist concerning the distribution of cable royalty fees. A distribution proceeding was instituted by a public notice issued September 12, 1979 (44 FR 53099).

 Therefore as of September 12, 1979 the Tribunal announced that a controversy concerning the distribution of cable royalty fees did exist for the period January 1 through June 30, 1978 and for the period July 1 through December 31, 1978, and that distribution proceedings had commenced.

 Background and Chronology

 Filing of Claims

  The Tribunal in an advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, published February 14, 1978 (43 FR 6263), invited comments concerning the filing of claims to royalty fees for secondary transmissions by cable systems, pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 111(d)(5)(A).

 In the Federal Register of May 5, 1978 (43 FR 19423) the Tribunal announced that consideration was being given to a proposed rule which would prescribe requirements whereby persons claiming to be entitled to compulsory license copyright fees for secondary transmissions by cable systems shall file claims with the Tribunal. The proposed rule prescribed the content and time of filing such claims.

 The comments and reply comments filed with the Tribunal reflected a difference of opinion among representatives of copyright owners who were likely to be major claimants as to whether the copyright statute requires filings in July 1978 for claims to royalty fees for secondary transmissions during the period January 1 through June 30, 1978. Certain comments filed maintained that the copyright statute requires filings every July, including July 1978. Other comments suggested the claims be filed in July of 1979 in view of the regulations adopted by the Copyright Office as to the filing of statements of account by cable operators.

 The proposed rule required all copyright owners who wished to share in the distribution of royalty fees for secondary transmissions by cable systems during the first six months of 1978 to file claims with the Tribunal during the month of July 1978. The proposed rule required only a minimum filing of a claim in July 1978 with a requirement that the filing be supplemented in July 1979, after copyright owners had an opportunity to examine the statements of account filed by cable operators in the Copyright Office. The final rule was published in the Federal Register June 6, 1978 (43 FR 24528).

 Fixation of Copyrighted Works

  The Tribunal in an initial advisory letter of January 31, 1978 stated that participation in the royalty distribution proceedings did not require copyright owners to preserve and submit simultaneous fixations of live transmissions. In a subsequent advisory letter of November 27, 1978 the Tribunal responded to an inquiry on behalf of a television station questioning whether the use of an audio-video logger for recording a work simultaneously with its transmission complied with the requirements of the Copyright Act and the regulations of the Tribunal. The television station was informed that the use of such a device did meet the requirements of the Copyright Act and the regulations of the Tribunal.

 In the Federal Register of July 28, 1978 (43 FR 32825) the Tribunal issued a proposed rule with respect to Proof of Fixation of Copyrighted Works. The proposed rule established the policy and procedures of the Tribunal concerning the submission to the Tribunal during proceedings for the distribution of cable royalty fees of evidence of the fixation of works in a tangible medium as required by Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act. Under this proposed rule, the filing of tangible fixations would not be required, and controversies concerning the fixation of works would be resolved on the basis of other appropriate evidence.

 In the Federal Register of September 11, 1978 (43 FR 40225) the final rule with respect to proof of fixation of copyright works was published.

 Amendment of Claim Rules

  A notice of proposed rulemaking appeared in the Federal Register of April 4, 1979 (44 FR 20220). This notice was to inform the public that the Tribunal was proposing to supplement the rule issued June 6, 1978 (43 FR 24528) pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 111(d)(5)(A) which stated the filing requirements for those claiming to be entitled to compulsory license copyright fees for secondary transmissions by cable systems. In that rule for a claim to be valid it was required to contain the name of the claimant, the address, a general description of the copyrighted works transmitted, and an identification of at least one transmission. The proposed rule, in addition, would require the percentage or dollar figure of the license *63027 fees the claimant feels entitled to, and a justification for that amount. This rule would apply to both the 1979 filing and, as a supplement, to the July 1978 filing. The proposed rule also provided that the Tribunal prior to the distribution of royalty fees, shall deduct all costs which would not have been incurred by the Tribunal but for the distribution proceeding.

 An amended version of the proposed rule was adopted and published in the Federal Register of May 23, 1979 (44 FR 29892).

 Structure of Proceeding

  The Tribunal in its order of September 12, 1979 (44 FR 53099) also directed claimants or their duly authorized representatives to submit proposals on the structure and procedures of the distribution proceedings to the Tribunal no later than October 1, 1979. A pre-hearing conference of claimants was held on October 11, 1979 to dicuss the structure and procedures of the proceeding.

 After receipt of the proposals and consideration of the claimants' statements during the pre-hearing conference, the Tribunal requested further memoranda or briefs on the following issues:

 (a) concerning the issue of the broadcast day as a copyright compilation;

 (b) concerning the issue of programming of which a broadcast station is an exclusive license;

 (c) concerning the objections raised as to the standing of certain or all sports claimants;

 (d) concerning any other question of copyright ownership as it affects a claim or right to any of the cable television royalties Federal Register of October 17, 1979 (44 FR 59930). The Tribunal deemed these to be "threshold issues" which necessarily had to be resolved before the hearings commenced. These submissions were to be received by the tribunal no later than November 15, 1979; reply comments no later than November 28, 1979. Oral arguments on the above issues commenced on December 5, 1979 and continued on December 6.

 Scope of Claims

  In the Federal Register of October 22, 1979 (44 FR 60726) the Tribunal published a final rule with respect to filing of claims to cable royalty fees. This rule amended 37 CFR, Chapter III, Part 302, § 302.2 and 302.6 by providing that the Tribunal shall accept as a valid claim all claims filed prior to July 31, 1979 and further that said claims will cover the full calendar year of 1978.

 Prehearing Memoranda

  In the Federal Register of December 19, 1979 (44 FR 75201) the Tribunal issued an order calling for pre-hearing memoranda on the submission of evidence and other hearing procedures regarding the conduct of this proceeding. The Tribunal indicated that these memoranda should be filed in accordance with the following:

 (a) The Copyright Act does not provide for the payment of cable royalty fees to broadcaster claimants for the secondary transmission of the broadcast day as a compilation.

 (b) The Copyright Act does not provide for the payment of cable royalty fees to broadcaster claimants who have acquired rights to syndicated programming in a market, which rights are exclusive against other broadcasters in that market, when the syndicated programming is included in distant broadcasts which are retransmitted into the broadcaster's market.

 (c) The Copyright Act provides for the distribution of cable royalty fees to performing rights organizations.

 (d) The Copyright Act provides that cable royalty fees awarded for secondary transmission of certain sporting events shall be distributed to the sports claminats except when contractural arrangements specifically provide that such royalty shall be distributed to broadcaster claimants.

 This order was the subject of a Petition for Review, No. 80-1076, filed by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) on January 17, 1980 in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Petition for Review was challenged by motions to dismiss, filed on behalf of the Tribunal, Program Syndicators, Joint Sports Claimants, and ASCAP. The Court by per curiam order dated April 21, 1980 dismissed the petition on the basis that the "matter is not ripe for judical review."

 This order was the subject also of an "Application for Stay and Continuance" filed by NAB with the Tribunal on January 18, 1980.

 The Tribunal issued an order on January 29, 1980 in which it denied NAB's application for a stay and a continuance.

 Evidentiary Proceeding

  The Tribunal's December 19, 1979 order (44 FR 75201) requesting memoranda on presentation of evidence and conduct of the hearing brought responses from all categories of claimants. These matters were considered at a pre-hearing conference held on February 14, 1980.

 On February 14, 1980 after hearing the views of claimants, the Tribunal ruled that the current cable distribution proceeding would be conducted in two phases. Phase I would determine the allocation of cable royalties to specific groups of claimants. Phase II would allocate royalties to individual claimants within each group.

 Phase I of the evidentiary hearing began on March 31, 1980 and continued over a period of 13 days, concluding May 6, 1980.

 On May 7, 1980 the Tribunal issued an order governing the schedule for further proceedings which provided that:

 (a) Claimants who were precluded from submitting evidence on claims excluded by the Tribunal's order of December 19, 1979 were required to submit a written direct case on such matters by May 19, 1980 and hearing on such claims were scheduled for May 22 and 23, 1980.

 (b) On May 23 interested parties were to submit briefs on legal issues arising from the situation of those categories of claimants not fully represented by its total number of eligible claimants ("unclaimed funds").

 (c) Rebuttal testimony consisting of a list of witnesses and a concise statement of their testimony were to be filed on May 23, 1980 and hearings on rebuttal testimony were to commence on May 27, 1980.

 (d) All joint claimants were required to file on June 6, 1980 information concerning the allocation of total shares to individual claimants and/or the matters that will require consideration by the Tribunal in Phase II of the proceeding.

 Pursuant to the Tribunal's order, NAB presented its direct case with respect to its claims based on compliation, exclusivity and sports programs. Hearings on these claims were held on May 22 and 23, 1980 at which time the record was close with respect to such claims.

 Briefs were filed on May 23, 1980 by several parties setting forth their respective positions concerning unclaimed funds.

 On May 23, 1980 Program Syndicators, Joint Sports Claimants and NAB filed their rebuttal cases. Hearings were held on these presentations on May 27, 28 and 29, 1980 after which the record in Phase I of these proceedings was closed. The Tribunal directed the parties to file proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on July 7, 1980.

 In order to permit the Tribunal to proceed to Phase II of this proceeding, the Tribunal published a summary statement of its Phase I determinations *63028 in the Federal Register of July 30, 1980 (45 FR 50621).

 The Tribunal also announced in this statement that Phase II of the proceeding would commence on August 18, 1980 and would continue on such subsequent days as were necessary. This date was subsequently delayed to August 19, 1980.

 In preparation for Phase II the Tribunal in its order of May 7, 1980 directed joint claimants to advise the Tribunal of the status of arrangements for voluntary agreements for distribution of royalty fees among the members of a joint claim. On the basis of the replies of this order, it was the understanding of the Tribunal that there were no Phase II issues involving the distribution of royalty fees among the Joint Sports Claimants, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the Public Broadcasting Service, National Public Radio and among the commercial television stations represented by the National Association of Broadcasters.

 There were pending before the Tribunal a number of claims filed by copyright owners who were not associated with a joint claim or joint representation before the Tribunal. These claimants were ordered to submit not later than August 15, 1980 any entitlement justification which they wished to have considered by the Tribunal in the determination of their share of the royalty fees. Phase II hearings concluded on August 21, 1980.

 Summary of Evidentiary Positions of Major Claimants

 Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)

  MPAA considered that it was the objective of Congress in the Copyright Act to compensate copyright owners both for the harm they suffer from cable retransmission of their works and for the benefit derived by cable systems from that retransmission. [FN1] The size of the MPAA claim is due to the preponderance of movies and syndicated programming retransmitted by cable and to the royalties MPAA believes is attributable to that programming.

   FN1 "Proposed Findings and Conclusions of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., Its Member Companies, and Other Program Producers and Distributors" July 7, 1980, p. 2.

 MPAA did not measure harm suffered by program producers specifically, but presented testimony to show that the lack of exclusive franchise and of spectrum use, because of cable retransmission, adversely affects their ability to syndicate. [FN2] Program production requires substantial initial investment, and in syndication there is a high rate of cancellation. [FN3] As a result, the number of programs entering syndication has fallen. [FN4] For a cable system to bring in a program causes the value of a license to show the same program in that market to drop, [FN5] and lower earings decrease the incentive for producers. In terms of popularity, MPAA did not analyze its programming, but believed that if it had, it would have found its ratings very high. [FN6]

   FN2 Ibid, p. 23.

   FN3 Ibid, p. 24.

   FN4 Ibid, p. 25.

   FN5 Ibid, p. 25.

   FN6 Ibid, p. 22.

 To measure the benefit to cable systems and place a value on the royalty share due program producers, MPAA proposed the "time plus fee generated" method. This measured the amount of time programs were carried and placed a value on the worth of such programs to cable systems. [FN7]

   FN7 Ibid, p. 2-3.

 In order to give a value to the various signals carried by cable systems, MPAA gave them the same values assigned by Congress to distant signals for the payment of royalties, 1.0 for an independent, and 0.25 for a network affiliate or educational station. [FN8] MPAA argued that this was a factor established by Congress, [FN9] and would base the "pay out" of royalties on the "pay in". [FN10] To the extent that viewing determines advertising rates, it reflects the amount that stations would be willing to pay for programs. [FN11] MPAA argued also that viewing on independents overall is relatively larger than the viewing of qualifying, non-network programming on network affiliates. Viewing on network affiliates during non-network periods is relatively lower than it is at other times, while viewing on independents is more stable. [FN12]

   FN8 Ibid, p. 27.

   FN9 Ibid, p. 38.

   FN10 Ibid, p. 3.

   FN11 Ibid, p. 38.

   FN12 Ibid, p. 39.

 To determine the proportion of programming devoted to movies and syndication on different signals, MPAA conducted two studies. One was based upon a sample of 29 stations and determined the relative proportions of programming according to "TV Guide" for the 1978 FCC composite week. [FN13] The second was based upon the 1978 FCC Report Forms 303-A for 502 commercial stations and contained adjustments for network affiliates of 33.5%. [FN14] and for commercials of 20%. [FN15]

   FN13 Ibid, p. 30-31.

   FN14 Ibid, p. 33.

   FN15 Ibid, p. 34.

 Cable systems are classified according to their semi-annual gross receipts from secondary transmissions. Systems with gross receipts over $160,000 submit their royalty fee on the Copright Office's statement of accounts Form CS/SA-3. Therefore in its examination of royalties paid by cable systems, MPAA considered only these Form 3 systems, on the assumption that this was representative and adequate, because these systems accounted for 87% of all royalites paid. [FN16] In its calculation of the royalty share due program producers, MPAA weighted the royalites paid by each Form 3 cable system according to the distant signal equivalent values of the signals that system carried. MPAA then applied the percentages of the categories of programming carried on those signals to the weighted royalties, and the royalties attributed to all signals were aggregated. According to this "time plus fee generated" method, the MPAA royalty share under the first study was 83.4% [FN17] and under the second study 79.94%. [FN18]

   FN16 Ibid, p. 26.

   FN17 Ibid, p. 32.

   FN18

 Christian Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN)

  CBN did not present witnesses, but did present written submissions and cross-examined the witnesses of others. CBN considers itself a program syndicator [FN19] and, similar to MPAA, based its claim on the percentage of hours its progamming occupied. For a typical week in 1978 CBN compared the hours of its programming carried on 137 stations with the hours of independent and network affiliate programming. [FN20] To determine the hours of network affiliate programming, CBN used the FCC composite week [FN21] and then like MPAA discounted this programming by the distant signal equivalent values assigned for the payment of royalties in the Copyright Act. [FN22] To take into account the fact that FCC policy since 1972 has discouraged new cable systems from carrying network affiliated programming, CBN further discounted network affiliate hours by 50%. [FN23] The royalty share CBN claimed was 4.69% [FN24]

   FN19 "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law", Christian Broadcasting Network, Inc., July 7, 1980, p. 13.

   FN20 Ibid, p. 4.

   FN21 Ibid, p. 10.

   FN22 Ibid, p. 10.

   FN23 Ibid, p. 11.

   FN24 Ibid, p. 12.

 The Joint Sports Claimants

  The Joint Sports Claimants comprised of Major League Baseball, National *63029 Basketball Association, National Hockey League and North American Soccer League, argued that cable royalties should be distributed in a manner which approximates the marketplace. [FN25] This would represent how the cable industry would have allocated its royalty dollars if it had been required to bargain about compulsory licensing. [FN26] This would recognize the harm to the copyright owners and benefit to cable systems. Joint Sports, therefore, focused upon the comparative value of the different types of distant signal programming from the standpoint of the "buyer" and of the "seller." [FN27]

   FN25 "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Joint Sports Claimants", July 7, 1980, pp. 2 and 61.

   FN26 Ibid, pp. 2 and 9.

   FN27 Ibid, p. 11.

 The "buyers" standpoint represented the benefit sports programming provided the cable system, and Joint Sports presented a study of 16 cable operators representing over 40% of cable subscribers. According to this study cable operators would pay 27% of their programming dollars for live professional sports. [FN28] A separate study demonstrated that distant signal sports programming has a value that is greater than either its share of total hours broadcast or its share of audience. [FN29] Joint Sports cited evidence to show that cable systems import stations with professional sports to a disproportionate extent. [FN30] Sports flagship stations constitute fewer than one-tenth of all stations, but they account for 52% of the royalty pool. [FN31] Joint Sports presented evidence to show that households subscribe to cable to a large degree because of sports [FN32] and that during an average quarter hour twice as many cable households view distant signal sports as view movies and syndicated programming. [FN33] Examples were given of cable systems promoting their signals because of sports [FN34] and of how cable sports packages have grown. [FN35]

   FN28 Ibid, p. 12.

   FN29 Ibid, p. 14.

   FN30 Ibid, p. 14.

   FN31 Ibid, p. 16.

   FN32 Ibid, p. 16.

   FN33 Ibid, p. 19.

   FN34 Ibid, p. 16.

   FN35 Ibid, p. 16

 The "sellers" viewpoint represented the harm caused by retransmission to the copyright owner, and Joint Sports presented testimony to show that cable retransmission into a sports club's home territory hurts its gate and the value of its broadcast rights. [FN36] Sports telecasts are ephemeral and revenues cannot be received repeatedly in different types of markets. [FN37] Joint Sports presented the example of a contract for satellite carriage to show that in free bargaining sports has a high value. [FN38]

   FN36 Ibid, p. 22.

   FN37 Ibid, p. 23.

   FN38 Ibid, p. 24.

 Joint Sports claimed a royalty share of between 25% and 30% on the basis of evidence concerning marketplace consideration. Joint Sports felt that no scientific formula could take all factors into account. [FN39]

   FN39 Ibid, p. 3.

 National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)

  NCAA did not present its own witnesses, but did present its own documents and affidavits and cross examined the witnesses of others. [FN40] NCAA made the same argument that Joint Sports did that that Tribunal must act as a surrogate for the markeplace [FN41] and that the allocation of royalties on the basis of time alone would not take into consideration all relevant factors. [FN42] NCAA claimed that the same arguments made by Joint Sports for live professional sports apply to intercollegiate sports as well; [FN43] sports programming is ephemeral, [FN44] retransmission hurts gate receipts and the value of broadcast rights, [FN45] households subscribe for sports, [FN46] and cable operators promote sports. [FN47] NCAA also argued that intercollegiate sports are affected by the finanical crisis of educational institutions generally. [FN48]

   FN40 "Phase I Post-Hearing Brief of the National Collegiate Athletic Association," July 7, 1980, p. 6.

   FN41 Ibid, p. 14.

   FN42 Ibid, pp. 8 and 25.

   FN43 and [FN44] Ibid, p. 45.

   FN45 Ibid, p. 46.

   FN46 Ibid, p. 46.

   FN47 Ibid, pp. 50-53.

   FN48 Ibid, p. 5.

 NCAA did not agree with Joint Sports as to the 27% value assigned by cable system operators to sports programming. Instead, NCAA started with the 11% audience share attributed to sports and added a 5% premium for a total sports share of 16%. On the basis that one-quarter of live sports during 1978 were telecast on a non-network basis NCAA assigned intercollegiate sports one-quarter of the sports allocation. [FN49] After taking off the top for such claimants as music, NCAA claimed a royalty share of 3.83%. [FN50]

   FN49 Ibid, p. 71.

   FN50 Ibid, p. 75.

 Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)

  PBS argued that as far as detriment to the copyright owner and benefit to cable systems are concerned PBS should be considered as having the same economic interest and legal rights as commercial television. [FN51]

   FN51 "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Public Broadcasting Service," July 7, 1980, p. 82.

 PBS argued that the distribution of its programs and their selection by individual public television stations most nearly places PBS in the category of a program syndicator. [FN52] There is no profit motive behind PBS programming, but there is the motivation to recover its costs. [FN53] Most programs are priced so that the same amount of money is recovered regardless of the number of stations participating in the programs. [FN54] And a large amount of programming is produced by individual stations. [FN55] The support for this programming is hurt when stations decline to purchase it because it has been carried by other stations in the station's local communities, a situation PBS used testimony to illustrate. [FN56] Since the majority of financial support for public broadcasting comes from the local community, PBS argued that the importation of distant signals has an adverse direct financial impact. [FN57] PBS also considered that it was less able to absorb such impact than the major commerical claimants. [FN58]

   FN52 Ibid, p. 9.

   FN53 Ibid, pp. 10-11.

   FN54 Ibid, p. 11.

   FN55 Ibid, p. 12.

   FN56 Ibid, p. 13.

   FN57 Ibid, p. 16.

   FN58 Ibid, pp. 18-19.

 PBS considered that its programming is of benefit to cable systems. Nationwide viewing of public television ranges from one to five percent. [FN59] and 50% of television homes watch PBS at least three times a week as compared with 98% for commerical television. [FN60] Approximately one-eighth of all distant hours in 1978 was public television. [FN61]

   FN59 Ibid, p. 21.

   FN60 Ibid, p. 21.

   FN61 Ibid, p. 35.

 PBS denied that its programming was network programming. [FN62] PBS does not own or operate public television stations [FN63] and has no affiliates. [FN64] In commercial television clearances of network programs by network affiliates run on the order of 90% to 95%, whereas with PBS clearances by its members are 66%. [FN65] The three commercial networks reach virtually 100% of the United States, while PBS reaches 85%. [FN66] Congress has consistently sought to insure that public television remain *63030 local and that PBS not become a fourth network. [FN67]

   FN62 Ibid, p. 84.

   FN63 Ibid, p. 37.

   FN64 Ibid, p. 38.

   FN65 Ibid, pp. 41-42.

   FN66 Ibid, p. 45.

   FN67 Ibid, p. 50.

 PBS also argued that its programming carried by cable cannot be considered instructional and therefore ineligible for royalties, because there is no evidence that it is carried by cable for instructional purposes solely. [FN68]

   FN68 Ibid, pgs. 54-55.

 PBS considered that all evidence showed a minimum cable carriage of public broadcasting of 5%. [FN69] During 1978 on the basis of time, public broadcasting's proportion of distant cable carriage was 11% to 12%. [FN70] PBS considered that subjective factors of special quality and appeal should be taken into account, [FN71] and argued that its final royalty share be 9%. [FN72]

   FN69 Ibid, p. 83.

   FN70 Ibid, p. 3.

   FN71 Ibid, p. 84.

   FN72 Ibid, p. 85.

 American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP)/SESAC and Broadcast Music, Inc. (BMI)

  ASCAP and SESAC presented a joint case. ASCAP, like Joint Sports, argued that the distribution of royalties should be made on the basis of the marketplace, [FN73] what cable operators would pay if there were no compulsory license. [FN74] To arrive at a marketplace comparison they chose the amount television broadcasters pay for music performing rights and compared this with the amounts they pay performing rights in other copyrighted material. [FN75] ASCAP considered this comparison appropriate because the broadcast industry is mature, while the cable industry is still in its infancy. [FN76] On the basis of this comparison, ASCAP claimed that music's share of the television portion of cable royalties is 7.4%. [FN77]

   FN73 "Joint Memorandum and Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers and SESAC, Inc.", July 7, 1980, p. 2.

   FN74 Ibid, p. 3.

   FN75 Ibid, p. 18.

   FN76 Ibid, p. 5.

   FN77 Ibid, p. 19.

 ASCAP also claimed a music share for the radio portion of cable royalties. ASCAP could find no hard data on radio cable retransmission, but estimated that it is 5% of all retransmission. [FN78] ASCAP based the amount music occupies of radio retransmission on the amounts radio broadcasters pay for music's performing rights as compared with other performing rights, or 79%. ASCAP therefore calculated music's radio share of cable as 3.8%. [FN79] ASCAP felt that no other claimant group was as fully represented as music and that in consequence music's royalty share should be increased by 2.7%. [FN80] This produced a total royalty share for all music of 13.8%. [FN81]

   FN78 Ibid, p. 18.

   FN79 Ibid, p. 27.

   FN80 Ibid, p. 29.

   FN81 Ibid, p. 32.

 BMI, unlike ACAP, considered that the division of royalties should be based upon the amount of time various categories of copyrighted works were retransmitted. [FN82] BMI based music's share on an analysis of 40 stations in the FCC's composite week for 1975-76 and found that music was contained in programing 21.7% of total time. [FN83] In an analysis of 144 cable systems from "Television Factbook" BMI found that 69% of signals carried are distant signals. [FN84] On the basis of this BMI gave music a share of the television portion of cable royalties of 15%. [FN85]

   FN82 "Broadcast Music, Inc., Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law", July 7, 1980, p. 6.

   FN83 Ibid, p. 9.

   FN84 Ibid, p. 8.

   FN85 Ibid, p. 9.

 To determine music's share of the royalties for radio, BMI like ASCAP, estimated that radio comprises 5% of cable retransmission. BMI's estimate of music's portion of that was 90% to 95%. [FN86] BMI conservatively gave music a radio share of 2%. [FN87] And music's total royalty share was 17%. [FN88] To accomodate competing claims, BMI reduced this to 15%. [FN89] In support BMI cited early drafts of the Copyright Act which until 1974 included a mention of music's share of the cable royalties as 15%. [FN90]

   FN86 Ibid, p. 9.

   FN87 Ibid, p. 9.

   FN88 Ibid, p. 8.

   FN89 Ibid, p. 2.

   FN90 Ibid, p. 10.

 National Association of Broadcasters (NAB)

  NAB argued that royalties should be paid equally for equal time on a given cable system, because the benefit to the cable system is equal. [FN91]

   FN91 "Findings of Fact", National Association of Broadcasters, July 7, 1980, p. 6.

 NAB argued that the locally originated programing of broadcast stations is interesting to cable systems because the local programing carried most widely is that of larger stations with a greater pool of talent and expertise. These stations can provide public affairs programs or newscasts to smaller markets which could not produce them locally. [FN92] NAB argued that, although they are not obliged to, these stations often focus on national issues rather than local concerns. [FN93]

   FN92 Ibid, p. 8.

   FN93 Ibid, p. 8.

 In establishing its time-based formula NAB used the 1978 Statements of Account filed with the Copyright Office for both Form 2 and Form 3 cable systems, representing 99.6% of the royalty fund, [FN94] and the 1978 FCC Annual Programing Reports (303-A). [FN95] NAB used a 1977 study by the Cable Television Bureau to determine that the amount of non-network programing on network affiliates was 37.3%, [FN96] and from the 1978 Broadcast Year Book established a station as either independent, network affiliate or non-commercial. [FN97] A 20% adjustment was made for commercial matter, [FN98] and "local entertainment" was deleted from the local programing of 61 sports flagship stations to eliminate sports programing. [FN99] Canadian commercial programing was not included. [FN100] For each cable system NAB divided the total time of local programing by the total time of all qualifying programing. This percentage was multiplied by the royalties paid by the cable system, and the sums for all systems were aggregated to produce the total NAB royalty share. [FN101] Total local programing weighted by royalties produced a total NAB television share of 21%. [FN102]

   FN94 Ibid, p. 1.

   FN95 Ibid, pp. 2-3.

   FN96 Ibid, p. 4.

   FN97 Ibid, p. 5.

   FN98 Ibid, p. 5.

   FN99 Ibid, p. 5.

   FN100 Ibid, p. 7.

   FN101 Ibid, p. 6.

   FN102 Ibid, pp. 6 and 19.

 To determine the NAB royalty share for radio, NAB compared the non-network expenses of radio stations with the non-network expenses of television stations from FCC financial data for 1979. The percentage of radio to television was 7.9% [FN103] from which NAB computed an approximate radio royalty share of 1.6%. [FN104]

   FN103 Ibid, p. 7.

   FN104 Ibid, p. 7.

 In addition to its time-royalty based formula, NAB claimed broadcasters are due royalties for the broadcast day as a copyrighted compilation, for syndicated exclusivity, and for the copyright ownership of sports broadcasts.

 Aside from the legal issues of copyright ownership, NAB claimed that the broadcast day as a compilation benefits cable systems. [FN105] A program's success depends upon how it is arranged and selected in relation to other programs [FN106] and this is the result of the skill and ingenuity of the broadcaster, and demands no cost or *63031 risk on the part of the cable operator [FN107] although it assists the cable operator in reaching an audience. [FN108]

   FN105 Ibid, p. 8.

   FN106 Ibid, p. 8.

   FN107 Ibid, p. 9.

   FN108 Ibid, p. 9.

 Concerning syndicated exclusivity, NAB argued that broadcasters are harmed when programs they have paid substantial licensing fees for are retransmitted into their markets. [FN109] NAB argued that the FCC rules intended to protect syndicated exclusivity are cumbersome and fail to do so and that much syndicated programing cannot be protected because it is currently grandfathered. [FN110]

   FN109 Ibid, p. 12.

   FN110 Ibid, p. 13.

 Concerning sports broadcasting, NAB argued that the contractual agreements between sports clubs and broadcasters entitle the broadcaster to be the proper claimant for at least some portion of sports retransmission. [FN111] Contracts were presented as evidence in support.

   FN111 Transcript, May 22, 1980, pp. 140-171.

 NAB claimed a broadcaster's royalty share for local programming of 21% and a share for radio of 1.5%. NAB did not include estimates of the shares it felt broadcasters are entitled to for compilation, syndicated exclusivity, or sports.

 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. (CBC)

  CBC presented written submission to support, like NAB, the distribution of cable royalties on the basis of time. [FN112] CBC however did not weight the percentage of time of its programming by the amount of royalties paid by individual cable systems. [FN113] CBC claimed all its programming qualifies as either local or non-network and stressed its role as a major broadcaster. [FN114]

   FN112 Canadian Broadcasting Corp. letter to Chairman, CRT, of July 2, 1980, p. 3.

   FN113 CBC letter to Chairman, CRT, March 14, 1980, p. 14.

   FN114 CBC letter to Chairman, CRT, July 2, 1980, p. 6.

 Like NAB, CBC supported the rights of broadcaster under syndicated exclusivity. [FN115] CBC claimed a royalty share of 6.5%. [FN116]

   FN115 Ibid, p. 4.

   FN116 Ibid, p. 7.

 T. V. Ontario

  T. V. Ontario presented written submission to support the same arguments as submitted by CBC, and claimed a royalty share for itself and Canadian claimants other than CBC of 1.5%. [FN117]

   FN117 T. V. Ontario letter to Chairman, CRT, July 4, 1980, p. 3.

 National Public Radio (NPR)

  NPR argued that the compulsory license is for the privilege of retransmission, regardless of whether or not a cable system elects to carry all works that are accessible; [FN118] also that under compulsory licensing there is no distinction in value made between aural and television programming.

   FN118 "NPR's Phase I Findings of Fact", July 7, 1980, pp. 1-2.

 NPR considered that the value of radio to cable systems is supported by the frequency of its carriage. [FN119] Data on cable radio carriage is limited, but from a 1976 study by the NAB Cable Radio Committee and a 1977 FCC proceeding on cable radio carriage, NPR cited that approximately 70% of stations surveyed in the past have reported distant cable importation and that in 1977, 55% of all cable systems carried all band FM and among the larger systems this was 56%, while only 10% carried no radio. [FN120] In all cases where distant radio was imported FM was included. [FN121]

   FN119 "NPR" Phase I Findings of Fact", July 7, 1980, pp. 2-3.

   FN120 NPR letter to Chairman, CRT, of March 14, 1980, enclosing "Statement and Testimony of NPR", p. 3.

   FN121 Ibid, p. 3.

 NPR argued that with respect to audio, cable systems are less likely to originate their own programming than they are with respect to video. [FN122] In 1977 audio origination was 18%, while programming origination for video was 54%. [FN123] NPR argued that as far as providing alternative programming is concerned NPR is more beneficial to cable systems than commercial radio. According to the 1979 Carnegie Commission Study, commercial radio fell into the same programming categories as television in 85% of the cases, whereas NPR in 98% of the cases was different. [FN124] NPR considered that its status is chiefly that of a program syndicator, [FN125] and that its programming is mandated to be costly and economically non-viable by Congress. [FN126] In 1978, of the hours broadcast by public radio, locally originated programming represented 59.4% of which NPR represented approximately one-quarter [FN127] and NPR originated programming represented 21.7%. [FN128]

   FN122 Ibid, p. 2.

   FN123 Ibid, p. 3.

   FN124 "NPR's Phase I Findings of Fact", July 7, 1980, p. 9.

   FN125 NPR letter to Chairman, CRT, of March 14, 1980, enclosing "Statement and Testimony of NPR", p. 3.

   FN126 NPR letter to Chairman, CRT, of March 14, 1980, enclosing "Statement and Testimony of NPR", pp. 4 and 6.

   FN127 Transcript, May 6, 1980, p. 65.

   FN128 NPR letter to Chairman, CRT, of March 14, 1980, enclosing "Statement and Testimony of NPR", p. 6.

 NPR analyzed frequency values by megahertz in order to provide a value common to both radio and television [FN129] and using the 1978 FCC composite week for programming, converted categories of stations into program-megahertz values. [FN130] NPR's claim for a royalty share was 4%. [FN131]

   FN129 "NPR's Phase I Findings of Fact", July 7, 1980, p. 5.

   FN130 Ibid, p. 10.

   FN131 Ibid, p. 10.

 Cartoon Characters

  The Cartoon Characters ("Characters") claimants argued that like music, while Characters are not themselves programs, they are copyrighted components of programs and are therefore entitled to cable royalties. [FN132] There was no quantitative measure of the popularity of Characters, [FN133] but the Characters claimants argued that the popularity of certain works can be appraised without the need for hard data. [FN134] Approximately 6.56% of syndicated programming in 1978 consisted of animated or cartoon characters. [FN135] It is the single most effective childrens' television programming, [FN136] and it is the character and not the plot which is the primary attraction. [FN137] Experience shows that other programming does not succeed in competition with cartoons. [FN138] The Character claimants considered that as far as damage was concerned, it is presumed in secondary transmission and is not necessary to prove. [FN139]

   FN132 "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Character Claimants", July 7, 1980, p. 27.

   FN133 Ibid, p. 11.

   FN134 Ibid, p. 14.

   FN135 Ibid, p. 12.

   FN136 Ibid, p. 8.

   FN137 Ibid, p. 9.

   FN138 Ibid, p. 9.

   FN139 Ibid, p. 26.

 In calculating their share, the Charcters claimants applied the similarity they claimed with music and multiplied the share claimed by music, 15%, by the amount of syndicated programming time occupied by cartoon characters in 1978, approximately 7%. To take into account the fact that, unlike music, Characters represent entirely feature use and not background, this result was multiplied by a factor of 3 for a total royalty share of 3%. [FN140]

   FN140 Ibid, pp. 29-30.

 Legal Considerations

 The Issue of the Broadcast Day as a Compilation

  17 USC 103(a) states that the subject matter of copyright includes "compilations". 17 USC 101 defines compilation as "a work formed by the *63032 collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship."

 The NAB and individual broadcaster claimants asserted that the work done by broadcasters in assembling their "broadcast day" constitute a "compilation". [FN141] It was stated that "to assemble its 'broadcast day', a television broadcaster takes programs, commercial announcements and other broadcast materials, either live or pre-recorded on film or videotape, and coordinates them into a fluid and harmonious arrangement transmitted over the station's facilities to its viewers." They assert that if the "broadcast day" compilations meet the essential elements of copyright, that is originality of authorship and fixation in some tangible form, [FN142] the stations have a copyright separate and apart from the individual material used, and a distinct claim to cable royalties.

   FN141 "Memorandum Submitted In Support of the National Association of Broadcasters' Position", p. 19.

   FN142 17 USC 102(a).

 Program syndicators, sports claimants, and performing rights societies disputed these assertions in pleadings and oral argument. The Tribunal has not allocated royalties to broadcaster claimants on the basis of the compilation theory for several reasons, both legal and evidentiary.

 17 USC 111(d)(4) states in part:

 (4) The royalty fees thus deposited shall, in accordance with the procedures provided by clause (5), be distributed to those among the following copyright owners who claim that their works were the subject of secondary transmission by cable systems during the relevant semiannual period:

 (A) any such owner whose work was included in a secondary transmission made by a cable system of a nonnetwork television program in whole or in part beyond the local service area of the primary transmitter; and * * *

 Program syndicators and certain other claimants argue that the above quoted language clearly limits the distribution of cable royalties to the copyright owners "of a program only, that is, a particular show". [FN143] They argue that royalties are to be paid for a work "included in a secondary transmission made by a cable system of a nonnetwork television program" and that a "broadcast day" made up of a daily combination of programs and other matter cannot be considered a "work" included in such secondary transmissions.

   FN143 "Brief of Motion Picture Association of America, November 15, 1979, p. 14.

 It was also argued by program syndicators and other claimants that a television station's simultaneous recording of its entire broadcast day is an unlawful use of programs licensed to the station for broadcast purposes only. It is thus maintained that since Section 103(a) of the Copyright Act provides that protection "does not extend to any part of [a compilation] in which [copyrighted] material has been used unlawfully, no valid claim for a compilation can be made for any part of the compilation where material is used unlawfully. Finally, the record of this proceeding raises questions concerning whether the "broadcast day" can be regarded as a "work" within the meaning of the relevant language of the Copyright Act.

 The legislation for the general revision of the coypright law was pending before the Congress for many years. The language of the new Act relating to compilations and other subject matter of copyright, as well as definitions and other technical provisions, was drafted long before the Congress considered what is now section 111. These provisions are of general application and do not reflect the specific attention which the Congress gave to cable television issues. The lengthy legislative history of section 111 reflects a clear understanding by the Congress of the copyright owners and the nature of the "works" which are to be compensated by this Tribunal for cable transmissions of their materials. This history so decisively excludes the "broadcast day" theory of compensation that it is unnecessary for the Tribunal to interpret general technical language of the new Copyright Act.

 The record of this proceeding contains detailed analysis of the legislative history of section 111. Our review of this history persuades us that Congress did not intend compensation to broadcaster claimants on the basis of the "broadcast day" nor was any such compensation contemplated by those who participated in the resolution of the complex cable television issue.

 The Issue of the Broadcast Station as Licensee

  The NAB and broadcaster claimants generally assert that cable royalty fees must be awarded to certain broadcaster claimants to compensate them for the situation in which a distant cable signal transmitting syndicated programming is brought into the market of a broadcaster who has acquired rights to that programming, which are exclusive against other broadcasters in that market. For example, if a District of Columbia station has acquired the rights to exhibit the "Mary Tyler Moore Show" in the Washington market to the exclusion of all other broadcasters in that market, and an Arlington, Virginia cable system shows the "Mary Tyler Moore Show" in the Washington area as part of its carriage of a New York station, the Washington broadcaster would be entitled to royalties for the distant retransmission.

 The broadcasters argue that section 201(d)(2) of the Copyright Act gives explicit statutory recognition to the principle of divisibility of copyright, and that the owner of any particular exclusive right is entitled to all the remedies accorded a copyright owner. They assert that "local stations holding exclusive exhibition licenses are copyright owners of the exclusive rights licensed to them, entitled to all of the rights, remedies and protection provided by the new Act, including the right to receive compulsory fees". [FN144]

   FN144 "Memorandum Submitted In Support of the National Association of Broadcasters' Position," p. 5.

 The Tribunal, for reasons similar to those set forth in our discussion of the "broadcast day" issue, has concluded that the compensation sought by the broadcaster claimants is not in accordance with the intent of Congress concerning the distribution of cable royalties. The Tribunal rejects the efforts of the broadcaster claimants to increase their share of the royalty fees by strained application of general language of the Copyright Act which distorts the Congressional intent.

 We find adequate guidance in Section 111, and therefore, it is unnecessary for the Tribunal to analyze the ownership and remedies provisions of the Copyright Act. We find that Section 111 and its legislative history reflects the Congressional intent, and the understanding of interested parties, that television stations are to be compensated only for eligible locally produced programs. We find, with regard to syndicated programming, that Congress intended for royalties to be distributed to program syndicators and not to local stations.

 The legislative history speaks decisively as to the understanding of the drafters and interested parties as to scope of compensation to broadcaster claimants. This understanding was shared by the leading spokesmen for the broadcasting industry during the legislative proceedings on the copyright revision legislation. Mr. Vincent *63033 Wasilewski, President of the National Association of Broadcasters testified: [FN145]

   FN145 Hearing on H.R. 2223 before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of Committee on the Judiciary, 94th Congress, 1st Session, p. 1377 (1975).

 "* * * the broadcasters are not per se in that proposed legislation, asking for payments to them for the use of their signal per se. They are asking for payment to the copyright proprietor for the use of that programming material by the CATV, by the copyright proprietor, a motion picture producer, special sports interest, or what have you."

 The final text of section 111 was constructed by the House of Representative Subcommittee as a substitute for the version passed by the Senate. In recommending this language to the House, Congressman Tom Railsback, the ranking minority member of the Subcommittee, stated: [FN146]

   FN146 122 Congressional Record H10879, September 22, 1976.

 "All parties are now satisfied with section 111, except the National Association of Broadcasters. They were not a party to the compromise because they are not a major party of interest." In view of our reading of the legislative history, it again is not necessary to interpret other sections of the Copyright Act or consider the syndicated exclusivity rules of the Federal Communication Commission.

 The Public Broadcasting Service "Network" Issue

  17 USC 111(d)(4)(A) authorizes distribution of royalty fees to copyright owners whose works are included in a "nonnetwork television program." The Act does not define "network program."

 17 USC 111(f) defines a "network station" as "a broadcast station that is owned or operated by, or affiliated with, one or more of the television networks in the United States providing nationwide transmissions, and that transmits a substantial part of the programming supplied by such networks for a substantial part of the programming supplied by such networks for a substantial part of that station's typical broadcast day." The House report on the copyright bill states that "To qualify as a network station, all the conditions of the definition must be met." [FN147]

   FN147 H.R. No. 94-1476, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, p. 101 (1976).

 PBS does not own or operate any public television stations and is prohibited from doing so under its Articles of Incorporation. PBS has no affiliates. It is a membership corporation, whose members are the licensees of public television stations.

 Certain claimants have challenged or raised questions concerning the eligibility for compensation of PBS distributed programs on the grounds that such programs are exempt from compensation as network programs. It is argued that although PBS does not have affiliates, the term "affiliated with" in the definition of "network station" includes the "arrangements between PBS and its stations."

 The Congression in section 111(f) of the copyright law undertook to define a "network station", and "independent station" and a "noncommercial educational station". An "independent station" is defined as a "commercial television broadcast station other than a network station". This definition immediately follows the definition of a "network station" and the use of phraseology referring to a "commercial television broadcast station other than a network station" persuades us that the prior reference to a "network station" is intended to refer to a commercial network station. We conclude that public television stations do not come within the scope of the statutory definition of a "network station" and that public television programs distributed by PBS are not network programs within the meaning of section 111 of the Copyright Act.

 It has been argued that the Congress in 17 USC 111(f) in establishing the method for computing "distant signal equivalents", whereby a value of one-quarter was assigned to both network and noncommercial educational stations, manifested its determination that, like network affiliates, nonnetwork programming on educational stations approximates 25%. We find that this language is inconclusive and does not instruct us as to the congressional intent concerning PBS-distributed programming. We have looked to the record of this proceeding, which in our view establishes significant distinctions between the functioning of PBS and that of the commercial networks. We find that the operation of PBS in distributing programs is more akin to that of a program syndicator.

 Claim of Copyright Owners of Characters

  The copyright owners of certain pictorial, graphic or sculptural works ("Characters"), whose "works" were included in secondary transmissions, filed a claim for cable royalties. The claimants are the copyright owners of such Characters as Bugs Bunny, Miss Piggy, Kermit the Frog, Big Bird, Superman, and Bozo the Clown. A number of other claimants asserted that this claim is barred by 17 USC 111.

 The copyright owners of the Characters assert that these works are unique and significantly different from other material which is incorporated in television programming. They maintain that unlike such copyrighted works as novels and plays from which television programs are derived, and "which are incorporated in the program, these Characters are not merged or worked indistinguishably into the television program but are 'included' therein and continue to retain their independent identities remaining visible and separately recognizable throughout." [FN148]

   FN148 "Brief on behalf of Character Claimants", November 14, 1979, pp. 2-3.

 It is maintained that Congress did not restrict the distribution of cable royalties to the "owners of programs", but provided for payments to the owner of a "work" included in a secondary transmission. Congress, it is argued, did not intend to grant royalties to the owners of all copyrighted works incorporated in television programs, but created a relationship "which is peculiarly applicable to pictorial, graphic and sculptural characters."

 The issue presented by the claim of the copyright owners of Characters was not directly explored during the Congressional proceedings. However, we have concluded that our awarding cable royalties to the Character claimants would not be consistent with the general scheme adopted by the Congress in section 111. We conclude that the Congress did not contemplate this Tribunal awarding royalty fees to the copyright owners of individual components of programs. As was noted during the oral argument of this issue, approval of this claim might well require the Tribunal to award fees to authors of screen plays and novels that were adapted into programs. We are satisfied that Congress did not intend such a result.

 We believe that the denial of the Character claim is also required by our understanding of customary contractual arrangements, whereby the copyright owners of Characters license the program producer to use the Characters for all uses of the program.

 It has been argued that our denial of the Character claim would necessarily compel our denial of the claims of the performing rights societies. We find this argument to be without merit. Our record reflects that music licensing arrangements are unique and are clearly distinguishable from the licensing of Characters. Moreover, the legislative history reveals numerous examples of the Congressional intent that the *63034 performing rights societies should share in the distribution of cable royalties. [FN149]

   FN149 See S. 543 (Committee Print) 91st Congress, 1st sess. (1969); S. 644 92nd Congress, 1st sess. (1971); S. 1361 93rd Congress, 1st sess. (1973).

 The First Amendment and Royalty Distribution Criteria

  The NAB and certain broadcaster claimants asserted during this proceeding that constitutional problems necessarily result if the Tribunal adopts distribution criteria "favoring certain types of programming over others, according to an assessment of program popularity or quality based largely on guess work." [FN150]

   FN150 Rebuttal statement of the National Association of Broadcaster, p. 2.

 The NAB asserts that "the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the broadcast industry is protected by the First Amendment", that "the First Amendment requires that the public receive broad access to diversified information and an uninhibited marketplace of ideas," that "cable television resembles the print medium more than it does that of commercial broadcasting" and that the First and Fifth Amendments require the government to remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.

 We have no difficulty in accepting these statements. We have major difficulty in finding that they have any relevance to the statutory functions of the Tribunal in this proceeding. We are not engaged in the regulation of cable television systems. We are engaged, subject to the limitations of our jurisdiction, in providing fair compensation to certain copyright owners. It is our view that the Constitution and the copyright law not only permit our consideration of popularity and quality in awarding cable royalties, but that the Congress directly intended that the benefit of certain types of programs to cable systems be considered in the structuring of the distribution criteria.

 We have reviewed the cases cited by the NAB and find that none of them have application to the issues presented in a cable royalty distribution proceeding. Indeed, the case of Home Box Office v. FCC, [FN151] cited by the NAB, provides authority for the view that government regulations unrelated to the suppression of free speech are valid if the regulations further "an important or substantial governmental interest" or if "the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." Both the Congress and this Tribunal have found that the government interest in compensating copyright owners for the benefit their programs confer on a cable system is "important or substantial." Furthermore, this record provides no foundation for a conclusion that our cable distribution will impact on First Amendment program determinations by broadcasters, or their allocation of resources.

   FN151 185 U.S. App. D.C. 142, 567 F2nd 9, cert. denied, 434 US 829 (1977).

 Claims to Royalties for Sports Programing

  Subsequent to the filing of claims to cable royalties for 1978, the NAB and individual broadcaster claimants contested the scope of the claim of the Joint Sports Claimants and asserted that certain broadcaster claimants "Are The Copyright Owners With Respect To The Vast Majority Of the Sports Programming At Issue Here." [FN152] They stated that since the station's produce and record most sports programming, copyright ownership initially rests in the stations, and not the teams or leagues. They asserted that copyright ownership resides in the station, except where the team produces and records its own broadcast coverage, or obtains copyright in the broadcast by way of contract with the station producing and recording the broadcast.

   FN152 "Memorandum Submitted In Support of The National Association of Broadcasters' Position", p. 11.

 The broadcasters stress the language of the Copyright Act that copyright rests in the author of any copyrightable work from the moment the work is created and fixed in some tangible form. They maintain that the work done by the stations in producing and recording broadcast coverage of sports events meets the test of "original work of authorship", and that fixation of the work usually is entirely through the efforts of the broadcasters.

 The sports claimants assert that the legislative history of the Copyright Act establishes that the sports clubs are the copyright owners of sports telecasts, that common law principles support Congress' recognition of the sports clubs as the copyright owners of sports telecasts, and that patterns of commercial dealings between the clubs and broadcasters confirm that the clubs are the sole copyright owners within the meaning of the works made for hire and transfer of ownership provisions of the Copyright Act.

 During the oral argument on December 6, 1979, considerable attention was devoted to the role of contracts in determining who is the proper claimant. Counsel for NAB asserted:

 I think it's very clear from reading all of the briefs submitted by these sports interests, that they are, in fact, relying upon contracts. If there is a contract between a given station and a ball club, that contract will control. And that is the position the sports people are taking. And quite frankly, that is the position that the broadcasters are taking . . .

 We disagree entirely as to the legal import of the contracts. But, we recognize that the contracts are dispositive. We think, therefore that each contract between each of the ball clubs and each of the stations will have to be analyzed. [FN153]

   FN153 Transcript, December 6, 1979, pp. 12-13.

 Counsel for the Joint Sports Claimants responded:

 The broadcasters have stated in their pleadings, in their opening brief, it says that they are the owners of the sports copyright and should be entitled to compensation. Here today, after all of the briefing, we find that the issue is supposedly revolving back to the question of contract.

 I am somewhat sorrowful that Mr. King apparently didn't read our briefs, because our briefs, I thought, set forth, in some great detail, our view that the legislative intention of the Congress was to respond to our pleas, our concern for the protection of our property rights . . . [FN154]

   FN154 Ibid., p. 24.

 If, however, at the hearing, the broadcasters could come forward with a contract that says that they are the copyright, that we have given to them some of our property rights to come here, then I think one has to have that form available to you.

 But, we are not saying that everything is up for grabs. What we are saying is that this consistent course of dealing between them and us and the congressional recognition of it and the congressional concern for our problems with cable, presumptively establishes our rights to be here . . .

 Now I must say, that there are in some instances as a matter of contract, given all of this protection and the limited right that some of the money that comes to us might be shared with the broadcasters. That is not a question of who is the claimant here. That is a question of contract; that is a question that I presume will be fully accommodated in the courts, if anybody welshes on that. But, that is clearly an arrangement that does not control who is the copyright owner. The monies come to us. And in some instances, there have been bargains with broadcasters that they get a share of that money. But that does not interfere with the basic proposition, that in the first instance, as a matter of *63035 Copyright Law, we are the copyright owners. [FN155]

   FN155 Ibid., pp. 49-50.

 We again find the legislative history to be dispositive of this issue. This history has been extensively set forth in this record. From the first proceedings in the Congress in 1965 on the copyright revision legislation through the final enactment in 1976, there is a clear course of action by the Congress, and indeed by the broadcasting representatives, which compels the award of cable royalties for sports programming to the sports leagues, in the absence of contractual arrangements specifically providing that such royalties shall be distributed to broadcaster claimants.

 This history commenced with the successful efforts of the sports leagues to obtain copyright protection for telecasts of live sports programming. Both representatives of sports and broadcasters over the years in their congressional testimony understood who should be regarded as copyright owners.

 Pete Roselle, the Commissioner of the National Football League testified:

 We must have copyright protection if we are to reestablish our right to sell and to broadcast our programs in accordance with our proper ownership rights. [FN156]

   FN156 Hearing on H.R. 4347 before the House of Representatives Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 1825-26 (1965).

 At the 1975 House hearings [FN157] during the testimony of John Summers, the General Counsel of the NAB, the following colloquy ensued:

   FN157 House supra note 145 at 785.

 Mr. Kastenmeier: One of my questions in who, in fact, is the copyright holder who is the creator, author, of this work In the case of a professional baseball game, transmitted over, let us say, a network instantaneously, whether it is ephermerally recorded or not

 Mr. Summers: Well, I guess the club, or the league, is the copyright holder, but the station has purchased the right to broadcast that game, usually at a very large sum of money.

 The President of the National Association of Broadcasters, Mr. Vincent Wasilewski, also testified: [FN158]

   FN158 Ibid., p. 1377.

 the broadcasters are not per se in that proposed legislation, asking for payments to them for the use of their signals per se. They are asking for payment to the copyright proprietor for the use of that programming material by the CATV, by the copyright proprietor, a motion picture producer, special sports interest, or what have you.

 We have reviewed common law principles and customary business relationships between sports teams and broadcasters. These principles and relations confirm our understanding of the congressional intention concerning the distribution of cable royalties for sports programming.

 Criteria and Relative Weight of Factors

  The Copyright Act does not provide detailed criteria to guide the Tribunal in allocating royalties among the various claimants. The omission by the Congress of specific criteria was intentional. [FN159]

   FN159 H.R. No. 94-1476, 94th Congress, p. 97.

 The legislative history of the Act reflects that Congress determined that it would not be appropriate "to specify particular, limiting standards for distribution." Congress intended that the Tribunal should consider all pertinent data and considerations presented by the claimants. [FN160]

   FN160 Ibid., p. 97.

 Thus, it is clear that Congress did not consider that a paticular, limiting standard for distribution was appropriate and that it had no intention of establishing one. The legislative history of the Act also makes clear that the Tribunal in determining the allocation of the royalty pool should not confine itself to a single consideration, but must instead take into account all pertinent data, facts and considerations.

 A great deal of evidence and a wide variety of considerations have been advanced by the parties in this proceeding. What is clear to us from this turmoil is that no single formula advocated by any party succeeds in taking account of all pertinent data and consideration.

 We found that the approach of each claimant was designed to magnify and advance the particular interest of the claimant. In our opinion, none provided a basis for universal allocation.

 The Tribunal has made an allocation on the basis of the entire record of this proceeding. Our allocation has been fashioned by taking account of a variety of considerations and factors, as well as the use of combined results of a number of the approaches urged by the parties, adjusted as appropriate.

 Within the specific intent of Congress, the Tribunal has determined its allocations to the various categories of claimants on a combination of factors based on the record of the proceeding.

 The Tribunal determined the primary factors to be:

 (a) the harm caused to copyright owners by secondary transmissions of copyrighted works by cable systems,

 (b) the benefit derived by cable systems from the secondary transmission of certain copyrighted works, and

 (c) the marketplace value of the works transmitted.

 The Tribunal determined the secondary factors to be:

 (a) quality of copyrighted program material, and

 (b) time-related considerations.

 Harm Caused to Copyright Owners

  We find that Section 111 of the Copyright Act reflects several conclusions reached by the Congress. One conclusion is that there is detriment to the copyright owner arising from the distant carriage of television programs by cable systems. [FN161] This record establishes that this conclusion has validity.

   FN161 Ibid, p. 90.

 The legislative history of the Act clearly indicates that a factor to be considered by the Tribunal is the damage to copyright owners resulting from secondary transmissions by cable systems of different kinds of programming.

 It is therefore our conclusion that the harm caused to copyright owners by secondary transmissions of copyrighted works by cable systems is of material importance in the distribution of royalty fees. The record reflects that retransmission causes damage to the copyright owner by distribution of works in an area beyond which they have been licensed. This retransmission adversely affects the ability of the copyright owner to exploit the work in the distant market. [FN162]

   FN162 Written statements of Commissioner of Baseball Bowie Kuhn, March 24, 1980, pp. 7-11; and David J. Stern, General Counsel of the National Basketball Association, March 24, 1980, pp. 8-12.

 The harm thus is economic. From the evidence it is our conclusion that a copyright owner has been harmed when he is deprived of the opportunity to receive an adequate economic benefit from the exploitation of his works by a local television station in the distant area in which a cable system has imported his works. It is also our opinion, as reflected in the record, that there is a further adverse economic impact on a copyright owner from the importation of competing distant works into the aggrieved party's local community. [FN163]

   FN163 Transcript, May 5, 1980, pp. 103-106.

 Although some claimants offered no specific financial evidence but only generalized statements in support of their claim of harm from the importation of distant programs, we conclude that most claimants in varying degrees have sustained harm. [FN164]

   FN164 Ibid, pp. 107-109, 134-137 and 182-183.

 The evidence indicates that the difficulties and risks of copyright *63036 owners are substantially increased by distant signal carriage. In our judgment, this effectively reduces the value to a broadcast station of copyright owners' works in an area receiving the same program by distant signal.

 Copyrighted works are licensed for broadcasting in particular areas. A work's value to a station depends upon the ability of the work to attract audiences, which in turn, determines the revenues which the station will receive from the sales of commercial time. We therefore found that when that work is the subject of a retransmission by a cable system without adequate market compensation harm could result.

 Benefit Derived by Cable Systems

  The benefit derived by cable systems from secondary transmissions of copyrighted works was a major factor considered by the Tribunal in arriving at the ultimate allocation for each category of claimant.

 The Tribunal concluded that there is no readily available measure or gauge in quantitative terms of the benefit derived by cable systems from the carriage of particular programs. A great deal of probative evidence and relevant factors have been presented.

 We have recognized that a cable system is a commercial enterprise. Cable systems are operated to make money for their investors.

 From the evidence, we concluded that cable systems generally will elect to retransmit those stations which offer a programming mix that has maximum popularity and/or appeal to their subscribers who pay money for this service. In our opinion, economic prudence would dictate that programming which has no appeal would not be carried because it would not be attractive to current subscribers, nor would it have the potential to attract new subscribers. The necessity for a cable system operator to always have popular programming for his subscribers is without question a benefit. The ability to retransmit the most popular programming directly affects its appeal to subscribers, which in turn affects revenue.

 Marketplace Value

  The marketplace value of the works transmitted, based on the record, was one of the most significant factors considered by the Tribunal in making the allocation to the various categories of claimants.

 Sufficient evidence was introduced in this proceeding to clearly establish that the marketplace value of any work sold is the price which would exist in the market in the absence of a compulsory license system. Thus in the judgment of the Tribunal marketplace value is that value determined by barter and sale in the marketplace; values that are well documented in the record. [FN165]

   FN165 Transcript, April 8, 1980, pp. 60-61 and Transcript, April 9, 1980, p. 142.

 Evidence was offered in this proceeding which indicates that the copyright owners sell their works to various television station users. These users select the best possible mix of works. The cable system operators under compulsory licensing have the right to retransmit these works. Thus we conclude that the marketplace value of the original work is reflected in many ways. We further find that the cable system operators obtain the benefits of programming at a rate which does not reflect the true market value of the original copyright owners product to the cable system operators.

 Because we find that the rate the cable systems pay under compulsory license is not a clear or true reflection of the direct marketplace value of the work, additional considerations, adjusted as appropriate, were used by the Tribunal to determine the marketplace value of the copyright owner's work. The additional considerations used to determine the marketplace value are reflected in (a) the FCC's composite week as a basis for estimating the relative amount of particular kinds of non-network programming on broadcast stations carried on a distant signal basis; [FN166] (2) the A. C. Nielsen Company report as reported by Kalba Bowen; [FN167] and (3) by comparing amounts paid for the various copyrighted works by stations responsible for the primary transmission of the copyright owner's original work. [FN168] Despite the faults found in these surveys, studies and documents individually, the Tribunal determined they were all of sufficient probative value. Thus the Tribunal from the evidence, has identified the value the market would place on various programming carried by cable systems.

   FN166 Transcript, April 8, 1980, pp. 105-107 and 111-126.

   FN167 KBA Report, p. 33; Transcript, April 29, 1980, pp. 9 and 19-21, KBA Report, pp. 4-7.

   FN168 Transcript, March 31, 1980, pp. 68-71 and 84.

 The Tribunal concluded that the allocation must take primary account of market factors in an effort to simulate market valuation. It is our opinion that the compulsory license was established by Congress to compensate for a perceived deficiency in the unregulated market. Congress imposed copyright liability on cable systems and determined that they should pay royalties to the creators of the programs they retransmit. [FN169]

   FN169 House supra note 159 at 89.

 The evidence in this proceeding indicates that the usefulness and application of the compulsory license is limited to the market inadequacy which justifies its existence. Congress and the courts have recognized that, in our economic system, resources are most fairly and efficiently allocated by a market system.

 The Tribunal decided that it was not the legislative intent of the Act to alter market valuation and return. Under our economic system of supply and demand, Congress regulated only the latter by providing a compulsory license for cable systems use of copyright programming. The record clearly reflects that this programming has a value. Thus by assigning the relative weight we have to marketplace value, we determined not to impair the free play of market forces, subject to the limitation necessarily imposed by Section 111.

 Quality of Copyrighted Program Material

  The Tribunal determined that the quality of program material should be regarded as a secondary factor to be considered in our allocation of royalty fees to claimants.

 Our record reflects different perspectives on this subject. [FN170] The record also includes testimony discussing the problems inherent in judging or measuring quality. Most claimants did not consider this factor in the presentation of their direct cases. Because of the state of the record in this proceeding, the Tribunal was not able in this distribution to accord any significant weight to this factor in assessing most claims.

   FN170 Transcript, April 8, 1980, Jack Valenti testimony pp. 18-19; Transcript, May 1, 1980, Lawrence K. Grossman testimony pp. 30-36; "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Joint Sports Claimants", July 7, 1980, p. 46 and NAB Rebuttal Statement, p. 2.

 Time-Related Considerations

  The time-related consideration factor, in comparison to all other factors used in arriving at the final allocation for each category of claimants, was given very limited weight by the Tribunal.

 We find that despite the clear deficiencies and questionable data in all the time-related methods, each did offer some probative value to which we were able to accord some limited weight.

 The number of hours of cable carriage of particular kinds of qualifying programming was of some value to us. We found however that there were serious problems inherent in the use of *63037 any formulation which would allocate the royalty fees exclusively on the basis of hours of carriage in that such formualtion fails to compensate copyright owners adequately for the use of their programming.

 We conclude that an allocation of royalties mainly based on the amount of time occupied by particular categories of programming would ignore market considerations and produce a distorted value of programming.

 Application of Criteria to Categories of Claimants

 Program Syndicators

  Applying the criteria listed above, the Tribunal has allocated 75% of the cable royalties funds available for distribution to Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) and other program syndicators.

 All claimants in this proceeding agreed that the largest share of the royalty fees should be awarded to the program syndicator claimants. The direct case of the program syndicators consisted of the testimony of Jack Valenti, President of MPAA, who testified on the rationale which justified the program syndicators' claim to a share of the royalty fund; Robert D. Hadl, Vice President of MCA Television, Inc., who testified on the fee structure contained in the Act; Allen R. Cooper, Vice President of MPAA, who testified on the methodology used by the syndicators; and Alexander Korn, an independent consultant, who testified on the validity and accuracy of program syndiciators' approach.

 Program syndicators attempted to provide an objective means of dividing the cable royalty fund through a time plus fee generated methodology. This methodology determines fees generated by distant television stations by attributing the royalty fee paid by each cable system for each distant station retransmitted according to the statutory formula. Although program syndicators did not analyze the popularity of their programs specifically as a means for distributing the fund, studies by other parties clearly indicated that program syndicators would be entitled to a higher share of the fund than would a time basis only showing.

 Our conclusion is that by any measure syndicated movies and programs comprise the largest segment of programming retransmitted by cable systems. As Jack Valenti testified, this results from the appeal of these programs to national audiences. [FN171] The widespread use, in our opinion, indicated the benefits which these movies and programs bring to the cable systems as well as the harm which program syndicators suffer from distant signal carriage.

   FN171 Transcript, April 8, 1980, pp. 9-10.

 Mr. Valenti described the unique position of program syndicators in this proceeding. He testified that, "Unlike sports teams, we do not have exclusive franchises; and unlike broadcast stations, we don't have exclusive use to the spectrum of the air." [FN172] The evidence showed, and we find, that the lack of exclusive franchise and spectrum use requires producers to operate in a highly competitive market where the risks are great. There is also evidence that the high costs of production and the low returns from network licensing make program producers dependent upon syndication to recoup their costs. [FN173]

   FN172 Ibid, pp. 8-9.

   FN173 Ibid, pp. 8-9.

 The importance of program syndicators' position is reflected in The Rand Report (MPAA Exhibit D1) which states in part:

 The objective of compulsory licensing is to limit negotiation costs, but unless rates are set correctly and adjusted frequently they will create the wrong incentives to program suppliers. If, as we conjecture, the rates contained in the Revision will generate too little revenue, then as cable penetration and distant signal importation increase, the ability of program suppliers to capture the incremental value of their programs will decline. Some suppliers may be forced out of business and others may never enter the industry at all. Moreover, since the distribution of royalty fees need bear little relation to a particular program's value, the composition of programming will also be adversely affected. [FN174]

   FN174 "Copyright Liability for Cable Television: Is Compulsory Licensing the Solution", Rand Report, February 1977, p. 41.

 In our opinion, the economics of program production and distribution are adversely affected by distant signal carriage. Program production requires a substantial front-end investment which can be recovered only by licensing the program. [FN175] Evidence was offered to show the difficulties and risks of program production that were substantially increased by distant signal carriage, and which effectively undermine the value to a broadcast station of a syndicated program in an area receiving the same program by distant signal carriage.

   FN175 Transcript, April 8, p. 64.

 MPAA originally sought to recover at least 75% of the pool for program syndicators. During the hearing they presented two studies in support of an adjusted claim for between 79% and 83%. We find serious weakness in the MPAA formulation. Both studies used factors for estimating the amount of non-network programming carried by network affiliate stations. The validity of these estimates was not sufficiently established in the opinion of the Tribunal. We thus rejected the MPAA formulation as a complete solution to the allocation problem.

 The MPAA, the cartoon character claimants, ASCAP and the Joint Sports claimants all took the position, in varying degree, that the allocation of cable royalty fees must take account of the relative popularity of programming with the cable system subscribers. The Tribunal has judged this to be the relative cable market value. As shown above, this position accords both with the evidence presented and with such guidance as Congress has provided.

 MPAA's witnesses agreed that the value of a copyrighted work is measured by the marketplace bargaining between licenser and licensee. [FN176] We have examined the comparative costs to broadcasters of various kinds of copyrighted works.

   FN176 Transcript, April 8, 1980, pp. 60-61 and Transcript, April 9, 1980, p. 142.

 Congress granted cable systems a compulsory license to retransmit broadcast programming. We find that this was done solely on the theory that it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system. [FN177]

   FN177 H.R. No. 94-1476, 94th Congress, p. 89.

 Our review of the Act and legislative history indicates nothing that remotely suggests the purpose or effect of compulsory licensing should be to deprive affected copyright owners of the relative copyright payment which they would have received in a free marketplace. From our evaluation of all the evidence submitted by the claimants, we determined that the marketplace realities result in an allocation to the MPAA, CBN and other program syndicators of 75% of the total funds paid by cable system operators. This is the exact allocation originally sought by program syndicators and close to what was proposed by some other claimants.

 Joint Sports Claimants and National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)

  We have allocated 12% of the cable royalties to the Joint Sports claimants and NCAA. The division of the 12% among these claimants has been resolved by voluntary agreement.

 The direct case of the sports claimants was presented in a manner that most *63038 closely conformed to what the Tribunal has now determined to be appropriate for cable distribution proceedings. The sports claimants rejected artificial formulas and stressed the marketplace criteria of "benefit" and " harm" not directly related to share of time or total audience. The record, however, presents some questions concerning certain of the evidence presented by the sports claimants.

 We find deficiencies in the evidence introduced to establish cable system operators' attitutes toward distant signal programming and the relative interest of such operators in "live professional sports," movies, syndicated series programs, and local news and public affairs programs. Likewise, the record raises valid questions concerning the methodology employed and the data submitted measuring cable audience viewing of distant signals in 1978. Also, valid questions were raised as to the probative value of evidentiary material presented relating to a survey of cable subscribers designed to establish the reasons why persons subscribe to cable television.

 Because of these evidentiary limitations in the case of the Joint Sports claimants, we have reduced their recommended award for all sports programming from 25% to 30% of the royalty pool to 12%.

 Despite the limitations of the direct case of the Joint Sports claimants, the thrust of their evidence establishes the marketplace value of sports programming and the benefit of such programming to cable systems. Our record shows that sports programming can be distinguished from other categories of programming in that distant signal sports programming attracts a share of total audience "viewing" which is significantly higher than its share of broadcast time.

 In making this allocation for sports programming, we note the ephemeral quality of sports telecasts. In contrast to owners of movies and syndicated programs which can produce revenues repeatedly in different market situations, once a sports event has been telecast, it is thereafter usually of no further monetary value to the copyright owner.

 We also note the legislative history of the Copyright Act, which as we view it, manifests a special concern by the Congress for the harm which may be caused to professional sporting leagues by secondary transmissions of cable systems.

 Allocation of Cable Royalties to Television Broadcasters

  Television broadcasters have sought cable royalties on several theories. We discuss here, separately, evidentiary conclusions for each of these theories. We have discussed elsewhere in this document our legal conclusions.

 The Broadcast Day as a Compilation

  The NAB presented two witnesses, a vice president of a major independent television station and the program director of a radio station, during its direct case in support of a share of cable royalties for the entire broadcast day as a compilation. This testimony failed to establish that the "broadcast day" has any independent compensable value. We find that this testimony and the record as a whole provides no basis for establishing the value of the broadcast day nor does it provide any basis for a distribution of royalties to broadcaster claimants on this theory.

 Broadcaster Claimants Who Have Acquired Certain Rights to Syndicated Programming

  The NAB presented a single witness, an attorney with Metromedia, Inc., during its direct case in support of those broadcaster claimants who have acquired certain rights to syndicated programming. This witness testified generally as to how negotiations regarding exclusivity in particular markets are conducted. We find that this testimony and the record as a whole provide no basis for the distribution of royalties to broadcaster claimants on the basis of this theory.

 Local Programing of Television Broadcasters

  NAB asserted that television broadcasters are entitled to 21% of the royalty fees for distant cable carriage of local programming of television stations. NAB's direct case was presented entirely by two consultants who testified concerning the NAB formula. No NAB executives or other national broadcasting spokesmen were presented to testify concerning the value of local programming to cable operators, the harm to copyright owners of cable carriage, the appropriate criteria to be applied to distribution proceedings, or the testimony in this record as to the congressional intent as to compensation of particular copyright owners.

 We have stated above that we have not found mechanistic formulas to be useful in determining out final allocation of royalties. Because of this determination it is unnecessary for us to consider whether we should deny any award to broadcaster claimants for local programming because of the pervasive errors established in this record concerning the NAB formula.

 The program syndicators stated that "the direct case of NAB consisted of a bewildering procession of inconsistent and contradictory exhibits which were formally proffered as the definitive basis and justification for NAB's claim, only to be renounced and disavowed, followed by other exhibits which suffered the same fate. As a result, NAB's direct case was littered with the debris of replaced and substituted exhibits, and at the conclusion of its presentation, it left the record in such a state of utter confusions and disarry so as to preclude any reliance by the Tribunal on that presentation." [FN178] The Joint Sports claimants stated that NAB case was "rife with error." [FN179] We concur in these assessments of the testimony.

   FN178 "Proposed Findings and Conclusions of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., Its Member Companies, and Other Program Producers and Distributors" July 7, 1980, pp. 71-72.

   FN179 "Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Joint Sports Claimants" July 7, 1980, p. 40.

 The record is void of any useful evidence that local broadcasters are harmed by cable carriage in distant markets of their locally produced programs, or that distant cable systems benefit from their carriage of locally produced news and public affairs program. We are unable on the basis of this record to find any significant marketplace value for such programs. Finally, we have accorded only secondary value to time related considerations.

 Taking the entire record of this proceeding into consideration, including some evidence on this subject by other claimants, we have allocated American and Canadian broadcaster claimants 3.25% of the royalty pool for local programming.

 Claim of Certain Broadcaster Claimants to Sports Programing Royalties

  No single subject in this proceeding has more occupied the Tribunal, or received such repeated consideration, as the determination of the proper claimants to royalties for distant cable carriage of sports programing. We have addressed elsewhere in this document our conclusions on matters of law.

 At the request of the sports claimants and the broadcasters, we heard oral argument on the legal issues. We rendered our preliminary determination that as a matter of law the sports teams were the proper claimants to the royalties to be allocated for sports programing "except when contractual *63039 arrangements specifically provide that such royalties shall be distributed to broadcaster claimants." We ordered that the direct cases of the claimants be presented in accordance with this determination. The NAB and broadcaster claimants presented no evidence on this issue during their Phase I direct case.

 At the conclusion of the direct cases in Phase I, the Tribunal issued an order on May 7, 1980 specifically intented to permit broadcaster claimants to present any relevant sports evidence, including contracts, that was precluded during the principal part of Phase I by our preliminary legal determination.

 Immediately at the opening of this second round of Phase I the Tribunal, in responce to the pleadings and oral arguments of NAB, considered and resolved the question of whether the determination of the eligible claimants to sports programing was to be resolved in Phase I or Phase II.

 The record reflects the following:

 Commissioner Brennan: My understanding of phase one and phase two is that the allocation of rights, as between commercial broadcasters and sports, is a phase one question. [FN180]

   FN180 Transcript, May 22, 1980, p.4.

 Commissioner Coulter: My understanding of the distinction between phase one and phase two is entirely in accord with Commissioner Brennan's [FN181]

   FN181 Ibid, p. 10.

 Chairman Burg: We have decided that we regard this issue as part of phase one, and therefore, any evidence or any witnesses that you want concordant with your case should be presented during this phase. [FN182]

   FN182 Ibid, p. 11.

 Subject to the Rules of Procedure of the Tribunal, the resolution of disputes among the parties concerning the appropriate time to present evidence rests exclusively within the discretion of the Tribunal. The Tribunal, not any one claimant, must regulate its process. Once the Tribunal has reached such a determination in an adjudication proceeding, it may not be subsequently reversed if the reversal would prejudice the rights of claimants.

 At the direction of the Tribunal, NAB proceeded with its direct case which consisted of the testimony of one witness and the introduction of two contracts between a broadcaster and a savings and loan association, which contracts were silent on the issued of copyright ownership. The broadcaster claimants did not present any additional evidence prior to the closing of Phase I record. On July 30, 1980 in publishing its summary of Phase I findings, the Tribunal, on the basis both of law and the record of this proceeding, determined that the royalty fees for sports programing should be awarded to the sports claimants "except when contractual arrangements specifically provide that such royalties shall be distributed to broadcaster claimants."

 The Tribunal stated in its July 30 notice that "The evidentiary consideration of this issue has not been concluded and the Tribunal in its final determination will make such adjustments as may be warranted on the basis of the Phase II proceedings." The NAB subsequently filed on August 1, 1980 a motion for a declatory ruling "specifying the types of proof which will be permitted during the Tribunal's evidentiary consideration of the sports issue in Phase II of the 1978 cable royalty distribution proceedings." In denying this motion on August 6, 1980 the Tribunal stated in part that broadcaster claimants were previously "granted the opportunity to present all relevant evidence pertaining to the sports question in the May 7, 1980 Order."

 Another motion of the NAB for declaratory ruling was filed on August 8, 1980 requesting that "NAB be afforded the opportunity to present various proofs (fully described infra) during Phase II establishing the broadcasters copyright ownership of certain sports programming and entitlement to cable royalties allocated thereto." This motion was deined without comment by the Tribunal on August 15, 1980.

 The efforts of NAB and certain American and Canadian broadcaster claimants to reopen Phase I issues to the prejudice of other claimants presisted during the Phase II sessions of the Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected the presentation during Phase II in any form of material which concerned the Phase I issue of determining the proper claimants to sports royalties. Broadcaster claimants had full opportunity to present relevent evidence on this subject at the proper time in this proceeding.

 The NAB during Phase II sought the introduction into evidence of certain sports contracts. The description of these documents made clear that none of them were proper Phase II evidence, and we therefore excluded them.

 The presentation of these contracts during Phase II was not only not timely, but their introduction into evidence on the final scheduled session of this proceeding would have been prejudicial to the rights of other claimants. The only relevant Phase II issue on this subject was the presentation of contractual arrangements "specifically" providing that cable royalties shall be distributed to broadcasters. It is useful to recall the description of the sports contracts provided by NAB counsel:

 Each contract, in and of itself, could be a fair subject of litigation. By that, I mean, you could litigate a case in a Federal court over any one of these contracts. [FN183]

   FN183 Ibid, p. 4.

 It is thus clear that these contracts did not "specifically" determine the distribution of cable royalties, and could only have been considered when the Tribunal was receiving evidence to determine the proper claimant to sports royalties--that is, during Phase I.

 It has been represented to the Tribunal that certain contracts may provide for the sharing of royalties between sports clubs and broadcasters, or even for the waiver of certain royalties by sports clubs. It is sufficient to note that any such clauses would not be dispostive of the issue of who is the proper claimant under Section 111. These contracts may grant broadcasters certain rights to a share of the royalties as against the sports teams. Nothing that this Tribunal determines can alter any such rights.

 NAB also sought the introduction during Phase II of several contracts in support of a broadcaster claim to a share of the sports royalties in a situation where no claim had been filed with the Tribunal by the appropriate sports team. The absence of a claim by the sports team does not serve to establish the broadcaster as a proper claimant. Any such issue had to be timely presented during Phase I.

 Although the sports issue involving Canadina broadcasters was separately presented to the Tribunal during Phase II, we find it unnecessary in view of our above stated conclusions to give separate consideration to that subject.

 Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)

  We have determined to make a single allocation of cable royalties to PBS for the distant signal retransmission of (a) programing owned and distributed by PSB; (b) local programing of noncommercial educational stations; and (c) programing owned by various other entities, such as noncommercial program syndicators.

 After adjustments to reflect our conclusion on the "network" issue, this award of 5.25% to PBS is close to that recommended in the proposed findings and allocations by several categories of claimants. The claim of PBS ranged to a high of 12%. We gave reduced the claim by the application to this record of the criteria.

 The direct case of PBS rested heavily on time-related factors. It was *63040 represented that during 1978 approximately 11 to 12% of all hours of distant television signal carriage by cable systems constituted programs of public television. The record also indicates a degree of duplication in this programming. As with other claims, we have given limited weight in our allocation to total numbers of program hours.

 While PBS did not base its case on the size of its audience, the record reflects general agreement that the ratings for public television in the absence of special circumstances are not high. We are unable on the basis of the record to favorably evaluate the claim on the basis of marketplace factors.

 We concur in the argument of PBS that the harm-benefit tests may be applied to public television programs as well as commercial syndicated programming.

 The direct case of PBS gave limited attention to the subject of quality of programming. However, unlike most other claimants, it did provide a listing of representative programs included in cable retransmissions during 1978. These programs included such generally acknowledged distinguished series as Masterpiece Theatre, Live From Lincoln Center, Nova, and The Electric Company. As stated previously the state of this record as a whole precluded any significant use of quality as a basis for this distribution. Therefore, our award in this proceeding of 5.25% to public broadcasting does not include a quality factor, a subject which may be reflected in subsequent distribution proceedings.

 Music

  Applying the criteria listed above, the Tribunal has allocated 4.5% of the royalty funds available for distribution to the music performing rights societies.

 BMI proposed that music as a group be allocated 17% of the cable royalty fees. We have rejected the allocation proposed by BMI on the grounds that the data and methodology employed are erroneous and lacking in probative value.

 ASCAP and SESAC presented a joint case and stated that music claimants as a group were entitled to receive 13.5% of cable royalty fees. They proposed that the Tribunal adopt a marketplace method of allocation and determine the economic value of the programming for which claims have been submitted. They pointed to the different amounts of money that network affiliate and independent television stations pay for music as evidence of the economic value of music.

 Based on Federal Communications Commission (FCC) data for 1978 concerning the amount that television stations pay for music and weighting the amount paid by the extent of distant signal carriage of independent, network affiliate and educational stations, they conclude that 7.4% of the stations' total expenditures for copyrighted material is for music. Using the same FCC data, ASCAP and SESAC conclude that radio stations pay 76.7% of their total expenditures for copyrighted materials on music. Weighting these expenditures by the percentage of royalty fees attributable to television and radio, ASCAP and SESAC conclude that all music claimants are entitled to 10.8% of the cable royalty pool. ASCAP and SESAC then raise by 25% the amount which they are claiming to 13.5% because they believe that potential copyright owner claimants have not filed claims with respect to at least one-fifth of the 1978 pool of cable royalty fees. [FN184]

   FN184 March 24, 1980 ASCAP/SESAC Joint Statement.

 We find that the evidence advanced by ASCAP and SESAC may be regarded as a basis for an inference as to the value that the market would place on the rights held by the music societies. However, this record provides no basis for the assumptions underlying their radio claim. In addition, they distorted their formula by comparing music royalty expenses of broadcast stations with total expenditures for copyrighted program materials alone and excluding six of the FCC's nine categories of programming expense categories. [FN185] It is our conclusion that both of those distortions inflate the proposed allocation to music. We therefore adjusted their proposal and when the other factors described above are considered we arrive at an allocation of 4.5%.

   FN185 Transcript, March 31, 1980, pp. 64-90.

 Cartoon Characters

  We have previously discussed our views concerning the legal issues relating to the claim of the copyright owners of Characters. Even if this claim were not rejected as a matter of law, the evidentiary record of this proceeding does not justify the distribution of any royalties to such copyright owners.

 We reject the argument of these claimants that the popularity of the Characters can be isolated from the plot and other elements of the programs in which they appear. We find that the evidence concerning character licensing in the merchandising of good and services is not useful in the distribution of cable royalties.

 Radio

  The Tribunal finds that the record of this proceeding provides no basis for any award of cable royalty fees for the distant carriage of radio signals. The record is inadequate to establish the extent of cable carriage of radio programming. Moreover, the record fails to show the value of such programming as would justify the award of royalties to commercial radio claimants, or support a finding that the carriage of commerical radio signals is harmful to radio stations.

 Our Phase I preliminary allocation on the basis of perceived distinctions between commerical radio and National Public Radio (NPR), as reflected in this record, awarded .25% of the royalty fees to NPR. The record contains testimony that "in almost every community in which a public radio station exists, it provided a service that is not otherwise available" [FN186] and that the value to a cable system of carrying a public radio station may be greater than "transmitting most commerical radio stations from one market to another because they are almost identical." [FN187] Our Phase I determination also took into account testimony concerning the role of NPR as a syndicator. [FN188]

   FN186 Transcript, May 6, 1980, p. 60.

   FN187 Ibid, p. 72.

   FN188 Ibid, p. 57 and "Statement and Testimony of MPR," March 14, 1980, p. 4.

 Prior to the adoption of our final decision in this proceeding, a motion was made and adopted for reconsideration of our award to NPR. Upon reconsideration, a majority of the Tribunal determined that the record in this proceeding is inadequate to support any award to NPR and therefore we have set aside our preliminary determination. Upon review of the other Phase I allocations, we determined to increase the PBS award from 5% to 5.25%.

 Division of Royalty Fees Among Music Claimants

  No voluntary agreement was reached by the performing rights societies concerning the distribution among music claimants of our Phase I award of 4.5% of the cable royalty fees to music claimants. Therefore the Tribunal on August 19, 1980 conducted a hearing on this subject at which time ASCAP, BMI and SESAC presented testimony.

 The Tribunal has concluded that our award to the music claimants should be determined on the basis of all evidence in this record and all previous actions of the Tribunal which are relevant to the allocation of copyright fees among the performing rights societies. We believe *63041 that equity is best reached by consideration of a broad range of relevant factors. We have rejected proposed "single" allocation formulas which arbitrarily exclude relevant considerations.

 We find that our distribution of the music claimant share among the performing rights societies should be determined by such factors as the following:

 (a) Total license fee revenues of the performing rights societies.

 (b) Performing rights societies share of 1978 local television license rates.

 (c) Performing rights societies share of 1978 television and radio performance credits.

 (d) Performing rights societies share of 1978 jukebox royalty fees.

 (e) Performing rights societies shares in 1978 public broadcasting proceeding of the Tribunal and voluntary licenses with educational institutions.

 Total License Revenues

  The record reflects that during the 12 month period closest to the period of this distribution proceeding, the total license revenues of ASCAP were $114,107,000 and of BMI approximately $70,548,000. [FN189] Comparable information is not available for other music claimants, although there are estimates of SESAC's revenues.

   FN189 Transcript, August 19, 1980, p. 6.

 We conclude that this significant difference in total license income is justification for awarding ASCAP a larger share of cable royalties than are awarded to BMI.

 1978 Local Television Revenues

  The record reflects that BMI's local television contract provides for payment based on 58% of the fees paid to ASCAP and that expressed as a percentage of the payment to BMI, ASCAP's share of local television license rates is 63.3%. [FN190] BMI argues that it would be unfair to distribute the cable royalties on the basis of its share of the local television revenues since they are based on a 1972 agreement that does not reflect what they regard as significant subsequent changes in the role of BMI. [FN191] SESAC maintains that it would be unfair to distribute cable royalties on the basis of local television revenues because there is no uniformity of licensing practices among the performing societies. [FN192]

   FN190 Ibid, p. 14.

   FN191 Ibid, pp. 44-45.

   FN192 Ibid, p. 74.

 We cannot speculate as to the terms of the next local television contracts with the performing rights societies, nor on the basis of the case presented in this proceeding by BMI can we make any definitive judgment as to recent trends concerning the respective television market share of ASCAP and BMI.

 We believe that it is valid to utilize the local television contracts, taking into account all the circumstances relating to them, as one factor in our music allocation.

 Television and Radio Performance Credits

  ASCAP introduced a survey seeking to show during 1978 that approximately two-thirds of the total local television performances of musical works were works in the ASCAP repertoire. [FN193] BMI introduced a survey seeking to show that BMI licenses "approximately 46 percent of the music used on local television." [FN194] BMI claims that if "dominates the contemporary music scene" as reflected in the hit charts of trade publications and that "far in excess of fifty percent" of the performances on AM radio and "almost fifty percent" of the performances on FM radio are licensed by BMI. [FN195]

   FN193 Ibid, pp. 21-22.

   FN194 Ibid, p. 40.

   FN195 Ibid, pp. 40-41.

 We find that the surveys introduced are not free of limitations, but taken together with other evidence are of probative value. Although we have not made any award to radio claimants we find that evidence concerning radio music performances is of some value in assessing the total contemporary role of the respective performing rights societies.

 Jukebox Royalty Fees Distribution

  The Tribunal has distributed the 1978 jukebox royalty fees among the performing rights societies according to the terms of voluntary agreements. This distribution awarded (other than for an award to the Italian Book Company) 47.5% of the royalties to ASCAP, 47.5% to BMI and 5% to SESAC. [FN196] This record does not contain any adequate basis for comparing music performed on jukeboxes with that performed on local television or radio. However we believe that the jukebox voluntary agreement among the performing rights societies is a relevant factor which should receive appropriate consideration in this proceeding.

   FN196 SESAC letter to Chairman, CRT, November 20, 1980 and BMI and ASCAP letters to Chairman, CRT, November 21, 1980.

 Public Broadcasting and Educational Institutions' Shares

  The Tribunal in our 1978 public broadcasting proceeding adopted a fee schedule providing for payment of royalty fees for the performance of certain musical works by certain public broadcasting entities. [FN197] These payments are in the range of 45% of the total to ASCAP, 45% to BMI and 10% to SESAC. Because of the limitations of the public broadcasting record concerning usage of the music of specific performing rights societies by public broadcasters only limited weight can be accorded to that determination. We note, however, the testimony in this proceeding concerning the terms of voluntary agreements between educational institutions and performing rights societies for the licensing of music. [FN198] The testimony reflected that ASCAP receives a slightly higher payment per student than BMI.

   FN197 37 CFR § 304.5 and 304.6.

   FN198 Transcript, August 19, 1980, p. 75.

 Conclusions and Allocation

  ASCAP has urged the Tribunal to determine the share of the music claimants according to the market value of the respective repertoires which value is determined by the amount paid for the repertoires. For this distribution they regard local television revenues as the appropriate benchmark.

 BMI and SESAC have urged us to consider a number of factors reflecting the total music scene. They both advocate parity between ASCAP and BMI.

 On the basis of the record made in this proceeding we cannot agree that there is parity between ASCAP and BMI. Even taking into account the broad range of factors recommended by BMI we conclude that ASCAP should receive a larger share of the cable royalties than BMI. We find major deficiencies in the case presented by SESAC. No evidence or entitlement justification was presented by the Italian Book Company or America Musical, S.A., and we therefore have no basis for making an award to these claimants.

 On the basis of the above we conclude that 54% of the music claimants' share should be awarded to ASCAP, 43% to BMI and 3% to SESAC.

 Claim of Grinell Communications Corp. (Grinell)

  The only program syndicator claim that was the subject of a hearing during Phase II was that of Grinell Communications Corp. The Tribunal heard testimony on this claim on August 21, 1980.

 At the commencement of the hearing counsel for MPAA asserted that the claim was barred because it covered "elements" contained in local programs. [FN199] We have not found it *63042 necessary in acting on this claim to reach the legal issue or consider whether the legal issue was not timely raised. [FN200] We find that the evidentiary justification presented in support of this claim is subject to such a range of possible errors that it is lacking in probative value. We make no award to Grinell.

   FN199 Transcript, August 21, 1980, p. 82.

   FN200 Federal Register October 17, 1980 (44 FR 59930).

 Unclaimed Funds

  As stated above, the Tribunal has divided this proceeding into two phases. Phase I was to determine the percentage of royalty fees to be allocated to specific categories of claimants. Phase II was to provide for the allocation of royalty fees to individual claimants within each group.

 During Phase I there was some random testimony to the effect that not all eligible claimants had submitted claims. The Tribunal determined that this subject was not appropriate to Phase I, but that it would be considered subsequently in the proceeding. The Tribunal therefore determined that the Phase I allocations to categories of claimants should be made as if all eligible claimants in each category had filed.

 On May 7, 1980 the Tribunal requested claimants to brief "the legal issues applying to the situation of those categories of claimants not fully represented by its total number of eligibile claimants." During Phase II the Tribunal accorded each claimant the opportunity to present any relevant evidence on this subject. No claimant presented any such evidence.

 The briefs presented to the Tribunal on the subject of any "unclaimed fund" generally recommended either that (a) the "unclaimed fund" in a particular category of claimants be distributed among the eligible claimants within the same category or (b) that the total "unclaimed fund" in all categories be distributed among all eligible claimants on the basis of their individual entitlements to the entire claimed portion of the royalty fund.

 The Tribunal determined that it was neither necessary nor feasible to establish an "unclaimed fund" for the 1978 cable distribution. Rather, royalty fees will be allocated to categories of claimants as if all eligible claimants in each category had filed valid claims. The share of each individual claimant in a category will be determined by voluntary agreement or our Phase II decision.

 We find that the record provides no objective basis for redistribution of royalty fees among categories of claimants tod reflect unclaimed royalties in particular categories. We conclude that our disposition of the unclaimed royalties issue provides an equitable allocation of the fees available for distribution.

 Finally, we observe that our disposition of the unclaimed royalty issue in this proceeding may not necessarily control any subsequent distribution proceeding.

TABULAR OR GRAPHIC MATERIAL SET FORTH AT THIS POINT IS NOT DISPLAYABLE

 The Copyright Office has retained $20,000 of the 1978 cable royalty fees for unresolved refund requests from cable operators. The Tribunal has not approved the retention of such sums by the Office beyond the expiration of the statutory period for the adoption of the Tribunal's final decision in the distribution of the 1978 cable royalty fees. the retention of certain royalty fees by the Copyright Office beyond the statutory period provided in 17 U.S.C. 804(e) is pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Librarian of Congress establishing a final date for 1978 refund requests of cable operators. Our listing of the $20,000 item in the financial statement shall not be interpreted as Tribunal approval of the retention of such sums, or Tribunal approval of the validity of any refunds subsequent to September 11, 1980.

 Allocations

  The Tribunal has adopted the following aldlocation to categories of claimants of the specified percentage of the royalty fees available for distribution:

 1. Motion Picture Association of America, Christian Broadcasting Network, and other program syndicators--75.00%

 2. Joint Sports Claimants and NCAA--12.00%

 3. Public Broadcasting Service (for all purposes)--5.25%

 4. Music Performing Rights Societies--4.50%

 5. U.S. and Canadian Television Broadcasters--3.25%

 The Tribunal will distribute the royalty fees allocated to program syndicators, sports claimants, PBS and television broadcasters represented by NAB to designated common agents according to the terms of voluntary agreements. The royalty fees allocated to music performing rights societies will be distributed to ASCAP, BMI and SESAC as provided in this determination.

 Some 68 television broadcaster claimants have not authorized the NAB to represent them in the allocation of their portion of the broadcasters' share of the cable royalties. The Tribunal has determined that in our Phase II allocation all broadcasters should be treated equally. Therefore, we have adopted the NAB formula in the computation of the share of all commercial television claimants.

 The Tribunal for lack of any justification has not awarded cable fees to claimants who:

 1. Were not associated with a Phase II voluntary agreement, or

 2. Could not reasonably on the basis of this record be treated according to the terms of voluntary agreements, or

 3. Which did not submit adequate entitlement justification.

 Adopted: September 11, 1980.

 Mary Lou Burg,

 Chairman.

 Separate Findings of Facts, Conclusions and Specific Reasons of Commissioners Garcia and James on the Distribution Among the Music Claimants

  The performing rights societies were the only category of claimants that could not reach a voluntary agreement as to how the allocation awarded would be distributed. ASCAP, SESAC, and BMI, all presented evidence in the Phase II proceeding to support their particular positions as to how the allocation should be distributed among them. The Italian Book Company and American Musical, S.A., presented no evidence and consequently, we find based on the record, that they are not entitled to any allocation.

 We disagree with the findings of facts, the conclusion reached from those facts, and the specific reasoning of the majority of the members of the Tribunal in arriving at the final distribution of the royalty fees among ASCAP, BMI and SESAC. The basic issue before the Tribunal in this aspect of the proceedings, is the value of music that played on local television which is simultaneously retransmitted by a cable system.

 There is one basic fact from the evidence received at the Phase II hearing on August 19, 1980, which is indisputed. In 1978, each performing right society that presented testimony had a negotiated contract with local television stations. We find that each *63043 performing rights society negotiated to sell its repertory on the best terms and conditions possible at the time. The terms and conditions of each individual contract was the specific concern of that particular performing rights society. It must be assumed that each society knew the value of its repertory and that they conducted negotiations for terms and conditions in the contract based on that value.

 The various terms and conditions in each contract regarding payment, duration of contract, audit adjustments, etc., were totally under the control and discretion of the parties to the contract. They were not forced to agree to any unacceptable terms. From the evidence, we find that these contracts were in full force and effect during the year 1978.

 In our opinion, based on the Act and the legislative history, the Tribunal is without any authority to interpret an existing written contract as to value, equity or fairness. It is our opinion that the majority of the Tribunal, by considering, in its determination, other factors which do not evolve directly from said contracts is thereby attempting to interpret the contract. By considering these outside factors, they are giving more value to the contract than the parties did when they were executed.

 One of the factors the majority of the Tribunal has taken into consideration is the relationship between the performing rights societies in the distribution of the royalties under 17 U.S.C. 116(c). Under this proceeding, the three major performing rights societies entered into a voluntary agreement to share the royalties received from jukebox licenses. The division agreed upon was 47 1/2 % each of ASCAP and BMI and 5% to SESAC. No evidence was taken by the Tribunal in the jukebox distribution proceeding. The only thing that can be considered evidence is a statement signed by BMI and ASCAP, and subsequently agreed to by SESAC, upon which the final distribution was made. However, the agreement specifically states:

 "This agreement for 1978 royalty distribution is without prejudice to any claim which may of the parties may assert for any subsequent year". [FN1]

   FN1 BMI Exhibit 1, Appendix G; Tr. August 19, pp. 53-54.

 In our opinion, by giving the voluntary agreement any consideration, the majority assume that the music which is played on local television is the same or similar to music that is played on jukeboxes. We find there is no evidence in the record to support that assumption. We find no evidence in the record as to what the music usage is in jukeboxes. Consequently, in our opinion, any analogy or reference between the distribution proceeding under 116(c) and this proceeding it totally irrelevant.

 The majority of the Tribunal also took into consideration as a factor the rate established by the Tribunal under 17 U.S.C. 118(b). This proceeding established the rate that Public Broadcasting and National Public Radio would pay for the use of ASCAP's repertory. In addition, the Tribunal was required to establish rates and terms for several hundred noncommercial radio stations. In the latter, rates were set that resulted in a ratio of 45% each to ASCAP and BMI and 10% to SESAC.

 The Tribunal, in determining the reasonable royalty payments for the performance of ASCAP musical compositions, in that proceeding stated:

 "The CRT has adopted this schedule on the basis of the record made in this proceeding. When this matter again comes before the CRT, the CRT will have the benefit of several years experience with this schedule. The CRT does not intend that the adoption of this schedule should preclude active consideration of alternative approaches in a future proceeding." [FN2]

   FN2 Fed. Reg., Vol. 43, No. 111 June 8, 1978, p. 25069.

 In adopting separate schedules of rates for the stations licensed to colleges or other educational institutions, and for those not affiliated either with National Public Radio or colleges, the Tribunal in that proceeding stated:

 "In establishing the schedule of rates for the performance of copyrighted musical compositions by college and the unaffiliated stations, the CRT in effect was required to establish a relationship among the several performing rights societies as to the value of their repertory and the use of their music. The public broadcasting proceeding was not as appropriate occasion for making such judgments. Accordingly, the ratio resulting from this schedule of rates is not intended in any respect to establish a precedent for any other rate proceeding, including any future proceeding pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 118." [FN3]

   FN3 Ibid.

 BMI attempted to show the role it plays in the total music field. Their position and supporting evidence stated that all marketplace considerations of value constituted a more appropriate basis for comparison among the various performing rights societies. [FN4] They proposed that such a distribution would result in a division of 47 [FN12] % each to ASCAP and BMI, and 5% to SESAC.

   FN4 Tr. Aug., 19, p. 39.

 To support this position, a BMI witness testified regarding a special BMI survey which attempted to show the actual music usage. [FN5] It was alleged that the survey showed, after weighting the results, that approximately 46% of music used on local television was BMI's. [FN6] BMI's witness admitted that no distinction was made between the kinds or time of performances, i.e., feature, theme, background music, etc. Evidence also was introduced that this was contrary to BMI's traditional practice of weighting performances according to the various types of performances. [FN7] We found it interesting that BMI chose to include their share of radio market survey (Appendix D in their Exhibit 1), but did not give us comparable data for their share of local television. From Exhibit 7 we have to infer BMI has their own performance credit survey they use for paying local television fees collected to their members. Yet, this survey was not introduced into evidence. We find ourselves confronted by the question; why did BMI commission a special survey when they already had a survey The inference drawn by us as a result of their failure to introduce their performance credit survey into evidence is that it may be similar to the evidence introduced by ASCAP, which shows a 68% ASCAP/32% BMI relationship (Exhibit 5).

   FN5 Ibid., Tr. p. 61-63.

   FN6 Ibid., Tr. p. 63.

   FN7 Ibid., Tr. pp. 67-71.

 We were unable to determine BMI's share of music usage from Appendices C, E and F, included in Exhibit 1. We, therefore, find that said Appendices lack probative value. [FN8]

   FN8 Ibid., pp. 48-49; 52-53; 85-95.

 BMI's local television contract calls for payment based on 58% of the fees paid to ASCAP. This amounts to approximately 37% of the total fees paid ASCAP and BMI for music. [FN9] BMI is opposed to making the cable royalty fees distribution based on fee generation. They argue that an allocation based upon fee distribution is unfair and is presently not an accurate measure. This argument is based upon market condition changes purported to have occurred since the contracts with local television stations were negotiated. They further argued, that the difference between them and ASCAP has narrowed. [FN10]

   FN9 Ibid., p. 43.

   FN10 Ibid., pp. 43-45.

 We find no evidence in the record to indicate that ASCAP and BMI are at parity in the use of their repertories on local television. Further, there is no evidence in the record that if local television stations' contracts were renegotiated, BMI would receive a higher share than 37%, let alone parity with ASCAP. We find further from the evidence (ASCAP's Exhibit 6), that the difference between ASCAP and BMI has in fact widened in favor of ASCAP.

 BMI specifically cites the relative shares of the radio market. [FN11] In light of the fact that the Tribunal has determined in this proceeding that no probative evidence was present in the record that shows any significant radio programming, either commerial or public, which would entitle any radio claimant to cable royalties, we failed to find any relevancy in this comparison. The majority considered it as a factor in reaching its allocation. We conclude that the allocation to the music claimants in this proceeding of 4.5% of the royalty fees, is based entirely on the use of music in local television. Radio claimants received no allocation. There is no evidence that radio music usage is similar to local television music usage. Consequently, music usage on radio is irrelevant and immaterial.

   FN11 Ibid., pp. 40-41; 49-51.

 We further find as stated above, that the testimony regarding PBS negotiations and the jukebox distribution settlement, was void of probative value in assisting us in this matter. We, therefore, reject BMI's proposal for distribution as the record is totally lacking in any probative evidence to support its position.

 SESAC testified that we should consider only areas where the factors among the performing rights societies have been the same. SESAC's witness referred to the payments received pursuant to the Act, by the societies, from negotiations with colleges and universities. He further suggested that we look to the allocation in the area of *63044 noncommercial broadcasting and like BMI, the jukebox distribution voluntary settlement. It is SESAC's recommendation that the distribution should be 45% each to ASCAP and BMI, and 10% to SESAC. [FN12] We reject SESAC's proposal as it is not supported by any probative evidence in the record as has been noted above.

   FN12 Ibid., pp. 74-75.

 ASCAP presented evidence which showed the marketplace concept based on fees generated from local television stations. Their position is that the distribution should be in the same ratio as the various societies are paid by local television for their repertories. ASCAP submitted evidence (Exhibit 4), which indicated that they receive approximately 63% of fees paid to them and BMI from local television licenses. (This schedule omits a smaller share which would be attributed to SESAC). This data was not disputed by SESAC or BMI. In addition, the evidence submitted by ASCAP as their share of performance credits by quarter indicates that 68.3% of all local television performances of musical works were in the ASCAP repertoire. [FN13] This fact was not challenged by either BMI or SESAC.

   FN13 Ibid. pp. 16-23.

 We conclude, it is appropriate for us to look at how the market values the respective repertories of each performing rights society. We find that these values are determined by the amount paid for the repertories by local television stations. We further find, that the rates which are charged by ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, in 1978, to the television stations, whose signals were carried by cable system, are the best criterion. The rates for each were charged under a valid and existing contract, freely negotiated by each society.

 We further find, based on the record in this proceeding, that income from total license fees in 1978 was $114,107,000 for ASCAP and $70,548,000 for BMI (Exhibit 1). In the public broadcasting hearings, it was determined that SESAC's annual royalty collections were estimated to be between $3 million and $4 million in 1976. Since current data is not available, and for purposes of comparision and our allocation, in this proceeding only, we have determined SESAC's 1978 royalty collections to be $5 million. this was determined by providing a growth factor for SESAC comparable to ASCAP and BMI growth for the same period.

 We thus conclude, based on the record, that the distribution of the music performing right societies allocation of 4.5% of the funds available for distribution should have been:

 1. ASCAP--60%

 2. BMI--37%

 3. SESAC--3%

 4. Italian Book Co.--0%

 5. American Musical, S.A.--0%

 [FR Doc. 80-29271 Filed 9-22-80; 8:45 am]


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