THE

LAW OF TRADE MARKS

AND THEIR REGISTRATION,

AND MATTERS CONNECTED THEREWITH;

INCLUDING

A CHAPTER ON GOODWILL.

TOGETHER WITH

THE PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883,

AND THE TRADE MARKS RULES AND INSTRUCTIONS THEREUNDER;

FORMS AND PRECEDENTS;

THE MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT, 1862,

AND OTHER STATUTORY ENACTMENTS;

THE UNITED STATES STATUTES, 1870—81,

AND THE RULES AND FORMS THEREUNDER;

AND THE TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1877.

BY

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TO

The Memory of

THE RIGHT HON. SIR GEORGE JESSEL,

MASTER OF THE ROLLS,

TO WHOM,

BY HIS KIND PERMISSION,

THE

FIRST EDITION OF

This Work

WAS MOST RESPECTFULLY DEDICATED.

PREFACE

TO

THE SECOND EDITION.

DURING the six years which have passed since the first edition of this book was submitted to the profession, many new cases have been decided with respect to the registration and the infringement of trade marks, and a new Act of Parliament has been substituted for the statutes recently in force. These additions to, and alterations in, the law, together with other new matter (in particular, the forms and precedents in Appendix B.), account for the expansion of the book from 300 pages to 500. The cases cited have alone increased from under 500 to over 1000.

In this edition, as in the first, a large number of American decisions are cited, both because of the sale which this book has obtained in the United States and the Colonies, and also because of the increasing extent to which such decisions are cited in this country. "Although," as Cockburn, C.J., said (*a*), "the decisions of the American Courts are, of course, not binding on us, yet the sound and enlightened views of American lawyers in the administration and development of the law—a law, except so far as altered by statutory enactment, derived from a common source with our own—entitle their decisions to the utmost respect and confidence on our part." The American references are explained by the Table of Abbreviations.

(*a*) In *Scaramanga* v. *Stamp*, 5 C. P. D. 295—303.

Some difficulty was felt in dealing with the unreported cases, of which a considerable number, especially in connection with registration, are cited in this edition, since, on the one hand, valuable decisions known to the author could hardly be passed over merely because they had not been published in the Reports and were too recent for the author's Digest of Trade Mark Cases, while, on the other hand, it was not possible to give the necessary details of these cases wherever they were mentioned. Some of the more important of these cases have been printed, at the author's suggestion, in the form of notes to later reported cases, and for them the references are given, but in most instances the particulars can be ascertained at some one or other of the pages of this book noted against the case in the Table of Cases. With respect to reported cases, all references are given in the Table of Cases, and the cases, reported and unreported, are brought down to the present date.

The author's thanks are due to various friends at the Bar and at the Patent Office, for useful hints and assistance, in particular to Mr. JOHN CUTLER, of Lincoln's Inn, who kindly prepared the three forms of Statements of Claim in Appendix B., and made several valuable suggestions.

The documents relating to the International Arrangements, just concluded, will be found inserted after the Table of Abbreviations.

L. B. S.

2, NEW SQUARE, LINCOLN'S INN,
July, 1884.

EXTRACT FROM THE

PREFACE

TO

THE FIRST EDITION.

In this book an attempt is made to present a complete view of the Law of Trade Marks in this country. It is hoped that it may at least be found to be of some service to those who have to consider the numerous questions which are now constantly arising in connexion with that branch of Law.

Where practicable, the *ipsissima verba* of the various learned judges who decided the cases to which reference is made are given, as it is thought that their views are best expressed in the language they themselves advisedly employed.

A considerable number of American cases have been cited, containing the decisions of acute and practised lawyers, delivered after full consideration of English as well as American authorities. Such decisions are, it is admitted, "intrinsically entitled to the highest respect" (*a*); and though they are, of course, not in any way binding upon British Courts, it may reasonably be anticipated that English judges will in similar circumstances arrive at similar

(*a*) Per Patteson, J., in *Beverley* v. *Lincoln Gas Light and Coke Co.*, 6 Ad. & E. 829—37; and see per V.-C. Bacon, in *Dawson* v. *Bank of Whitehaven*, 4 Ch. D. 639—48.

conclusions with the Courts of the United States. The American cases have generally been cited from the "Reports of Trade Mark Cases" (*a*), by Mr. ROWLAND COX, or, in the more recent instances, from the "American Reports" (*b*).

L. B. S.

2, NEW SQUARE, LINCOLN'S INN,
March 1*st*, 1878.

(*a*) Robert Clarke & Co., Cincinnati, 1871.

(*b*) J. D. Parsons, Albany.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

PAGE

TABLE OF CASES xi

TABLE OF DEFENDANTS lv

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS lxv

INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS lxxi

ADDENDUM lxxx

CHAPTER I.

General Introduction 1

CHAPTER II.

What is a Trade Mark? 19

CHAPTER III.

Acquisition, Transfer, and Discontinuance of Trade Marks . . 74

CHAPTER IV.

Infringement 105

CHAPTER V.

The Criminal Prosecution 131

CHAPTER VI.

The Civil Remedy. I. 142

CHAPTER VII.

PAGE

The Civil Remedy. II. Defences, Discovery and Inspection, Account, Damages, Costs 181

CHAPTER VIII.

Cases Analogous to those of Trade Mark 224

CHAPTER IX.

Goodwill 268

APPENDIX A.

The Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, and the Trade Marks Rules and Instructions thereunder 301

APPENDIX B.

Forms and Precedents 384

APPENDIX C.

Statutory Enactments with respect to Marks on Goods, &c. . . 438

APPENDIX D.

Statutory Enactments with respect to Marks on Special Classes of Goods 456

APPENDIX E.

The United States Statute Law, Rules and Forms 478

APPENDIX F.

The Treaty with the United States, 1877 497

INDEX 499

TABLE OF CASES.

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Abbott *v.* Bakers' and Confectioners' Tea Association	V. C.—W. N. 1871, p. 207; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1871, p. 199 L. C.—W. N. 1872, p. 31; Dig. 379	119, 121, 123
Actien Gesellschaft Apollinaris Brunnen *v.* Somborn	14 Bl. C. C. 380	124, 162
Adriance, Platt & Co., *Ex parte*	20 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1820 . . .	489
Aikins *v.* Piper . .	15 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 581 . . .	25
Ainsworth *v.* Bentley .	14 W. R. 630; Dig. 259 . . .	176, 247, 428
Ainsworth *v.* Walmsley .	L. R. 1 Eq. 518; 35 L. J. Ch. 352; 12 Jur. N. S. 205; 14 L. T. N. S. 220; 14 W. R. 363; Dig. 257	10, 29, 31, 69, 70, 80, 92, 113, 116, 127, 176, 203, 215, 306
Albert (Prince) *v.* Strange	V. C.—2 De G. & Sm. 652; 13 Jur. 45—507; 12 L. T. 367; 13 L. T. 341; 37 Leg. Obs. 276 L. C.—1 Mac. & G. 25; 1 H. & Tw. 1; 18 L. J. Ch. 120; 13 Jur. 109; 12 L. T. 441; 37 Leg. Obs. 394; Dig. 98	257, 429
Alden, *Ex parte* . .	15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 389 . . .	51, 482
Alleghany Fertilizer Co. *v.* Woodside	1 Hughes, 115; Dig. 364 . . .	50, 51, 59, 60, 76, 122, 124
Allen *v.* Richards . .	26 Sol. J. 658; 73 L. T. 283 . .	113, 129
Allsopp *v.* Walker . .	Dig. 545	38, 311, 314
Allsopp *v.* Wheatcroft .	L. R. 15 Eq. 59; 42 L. J. Ch. 12; 27 L. T. N. S. 372; 21 W. R. 102	258
American Grocer Publishing Association *v.* Grocer Publishing Co. (1)	51 How. Pr. 402; Dig. 503 . . .	120, 161, 265
American Grocer Publishing Association *v.* Grocer Publishing Co. (2)	32 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (25 Hun) 398 . .	120, 161, 265
American Lubricating Oil Co., *In re*	9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 687; Dig. 486 . .	122, 314, 483

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
American Sardine Co., *In re*	3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 495; Dig. 422. .	50, 56, 66, 194, 315, 482
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. *v.* Garner (1)	55 Barb. 151; 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 265; R. Cox, 541; Dig. 314 . . .	4, 64, 81, 168, 185
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. *v.* Garner (2)	54 How. Pr. 298; 4 Am. L. T. N. S. 176; Dig. 500	4, 110, 124, 168, 189, 190, 210, 212, 214
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. *v.* Spear	2 Sandf. S. C. 599; R. Cox, 87; Dig. 100	5, 21, 53, 70, 126
Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. *v.* Trainer	101 U. S. Rep. (11 Otto) 51; 17 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1217; 21 Alb. L. J. 451	2, 3, 4, 53, 54, 69, 120
Ams, *Ex parte* . .	23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 344 . . .	51, 488
Anderson, *In re* . .	26 Ch. D. 409; 32 W. R. 677 . .	22, 38
Anderson *v.* Liebig's Extract of Meat Co., Limited	45 L. T. N. S. 757	161, 251
Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Co. *v.* Swiss Condensed Milk Co.	W. N. 1871, p. 163; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1871, p. 154; Dig. 370	121, 189, 255
Ansell *v.* Gaubert . .	Seton, 4th ed., 235; Dig. 163 . .	259, 430
Apollinaris Co. *v.* Edwards	Seton, 4th ed., 237; Dig. 509 . .	5, 64, 158, 425
Apollinaris Co. *v.* Norrish	33 L. T. N. S. 242; Dig. 465 . .	5, 64, 123, 153, 424
Archbold *v.* Sweet . .	1 M. & Rob. 162; 5 C. & P. 219; Dig. 49	121, 244, 245
Armistead *v.* Blackwell .	1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 603; Browne on Trade Marks, 495; Dig. 399	52, 66, 95, 103, 482, 485
Armstrong *v.* Kleinhaus.	1 Ky. L. Rep. 112; 22 Alb. L. J. 143	167, 241
Army and Navy Co-operative Society, Limited *v.* Junior Army and Navy Stores, Limited	Dig. 640	230
Arundell *v.* Bell . .	52 L. J. Ch. 537; 49 L. T. N. S. 345; 31 W. R. 477	273
Ashton & Sons, *In re* .	V.-C. H.—Feb. 26th, 1881 . . .	127, 306, 370
Atkinson, *In re.* See *In re* Hall & Co.		
Attorney-General *v.* Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co.	3 De G. M. & G. 327; 22 L. J. Ch. 811; 17 Jur. 677; 21 L. T. 49; 1 W. R. 185	185, 188
Aubin *v.* Holt. . .	2 K. & J. 66; 25 L. J. Ch. 36; 4 W. R. 112; Dig. 135	274, 296
Austen *v.* Boys . .	M. R.—24 Beav. 598; 27 L. J. Ch. 243; 3 Jur. N. S. 1285; 30 L. T. 216 L. C.—2 De G. & J. 626; 27 L. J. Ch. 714; 4 Jur. N. S. 719; 31 L. T. 276; 6 W. R. 729; Dig. 156	272, 273, 275, 299
Australian Mortgage, Land and Finance Co. *v.* Australian and New Zealand Mortgage Co.	V.-C. M.—Dec. 4th, 1879 . . . C.A.—W. N. 1880, p. 6	231
Avanzo *v.* Mudie . .	10 Ex. 203	471
Avery *v.* Meikle . .	23 Alb. L. J. 443	53, 69

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Axmann *v.* Lund . .	L. R. 18 Eq. 330; 43 L. J. Ch. 655; 31 L. T. N. S. 119; 22 W. R. 789	249
Ayer *v.* Rushton . .	7 Daly, 9; Dig. 574	50, 115, 202, 241
Bain *v.* Munro . .	Ct. of Sess. Cas., 4th Ser. V. 416; 15 Scot. L. Rep. 260; Dig. 588	273, 275
Balfour & Co. *v.* Kilburn & Co.	1 Hyde, 270	107, 111, 113, 125, 201
Banks *v.* Gibson . .	34 Beav. 566; 34 L. J. Ch. 591; 11 Jur. N. S. 680; 13 W. R. 1012; 6 N. R. 373; Dig. 248	95, 97, 236, 237, 277, 278, 279, 286, 290, 296
Barnard *v.* Pillow . .	W.N., 1868, p. 94; Dig. 293 . .	121, 245
Barnett *v.* Leuchars .	13 L. T. N. S. 495; 14 W. R. 166; Dig. 253	58, 128, 153, 172, 210
Barrett *v.* Gomm . .	74 L. T. (Journal) 388. . . .	115, 129, 203, 221
Barrett *v.* White . .	North, J., May 12th, 1883 . . .	115, 129, 203
Barrow *v.* Barrow . .	27 L. T. N. S. 431	291
Barrows, *Ex parte* . .	W. N., 1877, p. 119; L. J. N. C., 1877, p. 110; Dig. 555	306
Barrows, *In re* . .	V. C.—5 Ch. D. 353; 46 L. J. Ch. 450; 36 L. T. N. S. 291; 25 W. R. 407; 1 Trade Marks, 122	3, 46, 69, 151, 306, 312, 316, 319, 338
	C. A.—5 Ch. D. 364; 46 L. J. Ch. 725; 36 L. T. N. S. 780; 25 W. R. 564; 1 Trade Marks, 126; Dig. 540	
Barrows *v.* Knight . .	6 R. I. 434; R. Cox, 238; Dig. 184 .	32, 124
Barrows *v.* Pelsall Coal & Iron Co.	Dig. 530	69, 125, 177, 314
Bass *v.* Dawber . .	19 L. T. N. S. 626; Dig. 310 . .	37, 38, 111, 120, 159, 204, 214, 215
Batchellors *v.* Batchellor Manufacturing Co.	12 Amer. Rep. 414 n.	230
Batty *v.* Hill . . .	1 H. & M. 264; 8 L. T. N. S. 791; 11 W. R. 745; 2 N. R. 265; Dig. 218	9, 53, 172, 305
Baumgarten *v.* Broadaway	77 N. Car. 8	283
Baxter *v.* Connolly . .	1 Jac. & W. 576; Dig. 32 . . .	278
Beard *v.* Turner . .	13 L. T. N. S. 746; Dig. 251 . .	38, 114, 115, 186, 190, 202, 210, 214
Beazley *v.* Soares . .	22 Ch. D. 660; 52 L. J. Ch. 201; 31 W. R. 887	225, 278, 288
Beddow *v.* Beddow . .	9 Ch. D. 89; 47 L. J. Ch. 588; 26 W. R. 570	250
Bell, Black & Co. *v.* Bell & Co.	Dig. 514	38, 112, 125
Bell *v.* Locke . . .	8 Paige, 75; R. Cox, 11; Dig. 65 .	120, 265
Benbow *v.* Low (1) . .	23 Sol. J. 819	251
Benbow *v.* Low (2) . .	13 Ch. D. 553; 42 L. T. N. S. 14; 28 W. R. 384	161

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Benbow *v.* Low (3).	V. C. B.—28 W. R. 891; C. A.—16 Ch. D. 93; 50 L. J. Ch. 35; 44 L. T. N. S. 119; 29 W. R. 265	205
Benbow *v.* Low (4).	44 L. T. N. S. 875; 29 W. R. 837	47, 52, 97, 169, 313
Berliner Brauerei Gesellschaft Tivoli *v.* Knight Stocks & Co.	W. N. 1883, p. 70	52, 123, 203
Beverley *v.* Lincoln Gas Light and Coke Co.	6 Ad. & E. 829	vii.
Binninger *v.* Wattles	28 How. Pr. 206; R. Cox, 318; Dig. 249	25, 50, 232
Blackwell *v.* Armistead	5 Am. L. T. 85; Browne on Trade Marks, 510; Dig. 392	52, 78, 114, 123, 154, 191, 194
Blackwell *v.* Crabb.	36 L. J. Ch. 504; Dig. 274	37, 59, 120, 123, 181
Blackwell *v.* Dibrell	14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 633; Dig. 590	52, 66, 98, 99
Blackwell *v.* Harper	2 Atk. 95; Barnard. 210	471
Blackwell *v.* Wright	73 N. Car. 310; Dig. 466	6, 12, 52, 109, 110, 118, 120, 121, 123, 181, 253
Blakeslee & Co., *In re*	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 284; Dig. 376	50, 52, 483
Blanchard *v.* Hill	2 Atk. 484; Dig. 2	6, 108, 149, 152
Block & Co., *In re*	14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 235; Dig. 584	480, 483
Blofeld *v.* Payne	4 B. & Ad. 410; 1 N. & M. 353; 2 L. J. K. B. N. S. 68; Dig. 50	113, 149, 202, 213
Bloss *v.* Bloomer	23 Barb. 604; R. Cox, 200; Dig. 146	177, 185, 194
Boardman *v.* Meriden Britannia Co.	35 Conn. 402; R. Cox, 490; Dig. 302	59, 70, 71, 115, 203
Boehm & Co., *In re*	8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 319; Dig. 470	480
Bond *v.* Milbourn	20 W. R. 197; Dig. 383	95, 237, 278, 280, 286, 297
Bondier *v.* Depatie	Montreal Q. B., May 29th, 1883	69, 106, 146, 149, 214
Bonner *v.* Field	5 T. R. 44	471
Boon *v.* Moss	70 N. Y. (25 Sickels), 465; Dig. 576	271, 276, 279
Boord, *In re*	M. R., March 25th, 1881	330
Booth *v.* Jarrett	52 How. Pr. 169; Dig. 524	90, 234, 243, 286
Boulnois *v.* Peake	13 Ch. D. 513 n.; Dig. 294	227, 234, 240
Bowman *v.* Floyd	85 Mass. (3 Allen), 76; Dig. 201	32, 78, 227, 286
Bozon *v.* Farlow	1 Mer. 459; Dig. 22	273, 278
Braby & Co., *In re*	21 Ch. D. 223; 51 L. J. Ch. 637; 46 L. T. N. S. 380; 30 W. R. 675	81, 306
Bradbury *v.* Beeton	39 L. J. Ch. 57; 21 L. T. N. S. 323; 18 W. R. 33; Dig. 320	153, 265
Bradbury *v.* Dickens	27 Beav. 53; 28 L. J. Ch. 667; 33 L. T. 54; Dig. 173	95, 266, 277, 278, 290, 294, 298
Bradley *v.* Norton	33 Conn. 157; R. Cox, 331; Dig. 250	33, 126
Braham *v.* Beachim (1)	7 Ch. D. 848; 47 L. J. Ch. 348; 38 L. T. N. S. 640; 26 W. R. 654; Dig. 599	5, 64, 112, 119, 154, 162, 163, 230, 244, 433
Braham *v.* Beachim (2)	Dig. 633	64, 163

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Braham *v.* Bustard .	1 H. & M. 447 ; 9 L. T. N. S. 199 ; 11 W. R. 1061 ; 2 N. R. 572 ; Dig. 226	3, 9, 21, 43, 51, 53, 60, 101, 115, 165, 182, 202, 203, 425
Brandreth, *In re* . .	9 Ch. D. 618 ; 47 L. J. Ch. 816 ; 27 W. R. 281 ; Dig. 626	21, 47, 50, 86, 223, 309, 323, 347
Braun & Co. *v.* Blackwell	19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 481	484, 493
Brebner, *In re* . .	2 W. & W. (I. E. & M.), 12 ; Dig. 649	2, 180
Brigham, *Ex parte* . .	20 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 891	51, 479, 482
Broadhurst *v.* Barlow .	W. N. 1872, p. 212 ; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1872, p. 183 ; Dig. 411	36, 61, 70, 71, 423
Brook, *In re* . . .	26 W. R. 791 ; Dig. 622 . . .	47, 55, 69, 172, 305, 308, 312, 313, 317, 368, 370
Brook *v.* Evans . .	V.C.—29 L. J. Ch. 616 ; 6 Jur. N. S. 1025 ; 2 L. T. N. S. 740 C. A.—29 L. J. Ch. 617; 3 L. T. N. S. 571; Dig. 190	216, 251
Brooklyn White Lead Co. *v.* Masury	25 Barb. 416; R. Cox, 210 ; Dig. 154 .	114, 121, 230
Brooks *v.* Cocks . .	3 Ad. & Ell. 133	471
Broughton *v.* Broughton .	44 L. J. Ch. 526; 23 W. R. 779 ; Dig. 451	295
Brown *v.* De Tastet .	Jac. 284	293
Brown *v.* Mercer . .	37 N. Y. Super. Ct. (5 J. & S.) 265; Dig. 435	112, 121, 123, 124
Browne *v.* Freeman (1) .	12 W. R. 305 ; 4 N. R. 476 ; Dig. 230	11, 49, 50, 57, 102, 253
Browne *v.* Freeman (2) .	W. N. 1873, p. 178 ; Dig. 424 . .	100, 102, 249, 253
Bryson *v.* Whitehead .	1 S. & S. 74 ; 1 L. J. Ch. 42 ; Dig. 36 .	258, 277, 279, 283
Buckingham *v.* Waters .	14 Cal. 246	278
Bulloch, Lade & Co: *v.* Gray	19 Journ. of Jurisp. 218 ; Dig. 452 .	50, 101
Bullock *v.* Chapman .	2 De G. & Sm. 211; 12 Jur. 738 ; 11 L. T. 326 ; Dig. 95	248, 251
Bunn *v.* Guy . . .	4 East, 190 ; Dig. 11	268, 273, 274, 278
Burckhardt *v.* Burckhardt	36 Ohio St. 261	285
Burfield *v.* Rouch . .	31 Beav. 241	291
Burgess *v.* Burgess . .	3 De G. M. & G. 896 ; 22 L. J. Ch. 675 ; 17 Jur. 292 ; 21 L. T. 53 ; Dig. 117	25, 27, 31, 61, 116, 162, 185, 193, 202, 232, 233, 239, 280
Burgess *v.* Hately . .	26 Beav. 249 ; Dig. 169 . . .	210, 219, 220
Burgess *v.* Hills . .	26 Beav. 244 ; 23 L. J. Ch. 356 ; 5 Jur. N. S. 233 ; 32 L. T. 328 ; 7 W. R. 158 ; Dig. 170	110, 125, 153, 201, 219
Burke *v.* Cassin . .	45 Cal. 467; 13 Amer. Rep. 204 ; Dig. 415	33, 50, 53, 100, 126

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Burnett *v.* Phalon	N. Y. Super. Ct.; 22 Monthly L. R. (12 N.S.) 220; 9 Bos. 192; R. Cox, 376 N. Y. Ct. of App.; 3 Keyes, 594; 3 Trans. App. 167; 5 Abb. Pr. N. S. 212; R. Cox, 397; Dig. 277	51, 57, 125, 154
Burnett *v.* Tate	45 L. T. N. S. 743	251
Burrows *v.* Foster	1 N. R. 156; 32 Beav. 18; Seton, 4th ed. 257; Dig. 207	235, 238, 298, 434
Burton *v.* Stratton	73 L. T. (Journal) 349	48, 52, 66, 69, 70, 71, 190
Bury *v.* Bedford	M. R.—32 L. J. Ch. 741; 9 Jur. N. S. 956; 8 L. T. N. S. 847; 11 W. R. 973; 1 N. R 5 C. A.—4 De G. J. & S. 352; 33 L. J. Ch. 465; 10 Jur. N. S. 503; 10 L. T. N. S. 470; 12 W. R. 726; 4 N. R. 180; Dig. 222	31, 90, 91, 92. 93, 94, 458
Bush & Co., *In re*	10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 164; Dig. 506	52, 174, 305, 314, 483
Butler *v.* Burleson	16 Vt. (1 Washb.) 176	273, 283, 284
Byass *v.* Sullivan	21 How. Pr. 50; R. Cox, 278	206
Byron (Ld.) *v.* Johnston	2 Mer. 29; Dig. 23	244, 246
Caire, *Ex parte*	15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 248	121, 314, 483
Campbell *v.* Hollins	Dig. 548	230, 233
Canal Co. *v.* Clark	U.S.C.C., S.Dt. of N.Y.; 7 Bl. C.C. 112 U. S. Sup. Ct.; 13 Wallace, 311; 5 Am. L. T. 135; 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 279; Dig. 327	2, 5, 42, 43, 48, 50, 66
Candee, Swan & Co. *v.* Deere & Co.	54 Ill. 439; 5 Amer. Rep. 125; 4 Am. L. T. 266; 10 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 694; Dig. 339	21, 53, 66, 69, 98
Canham *v.* Jones	2 V. & B. 218; Dig. 19	108, 152, 257, 258
Capital and Counties Bank, Limited *v.* Capital and County Deposit Bank	Chitty, J., Feb. 9th, 1884	230
Carmichael *v.* Latimer	11 R. I. 395; 23 Amer. Rep. 481; 16 Alb. L. J. 73; Dig. 521	26, 33, 66, 90, 167, 193
Carnrick *v.* Morson	L. J. Notes of Cases, 1877, p. 71; Chemist and Druggist, 1877, p. 161; Dig. 543	52, 57, 125
Carroll *v.* Ertheiler	21 Alb. L. J. 503; 9 Fed. Rep. 737	32, 115, 123, 128, 203
Carter *v.* Goetze	2 Keen, 581	257
Cartier *v.* Carlile	31 Beav. 292; 8 Jur. N. S. 183; Dig. 204	13, 38, 69, 110, 120, 122, 153, 158, 201, 209, 211, 212
Cartier *v.* May	Cited in Lloyd on Trade Marks, pp. 55, 77; Dig. 200	38, 69, 122, 165, 189, 218
Cartier *v.* Westhead	Dig. 199	38, 69, 122

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Caruncho *v.* Highmoor .	27 Sol. J. 199; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1883 p. 15	161, 220
Caruncho *v.* Stephenson .	25 Sol. J. 929	60, 425
Carver *v.* Bowker . .	V.C.—1 Trade Marks, 252. . . . C. A.—Dig. 581	36, 37, 41, 53, 69, 70, 71, 72, 190, 209
Carver *v.* Pinto Leite .	V.C.—L. R. 7 Ch. 92; 41 L. J. Ch. 93; 25 L. T. N. S. 724; 20 W. R. 135 C. A.—L. R. 7 Ch. 90; 41 L. J. Ch. 92; 25 L. T. N. S. 722; 20 W. R. 134; Dig 356	36, 70, 71, 205
Cassidy *v.* Metcalf . .	1 Mo. App. 593	278, 282, 283
Caswell *v.* Davis . .	N. Y. C. P.—4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 6; 35 How. Pr. 76; R. Cox, 429 N. Y. Ct. of App.—58 N. Y. (13 Sickels) 223; Dig. 289	50
Cave *v.* Myers . .	Seton, 4th ed. 238; Dig. 304 . .	114, 120, 160, 189, 198, 204, 234, 241, 432
Chance *v.* Sheppard .	Dig. 317.	264
Chappell *v.* Davidson .	V.C.—2 K. & J. 123 . . . . C. A.—8 De G. M. & G. 1; Dig. 136	107, 149, 214, 220, 266
Chappell *v.* Sheard .	2 K. & J. 117; 1 Jur. N. S. 996; 3 W. R. 646; Dig. 132	185, 266, 429
Charleson *v.* Campbell .	Ct. of Sess. Cas., 4th Ser. IV. 149; 14 Scot. L. Rep. 104; Dig. 520	243
Chase *v.* Mayo . .	121 Mass. (7 Lathrop) 343; Dig. 523 .	72, 76
Cheavin *v.* Walker . .	V.C.—5 Ch. D. 854; 46 L. J. Ch. 265; 25 L. T. N. S. 757 C.A.—5 Ch. D. 850; 46 L. J. Ch. 686; 36 L. T. N. S. 938; Dig. 528	15, 48, 59, 114, 153, 156, 198, 203, 212
Chinn *v.* Thomas . .	5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 188	34, 120, 162, 186, 288
Chissum *v.* Dewes . .	5 Russ. 29; Dig. 45	270, 276, 277, 289
Choynski *v.* Cohen . .	39 Cal. 501; 2 Amer. Rep. 476; R. Cox, 593; Dig. 336	50, 240
Christie *v.* Christie . .	V.C.—42 L. J. Ch. 261; L. R. 8 Ch. 502n. C.A.—L. R. 8 Ch. 499; 42 L. J. Ch. 544; 28 L. T. N. S. 607; 21 W. R. 493; Dig. 414	160, 233 235
Christy *v.* Murphy . .	12 How. Pr. 77; R. Cox, 164; Dig. 137	233
Chubb *v.* Griffiths . .	35 Beav. 127; Dig. 255 . . .	160, 204, 221
Chubb *v.* Priest . .	1 L. T. 142	33, 113
Churton *v.* Douglas .	Johns. 174; 28 L. J. Ch. 841; 5 Jur. N. S. 887; 33 L. T. 57; 7 W. R. 365; Dig. 172	88, 90, 92, 114, 193, 202, 225, 228, 230, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 286, 288, 296, 297, 310

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Cigar Makers' Association of the Pacific Coast, *Ex parte*	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 958 . . .	315, 483
Civil Service Supply Association *v.* Dean	13 Ch. D. 513	21, 78, 79, 119, 228
Clark *v.* Clark . .	25 Barb. 76; R. Cox, 200; Dig. 148 .	121, 154
Clark *v.* Freeman . .	11 Beav. 112; 17 L. J. Ch. 142; 12 Jur. 149; 11 L. T. 22; 35 Leg. Obs. 436; Dig. 93	171, 245, 249
Clark *v.* German Mutual Fire Insurance Co.	7 Mo. App. 77	90
Clark *v.* Leach . .	M.R.—32 Beav. 14; 32 L. J. Ch. 290; 9 Jur. N. S. 165; 8 L. T. N. S. 40; 11 W. R. 227; 1 N. R. 155 L. C.—1 De G. J. & S. 409; 32 L. J. Ch. 290; 9 Jur. N. S. 610; 8 L. T. N. S. 40; 11 W. R. 351; Dig. 210	236, 238, 281, 282, 286, 290, 297, 298
Clark & Co., *In re* .	27 Sol. J. 396	306
Clayton *v.* Day . .	26 Sol. J. 43; 76 L. T. (Journal) 79 .	235
Clegg *v.* Edmonson .	8 De G. M. & G. 787; 26 L. J. Ch. 673; 3 Jur. N. S. 299; 29 L. T. O. S. 131	187
Clemens *v.* Such . .	Codd. Dig. 312; Dig. 429 . . .	244
Clement *v.* Maddick .	1 Giff. 98; 5 Jur. N. S. 592; 33 L. T. 117; Dig. 174	153, 263, 266, 427
Clippens Oil Co., *In re* .	M. R.—March 11th, 1881 . . .	312
Clover *v.* Royden . .	L. R. 17 Eq. 190; 43 L. J. Ch. 665; 29 L. T. N. S. 639; 22 W. R. 254	251
Clowes v. Hogg . .	V.C.—W. N. 1870, p. 268; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1870, p. 267 L. J. J.—W. N. 1871, p. 40; Dig. 345	176, 189, 262, 266
Coats, *Ex parte* . .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 544 . . .	482
Coats *v.* Holbrook . .	2 Sandf. Ch. 586; 3 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 404; R. Cox, 29; Dig. 79	75, 173, 201, 202, 219, 220
Cocks *v.* Chandler . .	L. R. 11 Eq. 446; 40 L. J. Ch. 575; 24 L. T. N. S. 379; 19 W. R. 593; Dig. 351	37, 49, 190, 252
Coe *v.* Bradley . .	9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 541; Dig. 489	125, 247
Coffeen *v.* Brunton (1) .	4 McLean, 516; R. Cox, 82; Dig. 99.	14, 51, 126, 149, 201
Coffeen *v.* Brunton (2) .	5 McLean, 256; R. Cox, 132; Dig. 109	51, 169, 201, 202
Coggin, Kidder & Co., *In re*	11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1109; Dig. 490 .	33, 123, 314, 483
Cohn, *Ex parte* (1) . .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 680 . . .	51, 53, 482
Cohn, *Ex parte* (2) . .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 680 . . .	51, 482
Colburn *v.* Simms . .	2 Hare, 543; 12 L. J. Ch. 388; 7 Jur. 1104	219
Coles *v.* Sims . . .	5 De G. M. & G. 1; 23 L. J. Ch. 208; 18 Jur. 683	185
Colladay *v.* Baird . .	4 Phila. 139; R. Cox, 257; Dig. 186 .	80, 120
Collins Co. v. Brown .	3 K. & J. 423; 3 Jur. N. S. 929; 30 L. T. 62; Dig. 151	31, 33, 75, 77, 153

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Collins Co. *v.* Cowen	3 K. & J. 428; 3 Jur. N. S. 929; 29 L. T. 245; 30 L. T. 62; 5 W. R. 676; Dig. 152	15, 16, 33, 74, 108. 153
Collins Co. *v.* Reeves	28 L. J. Ch. 56; 4 Jur. N. S. 865; 33 L. T. 101; 6 W. R. 717; Dig. 164	75, 153
Collins Co. *v.* Walker	7 W. R. 222; Dig. 171	75, 160, 214, 219, 425
Colman *v.* Crump	N. Y. Super. Ct.—40 N. Y. Super. Ct. (S J. & S.) 548 N. Y. Ct. of App.—70 N. Y. (25 Sickels) 573; 16 Alb. L. J. 352; Dig. 579.	10, 81, 110, 121, 124, 127, 154, 203
Colnaghi *v.* Ward	12 L. J. Q. B. 1; 6 Jur. 969	471
Colonial Life Assurance Co. *v.* Home and Colonial Assurance Co.	33 Beav. 548; 33 L. J. Ch. 741; 10 Jur. N. S. 967; 10 L. T. N. S. 448; 12 W. R. 783; 4 N. R. 129; Dig. 236	223
Colton *v.* Thomas	7 Phila. 257; 2 Brews. 308; R. Cox, 507; Dig. 305	113, 120, 121, 239, 253
Comstock *v.* White	18 How. Pr. 421; R. Cox, 232; Dig. 180	14, 51, 192, 203
Condy *v.* Mitchell	V. C.—37 L. T. N. S. 268 C. A.—37 L. T. N. S. 766; 26 W. R. 269; Dig. 561	48, 94, 95, 112, 120, 121, 231, 236, 247, 257, 278, 286, 290
Congress & Empire Spring Co. *v.* High Rock Congress Spring Co.	N. Y. Sup. Ct.—57 Barb. 526; R. Cox, 599 N. Y. Ct. of App.—45 N. Y. (6 Hand) 291; 10 Abb. Pr. N. S. 348; 6 Amer. Rep. 82; 4 Am. L. T. 168; R. Cox, 624; Dig. 354	5, 51, 64, 88, 113, 127, 268
Connell *v.* Reed	128 Mass. (14 Lathrop) 477; 35 Amer. Rep. 397	55, 190
Conrad *v.* Joseph Uhrig Brewing Co.	8 Mo. App. 277	123
Consolidated Fruit Jar Co., *Ex parte*	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 679	48, 196, 480, 483
Consolidated Fruit Jar Co., *In re*	14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 269; Dig. 578	25, 26, 48, 196, 483
Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. *v.* Dorflinger	6 Amer. L. T. N. S. 511; Dig. 444	190, 197, 199
Constable & Co. *v.* Brewster	Ct. of Sess. Cas. 1st series III. 215 (new ed. 152); Dig. 39	261, 264
Cook *v.* Collingridge	Jac. 607; 1 L. J. Ch. 74; Collyer on Partnership (2nd ed.) 215; Dig. 37	293, 297
Cook *v.* Starkweather	13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392; Dig. 395	14, 72, 92, 113, 119, 120, 124, 127, 202, 482
Cooper *v.* Hood	26 Beav. 293; 28 L. J. Ch. 212; 4 Jur. N. S. 1266; 32 L. T. 171; 7 W. R. 83; Dig. 168	268, 276, 277, 278, 284, 310
Cooper *v.* Metropolitan Board of Works	25 Ch. D. 472; 53 L. J. Ch. 109; 32 W. R. 709	271, 272, 289
Cooper *v.* Watson	3 Doug. 413; Dig. 5	277, 283, 284
Cope *v.* Evans	L. R. 18 Eq. 138; 30 L. T. N. S. 292; 22 W. R 453; Dig. 433	60, 77, 112, 119, 120, 156, 159, 201, 204

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Corns *v.* Griffiths . .	W. N. 1873, p. 93; Pemberton (3rd ed.) 238; Dig. 420	264, 427
Cornwall, *In re* (1) . .	12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 133; Dig. 563 .	314, 483
Cornwall, *In re* (2) . .	12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 312; Dig. 565 .	52, 56, 64, 66, 482
Correspondent Newspaper Co. *v.* Saunders	11 Jur. N. S. 540; 12 L. T. N. S. 540; 13 W. R. 804; Dig. 246	15, 267
Corwin *v.* Daly . .	7 Bos. 222; R. Cox, 265; Dig. 187 .	50
Cory *v.* Gertcken . .	2 Madd. 49	204, 221
Coslake *v.* Till . .	1 Russ. 376; Dig. 42	277, 278
Cotton *v.* Gillard . .	44 L. J. Ch. 90; Dig. 447 . . .	10, 37, 52, 58, 88, 93, 98, 169, 184, 259, 269, 310
Cowen *v.* Hulton . .	46 L. T. N. S. 897	110, 154, 265
Crawford *v.* Shuttock .	13 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 149 . .	58, 123
Crawshay *v.* Collins .	15 Ves. 218; Dig. 14	293, 294
Crawshay *v.* Thompson .	4 Man. & G. 357; 5 Scott, N. R. 562; 11 L. J. C. P. 301; Dig. 72	36, 68, 106, 145, 146, 181
Croft *v.* Day (1) . .	7 Beav. 84; Dig. 76	96, 108, 114, 118, 153, 202, 235, 422
Croft *v.* Day (2) . .	28 Leg. Obs. 378; Dig. 77 . . .	96, 163, 164
Crookes *v.* Petter . .	6 Jur. N. S. 1131; 3 L. T. N. S. 225; Dig. 181	247
Cruttwell *v.* Lye . .	17 Ves. 335; 1 Rose, 123; Dig. 17 .	228, 230, 270, 271, 277, 280
Curtis *v.* Bryan .	2 Daly, 212; 36 How. Pr. 33; R. Cox, 434; Dig. 291	33, 62, 193
Curtis, Harvey & Co. *v.* Kraft, Meyer & Co.	Chitty, J.—June 16th, 1882 . .	122
Dakin *v.* Cope . .	2 Russ. 170; Dig. 43 . . .	276
Dale *v.* Smith . .	W. N. 1882, p. 145	163, 219, 265
Dale *v.* Smithson . .	12 Abb. Pr. 237; R. Cox, 282; Dig. 195	154, 193
Darbey *v.* Whitaker .	4 Drew. 134; 5 W. R. 772; Dig. 153.	276, 278
Dausman & Drummond Tobacco Co. *v.* Ruffner	15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 559. . . .	3, 39
Davenport *v.* Rylands .	L. R. 1 Eq. 302; 35 L. J. Ch. 204; 12 Jur. N. S. 71; 14 L. T. N. S. 53; 14 W. R. 243	14, 213
Davids & Co., *Ex parte* .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 94	305, 479, 482, 483
Davies *v.* Hodgson . .	25 Beav. 177; 27 L. J. Ch. 449; 4 Jur. N. S. 252; 31 L. T. 40; 6 W. R. 355; Dig. 158	277, 297
Davis *v.* Kendall . .	2 R. I. 566; R. Cox, 112; Dig. 103 .	14, 51, 126, 154, 201
Davis *v.* Kennedy . .	13 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 523 · Dig. 281	16, 33, 51, 58, 75, 123

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Davis *v.* Reid . . .	17 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 69 . . .	112, 113, 123, 313
Davis *v.* Tylor (1) . .	M. R.—July 27th, 1877 . . .	161
Davis *v.* Tylor (2) . .	M. R.—April 24th, 1879 . . .	5, 64, 222, 309, 312
Dawes *v.* Davies . .	Codd. Dig. 260; Dig. 426 . . .	70, 120, 121
Dawes & Fanning, *Ex parte*	1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 27; Dig. 382 . .	22, 70, 482
Dawson *v.* Bank of Whitehaven	4 Ch. D. 639; 46 L. J. Ch. 545; 36 L. T. N. S. 310; 25 W. R. 582	vii.
Dawson *v.* Beeson . .	22 Ch. D. 504; 52 L. J. Ch. 563; 48 L. T. N. S. 407; 31 W. R. 537	280, 283, 297, 298
Day *v.* Binning . .	C. P. Coop. 489; 1 Leg. Obs. 205; Dig. 47	8, 113, 150, 253
Day *v.* Brownrigg . .	V. C.—39 L. T. N. S. 226 . . .	242, 250
	C. A.—10 Ch. D. 294; 48 L. J. Ch. 173; 39 L. T. N. S. 553; 27 W. R. 217; Dig. 631	
Day *v.* Day . . .	Eden on Inj. (ed. of 1821), 314; Dig. 21	150
Day *v.* Finch . . .	25 Sol. J. 354	237, 281
Day *v.* Neale . . .	V. C. B.—May 24th, 1881 . . .	51, 97, 169, 190, 216
Day *v.* Walls . . .	12 Phila. 274	113, 123
Dayton *v.* Wilkes . .	17 How. Pr. 510; R. Cox, 224; Dig. 178	266, 277, 290, 294
Decker *v.* Decker . .	52 How. Pr. 218; Dig. 525 . . .	25, 479
Degraves *v.* Whiteman .	5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 304	58, 77, 120, 161, 215
Deiz *v.* Lamb . . .	29 N. Y. Super Ct. (6 Robertson) 537; Dig. 266	243, 255
Del Valle *v.* Mayer .	Seton, 4th ed. 236; Dig. 326 . .	174, 426
Delondre *v.* Shaw . .	2 Sim. 237; Dig. 44 . . .	171, 210, 246
Dence *v.* Brand . .	W. N. 1881, p. 31	163, 164, 202, 218, 235
Dence *v.* Mason (1) .	V. C. M.—W. N. 1877, p. 23; 1878, p. 42; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1877, p. 33; Dig. 534	26, 113, 162, 163, 168, 202, 235, 236, 239, 253, 286, 296
	C. A.—41 L. T. N. S. 573	
Dence *v.* Mason (2) .	Dig. 570	163
Dent *v.* Turpin . .	2 J. & H. 139; 30 L. J. Ch. 495; 7 Jur. N. S. 673; 4 L. T. N. S. 637; 9 W. R. 548; Dig. 196	32, 53, 96, 97, 159, 170, 203, 210, 295
Derringer *v.* Plate . .	29 Cal. 292; R. Cox, 324; Dig. 249	16, 32, 89, 154, 269
Devlin *v.* Devlin . .	N. Y. Sup. Ct.—11 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (4 Hun) 651	26, 114, 163, 218, 233, 280
	N. Y. Ct. of App.—69 N. Y. (24 Sickels) 212; 15 Alb. L. J. 290; 5 Amer. Rep. 173; Dig. 463	
Dewhurst, *In re* . .	M. R.—June 11th, 1880 . . .	87, 304, 330
Dick & Co., *In re* . .	9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 538; Dig. 493 . .	4, 50, 52, 53, 81, 483

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Dickinson, Akroyd & Co., *In re*	V. C. H.—July 8th, 1880 . . .	370
Dicks *v.* Brooks . .	V. C.—15 Ch. D. 22; 40 L. T. N. S. 710 C. A.—15 Ch. D. 31; 49 L. J. Ch. 812; 43 L. T. N. S. 71; 29 W. R. 87	250, 251
Dicks *v.* Jackson . .	Chitty, J.—March 31st, 1884 . .	211, 214
Dicks *v.* Yates . .	V. C.—18 Ch. D. 76; 43 L. T. N. S. 470; 29 W. R. 135 C. A.—18 Ch. D. 83; 50 L. J. Ch. 809; 44 L. T. N. S. 660	15, 265, 267
Dickson *v.* Mc Master & Co.	18 Ir. Jur. 202; Dig. 260 . . .	167, 268, 286, 290, 291
Dixon *v.* Fawcus . .	3 Ell. & Ell. 537; 30 L. J. Q. B. 137; 7 Jur. N. S. 895; 3 L. T. N. S. 693; 9 W. R. 414; Dig. 194	31, 32, 110, 145, 148, 221
Dixon, Ld., *In re.* See William Dixon.		
Dixon *v.* Holden . .	L. R. 7 Eq. 488; 30 L. T. N. S. 357; 17 W. R. 482; Dig. 311	248, 249
Dixon *v.* Jackson . .	Ct. of Sess. Cas., 3rd Ser. V. 326; 3 Scot. L. Rep. 188; Dig. 271	76, 112
Dixon Crucible Co. *v.* Guggenheim	7 Phila. 408; 2 Brews. 321; 3 Am. L. T. 288; R. Cox, 559; Dig. 331	10, 88, 119, 121, 154, 241, 268, 269
Dolo Bros., *In re* . .	12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 939; Dig. 577 .	50, 55, 166, 194, 315, 482, 483
Dougherty *v.* Van Nostrand	Hoff. 68; Dig. 64	278, 291, 294
Du Boulay *v.* Du Boulay.	L. R. 2 P. C. 430—441; 6 Moo. P. C. N. S. 31; 38 L. J. P. C. 35—38; 22 L. T. N. S. 228—231; 17 W. R. 594; Dig. 312	225
Dugdale, *In re* . .	49 L. J. Ch. 303; 28 W. R. 436 . .	370
Duke *v.* Green . .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1094 . . .	480, 484
Dunbar *v.* Glenn . .	42 Wisc. 113; Dig. 529 . . .	5, 66, 123, 254
Dunnachie *v.* Young & Sons	Ct. Sess. Cas., 4th Ser. X., 874; 20 Scot. L. Rep. 588	6, 26, 170, 171, 203
Dutcher Temple Co, *In re*	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis., 1871, 248; Dig. 371	7, 21, 22, 70, 99, 184, 317
Duwel *v.* Bohmer . .	14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 270; Dig. 613 .	481
Eagle Pencil Co., *In re* .	10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 981; Dig. 522 .	3, 53, 71, 479, 482
Eastman, *In re* . .	W. N. 1880, p. 128	48, 52, 67, 82, 305
Ede Bros. & Co., *Ex parte*	28 W. R. 436n.; Dig. 632 . . .	369, 370
Edelsten *v.* Edelsten .	1 De G. J. & S. 185; 9 Jur. N. S. 479; 7 L. T. N. S. 763; 11 W. R. 328; 1 N. R. 300; Dig. 213	13, 37, 38, 110, 111, 122, 144, 153, 155, 158, 181, 201, 202, 209, 211, 212, 214, 425
Edelsten *v.* Vick . .	11 Hare, 78; 1 Eq. Rep. 413; 18 Jur. 7; Dig. 119	48, 77, 108, 119, 136, 153, 183, 190, 196, 197, 255, 425

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Edgington *v.* Edgington	10 L. T. N. S. 299; Dig. 237	215, 235
Edinburgh Correspondent Newspaper, *In re*	Ct. of Sess. Cas., 1st Ser. I. (New ed.), 407n.; Dig. 34	261, 264
Edmonds *v.* Benbow	Seton, 3rd ed., 905; 4th ed., 238; Dig. 33	264, 427
Electro-Silicon Co. *v.* Levy	59 How. Pr. 469	51, 123
Electro-Silicon Co. *v.* Trask	59 How. Pr. 189	57, 125
Ellin *v.* Slack	24 Sol. J. 290; L. J. N. of C. 1880, p. 15	209
Ellis *v.* Zeilen & Co.	42 Ga. 91; Dig. 348	120, 192
Ellis & Sons *v.* Ruthin Soda Water Co.	M. R.—Nov. 21st, 1879	116, 130
Emerson *v.* Badger	101 Mass. (5 Browne), 82; Dig. 309	32, 115, 117, 238
Emperor of Austria *v.* Day	V. C.—2 Giff. 628; 30 L. J. Ch. 690; 7 Jur. N. S. 483; 4 L. T. N. S. 274; 9 W. R. 568 L. C. & L. J. J.—3 De G. F. & J. 217; 30 L. J. Ch. 690; 7 Jur. N. S. 639; 4 L. T. N. S. 494; 9 W. R. 712; Dig. 197	153, 249, 430
England *v.* Cowing	8 Beav. 129; Dig. 75	235, 238, 268, 290, 298, 433, 435
England *v.* Downs	6 Beav. 269; 12 L. J. Ch. 85; 6 Jur. 1075; Dig. 74	270, 279
England *v.* New York Publishing Co.	8 Daly, 375	27, 28, 234
English, *In re*	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1870, 142; Dig. 342	4, 55, 81, 479
Eno *v.* Stephens	V. C.—1 Trade Marks, 324 C. A.—1 Trade Marks, 325; Dig. 609	43, 52, 115, 123, 157, 202
Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co. *v.* Hunkele	15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1092	57, 161
Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co. *v.* Schwachhofer	55 How. Pr. 37; 17 Alb. L. J. 229	57, 118, 127
Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co. *v.* Troxell	N. Y. Sup. Ct.—57 How. Pr. 121; 30 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (23 Hun) 632 N. Y. Ct. of App.—89 N. Y. (44 Sick.) 292	120, 127
Esbensen, *In re*	Pearson, J.—Jan. 25th, 1883	348
Estcourt *v.* Estcourt Hop Essence Co.	V. C.—31 L. T. N. S. 567 C. A.—L. R. 10 Ch. 276; 44 L. J. Ch. 223; 32 L. T. N. S. 80; 23 W. R. 313; Dig. 449	185, 189, 194, 257, 258, 259, 430
Evans *v.* Hughes	18 Jur. 691; Dig. 127	289, 299
Faber *v.* D'Utassey	11 Abb. Pr. N. S. 399; Dig. 355	111
Faber *v.* Faber	49 Barb. 357; 3 Abb. Pr. N. S. 115; R. Cox, 401; Dig. 278	25, 32
Faber *v.* Hovey	Codd. Dig. 79, 242; Dig. 481	51, 58, 213
Fairbanks *v.* Jacobus	14 Bl. C. C. 337	48, 50, 56, 72, 194, 197, 198

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Fairchild, *Ex parte*.	21 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 789 . . .	483, 488
Falkinburg *v.* Lucy	35 Cal. 52; R. Cox, 448; Dig. 296	14, 120
Farina, *In re* (1)	26 W. R. 261; Dig. 592 . . .	38, 314
Farina, *In re* (2)	27 W. R. 456; Dig. 612 . . .	16, 34, 100, 124, 188, 305, 311, 314
Farina, *In re* (3)	Dig. 654	34, 38, 87, 172, 313
Farina, *In re* (4)	44 L. T. N. S. 99; 29 W. R. 391	96, 171, 310, 328, 349
Farina *v.* Cathery	L. J. Notes of Cases, 1867, p. 134; Dig. 275	16, 112, 161, 173
Farina *v.* Gebhardt.	Cited 3 Eq. Rep. 891; 1 K. & J. 517; Dig. 118	185
Farina *v.* Shaw	Cited 3 Eq. Rep. 886—7; 1 K. & J. 514; 24 L. J. Ch. 632; 25 L. T. 211; 3 W. R. 532; Dig. 113	174
Farina *v.* Silverlock	V. C.—1 K. & J. 509; 3 Eq. Rep. 883; 24 L. J. Ch. 632; 25 L. T. 211; 3 W. R. 532 L. C.—6 De-G. M. & G. 214; 26 L. J. Ch. 11; 2 Jur. N. S. 1008; 27 L. T. 277; 4 W. R. 731; 52 Leg. Obs. 342 Q. B.—30 L. T. 242; 31 L. T. 99 V. C.—4 K. & J. 650; Dig. 130	15, 34, 105, 130, 146, 153, 154, 156, 158, 172, 174, 210, 214 427
Farnum & Co., *Ex parte*.	18 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 412. . . .	56, 66, 482
Farr *v.* Pearce	3 Madd. 74; Dig. 28	274, 275, 291
Featherstonhaugh *v.* Fenwick	17 Ves. 298; Dig. 16	277, 292, 293
Fenn *v.* Bolles	7 Abb. Pr. 202; Dig. 166 . . .	295
Ferguson *v.* Davol Mills.	2 Brews. 314; 7 Phila. 253; R. Cox, 516; Dig. 307	70
Fetridge *v.* Merchant	4 Abb. Pr. 156; R. Cox, 194; Dig. 145	51, 57, 58, 192
Fetridge *v.* Wells	4 Abb. Pr. 144; 13 How. Pr. 385; R. Cox, 180; Dig. 144	50, 58, 100, 192, 215
Field *v.* Lewis	Seton, 4th ed. 237; Dig. 280 . . .	58, 115, 119, 203, 220
Filkins *v.* Blackman	13 Bl. C. C. 440; Dig. 502 . . .	33, 90, 92, 94, 283
Filley *v.* Child	16 Bl. C. C. 376; 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 261	51, 58, 101, 185
Filley *v.* Fassett	44 Mo. 173; R. Cox, 530; 8 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 402; Dig. 313	51, 58, 119, 123, 154, 187, 203
Fisher *v.* Apollinaris Co.	V. C.—L. R. 10 Ch. 209n.; 32 L. T. N. S. 628 C. A.—L. R. 10 Ch. 297; 44 L. J. Ch. 500; 32 L. T. N. S. 628; 23 W. R. 460; Dig. 457	249, 438
Flavel *v.* Harrison	10 Hare, 467; 22 L. J. Ch. 866; 17 Jur. 368; 1 W. R. 213; Dig. 116	55, 160, 185, 196
Fleischmann *v.* Schuckmann	62 How. Pr. 92	64, 115, 123, 203
Fleming *v.* Newton.	Ct. Sess.—Ct. of Sess. Cas. 2nd Ser., VIII., 677 H. L.—1 H. L. C. 363; Dig. 94	248

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Foot *v.* Lea	13 Ir. Eq. 484; Dig. 107	113, 153, 154, 240
Ford *v.* Foster	V. C.—L. R. 7 Ch. 616; 27 L. T. N. S. 220; 20 W. R. 311 C. A.—L. R. 7 Ch. 611; 41 L. J. Ch. 682; 27 L. T. N. S. 219; 20 W. R. 818; Dig. 384	4, 11, 13, 36, 45, 51, 55, 60, 100, 101, 115, 116, 123, 162, 166, 185, 193, 196, 199, 201, 202, 203, 211, 424, 426, 439
Foss, *Ex parte*	Comm.—30 L. T. 354 C. A.—2 De G. & J. 230; 27 L. J. Bky. 17; 4 Jur. N. S. 522; 31 L. T. 30; Dig. 159	93, 266, 276, 277
Foster *v.* Megevand	Pemberton, 3rd ed. 293; Dig. 499	426
Fowle *v.* Spear	7 Penn. L. J. 176; R. Cox, 67; Dig. 90	51, 192
Fox & Co., *In re*	V. C. H.—May 7th, 1881	306, 312
Fradella *v.* Weller	2 R. & M. 247	219
Framjee, Sands & Co., *In re*	V. C. B.—Nov. 30th, 1883	370
Francis & Mallon, *In re*	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 283; Dig. 375	52, 57, 482
Franks *v.* Weaver	10 Beav. 297; 8 L. T. 510; Dig. 87	105, 113, 254, 431
Frese *v.* Bachof (1)	13 Bl. C. C. 234; Dig. 484	127, 158, 255
Frese *v.* Bachof (2)	14 Bl. C. C. 432; 13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 635; Dig. 603	14, 51, 92, 112, 115, 127, 183, 203, 255
Frieberg & Workum, *Ex parte*	20 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1164	489
Fullwood *v.* Fullwood (1)	V. C.—W. N. 1873, p. 93 C. A.—W. N. 1873, p. 185; Dig. 421	26, 32, 113, 114, 127, 233, 280
Fullwood *v.* Fullwood (2)	9 Ch. D. 176; 47 L. J. Ch. 459; 38 L. T. N. S. 380; 26 W. R. 435; Dig. 602	26, 32, 114, 176, 187, 233, 253, 432
Fulton *v.* Sellers	4 Brews. 42; Dig. 279	21, 33, 53, 88, 90, 193, 269
Gamble *v.* Stephenson	10 Mo. App. 581	187, 242
Gardner *v.* Bailey	Codd. Dig. 131; Dig. 365	125
Gaskin *v.* Balls	13 Ch. D. 324; 28 W. R. 552	250
Geary *v.* Norton	1 De G. & Sm. 9	158, 201, 219, 220
Gee *v.* Pritchard	2 Swanst. 402; Dig. 30	249
Genin *v.* Chadsey	Cited 2 Brews. 330; R. Cox, 567; Dig. 330	241
Giblett *v.* Read	9 Mod. 459; Dig. 3	96, 209, 268, 277
Gillespie & Co. *v.* Marshall	Dig. 648	147, 179
Gillis *v.* Hall (1)	7 Phila. 422; 2 Brews. 342; R. Cox, 580; Dig. 335	283
Gillis *v.* Hall (2)	8 Phila. 231; 3 Brews. 509; R. Cox, 596; Dig. 353	26, 33, 126, 163, 233

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Gillott *v.* Esterbrook .	N. Y. Sup. Ct.—47 Barb. 455; R. Cox, 340 N. Y. Comm. of App.—48 N. Y. (3 Sickels) 374; 8 Amer. Rep. 553; Dig. 269	3, 4, 53, 70, 76, 154, 182, 187
Gillott *v.* Kettle . .	3 Ducr, 624; R. Cox, 148; Dig. 126 .	3, 70, 71, 128, 202
Gilman *v.* Hunnewell .	122 Mass. (8 Lathrop) 139; Dig. 541 .	25, 37, 50, 59, 114, 115, 121, 154
Ginesi *v.* Cooper & Co. .	14 Ch. D. 596; 49 L. J. Ch. 601; 42 L. T. N. S. 751	280, 281
Ginter *v.* Kinney Tobacco Co.	22 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 770 . . .	55, 56, 315
Glen & Hall Manufacturing Co. *v.* Hall	N. Y. Sup. Ct.—6 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (6 Lans.) 158 N. Y. Comm. of App.—61 N. Y. (16 Sickels) 226; 19 Amer. Rep. 278; Dig. 443	158, 233, 234, 241
Glendon Iron Co. *v.* Uhler	75 Penn St. 467; 15 Amer. Rep. 599; 13 Amer. L. Reg. N. S. 543; 6 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 154; Dig. 439	66
Glenny *v.* Smith . .	2 Drew. & Sm. 476; 11 Jur. N. S. 964; 13 L. T. N. S. 11; 13 W. R. 1032; 6 N. R. 363; Dig. 247	113, 239, 431
Clines, *In re* . . .	8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 435; Dig. 471 . .	52, 58
Godillot, *In re* . .	6 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 641; Dig. 446 . .	479
Godillot *v.* Hazard . .	N. Y. Super. Ct. (Monell, C. J.)—49 How. Pr. 5; 44 N. Y. Super. Ct. (12 J. & S.) 427; Dig. 461 N. Y. Super. Ct.—44 N. Y. Super. Ct. (12 J. & S.) 435 N. Y. Ct. of App.—81 N. Y. (36 Sickels) 263	3, 4, 14, 38, 50, 55, 113, 123, 124, 168
Goodwin *v.* Venning .	24 Sol. J. 690	120, 128
Goodyear Rubber Co., *In re*	11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1062; Dig. 347 .	50, 53, 482
Gordon, *In re* . . .	12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 517; Dig. 572 .	72, 73, 482
Gordon *v.* Cheltenham Railway Co.	5 Beav. 229	186, 187
Gouraud *v.* Trust . .	10 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (3 Hun) 627; 6 Thomp. & C. 133; Dig. 460	28, 33, 52, 114, 234, 238
Gout *v.* Aleploglu . .	6 Beav. 69n.; 5 Leg. Obs. 495; Chitty, Gen. Pr. 721; Dig. 51	8, 60, 61, 150, 153, 318
Graham, *In re* . .	2 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 618; Dig. 412 . .	50, 52
Graham *v.* Plate . .	40 Cal. 593; 6 Amer. Rep. 639; 4 Am. L. T. 75; Dig. 347	148, 213
Graham & Co. *v.* Kerr, Dods & Co.	3 Beng. L. R. App. 4; Dig. 315 . .	111, 152
Graveley *v.* Winchester .	Seton, 4th ed. 257; Dig. 272 . .	158, 212, 235, 238, 298, 433
Graves *v.* Ashford . .	L. R. 2 C. P. 410; 36 L. J. C. P. 130; 16 L. T. N. S. 98; 15 W. R. 495	471
Gray *v.* Koch . . .	2 Mich. N. P. 119; Dig. 363 . .	50, 241

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Gray *v.* Taper Sleeve Pulley Works	24 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 602 . . .	203, 231
Green, *In re* . . .	8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 729; Dig. 473 . .	52, 56, 66, 194, 315, 482
Green *v.* Folgham . .	1 S. & S. 398; 1 L. J. Ch. 203; Dig. 38	33, 209, 258, 259
Green *v.* Rooke . .	W. N. 1872, p. 49; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1872, p. 54; Dig. 389	48, 50, 161, 253, 258
Green *v.* Shepherd . .	Ct. of Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. IV. 1023; 2 Scot. L. Rep. 168; Dig. 262	162
Grillon *v.* Guénin . .	W. N. 1877, p. 14; Dig. 532 . .	52, 60, 154
Grimshaw, *Ex parte* .	W. N. 1877, p. 24; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1877, p. 24; 1 Trade Marks, 23; Dig. 535	311
Guardian Fire and Life Assurance Co. *v.* Guardian and General Assurance Co., Limited	50 L. J. Ch. 252; 43 L. T. N. S. 791 .	219, 230
Guinness *v.* Heap . .	Dig. 617	125, 158
Guinness *v.* Ullmer .	10 L. T. 127; Dig. 89	130, 173, 426
Hagg *v.* Darley . .	47 L. J. Ch. 567; 38 L. T. N. S. 312; Dig. 604	176, 253, 258, 283
Hall *v.* Barrows . .	M. R.—32 L. J. Ch. 548; 9 Jur. N. S. 483; 8 L. T. N. S. 227; 11 W. R. 525; 1 N. R. 543 L. C.—4 De G. J. & S. 150; 33 L. J. Ch. 204; 10 Jur. N. S. 55; 9 L. T. N. S. 561; 12 W. R. 322; 3 N. R. 259; Dig. 215	10, 18, 31, 36, 69, 77, 80, 90, 91, 92, 95, 108, 127, 153, 155, 156, 203, 268, 272, 277, 290, 291, 294, 297, 306
Hall *v.* Hall . . .	20 Beav. 139; Dig. 129 . . .	277, 291
Hall & Co., *In re* . .	13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 229; Dig. 596 .	33, 44, 482
Hallett *v.* Cunston . .	110 Mass. (14 Browne) 29; Dig. 391 .	114, 202, 236, 247, 286
Halliday Bros., *Ex parte* .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 500 . . .	40, 58, 72, 482
Halsey *v.* Brotherhood .	M. R.—15 Ch. D. 514; 49 L. J. Ch. 786; 43 L. T. N. S. 366; 29 W. R. 9 C. A.—19 Ch. D. 386; 51 L. J. Ch. 233; 45 L. T. N. S. 640; 30 W. R. 279	251
Hammond *v.* Douglas .	5 Ves. 539; Dig. 9	277, 294
Hanford *v.* Westcott .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1181 . . .	34, 484
Hankinson, *In re* . .	8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 89; Dig 464 . .	479, 480
Hanson *v.* British Tea and Trading Association, Limited . .	V. C. B.—April 9th, 1884 . . . C. A.—June 19th, 1884	118, 307
Hardy *v.* Cutter . . .	3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 468; Dig. 427 . .	14, 25, 28, 50
Hargreaves, *In re* . .	11 Ch. D. 669; 27 W. R. 550; Dig. 645	306, 314
Hargreaves *v.* Smith .	Dig. 338	38, 123, 145, 147
Harper *v.* Pearson . .	3 L. T. N. S. 547; Dig. 193 . .	167, 238

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Harrington *v.* Libby .	14 Bl. C. C. 128; 12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 188; 4 Am. L. T. N. S. 47; Dig. 538	72, 482
Harrison *v.* Gardner .	2 Madd. 198; Dig. 25 . . .	270, 280, 281, 283, 289, 297
Harrison *v.* Hogg . .	2 Ves. Jun. 323	471
Harrison *v.* Taylor . .	11 Jur. N. S. 408; 12 L. T. N. S. 339; Dig. 244	110, 189, 210, 425
Harter *v.* Souvazoglu .	V. C.—W. N. 1875, p. 11; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1875, p. 20 C. A.—W. N. 1875, p. 101; Dig 454	37, 40, 72
Hauthaway, *In re* (1) .	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 97; Dig. 357	50, 482
Hauthaway, *In re* (2) .	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 284; Dig. 377	50, 482
Hazard *v.* Caswell . .	46 N. Y. Super. Ct. (14 J. & S.) 559; 47 *ib.* 537	95, 269
Hazzopulo *v.* Kaufmann	23 Sol. J. 819	183, 319
Heath *v.* Wright . .	3 Wall. Jr.; R. Cox, 154; Dig. 133 .	51, 192
Heathcote *v.* Hulme	1 Jac. & W. 122	293
Hegeman & Co. *v.* Hegeman	8 Daly, 1	11, 51, 90, 92, 93, 276, 280, 283, 286
Hegeman *v.* O'Byrne .	9 Daly, 264	115, 124, 203
Helmbold *v.* Helmbold Manufacturing Co.	53 How. Pr. 453; Dig. 575 . .	25, 50, 59, 90, 94, 98, 169, 190, 247, 259, 283
Hemming & Son, *Ex parte*	M. R.—April 27th, 1881 . . .	87, 170, 313
Henderson *v.* Jorss . .	Seton, 4th ed. 236; cited in Lloyd on Trade Marks, p. 54; Dig. 198	36, 38, 115, 426
Hendriks *v.* Montagu .	M. R.—17 Ch. D. 638; 50 L. J. Ch. 257; 44 L. T. N. S. 89 C. A.—17 Ch. D. 643; 50 L. J. Ch. 456; 44 L. T. N. S. 879; 30 W. R. 168	228, 230, 232, 432
Hennessy *v.* Cooper .	Dig. 549	128
Hennessy *v.* Hogan .	6 W. W. & A'B. Eq. 225; Dig. 651 .	111, 121, 128, 202
Hennessy *v.* Kennett .	Dig. 556	127, 128, 202
Hennessy *v.* Rohmann, Osborne & Co.	36 L. T. N. S. 51; Dig. 531 . .	128, 161, 208
Hennessy *v.* Wheeler .	N. Y. C. P.—51 How. Pr. 457 . .	195
	N. Y. Ct. of App.—69 N. Y. (24 Sickels) 271; 15 Alb. L. J. 454; 25 Amer. Rep. 188; Dig. 483	
Hennessy *v.* White . .	6 W. W. & A'B. Eq. 216; Dig. 650 .	111, 113, 121, 124, 128, 202
Henry *v.* Price . .	1 Leg. Obs. 364; Dig. 48 . . .	8, 113, 127, 150
Heyman, *Ex parte* . .	18 U. S. Pat Gaz. 922	52, 488
Hier *v.* Abrahams . .	82 N. Y. (37 Sickels) 519; 37 Amer. Rep. 589	52, 115, 125, 203
Hill *v.* Hart-Davies .	21 Ch. D. 798; 51 L. J. Ch. 845; 47 L. T. N. S. 82; 31 W. R. 22	252
Hilsen *v.* Libby . .	44 N. Y. Super. Ct. (12 J. & S.) 12 .	157

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Hine *v.* Last . . .	10 Jur. 106; 7 L. T. 41; Dig. 80 .	51, 63, 76, 97, 112, 170, 295
Hinrichs *v.* Berndes .	W. N. 1878, p. 11; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1878, p. 11; Dig. 594	250
Hirsch *v.* Jonas . .	3 Ch. D. 584; 45 L. J. Ch. 364; 3 L. T. N. S. 228; Dig. 494	4, 15, 76, 130, 168, 267
Hirst *v.* Denham . .	L. R. 14 Eq. 542; 41 L. J. Ch. 752; 27 L. T. N. S. 56; Dig. 400	3, 37, 52, 54, 58, 153
Hitchcock *v.* Coker .	6 Ad. & E. 438; 1 N. & P. 796; 2 H. & W. 464; 6 L. J. Ex. N. S. 266; Dig. 58	276
Hobbs *v.* Français . .	19 How. Pr. 567; R. Cox, 287; Dig. 191	192
Hoby *v.* Grosvenor Library Co., Limited	28 W. R. 386	166, 241
Hodson & Co., *In re* .	26 Sol. J. 43	47, 97, 169, 305, 313, 317
Hoffman *v.* Duncan .	Seton, 4th ed. 256; Dig. 122 . .	236, 433
Hogg *v.* Kirby . .	8 Ves. 215; Dig. 10	8, 192, 261, 428
Hogg *v.* Maxwell . . And see Maxwell *v.* Hogg.	V. C.—12 Jur. N. S. 916; 15 L. T. N. S. 204; 15 W. R. 84 C. A.—L. R. 2 Ch. 316; 36 L. J. Ch. 437; 16 L. T. N. S. 133; 15 W. R. 470; Dig. 265	194, 195
Holloway *v.* Holloway .	13 Beav. 209; Dig 106 . . .	26, 31, 162, 192, 193, 203, 233, 280
Holmes, Booth & Haydens *v.* Holmes, Booth & Atwood M'f'g. Co.	37 Conn. 278; 9 Amer. Rep. 324; Dig. 340	230, 233, 235
Hookham *v.* Pottage .	V. C.—L. R. 8 Ch. 93n.; 26 L. T. N. S. 755; 20 W. R. 720 C. A.—L. R. 8 Ch. 91; 27 L. T. N. S. 595; 21 W. R. 47; Dig. 398	113, 239, 282, 290, 296, 297, 432
Hoosier Drill Co. *v.* Ingels	14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 785; Dig. 627 .	77, 479, 484
Hopkins *v.* Hitchcock .	14 C. B. N. S. 65; 32 L. J. C. P. 154; 9 Jur. N. S. 896; 8 L. T. N. S. 204; 11 W. R. 597; 2 N. R. 32; Dig. 216	69, 178
Horsburgh, *In re* . .	53 L. J. Ch. 237; 50 L. T. N. S. 23; 32 W. R. 530; 1 Trade Marks, 260; Dig. 597	30, 50, 82, 101, 116, 117, 123, 305, 315
Hostetter *v.* Adams .	22 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 943 . . .	51, 123
Hostetter *v.* Anderson .	1 V. R. (1 W. A'B. & W.) Eq. 7; 1 A. J. 4; Dig. 652	34, 113, 129
Hostetter *v.* Vowinkle .	1 Dill. 329; Dig. 366	34, 125, 148, 213
Hovenden *v.* Lloyd .	18 W. R. 1132; Dig. 337 . . .	96, 97, 185, 259
Howard *v.* Henriques .	2 Sandf. S. C. 725; R. Cox, 129; Dig. 108	242
Howe *v.* Howe Machine Co.	50 Barb. 236; R. Cox, 421; Dig. 284.	25, 32
Howe *v.* McKernan .	30 Bonv. 547; Dig. 203 . . .	75, 206

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Howe *v.* Searing . .	6 Bos. 354; 10 Abb. Pr. 264; 19 How. Pr. 14; R. Cox, 244; Dig. 185 .	234, 276, 278, 286, 288
Hoyle & Sons, Limited, *In re* (1)	V. C. H.—May 8th, 1880 . . .	370
Hoyle & Sons, Limited, *In re* (2)	Chitty, J.—Nov. 30th, 1883 . .	86, 313, 317, 370
Hudson *v.* Bennett . .	12 Jur. N. S. 519; 14 L. T. N. S. 698; 14 W. R. 911; Dig. 261	214, 219
Hudson *v.* Osborne . .	39 L. J. Ch. 79; 21 L. T. N. S. 386; Dig. 323	11, 92, 93, 193, 236, 240, 276, 280, 432
Hudson *v.* Osgerby . .	50 L. T. N. S. 323	217
Hunt *v.* Maniero . .	M. R.—34 Beav. 157; 34 L. J. Ch. 142; 11 Jur. N. S. 28; 11 L. T. N. S. 469; 13 W. R. 212; 5 N. R. 181 C. A.—34 L. J. Ch. 144; 11 Jur. N. S. 73; 11 L. T. N. S. 723; 13 W. R. 363; 5 N. R. 295; Dig. 239	176
Hurricane Patent Lantern Co. *v.* Miller & Co.	56 How. Pr. 234	120
Hutchings *v.* Sheard .	W. N. 1881. p. 20	264
Huwer *v.* Dannenhoffer .	82 N. Y. (37 Sickels) 499 . . .	96, 271
Hyde & Co., *In re* . .	7 Ch. D. 724; 38 L. T. N. S. 777; 26 W. R. 625; 1 Trade Marks, 245; Dig. 593	36, 46, 100, 185, 223, 308, 312, 316, 328, 346
Imbs, *In re* . . .	10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 463; Dig. 518 .	70, 120, 314, 483
India and China Tea Co. *v.* Teede	W. N. 1871, p. 241	231
India-Rubber Comb Co., *In re*	8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 905; Dig. 476 . .	30, 32, 232, 483
India-Rubber Comb Co. *v.* Meyer	Cited 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 905; Dig. 475.	33
India-Rubber Comb Co. *v.* Rubber Comb and Jewelry Co.	45 N. Y. Super. Ct. (13 J. & S.) 258 .	26, 33, 70, 113, 119, 162, 202, 232, 233
Ingram *v.* Stiff	5 Jur. N. S. 947; 33 L. T. 195; Dig. 175	264, 427
Insurance Oil-Tank Co. *v.* Scott	33 La. Ann. 946; 39 Amer. Rep. 280 .	52
Isaacs *v.* Daly . .	39 N. Y. Super. Ct. (7 J. & S.) 511; Dig. 440	266, 267
Isaacson *v.* Thompson .	41 L. J. Ch. 101; 20 W. R. 196; Dig. 381	160, 162, 185, 186, 189, 216, 233
Jacoby *v.* Whitmore .	49 L. T. N. S. 335; 32 W. R. 18 .	270, 284, 285
Jacoby & Co. *v.* Lopes & Co.	23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 342 . . .	484, 493
James *v.* James . .	L. R. 13 Eq. 421; 41 L. J. Ch. 353; 26 L. T. N. S. 568; 20 W. R. 434; Dig. 388	26, 33, 48, 50, 249, 252, 257, 258, 432, 436

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Jarvis *v.* Peck	10 Paige, 118	258
Jelley, Son & Jones, *In re*	51 L. J. Ch. 639; 46 L. T. N. S. 381; 1 Trade Marks, 346; Dig. 616	46, 81, 97, 119, 122, 127, 222, 305, 306, 311, 312, 313, 314, 342
Jendwine *v.* Slade	2 Esp. N. P. C. 572; Dig. 8	179
Johnson *v.* Helleley	M. R.—34 Beav. 63; 34 L. J. Ch. 32; 10 Jur. N. S. 1041; 11 L. T. N. S. 295; 13 W. R. 38; 5 N. R. 4 C. A.—2 De G. J. & S. 446; 34 L. J. Ch. 179; 11 L. T. N. S. 581; 13 W. R. 220; 5 N. R. 211; Dig. 238	236, 297, 299
Johnson *v.* Raylton	7 Q. B. D. 438; 50 L. J. Q. B. 735; 45 L. T. N. S. 374; 30 W. R. 350	130, 177, 179
Johnson & Co., *In re*	2 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 315; Dig. 404	50, 59
Johnston, *In re*	43 L. T. N. S. 672	86, 309, 348
Johnston & Co. *v.* Orr-Ewing & Co. *See* Orr-Ewing & Co. *v.* Johnston & Co.		
Jollie *v.* Jaques	1 Bl. C. C. 618; Dig. 105	267
Jones, Bros. & Co., *In re*	V. C. H.—July 10th, 1880	223, 308, 314, 370
Josselyn *v.* Swezey & Dart	15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 702.	484
Julian *v.* Hoosier Drill Co.	75 Ind. 408	100, 187
Jurgensen *v.* Alexander	24 How. Pr. 269; R. Cox, 298; Dig. 211	32, 159
Kane & Co., *In re*	9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 105; Dig. 480	48, 72, 482
Keene *v.* Harris	17 Ves. 338	264, 266, 276, 277
Keep, Bros., *In re*	26 Ch. D. 187; 50 L. T. N. S. 453; 32 W. R. 427	87, 309, 349
Kelly *v.* Byles	V. C.—13 Ch. D. 682; 48 L. J. Ch. 569; 40 L. T. N. S. 623; 28 W. R. 585 C. A.—13 Ch. D. 691; 49 L. J. Ch. 181; 42 L. T. N. S. 338; 28 W. R. 587	265
Kelly *v.* Hooper	1 Y. & C. Ch. 197	219, 220
Kelly *v.* Hutton	V. C.—37 L. J. Ch. 297; 17 L. T. N. S. 591 C. A.—L. R. 3 Ch. 703; 37 L. J. Ch. 917; 19 L. T. N. S. 223; 16 W. R. 1182; Dig. 292	11, 15, 263, 266, 267
Kennedy *v.* Lee	3 Mer. 441; Dig. 27	280, 291, 297
Kidd *v.* Johnson	100 U. S. Rep. (10 Otto) 617	2, 10, 58, 89, 94, 95, 102, 154, 185, 269
Kidd & Co. *v.* Mills, Johnson & Co.	5 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 337; Dig. 437	32, 52, 58, 94, 95, 102, 185, 188
Kimball, *In re*	11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1109; Dig. 553	58, 480

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Kinahan *v.* Bolton . .	15 Ir. Ch. 75; Dig. 228 . . .	68, 105, 115, 154, 157, 185, 188, 202
King, *Ex parte* . .	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1870, 109; Dig. 341	479
King *v.* Midland Railway Co.	17 W. R. 113	270, 289
Kinney *v.* Allen . .	1 Hughes, 106; 4 Am. L. T. N. S. 258; Dig. 557	53, 70, 71, 117, 482
Kinney *v.* Basch . .	1 Trade Marks, 183; Dig. 542 . .	64, 66, 70, 71, 119
Kipling, *Ex parte* . .	21 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 899. . . .	51, 156, 488
Kitchin, *In re*; see *Ex parte* Punnett.		
Knapp, *Ex parte* . .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 318 . . .	56, 66, 194, 315, 482
Knott *v.* Morgan . .	2 Keen, 213; Dig. 57	243, 255, 431
Kuhn & Co., *In re* . .	53 L. J. Ch. 238; Dig. 637 . . .	47, 84, 86, 185, 190, 220, 221, 223, 308, 312, 313, 316, 317, 328
Labouchere *v.* Dawson .	L. R. 13 Eq. 322; 41 L. J. Ch. 427; 25 L. T. N. S. 894; 20 W. R. 309; Dig. 385	271, 280, 281, 283, 298, 435
Laferme (Compagnie) *v.* Hendrickx	Dig. 512	16, 105, 162, 216
Laird *v.* Wilder . .	9 Bush, 131; 15 Amer. Rep. 707; Dig. 418	113, 127, 190, 192
Lamplough *v.* Balmer .	W. N. 1867, p. 293; Dig. 288 . .	57, 196, 199
Lamplough *v.* Beedzler .	M. R.—24 Sol. J. 672 . . . . C. A.—Nov. 12, 1880	51, 116, 129, 318
Lanferty *v.* Wheeler .	63 How. Pr. 488	64, 123, 198
Lautz Bros. *v.* Schultz & Co.	9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 791; Dig. 496 . .	484
Lawrence Bros., *Ex parte*	44 L. T. N. S. 98; 29 W. R. 392; Dig. 630	88, 171, 310, 318, 327, 328, 319
Lawrence & Co., *In re* .	10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 163; Dig. 504 .	50, 62, 482
Lawrence Manufacturing Co. *v.* Lowell	129 Mass. (15 Lathrop), 325; 37 Amer. Rep. 362	55, 70, 71
Lawson *v.* Bank of London	18 C. B. 84; 25 L. J. C. P. 188; 2 Jur. N. S. 716; 27 L. T. 134; 4 W. R. 481; Dig. 140	78, 147, 229
Lazenby, *Ex parte* . .	C. M.—Feb. 26th, 1880 . . .	330
Lazenby *v.* Lazenby .	Seton, 4th ed. 237; cited 41 L. J. Ch. 354; Dig. 100	33, 45, 123
Lazenby *v.* White (1) . .	M. R.—Cited L. R. 11 Eq. 448; 40 L. J. Ch. 576; 24 L. T. N. S. 380; 19 W. R. 595; Seton, 4th ed. 237 C. A.—41 L. J. Ch. 354; Dig. 314	25, 45, 48, 50, 100, 187, 253
Lazenby *v.* White (2) . .	L. R. 6 Ch. 89; 19 W. R. 291; Dig. 346	163
Lea *v.* Millar . . .	Seton, 4th ed. 242; Dig. 513 . .	11, 44, 64, 100, 102

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Lea *v.* Wolff	N. Y. Sup. Ct.—13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 389; 1 Thomp. & C. 626 N. Y. Sup. Ct.—15 Abb. Pr. N. S. 1; 46 How. Pr. 157; 1 Am. L. T. N. S. 400; Dig. 407	58, 66, 115, 123, 203
Leather Cloth Co. *v.* American Leather Cloth Co.	V. C.—1 H. & M. 271; 32 L. J. Ch. 721; 8 L. T. N. S. 829; 11 W. R. 931; 2 N. R. 481 L. C.—4 De G. J. & S. 137; 33 L. J. Ch. 199; 10 Jur. N. S. 81; 9 L. T. N. S. 553; 12 W. R. 289; 3 N. R. 264 H. L.—11 H. L. C. 523; 35 L. J. Ch. 53; 11 Jur. N. S. 513; 12 L. T. N. S. 742; 13 W. R. 873; 6 N. R. 209; Dig. 223	7, 10, 29, 31, 35, 55, 59, 78, 80, 88, 90, 91, 92, 105, 108, 121, 153, 155, 171, 172, 190, 191, 193, 197, 198, 199, 210, 238, 246, 296
Leather Cloth Co. *v.* Hirschfeld (1)	1 N. R. 551 (and see 1 H. & M. 295); Dig. 214	197
Leather Cloth Co. *v.* Hirschfeld (2)	1 H. & M. 295; 11 W. R. 933; Dig. 224	207
Leather Cloth Co. *v.* Hirschfeld (3)	L. R. 1 Eq. 299; 13 L. T. N. S. 427; 14 W. R. 78; Dig. 252	148, 213
Leather Cloth Co. *v.* Lorsont	L. R. 9 Eq. 345; 39 L. J. Ch. 86; 21 L. T. N. S. 661; 18 W. R. 572; Dig. 324	196, 198, 215, 258
Ledger *v.* Ray	Dig. 550	120, 265
Lee *v.* Ehrhart	19 L. T. N. S. 637	283, 284
Lee *v.* Haley	V. C.—21 L. T. N. S. 546; 18 W. R. 181 C. A.—L. R. 5 Ch. 155; 39 L. J. Ch. 284; 22 L. T. N. S. 251; 18 W. R. 242; Dig. 325	114, 120, 160, 189, 195, 204, 228, 229, 432
Leggott *v.* Barrett	15 Ch. D. 306; 51 L. J. Ch. 90; 43 L. T. N. S. 641; 28 W. R. 962	280, 281, 297, 298, 435
Lehmann *v.* McArthur	L. R. 3 Ch. 496; 37 L. J. Ch. 625; 18 L. T. N. S. 806; 16 W. R. 877	188
Leidersdorf *v.* Flint (1)	8 Biss. 327; 13 Am. L. Rev. 390; 18 Alb. L. J. 429; Dig. 629	77, 479, 481
Leidersdorf *v.* Flint (2)	50 Wisc. 491	124, 158, 212
Lemoine *v.* Ganton	2 E. D. Smith, 343; R. Cox, 142; Dig. 125	75, 103, 128, 149
Leonard & Ellis, *In re* See Leonard & Ellis *v.* Wells & Co.		
Leonard & Ellis *v.* Wells & Co.	Pearson, J.—53 L. J. Ch. 233; 50 L. T. N. S. 23; 32 W. R. 530 C. A.—26 Ch. D. 288; 53 L. J. Ch. 603; 32 W. R. 532	45, 48, 49, 50, 67, 75, 79, 82, 101, 123, 224, 254, 304, 305, 316, 318, 327, 328, 346
Leonardt, *In re*	1 Trade Marks, 316; Dig. 610	46, 86, 313, 316, 317, 328
Levy *v.* Walker	10 Ch. D. 436; 48 L. J. Ch. 273; 39 L. T. N. S. 654; 27 W. R. 370; Dig. 639	236, 269, 278, 279, 285, 286, 290, 296

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Lewis *v.* Langdon . .	7 Sim. 421; 4 L. J. Ch. N. S. 258; Dig. 55	278, 286, 288, 289, 294, 296, 299
Lichtenstein *v.* Mellis .	8 Oreg. 464; 34 Amer. Rep. 592 . .	241
Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. *v.* Anderson	Field, J.—W. N. 1882, p. 147; L. J. N. of C. 1882, p. 119 C. A.—W. N. 1883, p. 185; 28 Sol. J. 105	48, 50, 100, 121, 233
Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. *v.* Hanbury	17 L. T. N. S. 298; Dig. 286 . .	48, 50, 100, 159, 257
Linde *v.* Bensel . .	29 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (22 Hun) 601 . .	157
Linoleum Manufacturing Co. *v.* Nairn	7 Ch. D. 834; 47 L. J. Ch. 430; 38 L. T. N. S. 448; 26 W. R. 463; 1 Trade Marks, 291; Dig. 536	43, 48, 49, 56, 161
Lisner, *In re* . . .	13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 455; Dig. 600 .	480
Llewellyn *v.* Rutherford .	L. R. 10 C. P. 456; 44 L. J. C. P. 281; 32 L. T. N. S. 610; Dig. 462	271, 272, 277, 279
Lochgelly Co., Limited, *v.* Lumphinnans Iron Co.	Ct. of Sess. Cas. 4th Ser. VI. 482; 16 Scot. L. Rep. 268	5, 64, 220
Lockett *v.* Lockett . .	L. R. 4 Ch. 341; 38 L. J. Ch. 290; 17 W. R. 476	205
Lockwood *v.* Bostwick .	2 Daly, 521; R. Cox, 555; Dig. 319 .	51, 57, 92, 121, 125
London Assurance *v.* London & Westminster Assurance Corporation	32 L. J. Ch. 664; 9 Jur. N. S. 497; 8 L. T. N. S. 497; Dig. 221	229
London & County Banking Co. *v.* Hampshire & North Wilts Bank	Dig. 618	121, 230
London & Provincial Law Assurance Society *v.* London & Provincial Joint Stock Life Assurance Co.	17 L. J. Ch. 37; 11 Jur. 938; 10 L. T. 127; Dig. 88	229
Longman *v.* Tripp . .	2 Bos. & P. N. R. 67; Dig. 12 . .	93, 266, 276, 277
Longman *v.* Winchester .	16 Ves. 269; Dig. 15	262
Low *v.* Hart . . .	90 N. Y. (45 Sickels) 457 . . .	106, 173
Lowell Manufacturing Co. *v.* Larned	Codd. Dig. 341; Dig. 428 . . .	73, 482
Lucke *v.* Webster . .	M. R.—April 4th, 1879 . . .	39, 116, 123, 214, 316
Lumley *v.* Wagner . .	V. C.—5 De G. & Sm. 485 . . .	176
	L. C.—1 De G. M. & G. 604; 21 L. J. Ch. 898; 16 Jur. 871; Dig. 112	
Lysaght, *In re* . .	Dig. 623	306, 329
McAndrew *v.* Bassett .	V. C.—33 L. J. Ch. 561; 10 Jur. N. S. 492; 10 L. T. N. S. 65, 442; 4 N. R. 12 L. C.—4 De G. J. & S. 380; 33 L. J. Ch. 566; 10 Jur. N. S. 550; 10 L. T. N. S. 442; 12 W. R. 777; 4 N. R. 123; Dig. 234	9, 10, 17, 21, 31, 36, 51, 63, 64, 65, 78, 98, 108, 112, 147, 153, 155, 157, 172, 184, 210, 214, 219, 224, 228, 263, 317, 425

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
McCardel *v.* Peck	23 How. Pr. 120; R. Cox, 312; Dig. 233	242
McCartney *v.* Garnhart	45 Mo. (4 Post) 503; Dig. 332	114, 125
McCord *v.* Williams	96 Pa. St. 78	285
McCormick *v.* McCubbin	Ct. of Sess. Cas. 1st Ser. I. 541 (New ed. 496); Dig. 35	266, 276, 277, 290, 294
McDonald *v.* Richardson	1 Giff. 81; 5 Jur. N. S. 9; 32 L. T. 237; Dig. 165	277, 293, 294
McElwee *v.* Blackwell	15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 658	479, 481, 485
McGowan Bros. Pump and Machine Co. *v.* McGowan	2 Cinc. 313; Dig. 406	176, 230, 233, 269, 286, 288, 296
McIntyre *v.* Belcher	14 C. B. N. S. 654; 32 L. J. C. P. 254; 10 Jur. N. S. 239; 8 L. T. N. S. 461; 11 W. R. 889; 2 N. R. 324; Dig. 220	289
McLean *v.* Fleming	96 U. S. Rep. (6 Otto) 245; 13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 913; Dig. 580	2, 14, 23, 25, 26, 31, 33, 58, 77, 78, 90, 96, 110, 111, 112, 116, 119, 121, 123, 124, 154, 158, 168, 187, 190, 201, 204, 210, 218, 255, 425
McMurdo *v.* Smith	7 T. R. 518	471
McNair *v.* Cleave	10 Phila. 155	190, 231
Mack *v.* Potter	L. R. 14 Eq. 431; 41 L. J. Ch. 781; 20 W. R. 964; Dig. 403	266, 427
Magee Furnace Co. *v.* Le Barron	127 Mass. (13 Lathrop) 115	114, 203, 228
Maignen, *In re*	28 W. R. 759	34, 222
Manhattan Medicine Co. *v.* Wood	U. S. C. C., Dt. of Me.--4 Cliff. 461; 14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 519; Dig. 628 U. S. Sup. Ct.—23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1925	5, 14, 16, 33, 72, 90, 99, 102, 121, 122, 170, 177, 185, 190, 193, 194, 259
Marcovitch *v.* Bramble, Wilkins & Co.	Dig. 595	58, 164
Marsching & Co., *Ex parte*	15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 294	51, 56, 66, 194, 315, 482
Marsh *v.* Billings	7 Cush. 322; 14 Monthly L. R. (4 N. S.) 664; R. Cox, 118; Dig. 111	243, 255
Marshall *v.* Pinkham	52 Wisc. 572; 38 Amer. Rep. 756	26, 51, 184, 185
Marshall *v.* Ross	L. R. 8 Eq. 651; 39 L. J. Ch. 225; 21 L. T. N. S. 260; 17 W. R. 1086; Dig. 316	125, 136, 198, 200
Marshall *v.* Watson	25 Beav. 501; Dig. 162	277, 299
Marten *v.* Van Schaick	4 Paige, 479	290
Martin *v.* Wright	6 Sim. 297; Dig. 52	245, 249
Massam *v.* Thorley's Cattle Food Co. (1)	6 Ch. D. 574; 46 L. J. Ch. 707; 36 L. T. N. S. 848; Dig. 560	25, 34, 48, 254

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Massam *v.* Thorley's Cattle Food Co. (2) .	14 Ch. D. 748; 42 L. T. N. S. 851; 28 W. R. 966	3, 26, 29, 31, 33, 88, 90, 102, 120, 162, 193, 231, 255, 257, 434
Matsell *v.* Flanagan .	2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 459; R. Cox, 367; Dig. 270	264
Mauger *v.* Dick . .	55 How. Pr. 132	249
Maxwell *v.* Hogg . . And see Hogg *v.* Maxwell.	V. C.—12 Jur. N. S. 916; 15 L. T. N. S. 204; 15 W. R. 84 C. A.—L. R. 2 Ch. 307; 36 L. J. Ch. 433; 16 L. T. N. S. 130; 15 W. R. 467; Dig. 264	15, 21, 78, 98, 147, 153, 184, 224, 246, 249, 267, 317
Meik'e, *In re* . . .	24 W. R. 1067; 1 Trade Marks, 22; Dig. 515	151, 308, 338, 346
Mellersh *v.* Keen . .	27 Beav. 236; 23 Beav. 453; Dig. 177	297, 299
Mencely *v.* Mencely .	N. Y. Sup. Ct.—8 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (1 Hun) 673; 2 Thomp. & C. 540 N. Y. Ct. of App.—62 N. Y. (17 Sickels) 427; 20 Amer. Rep. 489; 2 Amer. L. T. N. S. 482; Dig. 472	25, 33
Merchant Banking Co. of London *v.* Merchants' Joint Stock Bank, Limited	9 Ch. D. 560; 47 L. J. Ch. 828; 26 W. R. 847; Dig 619	10, 80, 230, 232
Meriden Britannia Co. *v.* Parker	39 Conn. 450; 12 Amer. Rep. 401; 13 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 153; Dig 409	31, 33, 114, 126, 159, 193, 202
Merrimack M'f'g. Co. *v.* Garner	2 Abb. Pr. 318; 4 E. D. Smith, 387; R. Cox, 155; Dig. 134	161
Messerole *v.* Tynberg .	4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 410; 36 How. Pr. 14; R. Cox, 479; Dig. 300	32, 51
Metzler *v.* Wood . .	V. C.—8 Ch. D. 608 . . . . . C. A.—8 Ch. D. 606; 47 L. J. Ch. 625; 38 L. T. N. S. 541; 26 W. R. 577; Dig. 587	113, 192, 203, 216, 264
Mickle *v.* Emery . .	Seton, 4th ed. 234; Dig. 495 . .	425
Midland Electric Light and Power Co. *v.* Brush Midland Electric Light and Power Co.	26 Sol. J. 465	231
Milliken *v.* Dart . .	33 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (26 Hun) 24 . .	11
Millington *v.* Fox . .	3 My. & Cr. 338; Dig. 63 . . .	8, 12, 36, 68, 69, 109, 153, 154, 172, 190, 214, 219, 264, 288, 318, 425
Milne & Co., *In re* . .	Chitty, J.—July 6th, 1883 . . .	314
Milner *v.* Reed . .	Bryce on Trade Marks, 90; Dig. 328	233, 275, 295
Missouri (State of) *v.* Gibbs	56 Mo. (15 Pest) 133; Dig. 430 . .	6, 75, 154
Mitchell, *In re* (1) . .	7 Ch. D. 36; 46 L. J. Ch. 876; 26 W. R. 326; 1 Trade Marks, 55; Dig. 668	9, 24, 67, 69, 305

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Mitchell, *In re* (2) . .	W. N. 1878, p. 101; 1 Trade Marks, 317; Dig 611	46, 86, 313, 316, 317, 328
Mitchell *v.* Henry . .	15 Ch. D. 181; 43 L. T. N. S. 186 .	55, 72, 117, 119, 161, 308, 344
Mitchell *v.* Read (1) .	61 N. Y. 128	292
Mitchell *v.* Read (2) .	26 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (19 Hun) 418 . .	270, 271
Moet *v.* Clybouw . .	Dig. 533	36, 69, 99, 114, 202, 235
Moet *v.* Couston . .	33 Beav. 578; 10 L. T. N. S. 395; 4 N. R. 86; Dig. 235	13, 36, 111, 153, 158, 159, 201, 209, 211, 212, 214, 219
Moet *v.* Pickering . .	Fry, J.—6 Ch. D. 770 . . . . C. A.—8 Ch. D. 372; 47 L. J. Ch. 527; 38 L. T. N. S. 799; 26 W. R. 637; Dig. 567	36, 69, 99, 174, 175, 215, 426
Mogford *v.* Courtenay .	45 L. T. N. S. 303; 29 W. R. 864 .	113, 235, 237, 297
Montague *v.* Moore .	Seton, 4th ed. 238; Dig. 242 . .	233, 238, 432
Moore *v.* Craven . .	L. R. 7 Ch. 94n.	204
Moorman *v.* Hoge . .	2 Sawy. 78; 4 Am. L. T. 217; 6 Am. L. Rev. 365: Dig. 373	72, 113, 127, 182, 479, 482
Morgan *v.* McAdam .	36 L. J. Ch. 228; 15 L. T. N. S. 348; Dig. 267	55, 195, 196, 197, 198, 214, 443
Morgan *v.* Perhamus .	36 Ohio St. 517	276, 283
Morgan *v.* Rogers . .	26 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1113 . . .	34, 88, 99, 184, 269, 310
Morgan *v.* Schuyler .	79 N. Y. (34 Sickels) 490; 21 Alb. L. J. 154	113, 254, 298
Morison *v.* Moat . .	V. C.—9 Hare, 241: 20 L. J. Ch. 513; 15 Jur. 787 C. A.—21 L. J. Ch. 248; 16 Jur. 321; Dig. 110	185, 257, 258, 430
Morison *v.* Salmon . .	2 Man. & G. 385; 2 Scott, N. R. 449; 10 L. J. C. P. 91; Dig. 68	106, 145, 147, 149, 213, 214
Morris *v.* Moss . .	25 L. J. Ch. 194; Dig. 131 . . .	277, 279
Morrison *v.* Case .	9 Bl. C. C. 548; 2 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 544; Dig. 394	123, 483
Morse *v.* Cornwell. See Morse *v.* Worrell		
Morse *v.* Hall . . .	109 Mass. (13 Browne) 409 . . .	286
Morse *v.* Martin . .	Mont. Super. Ct.—Johnson, J., Feb. 28th, 1882 Montreal C. A.—Feb. 23rd, 1884	79, 318, 319
Morse *v.* Worrell . .	10 Phila. 168; 9 Am. L. Rev. 368; Codd. Dig. 242; Dig. 445	38, 52, 125
Moses *v.* Sargood, Ewen & Co.	Dig. 636	3, 55, 81, 121, 122, 124, 127
Mossop *v.* Mason . .	Upper Can. Ch.—16 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 302 V. C.—17 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 360 C. A.—18 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 453	242, 253, 280, 286
Motley *v.* Downman .	3 My. & Cr. 1; 6 L. J. Ch. N. S. 308; Dig. 61	36, 67, 69, 108, 154, 161, 167, 185

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Mouson & Co. *v.* Boehm.	26 Ch. D. 398; 32 W. R. 612 . .	100, 183, 188, 222, 313, 318
Mulkern *v.* Ward . .	L. R. 13 Eq. 619; 41 L. J. Ch. 464; 26 L. T. N. S. 831	249
Münch, *In re* . . .	50 L. T. N. S. 12	17, 67, 75, 82, 305, 313
Musselman & Clarkson's Appeal, *In re*	62 Pa. St. 81	293
Myers *v.* Baker . .	3 H. & N. 802; 28 L. J. Ex. 90; 32 L. T. 133; 7 W. R. 66; Dig. 167	106, 145, 200, 335
Neilson *v.* Betts . .	L. R. 5 H. L. 1; 40 L. J. Ch. 317; 19 W. R. 1121	158, 212
Newbery *v.* James . .	2 Mer. 446; Dig. 24	258, 260
Newby *v.* Oregon Central Railway Co.	Deady 609; 9 Amer. Rep. 331n.; Dig. 318	230
Newling *v.* Dobell . .	38 L. J. Ch. 111; 19 L. T. N. S. 408; Dig. 303	277, 283, 284
Newman *v.* Alvord . .	N. Y. Sup. Ct.—49 Barb. 588; 35 How. Pr. 108; R. Cox, 404	58, 64, 171
	N. Y. Comm. of App.—51 N. Y. (6 Sickels) 189; 10 Amer. Rep. 588; Dig. 282	
Newton *v.* Cowie . .	4 Bing. 234	471
Nichol *v.* Godts . .	10 Ex. 191; 23 L. J. Ex. 314; 2 C. L. Rep. 1468; 23 L. T. 162	179
Nixey *v.* Roffey . .	W. N. 1870, p. 227; Dig. 343 . .	196, 199, 215
North London Railway Co. *v.* Great Northern Railway Co.	11 Q. B. D. 30; 52 L. J. Q. B. 380; 48 L. T. N. S. 695; 31 W. R. 490	250
Nunn *v.* D'Albuquerque.	34 Beav. 595	210, 217, 219
Nuthall *v.* Vining . .	C. A.—Jan. 21st, 1880; 28 W. R. 330	79, 116, 117, 128, 307, 313, 318
Oldham *v.* James . .	M. R.—13 Ir. Ch. 393	177, 185
	C. A.—14 Ir. Ch. 81; Dig. 209	
Olin *v.* Bate . . .	98 Ill. 55; 38 Amer. Rep. 78 . .	232
Oliphant *v.* Salem Flouring Mills	5 Sawy. 128	200
Oliver, *Ex parte* . .	18 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 923 . . .	66, 488
Orr *v.* Diaper . . .	4 Ch. D. 92; 46 L. J. Ch. 41; 35 L. T. N. S. 468; 25 W. R. 23; Dig. 519	175, 183, 205, 207, 255
Orr-Ewing *v.* Chooneeloll Mullick	Cor. 150; Dig. 241	16, 75, 127, 159
Orr-Ewing *v.* Registrar of Trade Marks See Orr-Ewing & Co., *In re* (1).		

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Orr-Ewing & Co., *In re* (1)	V. C.—8 Ch. D. 798; 47 L. J. Ch. 180; 38 L. T. N. S. 313; 26 W. R. 259; 1 Trade Marks, 211 C. A.—8 Ch. D. 794; 47 L. J. Ch. 807; 38 L. T. N. S. 695; 26 W. R. 777; Dig. 586 H. L.—4 App. Cas. 479; 48 L. J. Ch. 707; 41 L. T. N. S. 239; 28 W. R. 17	23, 24, 85, 183, 305, 308, 312, 313, 314, 317, 319, 327, 369, 370
Orr-Ewing & Co., *In re* (2)	28 W. R. 412	150, 222, 311, 376
Orr-Ewing & Co. *v.* Grant, Smith & Co.	2 Hyde, 185.	2, 75, 77, 100, 110, 111, 154, 201
Orr-Ewing & Co. *v.* Johnston & Co.	Fry, J.—13 Ch. D. 434; 40 L. T. N. S. 307; 27 W. R. 575 C. A.—13 Ch. D. 450; 42 L. T. N. S. 67; 28 W. R. 330 H. L.—7 App. Cas. 219; 51 L. J. Ch. 797; 46 L. T. N. S. 216; Dig. 646	3, 13, 47, 107, 112, 113, 116, 122, 157, 183, 203, 316, 317, 369, 419, 423
Osgood *v.* Allen . .	1 Holmes, 185; 6 Am. L. T. 20; 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 124; Dig. 410	53, 58, 66, 265, 267
Osgood *v.* Rockwood .	11 Bl. C. C. 310; Dig. 430 . . .	481, 484
Ottoman Calvey Co. *v.* Dane	95 Ill. 203	231
Pace, Talbott & Co., *Ex parte*	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 909. . . .	32, 38, 483
Page *v.* Townsend . .	5 Sim. 395	171
Palmer, *Ex parte* . .	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 289; Dig. 378	50, 53, 58, 482
Palmer, *In re* (1) . .	Chitty, J.—21 Ch. D. 47 C. A.—21 Ch. D. 53; 51 L. J. Ch. 673; 46 L. T. N. S. 787	45, 79, 182, 304, 318, 328
Palmer, *In re* (2) . .	22 Ch. D. 88; 48 L. T. N. S. 52; 31 W. R. 33	163, 328
Palmer, *In re* (3) . .	24 Ch. D. 504; 32 W. R. 306; 50 L. T. N. S. 30	45, 46, 79, 82, 223, 304, 305, 308, 316, 318, 328, 346
Palmer *v.* Harris . .	60 Pa. St. 156; R. Cox, 523; 8 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 137; Dig. 308	51, 191, 193
Park, *In re* . . .	12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 2; Dig. 544 . .	123, 479, 483
Parker, *In re* . . .	13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 323; Dig. 582 .	72, 479, 482
Parsons *v.* Hayward .	M. R.—31 Beav. 199; 31 L. J. Ch. 666; 8 Jur. N. S. 474; 6 L. T. N. S. 523; 10 W. R. 531 L. C.—31 L. J. Ch. 666; 8 Jur. N. S. 924; 6 L. T. N. S. 628; 10 W. R. 651; Dig. 206	272, 277, 293
Partridge *v.* Menck .	2 Sandf. Ch. 622; 2 Barb. Ch. 101; 1 How. App. Cas. 558; R. Cox, 72; Dig. 91	90, 91, 121, 193, 202
Patching *v.* Dubbins .	Kay, 1; 23 L. J. Ch. 45; 17 Jur. 1113; 22 L. T. 116; 2 W. R. 2	187

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Patent Nut and Bolt Screw Co., *In re*	Chitty, J.—March 9th, 1883 . .	343
Patent Plumbago Crucible Co., *In re*	M. R.—Aug. 1st, 1879. . . .	223, 314
Paton, *In re* . . .	1 Trade Marks, 285; Dig. 601 . .	343
Peabody *v.* Norfolk .	98 Mass. (2 Browne) 452; Dig. 290 .	258
Pearson *v.* Pearson .	W. N. 1884, p. 117; L. J. Notes of Cases, p. 55; 77 L. T. (Journal), p. 30	281
Peltz *v.* Eichele . .	62 Mo. (21 Post) 171; Dig. 485 . .	26, 213, 247, 280, 283
Peper, *Ex parte* . .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 678 . . .	58, 483
Perks *v.* Hall & Co. .	W. N. 1881, p. 111	28, 32, 61, 114, 190, 202, 214, 216, 288
Perry *v.* Truefitt . .	6 Beav. 66; 1 L. T. 384; Dig. 73 . .	2, 13, 51, 55, 108, 115, 153, 154, 191, 202
Peru, Republic of, *v.* Reeves	40 N. Y. Super. Ct. (8 J. & S.) 316; Dig. 482	76, 165
Peterson *v.* Humphrey .	4 Abb. Pr. 394; R. Cox, 212; Dig. 149	273, 286, 290, 296
Phalon *v.* Wright . .	5 Phila. 464; R. Cox, 307; Dig. 232 .	14, 50, 115, 192, 202
Phelan *v.* Collender .	13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (6 Hun) 241; Dig. 479	286, 288, 295, 296
Pickford *v.* Grand Junction Railway Co.	3 Ry. Cas. 538	160, 187
Pidding *v.* How . .	8 Sim. 477; 6 L. J. Ch. N. S. 345; Dig. 60	13, 51, 55, 191
Pierce *v.* Franks . .	15 L. J. Ch. 122; 10 Jur. 25; Dig. 81 .	210, 217
Piggott *v.* Anglo-American Telegraph Co.	19 L. T. N. S. 46.	205
Pile *v.* Pile . . .	3 Ch. D. 36; 45 L. J. Ch. 841 . .	289
Polhill *v.* Walter . .	3 B. & Ad. 114	146
Ponsardin *v.* Peto . .	33 Beav. 642; 33 L. J. Ch. 371; 10 Jur. N. S. 6; 9 L. T. N. S. 567; 12 W. R. 198; 3 N. R. 237; Dig. 229	36, 159, 175
Popham *v.* Cole. See Popham *v.* Wilcox		
Popham *v.* Wilcox . .	N. Y. Super. Ct.—14 Abb. Pr. N. S. 206 N. Y. Super. Ct.—38 N. Y. Super. Ct. (6 J. & S.) 274 N. Y. Ct. of App.—66 N. Y. (21 Sickels) 69; 23 Amer. Rep. 22; Dig. 425	39, 50, 105, 119, 121, 482
Porter Blanchard's Sons, *In re*	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 97; Dig. 358	52, 482, 483
Post *v.* Marsh. . .	16 Ch. D. 395; 50 L. J. Ch. 287; 43 L. T. N. S. 628; 29 W. R. 198	190
Potter *v.* Commissioners of Inland Revenue	10 Ex. 147; 23 L. J. Ex. 345; 18 Jur. 778; 23 L. T. 269; 2 W. R. 561; Dig. 128	270, 271, 276, 277
Potter *v.* McPherson .	28 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (21 Hun) 559 . .	113, 264
Powell, *In re* . . .	1 Trade Marks, 237; Dig. 589 . .	46, 97, 313

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Powell *v.* McNulty .	Dig. 526	64
Power *v.* Barham . .	N. P.—7 C. & P. 356; 1 M. & Rob. 507	179
	K. B.—4 Ad. & E. 473; 6 N. & M. 62; 1 H. & W. 683; 5 L. J. K. B. N. S. 68; Dig. 56	
Pratt, *In re.* See *In re* Powell		
Pratt & Farmer, *In re* .	10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 866; Dig. 527 .	39, 123, 482
Prince Metallic Paint Co. *v.* Carbon Metallic Paint Co.	Codd. Dig. 209; Dig. 573 . . .	25, 120
Probasco *v.* Bouyon .	1 Mo. App. 241	31, 176, 286, 296
Prowett *v.* Mortimer .	2 Jur. N. S. 414; 27 L. T. 132; 4 W. R. 519; Dig. 141	264, 428
Prudential Assurance Co. *v.* Knott	L. R. 10 Ch. 142; 44 L. J. Ch. 192; 31 L. T. N. S. 866; 23 W. R. 249; Dig. 453	248, 249
Pullar *v.* Pullar . .	Fry, J.—April 9th, 1883 . . .	26, 202, 233
Punnett, *Ex parte* . .	16 Ch. D. 226; 50 L. J. Ch. 212; 44 L. T. N. S. 226; 29 W. R. 129	271, 272, 276, 277, 278, 279, 289
Purser *v.* Brain . .	17 L. J. Ch. 141; Dig. 92 . . .	77, 229, 235
Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co. *v.* Beall	20 Ch. D. 501; 51 L. J. Ch. 874; 46 L. T. N. S. 746; 30 W. R. 583	250, 251
Rabone, *In re.* . .	Dig. 643	87, 122, 127, 306, 313, 324, 458
Radde *v.* Norman . .	L. R. 14 Eq. 348; 41 L. J. Ch. 525; 26 L. T. N. S. 788; 20 W. R. 766; Dig. 397	5, 64, 112, 113, 125, 153, 161
Rader & Co., *In re.* .	13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 596; Dig. 612 .	50, 52, 483
Radway *v.* Coleman .	15 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 50 . . .	34, 219
Raggett *v.* Findlater .	L. R. 17 Eq. 29; 43 L. J. Ch. 64; 29 L. T. N. S. 448; 22 W. R. 53; Dig. 431	3, 21, 53, 60, 101, 114, 182, 192
Ralph, *In re* . . .	25Ch. D. 194; 53 L. J. Ch. 188; 49 L. T. N. S. 504; 32 W. R. 168	48, 51, 99, 304, 310, 318, 327, 328
Rammelsberg *v.* Mitchell.	29 Ohio St. 22	291, 297
Ransome *v.* Bentall .	3 L. J. Ch. N. S. 161; Dig. 53 . .	68, 71
Ransome *v.* Graham .	51 L. J. Ch. 897; 47 L. T. N. S. 218 .	1, 3, 33, 54, 55, 69, 71, 154, 159, 198, 204
Rawlinson *v.* Clarke .	14 M. & W. 187; 14 L. J. Ex. 361 .	273, 283, 284
R. *v.* —— . . .	Foster Cr. Cas. 439	476
R. *v.* Abbott . . .	1 Den. 273	139
R. *v.* Ardley . . .	L. R. 1 C. C. R. 301; 12 Cox, 23; 40 L. J. M. C. 85; 24 L. T. N. S. 193; 19 W. R. 478; Dig. 319	139, 141, 461
R. *v.* Avery . . .	8 C. & P. 596	135

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
R. *v.* Ball . . .	C. & M. 249.	138
R. *v.* Banks . . .	1 Esp. 144	477
R. *v.* Bryan . . .	D. & B. 265; 7 Cox, 312; 26 L. J. M. C. 84; 3 Jur. N. S. 620; 45 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 529; Dig. 147	137, 138, 139, 140
R. *v.* Carter . . .	10 Cox, 642; 17 L. T. N. S. 321; 16 W. R. 342; Dig. 287	141
R. *v.* Closs . . .	D. & B. 460; 7 Cox, 494; 27 L. J. M. C. 54; 3 Jur. N. S. 309; Dig. 155	131, 132, 137
R. *v.* Cohen . . .	8 Cox, 41	477
R. *v.* Cole . . .	2 East, P. C. 767	477
R. *v.* Collicott . . .	2 Leach, 1048	136
R. *v.* Dark . . .	1 Den. 276	139
R. *v.* Dundas . . .	6 Cox, 380; Dig. 120	26, 51, 125, 136
R. *v.* Elsworth . .	2 East, P. C. 986	136
R. *v.* Fitzgerald . .	43 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 369 . . .	477
R. *v.* Foster . . .	13 Cox, 393	139
R. *v.* Garlick . . .	1 Den. 276	139
R. *v.* Goss . . .	Bell, 208; 8 Cox, 262	139
R. *v.* Gray & Gosling .	Lloyd on Trade Marks, p. 11; Dig. 183	137
R. *v.* Hall . . .	45 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 451 . . .	138
R. *v.* Hunter . . .	10 Cox, 642; 17 L. T. N. S. 321; 16 W. R. 342; Dig. 287	141
R. *v.* Jones . . .	Lloyd on Trade Marks, p. 11; Poland on Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, p. 33; Dig. 182	137
R. *v.* Lee (1) . . .	1 Leach, 416	464
R. *v.* Lee (2) . . .	8 Cox, 233	138
R. *v.* Lee (3) . . .	9 Cox, 460	134, 141
R. *v.* Levine & Wood .	10 Cox, 374	138
R. *v.* Lewis . . .	Foster Cr. Cas. 116	135
R. *v.* Lloyd . . .	Recorder of Birmingham—Oct. 13th, 1881	132
R. *v.* Morgan . . .	1 Trade Marks, 313	474
R. *v.* O'Brien . . .	15 L. T. N. S. 419	477
R. *v.* Ogden . . .	6 C. & P. 631; Dig. 54 . . .	464
R. *v.* Priestley . .	63 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 541 . . .	138
R. *v.* Ragg . . .	8 Cox, 265	134, 140
R. *v.* Ridgway . .	3 F. & F. 838	141
R. *v.* Roberts . . .	70 L. T. (Journal), 265 . . .	464
R. *v.* Roebuck. . .	D. & B. 24; 7 Cox, 126 . . .	138, 139
R. *v.* Sherwood . .	7 Cox, 270	134, 141
R. *v.* Silversides . .	3 Q. B. 406	477
R. *v.* Sleep . . .	8 Cox, 472; L. & C. 44 . . .	477
R. *v.* Smith . . .	D. & B. 566; 8 Cox, 32; 27 L. J. M. C. 225; 4 Jur. N. S. 1003; 31 L. T. 135; 6 W. R. 495; 47 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 269; 48 *ib.* 8; Dig. 161	131, 132, 137
R. *v.* Stevens . . .	1 Cox, 83	138
R. *v.* Sunley . . .	8 Cox, 179; Bell, 145	477
R. *v.* Suter & Coulson .	10 Cox, 577; 17 L. T. N. S. 177; 16 W. R. 141; Dig. 285	136, 137, 138, 139, 464
R. *v.* White . . .	72 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 222 . . .	135

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
R. *v.* Willmett . .	3 Cox, 281	477
Read Bros. *v.* Richardson & Co.	45 L. T. N. S. 54	122, 128, 198, 204, 423
Reeves *v.* Denicke . .	12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 92; Dig. 368 . .	234, 238, 286, 288, 296
Reid *v.* Sibbald . .	18 Journ. of Jurisp. 392; Dig. 438 .	158, 248
Reinhardt *v.* Spalding .	49 L. J. Ch. 57; 28 W. R. 300 . .	52, 79, 115, 123, 166, 203, 204, 318
Renard *v.* Levinstein .	10 L. T. N. S. 94; 3 N. R. 665 . .	206
Reynolds *v.* Bullock .	47 L. J. Ch. 773; 39 L. T. N. S. 443; 26 W. R. 678; Dig. 615	279, 291
Richards *v.* Williamson .	30 L. T. N. S. 746; 22 W. R. 765; Dig. 441	32, 128
Richardson, *In re* . .	3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 120; Dig. 416 . .	48, 50, 196, 482
Richardson *v.* Peacock .	26 N. J. Eq. (11 Green), 40 . . .	284
Rillet *v.* Carlier . .	61 Barb. S. C. 435; 11 Abb. Pr. N. S. 186; Dig. 334	51, 62, 123, 154
Rivero *v.* Norris . .	Seton, 4th ed. 236; Dig. 299 . .	174, 426
Riviere & Co., *In re* .	Pearson, J.—53 L. J. Ch. 455; 49 L. T. N. S. 506 C. A.—26 Ch. D. 48; 53 L. J. Ch. 578; 32 W. R. 390 Pearson, J.—W. N. 1884, p. 75	17, 67, 75, 82, 183, 303, 309, 327, 328, 335
Roach, *In re* . . .	10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 333; Dig, 516 .	47, 50, 482
Roberts, *In re* (1) . .	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 113; Dig. 359	59, 483
Roberts, *In re* (2) . .	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 100; Dig. 360	59, 483
Roberts, *In re* (3) . .	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 101; Dig. 361	59, 483
Roberts, *In re* (4) . .	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 100; Dig. 362	50, 482
Roberts *v.* Sheldon . .	8 Biss. 398; 18 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1277 .	51, 59, 173, 203
Robertson *v.* Berry . .	50 Md. 591; 33 Amer. Rep. 328 . .	121, 154, 261
Robertson *v.* Quiddington	28 Beav. 529; Dig. 189 . . .	276, 279, 294
Robineau *v.* Charbonnel .	W. N. 1876, p. 160; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1876, p. 104; Dig. 498	113, 215, 240
Robinson, *In re* . .	29 W. R. 31	72, 117, 307, 308, 313, 344, 367, 370
Robinson *v.* Currey .	Q. B. D.—6 Q. B. D. 21; 50 L. J. Q. B. 9; 43 L. T. N. S. 504; 29 W. R. 284 C. A.—7 Q. B. D. 465; 50 L. J. Q. B. 561; 45 L. T. N. S. 368; 30 W. R. 39	462, 464
Robinson *v.* Finlay .	9 Ch. D. 487; 39 L. T. N. S. 398; 27 W. R. 294; Dig. 585	4, 37, 38, 41, 70, 71, 72, 94, 95, 102, 168, 171, 368
Rock *v.* Lazarus . .	L. R. 15 Eq. 104; 42 L. J. Ch. 105; 27 L. T. N. S. 744; 21 W. R. 215	471
Rodgers *v.* Nowill (1) .	V. C.—6 Hare, 325 C. P.—5 C. B. 109; 17 L. J. C. P. 52; 11 Jur. 1039; 10 L. T. 88; Dig. 82	7, 26, 33, 106, 108, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 154

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Rodgers *v.* Nowill (2) .	V. C.—17 Jur. 109; 1 W. R. 122 C. A.—3 De G. M. & G. 614; 22 L. J. Ch. 404; 17 Jur. 171; 20 L. T. 319; 1 W. R. 205; Dig. 115	13, 163, 164, 189
Rodgers *v.* Philp . .	1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 29; Dig. 352 . .	111, 112, 124, 125, 177, 183, 185, 187
Rodgers *v.* Rodgers. .	31 L. T. N. S. 285; Dig. 442 . .	111, 114, 187, 189, 190, 215
Rogers *v.* Taintor . .	97 Mass. (1 Browne), 291; Dig. 283 .	26, 31, 32, 94, 95, 117, 236, 278, 286
Rohland, *In re* . .	10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 980; Dig. 497 .	33, 52, 92, 482
Rolfe *v.* Rolfe . .	15 Sim. 88	283, 284
Rollins *v.* Hinks . .	L. R. 13 Eq. 355; 41 L. J. Ch. 358; 26 L. T. N. S. 56; 20 W. R. 287	249
Rolt *v.* Bulmer . .	W. N. 1878, p. 119; Dig. 614 . .	279, 291
Roper's Patent Seat Raft and Marine Life Saving Apparatus Co. *v.* Copeman's Patent Seat, Raft, and Marine Life Saving Association, Ld.	28 Sol. J., 218	9, 53, 172, 251
Rose *v.* Evans. . .	48 L. J. Ch. 618	9, 182, 304, 327
Rose *v.* Henley . .	Cited 47 L. J. Ch. 577; 38 L. T. N. S 410; Dig. 551	113, 129
Rose *v.* Loftus . .	47 L. J. Ch. 576; 38 L. T. N. S. 409; Dig. 608	107, 110, 111, 115, 129, 201, 202, 216
Rosing, *In re* . . .	Dig. 621	38, 222, 312, 313, 314, 324
Rosing *v.* Atkinson. .	27 Sol. J. 534; 75 L. T. (Journal), 128.	52, 56
Rotherham, *In re* . .	V. C.—11 Ch. D. 250; 49 L. J. Ch. 511; 40 L. T. N. S. 387; 27 W. R. 503 C. A.—14 Ch. D. 585; 49 L. J. Ch. 513; 43 L. T. N. S. 1; Dig. 647	60, 151, 223, 338, 344
Rothschild, *In re* . .	7 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 220; Dig. 456 . .	479
Routh *v.* Webster . .	10 Beav. 561; 11 Jur. 701; 9 L. T. 491; Dig. 386	219, 246, 248, 437
Rowe, *In re* . . .	48 L. T. N. S. 388	327
Rowe & Post, *In re* .	9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 496; Dig. 491 . .	30, 232, 483
Rowland *v.* Breidenbach.	Cited 1 Trade Marks, 261; Dig. 386 .	50, 101
Rowley *v.* Houghton .	2 Brews. 303; 7 Phila. 39; 2 Cox, 486; Dig. 301	51, 77, 78, 80, 118, 121
Roworth *v.* Wilkes . .	1 Camp. 94	471
Royal Baking Powder Co., *In re*	V. C.—W. N. 1879, p. 108; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1879, p. 101 C. A.—W. N. 1880, p. 49	82, 305
Royal Baking Powder Co. *v.* Sherrill	59 How. Pr. 17	58, 125
Rubber Clothing Co., *In re*	10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 111; Dig. 507 . .	33, 232, 483

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Rudderow *v.* Huntington	3 Sandf. S. C. 252; R. Cox, 106; Dig. 101	148, 159
Russell *v* Crichton . .	Ct. Sess. Cas. 1st Ser. XV. 1270 . .	206
Russell & Sons, Limited *v.* Smith	M. R.—June 18th, 1880 . . .	82, 116, 305
Rust & Co., *In re* . .	44 L. T. N. S. 98; 29 W. R. 393 . .	171, 328
Rutter *v.* Daniel . .	Fry, J.—46 L. T. N. S. 681; 30 W. R. 724 C. A.—30 W. R. 801	270, 271
Safety Powder Co., *Ex parte*	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 136	50, 482
St. Louis Piano Manufacturing Co. *v.* Merkel	1 Mo. App. 305	19, 78
Salamon, *In re* . .	1 Trade Marks, 135; Dig. 569 . .	86, 347
Sales, Pollard & Co., *Ex parte*	Dig. 620	46, 313, 316, 328, 329
Samuel *v.* Berger . .	24 Barb. 163; 13 How. Pr. 342; 4 Abb. Pr. 83; R. Cox, 178; Dig. 143	177, 185, 194
Sander *v.* Hoffmann .	64 N. Y. (19 Sickels) 248 . . .	283, 284
Saunion & Co., *In re* .	Dig. 625	50, 56, 194, 315
Sawyer *v.* Kellogg . .	19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1627; 20 *ib.* 1893 .	100, 122, 123, 187, 188, 202, 210, 220
Saxby *v.* Easterbrook .	3 C. P. D. 339; 27 W. R. 188; Dig. 606	250
Saxony, *Ex parte* King of	1 Trade Marks, 245; Dig. 598 . .	76, 348
Sayer *v.* Dicey . .	3 Wils. 60	471
Scaramanga *v.* Stamp .	5 C. P. D. 295; 49 L. J. C. P. 674; 42 L. T. N. S. 840; 28 W. R. 691	v.
Scholle *v.* Brakell . .	11 W. R. 796; Seton, 4th ed. 253; Dig. 219	235, 435
Schrander *v.* Beresford .	U. S. Pat. Office, June 27th, 1872 .	122
Schumacher & Ettlinger, *Ex parte* (1)	19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 791 . . .	479
Schumacher & Ettlinger, *Ex parte* (2)	22 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1291 . . .	479
Schweitzer *v.* Atkins .	37 L. J. Ch. 847; 19 L. T. N. S. 6; 16 W. R. 1080; Dig. 298	114, 125, 235
Scott *v.* Mackintosh .	1 V. & B. 503; Dig. 20 . . .	277, 285
Scott *v.* Rowland . .	26 L. T. N. S. 391; 20 W. R. 508; Dig. 393	236, 277, 278, 285, 286
Scott *v.* Scott . . .	16 L. T. N. S. 143; Dig. 268 . .	237, 238, 295 433
Scoville *v.* Toland . .	6 West. L. J. 84; Dig. 97 . . .	15, 267
Seabury *v.* Grosvenor .	14 Bl. C. C. 262; 53 How. Pr. 192; 14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 679; Dig. 562	190
Sedon *v.* Senate . .	Cited 2 V. & B. 220; Dig. 18 . .	113, 254, 258, 280
Seeley *v.* Fisher . .	11 Sim. 581; 10 L. J. Ch. N. S. 274; 21 Leg. Obs. 474; Dig. 67	215, 219
Seixo *v.* Provezende .	L. R. 1 Ch. 192; 12 Jur. N. S. 215; 14 L. T. N. S. 314; 14 W. R. 357; Dig. 256	2, 12, 36, 65, 121, 125, 422

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Selby *v.* Anchor Tube Co.	W. N. 1877, p. 191; Dig. 566 . .	235, 237, 238, 239, 281, 297, 298, 435
Seltzer *v.* Powell . .	8 Phila. 296; Dig. 374	52, 77, 150, 154
Shackle *v.* Baker . .	14 Ves. 468; Dig. 13	277, 280
Shaver *v.* Shaver . .	54 Iowa, 208; 37 Amer. Rep. 194 .	26, 124, 201, 202, 233, 244
Shepherd *v.* Trustees of Port of Bombay	Ind. L. R. 1 Bomb. 132 . . .	249
Sherwood *v.* Andrews .	3 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 588; Dig. 263 .	32, 44, 50, 90, 91, 193
Shipwright *v.* Clements .	19 W. R. 599; Dig. 350 . . .	10, 88, 92, 93, 210, 268, 276, 279, 282, 283, 291, 310
Shrimpton *v.* Laight .	18 Beav. 164; Dig. 123 . . .	59, 121
Siegert *v.* Ehlers . .	Cited 7 Ch. D. 803; 38 L. T. N. S. 351; Dig. 432	62, 123, 173, 203, 254
Siegert *v.* Findlater .	7 Ch. D. 801; 47 L. J. Ch. 233; 38 L. T. N. S. 349; 26 W. R. 459; Dig. 591	43, 48, 49, 50, 62, 64, 77, 112, 113, 115, 123, 127, 162, 173, 188, 194, 202, 203, 254, 425
Simpson *v.* Anglo-Indian Tea Co., Ld.	V. C. B.—May 4th, 1883 . . .	230
Simpson *v.* Chapman .	4 De G. M. & G. 154	293, 295
Simpson *v.* Wright (1) .	15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 248 . . .	95, 102, 188, 484
Simpson *v.* Wright (2) .	15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 293 . . .	481, 484
Simpson & Sons, *In re* .	10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 333; Dig. 508 .	479
Simpson, Davies & Sons, *In re*	15 Ch. D. 525; 42 L. T. N. S. 675; 28 W. R. 760—Jan. 12th, 1881	9, 21, 78, 85, 86, 305, 309, 317, 347
Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.* Kimball & Morton	Ct. of Sess. Cas., 3rd Ser. XI., 267; 10 Scot. L. Rep. 173; Dig. 413	14, 49, 75, 115, 152, 154, 227
Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.* Larsen	8 Biss. 181	49
Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.* Loog (1)	Dig. 635	165
Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.* Loog (2)	11 Ch. D. 656; 48 L. J. Ch. 649; 27 W. R. 903	160
Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.* Loog (3)	V. C.—18 Ch. D. 395 C. A.—18 Ch. D. 412; 44 L. T. N. S. 888; 29 W. R. 699 H. of L.—8 App. Cas. 15; 52 L. J. Ch. 481; 48 L. T. N. S. 3; 31 W. R. 325	7, 44, 49, 107, 109, 110, 112, 114, 120, 121, 143, 145, 146, 147, 153, 154, 155, 157, 167, 201, 202, 226, 227, 228, 255, 263
Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.* Stanage	2 McCrary, 512; 6 Fed. Rep. 279 .	48, 49

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.* Wilson	M. R.—2 Ch. D. 434; 45 L. J. Ch. 491; 34 L. T. N. S. 858; 24 W. R. 1023 C. A.—2 Ch. D. 448; 45 L. J. Ch. 490; 34 L. T. N. S. 863; 24 W. R. 1026. H. L.—3 App. Cas. 376; 47 L. J. Ch. 481; 38 L. T. N. S. 303; 26 W. R. 664; Dig. 477	7, 12, 15, 17, 19, 37, 41, 44, 48, 73, 80, 98, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 121, 142, 146, 149, 151, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 166, 195, 202, 203, 226, 227
Singleton *v.* Bolton	3 Doug. 293; Dig. 4	6, 96, 106, 145, 257, 259
Skinner v. Oakes	10 Mo. App. 45	88, 184
Smalo *v.* Graves	3 De G. & Sm. 706; 19 L. J. Ch. 157; 14 Jur. 662; 15 L. T. 179; Dig. 102	275, 278
Smith, *Ex parte* (1)	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 679	314, 483
Smith, *Ex parte* (2)	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 679	40, 50, 482
Smith, *Ex parte* (3)	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 764	37, 50, 482
Smith *v.* Everett	27 Beav. 446; 29 L. J. Ch. 236; 5 Jur. N. S. 1332; 34 L. T. 58; 7 W. R. 605; Dig. 176	277, 294, 297, 299
Smith *v.* Harris (1)	48 L. T. N. S. 869	208
Smith *v.* Harris (2)	C. A.—Feb. 6th, 1884	208
Smith *v.* Mason	W. N. 1875, p. 62; L. J. Notes of Cases, 1875, p. 44; Dig. 458	52, 57, 153
Smith *v.* Reynolds (1)	10 Bl. C. C. 85; 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 213; Dig. 401	480
Smith *v.* Reynolds (2)	10 Bl. C. C. 100; 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 214; Dig. 402	306, 480, 482
Smith *v.* Reynolds (3)	13 Bl. C. C. 458; Dig. 511	306, 480
Smith *v.* Sixbury	32 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (25 Hun) 232	52
Smith *v.* Smith	4 Wend. 468	273, 283, 284
Smith *v.* Woodruff	48 Barb. 438; R. Cox, 373; Dig. 276.	51, 58, 77, 192
Snowden *v.* Noah	Hopk. 347; R. Cox, 1; Dig. 41	120, 265, 266, 277, 279
Société Anonyme des Mines et Fonderies de Zinc de la Vieille Montagne *v.* Baxter	14 Bl. C. C. 261; 12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 679; Dig. 559	10, 81, 127
Sohier *v.* Johnson	111 Mass. (15 Browne) 238; Dig. 408	32, 94, 268, 278, 286, 310
Sohl *v.* Geisendorf	1 Wils. (Ind.) 60; Dig. 367	2, 3, 55, 77, 92, 101, 122, 282
Sorg *v.* Welsh.	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 910	52, 306, 479, 480
Southern *v.* How	Popham 144; Cro. Jac. 471; 2 Rolle, 28; Dig. 1	6, 143
Southorn *v.* Reynolds	12 L. T. N. S. 75; Dig. 243	64, 97, 171
Spicer *v.* James	Collyer on Partnership, 2nd ed., 104; Dig. 46	275
Spottiswoode *v.* Clarke	2 Ph. 154; 1 Coop. 254; 10 Jur. 1043; 8 L. T. 230—271; Dig. 85	2, 3, 53, 77, 161, 182, 262
Spratt *v.* Jeffery	10 B. & C. 249	277

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Spratt's Patent *v.* Ward & Co.	11 Ch. D. 240; 48 L. J. Ch. 649; 40 L. T. N. S. 250; 27 W. R. 470; Dig. 644	160
Springhead Spinning Co. *v.* Riley	L. R. 6 Eq. 561; 37 L. J. Ch. 889; 19 L. T. N. S. 64; 16 W. R. 1138	246, 249
Standish *v.* Whitwell .	14 W. R. 512; Dig. 258 . . .	38, 217
Steedman, *In re* . .	L. J. Notes of Cases, 1883, p. 83 .	72, 312
Steinthal *v.* Samson .	Dig. 546	38, 177
Stephens, *Ex parte* (1) .	24 W. R. 819; 1 Trade Marks, 13; Dig. 505	37, 86
Stephens, *Ex parte* (2) .	3 Ch. D. 659; 46 L. J. Ch. 46; 24 W. R. 963; 1 Trade Marks, 13; Dig. 510	9, 23, 36, 67, 182, 304
Stephens *v.* Brett . .	10 L. T. N. S. 231	206
Stephens *v.* De Conto .	4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 47; 30 N. Y. Super. Ct. (7 Robertson) 343; R. Cox, 442; Dig. 295	120, 265
Stephens *v.* Peel . .	16 L. T. N. S. 145; Dig. 273 . .	30, 31, 33, 125, 422
Sternberger *v.* Thalheimer	3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 120; Dig. 417 . .	52, 58, 77, 99, 481
Stetson *v.* Winsor. See Winsor *v.* Clyde.		
Stewart *v.* Gladstone .	Fry, J.—10 Ch. D. 646; 47 L. J. Ch. 423; 38 L. T. N. S. 557; 26 W. R. 657 C. A.—10 Ch. D. 626; 40 L. T. N. S. 145; 27 W. R. 512; Dig. 605	291, 292, 293
Stevens *v.* Keating . .	2 Ph. 333; 2 Webs. P. C. 176 . .	161
Stevens *v.* Paine . .	18 L. T. N. S. 600; Dig. 297 . .	235, 238
Stewart *v.* Smithson .	1 Hilt. 119; R. Cox, 175; Dig. 142 .	196
Stimpson *v.* Pond . .	2 Curtis, 502	200
Stokes *v.* Landgraff .	17 Barb. 608; R. Cox, 137; Dig. 121 .	3, 53
Stone *v.* Carlan . .	13 Monthly L. R. 360; R. Cox, 115; Dig. 104	243, 255
Stonebraker *v.* Stonebraker	33 Md. 252; Dig. 333	26, 110, 154, 209
Strahan & Co. *v.* King & Co.	Dig. 539	262
Straiton & Storm, *Ex parte*	18 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 923 . . .	73, 488
Strasburger & Co., *Ex parte*	20 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 155 . . .	51, 479, 484, 488, 489, 492, 493
Sullivan & Burke, *Ex parte*	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 765 . . .	32, 38, 485
Swezey & Dart, *In re* .	62 How. Pr. 215	90, 93
Swift *v.* Dey . . .	27 N. Y. Super. Ct. (4 Robertson) 611; R. Cox, 319; Dig. 245	121, 163
Swift *v.* Peters . .	11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1110; Dig. 554 .	14, 33, 76, 77, 102, 168, 484
Sykes, *In re* . . .	43 L. T. N. S. 626; 29 W. R. 235 .	4, 87, 168, 313, 370
Sykes *v.* Sykes . .	3 B. & Cr. 541; 5 D. & R. 202; 3 L. J. K. B. 46; Dig. 40	7, 12, 106, 107, 143, 145, 146, 196, 201, 213

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Tallcott *v.* Moore	13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (6 Hun) 106; Dig. 478	121, 215, 265
Taylor *v.* Ashton	11 M. & W. 415; 12 L. J. Ex. 363; 7 Jur. 978	106, 145
Taylor *v.* Bemis	4 Biss. 406; Dig. 231	88, 94, 98, 169, 184, 269, 310
Taylor *v.* Bothin	5 Sawy. 584	328
Taylor *v.* Carpenter (1)	3 Story, 458; R. Cox, 14; Dig. 78	16, 51, 75, 203
Taylor *v.* Carpenter (2)	2 Wood & M. 1; R. Cox, 32; 9 L. T. 514; Dig. 83	51, 75, 148
Taylor *v.* Carpenter (3)	2 Sandf. Ch. 603; 11 Paige, 292; R. Cox, 45; Dig. 84	15, 51, 75, 201, 202
Taylor *v.* Gillies	N. Y. C. P.—5 Daly, 285 N. Y. Ct. of App.—59 N. Y. (14 Sickels) 331; 17 Amer. Rep. 333; Dig. 448	53, 172, 305
Taylor *v.* Taylor	2 Eq. Rep. 290; 23 L. J. Ch. 255; 22 L. T. 271; Dig. 124	26, 31, 33, 51, 63, 125
Thomas, *Ex parte*	2 Mont. D. & De G. 294; 10 L. J. Bky. 75; 5 Jur. 967; Dig. 69	272, 277
Thomas, *In re*	14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 821; Dig. 634	37, 482, 483
Thomas *v.* Williams	14 Ch. D. 864; 49 L. J. Ch. 605; 43 L. T. N. S. 91; 28 W. R. 983	160, 251, 252, 436
Thompson *v.* Dunn	L. R. 5 Ch. 573; 18 W. R. 854	206
Thompson, Derby & Co., *Ex parte*	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 137	51, 482
Thompson *v.* Symonds	5 T. R. 41	471
Thomson *v.* Winchester	19 Pick. 214; R. Cox, 7; Dig. 59	14, 50
Thorley's Cattle Food Co. *v.* Massam	6 Ch. D. 582; 46 L. J. Ch. 713; Dig. 564 V. C.—14 Ch. D. 763; 41 L. T. N. S. 543; 28 W. R. 295 C. A.—14 Ch. D. 781; 42 L. T. N. S. 851; 28 W. R. 966	250, 252, 436
Thornbury *v.* Bevill	1 Y. & C. Ch. 554; 6 Jur. 407; Dig. 71	274, 206
Thornton *v.* Crowley	47 N. Y. Super. Ct. (15 J. & S.) 527	115, 123, 203
Tipping *v.* Clarke	2 Hare, 383	257, 258
Tolle, *In re*	2 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 415; Dig. 405	37, 66, 72, 177, 185, 482
Tonge *v.* Ward	21 L. T. N. S. 480; Dig. 321	32, 125, 158, 173, 211, 214, 219
Town *v.* Stetson	4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 218; 3 Daly, 53; R. Cox, 514; Dig. 306	50
Tucker Manufacturing Co. *v.* Boyington	9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 455; Dig. 474	39, 48, 50, 123
Tudor *v.* Tudor	W. N. 1873, p. 72; Dig. 419	176, 236, 237, 248, 286
Turner *v.* Evans	C. A.—2 De G. M. & G. 740 Q. B.—2 E. & B. 512; 22 L. J. Q. B. 412; 17 Jur. 1073; 21 L. T. 153; 1 W. R. 434; Dig. 114	283, 284
Turner *v.* Major	3 Giff. 442; 8 Jur. N. S. 909; 5 L. T. N. S. 600; 10 W. R. 243; Dig. 202	277, 286, 289, 299

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Tweed *v.* Mills . .	L. R. 1 C. P. 39	277
Twentsche Stoom Bleekery Goor *v.* Ellinger & Co.	26 W. R. 70; Dig. 583 . . .	113, 173, 220, 319
Union Paper Collar Co. *v.* Metropolitan Collar Co.	3 Daly, 171	206
United States *v.* Marble .	22 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1366 . . .	39, 479
United States *v.* Morris .	2 Bond, 23	200
United States *v.* Roche .	1 McCrary, 385	163, 479, 484
United States *v.* Steffens.	100 U. S. Rep. (10 Otto) 82; 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 999; 20 Alb. L. J. 447	77, 479, 484, 485, 493
Upmann *v.* Elkan . .	M. R.—L. R. 12 Eq. 140; 40 L. J. Ch. 475; 24 L. T. N. S. 896; 19 W. R. 867 L. C.—L. R. 7 Ch. 130; 41 L. J. Ch. 246; 25 L. T. N. S. 813; 20 W. R. 131; Dig. 369	159, 174, 175, 215, 218, 219, 221, 426
Upmann *v.* Forester .	24 Ch. D. 231; 52 L. J. Ch. 946; 49 L. T. N. S. 122; 32 W. R. 28	110, 111, 175, 201, 220, 221
Van Beil *v.* Prescott .	N. Y. Super. Ct.—46 N. Y. Super. Ct. (14 J. & S.) 542 N. Y. Ct. of App.—82 N. Y. (37 Sickels) 630	51, 318
Vergaras, *In re* . .	V. C. H.—June 3rd, 1881 . . .	47, 313
Vickery *v.* Welch . .	19 Pick. 523; Dig. 62	258, 283
Vidvard & Sheehan, *In re*	8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 143; Dig. 469 . .	480
Volta Belt Co., *In re* .	8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 144; Dig. 468 . .	480
Vulcan Match Manufacturing Co. *v.* Knos & Co.	Pearson, J.—June 22nd., 1883 . .	125
Wade *v.* Jenkins . .	2 Giff. 509; 30 L. J. Ch. 633; 7 Jur. N. S. 39; 3 L. T. N. S. 464; Dig. 192	277, 292
Waeferling, *Ex parte* .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 764. . . .	50, 479, 482
Walkden Aerated Waters Co., *In re*	1 Trade Marks, 39; Dig. 558 . .	38, 46, 47, 312, 313
Walker & Co., *Ex parte* .	Dig. 624	330
Walker *v.* Alley . .	13 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 366 . .	112, 113, 154, 156, 241
Walker *v.* Hawxhurst .	5 Bl. C. C. 494	200
Walker *v.* Mottram .	19 Ch. D. 355; 51 L. J. Ch. 108; 45 L. T. N. S. 659; 30 W. R. 165	247, 280, 281, 282, 298
Wallace & Co. *v.* King & Co.	Bombay High Ct., Bayley, J.—April 30th, 1879	119, 123, 217, 317
Wallis *v.* Wallis . .	4 Dr. 458; 28 L. J. Ch. 441; 7 W. R. 313	216, 219, 220
Walter *v.* Head . .	M. R.—W. N. 1881, p. 124; 25 Sol. J. 742 C. A.—25 Sol. J. 757	264, 428

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Walton *v.* Crowley . .	3 Bl. C. C. 440; R. Cox, 166; Dig. 138	11, 89, 121, 153, 310
Wamsutta Mills *v.* Allen.	12 Phila. 535	4, 125, 127, 168
Warburg & Co., *In re* .	13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 44; Dig. 571 . .	50, 56, 66, 194, 315, 482
Ward *v.* Beeton . .	L. R. 19 Eq. 207; 23 W. R. 533; Dig. 450	176, 247, 266
Ward *v.* Drat . . .	L. J. Notes of Cases, 1878, p. 67; Dig. 607	250
Ward *v.* Robinson. See Robinson *v.* Finlay		
Ward, Sturt & Sharp, *In re*	50 L. J. Ch. 347; 44 L. T. N. S. 97; 29 W. R. 395	328, 349, 370
Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Co. *v.* Haish	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 465. . . .	255
Wason *v.* Waring . .	15 Beav. 151	185
Weaver, *In re* . .	10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1; Dig. 501 . .	52, 84, 123, 483
Webster *v.* Webster .	3 Swanst. 490; Dig. 7	11, 248, 286
Wedderburn *v.* Wedderburn	22 Beav. 84; 25 L. J. Ch. 710; 2 Jur. N. S. 674; 28 L. T. 4; Dig. 139	294
Wedgwood *v.* Smith .	Dig. 96	31 32
Weed *v.* Peterson . .	12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 178; Dig. 387 . .	31, 90, 92, 158, 201, 212, 219, 247
Weisert Bros., *Ex parte* .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 680 . . .	314, 483
Welch *v.* Knott . .	4 K. & J. 747; 4 Jur. N. S. 330; Dig. 157	34, 129, 153
Weldon *v.* Dicks . .	10 Ch. D. 247; 48 L. J. Ch. 201; 39 L. T. N. S. 467; 27 W. R. 639; Dig. 638	100, 188, 266, 267
Western Counties Manure Co. *v.* Lawes Chemical Manure Co.	L. R. 9 Ex. 218; 43 L. J. Ex. 171; 123 W. R. 5	249
Weston *v.* Hemmons .	2 Vict.—L. R. Eq. 121; Dig. 517 .	33, 58, 258, 430
Weston *v.* Ketcham (1) .	39 N. Y. Super. Ct. (7 J. & S.) 54; Dig. 455	10, 31, 33, 90, 95, 98, 105, 170, 171, 184, 188, 259, 269, 290, 292, 310
Weston *v.* Ketcham (2) .	51 How. Pr. 455; Dig. 487 . .	33, 65, 90, 94, 95, 98, 105, 170, 184, 259, 269, 290, 310
Wheeler *v.* Johnston .	3 L. R. Ir. 284	5, 9, 10, 19, 21, 23, 64, 78, 79, 98, 113, 120, 154, 162, 165, 203, 217, 241, 253, 317, 318, 433
Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Co. *v.* Shakespear	39 L. J. Ch. 36; Dig. 322 . . .	48, 100, 185, 255, 435
Whiteley, *In re* . .	43 L. T. N. S. 627; 29 W. R. 235; Dig. 641	87, 122, 127, 313

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Whitney *v.* Hickling .	5 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 605 . . .	115, 123, 253, 258
Whittaker *v.* Howe .	3 Beav. 383; Dig. 66 . . .	274, 283
Whyte, *In re* . . .	U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis., 1871, 304; Dig. 380	479
Wilder *v.* Wilder . .	Cited 2 Sawy. 78—89; Dig. 372. .	26, 33, 113, 127
Wilkie *v.* McCulloch .	Ct. of Sess. Cas. 1st Ser. II. (2 S.) 413; (New ed. 369)	7, 32
Willett *v.* Blanford .	1 Hare, 253; 11 L. J. Ch. 182; 6 Jur. 274; Dig. 70	293, 295
William Dixon, Ld., *In re*	M. R.—April 4th, 1879 . . .	312
Williams *v.* Adams. .	8 Biss. 452	51, 58, 100, 188
Williams *v.* Johnson .	2 Bos. 1; R. Cox, 214; Dig. 150. .	51, 115, 126, 202
Williams *v.* Osborne .	13 L. T. N. S. 498; Dig. 251 . .	112, 214, 219, 220, 223, 240, 263
Williams *v.* Spence . .	25 How. Pr. 366; R. Cox, 305; Dig. 225	51, 58
Williams *v.* Williams (1).	3 Mer. 157; Dig. 26	257, 260
Williams *v.* Williams (2).	2 Swanst. 253; 1 Wils. 473; Dig. 29 .	283
Williams *v.* Wilson . .	4 Sandf. Ch. 379	278, 283, 290
Wilson *v.* Maxfield . .	L. J. Notes of Cases, 1875, p. 51; Dig. 459	112, 120, 166
Wilson *v.* Singer Manufacturing Co. . .	16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1091 . . .	197, 200, 335
Winsor *v.* Clyde . .	9 Phila. 513; Dig. 396 . . .	154, 169, 243
Witt *v.* Corcoran . .	Seton, 4th ed. 257; 2 Ch. D. 69; 45 L. J. Ch. 603; 34 L. T. N. S. 550; 24 W. R. 501; Dig. 423	235, 236, 238, 433, 435
Witthaus *v.* Braun . .	14 Md. 303; 22 Amer. Rep. 44; Dig. 492	10, 88, 98, 105, 161, 169, 184, 259, 268, 269, 310
Wolfe *v.* Barnett . .	24 La. Ann. 97; 13 Amer. Rep. 111; Dig. 390	15, 187, 202
Wolfe *v.* Burke . .	N. Y. Sup. Ct.—7 N. Y. Sup. Ct. (7 Lans.) 151; 2 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 441 N. Y. Ct. of App.—56 N. Y. (11 Sickels) 115; Dig. 434	190, 192, 251
Wolfe *v.* Goulard . .	18 How. Pr. 64; R. Cox, 226; Dig. 179	50, 57, 100, 113, 114, 127
Wolfe *v.* Hart. . .	4 Vict. L. R. Eq. 125; Dig. 653 . .	50, 113, 121, 124, 162
Wolmershausen *v.* O'Connor	36 L. T. N. S. 921; Dig. 552 . .	238, 283, 297, 298
Woodman *v.* United States	15 Ct. of Cl. 541	479
Woods *v.* Sands . .	Codd. Dig. 50; Dig. 467 . . .	90, 242, 253, 283, 286
Woodward *v.* Lazar .	21 Cal. 448; R. Cox, 300; Dig. 212 .	154, 242, 279
Woollam *v.* Ratcliff .	1 H. & M. 259; Dig. 217 . . .	113, 119, 127, 183, 214, 255, 256
Worral *v.* Hand . .	Peake, 105; Dig. 6.	276
Worthington & Co., *In re*	14 Ch. D. 8; 49 L. J. Ch. 646; 42 L. T. N. S. 563; 28 W. R. 747; Dig. 655	38, 118, 121, 122, 307, 313, 314

Name of Case.	References.	Page where cited.
Wotherspoon & Co. *v.* Currie	V. C.—22 L. T. N. S. 260; 18 W. R. 562 C. A.—42 L. J. Ch. 130; 23 L. T. N. S. 443; 18 W. R. 942 H. L.—L. R. 5 H. L. 508; 42 L. J. Ch. 130; 27 L. T. N. S. 393; Dig. 329	37, 63, 64, 113, 115, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 181, 201, 202, 215, 424
Wotherspoon & Co. *v.* Gray & Co.	Ct. of Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. II. 38; Dig. 227	50, 166, 254
Wren *v.* Weild . .	L. R. 4 Q. B. 730; 38 L. J. Q. B. 88; 20 L. T. N. S. 277	249
Wright *v.* Simpson . .	15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 968 . . .	58, 95, 102, 188, 479, 485
Wylam *v.* Clarke . .	W. N. 1876, p. 68; Dig. 488 . .	120, 215
Young, *Ex parte* . .	Dig. 537	69, 93, 269
Young *v.* Jones Bros. & Co.	3 Hughes, 274	31, 90, 95, 268, 288, 294, 296
Young *v.* Macrae . .	9 Jur. N. S. 322; Dig. 205 . . .	5, 42, 43, 48, 50, 57, 101
Yovatt *v.* Winyard . .	1 Jac. & W. 394; Dig. 31 . . .	113, 257
Zimmerman *v.* Erhard .	83 N. Y. (38 Sickels) 74 . . .	280

TABLE OF DEFENDANTS.

ABBOTT—R. *v.*
Abrahams—Hier *v.*
Adams—Hostetter *v.*
Adams—Williams *v.*
Aleploglu—Gout *v.*
Alexander—Jurgensen *v.*
Allen—Kinney *v.*
Allen—Osgood *v.*
Allen—Wamsutta Mills *v.*
Alley—Walker *v.*
Alvord—Newman *v.*
American Leather Cloth Co.—Leather Cloth Co. *v.*
Anchor Tube Co.—Selby *v.*
Anderson—Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. *v.*
Andrews—Sherwood *v.*
Anglo-American Telegraph Co.—Piggott *v.*
Anglo-Indian Tea Co., Limited—Simpson *v.*
Apollinaris Co.—Fisher *v.*
Ardley—R. *v.*
Armistead—Blackwell *v.*
Ashford—Graves *v.*
Ashton—Taylor *v.*
Atkins—Schweitzer *v.*
Atkinson—Rosing *v.*
Australian & New Zealand Mortgage Co.—Australian Mortgage, Land & Finance Co. *v.*
Avery—R. *v.*

BACHOF—Frese *v.*
Badger—Emerson *v.*
Bailey—Gardner *v.*
Baird—Colladay *v.*
Baker—Myers *v.*
Baker—Shackle *v.*
Bakers' and Confectioners' Tea Association—Abbott *v.*
Ball—R. *v.*
Balls—Gaskin *v.*
Balmer—Lamplough *v.*
Bank of London—Lawson *v.*
Bank of Whitehaven—Dawson *v.*
Banks—R. *v.*
Barham—Power *v.*
Barlow—Broadhurst *v.*
Barnett—Wolfe *v.*
Barrett—Leggott *v.*
Barrow—Barrow *v.*
Barrows—Hall *v.*
Basch—Kinney *v.*
Bassett—McAndrew *v.*
Batchellor—Batchellors *v.*
Bate—Olin *v.*
Baxter—Société Anonyme des Mines et Fonderies de Zinc de la Vielle Montagne *v.*
Beachim—Braham *v.*
Beall—Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co. *v.*
Beddow—Beddow *v.*
Bedford—Bury *v.*
Beedzler—Lamplough *v.*
Beeson—Dawson *v.*
Beeton—Bradbury *v.*
Beeton—Ward *v.*
Belcher—McIntyre *v.*
Bell—Arundell *v.*
Bell & Co.—Bell, Black & Co. *v.*
Bemis—Taylor *v.*
Benbow—Edmonds *v.*
Bennett—Hudson *v.*
Bensel—Linde *v.*
Bentall—Ransome *v.*
Bentley—Ainsworth *v.*
Beresford—Schrander *v.*
Berger—Samuel *v.*
Bernales—Hinrichs *v.*
Berry—Robertson *v.*
Betts—Neilson *v.*

Bevill—Thornbury *v.*
Billings—Marsh *v.*
Binning—Day *v.*
Blackman—Filkins *v.*
Blackwell—Armistead *v.*
Blackwell—Braun & Co. *v.*
Blackwell—McElwee *v.*
Blanford—Willett *v.*
Bloomer—Bloss *v.*
Boehm—Mouson & Co. *v.*
Bohmer—Duwel *v.*
Bolles—Fenn *v.*
Bolton—Kinahan *v.*
Bolton—Singleton *v.*
Bostwick—Lockwood *v.*
Bothin—Taylor *v.*
Bonyon—Probasco *v.*
Bowker—Carver *v.*
Boyington—Tucker Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Boys—Austen *v.*
Bradley—Coe *v.*
Brain—Purser *v.*
Brakell—Scheile *v.*
Bramble, Wilkins & Co.—Marcovitch *v.*
Brand—Dence *v.*
Braun—Witthaus *v.*
Breidenbach—Rowland *v.*
Brett—Stephens *v.*
Brewster—Constable & Co. *v.*
British Tea and Trading Association, Limited—Hanson *v.*
Broadaway—Baumgarten *v.*
Brooks—Dicks *v.*
Brotherhood—Halsey *v.*
Broughton—Broughton *v.*
Brown—Collins Co. *v.*
Brownrigg—Day *v.*
Brunton—Coffeen *v.*
Brush Midland Electric Light and Power Co.—Midland Electric Light and Power Co. *v.*
Bryan—Cutis *v.*
Bryar—R. *v.*
Bullock—Reynolds *v.*
Bulmer—Rolt *v.*
Burckhardt—Burckhardt *v.*
Burgess—Burgess *v.*
Burke—Wolfe *v.*
Burleson—Butler *v.*
Bustard—Braham *v.*
Byles—Kelly *v.*

CAMPBELL—Charleson *v.*
Capital and County Deposit Bank—Capital and Counties Bank Limited *v.*
Carbon Metallic Paint Co.—Prince Metallic Paint Co. *v.*
Carlan—Stone *v.*
Carlier—Rillet *v.*
Carlile—Cartier *v.*
Carpenter—Taylor *v.*
Carter—R. *v.*
Case—Morrison *v.*
Cassin—Burke *v.*
Caswell—Hazard *v.*
Cathery—Farina *v.*
Chadsey—Genin *v.*
Chandler—Cocks *v.*
Chapman—Bullock *v.*
Chapman—Simpson *v.*
Charbonnel—Robineau *v.*
Cheltenham Railway Co.—Gordon *v.*
Child—Filley *v.*
Choonecloll Mullick—Orr-Ewing *v.*
Christie—Christie *v.*
Clark—Canal Co. *v.*
Clark—Clark *v.*
Clarke—Rawlinson *v.*
Clarke—Spottiswoode *v.*
Clarke—Tipping *v.*
Clarke—Wylam *v.*
Cleave—McNair *v.*
Clements—Shipwright *v.*
Closs—R. *v.*
Clybouw—Moet *v.*
Clyde—Winsor *v.*
Cocks—Brooks *v.*
Cohen—Choynski *v.*
Cohen—R. *v.*
Coker—Hitchcock *v.*
Cole—Popham *v.*
Cole—R. *v.*
Coleman—Radway *v.*
Collender—Phelan *v.*
Collicott—R. *v.*
Collingridge—Cook *v.*
Collins—Crawshay *v.*
Commissioners of Inland Revenue—Potter *v.*
Connolly—Baxter *v.*
Cooper—Hennessy *v.*
Cooper & Co.—Ginesi *v.*
Cope—Dakin *v.*
Copeman's Patent Seat Raft and Marine Life-Saving Association, Limited—Roper's Patent Seat-Raft and Marine Life-Saving Apparatus Co. *v.*
Corcoran—Witt *v.*
Cornwell—Morse *v.*
Courtenay—Mogford *v.*
Couston—Moet *v.*
Cowen—Collins Co. *v.*

Cowie—Newton *v.*
Crabb—Blackwell *v.*
Craven—Moore *v.*
Crichton—Russell *v.*
Crowley—Thornton *v.*
Crowley—Walton *v.*
Crump—Colman *v.*
Cumston—Hallett *v.*
Curling—England *v.*
Currey—Robinson *v.*
Currie—Wotherspoon *v.*
Cutter—Hardy *v.*

D'Albuquerque—Numa *v.*
Daly—Corwen *v.*
Daly—Isaacs *v.*
Dane—Ottoman Cabvey Co. *v.*
Daniel—Rutter *v.*
Dannenhoffer—Huwer *v.*
Dark—R. *v.*
Darley—Hagg *v.*
Dart—Milliken *v.*
Davidson—Chappell
Davies—Dawes *v.*
Davis—Caswell *v.*
Davol Mills—Ferguson *v.*
Dawber—Bass *v.*
Dawson—Labouchere *v.*
Day—Clayton *v.*
Day—Croft *v.*
Day—Day *v.*
Day—Emperor of Austria *v.*
Dean—Civil Service Supply Association *v.*
Decker—Decker *v.*
De Conto—Stephens *v.*
Deere & Co.—Candee, Swan & Co. *v.*
Denham—Hirst *v.*
Denicke—Reeves *v.*
Depatie—Bondier *v.*
De Tastet—Brown *v.*
Devlin—Devlin *v.*
Dewes—Chissum *v.*
Dey—Swift *v.*
Diaper—Orr *v.*
Dibrell—Blackwell *v.*
Dicey—Sayer *v.*
Dick—Manger *v.*
Dickens—Bradbury *v.*
Dicks—Weldon *v.*
Dobell—Newling *v.*
Dorflinger—Consolidated Fruit Jar Co. *v.*
Douglas—Churton *v.*
Douglas—Hammond *v.*
Downman—Motley *v.*
Downs—England *v.*

Drat—Ward *v.*
Dubbins—Patching *v.*
Du Boulay—Du Boulay *v.*
Duncan—Hoffman *v.*
Dundas—R. *v.*
Dunn—Thompson *v.*
D'Utassey—Faber *v.*

Easterbrook—Saxby *v.*
Edelsten—Edelsten *v.*
Edgington—Edgington *v.*
Edmonton—Clegg *v.*
Edwards—Apollinaris Co.
Ehlers—Siegert *v.*
Ehrhart—Lee *v.*
Eichele—Peltz *v.*
Elkan—Upmann *v.*
Ellinger & Co.—Twentsche Stoom Bleekery Goor *v.*
Elsworth—R. *v.*
Emery—Mickle *v.*
Erhard—Zimmerman *v.*
Ertheiler—Carroll *v.*
Estcourt Hop Essence Co.—Estcourt *v.*
Esterbrook—Gillott *v.*
Evans—Brook *v.*
Evans—Cope *v.*
Evans—Rose *v.*
Evans—Turner *v.*
Everett—Smith *v.*

Faber—Faber *v.*
Farlow—Bozon *v.*
Fassett—Filley *v.*
Faweus—Dixon *v.*
Fenwick—Featherstonhaugh *v.*
Field—Bonner *v.*
Finch—Day *v.*
Findlater—Raggett *v.*
Findlater—Siegert *v.*
Finlay—Robinson *v.*
Fisher—Seeley *v.*
Fitzgerald—R. *v.*
Flanagan—Matsell *v.*
Fleming—McLean *v.*
Flint—Leidersdorf *v.*
Floyd—Bowman *v.*
Folgham—Green *v.*
Forester—Upmann *v.*
Foster—Burrows *v.*
Foster—Ford *v.*
Foster—R. *v.*
Fox—Millington *v.*
Frangais—Hobbs *v.*
Franks—Pierce *v.*
Freeman—Browne *v.*
Freeman—Clark *v.*

Fullwood—Fullwood *v.*

Ganton—Lemoine *v.*
Gardner—Harrison *v.*
Garlick—R. *v.*
Garner—Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Garner—Merrimack Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Garnhart—McCartney *v.*
Gaubert—Ansell *v.*
Gebhardt—Farina *v.*
Geisendorf—Sohl *v.*
German Mutual Fire Insurance Co.—Clark *v.*
Gerteken—Cory *v.*
Gibbs—Missouri (State of) *v.*
Gibson—Banks *v.*
Gillard—Cotton *v.*
Gillies—Taylor *v.*
Gladstone—Stewart *v.*
Glenn—Dunbar *v.*
Goldts—Nichol *v.*
Goetze—Carter *v.*
Gomm—Barrett *v.*
Goss—R. *v.*
Goulard—Wolfe *v.*
Graham—Ransome *v.*
Grand Junction Railway Co—Pickford *v.*
Grant, Smith & Co.—Orr-Ewing *v.*
Graves—Smale *v.*
Gray—Bullock, Lade & Co. *v.*
Gray—Wotherspoon *v.*
Gray & Gosling—R. *v.*
Great Northern Railway Co.—North London Railway Co. *v.*
Green—Duke *v.*
Griffiths—Chubb *v.*
Griffiths—Corns *v.*
Grocer Publishing Co.—American Grocer Publishing Association *v.*
Grosvenor—Seabury *v.*
Grosvenor Gallery Co.—Hoby *v.*
Guardian and General Assurance Co., Limited—Guardian Fire and Life Assurance Co. *v.*
Guénin—Grillon *v.*
Guggenheim—Dixon Crucible Co. *v.*
Guy—Bunn *v.*

Haish—Washburn and Moen Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Haley—Lee *v.*
Hall—Gillis *v.*
Hall—Glen & Hall Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Hall—Hall *v.*
Hall—Morse *v.*
Hall—R. *v.*
Hall & Co.—Perks *v.*
Hampshire and North Wilts Bank—London and County Banking Co. *v.*
Hanbury—Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. *v.*
Hand—Worral *v.*
Harper—Blackwell *v.*
Harris—Keene *v.*
Harris—Palmer *v.*
Harris—Smith *v.*
Harrison—Flavel *v.*
Hart—Low *v.*
Hart—Wolfe *v.*
Hart-Davies—Hill *v.*
Hately—Burgess *v.*
Hawxhurst—Walker *v.*
Hayward—Parsons *v.*
Hazard—Godillot *v.*
Head—Walter *v.*
Heap—Guinness *v.*
Hegeman—Hegeman & Co. *v.*
Helleley—Johnson *v.*
Helmbold Manufacturing Co.—Helmbold *v.*
Hemmons—Weston *v.*
Hendrickx—Laferme (Compagnie) *v.*
Henley—Rose *v.*
Henriques—Howard *v.*
Henry—Mitchell *v.*
Hickling—Whitney *v.*
High Rocks Congress Spring Co.—Congress and Empire Spring Co. *v.*
Highmoor—Carmcho *v.*
Hill—Batty *v.*
Hill—Blanchard *v.*
Hills—Burgess *v.*
Hinks—Rollins *v.*
Hirschfeld—Leather Cloth Co. *v.*
Hitchcock—Hopkins *v.*
Hodgson—Davies *v.*
Hoffman—Sanders *v.*
Hogan—Hennessy *v.*
Hoge—Moorman *v.*
Hogg—Clowes *v.*
Hogg—Harrison *v.*
Hogg—Maxwell *v.*
Holbrook—Coats *v.*
Holden—Dixon *v.*
Hollins—Campbell *v.*
Holloway—Holloway *v.*
Holmes, Booth & Atwood Manufacturing Co.—Holmes, Booth & Haydens *v.*
Holt—Aubin *v.*
Home and Colonial Assurance Co.—Colonial Life Assurance Co. *v.*
Hood—Cooper *v.*
Hooper—Kelly *v.*
Hoosier Drill Co.—Julian *v.*
Houghton—Rowley *v.*

How—Pidding *v.*
How—Southern *v.*
Howe—Whittaker *v.*
Howe Machine Co.—Howe *v.*
Hughes—Evans *v.*
Hulme—Heathcote *v.*
Hulton—Cowen *v.*
Humphrey—Peterson *v.*
Hunkele—Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co. *v.*
Hunnewell—Gilman *v.*
Hunter—R. *v.*
Huntington—Rudderow *v.*
Hutton—Kelly *v.*

Ingels—Hoosier Drill Co. *v.*

Jackson—Dicks *v.*
Jackson—Dixon *v.*
Jacobus—Fairbanks *v.*
James—James *v.*
James—Newbery *v.*
James—Oldham *v.*
James—Spicer *v.*
Jaques—Jollie *v.*
Jarrett—Booth *v.*
Jeffery—Spratt *v.*
Jenkins—Wade *v.*
Johnson—Kidd *v.*
Johnson—Sohier *v.*
Johnson—Williams *v.*
Johnston—Byron (Lord) *v.*
Johnston—Wheeler *v.*
Johnston & Co.—Orr-Ewing & Co. *v.*
Jonas—Hirsch *v.*
Jones—Canham *v.*
Jones—R. *v.*
Jones, Brothers & Co.—Young *v.*
Jorss—Henderson *v.*
Joseph Uhrig Brewing Co.—Conrad *v.*
Junior Army and Navy Stores Ld.—Army and Navy Co-operative Society, Ld. *v.*

Kaufmann—Hazzopulo *v.*
Keating—Stevens *v.*
Keen—Mollersh *v.*
Kellogg—Sawyer *v.*
Kendall—Davis *v.*
Kennedy—Davis *v.*
Kennett—Hennessy *v.*
Kerr, Dods & Co.—Graham & Co. *v.*
Ketcham—Weston *v.*
Kettle—Gillott *v.*
Kilburn & Co.—Balfour & Co. *v.*
Kimball—Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.*
King & Co.—Strachan & Co. *v.*
King & Co.—Wallace & Co. *v.*
Kinney Tobacco Co.—Ginter *v.*
Kirby—Hogg *v.*
Kleinhans—Armstrong *v.*
Knight—Barrows *v.*
Knight, Stocks & Co.—Berliner Brauerei Gesellschaft Tivoli *v.*
Knos & Co.—Vulcan Match Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Knott—Prudential Assurance Co. *v.*
Knott—Welch *v.*
Koch—Gray *v.*
Kraft, Meyer & Co.—Curtis, Harvey & Co. *v.*

Laight—Shrimpton *v.*
Lamb—Deiz *v.*
Landgraff—Stokes *v.*
Langdon—Lewis *v.*
Larned—Lowell Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Larsen—Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Lart—Hine *v.*
Latimer—Carmichel *v.*
Lawes Chemical Manure Co.—Western Counties Manure Co. *v.*
Lazar—Woodward *v.*
Lazarus Rock *v.*
Lazenby—Lazenby *v.*
Lea—Foot *v.*
Leach—Clark *v.*
Le Barron—Magee Furnace Co. *v.*
Lee—Kennedy *v.*
Lee—R. *v.*
Leuchars—Barnett *v.*
Levine & Wood—R. *v.*
Levinstein—Renard *v.*
Levy—Electro-Silicon Co. *v.*
Lewis—Field *v.*
Lewis—R. *v.*
Libby—Harrington *v*
Libby—Hilsen *v.*
Liebig's Extract of Meat Co.—Anderson *v.*
Lincoln Gas Light and Coke Co.—Beverley *v.*
Lloyd—Hovenden *v.*
Lloyd—R. *v.*
Locke—Bell *v.*
Lockett—Lockett *v.*
Loftus—Rose *v.*
London and Westminster Assurance Corporation—London Assurance *v.*

London and Provincial Joint Stock Life Assurance Co.—London and Provincial Law Assurance Society *v.*
Loog—Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Lopes & Co.—Jacoby & Co. *v.*
Lorsont—Leather Cloth Co. *v.*
Low—Benbow *v.*
Lowell—Lawrence Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Lucy—Falkinburg *v.*
Lumphinnans Iron Co.—Lochgelly Co. Ld. *v.*
Lund—Axmann *v.*
Lye—Cruttwell *v.*

McAdam—Morgan *v.*
McArthur—Lehmann *v.*
McCubbin—McCormick *v.*
McCulloch—Wilkie *v.*
McGowan—McGowan Brothers' Pump and Machine Co. *v.*
McKernan—Howe *v.*
Mackintosh—Scott *v.*
McMaster & Co.—Dickson *v.*
McNulty—Powell *v.*
McPherson—Potter *v.*
Macrae—Young *v.*
Maddick—Clement *v.*
Major—Turner *v.*
Maniere—Hunt *v.*
Marble—United States *v.*
Marsh—Post *v.*
Marshall—Gillespie & Co. *v.*
Martin—Morse *v.*
Mason—Dence *v.*
Mason—Mossop *v.*
Mason—Smith *v.*
Massam—Thorley's Cattle-Food Co. *v.*
Masury—Brooklyn White Lead Co. *v.*
Maxfield—Wilson *v.*
Maxwell—Hogg *v.*
May—Cartier *v.*
Mayer—Del Valle *v.*
Mayo—Chase *v.*
Megevand—Foster *v.*
Meikle—Avery *v.*
Mellis—Lichtenstein *v.*
Menck—Partridge *v.*
Meneely—Meneely *v.*
Mercer—Brown *v.*
Merchant—Fetridge *v.*
Merchants' Joint Stock Bank, Ld.—Merchant Banking Co. of London *v.*
Meriden Britannia Co.—Boardman *v.*
Merkel—St. Louis Piano Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Metcalf—Cassidy *v.*
Metropolitan Board of Works—Cooper *v.*
Metropolitan Collar Co.—Union Paper Collar Co. *v.*
Meyer—India Rubber Comb Co. *v.*
Midland Railway Co.—King *v.*
Milbourn—Bond *v.*
Millar—Lea *v.*
Miller & Co.—Hurricane Patent Lantern Co. *v.*
Mills—Tweed *v.*
Mills, Johnson & Co.—Kidd & Co. *v.*
Mitchell—Condy *v.*
Mitchell—Rammelsberg *v.*
Moat—Morison *v.*
Montagne—Hendriks *v.*
Moore—Montague *v.*
Moore—Talcott *v.*
Morgan—Knott *v.*
Morgan—R. *v.*
Morris—United States *v.*
Morson—Carmrick *v.*
Mortimer—Prowett *v.*
Moss—Boon *v.*
Moss—Morris *v.*
Mottram—Walker *v.*
Mudie—Avanzo *v.*
Munro—Bain *v.*
Murphy—Christy *v.*
Myers—Cave *v.*

Nairn—Linoleum Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Neale—Day *v.*
New York Publishing Co.—England *v.*
Newton—Fleming *v.*
Noah—Snowden *v.*
Norfolk—Peabody *v.*
Norman—Radde *v.*
Norris—Rivero *v.*
Norrish—Apollinaris Co. *v.*
Norton—Bradley *v.*
Norton—Geary *v.*
Nowill—Rodgers *v.*

Oakes—Skinner *v.*
O'Brien—R. *v.*
O'Byrne—Hegeman & Co. *v.*
O'Connor—Wolmershausen *v.*
Ogden—R. *v.*
Oregon Central Railway Co.—Newby *v.*
Orr-Ewing & Co.—Johnston & Co. *v.*
Osborne—Hudson *v.*
Osborne—Williams *v.*
Osgerby—Hudson *v.*

PAINE—Stevens *r.*
Parker—Meriden Britannia Co. *r.*
Payne—Blofeld *r.*
Peacock—Richardson *r.*
Peake—Bulnois *r.*
Pearce—Farr *r.*
Pearson—Harper *r.*
Pearson—Pearson *r.*
Peck—Jarvis *r.*
Peck—McCardel *r.*
Peel—Stephens *r.*
Pelsall Coal and Iron Co.—Barrows *r.*
Perhamus—Morgan *r.*
Peters—Swift *r.*
Peterson—Weed *r.*
Peto—Ponsardin *r.*
Petter—Crookes *r.*
Petter—Mack *r.*
Phalon—Barnett *r.*
Philp—Rodgers *r.*
Pickering—Moet *r.*
Pile—Pile *r.*
Pillow—Barnard *r.*
Pinkham—Marshall *r.*
Pinto-Leite—Carver *r.*
Piper—Aikins *r.*
Plate—Derringer *r.*
Plate—Graham *r.*
Pond—Stimpson *r.*
Pottage—Hookham *r.*
Powell—Seltzer *r.*
Prescott—Van Beil *r.*
Price—Henry *r.*
Priestley—R. *r.*
Pritchard—Cee *r.*
Provezende—Seixo *r.*
Pullar—Pullar *r.*

QUEDDINGTON—Robertson *r.*

RAGG—R. *r.*
Ratcliff—Woollam *r.*
Ray—Ledger *r.*
Raylton—Johnson *r.*
Read—Giblett *r.*
Read—Mitchell *r.*
Reed—Connell *r.*
Reed—Milner *r.*
Reeves—Collins Co. *r.*
Reeves—Peru (Republic of) *r.*
Registrar of Trade Marks—Orr-Ewing *r.*
Reid—Davis *r.*
Reynolds—Smith *r.*
Reynolds—Southorn *r.*
Richards—Allen *r.*
Richardson—McDonald *r.*
Richardson & Co—Read, Brothers *r.*
Ridgway—R. *r.*
Riley—Springhead Spinning Co. *r.*
Roberts—R. *r.*
Robinson—Ward *r.*
Roche—United States *r.*
Rockwood—Osgood *r.*
Rodgers—Rodgers *r.*
Roebuck—R. *r.*
Roffey—Nixey *r.*
Rogers—Morgan *r.*
Rohmann, Osborne & Co.—Hennessy *r.*
Rolfe—Rolfe *r.*
Rooke—Green *r.*
Ross—Marshall *r.*
Roach—Burfield *r.*
Rowland—Scott *r.*
Roylen—Clover *r.*
Rubber Comb and Jewelry Co.—India Rubber Comb Co. *r.*
Ruffner—Dausman & Drummond Tobacco Co. *r.*
Rushton—Ayer *r.*
Rutherford—Llewellyn *r.*
Ruthin Soda Water Co.—Ellis & Sons *r.*
Rylands—Davenport *r.*

SALEM FLOURING MILLS—Oliphant *r.*
Salmon—Morison *r.*
Samson—Steinthal *r.*
Sands—Woods *r.*
Sargood, Ewen & Co.—Moses *r.*
Saunders—Correspondent Newspaper Co. *r.*
Schuckmann—Fleischmann *r.*
Schultz & Co.—Lautz Brothers *r.*
Schuyler—Morgan *r.*
Schwachhofer—Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co. *r.*
Scott—Insurance Oil Tank Co. *r.*
Scott—Scott *r.*
Searing—Howe *r.*
Sellers—Fulton *r.*
Senate—Selon *r.*
Shakespear—Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Co. *r.*
Shaver—Shaver *r.*
Shaw—Deloudre *r.*
Shaw—Farina *r.*
Sheard—Chappe'l *r.*
Sheard—Hutchings *r.*
Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co.—Attorney-General *r.*
Sheldon—Roberts *r.*
Shepherd—Green *r.*

Sheppard—Chance *v.*
Sherrill—Royal Baking Powder Co. *v.*
Sherwood—R. *v.*
Shuttock—Crawford *v.*
Sibbald—Reid *v.*
Silverlock—Farina *v.*
Silversides—R. *v.*
Simms—Colburn *v.*
Simpson—Wright *v.*
Sims—Coles *v.*
Singer Manufacturing Co.—Wilson *v.*
Sixbury—Smith *v.*
Slack—Ellen *v.*
Slade—Jendwine *v.*
Sleep—R. *v.*
Smith—Dale *v.*
Smith—Glenny *v.*
Smith—Hargreaves *v.*
Smith—McMurdo *v.*
Smith—R. *v.*
Smith—Russell & Sons, Limited *v.*
Smith—Smith *v.*
Smith—Wedgwood *v.*
Smithson—Dale *v.*
Smithson—Stewart *v.*
Soares—Beazley *v.*
Somborn—Actien Gesellschaft Apollinaris Brunnen *v.*
Sonvazoglu—Harter *v.*
Spalding—Reinhardt *v.*
Spear—Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Spear—Fowle *v.*
Spence—Williams *v.*
Stanage—Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Starkweather—Cook *v.*
Steffens—United States *v.*
Stephens—Eno *v.*
Stephenson—Carnucho *v.*
Stephenson—Gamble *v.*
Stetson—Town *v.*
Stevens—R. *v.*
Stiff—Ingram *v.*
Stonebraker—Stonebraker *v.*
Strange—Albert (Prince) *v.*
Stratton—Burton *v.*
Such—Clement *v.*
Sullivan—Byass *v.*
Sunley—R. *v.*
Suter & Coulson—R. *v.*
Sweet—Archbold *v.*
Swezey & Dart—Josselyn *v.*
Swiss Condensed Milk Co.—Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Co. *v.*
Sykes—Sykes *v.*
Symonds—Thompson *v.*

Taintor—Rogers *v.*
Taper Sleeve Pulley Works—Gray *v.*
Tate—Burnett *v.*
Taylor—Harrison *v.*
Taylor—Taylor *v.*
Teede—India & China Tea Co. *v.*
Thalheimer—Sternberger *v.*
Thomas—Chinn *v.*
Thomas—Colton *v.*
Thompson—Crawshay *v.*
Thompson—Isaacson *v.*
Thorley's Cattle-Food Co.—Massam *v.*
Till—Coslake *v.*
Toland—Scoville *v.*
Townsend—Page *v.*
Trainer—Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Trask—Electro-Silicon Co. *v.*
Tripp—Longman *v.*
Troxell—Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co. *v.*
Truefitt—Perry *v.*
Trust—Gouraud *v.*
Trustees of Port of Bombay—Shepherd *v.*
Tudor—Tudor *v.*
Turner—Beard *v.*
Turpin—Dent *v.*
Tylor—Davis *v.*
Tynberg—Messerole *v.*

Uhler—Glendon Iron Co. *v.*
Ullmer—Guinness *v.*
United States—Woodman *v.*

Van Nostrand—Dougherty *v.*
Van Schaick—Marten *v.*
Venning—Goodwin *v.*
Vick—Edelsten *v.*
Vining—Nuthall *v.*

Wagner—Lumley *v.*
Walker—Allsopp *v.*
Walker—Cheavin *v.*
Walker—Collins Co. *v.*
Walker—Levy *v.*
Wallis—Wallis *v.*
Walls—Day *v.*
Walmsley—Ainsworth *v.*
Walter—Polhill *v.*
Ward—Colnaghi *v.*
Ward—Mulkern *v.*
Ward—Tonge *v.*
Ward & Co.—Spratt's Patent *v.*
Waring—Wason *v.*
Waters—Buckingham *v.*
Wattles—Binninger *v.*
Watson—Cooper *v.*
Watson—Marshall *v.*
Weaver—Franks *v.*

Webster—Lucke *v.*
Webster—Routh *v.*
Webster—Webster *v.*
Wedderburn—Wedderburn *v.*
Weild—Wren *v.*
Welch—Vickery *v.*
Weller—Fradella *v.*
Wells—Fetridge *v.*
Wells & Co.—Leonard & Ellis *v.*
Welsh—Sorg *v.*
Westcott—Hanford *v.*
Westhead—Cartier *v.*
Wheatcroft—Allsopp *v.*
Wheeler—Hennessy *v.*
Wheeler—Lauferty *v.*
Whitaker—Darbey *v.*
White—Barrett *v.*
White—Comstock *v.*
White—Hennessy *v.*
White—Lazenby *v.*
White—R. *v.*
Whitehead—Bryson *v.*
Whiteman—Degraves *v.*
Whitmore—Jacoby *v.*
Whitwell—Standish *v.*
Wilcox—Popham *v.*
Wilder—Laird *v.*
Wilder—Wilder *v.*
Wilkes—Dayton *v.*
Wilkes—Roworth *v.*
Williams—McCord *v.*
Williams—Thomas *v.*
Williams—Williams *v.*
Williamson—Richards *v.*
Willmett—R. *v.*
Wilson—Singer Manufacturing Co. *v.*
Wilson—Williams *v.*
Winchester—Graveley *v.*
Winchester—Longman *v.*
Winchester—Thomson *v.*
Winsor—Stetson *v.*
Winyard—Yovatt *v.*
Wood—Manhattan Medicine Co. *v.*
Wood—Metzler *v.*
Woodruff—Smith *v.*
Woodside—Alleghany Fertilizer Co. *v.*
Woolf—Lea *v.*
Worrell—Morse *v.*
Wright—Blackwell *v.*
Wright—Heath *v.*
Wright—Martin *v.*
Wright—Phalon *v.*
Wright—Simpson *v.*

Yates—Dicks *v.*
Young & Sons—Dunnachie *v.*

Zeiles & Co.—Ellis *v.*

TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS.

A. J.	Australian Jurist.
Abb. Pr.	Abbott's Practice Reports (New York).
Act. Comm.	Acting Commissioner.
Ad. & E.	Adolphus and Ellis.
Alb. L. J.	Albany (New York) Law Journal.
Allen	Allen (Massachusetts).
Am. L. Reg.	American Law Register.
Am. L. Rev.	American Law Review.
Am. L. T.	American Law Times.
Amer. Rep.	American Reports.
App. Cas.	Appeal Cases.
Asst. Comm.	Assistant Commissioner.
Atk.	Atkins.
B. & Ad.	Barnewall and Adolphus.
B. & Cr.	Barnewall and Cresswell.
Barb. Ch.	Barbour's Chancery Reports (New York).
Barb. S. C. or Barb.	Barbour's Supreme Court Reports (New York.
Barnard.	Barnardiston.
Beav.	Beavan.
Bell	Bell's Crown Cases.
Beng. L. R. App.	Bengal Law Reports, Appendix.
Biss.	Bissell (U. S. Circuit Court).
Bl. C. C.	Blatchford (U. S. Circuit Court).
Bomb.	Bombay.
Bond	Bond (U. S. Circuit Court).
Bos.	Bosworth (New York).
Bos. & P., N. R.	Bosanquet and Puller New Reports.
Brews.	Brewster (Pennsylvania).
Browne	Browne (Massachusetts).
Bush	Bush (Kentucky).
C. A.	Court of Appeal.
C. B.	Common Bench.
C. C. C.	Central Criminal Court.
C. C. C. Sess. Pap.	Central Criminal Court Sessions Papers.
C. C. R.	Court of Crown Cases Reserved.
C. & M.	Carrington and Marshman.
C. & P.	Carrington and Payne.
C. P.	Common Pleas.
C. P. Div.	Common Pleas Division.
Cal.	California.
Ch. D.	Chancery Division.

Chitty Gen. Pr.	Chitty's General Practice.
Cinc.	Cincinnati.
Codd. Dig.	Coddington's American Digest of Trade Mark Cases.
Comm.	Commissioner.
Comm. of App.	Commission of Appeals (New York).
Conn.	Connecticut.
Coop.	Cooper.
C. P. Coop.	C. P. Cooper.
Cor.	Coryton (Bengal).
Cox	Cox's Criminal Cases.
R. Cox	R. Cox's American Trade Mark Cases.
Cro.	Croke.
Ct. of App.	Court of Appeal.
Ct. of Cl.	Court of Claims (U. S.).
Ct. of Sess. Cass.	Court of Session Cases (Scotch).
Curtis	Curtis (U. S. Circuit Court).
Cush.	Cushing (Massachusetts).
D. & B.	Dearsley and Bell.
D. & R.	Dowling and Rylands.
Daly	Daly (New York).
Deady	Deady (U. S. Circuit Court).
De G. F. & J.	De Gex, Fisher and Jones.
De G. & J.	De Gex and Jones.
De G. J. & S.	De Gex, Jones and Smith.
De G. M. & G.	De Gex, Macnaghten and Gordon.
De G. & Sm.	De Gex and Smale.
Den.	Denison, Crown Cases.
Dig.	Sebastian's Digest of Cases of Trade Mark, &c.
Dill.	Dillon (U. S. Circuit Court).
Doug.	Douglas
Dr.	Drewry.
Dr. & Sm.	Drewry and Smale.
Duer	Duer (New York).
E. & B.	Ellis and Blackburn.
East P. C.	East's Pleas of the Crown.
Ell. & Ell.	Ellis and Ellis.
Eq. Rep.	Equity Reports.
Esp. N. P. C.	Espinasse, Nisi Prius Cases.
Ex.	Exchequer.
F. & F.	Foster and Finlason.
Fed. Rep.	Federal Reports (U. S.).
Foster Cr. Cas.	Foster, Crown Cases.
Ga.	Georgia.
Giff.	Giffard.
Grant, Up. Can. Ch.	Grant, Upper Canada Chancery.
Green	Green, New Jersey.
H. L. C.	House of Lords Cases.
H. of L.	House of Lords.
H. & M.	Hemming and Miller.
H. & N.	Hurlstone and Norman.
H. & Tw.	Hall and Twells.
H & W.	Harrison and Wollaston.

Hand	Hand (New York).
Hilt.	Hilton (New York).
Hoff.	Hoffman (New York).
Holmes	Holmes (U. S. Circuit Court).
Hopk.	Hopkins (New York).
How. App. Cas.	Howard's Appeal Cases (New York).
How. Pr.	Howard's Practice Cases (New York).
Hughes	Hughes (U. S. Circuit Court).
Hun	Hun (New York).
Hyde	Hyde (Bengal).
Ill.	Illinois.
Ind.	Indiana.
Ind. L. R.	Indian Law Reports.
Iowa	Iowa State Reports.
Ir. Ch.	Irish Chancery.
Ir. Eq.	Irish Equity.
Ir. Jur.	Irish Jurist.
J. & H.	Johnson and Hemming.
J. & S.	Jones and Spencer (New York).
Jac.	Jacob.
Jac. & W.	Jacob and Walker.
Johns.	Johnson.
Journ. of Jurisp.	Journal of Jurisprudence (Scotch).
Jur.	Jurist.
K. & J.	Kay and Johnson.
Keyes	Keyes (New York).
Ky.	Kentucky.
L. C.	Lord Chancellor.
L. J. J.	Lords Justices.
L. J. Bkptcy.	Law Journal, Bankruptcy.
L. J. Ch.	Law Journal, Chancery.
L. J. C. P.	Law Journal, Common Pleas.
L. J. Ex.	Law Journal, Exchequer.
L. J. K. B.	Law Journal, King's Bench.
L. J. M. C.	Law Journal, Magistrates' Cases.
L. J. N. of C.	Law Journal, Notes of Cases.
L. J. P. C.	Law Journal, Privy Council.
L. J. Q. B.	Law Journal, Queen's Bench.
L. R. Ch.	Law Reports, Chancery Appeals.
L. R. C. P.	Law Reports, Common Pleas.
L. R. Eq.	Law Reports, Equity.
L. R. Ex.	Law Reports, Exchequer.
L. R. H. L.	Law Reports, House of Lords (English and Irish).
L. R. Ir.	Irish Law Reports.
L. R. P. C.	Law Reports, Privy Council.
L. R. Q. B.	Law Reports, Queen's Bench.
L. T.	Law Times.
L. & C.	Leigh and Cave, Crown Cases.
La. Ann.	Louisiana Annual Reports.
Lans.	Lansing (New York).
Lathrop	Lathrop (Massachusetts).
Leach	Leach, Crown Cases.

Leg. Obs.	Legal Observer.
M. M. A.	Merchandise Marks Act, 1862.
M. & Rob.	Moody and Robinson.
Mac. & G.	Macnaghten and Gordon.
McCrary	McCrary (U. S. Circuit Court).
McLean	McLean (U. S. Circuit Court).
Madd.	Maddock.
Man. & G.	Manning and Granger.
Mass.	Massachusetts.
Md.	Maryland.
Me.	Maine.
Mer.	Merivale.
Mich. C. C.	Michigan Circuit Court.
Mich. N. P.	Michigan Nisi Prius.
Mo.	Missouri.
Mo. App.	Missouri Appeals.
Mod.	Modern Reports.
Mont. D. & De G.	Montague, Deacon and De Gex.
Monthly L. R.	Monthly Law Reports.
Moo. P. C.	Moore's Privy Council Cases.
My. & Cr.	Mylne and Craig.
N. Car.	North Carolina.
N. J. (Eq.)	New Jersey (Equity).
N. P.	Nisi Prius.
N. R.	New Reports.
N. S.	New Series.
N. Y.	New York.
N. & M.	Neville and Manning.
N. & P.	Neville and Perry.
Neb.	Nebraska.
Ohio St.	Ohio State Reports.
Oreg.	Oregon.
Pa. St.	Pennsylvania State Reports.
Paige	Paige (New York).
Peake	Peake, Nisi Prius Cases.
Pemb.	Pemberton on Judgments.
Penn. St.	Pennsylvania State Reports.
Penn. L. J.	Pennsylvania Law Journal.
Ph.	Phillips.
Phila.	Philadelphia.
Pick.	Pickering (Massachusetts).
Post	Post (Missouri).
Q. B.	Queen's Bench.
R. I.	Rhode Island.
Robertson	Robertson (New York).
Russ.	Russell.
Ry. Cas.	Railway Cases.
S. & S.	Simons and Stuart.
Sandf. Ch.	Sandford's Chancery Reports (New York).
Sandf. S. C.	Sandford's Supreme Court Reports (New York).
Sawy.	Sawyer (U. S. Circuit Court).
Scot. L. Rep.	Scottish Law Reporter.

Scott, N. R.	Scott's New Reports.
Seton	Seton on Decrees.
Sickles	Sickles (New York).
Sim.	Simons.
E. D. Smith	E. D. Smith (New York).
Sol. J.	Solicitor's Journal.
Story	Story (U. S. Circuit Court).
Sup. Ct.	Supreme Court.
Super. Ct.	Superior Court.
Swanst.	Swanston.
T. M. A.	Trade Marks Registration Act.
T. R.	Term Reports.
Thomp. & C.	Thompson and Cook (New York).
Trade Marks	British and Foreign Journal of Commerce, Trade Marks, and International Exhibitions.
Trans. App.	Transcript Appeals (New York).
U. S. C. C., Dt. of—	United States Circuit Court, District of —.
U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis.	Decisions of the U. S. Commissioner of Patents.
U. S. Pat. Gaz.	United States Official Patent Gazette.
U. S. Rep.	United States Supreme Court Reports.
U. S. Sup. Ct.	United States Supreme Court.
V. & B.	Vesey and Beames.
V.-C.	Vice-Chancellor.
V. R. Eq.	Victoria Reports (First Series) Equity.
Va.	Virginia.
Ves.	Vesey.
Viet. L. R. Eq.	Victoria Law Reports (New Series) Equity.
Vt.	Vermont.
W. N.	Weekly Notes.
W. R.	Weekly Reporter.
W. Va.	West Virginia.
W. & W. (I. E. & M.)	Wyatt and Webb's Victoria Reports (Insolvency, Ecclesiastical and Matrimonial).
W. W. & A'B. Eq.	Wyatt, Webb and A'Beckett's Victoria Reports (Equity).
W. A'B. & W. Eq.	Webb, A'Beckett and Williams' Victoria Reports (Equity).
Wallace	Wallace (United States Supreme Court).
Wall., Jr.	Wallace, Junior, (U. S. Circuit Court).
Washb.	Washburn (Vermont).
Webs. P. C.	Webster, Patent Cases.
Wend.	Wendell (New York).
West. L. J.	Western Law Journal.
Wils.	Wilson.
Wils. (Ind.)	Wilson's Indianapolis Reports.
Wisc.	Wisconsin.
Wood. & M.	Woodbury and Minot (U. S. Circuit Court).
Y. & C. Ch.	Younge and Collyer's Chancery Reports.

INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS.

(See Patents &c. Act, sec. 103, infrà.)

I.

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY.

Signed at Paris, March 20, 1883.

[*Ratifications exchanged at Paris, June* 6, 1884.]

(Official Translation.)

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil, His Majesty the King of Spain, the President of the French Republic, the President of the Republic of Guatemala, His Majesty the King of Italy, His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, His Majesty the King of Portugal and the Algarves, the President of the Republic of Salvador, His Majesty the King of Servia, and the Federal Council of the Swiss Confederation,

Being equally animated with the desire to secure by mutual agreement, complete and effectual protection for the industry and commerce of their respective subjects and citizens, and to provide a guarantee for the rights of inventors, and for the loyalty of commercial transactions, have resolved to conclude a convention to that effect, and have named as their plenipotentiaries, that is to say:—

(Here follow the appointments of the plenipotentiaries.)

Who, having communicated to each other their respective full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed upon the following Articles:—

Article I.

The Governments of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, France, Guatemala, Italy, Holland, Portugal, Salvador, Servia, and Switzerland constitute themselves into a union for the protection of industrial property.

Article II.

The subjects or citizens of each of the contracting states shall, in all the other states of the union, as regards patents, industrial designs or models, trade-marks and trade names, enjoy the advantages that their respective laws now grant, or shall hereafter grant, to their own subjects or citizens.

Consequently they shall have the same protection as the latter, and the same legal remedy against any infringement of their rights, provided they observe the formalities and conditions imposed on subjects or citizens by the internal legislation of each state.

Article III.

Subjects or citizens of states not forming part of the union, who are domiciled or have industrial or commercial establishments in the territory of any of the states of the union, shall be assimilated to the subjects or citizens of the contracting states.

Article IV.

Any person who has duly applied for a patent, industrial design or model, or trade-mark in one of the contracting states, shall enjoy, as regards registration in the other states, and reserving the rights of third parties, a right of priority during the periods hereinafter stated.

Consequently, subsequent registration in any of the other states of the union before expiry of these periods shall not be invalidated through any acts accomplished in the interval, either, *for instance*, by another registration, by publication of the invention, or by the working of it by a third party, by the sale of copies of the design or model, or by use of the trade-mark.

The above-mentioned terms of priority shall be six months for patents, and three months for industrial designs and models and trade-marks. A month longer is allowed for countries beyond sea.

Article V.

(Relates only to patents.)

Article VI.

Every trade-mark duly registered in the country of origin shall be admitted for registration, and protected in the form originally registered in all the other countries of the union.

That country shall be deemed the country of origin where the applicant has his chief seat of business.

If this chief seat of business is not situated in one of the countries of the union, the country to which the applicant belongs shall be deemed the country of origin.

Registration may be refused if the object for which it is solicited is considered contrary to morality or public order.

Article VII.

The nature of the goods on which the trade-mark is to be used can, in no case, be an obstacle to the registration of the trade-mark.

Article VIII.

A trade name shall be protected in all the countries of the union, without necessity of registration, whether it form part or not of a trade-mark.

Article IX.

All goods illegally bearing a trade-mark or trade name may be seized on importation into those states of the union where this mark or name has a right to legal protection.

The seizure shall be effected at the request of either the proper public department or of the interested party, pursuant to the internal legislation of each country.

Article X.

The provisions of the preceding Article shall apply to all goods falsely bearing the name of any locality as indication of the place of origin, when such indication is associated with a trade name of a fictitious character or assumed with a fraudulent intention.

Any manufacturer of, or trader in, such goods, established in the locality falsely designated as the place of origin, shall be deemed an interested party.

Article XI.

The high contracting parties agree to grant temporary protection to patentable inventions, to industrial designs or models, and trade-marks, for articles exhibited at official or officially recognized international exhibitions.

ARTICLE XII.

Each of the high contracting parties agrees to establish a special Government Department for industrial property, and a central office for communication to the public of patents, industrial designs or models, and trade-marks.

ARTICLE XIII.

An international office shall be organised under the name of "Bureau International de l'Union pour la Protection de la Propriété Industrielle" (International Office of the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property).

This office, the expense of which shall be defrayed by the Governments of all the contracting states, shall be placed under the high authority of the Central Administration of the Swiss Confederation, and shall work under its supervision. Its functions shall be determined by agreement between the states of the union.

ARTICLE XIV.

The present convention shall be submitted to periodical revisions, with a view to introducing improvements calculated to perfect the system of the union.

To this end conferences shall be successively held in one of the contracting states by delegates of the said states. The next meeting shall take place in 1885 at Rome.

ARTICLE XV.

It is agreed that the high contracting parties respectively reserve to themselves the right to make separately, as between themselves, special arrangements for the protection of industrial property, in so far as such arrangements do not contravene the provisions of the present convention.

ARTICLE XVI.

States which have not taken part in the present convention shall be permitted to adhere to it at their request.

Such adhesion shall be notified officially through the diplomatic channel to the Government of the Swiss Confederation, and by the latter to all the others. It shall imply complete accession to all the clauses, and admission to all the advantages stipulated by the present convention.

ARTICLE XVII.

The execution of the reciprocal engagements contained in the present convention is subordinated, in so far as necessary, to the observance of the formalities and rules established by the consti-

tutional laws of those of the high contracting parties who are bound to procure the application of the same, which they engage to do with as little delay as possible.

Article XVIII.

The present convention shall come into operation one month after the exchange of ratifications, and shall remain in force for an unlimited time, till the expiry of one year from the date of its denunciation. This denunciation shall be addressed to the Government commissioned to receive adhesions. It shall only affect the denouncing state, the convention remaining in operation as regards the other contracting parties.

Article XIX.

The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged in Paris, within one year at the latest.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto their seals.

Dated at Paris the 20th March, 1883.

(*Signed by the Plenipotentiaries.*)

II.

Final Protocol.

(*Official Translation.*)

On proceeding to the signature of the convention concluded this day between the Governments of Belgium, Brazil, Spain, France, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Servia, and Switzerland, for the protection of industrial property, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows:

1. The words "industrial property" are to be understood in their broadest sense; they are not to apply simply to industrial products properly so called, but also to agricultural products (wines, corn, fruits, cattle, &c.), and to mineral products employed in commerce (mineral waters, &c.).

2. (Relates only to patents.)

3. The last paragraph of Article II. does not affect the legislation of each of the contracting states as regards the procedure to be followed before the tribunals, and the competence of those tribunals.

4. Paragraph 1 of Article VI. is to be understood as meaning that no trade mark shall be excluded from protection in any state of the union, from the fact alone that it does not satisfy,

in regard to the signs composing it, the conditions of the legislation of that state; provided that on this point it comply with the legislation of the country of origin, and that it had been properly registered in said country of origin. With this exception, which relates only to the form of the mark, and under reserve of the provisions of the other articles of the convention, the internal legislation of each state remains in force.

To avoid misconstruction, it is agreed that the use of public armorial bearings and decorations may be considered as being contrary to public order in the sense of the last paragraph of Article VI.

5. The organisation of the special department for industrial property mentioned in Article XII. shall comprise, so far as possible, the publication in each state of a periodical official paper.

6. (After providing for the common expenses of the international office, continues:—)

The Swiss Government will superintend the expenses of the international office, advance the necessary funds, and render an annual account, which will be communicated to all the other administrations.

The international office will centralise information of every kind relating to the protection of industrial property, and will bring it together in the form of a general statistical statement which will be distributed to all the administrations. It will interest itself in all matters of common utility to the union, and will edit, with the help of the documents supplied to it by the various administrations, a periodical paper in the French language dealing with questions regarding the object of the union.

The numbers of this paper, as well as all the documents published by the international office, will be circulated among the administrations of the states of the union in the proportion of the number of contributing units as mentioned above. Such further copies as may be desired either by the said administrations, or by societies or private persons will be paid for separately.

The international office shall at all times hold itself at the service of members of the union, in order to supply them with any special information they may need on questions relating to the international system of industrial property.

The administration of the country in which the next conference is to be held will make preparation for the transactions of that conference, with the assistance of the international office.

The director of the international office will be present at the

meetings of the conferences, and will take part in the discussions, but without the privilege of voting.

He will furnish an annual report upon his administration of the office, which shall be communicated to all the members of the union.

The official language of the international office will be French.

7. The present final protocol, which shall be ratified together with the convention concluded this day shall be considered as forming an integral part of, and shall have the same force, validity, and duration as the said convention.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries have drawn up the present protocol.

(*Signed by the Plenipotentiaries.*)

III.

Accession of Her Majesty's Government to the Convention.

The undersigned, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to the French Republic, declares that Her Britannic Majesty, having had the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, concluded at Paris on the 20th March, 1883, and the protocol relating thereto, signed on the same date, laid before her, and availing herself of the right reserved by Article XVI. of that convention to States not parties to the original convention, accedes, on behalf of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to the said international convention for the protection of industrial property, and to the said protocol, which are to be considered as inserted word for word in the present declaration, and formally engages, as far as regards the President of the French Republic and the other high contracting parties, to co-operate on her part in the execution of the stipulations contained in the convention and protocol aforesaid.

The undersigned makes this declaration on the part of Her Britannic Majesty with the express understanding that power is reserved to Her Britannic Majesty to accede to the Convention on behalf of the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands, and any of Her Majesty's possessions, on due notice to that effect being given through Her Majesty's Government.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, has

signed the present declaration of accession, and has affixed thereto the seal of his arms.

Done at Paris, on the 17th day of March, 1884.

(L.S.) (Signed) Lyons.

IV.

Declaration of Acceptance of Accession.

(*Official Translation.*)

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, having acceded to the International Convention relative to the protection of industrial property, concluded at Paris, March 20, 1883, together with a protocol dated the same day, by the declaration of accession delivered by Her Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Government of the French Republic; the text of which declaration is word for word as follows:—

(*Here is inserted the text of No. III. in English.*)

The President of the French Republic has authorized the undersigned, President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, to formally accept the said accession, together with the reserves which are contained in it concerning the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, and all other possessions of Her Britannic Majesty, engaging as well in his own name as in that of the other high contracting parties to assist in the accomplishment of the obligations stipulated in the convention and the protocol thereto annexed, which may concern the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, has drawn up the present Declaration of Acceptance and has affixed thereto his seal.

Done at Paris, the 2nd April, 1884.

(L.S.) (Signed) Jules Ferry.

V.

Order in Council.

(*The Patents Act*, 1883.)

At the Court at Windsor, the 26th of June, 1884. Present, the Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas by the provisions of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, it is, amongst other things, provided :—

That if Her Majesty is pleased to make any arrangement with the Government or Governments of any foreign State or States for mutual protection of inventions, designs, and trade marks, or any of them, then any person who has applied for protection for any invention, design, or trade mark in any such State shall, subject to the conditions further provided and set forth in the said Act, be entitled to a patent for his invention, or to registration of his design or trade mark (as the case may be) under the said Act in priority to other applicants, and such patent or registration shall have the same date as the date of the protection obtained in such foreign State :

And whereas it has pleased Her Majesty to make an arrangement of the nature contemplated by the said Act by and in virtue of a declaration signed and sealed by Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris on the 17th of March, 1884, duly conveying the accession of Great Britain to the International Convention and Protocol for the Protection of Industrial Property, signed by representatives of certain powers on the 20th of March, 1883, and duly ratified on the 6th of June, 1884, power being reserved to Her Majesty to hereafter accede to the provisions of the said convention and protocol on behalf of the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands, and any of Her Majesty's possessions, which declaration of accession was duly accepted by the French Government on behalf of the signatory powers by and in virtue of a declaration dated the 2nd of April, 1884 :

Now, therefore, Her Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of her Privy Council, and by virtue of the authority committed to her by the said Act, doth declare, and it is hereby declared, that the provisions of the said Act hereinbefore specified shall apply to the following countries, viz. :—Belgium, Brazil, France, Guatemala, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Servia, Spain, Switzerland, Ecuador,* and Tunis.*

And it is hereby further ordered and declared that this order shall take effect from the 7th of July, 1884. C. L. PEEL.

* These States acceded to the Convention and Protocol

ADDENDUM.

Since the book has been in print a new edition of the Instructions to Applicants for Registration has been issued (see pp. 373–383, *infrà*).

The only alterations of importance are:—

1. Par. 5 is cancelled, the official publications being now only obtainable at the Sale Branch of the Patent Office.
2. Par. 30 is altered by limiting the refusal of registration of the Royal Arms, or arms resembling them, to the case of new marks, and omitting the words "patent," "patented" from the list of prohibited phrases.
3. Par. 31 is altered by limiting the refusal of registration of National Arms or Flags to those of Great Britain, and omitting prize or exhibition medals from the list of prohibited particulars in new marks.

THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS.

CHAPTER I.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION.

General principle of trade-mark law.

THE general principle upon which the Courts exercise jurisdiction in the case of trade marks is, that "a manufacturer who produces an article of merchandise which he announces as one of public utility, and who places upon it a mark by which it is distinguished from all other articles of a similar kind, with the intention that it may be known to be of his manufacture, becomes the exclusive owner of that which is henceforth called his trade mark. By the law of this country—and the like law prevails in most other civilised countries—he obtains a property in the mark which he so affixes to his goods. The property thus acquired by the manufacturer, like all other property, is under the protection of the law, and for the invasion of the right of the owner of such property the law affords a remedy similar in all respects to that by which the possession and enjoyment of all property is secured to the owners" (*a*). "A man is not to sell his own goods under the pretence that they are the goods of another man; he cannot be permitted to practise such a deception, nor to use the means which contribute to that end. He cannot, therefore, be allowed to use names, marks, letters, or other *indicia* by which he may induce purchasers to believe that the goods which he

(*a*) Per Bacon, V.-C., in *Ransome* v. *Graham*, 51 L. J. Ch. 897.

is selling are the manufacture of another person" (*a*). "Supposing the rival trader to have obtained celebrity in his manufacture, he is entitled to all the advantages of that celebrity, whether resulting from the greater demand for his goods, or from the higher price which the public are willing to give for them, rather than for the goods of other manufacturers whose reputation is not so high. Where, therefore, a manufacturer has been in the habit of stamping the goods which he has manufactured with a particular mark or brand, so that thereby persons purchasing goods of that description know them to be of his manufacture, no other manufacturer has a right to adopt the same stamp. By doing so he would be substantially representing the goods to be of the manufacture of the manufacturers who had previously adopted the stamp or mark in question, and so would or might be depriving him of the profit he might have made by the sale of the goods which, *ex hypothesi*, the purchaser intended to buy. The law considers this to be wrong towards the person whose mark is thus assumed, for which wrong he has a right of action, or, which is the more effectual remedy, a right to restrain by injunction the wrongful use of the mark thus pirated" (*b*).

Function of trade mark.

The function of the trade mark is to give the purchaser a satisfactory assurance of the make and quality of the article he is buying. Thus, it was said by Lord Cottenham, C. (*c*), "take a piece of steel; the mark of the manufacturer from whom it comes is the only indication to the eye of the customer of the quality of the article; so it is of

(*a*) Per Lord Langdale, M. R., in *Perry* v. *Truefitt*, 6 Beav. 66.

(*b*) Per Lord Cranworth, C., in *Seixo* v. *Provezende*, L. R. 1 Ch. 192. And see per the United States Supreme Court in *Canal Co.* v. *Clark*, 13 Wall. 311; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245, and *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Trainer*, 101 U. S. Rep. 51; and per Molesworth, J., in the Supreme Court of Victoria in *In re Brebner*, 2 W. & W. 12; and per Levinge, J., in the High Court of Bengal, in *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Grant, Smith & Co.*, 2 Hyde 185.

(*c*) In *Spottiswoode* v. *Clarke*, 2 Ph. 154; and see *Sohl* v. *Geisendorf*, 1 Wils. (Ind.) 60; *Kidd* v. *Johnson*, 100 U. S. Rep. 617.

blacking, or any other article of manufacture, the particular quality of which is not discernible by the eye." It is on the faith of the mark being genuine, and representing a quality equal to that which he has previously found a similar mark to indicate, that the purchaser makes his purchase. "That, in truth," said James, L. J. (*a*), "is the meaning and object of a trade mark. It indicates this—that you may take this as a warranty that it has come from the particular manufacturer of the goods with which you have been hitherto pleased."

Mere statement of quality, no trade mark.

Yet, while the object of the trade mark is to indicate quality, a mere English adjective, or word in common use (*b*), which indicates quality and nothing more, not serving to connect the goods with any particular manufacturer or seller, cannot be appropriated as a trade mark, for no person can be permitted to exclude others from the use of words common to all, even in their application to goods; and without such exclusive appropriation, the mark is a mere statement, offering no guarantee, and making no one responsible for its correctness. And in the same way the use of a mark which has for its object the enabling purchasers to divide into equal pieces the substance to which it is applied, cannot deprive other makers of the right to use other somewhat similar marks with the same object (*c*).

Exception.

Marks, however, which do serve to indicate the production of a certain manufacturer, though at the same time subject to variation for the purpose of denoting different qualities, are entitled to protection (*d*). And it may be

(*a*) *Massam* v. *J. W. Thorley's Cattle Food Co.*, (2) 14 Ch. D. 748; and see *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Trainer*, 101 U. S. Rep. 51.

(*b*) *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447; *Ragg* v. *Findlater*, L. R. 17 Eq. 29; *In re Barrows*, 5 Ch. D. 353; *Spottiswoode* v. *Clarke*, G. Coop. 154; *Gillott* v. *Esterbrook*, R. Cox 353; *Osgood* v. *Allen*, 1 Holmes 185; *In re Eagle Pencil Co.*, 19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 561.

(*c*) *Dausman and Drummond Tobacco Co.* v. *Rufner*, 15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 559.

(*d*) *Hirst* v. *Denham*, L. R. 14 Eq. 542; *Ransome* v. *Graham*, 51 L. J. Ch. 897; *Moses* v. *Sargood*, Dig. 636; *Sohl* v. *Grisendorf*, 1 Wils. (Ind.) 60; *Godillot* v. *Harris* (per Danforth, J.), 81 N. Y. 263. See *Stokes* v. *Landgraff*, 17 Barb. 608; R. Cox, 137; *Gillott* v. *Kettle*, 3 Duer, 624; R. Cox, 148; *Gillott* v.

observed that a symbol or word indicating quality in one class of goods need not necessarily do so in another (*a*).

Trade mark not always indicative of actual manufacturer.

The use of the trade mark is not in all cases to designate the maker of the substance to which it is attached (*b*), though that is usually so; it may indicate some other person who has expended labour on the article, so that, as finished, it owes some portion of its value to him. Thus, in a case in the Supreme Court of New York (*c*) it was held that, where one person manufactured cotton cloths, and another printed them, the mark was indicative of the printer and not of the original manufacturer. So a trade mark has been recognised as indicating the bleacher who finished the goods which another person had manufactured (*d*); and, in the same way, one may serve to denote the importer (*e*) or exporter (*f*) of manufactured goods.

May be indicative of selector.

Again, a trade mark may be so composed as to indicate that the goods have been examined and selected by a person of known ability, so that they have attributed to them such value as his approval can give, and his reputation depends upon their corresponding to their alleged quality. In such a case, therefore, the trade mark belongs to the selector and not to the manufacturer (*g*).

May indicate natural products.

To go further, it is not necessary that the goods to which the mark is affixed should be manufactured goods at all; it is sufficient if the vendors, whose property the trade mark is, have alone the opportunity of procuring the article in question, so that the trade mark indicates accurately

Esterbrook, 47 Barb. 455; R. Cox, 340; 3 Sickels, 374; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Trainer*, 101 U. S. Rep. 51.

(*a*) *In re English*, U.S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1870, 142; *In re Dick & Co.*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 538.

(*b*) See per V.-C. B. in *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

(*c*) *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner*, 55 Barb. 151; R. Cox, 541. See *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner* (2), 54 How. Pr. 298, and *Wamsutta Mills* v. *Allen*, 12 Phila. 535.

(*d*) *In re Sykes*, 43 L. T. N. S. 626.

(*e*) *Godillot* v. *Hazard*, 44 N. Y. Super. Ct. 427.

(*f*) *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 489, though it was held on appeal that in that particular instance this was not the case.

(*g*) *Hirsch* v. *Jonas*, 3 Ch. D. 584.

the source from which the article is derived. This is particularly the case with mineral waters and similar productions (*a*). A mere name, however, for a natural product which is available by all the world, cannot be exclusively appropriated by an individual, who possesses no exclusive access to its source (*b*).

Advantages of use of trade marks.

The benefits derivable from the recognition of the exclusive right of a trader to his trade mark are apparent from the consideration that the "trade mark is both a sign of the quality of the article and an assurance to the public that it is the genuine product of his manufacture. It thus often becomes of great value to him, and in its exclusive use the Court will protect him against attempts of others to pass off their products upon the public as his. This protection is afforded, not only as a matter of justice to him, but to prevent imposition upon the public" (*c*).

The protection of trade marks is, therefore, beneficial to the public, since it enables them to buy, with confidence that they are getting what they require; while at the same time it is beneficial to the manufacturer, since it affords him the means of securing the benefit of the custom which he deserves and which is intended for him. When the owner of a trade mark is asserting his exclusive rights, "monopoly is not the thing for which the one party struggles and which the other resists. On the contrary, fair trading is all for the protection of which the law is invoked, and the public, as well as the manufacturer or

(*a*) *Apollinaris Co.* v. *Norrish*, 33 L. T. N. S. 242; *Apollinaris Co.* v. *Edwards*, Seton, 4th ed. 237 (Apollinaris Water); *Radde* v. *Norman*, L. R. 14 Eq. 348 (Leopoldshall Kainit); *Congress and Empire Spring Co.* v. *High Rock Congress Spring Co.*, 57 Barb. 526; R. Cox, 599 (Congress Spring Water); *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284 (Cromac Springs Water); *Dunbar* v. *Glenn*, 42 Wisc. 118 (Bethesda Mineral Water); and see the coal cases — *Canal Co.* v. *Clark*, 13 Wall. 311; *Braham* v. *Beachim*, 7 Ch. D. 848; *Davis* v. *Tylor*, M. R., April 24th, 1879; *Lochgelly Co. Ld.* v. *Lamphinnans Iron Co.*, Ct. Sess. Cas., 4th Ser. VI. 482.

(*b*) *Young* v. *Macrae*, 9 Jur. N. S. 322.

(*c*) *Per* U. S. Sup. Ct. in *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1925; and see *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Spear*, 2 Sandf. S. C. 599.

merchant, are concerned that infringement of trade marks and trade designations should be prevented. For there is a double wrong: the public are or may be deceived, and the trader whose trade mark or trade designation is infringed is or may be injured" (*a*). So advantageous did the adoption of a trade mark speedily prove to be that, in 1742, Lord Hardwicke, C., said, that "every particular trader had some particular mark or stamp" (*b*).

Southern v. Howe.

In the earliest case on record (*c*) damages were given for the infringement of a mark on cloth, though it is not clear from the reports whether the plaintiff was a clothmaker whose mark had been pirated, or a purchaser who had been deceived into buying the wrong goods.

Blanchard v. Hill.

In *Blanchard* v. *Hill* (*d*), however, in 1742, Lord Hardwicke refused to protect the "Great Mogul" stamp on cards, deciding, in effect, that there was no right of property in a trade mark, though actual fraud might be restrained or punished, as in *Southern* v. *Howe* (*e*). The decision seems in great measure to have been founded upon a dread of setting up a monopoly, the distinction between a trade mark and a patent not being clearly present to his lordship's mind.

Singleton v. Bolton.

In *Singleton* v. *Bolton* (*f*), in the Court of King's Bench (1783), Lord Mansfield, C. J., said that if the defendant had sold a medicine of his own under the plaintiff's name or mark, that would be a fraud for which an action would lie; but the name of an original inventor being the trade mark in question, evidence was necessary of the medicine having been sold as if prepared by the plaintiff, a distinction being thus drawn

(*a*) Per Lord Craighill in *Dunnachie* v. *Young & Sons*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 4th Ser. X. 874; and see *State of Missouri* v. *Gibbs*, 56 Mo. 133; and *Blackwell* v. *Wright*, 73 N. Car. 310.

(*b*) *Blanchard* v. *Hill*, 2 Atk. 484, 485.

(*c*) *Southern* v. *Howe*, Poph. 144; 3 Cro. 471; 2 Rolle 28.

(*d*) Atk. 484.

(*e*) *Ubi supra.*

(*f*) 3 Doug. 293.

between the transmissibility of a name and that of other trade marks, which has since been removed (*a*).

Sykes v. *Sykes.*

In Scotland an interdict was granted in 1823 to restrain the infringement of a trade mark (*b*), but in England it was for the first time perceived, in 1824, that goods sold with a pirated mark attached, though they might not deceive an immediate purchaser, yet might deceive an ultimate purchaser, who might have no notice of the fraud (*c*).

Requisites to entitle to damages at Common Law.

This case marks the last stage of development in the law of trade marks as recognised at Common Law (*d*); and the requisites necessary to entitle a plaintiff to recover damages were, in accordance with the judgment of Sir T. Wilde, C. J., in *Rodgers* v. *Nowill* (*e*), that he should have been accustomed to use a certain mark upon goods of his manufacture to denote that that was so, that that mark was known in the trade (*f*), and that the defendant had imitated the mark and sold goods bearing it, as and for the plaintiff's goods, with intent to defraud (*g*).

Lord Blackburn in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog.*

Lord Blackburn, discussing the history of trade-mark law in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (*h*), said that, "The original foundation of the whole law is this—that when one, knowing that goods are not made by a particular trader, sells them as and for the goods of that trader, he does that which injures that trader. At first it was put upon the ground that he did so when he sold inferior goods as and for the trader's; but it is established, alike at law and in equity, that it is an

(*a*) See *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 1 H. & M. 271; 4 De G. J. & S. 137; 11 H. L. C. 523, and other cases.

(*b*) *Wilkie* v. *McCulloch*, Ct. Sess. Cas., 1st Ser. II. 413.

(*c*) *Sykes* v. *Sykes*, 3 B. & Cr. 541.

(*d*) See per Sir G. Mellish, L. J., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—454.

(*e*) 5 C. B. 109.

(*f*) Registration, provided the connexion with the goodwill of the business is observed, is now equivalent to public use of a mark: Patents Act, 1883, § 75; and see Trade Marks Act, 1875, § 2. This was held to be so also in America under the U. S. Statute of 1870: *In re The Dutcher Temple Co.*, U S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 248. And see § 7 of the U. S. Act of 1881.

(*g*) See, however, the Judicature Act of 1873, § 25, by which the rules of Equity prevail.

(*h*) 8 App. Cas. 29.

actionable injury to pass off goods known not to be the plaintiff's as and for the plaintiff's, even though not inferior. The modes in which goods may be passed off as and for the plaintiff's vary. The most usual is where a particular mark on the goods, or on the packages in which they are sold, has been used to denote that they are made by a particular firm to such an extent that it is understood in the market to bear that meaning. The law as to those trade marks is now regulated by statutes, but before there was any legislation on the subject it was well settled that when any one adopted a mark so closely resembling the trade mark of the plaintiff that it would be likely to be mistaken for it, and put it on his goods and sold them, knowing that, though the persons to whom he sold them were well aware that they were not the plaintiff's make, yet that they were meant to be sold to others who would see only the trade mark, and were likely to be deceived by its resemblance to that of the plaintiff, he might be properly found to have knowingly and fraudulently sold the goods as and for the plaintiff's goods. And, so far, there was no difference between law and equity.

"But at law it was necessary to prove that an injury had been actually done; in equity it was enough to show that the defendant threatened to do, and would, if not prevented, do that injury. But there is a further question on which there may be a difference between law and equity."

Equity—*Millington v. Fox.*

The difference to which allusion is here made arises from the fact that in equity the protection to the manufacturer and the public was carried a stage farther in 1833 by the decision of Lord Cottenham, C., in *Millington* v. *Fox*(*a*), since

(*a*) 3 My. & Cr. 338. In *Gout* v. *Aleploglu*, 5 Leg. Obs. 496, the Vice-Chancellor of England held that "the plaintiff had acquired by long previous usage *the exclusive right*" to his trade marks, but the report is too brief to show whether that expression was employed in its full meaning. *Hogg* v. *Kirby*, 8 Ves. 215 (1803); and *Day* v. *Binning*, C. P. Cooper, 489, and 1 Leg. Obs. 205 (1831), were cases of fraudulent competition; and in *Henry* v. *Price*, 1 Leg. Obs. 364 (1831), there were circumstances of fraud.

which time it has not been necessary to prove an actual fraudulent intention, the remedy being obtainable if the defendant's conduct has been such as to produce the effects of fraud, though he may, in fact, have acted in perfect innocence.

Limits to Court's interposition.

It is, however, "no part of the duty of the Court to enforce the observance of the dictates of morality" (*a*), and, therefore, if a defendant "has an abstract right to do what he has done, the Court must permit it, however opposed to one's moral sense" (*b*). The Court will not interfere, simply on the ground that there is a misrepresentation, unless some right belonging to the plaintiff has been interfered with (*c*).

Acquisition of trade marks.

The mode of acquiring a right to a trade mark was, from 1875 to 1883, regulated by the Trade Marks Registration Acts, 1875–7 (*d*). The trade mark was required to accord with the definition contained in section 10 of the Act of 1875 (*e*), and not to be obnoxious to the restrictions of section 6, and it had to be registered, or, if it had been used before the passing of the Act, application must have been made for registration, and have been refused, in which case a certificate of refusal could be obtained from the registrar (*f*), unsuccessful applicants thus retaining whatever rights might have been theirs before the Act. For a mark to have been used before the Act, it was sufficient for a vendible article to have been actually in the market, bearing the mark in question; it was not necessary for this to have been the case for any length of time, so long as there was some user (*g*).

(*a*) Per Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in *Batty* v. *Hill*, 1 H. & M. 264. And see *Roper's, &c., Co.* v. *Copeman's, &c., Association, Limited* 28 Sol. J. 218.

(*b*) *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447.

(*c*) See *Batty* v. *Hill*, *ubi supra*

(*d*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 91; 39 & 40 Vict. c. 33; 40 & 41 Vict. c. 37.

(*e*) Which was so restricted as to exclude from registration some marks previously recognised: *Ex parte Stephens*, 3 Ch. D. 659; *In re Mitchell* (1), 7 Ch. D. 36. See *Rose* v. *Evans*, 48 L. J. Ch. 618.

(*f*) Section 2 of the Amendment Act, 1876.

(*g*) Per Lord Westbury, C., in *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380; *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284; *In re Simpson, Davies & Sons*, M. R., Jan. 12, 1881, and other cases.

The Trade Marks Acts, 1875–7, are now repealed, and replaced by the Patents Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57), which contains a wider and more comprehensive definition of a trade mark (*a*), but is in other respects substantially identical, so far as concerns the acquisition of trade marks, with the repealed Acts (*b*).

Appropriation to special classes of goods.

A trade mark must, under the present Act, as under the repealed Acts, be registered as belonging to particular goods or classes of goods (*c*), according to the classification of goods contained in the Rules, and trade marks used before the Act of 1875 can only be protected in respect of the same classes of goods as those to which they have been habitually applied, for no man could be so deceived as to suppose that he was buying A.'s linen because he saw the same mark as A.'s on B.'s iron (*d*).

Assignment and transmission.

A trade mark is assignable and transmissible, but only in connection with the goodwill of the business concerned with the goods or classes of goods to which it relates (*e*). A trade mark cannot exist in gross and unattached to specific articles (*f*), for, if that could be so, the mark might come to be an instrument of deception, instead of a guarantee of genuineness (*g*). In an assignment of the business and goodwill, the trade mark passes as a matter of course (*h*), or, if specially excepted, must cease to be available by the vendor. On the death of a registered

(*a*) See § 64.

(*b*) See §§ 62—74.

(*c*) Trade Marks Act, 1875, § 2; Patents Act, 1883, § 65.

(*d*) *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518; *Merchant Banking Co.* v. *Merchants' Bank*, 9 Ch. D. 560; *Société Anonyme* v. *Baxter*, 14 Bl. C. C. 261; *Colman* v. *Crump*, 70 N. Y. 573.

(*e*) Patents Act, 1883, § 70, and see Trade Marks Act, 1875, § 2; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; and *Dixon Crucible Co.* v. *Guggenheim*, 2 Brewster, 321; R. Cox, 559.

(*f*) *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380; *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, *ib.* 137; 11 H. L. C. 523; *Dixon* v. *Guggenheim*, *ubi supra*; *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284; *Kidd* v. *Johnson*, 100 U. S. Rep. 617; *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1) 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; *S. C.* (2) 51 How. Pr. 455.

(*g*) *Cotton* v. *Gillard*, 44 L. J. Ch. 90; see *Witthaus* v. *Braun*, 44 Md. 303.

(*h*) *Shipwright* v. *Clements*, 19 W. R. 599.

proprietor, his legal personal representative acquires the title to the mark. Subsequent registered proprietors stood in the same position, under § 4 of the Trade Marks Act of 1875, as if their title were a continuation of the title of the first registered proprietor (*a*). And it seems that this will still be so, though the section has not been re-enacted in the new Act.

Bankruptcy.

It has been held in bankruptcy that a trade mark passes to a trustee in bankruptcy, as being "goods and chattels" within § 15, sub-s. 5, of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869 (*b*).

Trade mark lost.

Apart from the special provisions of the Patents Act, 1883, a trade mark may be lost, as by its coming to be commonly applied to a special article, in which case it becomes *publici juris;* thus "Worcestershire sauce," which might at one time have been protected, could no longer be so when it had come into common use (*c*). So, too, if a person abandons a suit which he has undertaken to restrain infringement, he abandons his exclusive right (*d*).

Infringement.

When once a person has acquired a right in a trade mark, any infringement of that right will form a ground for the interference of the Court. For the Court to interfere there must be fraud, for where there is no fraud there is no wrong to be redressed and no remedy applicable. But it is not necessary that there should be fraud in the sense that the infringer knowingly and wilfully makes a fraudulent attempt to appropriate to himself the fruits of another's reputation; if he acts so that custom intended

(*a*) And see *Walton* v. *Crowley*, 3 Bl. C. C. 440; R. Cox, 166.

(*b*) *Ex parte Young; Re Lemon Hart & Son*, Dig. 537; and see *Kelly* v. *Hutton*, L. R. 3 Ch. 708; *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79; and cases at p. 93, note (*i*); also the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, § 44 (iii). In America it has been considered a disputable question whether property in a trade mark is the subject of attachment or levy under execution (*Hegeman & Co.* v. *Hegeman*, 8 Daly 6), or whether it will pass under a general assignment (*Milliken* v. *Dart*, 33 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 24).

(*c*) *Lea* v. *Miller*, Dig. 513; and see per Sir G. Mellish, L. J., in *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

(*d*) *Browne* v. *Freeman*, 12 W. R. 305.

for another is diverted to himself, and that the public buy and pay for one thing while intending to buy and pay for another, so that both vendor and purchaser are injured, there is fraud, and the animus of the infringer is unimportant (*a*). Even if the purchaser is told that the goods are the goods of the actual seller, but the imitated mark is upon them, there is ground for interference, since the goods may be resold bearing the mark, but without the information necessary to correct the statement thereby made (*b*). There is infringement if ordinary purchasers, purchasing with ordinary caution, are likely to be misled (*c*); on the one hand the Court will not strain its jurisdiction to protect fools and idiots (*d*); on the other hand, it will not require such minuteness of imitation as to deceive persons of unusual sagacity and information.

Remedies for infringement.

Infringement is criminally punishable under an indictment for obtaining money by false pretences (*e*), or in accordance with the special provisions of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862 (*f*), expressly enacted to prevent such practices. The Common Law remedy is by an action on the case for damages caused by the offender's fraud (*g*). The equitable remedy is by injunction, together with an account, or damages, if preferred. The greater suitability of this form of remedy has occasioned the adjudication in Chancery of the great majority of trade-mark cases, and the carrying into operation of the Trade Marks Registration Acts was further entrusted to the Chancery Division (*h*).

Fraudulent intention.

At Common Law, at all events until the Judicature Acts, it was necessary to prove knowledge of the plaintiff's rights and intentional deception on the part of the de-

(*a*) See cases collected at p. 153, note (*d*).

(*b*) *Sykes* v. *Sykes*, 3 B. & Cr. 541; and cases at pp. 145, 146.

(*c*) *Seixo* v. *Provezende*, L. R. 1 Ch. 192.

(*d*) *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—47; *Blackwell* v. *Wright*, 73 N. Car. 310.

(*e*) See Ch. 5.

(*f*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 88.

(*g*) An injunction may now form part of the relief.

(*h*) Trade marks rule 42 of 1876.

fendant (*a*); to obtain an injunction in Chancery this has not been required since *Millington* v. *Fox* (*b*), in 1833. It may, however, be material with reference to the extent of the relief to be granted, since a plaintiff is only entitled to an account in respect of such user of his trade mark by the defendant as has been subsequent to the latter becoming aware of the prior ownership, or at least of the prior existence as a trade mark of the mark used by him (*c*).

Plaintiff disentitled to relief.

A plaintiff who in other respects would be entitled to obtain a remedy against an infringer may yet be deprived of his right by reason of some fraudulent statement contained in his own trade mark (*d*), for "*ex turpi causâ non oritur actio*, and if the trade mark contains a false representation calculated to deceive the public, a man cannot by using that which is in itself a fraud obtain any right at all in the mark" (*e*).

When not disentitled.

A mere collateral misrepresentation, not contained in the trade mark itself, and therefore not repeated at every transfer of the article, is not sufficient to disentitle the trade mark to protection (*f*).

Unauthorized use of word "patent," &c.

A particular form of misstatement which has proved fatal in several cases has been the insertion or retention in a trade mark of the words "patent" or "patented," so as to indicate the protection of an existing patent, to which the article bearing the trade mark is not in fact entitled (*g*).

Distinction between trade mark and patent.

"Trade marks have sometimes been likened to letters patent and sometimes to copyrights, from both of which they differ in many respects" (*h*). "There is this difference between the case of a trade mark and that of a patent: in the former case the article sold is open to the whole world

(*a*) *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 5 C. B. 109.
(*b*) 3 My. & Cr. 338.
(*c*) *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292; *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 Beav. 578.
(*d*) See *Pidding* v. *How*, 8 Sim. 477; *Perry* v. *Truefitt*, 6 Beav. 66; and other cases in Ch. 7, p. 190.
(*e*) Per Sir G. Mellish, L. J., in *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611.
(*f*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, *ubi supra*.
(*g*) See the cases in Ch. 7, p. 189.
(*h*) Per Lord Blackburn, in *Johnston* v. *Orr-Ewing*, 7 App. Cas. 219—228.

to manufacture, and the only right the plaintiff seeks is that of being able to say—'Don't sell any goods under my mark.' He may find his customers fall off in consequence of the defendant's manufacture; but it does not necessarily follow that the plaintiff can claim damages for every article manufactured by the defendant, even though it be under that mark. On the other hand, every sale without license of a patented article must be a damage to the patentee" (*a*). In the case of a trade mark, "the property and right to protection is in the device or symbol which is invented and adopted to designate the goods to be sold, and not in the article which is manufactured and sold" (*b*). The broad difference between a patent and a trade mark is, therefore, that the public are prohibited and restrained from manufacturing any article protected by the former, so long as the protection exists, whereas the public are at full liberty to manufacture an unpatented article (*c*), and that according to the identical original process, and to say that they are so doing, and this is so whether the original makers use, or do not use, a trade mark upon their goods. What the subsequent manufacturers may not do is to put upon their goods the mark used by the original makers, so as to represent that such goods are the actual goods of the original makers, and not merely equivalent goods made by others. The benefit conferred upon the public by the communication of a new invention, which after a limited period all

(*a*) Per Wood, V.-C., in *Davenport* v. *Rylands*, L. R. 1 Eq. 302.

(*b*) Per Monell, C. J., in *Godillot* v. *Hazard*, 49 How. Pr. 5; and see *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; and *Swift* v. *Peters*, 11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1110.

(*c*) This is quite clear in America as well as in this country. See *Thomson* v. *Winchester*, 19 Pick. 214; R. Cox. 7; *Coffeen* v. *Brunton*, 4 McLean, 516; R. Cox, 82; *Davis* v. *Kendall*, 2 R. I. 566; R. Cox, 112; *Comstock* v. *White*, 18 How. Pr. 421; R. Cox, 232; *Phalon* v. *Wright*, 5 Phila. 464; R. Cox, 307; *Falkinburg* v. *Lucy*, 35 Cal. 52; R. Cox, 448; *Cook* v. *Starkweather*, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392; *Godillot* v. *Hazard*, 44 N. Y. Super. Ct. 427; *Hardy* v. *Cutter*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 468; *Frese* v. *Bachof* (2), 14 Bl. C. C. 432; *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461. So also in Scotland, *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Kimball and Morton*, Ct. Sess. Cas., 3rd Ser. IX. 267.

can use, is the consideration in respect of which a monopoly of the invention is granted to the inventor for that limited period (*a*). Any attempt, therefore, to prolong the term of the patent by means of a trade mark will be discouraged (*b*).

Trade mark distinguished from copyright.

As a trade mark is not the same thing as a patent, so it is not the same as a copyright (*c*). The difference between them is in fact so wide that the United States statute of 1870, by which the registration of trade marks was authorized and regulated, was held to be unconstitutional and invalid on the express ground that the clause in the Constitution empowering the Legislature to regulate patents and copyrights conferred upon it no authority to make a statute for the regulation of trade marks. A copyright, like a patent, relates to the substance of an article, but differs in that it has reference to a literary instead of a material production. A trade mark does not protect the substance of the article to which it is attached from being imitated, but it identifies an article and indicates the source to which that article is to be attributed. Trade mark not being copyright, registration of a trade mark, or, what comes to be much the same thing, a title of a book or paper, under the Copyright Acts, is unnecessary and useless (*d*).

Trade marks of aliens protected.

Since trade marks are recognised throughout the world, and not merely in the manufacturer's own country, as indicative of his goods, so that the subjects of any country are liable to be defrauded by goods bearing an imitation of a foreign trade mark, and any manufacturer is liable to

(*a*) *Cheavin* v. *Walker*, 5 Ch. D. 850—63.

(*b*) See per Sir G. Mellish, L. J., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—56.

(*c*) *Farina* v. *Silverlock*, 6 De G. M. & G. 214; *Collins Co.* v. *Cowen*, 3 K. & J. 428; *Correspondent Newspaper Co.* v. *Saunders*, 11 Jur. N. S. 540; *Kelly* v. *Hutton*, L. R. 3 Ch. 708; *Dicks* v. *Yates*, 18 Ch. D. 76; *Taylor* v. *Carpenter*, 11 Paige, 292; 2 Sandf. 603; R. Cox, 45; *Wolfe* v. *Barnett*, 24 La. Ann. 97; 13 Amer. Rep. 111.

(*d*) *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307; *Kelly* v. *Hutton*, L. R. 3 Ch. 708; *Hirsch* v. *Jonas*, 3 Ch. D. 584; *Scoville* v. *Toland*, 6 West. L. J. 84.

suffer by the forgery of his marks abroad, the right of property in a trade mark is not limited by territorial bounds (*a*), though a limitation may be imposed by means of an exception of specified places by the assignor of a trade mark on assignment (*b*), and aliens' marks are protected in the English Court in precisely the same manner as if they belonged to British subjects (*c*). The same is the case in the United States (*d*), in India (*e*), Canada (*f*), and elsewhere.

Conflict of laws.

No direct conflict of laws has as yet arisen in the English Courts with respect to trade marks, though on some occasions such has appeared likely to be the case. In *Farina* v. *Cathery* (*g*) the question was raised whether a Prussian manufacturer could be restrained in this country from using a trade mark which he was entitled to use under Prussian law. It was held, however, that the mark was not identical with that to which a right had been acquired in Prussia. In *Compagnie Laferme* v. *Hendrickx* (*h*) there was a question whether a German manufacturer could acquire a right in England to the exclusive use of a trade mark consisting of the word "Laferme," a mere word not being allowed in Germany to constitute a trade mark; but as the plaintiff failed to satisfy the Court that he had been the first to use the word in Germany, no decision was given on the point. In *In re Farina* (2) (*i*) registration was refused to a German mark on the ground of too great a similarity existing between it and a previously registered German mark, notwithstanding that the German Court of Appeal, reversing the decision of the Court of First

(*a*) *Derringer* v. *Plate*, 29 Cal. 292: R. Cox, 325.

(*b*) *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461.

(*c*) *Collins Co.* v. *Cowen*, 3 K. & J. 428; and cases at p. 75, note (*a*).

(*d*) *Taylor* v. *Carpenter*, 3 Story, 458; R. Cox, 14; and cases at p. 75, note (*a*).

(*e*) *Orr-Ewing* v. *Chooneeloll Mullick*, Cor. 150.

(*f*) *Davis* v. *Kennedy*, 13 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 523.

(*g*) L. J. Notes of Cases, 1867, p. 134.

(*h*) Dig. 512.

(*i*) 27 W. R. 456.

Instance, had held that there was no such similarity as to prevent the registration in that country of the second mark. It has also been held that user abroad is not such user as will bring the person using within the three-mark rule (*a*), and that a person who has not even an intention of using a trade mark in England cannot be a person aggrieved by a wrongful entry on the register (*b*), but the latter decision was reversed (*c*). Sections 103 and 104 of the Patents Act provide for the grant of privileges to foreigners and colonists in cases in which their governments give protection to British subjects.

Cases analogous to trade mark cases.

Besides cases of infringement of trade marks proper, there are some other classes of cases nearly akin to the former, but differing from them in some important particulars, which yet require notice in connection with the subject of trade marks, as where there is an unfair competition in trade contrived, not by imitation of trade marks, but by other forms of representation that one man's goods are another's. Such cases are governed by substantially identical principles with those which regulate the law of trade marks, the decision of the Court of Appeal to the contrary (*d*) having been overruled by the House of Lords (*e*).

Trade names.

In imitations of trade names, again, used as such and not as trade marks on goods, there is a difference from trade mark cases proper; there is a false representation, but it is a representation, not that certain goods are certain other goods, but that a certain establishment is a certain other establishment, the object being that the one establishment should obtain custom intended for the other. Such cases are not cases of trade mark, not being concerned with marks placed on vendible articles in the market (*f*), but still the Court has to proceed on much the same lines.

(*a*) *In re Münch*, 50 L. T. N. S. 12.

(*b*) *In re Riviere & Co.*, 49 L. T. N. S. 506.

(*c*) 32 W. R. 390.

(*d*) *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434.

(*e*) S. C. 3 App. Cas. 376.

(*f*) *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380.

Goodwill.

All such cases, whether of trade mark, or trade name, or other unfair use of another's reputation, are concerned with an injurious attack upon the goodwill of a rival business; customers are diverted from one trader to another, and orders intended for one find their way to the other. Trade marks are really a branch of the goodwill of the business with which they are connected, representing it in the market, while the trade name over the shop represents it to the passer-by. It is by the devolution of the goodwill that that of the trade marks is regulated (*a*), they are in fact included in, and valued as part of, the goodwill (*b*); severed from it they cannot exist.

(*a*) § 70 of Patents Act, 1883; and see Rule 36, also § 2 of Trade Marks Act, 1875, and Rule 27 of the Trade Marks Rules, 1876.

(*b*) *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150.

CHAPTER II.

WHAT IS A TRADE MARK?

What is a trade mark?

THE first point which has to be considered in regard to the law of trade marks is, "What is a trade mark?" With what class of objects is this branch of law concerned? On the answer to this question must necessarily depend the principles to be applied in any given case.

A true trade mark must be affixed to the article.

The most important criterion by which a case of trade mark may be distinguished from a case of false representation not amounting to an infringement of trade mark, was thus described by Sir G. Jessel, M. R. (*a*): "The cases which have come before the Courts may, I think, be conveniently divided into two classes. The first class, which is the most numerous, consists of cases where the goods manufactured are distinguished by some description or device in some way or other affixed to the article sold. It may be description—that is, it may consist of a name or names or a lengthy description consisting of names with superadded words—and that description may be either affixed to, or impressed upon, the goods themselves by means of a stamp or an adhesive label, or it may be made to accompany the goods by being impressed or made to adhere to an envelope or case containing the goods (*b*).

"An illustration of the first class would be the common trade mark, which is either the name or the image of some

(*a*) *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—440.

(*b*) See the definition by the V.-C. of Ireland in *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284; also *St. Louis Piano Manufacturing Co.* v. *Merkel*, 1 Mo. App. 305.

known or unknown thing, actually impressed upon, or worked into, the material, or made to adhere to the surface of the material, or it may be not what is commonly known as a trade mark, a distinguishing mark which, perhaps, to a legal mind would be a trade mark, but some form of the material itself." His lordship then instanced a case recently before him in which the trade mark consisted of certain lines woven into the fringe of a certain make of cloth and continued—

"Sometimes you do not find anything put on the goods themselves, the reason often being that the goods are not capable of it; for instance, when there are liquids, upon which, of course, you cannot put a mark, and therefore a mark is put on the bottle containing the liquid, or on the cork which is in the bottle and helps to retain the liquid. These are again true trade marks, whether affixed in the shape of a label on a bottle of liquid, or in the shape of a device on the cork, or in the case of other goods, such as cigars, affixed to the box which contains the cigars, or the string which encircles them, they are in some way or other attached to the goods, and go along with the goods on sale. That I call the first class."

As to the second class, his lordship said that "they are cases where the defendant, without putting any trade mark at all on his goods, or putting a trade mark which is admittedly different in substance from the trade mark, if any, of the plaintiff on the goods, has represented the goods as being goods manufactured by the plaintiff. Here, again, the Court has to try the question of representation. What the defendant has said or has done must amount to a representation that the goods to be sold are the goods of the plaintiff, or that they are manufactured by the plaintiff. What amount of representation will be sufficient for that purpose must again depend, of course, on the facts of each particular case."

Registration equivalent to public use.

For a trade mark to be entitled to protection, it must therefore not only be applicable, but be actually applied to a "vendible article" (*a*) in the market; the registration, however, of a trade mark under the Patents Act of 1883, as under the Trade Marks Acts of 1875–77, is equivalent to public use of the same (*b*).

Not every mark applied can be a trade mark.

But it is not everything that can be marked on goods that will constitute a valid trade mark: a mere descriptive adjective, for instance, cannot be appropriated from the rest of the world (*c*). It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish true trade marks from other marks, which, though affixed to goods, yet cannot be claimed as the exclusive trade marks of any individual.

Name and address of proprietor need not be stated.

In some American cases a difficulty has been raised with regard to a supposed requirement for a trade mark to contain an indication of the name and address of its proprietor. This requirement, however, which appears to have been based on a misconstruction of the language of Duer, J., in *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Spear* (*d*), has in practice been disregarded, and the reasoning of the U. S. Commissioner of Patents, when admitting the number "140"

(*a*) See per Lord Westbury, C., in *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380; also *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307; *Civil Service Supply Association* v. *Dean*, 13 Ch. D. 512; *In re Simpson, Davies & Sons*, M. R., Jan. 12th, 1881; *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 8 L. R. Ir. 284; *Candee* v. *Deere*, 54 Ill. 439.

(*b*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 91, § 2; 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, § 75. And this is so also in the United States. See *In re Dutcher Temple Co.*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 248.

(*c*) Cf. *Raggett* v. *Findlater*, L. R. 17 Eq. 29; *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447; *In re Brandreth*, Dig. 626; *Fulton* v. *Sellers*, 4 Brews. 42, and other cases. As to trade marks composed of an essential particular with an addition varied to indicate different qualities or other matters, and how such marks should be registered, see *infrd.*

(*d*) 2 Sandf. S. C. 599; R. Cox, 87. The passage alluded to runs thus:—"The owner of an original trade mark has an undoubted right to be protected in the exclusive use of all the marks, forms, or symbols that were appropriated as designating the true origin or ownership of the article or fabric to which they are affixed; but he has no right to an exclusive use of any words, letters, figures, or symbols which have no relation to the origin or ownership of the goods, but are only meant to indicate their name or quality. He has no right to appropriate a sign or symbol which, from the nature of the fact which it is used to signify, others may employ with equal truth, and therefore have an equal right to employ for the same purpose."

Duer.

to registration as a trade mark for umbrellas (*a*), seems to be conclusive. "A trade mark," he says, "must be of such a character as, when attached to the applicant's goods in the market, will distinguish them as to origin from other goods of the same class. To do this, it need not necessarily give the name of the person owning the said mark, nor the place where the goods are made or sold. It is enough if the mark is of such a character as to indicate to the purchaser that all articles bearing it come from one and the same source. The object a man has in view in adopting a trade mark is to secure to himself the benefits arising from the superior merits of his goods over others of the same class. To do this he puts upon them a peculiar mark, that purchasers may be able to distinguish them in the market. It matters not to him nor to others whether the purchasers know either his name or place of business, provided that his goods have some mark by which they may be designated and inquired for." Again, "If a trade mark possesses the evidence upon its face that it is put forth or given out as a distinguishing mark of the goods to which it is attached, that is, distinguishing as to origin, and not as to kind or quality, it may have all the requisites of a valid trade mark without naming the person or place whence it came" (*b*). In short, if a trade mark is properly distinctive, no further particularity can be required, unless under the provisions of some statutory enactment.

Non-restraint of mark, no presumption in favour of mark.

The fact that an action to restrain the use of a particular trade mark has been successfully defended raises no presumption that the defendant's mark is a valid trade mark or capable of registration, for the action may have failed on such grounds as, *e.g.*, that the plaintiff's and defendant's marks were alike descriptive (*c*).

Definition of trade mark in

For the purposes of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862 (*d*),

(*a*) *Ex parte Dawes & Fanning*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 27.

(*b*) Per U. S. Commissioner in *In re Dutcher Temple Co.*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 248.

(*c*) *In re Anderson*, W. N. 1884, p. 75.

(*d*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 88, § 1.

a very wide definition was adopted for the words "trade mark," a definition too little precise to be of much practical use outside of that Act, although it was adopted by the V.-C. of Ireland in *Wheeler* v. *Johnston* (*a*). Merchandise Marks Act, 1862.

The Trade Marks Registration Act of 1875 (*b*), however, contained a definition, which was not only valuable in itself, but was of great practical importance, qualifying, as it did, for registration and the accompanying advantages, all marks which satisfied its requirements; and this definition is now repeated, in a somewhat amplified form, in the Patents Act, 1883 (*c*). Definition in Patents Act, 1883.

The definition in question, as it now stands, is as follows:—

"For the purposes of this Act a trade mark must consist of or contain at least one of the following essential particulars:

(*a.*) A name of an individual or firm printed, impressed, or woven in some particular and distinctive manner; or

(*b.*) A written signature, or copy of a written signature, of the individual or firm applying for registration thereof as a trade mark; or

(*c.*) A distinctive device, mark, brand, heading, label, ticket, or fancy word or words not in common use.

There may be added to any one or more of these particulars any letters, words, or figures (*d*), or combination of letters, words, or figures, or of any of them.

Provided that any special and distinctive word or words, letter, figure, or combination of letters or figures, or of letters and figures, used as a trade mark before the 13th day of August, 1875, may be registered as a trade mark under this part of this Act" (*e*).

(*a*) 3 L. R. Ir. 284.
(*b*) § 10.
(*c*) § 64.
(*d*) "Figures" means "numerals:" *Ex parte Stephens*, 3 Ch. D. 659.
(*e*) And see the definition in *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245. The House of Lords appears to have considered that it was the essential elements that constituted the trade mark, not the whole label with all the minor and immaterial additions: *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 479.

And by § 74 provision is made for the registration of additions to registered trade marks.

Effect of this definition.

The effect of this definition is to restrict the variety of marks now capable of adoption for the first time by a manufacturer, for he cannot register or obtain protection under the Act for a new mark which does not comply with this definition by containing some one of the three first mentioned essential particulars, although previously to the Act it would have been perfectly good. "There was obviously much more difficulty," said Lord Blackburn (*a*), referring to the Act of 1875, "in dealing with existing trade marks, in which there was a vested right of property, than in dealing with new trade marks, as to which no one as yet had a vested right. According to the usual course of legislation in this country, vested rights of property are to be respected, and not interfered with farther than is necessary; but as to rights to be acquired hereafter, it is merely a question of expediency what conditions the Legislature may think fit to attach to the acquiring of those rights." The Act of 1883 goes beyond the Act of 1875 in admitting to registration as a new trade mark a fancy word or fancy words, but there are still some marks incapable of registration as new ones which would have been protected before the Act of 1875. However, a manufacturer is entitled under § 64 to register any distinctive mark used as such *before* the passing of the Act of 1875, and which is within the wording of § 64 (*b*), so obtaining for it the benefits of the Act, or, in case of registration being refused, to demand a certificate of such refusal (*c*), the possession of which will place him in a position to exercise whatever rights he may have had before and independently of the Acts.

(*a*) *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 495.

(*b*) This is wider than the wording of § 10 of the Act of 1875, and a single distinctive letter or figure may be registered as an old trade mark, though this was not so under the Act of 1875: *In re Mitchell* (1), 7 Ch. D. 36.

(*c*) Patents Act, 1883, § 77.

First class of trade marks.—A name.

In accordance with the above definition, the first species of trade marks consists of a name of an individual or firm, printed, impressed, or woven in some particular and distinctive manner, to which essential particular may be added any letters, words, or figures, or combination of letters, words, or figures, or of any of them.

How names differ from other trade marks.

There is between a name of an individual or firm used as a trade mark, and a fancy name or arbitrary symbol used for the same purpose, a broad distinction, which was early perceived, and which caused some difficulty in the universal acceptance of a name as an efficacious trade mark. This difference is that a name is in its very nature generic, and is properly applied to designate, not one individual in the world, but, it may be, many thousands, to all of whom it is equally appropriate. The addition of the Christian to the surname does, indeed, diminish the number of persons to whom the appellation belongs; but the Christian name is commonly abbreviated to an initial letter, and, in any case, the surname is the important part of the name, beyond which many persons do not care to investigate.

Consequently the right in a name used as a trade mark is less complete.

The impossibility of a single manufacturer being allowed to arrogate to himself the exclusive use of a name which he shares in common with many other persons is apparent; and from this circumstance the rule was deduced that, while, as against persons bearing a different name, a manufacturer's right in his name trade mark is absolute and exclusive, as against persons bearing the same name no such exclusive right can be set up (*a*). Thus in *Dence*

(*a*) *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, 3 De G. M. & G. 896, and *infrd*, p. 27; *Faber* v. *Faber*, 49 Barb. 357; R. Cox, 401; *Meneely* v. *Meneely*, 17 Sickels, 427. See *Howe* v. *Howe Machine Co.*, 50 Barb. 236; R. Cox, 421; *Lazenby* v. *White* (1), 41 L. J. Ch. 354; *Massam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* (1), 6 Ch. D. 574; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S Rep. 245; *Binninger* v. *Wattles*, 28 How. Pr. 206; *Gilman* v. *Hunnewell*, 122 Mass. 139; *Prince Metallic Paint Co.* v. *Carbon Metallic Paint Co.*, Dig. 573; *Helmbold* v. *Helmbold Manufacturing Co.*, 53 How. Pr. 453; *Aikins* v. *Piper*, 15 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 581; *Decker* v. *Decker*, 52 How. Pr. 218; *Hardy* v. *Cutter*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 468; *In re Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.*, 14

v. *Mason* (*a*), Malins, V.-C., held that during the continuance of the partnership between two persons named Mason and Brand they could not be prevented from using the latter's name in their business, notwithstanding that it was well known in connection with a similar old-established business; and the Court of Appeal held (*b*) that the same would be the case if a new *bonâ fide* partnership should be formed. This rule must, however, be qualified by the statement that where a person uses his own name for the purpose of fraud, and satisfactory evidence of fraudulent intention can be produced, such unfair conduct will be restrained, even though the free use of the man's own name may be thereby hindered (*c*). And the Criminal Law also admits of the punishment of such fraudulent user of a man's own name (*d*).

Statements on this point.

A valuable statement of the law was made by Lord Craighill in the Scottish Court of Session, in *Dunnachie* v. *Young & Sons* (*e*), in which he said:—"The name of a person may be a trade mark; there may be other manufacturers of goods of the same description, and the latter are not precluded from placing their own names on their goods by reason of the fact that this name has already become the trade mark of another manufacturer. The only condition they must fulfil is that the name as used by them shall be accompanied with something which shall be

U. S. Pat. Gaz. 269; *Marshall* v. *Pinkham*, 52 Wisc. 572. And in the same way it seems that a manufacture may put his address, the name of his mill, on his goods, though it may resemble the address on another man's goods: *Carmichel* v. *Latimer*, 11 R. I. 395.

(*a*) Dig. 534.

(*b*) 41 L. T. N. S. 573.

(*c*) *Holloway* v. *Holloway*, 13 Beav. 209, and *infrà*; *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 6 Hare, 325; 5 C. B. 109; *Taylor* v. *Taylor*, 23 L. J. Ch. 255; *James* v. *James*, L. R. 13 Eq. 421; *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood*, W. N. 1873, pp. 93–185; *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (2), 9 Ch. D. 176; *Massam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* (2), 14 Ch. D. 748; *Pullar* v. *Pullar*, Fry, J., April 9th, 1883; *Gillis* v. *Hall*, R. Cox, 596; *Stonebraker* v. *Stonebraker*, 33 Maryland, 252; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Devlin* v. *Devlin*, 69 N. Y. 212; *Wilder* v. *Wilder*, Dig. 372; *Peltz* v. *Eichele*, 62 Mo. 171; *Rogers* v. *Taintor*, 97 Mass. 291; *In re Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.*, 14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 269; *Shaver* v. *Shaver*, 52 Iowa, 208; *India Rubber Comb Co.* v. *Rubber Comb & Jewelry Co.*, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 258.

(*d*) *R.* v. *Dundas*, 6 Cox, 380.

(*e*) Ct. Sess. Cas. 4th Ser. X. 874.

a distinction, if the bare name would lead to the deception of the public and the injury of the trader on whose goods the name first appeared as a trade mark." And in the New York case of *England* v. *The New York Publishing Co.* (*a*), Daly, C. J., said:—"The fact that a man has used his own name to designate the article he produces, and that the name has become valuable to him through the article becoming extensively known, gives him no right to exclude any other man of the same name from affixing his name upon the same kind of article, if he manufactures it. The test is whether he uses the name honestly and fairly in the ordinary prosecution of his business, or dishonestly, to palm off his own commodity as the production of another."

Holloway v. *Holloway*.

In *Holloway* v. *Holloway* (*b*), the defendant, Henry Holloway, sold pills and ointment in packets and pots, similar to those in which his brother, the plaintiff, Thos. Holloway, sold his, and the defendant also affixed to his packets and pots similar labels and wrappers, but with "H. Holloway," instead of simply "Holloway." Thomas Holloway having filed a bill for an injunction, Lord Langdale, M. R., granted the injunction, saying, on the evidence, that it was as clear and as plainly avowed a fraud as he ever knew. He, however, expressly stated that "the defendant's name being Holloway, he had a right to constitute himself a vendor of Holloway's pills and ointment," and that he, the M. R., "did not intend to say anything tending to abridge such right;" the defendant had, nevertheless, no right to do so with such additions to his own name as to deceive the public and make them believe that he was selling the plaintiff's pills and ointment.

Burgess v. *Burgess*.

The case of *Burgess* v. *Burgess* (*c*) was somewhat similar. There the plaintiff's father, to whose business the plaintiff had succeeded, had invented "Burgess' Essence

(*a*) 8 Daly, 375.
(*b*) 18 Beav. 209.
(*c*) 3 De G. M. & G. 896.

of Anchovies." He employed his two sons as his assistants, and the business was conducted by him and them at 107, Strand. After a time one of the sons, W. H. Burgess, took a house in King William Street, and setting up for himself, put on his shop front, "W. H. Burgess, late of 107, Strand." He also headed his labels, "36, King William Street, City, London (Royal Arms), late of 107, Strand, Burgess' Essence of Anchovies;" plaintiff's labels being headed, "107 (Royal Arms), Strand, corner of the Savoy Steps, John Burgess and Son, Original and Superior Essence of Anchovies." Sir R. T. Kindersley, V.-C., granted an injunction as to "late of 107, Strand," and the continuance on the sides of the defendant's shop door of a plate with the words "Burgess' Fish Sauce Warehouse, late of 107, Strand;" but the part of the motion which referred to the use of the words "Burgess' Essence of Anchovies" being refused, the plaintiff appealed, and the Lords Justices then distinctly refused to deny a man the use of his own name. Sir J. L. Knight-Bruce, L. J., said, "All the Queen's subjects have a right to sell their articles in their own names, and not the less so that they bear the same name as their fathers (*a*). The defendant carries on business in his own name, and sells his essence of anchovies as 'Burgess' Essence of Anchovies,' which, in truth, it is;" and Sir G. Turner, L. J., added that, "where a person was selling goods under a particular name, and another person, not having that name, was using it, it might be presumed that he so used it to represent the goods sold by himself as the goods of the person whose name he used (*b*); but that where the defendant sold goods under his own name, and

(*a*) And see *Hardy* v. *Cutter*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 468. However, a son has no right to deceive the public by using his father's new name, after the father has assumed a different name from that to which the son is entitled: *Gouraud* v. *Trust*, 10 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 627; but if the son has assumed the same fictitious name with the father, by the father's desire, the latter cannot afterwards interfere with the honest use of the fictitious name by the son: *England* v. *New York Publishing Co.*, 8 Daly, 375.

(*b*) See *Perks* v. *Hall & Co.*, W.N. 1881, p. 111.

it did happen that the plaintiff had the same name, it did not follow that the defendant was selling his goods as the goods of the plaintiff" (*a*); if, however, a fraudulent intention had been proved, both judges agreed that the case would have been different.

Ainsworth v. *Walmsley.*

The fact that according to these cases a man might with impunity, in the absence of proof of actual fraud, sell the same goods as another, under the same name, provided that his own name was the same as that of the rival manufacturer, who had been in the habit of using his name as his trade mark, not unnaturally produced doubts whether a trade mark which was not capable of protection against infringement in all cases could rightly be termed a trade mark at all; and in *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley* (*b*), where the defendant had affixed to thread not of the plaintiff's make labels with the words, "Ainsworth's Thread," it was argued that such a case was no case of trade mark, and that, this being so, it became necessary for the plaintiff to prove the *scienter* on the part of the defendant. Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., however, declined to adopt that argument, and intimated that in his opinion a man's name was "as strong an instance of trade mark as could be suggested," adding that it was subject "only to this inconvenience—that if a Mr. Jones or a Mr. Brown relied on his name, he might find it a very inadequate security, because there might be several other manufacturers of the same name."

A name may be a true trade mark.

The decision in this case finally established the principle that the name of an individual or firm duly appended to the vendible article is a valid trade mark (*c*), subject to the inconvenience mentioned above.

(*a*) In *Massam* v. *J. W. Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* (2), 14 Ch. D. 748, James, L. J., expressed the opinion that the language of Turner, L. J. was to be preferred to that of Knight-Bruce, L.J., the terms used by the latter being somewhat calculated to mislead.

(*b*) L. R. 1 Eq. 518.

(*c*) See per Lord Kingsdown, in *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 11 H. L. C. 523, where he treats a name as a good trade mark.

A name now first used as a trade mark must be in a distinctive form.

That inconvenience has now been removed as to new marks by the requirement for the name claimed as a trade mark to be "printed, impressed, or woven in some particular and distinctive manner" (*a*). For the future, a new trade mark consisting of a name will be available against all the world, without exception, for with the mere collocation of letters there is to be combined some further element, in respect of colour, pattern, or some other such differentia, which shall effectually distinguish the trade mark from even a similar succession of letters from which that further characteristic shall be absent (*b*). The effect of this provision is to render necessary for the future a precaution which many manufacturers have already voluntarily adopted, and the employment of a mode of printing, the imitation of which would furnish an almost irrefutable presumption of fraud, may be instanced from *Stephens* v. *Peel* (*c*), before Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in which case the labels on the bottles containing the plaintiff's ink were printed in letters which are described as being in part white on a red ground, in part white on a blue ground, and in part blue on a white ground.

The name need not be that of the actual manufacturer.

There is no provision in the Act which requires that the name selected as the trade mark shall be the name of the individual or firm by whom the goods to which the trade mark is to be attached are actually manufactured. Neither was this the case before the passing of the Act. In many instances, it is true, the name was that of the actual manu-

(*a*) Patents Act, 1883, § 64; Trade Marks Act, 1875, § 10.

(*b*) See per Jessel, M.R., in *In re Horsburgh & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 237. In the same way, the United States Statute of 1870, § 79, provided that the Commissioner of Patents should not receive and record any proposed trade mark which was merely the name of a person, firm, or corporation only, unaccompanied by a mark sufficient to distinguish it from the same name where used by other persons. And the Statute of 1881, now in force, provides by § 3, that "no alleged trade mark shall be registered which is merely the name of the applicant." See the decisions in *In re India Rubber Comb Co.*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 905, and *In re Rowe & Post*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 496, under the Act of 1870, and other cases noted against the Act.

(*c*) 16 L. T. N. S. 145.

facturer; thus, the words "Ainsworth's Thread" (*a*) and "Taylor's Persian Thread" (*b*) were used as trade marks on thread produced by those makers, "Ramsay" was used on bricks by G. H. Ramsay (*c*), Thomas Holloway placed "Holloway's Pills" and "Holloway's Ointment" on his boxes and pots (*d*), and so in many cases more (*e*).

A name become a trade mark may pass with the business.

But where a name has once become a trade mark, by registration, or, if used before the passing of the Trade Marks Registration Act of 1875, by actual user on a vendible article (*f*), since followed by registration or the procurement of a certificate of refusal to register, it is assignable (*g*), subject to a connection with the goodwill of the business (*h*), and may easily pass to and become the property of a person or firm whose own name is widely different. Thus, the trade mark "William Ash" in *Bury* v. *Bedford* (*i*), "1847, Rogers Bros. A. 1," in *Meriden Britannia Co.* v. *Parker* (*k*), "Thorley's Cattle Food" in *Massam* v. *J. W. Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* (2) (*l*), "D. Simmons" in *Weed* v. *Peterson* (*m*), "Pepper's Signal Oil" in *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), (2) (*n*), "Dr. C. McLane's Pills" in *McLean* v. *Fleming* (*o*), "Smith, Snyder & Co." in *Young* v. *Jones Bros. & Co.* (*p*), "Oakes' Candies" in *Probasco* v. *Bouyon* (*q*). But it is a fraudulent act to pur-

(*a*) *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518.

(*b*) *Taylor* v. *Taylor*, 23 L. J. Ch. 255.

(*c*) *Dixon* v. *Fawcus*, 3 Ell. & Ell. 537.

(*d*) *Holloway* v. *Holloway*, 13 Beav. 209.

(*e*) *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, 3 De G. M. & G. 896; *Wedgwood* v. *Smith*, Dig. 93; *Collins Co.* v. *Brown*, 3 K. & J. 428; *Stephens* v. *Peel*, 16 L. T. N. S. 145, &c.

(*f*) *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380.

(*g*) *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *The Leather Cloth Companies' case*, 1 H. & M. 271 (V.-C. Wood), and 11 H. L. C. 523 (Lords Cranworth and Kingsdown); *Rogers* v. *Taintor*, 96 Mass. 291; *Emerson* v. *Badger*, 101 Mass. 82.

(*h*) Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, § 2. Patents Act, 1883, § 70.

(*i*) 32 L. J. Ch. 741, and 4 De G. J. & S. 352.

(*k*) 39 Conn. 450; 12 Amer. Rep. 401.

(*l*) 14 Ch. D. 748.

(*m*) 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 178.

(*n*) 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; 51 How. Pr. 455.

(*o*) 96 U. S. Rep. 245.

(*p*) 3 Hughes, 274.

(*q*) 1 Mo. App. 241.

chase the right to use the name of a small maker because it happens to be identical with that of a maker of reputation (*a*).

Names of fancy personages.

Among trade marks used before the passing of the Trade Marks Act of 1875, instances are not unusual of marks consisting of a name which neither is nor ever has been borne by the present or any past manufacturer, but which either belongs to some person who actually exists or has existed, or to some imaginary or symbolical personage, or character from a book. Thus, the names "Victoria," "Albert," &c., are very commonly used on a great variety of articles; thus "Bismarck" denoted paper collars (*b*), and "Roger Williams" long cloth (*c*), "Dave Jones" whiskey (*d*), "Lone Jack" tobacco (*e*); so too "Britannia," "Dolly Varden," &c. All such names, whether of real or fictitious characters, will properly be classed with fancy names.

Name sometimes used alone.

In some cases the name constituting the trade mark is used alone, as "Wilkie" in *Wilkie* v. *McCulloch* (*f*), "Dent" in *Dent* v. *Turpin* (*g*), "Ramsay" in *Dixon* v. *Fawcus* (*h*), "Howe" in *Howe* v. *Howe Machine Co.* (*i*), "Wedgwood" in *Wedgwood* v. *Smith* (*k*), "Derringer" in *Derringer* v. *Plate* (*l*), "Jules Jurgensen" in *Jurgensen* v. *Alexander* (*m*), "A. W. Faber" in *Faber* v. *Faber* (*n*).

(*a*) *Perks* v. *Hall & Co.* W. N. 1881, p. 111.

(*b*) *Messerole* v. *Tynberg*, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 410; R. Cox, 479. In the U. S. Patent Office it has been held that one man may register as his trade mark another man's name with the latter's written consent: *Ex parte Sullivan & Burke*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 765; *Ex parte Pace, Talbott & Co.*, *ib.* 909.

(*c*) *Barrows* v. *Knight*, 6 R. I. 434; R. Cox, 238.

(*d*) *Kidd & Co.* v. *Mills, Johnson & Co.*, 5 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 337.

(*e*) *Carroll* v. *Ertheller*, 21 Alb. L. J. 503.

(*f*) Ct. Sess. Cas. 1st Ser. II. 418.

(*g*) 2 J. & H. 139.

(*h*) 3 Ell. & Ell. 537.

(*i*) 50 Barb. 236; R. Cox, 421.

(*k*) Dig. 96.

(*l*) 29 Cal. 292; R. Cox, 324.

(*m*) 24 How. Pr. 269; R. Cox, 298.

(*n*) 49 Barb. 357; R. Cox, 401. And see *Richards* v. *Williamson*, 30 L. T. N. S. 746; *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood*, W. N. 1873, pp. 93—185; *Tonge* v. *Ward*, 21 L. T. N. S. 480; *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (2), 9 Ch. D. 176; *Bowman* v. *Floyd*, 85 Mass. 76; *Rogers* v. *Taintor*, 97 Mass. 291; *Emerson* v. *Badger*, 101 Mass. 82; *Sohier* v. *Johnson*, 111 Mass. 238; *Sherwood* v. *Andrews*, 3 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 588; *In re India Rubber Comb Co.*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz.

Sometimes in combinations.

In other cases the name is used in combination with other letters, words, or figures, or combinations of letters, words, or figures; and the name of an inventor, discoverer, manufacturer, &c., "may make words distinctive which, without the name, would not be so" (*a*). Thus "Chubb's Patent-Lock Fire-proof Safe" (*b*), "Collins & Co. Hartford Cast Steel, Warranted" (*c*), "Taylor's Persian Thread" (*d*), "Stephens' Blue Black Writing Fluid" (*e*), "Thorley's Cattle Food" (*f*), "Coe's Super-phosphate of Lime" (*g*), "Wolfe's Aromatic Schiedam Schnapps" (*h*), "Mrs. Winslow's Soothing Syrup" (*i*), "1847, Rogers, Bros., A 1" (*k*), "Meneely's West Troy, N. Y." (*l*). Again, "J. Rodgers & Sons" was coupled with a crown between the initials of the sovereign (*m*), and "Ransomes & Co." was followed by "H. H. 6" (*n*).

905; *India Rubber Comb Co.* v. *Meyer*, *ib.* 905; *India Rubber Comb Co.* v. *Rubber Comb & Jewelry Co.*, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 258; *In re Rubber Clothing Co.*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 111; *In re Coggin, Kidder & Co.*, 11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1109; *In re Hall & Co.*, 13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 229; *Carmichel* v. *Latimer*, 11 R. I. 395.

(*a*) *Fulton* v. *Sellers*, 4 Brews. 42.

(*b*) *Chubb* v. *Priest*, 1 L. T. 142.

(*c*) *Collins Co.* v. *Brown*, 3 K. & J. 423; *Collins Co.* v. *Cowen*, 3 K. & J. 428.

(*d*) *Taylor* v. *Taylor*, 23 L. J. Ch. 255.

(*e*) *Stephens* v. *Peel*, 16 L. T. N. S. 145.

(*f*) *Massam* v. *J. W. Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* (2), 14 Ch. D. 748.

(*g*) *Bradley* v. *Norton*, 33 Conn. 157; R. Cox, 331.

(*h*) *Burke* v. *Cazzin*, 45 Cal. 467; 13 Amer. Rep. 204.

(*i*) *Curtis* v. *Bryan*, 2 Daly, 212; R. Cox, 434.

(*k*) *Meriden Britannia Co.* v. *Parker*, 39 Conn. 450; 12 Amer. Rep. 401.

(*l*) *Meneely* v. *Meneely*, 17 Sickles, 427.

(*m*) *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 6 Hare, 325; 5 C. B. 109; 3 De G. M. & G. 614.

(*n*) *Ransome* v. *Bentall*, 3 L. J. Ch. 161. And see *Green* v. *Folgham*, 1 S. & S. 398; *James* v. *James*, L. R. 13 Eq. 421; *Lazenby* v. *Lazenby*, Dig. 160; *Gillis* v. *Hall*, R. Cox, 596. Also *Wilder* v. *Wilder*, Dig. 372 ("J. B. Wilder & Co.'s Stomach Bitters"); *Weston* v. *Hemmons*, 2 Vict. L. R. Eq. 121 ("Weston's Wizard Oil"); *Filkins* v. *Blackman*, 13 Bl. C. C. 440 ("Dr. J. Blackman's Genuine Healing Balsam"); *Gouraud* v. *Trust*, 10 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 627 ("Gourand's Oriental Cream, or Magical Beautifier"); *Weston* v. *Ketcham*, (1) and (2) 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; 51 How. Pr. 455 ("Capt. S. Pepper's Extra Signal Oil"); *In re Rohland*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 980 ("Dr. Lobenthal's Essentia Antiphthisica"); *Swift* v. *Peters*, 11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1110 ("The John C. Ragsdale Ammoniated Dissolved Bone"); *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245 ("Dr. C. McLane's Liver Pills"); *Davis* v. *Kennedy*, 13 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 523 ("Perry Davis' Vegetable Pain-Killer"); *Fulton* v. *Sellers*, 4 Brews. 42 ("Dr. J. M. Lindsey's Improved Blood Searcher"); *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461 ("Atwood's Physical Vege-

Second class of trade marks.—A signature.

The second class of trade marks to which the Act allows registration is really little else than a subdivision of the first class, consisting, as it does, of "a written signature, or copy of a written signature of the individual or firm applying for registration thereof as a trade mark," to which there may be added, as before, "any letters, words, or figures, or combination of letters, words, or figures, or of any of them." The signature of an individual or firm is in fact the name of the individual or firm printed or written in a "particular and distinctive manner," and as such, even before the Registration Acts, necessarily exhibited characteristics which could hardly be copied without the presumption being irresistible that the imitation was fraudulent and intended to invade the rights of the person whose signature was in question. In the cases of *Farina* v. *Silverlock* (*a*) and *Welch* v. *Knott* (*b*), the signature formed an important part of the trade mark concerned, and in America the signatures of individuals and firms have been admitted to registration on the same principle. Under the Act of 1875, § 10, there was no necessity for the signature to be that "of the individual or firm applying for registration thereof as a trade mark," but that is now required by § 64 of the Act of 1883, so that an individual or firm will not in the future be able to register the signature of the person or firm to whose business he or they succeeded, unless that is an old mark, having been used as such before the passing of the Act of 1875. However, when the signature is once registered as a trade mark, whether with or without additions, it will descend and be assignable just

table Jaundice Bitters"); *Hostetter* v. *Vowinkle*, 1 Dill. 329, and *Hostetter* v. *Anderson*, 1 V. R. Eq. 7 ("Hostetter's Celebrated Stomach Bitters"); *Radway* v. *Coleman*, 15 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 50 ("Radway's Ready Relief"); *Chinn* v. *Thomas*, 5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 188 ("Hood & Co.'s Soluble Sheep Dip"); *Hanford* v. *Westcott*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 118 ("Hanford's Chestnut Grove Whiskey"); *Morgan* v. *Rogers*, 26 *ib.* 1113 ("Dr. Haynes' Arabian Balsam").

(*a*) 1 K. & J. 509; 6 De G. M. & G. 214; 4 K. & J. 650.

(*b*) 4 K. & J. 747. See *Meesam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* (1), 6 Ch. D. 574; *In re Farina* (2), 27 W. R. 456; *In re Farina* (3), Dig. 654; *In re Maignen*, 28 W. R. 759.

as any other trade mark, without its new owner being liable to any imputation of representing the person whose signature is employed to be still in charge of the business, although formerly the use of a mark of this description might not improbably have been held to convey some such representation to the public. To a case of this description Lord Cranworth's observations very directly apply, when, speaking of a buyer of a business using the name of a former maker, he said (*a*), "the question in every such case must be whether the purchaser in continuing the use of the original trade mark would, according to the ordinary usages of trade, be understood as saying more than that he was carrying on the same business as had been formerly carried on by the person whose name constituted the trade mark. In such a case I see nothing to make it improper for the purchaser to use the old trade mark, as the mark would in such a case indicate only that the goods so marked were made at the manufactory which he had purchased." The provision in the Acts of 1875 (*b*) and 1883 (*c*) that a trade mark "shall be assigned and transmitted only in connexion with the goodwill of the business" will enable the purchaser to use the trade mark so acquired by him without his motives being open to question, and will at the same time ensure that marked goods purchased by the public shall, except in cases of punishable infringement, be produced at the works from which they purport to have come.

Third class of trade marks.—A distinctive device, &c.

The third class of marks comprises "a distinctive device, mark, brand, heading, label, ticket, or fancy word or words not in common use," to which again may be added "any letters, words, or figures, or combination of letters, words, or figures, or of any of them."

Distinctiveness required.

The important feature which is absolutely necessary in all the varieties of trade marks included in this class is

(*a*) *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 11 H. L. C. 523.

(*b*) § 2.

(*c*) § 70.

that of distinctiveness; each mark must be such that, if a question of infringement arises, it shall be perfectly clear what it is that is being infringed, and that this something is quite different from all other marks used upon the same class of goods.

Composition of trade mark, and manner of use alluded to.

Of the words "device, mark, brand, heading, label, or ticket," some point more directly to the matter of which the trade mark is composed, others to the manner in which it is affixed to the vendible article.

"Device" and "mark."

"Device" and "mark" seem, at first sight, wide enough to include any of the symbols or combinations of which a trade mark could consist. It has, however, been held, under the Act of 1875, that they do not include a mere word, or collocation of letters or figures, however strangely combined, or singular in their application (*a*), and the decision seems to be equally applicable to the Act of 1883, though such combinations can now be registered as fancy words.

Mode of application indicated by them.

When used as indicative of the mode of application of the trade mark, these words will include such cases as where the mark is stamped on shirts (*b*) or other cotton goods (*c*), or imprinted on sticks of liquorice (*d*), or sealing-wax (*e*), and, generally, any cases which do not come within the remaining and more exact terms.

"Brand."

"Brand" refers to cases in which the trade mark is branded on metal goods (*f*) or on wine-casks (*g*), or corks (*h*).

"Heading."

"Heading" applies to cases where, in addition to the ordinary label on the goods, there is a separate label

(*a*) *Ex parte Stephens*, 3 Ch. D. 659.

(*b*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

(*c*) *Henderson* v. *Jorss*, Dig. 198; *Carver* v. *Pinto Leite*, L. R. 7 Ch. 90; *Broadhurst* v. *Barlow*, W. N. 1872, p. 212; *Carver* v. *Bowker*, Dig. 581.

(*d*) *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380.

(*e*) *In re Hyde & Co.* 7 Ch. D. 724.

(*f*) *Molley* v. *Downman*, 3 My. & Cr. 1; *Millington* v. *Fox*, *ib.* 338; *Crawshay* v. *Thompson*, 4 M. & G. 357; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 32 L. J. Ch. 548; and 4 De G. J. & S. 150, &c.

(*g*) *Seixo* v. *Provezende*, L. R. 1 Ch. 192; *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 Beav. 578; *Ponsardin* v. *Peto*, 33 Beav. 642, &c.

(*h*) *Moet* v. *Clybouw*, Dig. 533; *Moet* v. *Pickering*, 8 Ch. D. 372.

affixed above it, on which the special mark is exhibited (*a*). It also applies to the kind of marks specially applicable to the case of textile fabrics, in which a heading of special pattern is inwoven into the edge of the goods (*b*).

"Label" indicates an impression of a trade mark upon a piece of paper, or some other thin substance, which is made to adhere to the goods to which it is applied, or to the vessel containing them. Thus, in *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie* (*c*), the label was affixed to packets of starch; in *Bass* v. *Dawber* (*d*) to bottles of beer; in *Blackwell* v. *Crabb* (*e*), *Cocks* v. *Chandler* (*f*), *Cotton* v. *Gillard* (*g*), and other cases, to bottles of pickle. "Label."

"Ticket" points to a mark also impressed upon a separate material, but only loosely attached to the goods the make of which it indicates. Thus the trade mark of a wire manufacturer consisted of an anchor stamped on the tallies, or metal labels, attached to the bundles of his wire (*h*); the trade mark of a clothier was imprinted on a ticket pinned on to his wares (*i*). "Ticket."

The question, "What is a trade mark?" is, however, less directed to the manner in which the trader's symbol is attached to his goods than to its composition, and the varieties of mark which will merit and receive protection. Composition of trade mark.

The original form of trade mark was probably the representation of some animal, or other natural object, or mathematical figure, as the Hall mark of the lion or leopard's head, the Freemasons' square and compasses (*k*), or the "Device."

(*a*) *Ex parte Stephens*, 24 W.R. 963.

(*b*) *Harter* v. *Souvazoglu*, W. N. 1875, pp. 11–101; *Carrer* v. *Bowker*, Dig. 581; *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487; and see per Sir G. Jessel, M. R., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434.

(*c*) L. R. 5 H. L. 508. See *Gilman* v. *Hunnewell*, 122 Mass. 139.

(*d*) 19 L. T. N. S. 626.

(*e*) 36 L. J. Ch. 504.

(*f*) L. R. 11 Eq. 446.

(*g*) 44 L. J. Ch. 90.

(*h*) *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185.

(*i*) *Hirst* v. *Denham*, L. R. 14 Eq. 542.

(*k*) As to this Freemasons' emblem, it has been held in the United States that it is so generally appropriated to a special purpose as not to be registrable by a private firm, even in combination: *In re Tolle*, 2 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 415. But this decision was not followed in *In re Thomas*, 14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 821, though in *Ex parte Smith* (3), 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 764, registration was refused to the word "Masonic."

Government broad arrow. Such a mark would be independent of language, and would serve to distinguish goods of a certain make, even for the illiterate.

Examples. Such marks are still frequently employed, and this clause specially includes them. To this class belong the marks of an anchor (*a*), an eagle (*b*), a lion (*c*), an elephant (*c*), a cross (*d*), a pyramid (*e*), a bell (*f*), a hand (*g*), a cock (*h*), a rising sun (*i*), or a triangle (*k*).

A crest. A crest is just as capable of becoming a trade mark as any other arbitrary device (*l*). In *Beard* v. *Turner* (*m*) Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., said, "I am not prepared to say or hold that a man putting his crest should not so put it as to establish his right to say, 'Nobody shall use my crest.' It is incumbent on him, as on every plaintiff, to show that the crest is an essential part of his trade mark." The readiest way of proving this is now by reference to the Register of Trade Marks.

Portrait. The portrait of a person whose name has become descriptive of the goods, is not sufficiently distinctive to be registered as a good trade mark (*n*); but the portrait of a public character has been allowed to be registered in America (*o*).

Initials. Before the Trade Marks Act of 1875 a trade mark might consist of initials, either alone, or in combination with

(*a*) *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185.

(*b*) *Standish* v. *Whitwell*, 14 W. R. 512.

(*c*) *Henderson* v. *Jorss*, Dig. 198.

(*d*) *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292; *Cartier* v. *Westhead*, Dig. 199; *Cartier* v. *May*, Dig. 200.

(*e*) *Bass* v. *Dawber*, 19 L. T. N. S. 626.

(*f*) *Bell* v. *Bell*, Dig. 514.

(*g*) *Allsopp* v. *Walker*, Dig. 545.

(*h*) *In re Walkden Aërated Waters Co.*, Dig. 558.

(*i*) *Morse* v. *Worrell*, 10 Phila. 168.

(*k*) *In re Worthington*, 14 Ch. D. 8.

(*l*) In *Steinthal* v. *Samson*, Dig. 546, the trade mark consisted of the crest, arms, and motto of the plaintiff's family. See *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487; *Haryreaves* v *Smith*, 11 Ch. D. 338; *In re Rosing*, Dig. 621; *In re Farina* (1), 26 W R. 261; *In re Farina* (3), Dig. 654; *Godillot* v. *Hazard*, 81 N. Y. 263; also Instructions, as to royal, national, municipal, &c., arms.

(*m*) 13 L. T. N. S. 746. In *Standish* v. *Whitwell*, 14 W. R. 512, the defendant was restrained from using what he alleged to be his own crest as his trade mark.

(*n*) *In re Anderson*, W. N. 1884, p. 75.

(*o*) *Ex parte Sullivan & Burke*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 765; *Ex parte Pace*, *Talbott & Co. ib.* 909.

other ingredients (*a*). Now, however, it would be difficult to assert that initials alone, printed in the usual manner, and without any distinguishing peculiarities of shape, colour, &c., could be described as "a distinctive device, mark, brand, heading, label, ticket, or fancy word or words." Where the letters are combined together into the form of a monogram, or enclosed within a distinctive border, or are in any other way used in such a combination as to be distinguishable from the same letters used in the plain ordinary way, it might have been supposed that a device or mark would be constituted capable of registration; but in *Lucke* v. *Webster* (*b*), the late Master of the Rolls, while admitting to registration as an old mark a monogram on a shield, suggested that he could not have done so if it had been a new mark. In the American case of *United States* v. *Marble* (*c*), the Commissioner of Patents considered that the letters "W. G." in a monogram were registrable as a trade mark.

Marks with a mechanical purpose.

Marks which have a mechanical purpose, *e. g.*, to serve as guides for the equal division of the article to which they are applied, cannot deprive other manufacturers of the right to use somewhat similar marks for the same purpose (*d*).

Marks representing the article.

In some American cases it has been held or suggested that a device which represents the article to which it is intended to be applied must be treated as descriptive and incapable of appropriation, in the same way as words which are descriptive of the article to which they are applied are refused recognition as fancy names. Thus the representation of a pig, attached to packages of lard (*e*), the representation of a fish, for fishing-lines (*f*); the representation of a bed made under a special patent, for beds so made (*g*); the

(*a*) See p. 67, *infrd.*
(*b*) M. R., April 4th, 1879.
(*c*) 22 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1366.
(*d*) *Dauman and Drummond Tobacco Co.* v. *Ruffner*, 15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 559.
(*e*) *Popham* v. *Wilcox*, 66 N. Y. 69.
(*f*) *In re Pratt & Farmer*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 866.
(*g*) *Tucker Manufacturing Co.* v. *Boyington*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 455.

representation of a barrel composed of alternate light and dark staves, for barrels of flour so made up (*a*); the representation of a twig with three leaves and a plum, for medicated prunes (*b*). But there is no English authority in favour of such devices being incapable of appropriation, and it is very doubtful whether the principle would be recognised in this country. In the case of the descriptive name, the right to use it could hardly be separated from the right to make and sell the article; but there is no imperative necessity that every one who has the latter right should also be entitled to sell the article under a mark containing a representation of it. If the trade are entitled to sell the article, and to sell it by its appropriate name, their requirements appear to be satisfied. However, the question would probably be treated as being, to some extent at least, one of degree.

Harter v. *Souvazoglu.* "Heading."

In *Harter* v. *Souvazoglu* (*c*) the trade mark consisted of a certain combination of purple, pink, and green threads, nine stripes in three gradations, which were woven as a heading into cotton goods, which were forwarded to the markets of Turkey and the Levant. The owners of this mark having filed a bill for an injunction against a rival trader who had copied the mark, Sir C. Hall, V.-C., held "that a heading could be the subject of a trade mark, that the evidence in the case showed that this heading was distinguished from others in Turkey, and that it had become a trade mark, although it was sometimes associated with stamps on the goods, of the lion and the sun, and other devices. Customers had bought goods because of this particular heading, and he therefore considered that the plaintiffs who had adopted it were entitled to the protection they asked, and that no other persons could use it" (*d*).

(*a*) *Ex parte Halliday Brothers*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 500.
(*b*) *Ex parte Smith* (2), 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 679.
(*c*) W. N., 1875, pp. 11-101.
(*d*) And see per Sir G. Jessel,

Fancy words.

Besides the varieties of marks to which reference has already been made, the third class of registrable trade marks under § 64 of the Patents Act, 1883, also includes "a fancy word or words not in common use." This was not so under the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875—7, which entirely excluded fancy words from registration as new marks, and only admitted such as had been used before the Act of 1875. This exclusion was, however, found to cause great annoyance and inconvenience, since a fancy name is of all trade marks the most useful, seeing that it affords so easy a mode of inquiring for and obtaining goods produced by the precise manufacturer whose production is desired. For this reason the use of such words as trade marks has been more general than that of any other description of mark, and during the period of exclusion from registration recourse was had to all kinds of contrivances for obtaining the registration and at least partial protection of fancy names. The present Act places the matter on a proper footing.

Distinctiveness requisite.

For fancy names to be capable of exclusive appropriation by registration they must be "distinctive," and "not in common use," that is to say, they must be peculiar in their application to the goods manufactured at a certain establishment, and be capable of being understood by the public as ascribing the article to which they are applied to the manufacture of that establishment, and that only. Whether, however, a name selected for this purpose is really and truly a fancy name is often a question of extreme nicety.

Descriptive words.

The word may be purely descriptive, that is to say, it may express accurately and appropriately the material or mode of composition of the goods to which it is affixed, and unless the exclusive manufacture of such goods is

M. R., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434. Also *Carver* v. *Bowker*, Dig. 581, and *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487, where a heading of coloured threads was a part of the combination mark, though not mentioned in the report.

protected by a patent, and the same result cannot be attained without infringement of the patent, all the world has the right to make and sell such goods; and further, when the goods are manufactured and in course of sale, not only has the right, but is in duty bound to describe them, for the proper information and protection of the public, in such manner as will convey the most correct idea. Hence the original maker can claim no exclusive right in the properly descriptive name, nor would it be in accordance with the principles of Equity that he should be able to do so, for, as was well said by Mr. Justice Strong, in the Supreme Court of the United States (*a*), "Equity will not enjoin against telling the truth."

Young v. *Macrae.*

The reasoning of Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in *Young* v. *Macrae* (*b*), affords a good example of the just way of considering cases of this description. In that case the plaintiffs, who held a patent for manufacturing a kind of oil which they called "Paraffin oil," filed a bill against the defendant, who sold a substance which he styled "Kerosene oil," or "American Paraffin Oil." The case coming on on motion for injunction, the Vice-Chancellor said, "In the patent the process is described as 'a distillation of coal so as to obtain oil containing paraffin, and from this oil I obtain paraffin.' So he calls it paraffin oil because it contains paraffin. Here is a well-known substance called 'paraffin.' A chemist discovers that by the same process by which paraffin is produced, an oil containing paraffin, and from which paraffin can again be produced, is obtainable. Therefore, it being an oil containing paraffin, and producing paraffin, he calls it 'paraffin oil.' It is not a fanciful or whimsical name, but it describes the thing which he has produced. A man cannot take out a patent for a natural substance, but he can take out a patent for arriving at that natural substance, and he may christen it,

(*a*) *Canal Co.* v. *Clark*, 13 Wall. 311.

(*b*) 9 Jur. N. S., 322.

putting aside all other people, having called it by that name." The Vice-Chancellor then put the case of a man extracting sugar from beet root by a patented process, and calling the extract "beet-root sugar" for a period of ten years. In such a case, when beet-root sugar was asked for, it would be known that his was meant, because he was the only man who made it. "The name," the Vice-Chancellor said, "does not become a trade mark, but it gets fixed to his sugar simply because nobody else could make it. Then, suppose that another man found out another method of making sugar from beet-root, and so extracted it, not wanting to patent it, and described it as 'beet-root sugar,' may he not call it 'beet-root sugar' because the other gentleman for ten years has been the manufacturer of it, and sold it as such? I think the question of the fancifulness of the name is a question whether it is taken by way of trade mark or not. All he (*i. e.*, the plaintiff) has done here is this, he has found out an article which is a natural product, and he has given that natural product a name." "This is not like the case of the 'Medicated Mexican Balm,' which is a name extravagantly ridiculous. I therefore should not assume *mala fides* against a person who calls the thing what it is. It is paraffin and it is oil, therefore paraffin oil. There is paraffin in it, and paraffin to be obtained from it, and it is American." Injunction refused.

In a later case (*a*) the same Vice-Chancellor referred to the above case of *Young* v. *Macrae* (*b*), and remarked that "if the evidence had gone to show that the plaintiff had been the first to apply the name 'paraffin' to the oil, he would have granted an injunction (*c*); but that he had there

(*a*) *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447.

(*b*) 9 Jur. N. S. 322.

(*c*) So in *Eno* v. *Stephens*, Dig. 609, the term "Fruit Salt" was protected at the instance of the person who was the first to use it; but see *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 807; *Linoleum Manufacturing Co.* v. *Nairn*, 7 Ch. D. 834; and *Canal Co.* v. *Clark*, 13 Wall. 311, as to a name which is appropriated to an article.

had it proved that the name 'paraffin oil' had long been known as the scientific name of the article, and that the defendant could not well have called it anything else."

Name become *publici juris.*

Again, a word which was first applied to, or was even invented for the sole and express purpose of designating a substance or composition may prove, on investigation, to have ceased to retain the characteristic which it once possessed, of conveying the idea of the goods being of a particular manufacture, in which case the person who first used the word, though its inventor, will cease to have any exclusive rights in it, since it will have become purely descriptive of an article which all may freely make (*a*). The name thus becomes *publici juris*, and not only can be, but ought to be employed by all who manufacture and sell an article which they are at perfect liberty to manufacture and sell, and of which the name in question is generally recognised as the appropriate designation. This point is well stated by Lord Selborne, C., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3) (*b*), where he says, "The reputation acquired by machines of a particular form or construction is one thing, the reputation of the plaintiffs, as manufacturers, is another. If the defendant has no right under colour of the former to invade the latter, neither have the plaintiffs any right under colour of the latter to claim (in effect) a monopoly of the former. If the defendant has a right to make and sell, in competition with the plaintiffs, articles similar in form and construction to those made and sold by the plaintiffs, he must also have a right to say that he does so, and to employ for that purpose the terminology common in his trade, provided always that he does this in a fair, distinct and unequivocal way."

Effect of registration.

The registration as a trade mark of a name of this

(*a*) *E.g.*, "Worcestershire Sauce"—*Lea* v. *Millar*, Dig. 513; "Calhoun Plough," *In re Hall & Co.*, 13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 229; "Holbrook's School Apparatus," *Sherwood* v. *Andrews*, 3 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 588.

(*b*) 8 App. Cas. 27; and see per Mellish, L. J., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—456.

description will somewhat complicate the question, as registration of a trade mark is to be *primâ facie* evidence, and, after five years' registration, conclusive evidence of the right of the registered owner to the exclusive use of such trade mark (*a*); but the wording of the Act is entirely directed to the registration of "a trade mark," the exclusive use of "a trade mark," &c., and since a name which has become *publici juris*, whether registered or not, cannot be a "trade mark" within the definition section of the Act, because it contains nothing distinctive, it seems that this enactment does not preclude a defence on the ground that the name so registered is in fact no trade mark, and was registered, or is continued on the register, by error. At all events, whether that be so or not, it has been decided by the Court of Appeal that five years' registration cannot protect a descriptive term which has been registered as a trade mark from being removed from the register on the ground of its descriptiveness (*b*); and the remarks of Sir G. Mellish, L. J., in *Ford* v. *Foster* (*c*), appear to be equally applicable since the Act as before it. "There is no doubt, I think, that a word which was originally a trade mark, to the exclusive use of which a particular trader, or his successor in trade, may have been entitled, may subsequently become *publici juris*, as in the case which has been instanced of Harvey's sauce (*d*). Then, what is the test by which a decision is to be arrived at whether a word which was originally a trade mark has become *publici juris?* I think the test must be, whether the use of it by other persons is still calculated to deceive

(*a*) Patents Act, 1883, § 76.

(*b*) *In re Palmer* (1) and (3), 21 Ch. D. 47; 24 *ib.* 504. The wisest course to take in such a case is no doubt to apply to rectify the register by the removal of the offending mark, *e.g.*, *Leonard & Ellis* v. *Wells & Co.* 53 L. J. Ch. 213; C. A. 32 W. R. 530.

(*c*) L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

(*d*) With respect to this example, an injunction was granted by Sir J. Romilly, M. R., in 1858, to restrain a representation that the defendant's sauce was that of the inventor's successor in business. See *Lazenby* v. *Lazenby*, Dig. 160. But in *Lazenby* v. *White*, 41 L. J. Ch. 354, it was admitted that the name was common to the trade.

the public, whether it may still have the effect of inducing the public to buy goods not made by the original owner of the trade mark as if they were his goods. If the mark has come to be so public and in such universal use that nobody can be deceived by the use of it, or can be induced from the use of it to believe that he is buying the goods of the original trader, it appears to me, however hard to some extent it may appear on the trader, yet practically, as the right to a trade mark is simply a right to prevent a trader from being cheated by other persons' goods being sold as his goods through the fraudulent use of the trade mark, the right to the trade mark must be gone" (*a*).

The three-mark rule.

When the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, first came into operation, it was found that in many trades application was made by two or more traders for the registration of substantially identical marks, the fact being that the marks had not previously come into collision on account of their being used in different parts of the country, without any suspicion of want of *bona fides* on the part of any of the rival applicants. If the strict letter of the Act and Rules had been adhered to, much injustice would have been done to the later applicants, whose applications must have been refused; and the Commissioners of Patents, therefore, framed the rule that identical or similar *old* marks might be registered by different persons in the same trade up to the number of three, but not more; the rule providing that if the mark had been used *bonâ fide* by more than three persons it must be treated as common to the trade, and no registration at all be allowed. This rule was recognised by Courts of First Instance in numerous cases (*b*);

(*a*) Thus, the marks of the crown and horseshoe were proved to be common to the iron trade: in *In re Barrows*, 5 Ch. D. 353; the term "Braided Fixed Stars" to be common to the match trade, as describing cigar lights having their heads secured by braiding: *In re Palmer* (3), 24 Ch. D. 504; and see § 9 of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862.

(*b*) *In re Walkden Co.*, Dig. 558; *In re Powell*, Dig. 559; *In re Hyde & Co.*, Dig. 593; *In re Leonardt*, Dig. 610; *In re Mitchell* (2), Dig. 611; *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639; *Ex parte Sales Pol-*

and in two cases (*a*) three substantially identical *new* marks were allowed to be registered for the same goods by different traders with consent of all the parties concerned. The rule has now found its way into the Patents Act, 1883, in the shape of a provision in § 74, *q. v.*, that any device which was before August 13th, 1875, publicly used by more than three persons on the same or a similar description of goods shall, for the purposes of the section (*i.e.*, for the purpose of registration as an addition to a trade mark, exclusive rights therein being disclaimed) be deemed common to the trade in such goods (*b*).

Name indicative of a principle of construction.

In the majority of cases in which the question has been raised whether a word was descriptive of the article to which it was applied, or distinctive of the maker by whom that article was made, the question has been whether the word, according to the ordinary usage of the English language, indicated correctly the nature or origin of the article. Thus, "Porous Plasters" (*c*), "Croup Tincture" (*d*), and so on. But in a considerable number of instances the question has been whether a word, which had no descriptive signification to persons unacquainted with the particular trade, did or did not indicate to persons versed in the trade an article prepared according to a definite process, or a machine constructed on a definite principle, the rule being that if the word indicates such a process or principle it is descriptive and incapable of exclusive appropriation.

Articles made according to a patented process.

This difficulty has especially arisen with respect to articles made under a patent, which can only be made by the patentee during the existence of the patent, and to which, consequently, his name or some other special name usually becomes attached. "Where a patented article is known

lard & Co., Dig. 620; *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238; *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791; *In re Hodson & Co.*, 26 Sol. J. 43; *Benbow* v. *Low* (4), 44 L. T. N. S. 875.

(*a*) *In re Walkden Co.*, Dig. 558; *In re Vergaras*, V.-C. H., June 3rd, 1881.

(*b*) Common user is not proved by the books containing applications for registration: *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 13 Ch. D. 434.

(*c*) *In re Brandreth*, Dig. 626.

(*d*) *In re Roach*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 333.

in the market by any specific designation, whether of the name of the patentee, or otherwise, every person at the expiration of the patent has a right to manufacture and vend the same under the designation thereof by which it was known to the public. . . . . The original patentee or his assignees have no right to the exclusive use of the designation as a trade mark. Their rights were under the patent and expired with it" (*a*).

The sewing-machine cases.

Thus in the case of *The Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Co.* v. *Shakespeare* (*b*), Sir W. M. James, V.-C., and in that of *The Singer Mfg. Co.* v. *Wilson* (*c*), Sir G. Jessel, M. R. (affirmed by the Court of Appeal), refused to assist an attempt at continuing the monopoly in sewing machines which had been patented, after the expiration of the patent, by a claim to the exclusive use, by way of trade mark, of the name by which the peculiar principle of construction had come to be generally known. In the latter case the House of Lords declined to decide whether the name "Singer" was indicative of a maker or of a principle of construction, the defendant's evidence being incomplete, but it was assumed that if the latter had been proved, the defendant would have succeeded (*d*), and that result actually took place in *Singer*

(*a*) Per Treat, J., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Stanage*, 2 McCrary 512; and see *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78; *Young* v. *Macrae*, 9 Jur. N. S. 322; *Green* v. *Rooke*, W. N., 1872, p. 49; *Liebig's Extract of Meat Co.* v. *Hanbury*, 17 L. T. N. S. 298; *Same* v. *Anderson*, W. N., 1883, p. 185; *Lazenby* v. *White*, 41 L. J. Ch. 354; *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 766; *James* v. *James*, L. R. 13 Eq. 421; *Cheavin* v. *Walker*, 5 Ch. D. 850; *Massam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* (1), 6 Ch. D. 574; *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801; *Linoleum Manufacturing Co.* v. *Nairn*, 7 Ch. D. 834; *In re Ralph*, 25 Ch. D. 194; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530, 1884, per Cotton L. J.; *In re Richardson*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 120; *Tucker Manufacturing Co.* v. *Boyington*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 455; *Cahal Co.* v. *Clark*, 13 Wall. 323, per Strong, J.; *In re Kane & Co.*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 105; *In re Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.*, 14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 269; *Ex parte Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.*, 16 *ib.* 679; *Fairbanks* v. *Jacobus*, 14 Bl. C. C. 337; *Burton* v. *Stratton*, 73 L. T. 349. See *In re Eastman*, W. N., 1880, p. 128, in which registration was granted to a name which had been used for soap made under a patent.

(*b*) 39 L. J. Ch. 36.

(*c*) 2 Ch. D. 434.

(*d*) 3 App. Cas. 376.

Mfg. Co. v. *Loog* (3) (*a*). So in America, in *Singer Mfg. Co.* v. *Larsen* (*b*), and *Singer Mfg. Co.* v. *Stanage* (*c*), though in the earlier Scotch case of *Singer Mfg. Co.* v. *Kimball & Morton* (*d*) the decision was in favour of the company.

New name for new article.

And even where no patent is obtained, "it is to be observed that the person who produces a new article, and is the sole maker of it, has the greatest difficulty (if it is not an impossibility) in claiming the name of that article as his own, because, until somebody else produces the same article, there is nothing to distinguish it from" (*e*). Thus it was held by the Court of Appeal that a firm who invented a new description of oil, and called it "Valvoline," had no right of trade mark in the word (*f*).

Actual fraud.

Of course, in any case which arises, any element of actual intentional fraud will be taken into consideration, and the Court will, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction for the repression of fraud, award an injunction or damages in a case in which, but for the fraud, no remedy would have been given. Thus, for instance, in a case in which the infringer might have taken with impunity the name of an article invented by another, but not content with so doing, described his own manufacture as "the original" article, he was restrained by injunction from the use of that misleading epithet (*g*).

Name merely descriptive cannot be protected.

The general principle, however, is that where a name used by way of a trade mark either was originally, or has since come to be, merely descriptive of the article to which it is attached, so that while serving to indicate what the article is, it does not serve to connect it with any particular manufacturer or manufacturing establishment

(*a*) 8 App. Cas. 15.
(*b*) 8 Biss. 181.
(*c*) 2 McCrary, 512.
(*d*) Ct. Sess. Cas., 3rd Ser. XI., 267.
(*e*) Per Fry, J., in *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801; and see *Linoleum Manufacturing Co.* v. *Nairn*, *ib.* 834.
(*f*) *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530.
(*g*) *Cocks* v. *Chandler*, L. R. 11 Eq. 446. The presumption of fraud may, however, be refuted, as by a fair statement of the maker's own name: *Browne* v. *Freeman*, 12 W. R. 305.

that name cannot be protected as a trade mark (*a*), or registered as special and distinctive. The Act establishing registration "takes nothing away from anybody. It

Descriptive words.

(*a*) The following are cases in which words have been held to be descriptive:—*Thomson* v. *Winchester*, 19 Pick. 214 ("Thomsonian Medicines"); *Fetridge* v. *Wells*, R. Cox, 180 ("Balm of Thousand Flowers"); *Wolfe* v. *Goulard*, 18 How. Pr. 64 ("Schiedam Schnapps"); *Burke* v. *Cassin*, 45 Cal. 467 (do.); *Wolfe* v. *Hart*, 4 Vict. L. R. Eq. 125 (do.); *Corwin* v. *Daly*, 7 Bos. 222 ("Club House Gin"); *Young* v. *Macrae*, 9 Jur. N. S. 322 ("Paraffin Oil"); *Phalon* v. *Wright*, 5 Phila. 464 ("Extract of Night-Blooming Cereus"); *Binninger* v. *Wattles*, 28 How. Pr. 206 ("Old London Dock Gin"); *Liebig's Extract of Meat Co.* v. *Hanbury*, 17 L. T. N. S. 298 ("Liebig's Extract of Meat"); *Same* v. *Anderson*, W. N. 1883, p. 185 (do.); *Caswell* v. *Davis*, 58 N. Y. 223 ("Ferrophosphorated Elixir of Calisaya Bark"); *Town* v. *Stetson*, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 218 ("Desiccated Codfish"); *Canal Co.* v. *Clark*, 13 Wall. 311 ("Lackawanna" coal); *Choynski* v. *Cohen*, 39 Cal. 501 ("Antiquarian Book Store"); *Gray* v. *Koch*, 2 Mich. N. P. 119 ("Mammoth Wardrobe"); *In re Hauthaway* (1 and 2), U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 97, 284 ("Beeswax Oil"); *In re Roberts* (4), *ib.* 100 ("Razor Steel"); *In re Blakeslee & Co.*, *ib.* 284 ("Cundurango Ointment, C. O."); *Ex parte Palmer*, *ib.* 289 ("Invisible Face Powder"); *Rowland* v. *Breidenbach*, Dig. 386 ("Macassar" oil); *James* v. *James*, L. R. 13 Eq. 421 ("Lieut. James' Horse Blister"); *Green* v. *Rooke*, W. N. 1872, p. 49 ("Golden Ointment"); *In re Johnson & Co.*, 2 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 315 ("Parsons' Purgative Pills, P. P. P." and "Johnson's American Anodyne Liniment, Established A.D. 1810"); *In re Graham*, 2 *ib.* 618 ("New Manny Harvester"); *In re Richardson*, 3 *ib.* 120 ("Richardson's Patent Union Leather-splitting Machine"); *In re The American Sardine Co.*, 3 *ib.* 495 ("American Sardines"); *Hardy* v. *Cutler*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 468 ("Old Bourbon" whiskey); *Tucker Manufacturing Co.* v. *Boyington*, 9 *ib.* 455 ("Tucker Spring Bed"); *Browne* v. *Freeman*, 12 W. R. 305 ("Chlorodyne"); *Bulloch, Lade & Co.* v. *Gray*, 19 Journ. of Jurisp. 218 ("Loch Katrine" whiskey); *Godillot* v. *Hazard*, 81 N. Y. 263 ("Julienne" soup); *In re Dick & Co.*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 538 ("Tasteless" drugs); *In re Lawrence & Co.*, 10 *ib.* 163 ("Für Familien Gebrauch," and "Lawrence Feiner Familien Flannel"); *In re Roach*, 10 *ib.* 333 ("Croup Tincture"); *Gilman* v. *Hunnewell*, 122 Mass. 139 ("Cough Remedy"); *In re Goodyear Rubber Co.*, 11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1062 ("Crack-proof" indiarubber); *In re Warburg & Co.*, 13 *ib.* 44 ("Cachemire Milano"); *Ayer* v. *Rushton*, 7 Daly, 9 ("Cherry Pectoral"); *Helmbold* v. *Helmbold Manufacturing Co.*, 53 How. Pr. 453 ("Highly Concentrated Compound Fluid Extract of Buchu"); *In re Dole Brothers*, 12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 939 ("Egg Macaroni"); *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801 ("Angostura Bitters"); *In re Horsburyh*, 53 L. J. Ch. 237, and *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 53 L. J. Ch. 233; C.A. 32 W. R. 530 ("Valvoline" oil); *In re Rader & Co.*, 13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 596 ("Ironstone" water pipes); *In re Saunion & Co.*, Dig. 625 ("Anglo-Portugo" oysters); *In re Brandreth*, Dig. 626 ("Porous" plasters); *Ex parte Safety Powder Co.*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 136 ("Safety" powder); *Fairbanks* v. *Jacobus*, 14 Bl. C. C. 337 ("Fairbanks' Patent"); *Linoleum Manufacturing Co.* v. *Nairn*, 7 Ch. D. 834 ("Linoleum"); *Lazenby* v. *White*, 41 L. J. Ch. 354 ("Harvey's Sauce"); *Wotherspoon & Co.* v. *Gray & Co.*, Ct. Sess. Cas., 3rd Ser. II., 38 ("Victoria" lozenges); *Popham* v. *Wilcox*, 66 N. Y. 69 ("Prime Leaf" lard); *Sherwood* v. *Andrews*, 3 Amer. L. Reg. N. S. 588 ("Holbrook's School Apparatus"); *Alleghany Fertilizer*

confers, upon certain conditions and under particular circumstances, rights which, but for the Act of Parliament,

Co. v. *Woodside*, 1 Hughes, 115 ("Ammoniated Bone Superphosphate of Lime"); *Frese* v. *Bachof* (2), 14 Bl. C. C. 432 ("Hamburg" tea); *Ex parte Alden*, 15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 389 ("Evaporated" articles of food); *Ex parte Marsching & Co.*, 15 *ib.* 294 ("French" paints); *Ex parte Cohn* (1), 16 *ib.* 680 ("Standard A" cigars); *Ex parte Cohn* (2) 16 *ib.* 680 ("Druggists' Sundries" cigars); *Ex parte Smith*, (2) 16 *ib.* 679 ("Medicated Prunes"); *Ex parte Thompson, Derby & Co.*, 16 *ib.* 137 ("Swing" scythe-sockets); *Ex parte Smith* (3) 16 *ib.* 764 ("Masonic" cigars); *Ex parte Waeferling*, 16 *ib.* 764 ("Granulated Dirt-killer Soap"); *Lamplough* v. *Beedzler*, C. A., Nov. 12th, 1880 ("Pyretic Saline"); *Day* v. *Neale*, V. C. B., May 24th, 1881 ("White Chemical Extract," "Brown Chemical Extract," "Red Paste," "Red Drench," "Gaseous Fluid," &c.); *Roberts* v. *Sheldon*, 8 Biss. 398 ("Parabola"—eye needles); *Van Beil* v. *Prescott*, 82 N. Y. 630 ("Rye and Rock" liquor); *Marshall* v. *Pinkham*, 52 Wisc. 572 ("Old Dr. S. Marshall's Celebrated Liniment"); *Hostetter* v. *Adams*, 22 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 943 ("Celebrated Stomach Bitters"); *Ex parte Brigham*, 20 *ib.* 891 ("Satin Polish" boots and shoes); *Ex parte Ams*, 23 *ib.* 344 ("Albany Beef"); *Ex parte Strasburger & Co.*, 20 *ib.* 155 ("Timekeeper" watches); *Ex parte Kipling*, 24 *ib.* 899 ("Cristalline" brilliants); *Electro Silicon Co.* v. *Levy*, 59 How. Pr. 469 ("Silicon" polishing powder); *Hegeman & Co.* v. *Hegeman*, 8 Daly, 1 ("Hegeman's Ferrated Elixir of Bark, or Elixir of Calisaya Bark with Iron," "Hegeman's Compound Fluid Extract of Buchu," "Hegeman's, formerly Velpeau's, Celebrated Remedy for Diarrhœa"); *In re Ralph*, 25 Ch. D. 194 ("The Homewasher").

In the following cases descriptiveness has either not been alleged or has been held not to be established, and the words have been treated as fancy words:—*Pidding* v. *How*, 6 Sim. 477 ("Howqua's Mixture"); *Perry* v. *Truefitt*, 6 Beav. 66 ("Medicated Mexican Balm."); *Taylor* v. *Carpenter* (1), 3 Story, 458 ("Persian Thread."); S. C. (2) 2 Wood. & M. 1 (do.); S. C. (3) 2 Sandf. Ch. 603 (do.); *Taylor* v. *Taylor*, 2 Eq. Rep. 290 (do.); *Hine* v. *Lart*, 10 Jur. 106 ("Ethiopian" stockings); *Fowle* v. *Spear*, 7 Penn. L. J. 176 ("Wistar's Balsam of Wild Cherry"); *Coffeen* v. *Brunton* (1), (2), 4 McLean, 516; 5 *ib.* 256 ("Chinese Liniment"); *Davis* v. *Kendall*, 2 R. I. 566 ("Pain Killer" medicine); *Davis* v. *Kennedy*, 13 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 523 (do.); *R.* v. *Dundas*, 6 Cox, 380 ("Everett's Premier" blacking); *Heath* v. *Wright*, R. Cox, 154 ("Kathairon"); *Fetridge* v. *Merchant*, 4 Abb. Pr. 156 ("Balm of Thousand Flowers"); *Williams* v. *Johnson*, 2 Bos. 1 ("Yankee Soap"); *Williams* v. *Spence*, 25 How. Pr. 360 (do.); *Williams* v. *Adams*, 8 Biss. 452 (do.); *Comstock* v. *White*, 18 How. Pr. 421 ("Dr. Morse's Indian Root Pills"); *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447 ("Excelsior" soap); *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380 ("Anatolia" liquorice; *Faber* v. *Hovey*, Dig. 481 ("Star" pencils); *Rillet* v. *Carlier*, 61 Barb. S. C. 435 ("Grenade" syrup); *Smith* v. *Woodruff*, 48 Barb. 438 ("Sweet Opponax of Mexico" perfume); *Burnett* v. *Phalon*, 3 Keyes, 594 ("Cocoaine" hair oil); *Messerole* v. *Tynberg*, 4 Abb. Pr. N. S. 410 ("Bismarck" collars); *Rowley* v. *Houghton*, 2 Brews. 303 ("Hero" jars); *Palmer* v. *Harris*, 6 Penn. 156 ("Golden Crown" cigars); *Filley* v. *Fassett*, 44 Mo. 173 ("Charter Oak" stoves); *Filley* v. *Child*, 16 Bl. C. C. 376 (do.); *Lockwood* v. *Bostwick*, 2 Daly, 521 ("Bovilene" pomade); *Congress & Empire Spring Co.* v. *High Rock Congress Spring Co.*, 45 N. Y. 291 ("Congress Spring" water); *Alleghany Fertilizer Co.* v. *Woodside*, 1 Hughes, 115 ("Eureka" manure); *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7

Fancy words.

would not be as clearly asserted, but it takes nothing away. Any man who has a right to a trade mark has his trade mark just the same after the passing of the Trade Marks Registration Act as he had before. Only, if the persons enjoying the trade mark have been so numerous that it is impossible to say that any of them, or all of them together, had an exclusive right to it, then they shall not have the benefit of the registration, which would give an exclusive right" (*a*). Common marks may, however, now be registered as additions to good trade marks, if an exclusive right in them is disclaimed (*b*). If the name is descriptive, the addition of "new" or "improved" does not better the case (*c*), nor that of initials representing the name of the goods (*d*), or of a mere oval border (*e*).

Ch. 611 ("Eureka" shirts); *Seltzer* v. *Powell*, 8 Phila. 296 ("Silver Grove" whiskey); *In re Francis & Mallon*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 283 ("Beaverine" boots); *Blackwell* v. *Armistead*, 5 Am. L. T. 85 ("Durham" tobacco); *Armistead* v. *Blackwell*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 603 (do.); *Blackwell* v. *Wright*, 73 N. Car. 310 (do.); *Blackwell* v. *Dibrell*, 14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 633 (do.); *Hirst* v. *Denham*, L. R. 14 Eq. 542 ("Turin," "Sefton," "Leopold," "Liverpool," cloth); *Sternberger* v. *Thalheimer*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 120 ("Centennial" clothing); *In re Bush & Co.*, 10 *ib.* 164 ("Centennial" wines); *Kidd & Co.* v. *Mills, Johnson & Co.*, 5 *ib.* 337 ("Magnolia," "Dave Jones," whiskey); *Morse* v. *Worrell*, 10 Phila. 168 ("Rising Sun" stove polish); *Collon* v. *Gillard*, 44 L. J. Ch. 90 ("Licensed Victuallers' Relish"); *Smith* v. *Mason*, W. N. 1875, p. 62 ("Pectorine" medicine); *Gouraud* v. *Trust*, 10 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 627 ("Gouraud's Oriental Cream"); *In re Glines*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 435 ("Slate Roofing Paint"); *In re Green*, 8 *ib.* 729 ("German Sirup"); *In re Weaver*, 10 *ib.* 1 ("Lion" goods); *Grillon* v. *Guénin*, W. N. 1877, p. 14 ("Tamar Indien" lozenges); *Carrick* v. *Morson*, Dig. 543 ("Lactopeptine" medicine); *In re Cornwall* (2), 12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 312 ("Dublin" soap); *Eno* v. *Stephens*, Dig. 609 ("Fruit Salt"); *Reinhardt* v. *Spalding*, 49 L. J. Ch. 57 ("Family Salve"); *Rosing* v. *Atkinson*, 27 Sol. J. 534 ("Edelweiss" perfume); *Berliner Brauerei Gesellschaft Tivoli* v. *Knight, Stocks & Co.*, W. N. 1883, p. 70 ("Tivoli" lager beer); *In re Porter Blanchard's Sons*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 97 ("Blanchard Churn"); *In re Rohland*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 980 ("Dr. Lobenthal's Essentia Antiphthisica"); *Sorg* v. *Welsh*, 16 *ib.* 910 ("Tidal Wave" tobacco); *In re Eastman*, W. N. 1880, p. 128 ("Kitchen Crystal Soap"); *Burton* v. *Stratton*, 73 L. T. 349 ("Twin Brothers" yeast); *Hier* v. *Abrahams*, 82 N. Y. 519 ("Pride" cigars); *Insurance Oiltank Co.* v. *Scott*, 33 La. Ann. 946 ("Insurance" oil); *Smith* v. *Sixbury*, 32 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 232 ("Magnetic Balm"); *Ex parte Heyman*, 18 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 922 ("Invigorator" spring bed-bottoms).

(*a*) Per Bacon, V.-C., in *Benbow* v *Low* (4), 44 L. T. N. S. 875.

(*b*) Patents Act, 1883, § 74.

(*c*) *In re Graham*, 2 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 618.

(*d*) *In re Blakeslee & Co.*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 284; *In re Dick & Co.*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 538.

(*e*) *In re Rader & Co.*, 13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 596.

Name not distinctive.

Again, where a mark, though not descriptive, yet does not serve to distinguish the person using it from a number of other persons who use or are entitled to use it, it cannot be a valid trade mark, since it is common, if not to the whole world, at all events to a class of persons. Thus "prize medal" (*a*), "gold medal" (*b*). The objection, however, will not prevail where the class is very limited (*c*).

Adjective denoting quality only, no trade mark.

Again, an ordinary adjective in the common language of the country, descriptive of the quality of the article, and not designating it to be of the manufacture of a certain individual or establishment, as "superior" (*d*), "superfine" (*d*), "nourishing" (*e*), cannot be exclusively appropriated as a trade mark. And the same is the case with a word or symbol which is understood generally, or in the trade, to indicate quality and not a special manufacturer. Thus "A, No. 1," "A X, No. 1" (*f*).

Marks denoting maker as well as quality may be trade marks.

But in some of the American cases this principle appears to have been carried to an extent which is unreasonable, and which has not been and would not be recognised in this country, the rule having been laid down too generally that every word or symbol which serves to indicate quality is incapable of appropriation as a trade mark, the qualification being omitted that, if such word or symbol also serves

(*a*) *Batty v. Hill*, 1 H. & M. 264. See *Roper's, &c. Co.* v. *Copeman's, &c. Association, Ld.*, 28 Sol. J. 218.

(*b*) *Taylor* v. *Gillies*, 14 Sickels, 331.

(*c*) *Dent* v. *Turpin*, 2 J. & H. 139. And see p. 97, note (*a*).

(*d*) *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447.

(*e*) *Raggett* v. *Findlater*, L. R. 17 Eq. 29; and see *Spottiswoode* v. *Clarke*, G. Coop. 154; *Gillott* v. *Esterbrook*, R. Cox, 353; *Ex parte Palmer*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 289; *In re Dick & Co.*, 9 U.S. Pat. Gaz. 538; *In re Goodyear Rubber Co.*, 11 *ib.* 1062; *Fulton* v. *Sellers*, 4 Brews. 42; *Ex parte Cohn* (1), 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 680.

(*f*) *Candee, Swan & Co.* v. *Deere & Co.*, 54 Ill. 439; 5 Amer. Rep. 125; and see *The Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Spear*, 2 Sand. S. C. 599; R. Cox, 87; *Same* v. *Trainer*, 101 U. S. Rep. 51; *Burke* v. *Cassin*, 45 Cal. 467; 13 Amer. Rep. 204; *Stokes* v. *Landyraff*, 17 Barb. 608; R. Cox, 137; *Kinney* v. *Allen*, 1 Hughes, 106; *In re Eagle Pencil Co.*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 981; *Osgood* v. *Allen*, 1 Holmes, 185; *Carver* v. *Bowker*, Dig. 581; *Avery* v. *Meikle*, 23 Alb. L. J. 413.

to indicate a particular manufacturer, the mark may be a good trade mark. In *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Trainer* (*a*) the Supreme Court of the United States itself appears to have decided in favour of the wider rule. There the plaintiff company manufactured cotton tickings, and sold the different qualities under different labels, of which the one affixed to the best quality of the goods bore a combination device, in which the prominent and conspicuous feature consisted of the letters "A. C. A." Those letters had for many years been recognised as indicating that the goods to which they were attached were of the plaintiff company's manufacture, and also of the best quality of the goods so manufactured, and the plaintiffs' user of the letters had been substantially exclusive. In an action, however, brought against defendants who had sold similar goods of their own make under a label containing the same letters in a conspicuous place, the Supreme Court held that the letters being indicative of quality, no protection could be given. All trade marks, however, which are of any value at all, denote that the goods to which they are attached are of good quality, and by far the greater number of large manufacturing firms use a variety of trade marks, which they apply to goods of different descriptions or qualities, or intended for different markets. So that it seems that the English rule that combinations of letters, or words, or symbols, which indicate that the goods to which they are applied have been manufactured by a particular person or firm, may constitute valid and registrable trade marks, notwithstanding that they also indicate the quality or pattern of the goods as compared with other goods of the same makers (*b*), is preferable to that formulated in some of the American Courts. Thus, in *Hirst* v. *Denham* (*c*), different fancy patterns of the plaintiff's cloth were marked with different names,

(*a*) 101 U. S. Rep. 51.
(*b*) *Ransome* v. *Graham*, 51 L. J. Ch. 897.
(*c*) L. R. 14 Eq. 542.

each of which was protected; in *Moses* v. *Sargood*, *Ewen & Co.* (*a*), the plaintiff's clothing was marked with a number of crowns, varying from one to six, according to quality; in *Ransome* v. *Graham* (*b*) the plaintiff's ploughs were marked with the letters "R. N." and an additional letter or numeral, varied according to pattern and quality (*c*).

Marks denoting quality in only one trade.

If a word or symbol is only indicative of quality in a particular trade, it seems that it may be used as a trade mark in a different trade (*d*).

Deceptive marks.

Again, a trade mark which contains false representations, so as to deceive the public, will not be protected in equity as a valid trade mark (*e*), and cannot be registered as such under the Patents Act of 1883 (*f*). In short, as was said by Wallace, J., in *Ginter* v. *Kinney Tobacco Co.* (*g*), "no principles are better settled in the law of trade marks than that a generic name, or a name merely descriptive of the ingredients, quality, or characteristics of an article of trade, cannot be the subject of a trade mark; and that the use of a name or term which is likely to deceive the public in reference to the components or nature of the article to which it is applied will not be tolerated." But mere collateral misrepresentations do not disqualify (*h*).

Marks which are either descriptive or deceptive.

An attempt has occasionally been made to meet the contention that a word claimed as a trade mark is incapable of appropriation by reason of its descriptiveness, by the allegation that the goods to which it is applied do not answer the description imported by the word, and there-

(*a*) Dig. 636.

(*b*) 51 L. J. Ch. 897.

(*c*) And see *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791; *Mitchell* v. *Henry*, 15 Ch. D. 181; and the American cases of *Lawrence Mfg. Co.* v. *Lowell*, 129 Mass. 325; *Godillot* v. *Harris*, 81 N. Y. 263, per Danforth, J.; and *Sohl* v. *Geisendorf*, 1 Wils. (Ind.) 60.

(*d*) *In re English*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Deci. 1870, 142.

(*e*) *Pidding* v. *How*, 8 Sim. 477: *Perry* v. *Truefitt*, 6 Beav. 66; *Flavel* v. *Harrison*, 10 Hare, 467; *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 4 De G. J. & S. 137; *Morgan* v. *McAdam*, 36 L. J. Ch. 228; *Connell* v. *Reed*, 128 Mass. 477; and see c. 7, *infrd.*

(*f*) See § 73.

(*g*) 22 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 770.

(*h*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

fore that the word is not, in fact, descriptive of the goods. But in cases where a word is used which is descriptive of qualities which the goods might reasonably be supposed to possess, if the goods do not possess those qualities the use of the word is deceptive, so that *quâcunque viâ* the claim fails. Thus, in *In re Saunion & Co.* (*a*), the late Master of the Rolls refused registration to the words "Anglo-Portugo Oysters," on the ground that if the oysters were Anglo-Portuguese the use of the term was descriptive, while, if they were not, it was deceptive. And there are many American authorities to the same effect (*b*). But if the term claimed is one which is notoriously inappropriate to the article, it will not be treated as deceptive. Thus the name "Edelweiss" was allowed to be appropriated to scent not derived from that flower, it being well known that the edelweiss yields no perfume (*c*).

Extravagance an advantage in fancy names.

It may be stated as a general rule that the more extraordinary and extravagant the name that is adopted by way of trade mark, the better will the object be attained, and the protection of the Courts and of the Registration Office secured, for the more uncommon the designation is, the less obnoxious is the exclusive claim of the manufacturer, and the more conclusive the evidence of fraud supplied by an infringement. Thus, Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., said, "I have not the least doubt that if the plaintiff (if I doubted I should be going quite contrary to the Mexican Balm case and other cases in which ridiculous names have been used)

(*a*) Dig. 625.

(*b*) *Fairbanks* v. *Jacobus*, 14 Bl. C. C. 337 ("Fairbanks' Patent"); *In re American Sardine Co.*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 495 ("American Sardines"); *In re Dole Brothers*, 12 *ib.* 939 ("Egg Macaroni"); *In re Warburg & Co.*, 13 *ib.* 44 ("Cachemire Milano" silks); *Ex parte Marsching & Co.*, 15 *ib.* 294 ("French" paints); *Ex parte Knapp*, 16 *ib.* 318 ("London" animal foods); *Ex parte Farnum & Co.*, 18 *ib.* 412; ("Lancaster" tickings); *Ginter* v. *Kinney Tobacco Co.*, 22 *ib.* 770 ("Straight-cut" cigarettes). With which compare *In re Green*, 8 *ib.* 729 ("German Sirup"); *In re Cornwall* (2), 12 *ib.* 312 ("Dublin" s ap).

(*c*) *Rosing* v. *Atkinson*, 27 Sol. J. 534.

had invented a fanciful and ridiculous name—and the more ridiculous, the better it is for his purpose—and has used it for eight or ten years in his trade, that the Court would take care that nobody else should use that absurd name; for such user could only be a user for the express purpose of imitating the plaintiff's, and so defrauding the plaintiff, by representing goods manufactured by one person to be goods manufactured by another" (*a*).

Fancy names specially invented.

In many cases the fancy name used as a trade mark is an entirely new word, invented for the occasion by the manufacturer of the material or composition to which it is applied, and such a name may be registered and otherwise treated as a valid trade mark (*b*). Thus "Pectorine" (*c*) and "Lactopeptine" (*d*) were protected as names for medical compounds; "Cocoaine" (*e*) and "Bovilene" (*f*) for pomades. "Chlorodyne" (*g*) was only not protected because the proprietor, on a mistaken view of his rights, consented to have his bill for an injunction dismissed with costs (*h*).

Existing words composing a fancy name.

In many other cases the trade mark consists, not of a newly coined word, but of a word, or a combination of words, already in common use, but which for the purpose of the trade mark is or are used and applied in a manner quite different from the ordinary use and application, so different that it is seen at the first glance that the word or

(*a*) *Young* v. *Macrae*, 9 Jur. N. S. 322; and see *Fetridge* v. *Merchant*, 4 Abb. Pr. 156; R. Cox, 194.

(*b*) See Patents Act, 1883, § 64.

(*c*) *Smith* v. *Mason*, W. N. 1875, p. 62.

(*d*) *Carnrick* v. *Morson*, L. J. Notes of Cases, 1877, p. 71.

(*e*) *Burnett* v. *Phalon*, 9 Bos. 192; R. Cox, 376.

(*f*) *Lockwood* v. *Bostwick*, 2 Daly, 521; R. Cox, 555.

(*g*) *Browne* v. *Freeman*, 12 W. R. 305.

(*h*) *In re Francis & Mallon*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 283 ("Beaverine" boots and shoes); *Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co.* v. *Schwachhofer*, 55 How. Pr. 37, and *same* v. *Hunkele*, 16 U S. Pat. Gaz. 1092 ("Sapolio" soap); *Electro-Silicon Co.* v. *Trask*, 59 How. Pr. 189 ("Electro-silicon"). And see *Young* v. *Macrae*, 9 Jur. N. S. 322, in which "Paraffin Oil," *Lamplough* v. *Balmer*, W. N. 1867, p. 293, in which "Pyretic Saline," and *Wolfe* v. *Goulard*, 18 How. Pr. 64, R. Cox, 555, in which "Schiedam Schnapps," was not protected for special reasons only.

combination of words is or are being used quite out of the common signification, and in the nature of a fancy name designatory of the goods (*a*). Thus, "Pharaoh's Serpents" (*b*), applied to a toy; "The Licensed Victuallers' Relish" (*c*), to a sauce; "Turin," "Sefton," "Leopold," and "Liverpool" (*d*), to cloth; "United Service" (*e*) and "Genuine Yankee" (*f*), to soap; "Sweet Opoponax of Mexico" (*g*), and "Balm of Thousand Flowers" (*h*), to perfume; and "Charter Oak," to stoves (*i*).

(*a*) See *Newman* v. *Alvord*, R. Cox, 413, in which Daniels, J., said that "any member of the community, whose interests and business may be promoted by doing so, should be at liberty to apply even names and words in common use to the products of his industry, in such a manner as to indicate their origin or particular manufacture, where such application will not intrench upon and will be in no way included in their use by the public. By doing so, the rights of no member of the community can be in any manner infringed, and no public inconvenience whatever can be occasioned by it. The public will still be left at full liberty to use such words or terms as they were used before; while for a special purpose a new office or purpose may be imposed upon them;" *Osgood* v. *Allen*, 1 Holmes, 185, in which Shepley, J., said that "words or devices may be adopted as trade marks, which are not original inventions of the one who adopts and uses them. Words in common use may be adopted, if at the time of adoption they were not used to designate the same or similar articles of production;" and *Lea* v. *Wolff*, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. 1; *Ex parte Palmer*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 289; *M'Lean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Smith* v. *Woodruff*, 48 Barb. 438; and *Ex parte Halliday Brothers*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 500.

(*b*) *Barnett* v. *Leuchars*, 13 L. T. N. S. 495.

(*c*) *Cotton* v. *Gillard*, 44 L. J. Ch. 90.

(*d*) *Hirst* v. *Denham*, L. R. 14 Eq. 542.

(*e*) *Field* v. *Lewis*, Dig. 280.

(*f*) *Williams* v. *Johnson*, 2 Bos. 1; R. Cox, 214; *Williams* v. *Spence*, 25 How. Pr. 366; R. Cox, 305.

(*g*) *Smith* v. *Woodruff*, 48 Barb. 438; R. Cox, 373.

(*h*) *Fetridge* v. *Merchant*, 4 Abb. Pr. 156; R. Cox, 194; but see *Fetridge* v. *Wells*, 13 How. Pr. 385; R. Cox, 180.

(*i*) *Filley* v. *Fassett*, 44 Mo. 173; R. Cox, 530; *Filley* v. *Child*, 16 Bl. C. C. 376. And see *Weston* v. *Hemmons*, 2 Vict. L. R. Eq. 121 ("Wizard" oil); *Sternberger* v. *Thalheimer*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 120 ("Centennial" clothing); *Kidd & Co.* v. *Mills, Johnson & Co.*, 5 *ib.* 337 ("Magnolia" whiskey); *Kidd* v. *Johnson*, 100 U. S. Rep. 617 (same); *In re Glines*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 435 ("Slate Roofing Paint"); *In re Kimball*, 11 *ib.* 1109 ("Vanity Fair" cigarettes); *Marcovitch* v. *Bramble, Wilkins & Co.*, Dig. 595 (same); *Davis* v. *Kennedy*, 13 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 523 ("Painkiller" medicine); *Faber* v. *Horey*, Dig. 481 ("Star" pencils); *Ex parte Peper*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 678 ("Coin" tobacco); *Wright* v. *Simpson*, 15 *ib.* 968 ("Pond Lily Wash"); *Crawford* v. *Shuttock*, 13 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 149 ("Imperial" soap); *Degrares* v. *Whiteman*, 5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 304 ("Cascade" ale); *Royal Baking Powder Co.* v. *Sherrill*, 59 How. Pr. 17 ("Royal" baking powder).

Inscriptions or advertisements.

Occasionally it has been sought to protect as a trade mark, and to claim exclusive rights in, an inscription or advertisement composed of ordinary English words, used in their ordinary sense, and only peculiar from the length of the sequence. Usually, indeed, there is in such cases some feature which might be really distinctive, but of which the plaintiff, for some reason or other, is unable to avail himself; this failing, the whole inscription is claimed. Such cases, however, are in fact "advertisements of the character and quality of the goods" (*a*), in which advertisements no exclusive rights can be claimed, as was expressly decided by the Court of Appeal in *Cheavin* v. *Walker* (*b*), where the inscription was "G. Cheavin's improved patent, gold-medal, self-cleaning, rapid water filter, Boston, England," the name Cheavin having become indicative of a principle of construction. In *Shrimpton* v. *Laight* (*c*), the use of the words "graduated, grooveless, drill-eyed, ground-down" needles was also accompanied by that of the maker's name, and this being obviously imitated by the defendant, the injunction was granted.

Words taken from the dead languages.

Sometimes a word taken from a dead language has been applied to goods and protected as a valid trade mark, as

(*a*) Per Lord Westbury, C., in *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 11 H. L. C. 523, which see.

(*b*) 5 Ch. D. 850. And see *Blackwell* v. *Crabb*, 36 L. J. Ch. 504; *Alleghany Fertilizer Co.* v. *Woodside*, 1 Hughes, 115 ("Ammoniated Bone Superphosphate of Lime"); *Helmbold* v. *Helmbold M'fg. Co.*, 53 How. Pr. 453 ("Highly Concentrated Compound Fluid Extract of Buchu"); *In re Johnson & Co.*, 2 U. S Pat. Gaz. 315 ("Johnson's American Anodyne Liniment, Established A.D. 1810"); *Gilman* v. *Hunnewell*, 122 Mass. 139 ("A sure remedy for chronic or common cough, sore throat, and other minor throat complaints, so often by neglect the forerunner of consumption").

(*c*) 18 Beav. 164. And see *Boardman* v. *Meriden Britannia Co.*, 35 Conn. 402; R. Cox, 490, where an injunction was given. In *Roberts* v. *Sheldon*, 8 Biss. 398, the plaintiffs used the words "Roberts' Parabo a Gold-Burnished Sharps" on his needles, and the defendant was restrained from using the words "William Clark & Sons' Parabola Gold-Burnished Sharps." In *In re Roberts* (1), (2), (3), U.S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 118, 100, 101, the following were registered as trade marks:—"A luxury—R. J. Roberts' Razor-Steel Scissors. The best in the world. The best is the cheapest. For sale here;" "An exquisite pleasure to shave with R. J. Roberts' Diamond-Edged Razors;" "R. J. Roberts' Diamond-Edge Razor. Every razor warranted."

the Latin word "Excelsior" in respect of soap (*a*), or the Greek word "Eureka" on shirts (*b*), or on an agricultural compost (*c*).

Or from modern foreign languages.

In some instances words taken from modern foreign languages have been protected, though the precise extent to which trade marks so composed will be acknowledged has not yet been authoritatively decided. Where the name employed is a fancy name which happens to be in a foreign language, or framed in imitation of the forms of a foreign language, there is no doubt that there is just as good a trade mark as if it had been in English or framed on English forms; thus, "Flor Fina Prairie Superior Tabac" (*d*) was allowed to be a good trade mark, though the defendant was held not to have infringed, and "Tamar Indien" (*e*) was actually protected. In *In re Rotherham* (*f*), an Arabic word, used by way of a pun, was held to be entitled to registration as a good trade mark, though the Commissioners of Patents had directed the registrar to the contrary.

Foreign words in their ordinary signification.

Gout v. *Aleploglu*.

When, however, the foreign words are used in their ordinary sense, or in a sense not widely remote therefrom, the case is different. In *Gout* v. *Aleploglu* (*g*), the plaintiff was a maker of watches for the Turkish market. These watches he marked in Turkish with his own name (Ralph Gout) with the word "Pessendede" ("warranted"), with his initials "R. G." and a crescent, and also with a sprig and crescent. The defendant procured watches to be made, in which the minor features of the marks used by the plaintiff were omitted, but in which the main characteristics, the name ("Ralph Gout") and the word "Pessendede," in Turkish characters, were reproduced, the style

(*a*) *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447.

(*b*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

(*c*) *Alleghany Fertilizer Co.* v. *Woodside*, 1 Hughes, 115. See *Raggett* v. *Findlater*, L. R. 17 Eq. 29.

(*d*) *Cope* v. *Evans*, L. R. 18 Eq. 138.

(*e*) *Grillon* v. *Guénin*, W. N. 1877, p. 14; and see *Caruncho* v. *Stephenson*, 25 Sol. J. 929 ("Intimidad" cigars).

(*f*) 14 Ch. D. 585.

(*g*) 6 Beav. 69; 5 Leg. Obs. 496.

of engraving being copied. Such watches were then sent by the defendant to Constantinople, and there sold, to the prejudice of the plaintiff's business. This was a clear case of fraud, and so it was held to be by the Vice-Chancellor of England, Sir L. Shadwell, who, however, did express an opinion that the plaintiff had acquired an exclusive right in the word "Pessendede" (*a*). But the point that had to be decided was not simply whether the word "warranted," in Turkish, could be protected, and indeed, when it is considered that the watches were to be sold in Turkey, the case does seem to be just the same as if the word had been engraved in English on watches to be sold in this country, when such a proposition would be clearly untenable. But not only the word, but the manner of engraving it was copied, and not only that word, but the name of the maker; and what the Vice-Chancellor actually decided was that here there was a clear case of attempted fraud, which was quite sufficient ground for the issue of an injunction, without its being necessary to consider whether the imitation of one single feature would have been sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to that remedy. The use of the name "Ralph Gout" alone by the defendant, whose own name was entirely different, would indeed have been sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to an injunction (*b*), but the case with respect to "Pessendede" was different.

Broadhurst v. *Barlow.*

In *Broadhurst* v. *Barlow* (*c*), the case was again a far more complicated one than that of a single foreign word, or even a succession of words taken from the same foreign language. Here the plaintiffs were spinners and manufacturers at Manchester and Bolton, who exported to the East large quantities of pieces of Spanish shirting, which they marked with their proper trade mark, a lion in a border, and with the words "Spanish shirting" in a scroll,

(*a*) 5 Leg. Obs. 496.

(*b*) See per Sir G. Turner, L. J., in *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, 3 De G. M. & G. 896; *Perks* v. *Hall & Co.*, W. N. 1881, p. 111.

(*c*) W. N. 1872, p. 212; and L. J. Notes of Cases, 1872, p. 183.

and "No. 120." To this they had added "exactly 12 yards," in Turkish, Armenian, and Greek, the same statement being repeated in the three languages, placed one below the other (*a*). The defendants were discovered to be preparing Spanish shirting for export, similarly marked, except that there were five lines instead of four, and that an elephant was used in place of the lion. Sir J. Wickens, V.-C., held that "though an elephant was used by the defendants, the three sentences in the same languages in the same order was an infringement of the plaintiffs' rights," and he therefore granted the injunction to restrain the use of the words in the three languages in the order used by the plaintiffs.

Conclusion. The true principle appears to be that, while foreign words employed in their ordinary signification may, even when used on goods intended for consumption in the country where that foreign language is spoken, form a part of a combination trade mark, the infringement of which will be restrained, the exclusive use of such words themselves, apart from fraud, will not be protected in this country, any more than that of an ordinary English adjective. In an American registration case (*b*) it was sought to register the German words "Fur Familien Gebrauch," and "Lawrence Feiner Familien Flannel," meaning respectively "For Family Use" and "Lawrence Fine Family Flannel," but the application was refused, on the ground of descriptiveness. In *Rillet* v. *Carlier* (*c*) it was indeed held that an American maker of pomegranate syrup had acquired an exclusive right in America to the term "Grenade Syrup," though "Grenade" was the ordinary French word for pomegranate, and the term "Grenade Syrup" was in common use in France. In this case, how-

(*a*) In *Curtis* v. *Bryan*, 2 Daly, 212; R. Cox, 434, a label was used, with an inscription in English, French, German, and Spanish; and see *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801, and *Siegert* v. *Ehlers*, Dig. 432.

(*b*) *In re Lawrence & Co.*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 163.

(*c*) 61 Barb. S. C. 435.

ever, there were elements of fraud, and actual fraud will always be restrained.

Under the head of "Fancy Names" should be included trade marks consisting of geographical names. When such names are used as trade marks they are in that application to be understood, not as ascribing the goods to which they are affixed to any special section of the earth's surface, but as expressing the works at which, or the manufacturer by whom, those goods have been produced. So Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in the "Anatolia" liquorice case (*a*), said that "the plaintiffs had established beyond all doubt the connection of their name with that mark, that was beyond dispute," and that "he could not treat the word as being otherwise than a designation mark, which the plaintiffs had caused to be attached to that particular article of liquorice which they so manufactured, and which they had a right to consider, in that qualified sense, property." Lord Westbury, C., in that case strongly confirmed the opinion of the Vice-Chancellor; and in the later case of *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie* (*b*), where the subject of dispute was the word "Glenfield" applied to starch, he stated that that word had acquired a secondary signification or meaning in connection with a particular manufacture: in short, it had become the trade designation of the starch made by the appellants. It was wholly taken out of its ordinary meaning, and in connection with starch had acquired that peculiar secondary signification to which he had referred. The word "Glenfield," therefore, as a denomination of starch, had become the property of the appellants. It was their right and title in connection with the starch.

Geographical names.

In some cases there is no pretence for saying that the name is used in its ordinary geographical sense. Thus no one could affirm that the use of the names "Persian

Rules as to geographical names.

(*a*) *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380.

(*b*) L. R. 5 H. L. 508.

thread" (*a*) or "Ethiopian stockings" (*b*) had induced him to suppose that the articles in question were imported from those countries. In other cases, however, the name is less purely arbitrary, and was originally, at least, indicative of local origin. For instance, the pipes marked with "E. Southorn, Broseley" (*c*), were manufactured at a village of that name; Glenfield starch (*d*), in the same manner, came from Glenfield; Anatolia liquorice (*e*), and Leopoldshall Kainit (*f*), from those respective places. This fact, however, does not deprive the trade mark of the right to protection. It is true that the name of an existent place cannot for all purposes be appropriated (*g*), and that any one who manufactures at a place the name of which has become another's trade mark, indicative of that other's productions, may still describe his goods as made on that spot (*h*). But by English law he cannot stamp that name on his goods in the character of a trade mark of his own.

(*a*) *Taylor* v. *Taylor*, 23 L. J. Ch. 255.

(*b*) *Hine* v. *Lart*, 10 Jur. 106; and see *In re Cornwall* (2), 12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 312 ("Dublin" soap); *Fleischmann* v. *Schuckmann*, 62 How. Pr. 92 ("Vienna" bread); *Lauferty* v. *Wheeler*, 63 *ib.* 488 ("Alderney" oleo-margarine).

(*c*) *Southorn* v. *Reynolds*, 12 L. T. N. S. 75.

(*d*) *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508.

(*e*) *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380.

(*f*) *Rudde* v. *Norman*, L. R. 14 Eq. 348; and see *Apollinaris Co.* v. *Edwards*, Seton, 4th ed. 237; and *Apollinaris Co.* v. *Norrish*, 33 L. T. N. S. 342 ("Apollinaris Water"); *Congress and Empire Spring Co.* v. *High Rock Congress Spring Co.*, 57 Barb. 526, R. Cox, 599 ("Congress Spring Water"); *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner* (1), 55 Barb. 151; R. Cox, 541, and *s. c.* (2), 54 How. Pr. 298 ("Amoskeag" cloths); *Newman* v. *Alvord*, 6 Sickels, 189 ("Akron"); *Lea* v. *Millar*, Dig. 513 ("Worcestershire Sauce"); *Powell* v. *McNulty*, Dig. 526 ("Yorkshire Relish"); *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801 ("Angostura Bitters"); *Kinney* v. *Basch*, Dig. 542 ("St. James' Cigarettes"); *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 264 ("Cromac Springs"); *Davis* v. *Tylor*, M. R., April 24, 1879 ("Ferndale" coal); *Lochgelly Co., Limited*, v. *Lumphinnans Iron Co.*, Ct. Sess. Cas., 4th Ser. VI., 482 ("Lochgelly" coal).

(*g*) "Property in the word for all purposes cannot exist:" per Lord Westbury, C., *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380.

(*h*) Thus in *Braham* v. *Beachim* (1), 7 Ch. D. 848, an injunction was only granted to restrain the defendants from describing their coal as "Radstock" until they had some justification for so describing it, and when that justification could be produced, no relief was granted against them. See *Braham* v. *Beachim* (2), Dig. 633; and see *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801.

In *Seixo* v. *Provezende* (*a*), where it was urged by the defendants that parts of their vineyards were known by the name of Seixo, the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cranworth) said that even assuming that to be true, "that did not justify the defendants in adopting a device or brand, the probable effect of which was to mislead the public when purchasing their wine, to suppose that they were purchasing wine produced from the vineyards, not of the defendants, but of the plaintiff. Cases might be imagined, though very unlikely to arise, in which a person bringing into the market for the first time the produce of a newly established manufacture, to come into competition with one already established, might really be embarrassed as to the mode in which he should describe it, so as not to interfere with the description adopted by a manufacturer who had been before him." And he added that if such a case should arise, it would have to be dealt with on its own merits.

McAndrew v. *Bassett*.

Again, in *McAndrew* v. *Bassett* (*b*), Lord Westbury, C., said, "I am told that the word 'Anatolia,' being a general geographical expression—being, in point of fact, the geographical designation of a whole country—is a word common to all, and that in it, therefore, there can be no property. That is nothing in the world more than a repetition of the fallacy which I have frequently had occasion to expose. Property in the word for all purposes cannot exist; but property in that word, as applied by way of stamp upon a stick of liquorice, does exist the moment the liquorice goes into the market so stamped, and obtains acceptance and reputation in the market, whereby the stamp gets currency as an indication of superior quality, or of some other circumstances that render the article so stamped acceptable to the public."

Geographical names in America.

In America, the rule prohibiting the appropriation of

(*a*) L. R. 1 Ch. 192.
(*b*) 4 De G. J. & S. 380; See *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284.

geographical names as trade marks appears to be more stringent than in England, as the Courts there deny that such names can constitute trade marks (*a*), and registration is, as a rule, refused to them (*b*). Where, however, the use of a geographical name is clearly fraudulent (*c*), or where it is used by a defendant whose residence and works are not situate in the locality the name of which he seeks to employ (*d*), relief may be obtained, and registration has also been effected in cases where there was a plausible ground for the assertion that the name was selected and used in a purely arbitrary way (*e*).

Words disentitled to protection.

In addition to deceptive words, no other words, the exclusive use of which would be deemed disentitled to protection in a court of justice, can be registered (*f*).

Fourth class of trade marks—old marks.

The fourth class of trade marks allowed to be registered under the Patents Act, 1883, consists of "any special and distinctive word or words, letter, figure, or combination of

(*a*) Thus in *Canal Co.* v. *Clark*, 13 Wall. 311, the Supreme Court of the United States allowed the defendants to use the name "Lackawanna" on coal produced in that district, though the defendants had previously so used it; and see *Candee, Swan & Co.* v. *Deere & Co.*, 54 Ill. 439; 5 Amer. Rep. 125 ("Moline" ploughs); *Glendon Iron Co.* v. *Uhler*, 75 Penn. St. 467; 15 Amer. Rep. 599 ("Glendon" iron); *Carmichel* v. *Latimer*, 11 R. I. 395 ("Stillman Mill"); *Osgood* v. *Allen*, 1 Holmes, 185; *Dunbar* v. *Glenn*, 42 Wisc. 118; *Burton* v. *Stratton*, 73 L. T. 349. But see Mr. R. Cox's note to *Glendon Iron Co.* v. *Uhler*, at 8 Am. L. Reg. N.S. 543, in which he disputes the decision that a geographical name cannot be a trade mark.

(*b*) *Armistead* v. *Blackwell*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 603 ("Durham" tobacco); *Blackwell* v. *Dibrell*, 14 *ib.* 633 (same); *In re Tolle*, 2 *ib.* 415 ("Cherry St. Mills," "Market St. Mills"); *In re American Sardine Co.*, 3 *ib.* 495 ("American Sardines"); *In re Warburg & Co.*, 13 *ib.* 44 ("Cachemire Milano"); *Ex parte Marsching & Co.*, 15 *ib.* 294 ("French" paints); *Ex parte Knapp*, 16 *ib.* 318 ("London" animal foods); *Ex parte Farnum & Co.*, 18 *ib.* 412 ("Lancaster" tickings); *Ex parte Oliver*, 18 *ib.* 923 ("Raleigh" tobacco).

(*c*) *Kinney* v. *Basch*, Dig. 542 ("St. James' Parish" cigarettes); *Dunbar* v. *Glenn*, 42 Wisc. 118 ("Bethesda" mineral water).

(*d*) *Lea* v. *Wolff*, 15 Abb. Pr. N.S. 1 ("Worcestershire Sauce").

(*e*) *In re Green*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 729 ("German Sirup"); *In re Cornwall* (2), 12 *ib.* 312 ("Dublin" soap); and see *Ex parte Farnum & Co.*, 18 *ib.* 412, in which it was said that a geographical name would not be registered in the U. S. Patent Office unless it was clearly shown that it would be understood to be primarily fanciful, and that manufacturers residing at the place denoted by the name could be excluded from the use of it.

(*f*) See Patents Act, 1883, § 73.

letters or figures, or of letters and figures, used as a trade mark before August 13th, 1875" (*a*).

Extent of this class.

This clause is designed to extend the benefits conferred by registration under the Act to trade marks which, though protected by the Courts as such before the passing of the Registration Act of 1875, yet do not come within the more restricted definition which it has been thought right to apply to marks adopted and used for the first time since that date. The class of existing trade marks the registration of which this clause is intended to permit is to be composed of marks consisting of a special and distinctive letter, figure (*i.e.*, numeral) (*b*), or combination of letters or figures, or of letters and figures; other old trade marks can be registered under some one of the former heads, and this remark also applies to the "special and distinctive word or words," which appear to be now unnecessarily inserted in this part of the section, seeing that a fancy word or words (and no other word or words can well be special or distinctive) can now be registered either as an old or a new mark under the earlier part of the section. It will be observed that the wording of this part of the section differs considerably from that of the corresponding part of § 10 of the Registration Act, 1875, the object being to bring all old trade marks composed of letters, figures, or combinations within the scope of the provisions for registration, an object which the old section had failed to achieve (*c*).

Letters.

Letters, generally in the form of initials, have, with or without additions, frequently been treated as trade marks. Among the earliest of these cases are *Motley* v. *Downman* (*d*)

(*a*) For a mark to be old, it seems that the old user must have been within the United Kingdom. See *In re Münch*, 50 L. T. N. S. 12; *In re Riviere & Co.*, 49 L. T. N. S. 506; (App.) 32 W. R. 390; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 53 L. J. Ch. 233; (App.) 32 W. R. 530. *Contrà*, *In re Eastman*, W. N. 1880, p. 128. And the user must have been user as of a trade mark, and not as of a mere descriptive term, and it must have been user of the letter, figure, &c., alone, and not in combination with a device, &c., within the classes of marks registrable as new marks: *In re Leonard & Ellis, ubi suprd.*

(*b*) *Ex parte Stephens*, 3 Ch. D. 659.

(*c*) See *In re Mitchell* (1), 7 Ch. D. 36.

(*d*) 3 My. & Cr. 1.

and *Millington* v. *Fox* (*a*); in the first of which cases "M. C.," and in the second "J. H." was branded on iron. Still earlier than these cases, in the year 1834, "H. H. 6" formed part of a trade mark protected by injunction (*b*). In *Crawshay* v. *Thompson* (*c*), "W. C." in an oval was employed, and infringement being alleged through the use of "W. O." in a similar oval, a verdict was given by the jury for the defendants. The question whether initial letters could form a trade mark, alone or in conjunction with other symbols, was definitively raised before the Lord Chancellor of Ireland, in *Kinahan* v. *Bolton* (*d*). In that case the alleged trade mark consisted of the letters "L L" (standing for "Lord Lieutenant"), with a ducal coronet, which mark, it was alleged, had been adopted at a time when there was a ducal Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The case of the defendants was that "L L" could no more compose a trade mark than "X X," but was a mere mark of quality. The Lord Chancellor, saying that there was no doubt as to this mark being a trade mark "in the strictest sense," went on to observe: "A most competent witness says that this whisky, under the name of 'L L,' is a well-known article of commerce, that it has no other name than 'L L,' that under this name it has acquired a special reputation, and that for the long period of forty years this name has been applied to it. What is a trade mark more than that? It is proved that these two letters designate this whisky. The letters of themselves mean nothing; no one *d priori* could know the meaning of such a trade mark: it is merely like a diamond, an anchor, or a crown, stamped on any article, the mark by which the vendor enables the public to recognise his wares."—"There can be no doubt, and indeed it is not disputed, that two letters may

(*a*) 3 My. & Cr. 338.
(*b*) *Ransome* v. *Bentall*, 3 L. J. Ch. 161.
(*c*) 4 M. & G. 357.
(*d*) 15 Ir. Ch. 75.

constitute a trade mark." Reference was then made to the cases of *Motley* v. *Downman* (*a*) and *Millington* v. *Fox* (*b*), and the injunction was granted. Since that time "S. and H." with a crown (*c*). "B. B. H." with a crown (*d*), or in any other combination (*e*), "C. B." with a cross (*f*), "M. and C." in a circle (*g*), and other letters (*h*), have been treated as undoubted trade marks.

Conclusion.

In the result, while letters used as a trade mark for the first time since the Act of 1875 must be combined with some distinctive feature, it seems clear that, if used as such before the Act, they will, even standing alone, be entitled to protection, though probably not as against persons having them for their initials and using them without fraud (*i*).

Single letters.

The Trade Marks Registration Act of 1875, § 10, only authorised the registration of letters by the use of the term "any special and distinctive combination of figures or letters," and in *In re Mitchell* (1) (*k*), Hall, V.-C., felt himself compelled to hold that a single letter, however long and exclusively used by an applicant for registration, was not within the section, and was incapable of registration. Now, however, the wording of the present Act permits in express terms the registration of a "letter" as an old mark, so that the difficulty is removed. The letter will, of course, have to be proved to be special and distinctive. In America, the single letter "D" in a

(*a*) 3 My. & Cr. 1.
(*b*) 3 My. & Cr. 338.
(*c*) *Hopkins* v. *Hitchcock*, 32 L. J. C. P. 154.
(*d*) *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *Barrows* v. *Peteall Coal & Iron Co.*, Dig. 530.
(*e*) *Re Barrows*, 5 Ch. D. 353.
(*f*) *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292; *Cartier* v. *Westhead*, Dig. 199; *Cartier* v. *May*, Dig. 200.
(*g*) *Moet* v. *Clybouw*, Dig. 533; *Moet* v. *Pickering*, 8 Ch. D. 372.
(*h*) See *Ex parte Young*, Dig. 537 ("L. H. & S."); *Carver* v. *Bowker*, Dig. 581 ("R. H."); *Ransome* v. *Graham*, 51 L. J. Ch. 897 ("R. N."); *Bondier* v. *Depatie*, Montreal Q. B., May 29th, 1883 ("G. B. D."). See also *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791; *Candee* v. *Deere*, 54 Ill. 439; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Trainer*, 101 U. S. Rep. 51; *Avery* v. *Meikle*, 23 Alb. L. J. 443; *Burton* v. *Stratton*, 73 L. T. 349.
(*i*) The case is much the same as that of a maker's name. See *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1. Eq. 518.
(*k*) 7 Ch. D. 36.

lozenge has been admitted to registration (*a*), notwithstanding the decision in *Ferguson* v. *Davol Mills* (*b*) with respect to the letter "K" enclosed in circular lines, a decision which appears to have been founded on the mistaken interpretation of the expressions used in *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Spear* (*c*) previously referred to.

Numerical figures.

Numerals can only be registered as part of a new mark when combined with some essential particular (*d*), but provision is made for the registration of a single numeral or a combination of numerals, when it was used as an old mark and is special and distinctive, and in America a numeral may be registered as a trade mark (*e*). There does not, however, appear to be any case in which the English Courts have recognised a mere numeral or combination of numerals, standing alone, as sufficiently special and distinctive to constitute a trade mark (*f*), and in *Carver* v. *Bowker* (*g*), Little, V.-C. of Lancaster, held that that could not be; and in *Kinney* v. *Busch* (*h*) and *Burton* v. *Stratton* (*i*) the American Courts seem to have been of the same opinion. The use of numerals is, however, common in some trades, especially in the cotton trade, in which the usual combination marks generally include some arbitrary number or numbers, and there have been cases, both in England (*k*) and America (*l*), in which the

(*a*) *In re The Dutcher Temple Co.*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 248; and see *In re Imbs*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 463.

(*b*) 2 Brews. 314.

(*c*) 2 Sandf. S. C. 599.

(*d*) See Patents Act, 1883, § 64.

(*e*) *Ex parte Dawes & Fanning*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 27; and see *Dawes* v. *Davies*, Dig. 426.

(*f*) In *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518, the imitation of a series of numbers was held to be an important *indicium* of fraud, but the V.-C. did not treat the numbers as a trade mark; on the contrary, he distinguished them from one. See L. R. 1 Eq. 527.

(*g*) Dig. 581. The decision of the V.-C. was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in general terms.

(*h*) Dig. 542.

(*i*) 73 L. T. 349.

(*k*) *Carver* v. *Pinto Leite*, L. R. 7 Ch. 90; *Carver* v. *Bowker*, Dig. 581; *Broadhurst* v. *Barlow*, W. N. 1872, p. 212; *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487.

(*l*) *Gillott* v. *Kettle*, 3 Duer, 624; *Gillott* v. *Esterbrook*, 3 Sickles, 374; *Boardman* v. *Meriden Britannia Co.*, 35 Conn. 402; *Kinney* v. *Basch*, Dig. 542; *Kinney* v. *Allen*, 1 Hughes, 106; *Lawrence Manufacturing Co.* v. *Lowell*, 129 Mass 325; *India Rubber Comb Co.* v. *Rubber Comb and Jewelry Co.*, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 258.

imitation of numbers has been restrained. In such cases, however, either the numerals have been parts of combination marks (*a*), or they have been printed in a special and distinctive colour and configuration (*b*), or they have been selected in so arbitrary a manner that they have conveyed no idea of number (*c*), or there has been an evident intention to commit a fraud (*d*); and it is appreheended that if a case were to occur in which the plaintiff's numeral was printed in an ordinary style, and the defendant could show any reason for desiring to use the number in the course of his business, which was not necessarily attributable to a wish to appropriate the plaintiff's custom, no relief would be granted against him.

Combinations of letters and figures.

A special and distinctive combination of letters and figures may also be registered as an old mark, and though the contention may possibly be raised that this does not include a combination of one letter and one figure, as "A 1," or of several letters with one figure (*e*), or of one letter with several figures, the intention of the words is so obviously comprehensive that it does not appear likely that the contention could succeed.

Combination marks.

In some cases protection has been granted to a combination of marks, taken as a whole, notwithstanding that some of the component marks were *publici juris* (*f*); but it seems that a combination of marks, none of which

(*a*) *Carver* v. *Pinto Leite*, L. R. 7 Ch. 90; *Carver* v. *Bowker*, Dig. 581; *Broadhurst* v. *Barlow*, W. N. 1872, p. 212; *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487; *Boardman* v. *Meriden Britannia Co.*, 35 Conn. 402; *Lawrence Manufacturing Co.* v. *Lowell*, 129 Mass. 325.

(*b*) *Kinney* v. *Basch*, Dig. 542; *Kinney* v. *Allen*, 1 Hughes, 105.

(*c*) See *Kinney* v. *Allen*, 1 Hughes, 106; and compare *Burton* v. *Stratton*, 73 L. T. 349, and *In re Eagle Pencil Co.*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 981, in which registration was refused to numerals which had not been selected with sufficient arbitrariness.

(*d*) *Gillott* v. *Kettle*, 3 Duer, 624; *Gillott* v. *Esterbrook*, 3 Sickles, 374; *Boardman* v. *Meriden Britannia Co.*, 35 Conn. 412; *Kinney* v. *Basch*, Dig. 542.

(*e*) *E.g.*, "H. H. 6," in *Ransome* v. *Bentall*, 3 L. J. Ch. 161; "R. N. 1," in *Ransome* v. *Graham*, 51 *ib.* 897.

(*f*) *Carver* v. *Bowker*, Dig. 581; *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487; &c.

was capable in itself of forming a valid trade mark, could hardly be claimed. And this has been so held in America (*a*).

Official stamps.

An official stamp or brand can never become a private trade mark (*b*).

Colour.

It has been said in many cases that there can be no right of trade mark in the colour of wrappers, labels, &c., but in the case of trade marks consisting of coloured threads in the border of a piece of stuff (*c*), or in the wick of a candle (*d*), or of the representation of a coin (*e*), the colour may form a material part of the mark, and such marks will be registered by deposit.

Price.

The price of the article to which the trade mark is attached is no part of the trade mark (*f*).

Shape of barrel, &c.

A particular shape of barrel, bottle, parcel, &c., containing goods is no trade mark for the goods contained in it (*g*); nor is the representation of such barrel, bottle, or parcel a trade mark for such goods (*h*), though the fraudulent imitation of it will be restrained (*i*). Nor is a mechanical convenience not used for purposes of identification, such as a strip of tobacco rolled round the mouthpiece of cigarettes (*k*), nor the general configuration and appearance of a machine (*l*), nor a sampler-pattern (*m*), a trade mark. But where the mark is "something different from the article itself which the mark designates" (*n*), such as a stick placed in a roll of carpet, showing an

(*a*) *In re Tolle*, 2 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 415.

(*b*) *Chase* v. *Mayo*, 121 Mass. 343.

(*c*) *Harter* v. *Souvazoglu*, W. N. 1875, pp. 11, 101; *Carver* v. *Bowker*, Dig. 581; *Mitchell* v. *Henry*, 15 Ch. D. 181; *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487.

(*d*) See the Public Stores Act, 1875.

(*e*) *In re Robinson*, 29 W. R. 31. See Patents Act, 1883, § 67.

(*f*) *In re Steedman*, L. J. N. of C. 1883, p. 83.

(*g*) *Moorman* v. *Hoge*, 2 Sawy. 78 (a barrel); *Harrington* v. *Libby*, 14 Bl. C. C. 128 (a collar-box). See *In re Kane & Co.*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 105, and *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461.

(*h*) *Ex parte Halliday Brothers*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 500.

(*i*) *Cook* v. *Starkweather*, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392.

(*k*) *In re Gordon*, 12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 517.

(*l*) *Fairbanks* v. *Jacobus*, 14 Bl. C. C. 337.

(*m*) *In re Parker*, 13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 323.

(*n*) Per Johnson, J., in *Fairbanks* v. *Jacobus*, 14 Bl. C. C. 337.

octagonal ring at each end (*a*), or a band attached to cigar-boxes (*b*), and is special and distinctive, and not in common use, then it may be recognised as a good trade mark, notwithstanding that it is not attached to the goods in the usual way.

Mark may be consumed with the article.

If a mark is in other respects a good trade mark, the fact that it is consumed with the article to which it is attached is no objection to its validity (*c*).

(*a*) *Lowell Manufacturing Co.* v. *Larned*, Dig. 428.

(*b*) *Ex parte Straiton & Storm*, 18 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 923.

(*c*) *In re Gordon*, 12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 517; and see *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 441.

CHAPTER III.

ACQUISITION, TRANSFER, AND DISCONTINUANCE OF TRADE MARKS.

1. *Acquisition.*

Who may acquire.

As a general rule, any person capable of acquiring any other species of property is capable of acquiring a right to a trade mark, and this is equally the case with artificial persons, as corporations (*a*), as with physical persons, or individuals.

Aliens.

A question has, however, been raised as to whether an alien was capable of acquiring a right to a trade mark, but when raised was at once finally decided by Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in accordance alike with justice and expediency. The plaintiffs in *The Collins Co.* v. *Cowen* (*b*), were an American firm of edge-tool manufacturers, whose trade marks appear to have been systematically infringed by English rivals. In the case in question the defendants, who had copied the plaintiffs' stamp of "Collins Co., Hartford, cast steel, warranted," demurred. The Vice-Chancellor overruled the demurrer, and observed in the course of his judgment, "I apprehend that every subject of every country, not being an alien enemy—and even to an alien enemy the Court has extended relief in cases of fraud—has a right to apply to this Court to have a fraudulent injury to his property arrested. And here the plaintiffs have the right, a right recognised, I imagine, everywhere in the world, or at least in every civilised community, of

(*a*) See Patents Act, 1883, § 117, for definition of "person."

(*b*) 3 K. & J. 428.

saying, 'We, being the manufacturers of certain goods, claim that another man shall not manufacture goods and put upon them our trade mark, and then pass them off as manufactured by us.' It would be most grievous if any Court should hold that there was an incapacity of affording relief in a case where a fraud has been committed upon a subject of any country. I speak, of course, of a fraud so far connected with property as to be not a shadowy but a substantial injury. If you use the name of another for the purpose of securing to yourself, in the disposition of property, advantages which belong to him, the fraud is complete, and the remedy ought to be complete, as in the case of a libel, where the action is allowed to a foreigner. I cannot in my own mind entertain the slightest misgiving in this case, whether it be new or not" (*a*).

Where no user in England.

When no goods bearing the foreign trade mark have been sold in this country, the trade mark can have acquired here no reputation for its foreign owner, so that it would appear doubtful whether the protection extended to foreign trade-mark owners should be afforded in cases where there has been no user in this country, and the mark does not expressly state a foreign origin. In such a case the first person to use the mark in the United Kingdom is the first person to gain a reputation for it here (*b*).

(*a*) See also *Collins Co.* v. *Brown*, 3 K. & J. 423; *Collins Co.* v. *Walker*, 7 W. R. 222; *Collins Co.* v. *Reeves*, 28 L. J. Ch. 56; *Hoice* v. *McKernan*, 30 Beav. 547. So in Scotland the trade marks or names of American manufacturers have been protected: *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Kimball & Morton*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. XI. 267. The same rule obtains in America: *Taylor* v. *Carpenter*, 3 Story, 458; R. Cox, 14; Same *v.* Same, 2 Wood. & M. 1 R. Cox. 32; Same *v.* Same, 11 Paige, 292; R. Cox, 45; *Coats* v. *Holbrook*, 2 Sandf. Ch. 586; R. Cox, 20; and *Lemoine* v. *Ganton*, 2 E. D. Smith, 343; R. Cox, 142. And the infringement of a British trade mark has been criminally punished in Missouri: *State of Missouri* v. *Gibbs*, 56 Mo. 133. In India protection is afforded to British trade marks: *Orr-Ewing* v. *Chooneelall Mullick*, Cor. 150; *Orr-Ewing* v. *Grant, Smith & Co.*, 2 Hyde, 185; and in Canada also the trade marks of aliens are protected: *Davis* v. *Kennedy*, 13 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 523.

(*b*) See *In re Münch*, 50 L. T. N. S. 12; *In re Riviere & Co.*, 49 L. T. N. S. 506; (App.) 32 W. R. 390; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530, per Fry, L. J. Registration is equivalent to public use: Patents Act, 1883, § 75.

New rules as to foreign trade marks.

The rules under the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, distinctly provided for the registration of his trade mark by any person, whether a British subject or an alien (*a*); and although § 103 (3) of the Patents Act, 1883, appears to imply that before registration can be granted to a foreign trade mark here, application must first have been made in its country of origin, yet, in the case of subjects of any foreign state between which and the British Government a convention exists, a priority is given by the same section over other claimants, so that there is some compensation for the new requirement of application abroad.

Sovereigns.

It seems that there is nothing to prevent sovereign princes or states from being the proprietors of trade marks in respect of goods manufactured or produced on their account (*b*).

Officials.

A person in an official position, using an official stamp in his official capacity, cannot thereby acquire any private right therein (*c*). Nor can an agent acquire any interest in his principal's mark from the fact that he has used it (*d*).

Agents.

Length of user formerly required.

There was for some time a doubt as to the circumstances under which one person could acquire a sufficient right to a trade mark to be entitled to rèstrain another from infringing it. The right to redress being treated as founded on the defendant's intentional fraud, it was thought that a plaintiff who claimed an injunction against a defendant ought to show that he (the plaintiff) had acquired for the mark indicating his manufacture such a reputation (*e*) as would raise a presumption that the

(*a*) Compare Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, § 1.

(*b*) See *Ex parte King of Saxony*, Dig. 598; *Republic of Peru* v. *Reeves*, 40 N. Y. Super. Ct. 316.

(*c*) *Chase* v. *Mayo*, 7 Lathrop, 343.

(*d*) *Hirsch* v. *Jonas*, 3 Ch. D. 584; *Swift* v. *Peters*, 11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1110.

(*e*) In *Hine* v. *Lart*, 10 Jur. 106, Sir L. Shadwell, V.-C. of England, thought that the imitation by a defendant of a plaintiff's trade mark afforded a presumption of that mark having acquired a reputation. And see *Dixon* v. *Jackson*, Court of Session Cases, 3rd Series V. 326, per the Lord Justice Clerk, and *Alleghany Fertilizer Co.* v. *Woodside*, 1 Hughes, 115.

defendant in adopting a similar mark had done so with the intention of availing himself of that reputation to divert to himself the plaintiff's custom, or at all events that the plaintiff ought to show that he had used the mark long enough to render it probable that such a reputation had been acquired (*a*).

Latterly considered unnecessary.

But when it came to be recognised that there was a right of property in a trade mark, intentional fraud being unnecessary to justify restraint, it was at once seen that, as was stated by Sir J. Romilly, M. R., "the interference of a Court of Equity could not depend on the length of time the manufacturers had used it" (*b*), but that, "from the time of their commencing the user of their trade mark they became entitled to the protection of the Court against any other persons using the same, so that purchasers might be induced to purchase the goods of other persons as theirs" (*c*).

Acquisition by common repute.

In *Siegert* v. *Findlater* (*d*), it was even held that the plaintiffs were entitled to restrain the defendant from using the term "Angostura Bitters," although the defendant had used it on his labels before the plaintiffs had done so, on the ground that, before the plaintiffs had themselves used the term, it had become attached to their

(*a*) See *Purser* v. *Brain*, 17 L. J. Ch. 141; *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78; *Collins Co.* v. *Brown*, 3 K. & J. 423; and compare *Spottiswoode* v. *Clarke*, 2 Ph. 154.

(*b*) *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 32 L. J. Ch. 548.

(*c*) Per Sir C. Hall, V.-C., in *Cope* v. *Evans*, L. R. 18 Eq. 138; and see *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Grant, Smith & Co.*, 2 Hyde, 185. This principle does not appear to be universally recognised in America. See *Seltzer* v. *Powell*, 8 Phila. 296. In *Sternberger* v. *Thalheimer*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 120, it was held that prior registration and prior use of about six days, but only on a few articles by way of experiment, by one manufacturer, did not disentitle another to registration, he having systematically used the mark for some time before his rival had seriously adopted it. It is the adoption and use, not the invention, of the mark that gives a title to it: *Swift* v. *Peters*, 11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1110; *Hoosier Drill Co.* v. *Ingels*, 14 *ib.* 785; *Leiderdorf* v. *Flint*, (1) 8 Biss. 327; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *U. S.* v. *Steffens*, 100 *ib.* 82; and a trade mark may have been in part purchased and in part invented: *Sohl* v. *Geisendorf*, 1 Wils. (Ind.) 60.

(*d*) 7 Ch. D. 801. And see *Smith* v. *Woodruff*, 48 Barb. 438; *Rowley* v. *Houghton*, 2 Brews. 303; *Degraves* v. *Whiteman*, 5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 304.

article in common parlance. But acquisition of a trade mark by common report has not been universally recognised (*a*).

How property in a trade mark acquired.

Lord Westbury, C., said, in *McAndrew* v. *Bassett* (*b*), that the elements of the right to property in a trade mark might be represented as being the fact of the article being in the market as a vendible article with that stamp or trade mark at the time when the defendants imitated it; and he went on: "The essential qualities for constituting that property probably would be found to be no other than these: first, that the mark has been applied by the plaintiffs properly (that is to say, that they have not copied any other person's mark, and that the mark does not involve any false representation) (*c*); secondly, that the article so marked is actually a vendible article in the market; and thirdly, that the defendants knowing that to be so, have imitated the mark for the purpose of passing off in the market other articles of a similar description" (*d*).

The mark must be on a vendible article.

From this judgment it follows, and it was expressly recognised in *Maxwell* v. *Hogg* (*e*), that no property could be acquired in a trade mark, except through the process of sale, or offering for sale, in the market, of the article to which the trade mark was affixed (*f*). And in the last-mentioned case it was held that no expenditure during the course of manufacture in advertisements or other announcements to the public of the article so in course of manufacture could give any right in the mark or name by which it was intended that the article should be known when

(*a*) See *Blackwell* v. *Armistead*, 5 Amer. L. T. 85.

(*b*) 4 De G. J. & S. 380.

(*c*) Compare §§ 72, 73, 86 of the Patents Act, 1883.

(*d*) Compare remarks of Lord Kingsdown in the *Leather Cloth Companies' case*, 11 H. L. C. 523.

(*e*) L. R. 2 Ch. 307.

(*f*) And see per Willes, J., in *Lawson* v. *Bank of London*, 18 C. B. 84. Also *Civil Service Supply Association* v. *Dean*, 13 Ch. D. 512; *In re Simpson, Davies & Sons*, M. R., Jan. 12th, 1881; *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284; *Rowley* v. *Houghton*, 2 Brewster, 303, R. Cox, 486; *Bowman* v. *Floyd*, 85 Mass. 76; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *St. Louis Piano Manufacturing Co.* v. *Merkel*, 1 Mo. App. 305. As to the difficulty of acquiring a right of trade mark in a name applied to a patented article, see p. 47, *ante*.

completed and in the market (*a*). Moreover user must be as of a trade mark, and not as of a mere descriptive term (*b*).

Acquisition by registration.

By the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, now repealed, a new manner of acquiring a right to a trade mark was introduced, and with respect to new marks substituted for the earlier method. By the Patents Act, 1883 (*c*), which has now taken the place of the Act of 1875, no infringement of a registrable trade mark can be restrained or punished, unless the mark has been registered. For five years after registration the fact of registration is *primâ facie* evidence of the right of the registered proprietor to the exclusive use of the trade mark (*d*), or, in other words, it qualifies him for taking proceedings against infringers (*e*); after five years have expired from the date of registration, the fact of registration becomes conclusive evidence of his right to the mark (*f*), provided only that the mark is one within the definition of registrable trade marks contained in the Act (*g*). Registration protects the trade mark in all sizes and in all colours, whether registered in colour (*h*) or not (*i*). In the case of trade marks in use before August 13th, 1875, application must be made for registration, and if that is refused, a certificate of refusal will preserve to the applicant whatever rights he would have had independently of the Act (*k*).

Goods classified.

A trade mark must be registered as belonging to particular goods or classes of goods (*l*), as arranged in the Third

(*a*) And see *Civil Service Supply Association* v. *Dean*, 13 Ch. D. 512.

(*b*) *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530.

(*c*) § 77.

(*d*) § 76; and see *Reinhardt* v. *Spalding*, 49 L. J. Ch. 57, *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284.

(*e*) *Nuthall* v. *Vining*, C. A. Jan. 21st, 1880. In the case of *Morse* v. *Martin*, Montreal Super. Ct. Feb. 28th, 1882, it was held that the corresponding Canadian statute gave no right of action for anything done before registration. But the Court of Appeal did not decide the point, Feb. 23rd, 1884.

(*f*) § 76. This is, however, subject to the provisions of the Act, *e.g.*, as to the connection with the goodwill: § 70.

(*g*) *In re Palmer* (1), 21 Ch. D. 47; S. C. (3) 24 *ib.* 504; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 53 L. J. Ch. 233; (App.) 32 W. R. 530.

(*h*) See § 67.

(*i*) *Nuthall* v. *Vining*, C. A. Jan. 21st, 1880.

(*k*) § 77.

(*l*) § 65.

Schedule to the Rules; the class to which the goods belong being determined, in case of doubt, by the comptroller (*a*) This requirement is no alteration of the rules of the pre-existing law, but is merely a statement of one of those rules as bearing upon registration under the Act. It had been already fully recognised that a particular trade mark could be protected as such only in connection with particular goods or classes of goods. Thus Lord Westbury, C., says, "Property in *a trade mark is the right to the exclusive use of some mark, name, or symbol in connection with a particular manufacture or vendible commodity; consequently the use of the same mark in connection with a different article is not an infringement of such a right of property" (*b*). And again, "An ironfounder who uses a particular mark for his manufactures in iron could not restrain the use of the same mark when impressed upon cotton or woollen goods; for the property in a trade mark consists in the exclusive right to the use of that mark as applied to some particular manufacture" (*c*). And V.-C. Wood similarly says, that "this Court has taken upon itself to protect a man in the use of a certain trade mark as applied to a particular description of article. He has no property in that mark, *per se*, any more than in any other fanciful denomination he may assume for his own private use, otherwise than with reference to his trade. If he does not carry on a trade in iron, but carries on a trade in linen, and stamps a lion on his linen, another person may stamp a lion on iron; but when he has appropriated a mark to a particular species of goods, and caused his goods to circulate with this mark upon them," his right to the mark so applied will be protected (*d*).

(*a*) Rule 6.

(*b*) *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 4 De G. J. & S. 137.

(*c*) *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150.

(*d*) *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518; and see *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—43; *Merchants' Banking Co. of London* v. *Merchants' Joint Stock Bank, Limited*, 9 *ib.* 560; *Colladay* v. *Baird*, 4 Phila. 139; R. Cox, 257; *Rowley* v. *Houghton*, 2

Limit of rights acquired by user.

As a result of the rule that a trade mark can only be acquired by user in respect of the goods on which it has been used, it has been decided that the use of a mark before August 13th, 1875, on certain descriptions of goods gives no right to have it registered in respect of other descriptions of goods, except as a new mark, so that although the mark may have been long used in respect of some goods, it will be refused registration in respect of other goods or classes of goods (though of a somewhat similar character), if it conflicts with another mark already registered therein (*a*). And it has been held in America, with apparently good reason, that a mark which is descriptive, and therefore incapable of registration, when applied to one description of goods, may be open to no such objection when applied to another description of goods (*b*). In *Moses* v. *Sargood* (*c*) it was held to be an infringement of the plaintiffs' rights for the defendants, who had previously only exported goods unmade up, and used their trade mark upon such goods, to begin to export and to use their trade mark upon ready made clothing, having regard to the fact that the plaintiffs had been in the habit of exporting and using a somewhat similar trade mark upon made up goods.

Provisions in the Patents, &c., Act and Rules.

By § 72 the registration of a mark identical with, or nearly similar to a mark already registered, is prohibited, not generally, but in connection with such goods or description of goods as those in respect of which the mark already on the register is registered. And, with a view to the protection of the public, this prohibition is extended over a period of five years after the removal of the mark once registered from the register for non-payment of a continuance fee, during which period of five years the renewed mark in

Brewster, 303; R. Cox, 486; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner*, 55 Barb. 151; R. Cox, 541; *Colman* v. *Crump*, 70 N. Y. 573; *Société Anonyme, &c.* v. *Baxter*, 14 Bl. C. C. 261.

(*a*) *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639; and see *In re Braby & Co.*, 21 Ch. D. 223.

(*b*) *In re English*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1870, 142; *In re Dick & Co.*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 538.

(*c*) Dig. 636.

question is to be still deemed to be registered for this purpose only (*a*).

Steps necessary to obtain registration. The application.

A person desirous of having his trade mark registered must send an application to the comptroller in the prescribed form (*b*), together with the prescribed number (*c*) of representations (*d*) of the trade mark. When a representation cannot be given in the usual manner, a specimen or copy of the trade mark may be supplied instead (*e*). The application must state the particular goods or classes of goods in connection with which the applicant desires the trade mark to be registered (*f*), and when the application is in respect of metal goods, other than cutlery, edge tools, and raw steel, *i.e.*, other than the goods within the Cutlers' Company's Acts, the metal of which the goods are made must be stated (*g*). Words in other than Roman character must have a translation supplied (*h*).

When mark is an old mark.

When the mark is claimed as an old mark, *i.e.*, a mark used before the passing of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875 (August 13th, 1875), the facts as to such prior user are to be stated (*i*), but no statutory declaration is now required, as was formerly the case. In such cases it is essential that the mark should be claimed and registered precisely in the form in which it has been used (*k*).

(*a*) § 79 (5).

(*b*) Form F. in the Second Schedule to the Rules. See § 62 (2) and Rules 4, 5, 11.

(*c*) Three, except when the application is in respect of goods in classes 23 to 35, *i.e.*, the textile classes. In such a case four representations must be sent. In either case one of the representations is to be placed on the application form. See Rule 13. When the application is for the registration of a series of marks under § 66, the case will be governed by Rule 14.

(*d*) For form of Additional Representation, see Form G. See also § 62 (3).

(*e*) See Rule 13.

(*f*) § 62 (3).

(*g*) Rule 12.

(*h*) Rule 15.

(*i*) Rule 10.

(*k*) *In re Horsburgh*, 53 L. J. Ch. 237; *In re Royal Baking Powder Co.*, W. N. 1880, p. 49; *Russell & Sons, Limited*, v. *Smith*, M. R., June 18th, 1880; *In re Palmer* (3), 24 Ch. D. 504; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530. In *In re Eastman*, W. N. 1880, p. 128, a trade mark was allowed to be registered as an old mark, because of its having been used abroad; but it hardly seems that foreign user, without use in the realm, should give any right. See *In re Münch*, 50 L. T. N. S. 12; *In re Riviere & Co.*, 49 L. T. N. S. 506; (App.) 32 W. R. 390; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 53 L. J. Ch. 233; (App.) 32 W. R. 530. And user, even within the realm, must have been user as a trade mark, and not as a mere descriptive term: *In re Leonard & Ellis, ubi suprd.*

When the application is made by a firm or partnership it may be signed by some one or more members of the firm or partnership, as the case may be (*a*). When by a firm.

When the application is made by a body corporate, it may be signed by the secretary or other principal officer of such body corporate (*a*). When by a body corporate.

The application and all other communications between the applicant and the comptroller may be made by or through a duly authorised agent (*b*), and may be sent by a prepaid letter through the post (*c*). Manner of making application.

All that remains to be done by the applicant for registration, after sending in his application, is to await an acknowledgment of its receipt by the comptroller (*d*), and then to furnish the comptroller with the means of inserting in the official paper the necessary advertisement of the application (*e*). Advertisement, &c.

At the expiration of two months from the date of the first advertisement, and subject to any proceedings which may have been taken, the comptroller is, if satisfied of the applicant's title, to register the trade mark (*f*) as from the date of the receipt of the application for registration (*g*), and upon registration is to send notice thereof to the registered proprietor with a reference to the advertisement (*h*). Registration.

If an applicant dies between application and registration the registration may be completed in the name of the successor to the goodwill of his business (*i*). In case of applicant's death.

Trade marks applied for in respect of goods within the Cutlers' Company's Acts (*k*) are governed by special rules (*l*); but marks on cotton goods, even, it would seem, B list marks, are for the future to be dealt with on the same footing as other trade marks. The only special requirements in the case of cotton marks are for the name by which the Sheffield and cotton marks.

(*a*) Rule 7.
(*b*) Rule 8.
(*c*) § 97 and Rule 16.
(*d*) Rule 9.
(*e*) § 68 and Rules 25—28.
(*f*) Rule 30.
(*g*) Rule 32.
(*h*) Rule 33.
(*i*) Rule 31.
(*k*) See Appendix C., *infrà*.
(*l*) § 81 and Rules 53—56. See also Rule 12.

mark would be referred to in invoices to be stated (*a*), and for three additional representations to be sent instead of two (*b*).

Series of marks.

Where it is desired to register a number of trade marks which, while resembling each other in the material particulars thereof (*c*), yet differ in respect of statements of the goods for which they are to be used, or of numbers, or price, or quality, or names of places, they may be registered as a series in one registration, each of the marks being treated as separately registered, except for purposes of assignment and transmission (*d*).

Common marks.

Additions which are common to the trade may, in accordance with the provisions of § 74, be registered together with trade marks, but such common elements must be disclaimed by the applicant (*e*).

Alternative marks.

No provision is made in the Patents Act, 1883, for registering alternative marks, as has sometimes been done in America, *e.g.*, where a trade mark was registered as consisting either of the figure of a lion, or the word "lion," or both (*f*).

Colour.

Trade marks may now be registered in colour, and the effect of such registration is no longer to limit the protection conferred by registration to the one colour in which the registration has been effected (*g*).

Registration by deposit.

Provision is made by the Rules for registration by deposit in cases where such a course is rendered necessary by the nature of the trade mark (*h*).

Refusal to gister.

Registration is by no means a necessary consequence of application. The comptroller may refuse to grant registration if he thinks fit (*i*), or if he thinks the use of the mark

(*a*) Instructions, par. 15.

(*b*) Rule 13.

(*c*) See § 64 as to essential particulars.

(*d*) § 66 and Rules 14, 28. This is new as an enactment, but the practice is not new. See note (*a*) to § 66, and note (*c*) to § 72, *infrà*.

(*e*) The practice of requiring common parts of marks or additions to marks to be disclaimed is not new See per Jessel, M. R., in *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238. Also notes to § 74, and note (*c*) to § 72, *infrà*.

(*f*) *In re Weaver*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1.

(*g*) See § 67 and note thereto, *inf.*

(*h*) Rules 13, 25. And see note to § 67.

(*i*) § 62 (4).

would be contrary to law or morality (*a*), and he must refuse registration where the same or a similar mark is already registered for the same goods (*b*), or where words inherently calculated to deceive are offered for registration (*c*). Where the refusal is made in the exercise of a discretion vested in the comptroller, he is not to exercise that discretion adversely to the applicant until he has had an opportunity of being heard personally, or by his agent (*d*), and if he does, in his discretion, refuse to register, there is an appeal to the Board of Trade (*e*), who may, if they think fit, refer the appeal to the Court (*f*), and any person aggrieved by the omission of the name of any person from the register, may apply to the Court to rectify the register (*g*). This provision appears to have the effect of enabling an applicant whose application has been refused to go direct to the Court, instead of to the Board of Trade, if he prefers that tribunal, or even to go to the Court after his application has been refused by the Board of Trade (*h*).

Opposition to application.

Even if the comptroller is willing to treat the application as unobjectionable, any person (*i*) may give notice of opposition at the Patent Office within two months after the first advertisement, and the applicant is then allowed two months for sending in a counter-statement, or the registrar may extend the time. If no such counter-statement is sent, the application is deemed to be withdrawn;

(*a*) § 86.
(*b*) § 72.
(*c*) § 73.
(*d*) § 94 and Rules 17—19.
(*e*) § 62 (4). See Rules 20—24.
(*f*) § 62 (5). "The Court" is the High Court of Justice (§ 117), the Chancery Division being no longer specified, but recourse will, no doubt, still be had to that Division.
(*g*) § 90. When the registration is objected to on the ground that the mark tendered for registration is not qualified for registration, "the first duty cast upon the Court is to ascertain whether some one or more than one of the essential particulars of a trade mark, as defined by the Act, is found to exist, so that the mark may be described with the one or more than one essential particular or particulars which distinguish it." Per Lord Cairns, C., in *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 484.
(*h*) See note (*n*) to § 62, *infra*.
(*i*) It need not be the proprietor of a registered mark. In *In re Simpson, Davies & Sons*, M. R., Jan. 12th, 1881, the proprietors of a trade mark registered for coal in class 4 successfully opposed the registration of a similar mark for railway waggons in class 22, the opponent's coal being carried in and sold out of waggons.

if it is sent, the person giving notice of opposition will be required to give security for costs, which if he does not do within fourteen days the opposition is deemed to be withdrawn. If he does give the required security, the comptroller is to inform the applicant thereof in writing, and thereupon the case stands for the determination of the High Court of Justice (*a*). Upon this point being reached, the comptroller is to require the applicant within one month, or such further time as he may allow, to take out a summons in chambers for leave to register (*b*), or to take such other proceedings as may be proper (*c*). If the applicant does not take the proceedings directed within the time allowed, and give notice to the comptroller, the application is to be deemed to be abandoned (*d*). If he does so, then the case will be dealt with by the Court in the usual way, and it seems that the Court will now have jurisdiction over the whole costs of the proceedings (*e*).

Limited registration.

In deciding whether registration is to be allowed or not, the Court will frequently grant the application in such a limited form as to obviate the risk of its clashing with the mark which it is considered to resemble (*f*). Thus registration has been granted in such a form as to be partial in respect of the mark itself which is registered (*g*), or of the goods for which it is registered (*h*), or of the manner of

(*a*) § 69. An opportunity will first be afforded the applicant of objecting to the security given. See Instructions, par. 34, *infrd.*

(*b*) This is under Rule 29. *Hitherto the practice has been to* require the opponent to take out a summons for directions as to the mode of proceeding. See *In re Simpson, Davies & Sons*, 15 Ch. D. 525.

(*c*) The recent usual practice has been to go by summons where there was a notice of opposition, by motion where the registrar objected to the application. As to going by way of motion, see *Ex parte Stephens*, 24 W. R. 819; see also *In re Johnston*, 43 L. T. N. S. 672; *In re Salamon*, Dig. 569.

(*d*) Rule 29.

(*e*) See § 90. Formerly the Court had only jurisdiction over the costs as from the time when the case stood for its determination, but not before. *In re Brandreth*, 9 Ch. D. 618.

(*f*) See as to the growth of this form of registration, per Jessel, M.R., in *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238.

(*g*) See note (*c*) to § 72 and *In re Leonardt*, Dig. 610; *In re Mitchell* (2), Dig. 611; *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238; *In re Hoyle & Sons, Limited* (2), Chitty, J., Nov. 30th, 1883.

(*h*) See note to § 65, *infrd.*

user (*a*), or of the locality within which it is to be used (*b*) or of the persons against whom it is to be protected (*c*).

Conflicting claims.

Again, where each of several persons claims the same trade mark the comptroller may refuse to register any of them until their rights have been determined according to law, and he may himself submit or require the claimants to submit their rights to the Court (*d*) in the form (unless the Court shall otherwise order) of a special case (*e*), agreed to by the parties, or, in case of difference, settled by the registrar (*f*).

Issue may be directed.

In any proceeding for rectification of the register, *e.g.*, for placing a name on it which has been rejected, the Court may direct an issue to be tried for the decision of any question of fact, and may award damages to the party aggrieved (*g*).

Alteration of registered trade mark.

Subsequently to registration clerical errors may be corrected by the comptroller (*h*), who may also alter the address of the registered proprietor (*i*), and by leave of the Court the registered proprietor may alter his trade mark and procure an alteration of the register accordingly, but the alteration must not extend to any of the "essential particulars" of the trade mark (*k*).

No trust entered on register.

No notice of any trust, expressed, implied, or constructive, can be received by the comptroller, or entered in the register (*l*).

2. *Transfer.*

Assignment and transmission.

A trade mark is capable of being assigned during the life of its proprietor, and of being transmitted at his death; but it can be assigned and transmitted only in connection

(*a*) See note (*c*) to § 72, *infrd*, and *In re Whiteley*, 43 L. T. N. S. 627; *In re Sykes*, *ib.* 626; *In re Farina* (3), Dig. 654.

(*b*) *In re Rabone*, Dig. 643; *In re Keep*, 32 W. R. 427.

(*c*) *Ex parte Hemming & Son*, M. R., April 27th, 1881.

(*d*) § 71, and Rules 40, 41.

(*e*) Rule 42, and see note to § 71, *infrd*.

(*f*) Rule 43.

(*g*) § 90.

(*h*) § 91.

(*i*) Rule 46.

(*k*) § 92; and see *In re Dewhurst*, M. R., June 11th, 1880. Notice of the application must be given to the comptroller: Rule 48.

(*l*) § 85.

with the goodwill of the business concerned in the particular goods or classes of goods for which it has been registered (*a*), and trade marks registered as a series can only be assigned and transmitted as a whole (*b*).

Trade mark cannot be severed from goodwill.

Even apart from the Act, there is no doubt that the trade mark cannot be severed from and used independently of the goodwill. If that could be done, the *indicium* of genuineness might only serve to mislead. This view was clearly put by Lord Westbury, C., in the *Leather Cloth Companies' case* (*c*), when he suggested the case of a firm of clothiers in Wiltshire, trading as A. B. & Co. for fifty years, and acquiring a great reputation for their broad cloth marked "A. B. & Co. Wilts"; then, he asked, supposing A. B. & Co. to discontinue their business, and to sell the right to use the mark to C. D. & Co. clothiers in Yorkshire, would the latter be protected in Equity in their claim to the exclusive use of the mark? and he answered the question in the negative.

Trade mark passes with goodwill.

To such an extent is a trade mark an accessory of the goodwill, that in *Shipwright* v. *Clements* (*d*), Sir R. Malins, V.-C., held that in the sale of the latter the trade mark would pass, whether specially mentioned or not (*e*).

Same principle adopted in America.

In a case before the New York Court of Appeals (*f*), the expression was adopted that "a property in trade mark might be obtained by transfer from him who had made the primary acquisition, though it was essential that the transferee should be possessed of the right either to manufacture or sell the merchandise to which the trade mark had been attached." In another American case (*g*), the statement

(*a*) § 70. See *Massam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.*, 14 Ch. D. 748; *Ex parte Lawrence & Co.*, 44 L. T. N. S. 98.

(*b*) § 66.

(*c*) 4 De G. J. & S. 137; and see *Cotton* v. *Gillard*, 44 L. J. Ch. 90; *Taylor* v. *Bemis*, 4 Biss. 406; *Witthaus* v. *Braun*, 44 Md. 303; *Skinner* v. *Oakes*, 10 Mo. App. 45; *Morgan* v. *Rogers*, 26 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1113.

(*d*) 19 W. R. 599.

(*e*) And see *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Fulton* v. *Sellers*, 4 Brews. 42.

(*f*) *Congress & Empire Spring Co.* v. *High Rock Congress Spring Co.*, R. Cox, 599.

(*g*) *Dixon Crucible Co.* v. *Guggenheim*, 2 Brewster, 321; R. Cox, 559;

that the "property or right to a trade mark might pass by an assignment or by operation of law," was followed by this limitation, "to any one who took at the same time the right to manufacture or sell the particular merchandise to which the trade mark had been attached." And in the very recent case of *Kidd* v. *Johnson* (*a*), the Supreme Court of the United States laid down that "as distinct property, separate from the article created by the original producer or manufacturer, a trade mark may not be the subject of sale. But when it is affixed to articles manufactured at a particular establishment, and acquires a special reputation in connection with the place of manufacture, and that establishment is transferred, either by contract or operation of law, to others, the right to the use of the trade mark may be lawfully transferred with it. Its subsequent use by the person to whom the establishment is transferred is considered as only indicating that the goods to which it is affixed are manufactured at the same place, and are of the same character, as those to which the mark was attached by its original designer."

Personal trade mark.

It is possible that occasionally, though rarely, a trade mark may be so framed as not to be merely a simple indication of quality, or a guide to the place of manufacture, but to have the effect of ascribing the article to which it is attached to the personal skill or supervision of an individual. In such a case the question arises whether the trade mark which, when originally adopted, contained no assertion which was incorrect, is capable of transfer to another person so as to enable him to apply it to his own goods and to prevent a similar use of it by others, the personal skill and supervision of its former proprietor having ceased to be applied.

Name of former proprietor.

It is, indeed, settled law in England, though there is

and see *Walton* v. *Crowley*, 3 Bl. C. C. 440; R. Cox, 166; and *Derringer* v. *Plate*, 29 Cal. 292; R. Cox, 325.

(*a*) 100 U. S. Rep. 617.

some American authority (*a*) to the contrary, that the mere fact of the trade mark consisting of or containing the name of its former proprietor, who originally conducted the business with which the trade mark is connected, is not of itself sufficient to disentitle the transmittee or assignee of the business to continue to use the mark, since the mere name of the maker will be deemed to be indicative rather of a business, in whosoever hands it may be, than of an individual proprietor of it (*b*).

When trade mark is personal.

It is, however, conceivable that a trade mark may be "so completely personal as of necessity to import that the goods sold under it have been manufactured by a particular individual" (*c*), as if it contains not only the name of the proprietor, but also some reference to his personal qualifications or supervision (*d*), or an allusion to particular workmen in his employ (*e*), in which case the mark will already become deceptive even while the business remains in the same hands, if the proprietor should cease to give his personal attention, or to employ the same workmen. And in *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood* (*f*), the Supreme Court of the United States said that "if one affix to goods

(*a*) *Sherwood* v. *Andrews*, 3 Amer. L. Reg. N. S. 588; and see *Partridge* v. *Menck*, 2 Sandf. Ch. 622; *Carmichel* v. *Latimer*, 11 R. I. 395; and *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood* (App.), 23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1925.

(*b*) *Bury* v. *Bedford*, 4 De G. J. & S. 352; *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 1 H. & M. 271; 4 De G. J. & S. 137; 11 H. L. C. 523; *Massam* v. *J. W. Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* (2), 14 Ch. D. 748; and the American cases of *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Filkins* v. *Blackman*, 13 Bl. C. C. 440; *Weed* v. *Peterson*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 178; *Booth* v. *Jarrett*, 52 How. Pr. 169; *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; S. C. (2) 51 How. Pr. 455; *Woods* v. *Sands*, Dig. 467; *Fulton* v. *Sellers*, 4 Brews. 42; *Young* v. *Jones Bros. & Co.*, 3 Hughes, 274. Compare *Clark* v. *German Mutual Fire Insurance Co.*, 7 Mo. App. 77.

(*c*) Per Sir G. Turner, L. J., in *Bury* v. *Bedford*, 4 De G. J. & S. 352; so in *Carmichel* v. *Latimer*, 11 R. I. 395.

(*d*) *Helmbold* v. *Helmbold Manufacturing Co.*, 53 How. Pr. 453.

(*e*) And compare the reference by Lord Kingsdown to an artist's special skill, in *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 11 H. L. C. 523.

(*f*) 23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1925, and see *In re Swezey & Dart*, 62 How. Pr. 215; and Daly, C. J.'s observations in *Hegeman & Co.* v. *Hegeman*, 8 Daly, 1.

of his own manufacture signs or marks which indicate that they are the manufacture of others, he is deceiving the public and attempting to pass upon them goods as possessing a quality and merit which another's skill has given to similar articles, and which his own manufacture does not possess in the estimation of purchasers. To put forth a statement, therefore, in the form of a circular or label attached to an article, that it is manufactured in a particular place by a person whose manufacture there had acquired a great reputation, when in fact it is manufactured by a different person at a different place, is a fraud upon the public which no Court of Equity will countenance."

No protection of deceptive marks.

In such a case, independently of statute, it is clear that no protection will be given to a mark become deceptive. Thus, Lord Westbury, C., was of opinion that the Court would not sell and transfer the right to use a mark of a personal character simply and without alteration (*a*).

The Patents, &c., Act.

The objection to the use of a trade mark become deceptive, which, independently of statute, applied rather to the use of the mark assigned than to the power of assigning it (*b*), should now, as it appears, more properly apply to the registration of the assignee or transmittee, by which the latter acquires, at least, a *primâ facie* right to practise deceit. The Act, indeed, contains no provision expressly directed to meet a case of this kind, the 73rd section being only aimed at an attempted registration of a mark disentitled from the beginning to protection, by reason of being inherently calculated to deceive, and not to a registration of a subsequent proprietor of a mark which has lost its right to protection through a change of circumstances. The spirit of the Act is, however, to favour the general

(*a*) *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150. See, too, the Clothiers' case, suggested by him in the *Leather Cloth Co.'s case*, 4 De G. J. & S. 137; and the remarks of Lord Cranworth in that case in the House of Lords, 11 H. L. C. 523; and those of the L. JJ. in *Bury* v. *Bedford*, 4 De G. J. & S. 352. Compare *Sherwood* v. *Andrews*, 3 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 588, and *Partridge* v. *Menck*, 2 Sandf. Ch. 622.

(*b*) Per Turner, L. J., in *Bury* v. *Bedford*, 4 De G. J. & S. 352.

assignability of trade marks together with the goodwill to which they are attached, and it may be expected that such elements in a trade mark as would impede this assignability will very rarely, if ever, survive the original process of registration now necessary.

Trade marks generally transferable.

Subject only to the provision prohibiting the severance of a trade mark from the goodwill of the business with which it is connected, the trade mark is freely assignable. "The right to a trade mark may, in general, treating it as property, or an accessory of property, be sold and transferred upon a sale and transfer of the manufactory of the goods on which the mark has been used to be affixed, and may be lawfully used by the purchaser" (*a*). If this were not so the value of a very valuable and important part of the goodwill of the business carried on by a person (*b*) would be seriously diminished. And for a similar reason, and in the interest alike of the owner of a trade mark himself and of his assignee, the original owner will, subsequently to assignment, be restrained from the use of his former trade mark, equally with persons who have never had an interest in it (*c*). Nor after that event does he retain any power of conferring on another a right to use it (*d*). The same will be the case if the sale has been

(*a*) Per Lord Cranworth in *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 11 H. L. C. 523; and see per V.-C. Wood in *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518; also *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79; *Weed* v. *Peterson*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 178; *Cook* v. *Starkweather*, 13 *ib.* 392; *Frese* v. *Bachof* (2), 14 Bl. C. C. 432; *In re Rohland*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 980; *Lockwood* v. *Bostwick*, 2 Daly, 521; and the clear and full statement by Daly, C. J., in *Hegeman & Co.* v. *Hegeman*, 8 Daly, 1. It was said by Shipman, J., in the American case of *Filkins* v. *Blackman*, 13 Bl. C. C. 440, that "the right to the use of a trade mark cannot be so enjoyed by an assignee that he shall have the right to affix the mark to goods differing in character or species from the article to which it was originally attached."

(*b*) Compare the observations of Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., as to the sale of a trade name, involving the same considerations, in *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; also *Shipwright* v. *Clements*, 19 W. R. 599.

(*c*) *Bury* v. *Bedford*, 4 De G. J. & S. 352; and see *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174.

(*d*) *Sohl* v. *Geisendorf*, 1 Wils. (Ind.) 60; *Filkins* v. *Blackman*, 13 Bl. C. C. 440.

made, not by the owner himself, but by his trustee in bankruptcy (*a*). In the sale of a business a trade mark will pass to the purchaser without special mention (*b*).

Registration of subsequent proprietor.

When a person becomes entitled to a registered trade mark by assignment or transmission, or other operation of law, the way in which he has to obtain the registration of himself as the proprietor (*c*) is by sending a request to that effect to the comptroller (*d*), signed in the same way as is required in the case of an original application (*e*), stating the name, address, and description of the claimant, and the particulars of his title, showing that the trade mark has gone with the goodwill of the business (*f*), and accompanied by a statutory declaration verifying the several statements made (*g*). And further proof of title is to be furnished to the comptroller if he requires it (*h*).

Transmission on bankruptcy.

On the owner of a trade mark becoming bankrupt, his trade mark is transmitted with his business to his representative in bankruptcy, and will, together with the business and goodwill, be dealt with by him (*i*). But, apart from the statutory provisions regulating registration, it seems that a trade mark which owes its value to its owner's personal skill will not pass; and in the American case of *In re Swezey and Dart* (*k*), an insolvent trader was directed to be examined for the purpose of ascertaining whether the value of the mark was owing to such skill or to the general working of the factory. And it has been held in America that an assignee in bankruptcy cannot sell a trade secret or a trade mark of which the main feature is

(*a*) *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79; *Heyeman & Co.* v. *Hegeman*, 8 Daly, 1.

(*b*) *Shipwright* v. *Clements*, 19 W. R. 599.

(*c*) § 87.

(*d*) Rule 34.

(*e*) Rule 35.

(*f*) Rule 36, and see § 70.

(*g*) Rule 37. For form of application and declaration, see Form K. in Second Schedule to Rules.

(*h*) Rule 38.

(*i*) *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79; *Cotton* v. *Gillard*, 44 L. J. Ch. 90; *Bury* v. *Bedford*, 4 De G. J. & S. 352; *Ex parte Young*, Dig. 537; *Rogers* v. *Taintor*, 97 Mass. 291; *Hegeman & Co.* v. *Hegeman*, 8 Daly, 1. And see *Longman* v. *Tripp*, 2 Bos. & P., N. R. 67; and *Ex parte Foss*, 2 De G. & J. 230.

(*k*) 62 How. Pr. 215.

the bankrupt's name, so as to restrict the bankrupt's right to use them (*a*); and also that where one of the partners in a solvent firm becomes bankrupt, his interest in the name or trade mark of the firm cannot be sold, on the ground that his right is only to an undivided part of the mark, and that this is of no value apart from its connection with the goodwill (*b*).

Formation of partnership.

Upon the formation of a partnership, one member of which is the proprietor of a trade mark, the trade mark will, in the absence of express provisions, or tacit acquiescence by the other partners in the previous owner's retention of his trade mark (*c*), pass into and become part of the partnership assets, for the trade mark is but an element of the trade (*d*). In that case it seems that the partner who has newly acquired an interest in the trade mark will be entitled to registration as joint proprietor with his partner who is already on the register. And where, without the actual formation of a partnership, three persons agreed to carry on business in common, one manufacturing, another acting as exporting agent, and the third as consignee and merchant at Rangoon, it was held on appeal that neither had an exclusive right to the combination of marks used on the goods which had passed through this course, though some of the marks in the combination had been used separately by one of the three before the arrangement between them was made, the decision being based on the fact that the combination as a whole had come to denote goods which had passed through the hands of all three (*e*).

Dissolution of partnership.

Upon the dissolution of a partnership among whose

(*a*) *Helmbold* v. *Helmbold Manufacturing Co.*, 53 How. Pr. 453.

(*b*) *Taylor* v. *Bemis*, 4 Biss. 406.

(*c*) *Kidd* v. *Johnson*, 100 U. S. Rep. 617, practically reversing *Kidd & Co.* v. *Mills, Johnson & Co.*, 5 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 337.

(*d*) *Bury* v. *Bedford*, 4 De G. J. & S. 352, per Sir G. Turner, L. J. And see *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268, *ib.* 766; *Filkins* v. *Blackman*, 13 Bl. C. C. 440; *Swift* v. *Peters*, 11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1110; *Rogers* v. *Taintor*, 97 Mass. 291; *Sohier* v. *Johnson*, 111 Mass. 238; *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (2), 51 How. Pr. 455.

(*e*) *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487.

property a trade mark is included, whether that dissolution be brought about by the mutual agreement of the partners, or by the death of one of them, the trade mark, as forming part of the partnership assets, and also on account of its close connection with the goodwill of the business, must be treated in the same way as the business and goodwill are treated, unless there is an express agreement for its discontinuance. If the business and goodwill are sold, the trade mark will be included in the sale (*a*); if the share of the retiring or deceased partner is, by arrangement, taken over by the continuing or surviving partner or partners, the retiring or deceased partner's interest in the trade mark passes with his share in the business, and must be included in the valuation of that share (*b*); if the partners merely agree to divide the partnership assets, so that each in effect carries on the same business, though they carry it on severally instead of jointly, then each is at liberty to use the mark as he did before (*c*). Thus, where H. B. Condy had brought into a partnership formed between himself and one Mitchell certain trade marks, which consisted in part of the former's name, it was held that after the dissolution, on which the goodwill became divisible in equal shares between the partners, Mitchell was equally entitled with Condy to continue to use the trade mark (*d*). And where

(*a*) *Bradbury* v. *Dickens*, 27 Beav. 53; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566; *Rogers* v. *Taintor*, 97 Mass. 291; *Armistead* v. *Blackwell*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 603.

(*b*) *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *Hazard* v. *Caswell*, 47 N. Y. Super. Ct. 537. But it seems that if a retiring partner sets up no claim to an interest in the trade mark, and the continuing partner continues to use it without objection, the former will be held to have given up his interest in favour of the latter: *Kidd & Co.* v. *Mills, Johnson & Co.*, 5 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 337. See *Kidd* v. *Johnson*, 100 U. S. Rep. 617, and *Simpson* v. *Wright* (1), 15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 248. On the other hand, the continued use of the mark by the retiring partner, even on a spurious article, is evidence of his intention to preserve his interest in the mark: *Wright* v. *Simpson*, 15 *ib.* 968.

(*c*) *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566. And see *Bond* v. *Milbourn*, 20 W. R. 197; *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; S. C. (2) 51 How. Pr. 455; *Young* v. *Jones Bros. & Co.*, 3 Hughes, 274; *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487.

(*d*) *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268, 766.

certain partners sold to their co-partners their interest in the business premises, and in certain personal property connected with the business, but not their interest in the goodwill or trade mark, it was held that they retained their right to use the trade mark concurrently with their former co-partner (*a*).

Transmission on death.

Where a trade mark has been transmitted by the death of the registered proprietor, his legal personal representative will be recognised as having the title to the mark. So long since as the reign of King George II., Lord Hardwicke, C., decided (*b*) that shares in the goodwill of a newspaper, entitled *The St. James's Evening Post*, were to be considered as part of the personal property of the proprietor; and that, on the death of the proprietor, his trade mark passes to his personal representative with the remainder of his personal property has never been questioned (*c*). Where letters of administration to a person who had adopted a trade mark for an article of his invention had not been taken out, it was held that his son could not, by merely continuing to make the article and use the trade mark after his father's death, acquire a right in the trade mark so as to be entitled to prevent another person from using it; still less could a purchaser of the son's business do so (*d*).

Bequest of trade mark.

The proprietor of a trade mark may bequeath it according to pleasure (*e*), but this is subject to the provisions prohibiting its transmission otherwise than in connection with the goodwill of his business (*f*), and a registered series of marks can only be transmitted as a whole (*g*).

(*a*) *Hurter* v. *Dannenhoffer*, 82 N. Y. 499.

(*b*) *Giblett* v. *Read*, 9 Mod. 459.

(*c*) Thus in *Croft* v. *Day*, 7 Beav. 84, 28 Leg. Obs. 378, the successful plaintiffs were the executors of the former proprietor of the business and trade mark. See *In re Farina*, (4), 44 L. T. N. S. 99.

(*d*) *Hovenden* v. *Lloyd*, 18 W. R. 1132. And see *Singleton* v. *Bolton*, 3 Doug. 293.

(*e*) *Dent* v. *Turpin*, 2 J. & H. 139; *M'Lean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245.

(*f*) § 70. And see Rules 36, 37, and Form K.

(*g*) § 66.

Several proprietors.

By means of bequest, dissolution of partnership, &c., it is possible for more than one person to become severally entitled to the same trade mark at the same time (*a*), and concurrent rights may similarly arise by reason of concurrent substantial user by more firms than one (*b*). In such cases it was provided by the old rules, now repealed, that the several claimants might, by their common consent, be registered separately as separate proprietors of such trade mark; and although no such provision is contained in the new rules, it would appear that in such a case the comptroller would have a discretion to register *each* of the claimants (*c*). But where one of the claimants has got on to the register, the comptroller cannot register the other without the leave of the Court (*d*); neither can he do so where either application is opposed (*e*).

Position of subsequent proprietors.

By the 4th section of the Act of 1875, it was provided that every proprietor registered in respect of a trade mark subsequently to the first registered proprietor was, as respected his title to that trade mark, to stand in the same position as if his title were a continuation of the title of the first registered proprietor (*f*). This section is not re-enacted, but there appears to be no doubt that the result will be the same as if it had been. It may be noticed that by § 76 the privileges conferred by § 3 of the Act of 1875 upon the *first* registered proprietor are now given to the registered proprietor.

3. *Discontinuance.*

When trade mark protected.

In order for a trade mark to be entitled to protection, it is now necessary either that the trade mark shall be regis-

(*a*) *Hine* v. *Lart*, 10 Jur. 106; *Dent* v. *Turpin*, 2 J. & H. 139; *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566; and see *Southorn* v. *Reynolds*, 12 L. T. N. S. 75.

(*b*) *In re Powell*, Dig. 589; *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639; *Benbow* v. *Low* (4), 44 L. T. N. S. 875; *Day* v. *Neale*, V.-C. B., May 24th, 1881; *In re Hodson & Co.*, 26 Sol. J. 43; and other cases on the Three Mark Rule. See note (*c*) to § 72, *infrà*.

(*c*) See § 71.

(*d*) § 72.

(*e*) § 69.

(*f*) Compare *Howenden* v. *Lloyd*, 18 W. R. 1132.

tered, or, if an old mark is in question, that registration shall have been refused (*a*). The protection of a mark once registered terminates, therefore, with the cessation of registration.

Duration of registration.

The original registration of a trade mark is for a period of fourteen years, and unless previously to the expiration of that period the fee for continuance is paid, the comptroller may, after the end of three months from such expiration, remove the mark from the register, and in the same way from time to time at the expiration of every fresh period of fourteen years (*b*). No difficulty need in ordinary cases be apprehended from the prolongation of registration, for the exclusive use of a trade mark is no injury or deprivation to the public, but a protection against fraud.

If subsequently to the expiration of the fourteen years, but before the expiration of the additional three months, the proprietor pays the increased fee, the comptroller may accept the fee as if paid before the expiration of the fourteen years, and allow the mark to remain on the register (*c*).

Restoration to register.

Even after the removal from the register for non-payment of the fee, the mark may be restored to the register by the comptroller, if he is satisfied that it is just so to do, on payment of an additional fee.

Must be a vendible article with trade mark attached.

Independently of registration no trade mark can exist as such unless there is actually existent in the market a vendible article to which the mark is in some way affixed or attached (*d*), though it is not necessary for the mark to

(*a*) § 77.
(*b*) § 79 (1), (2).
(*c*) § 79 (3).
(*d*) *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380; *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307; *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284; *Candee* v. *Deere*, 54 Ill. 439; *Blackwell* v. *Dibrell*, 14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 633. And see *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434. In *Cotton* v. *Gillard*, 44 L. J. Ch. 90, the plaintiffs had bought from the trustee in bankruptcy the interest of the bankrupt in a certain sauce and in his trade mark, but the sauce being compounded according to a secret which the trustee could not communicate, Sir G. Jessel, M.R., held that the plaintiff could not use or protect the trade mark. See *Witthaus* v. *Braun*, 44 Md. 303; *Taylor* v. *Bemis*, 4 Biss. 406; *Helmbold* v. *Helmbold Manufacturing Co.*, 53 How. Pr. 453; *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; *S. C.* (2), 51

be externally visible, *e.g.*, where it is placed on the bottom of a wine cork, which is not seen until the bottle is bought and opened (*a*).

Registration now equivalent to public use.

The necessity of proving the existence of such an article so marked, in the case of registered marks, now no longer exists, since, subject to the connection with the goodwill of the business, registration is to be deemed to be equivalent to public use (*b*); but in the case of old marks, it seems that a certificate of refusal will not entitle the unsuccessful applicant to his remedy, if discontinuance can be established. The old 34th Rule contained provisions intended to prevent the continuance of restrictions which no longer served any useful purpose, and this rule was put into practice in the very recent case of *In re Ralph* (*c*). It is not now re-enacted; but since, by § 70, a trade mark is determinable with the goodwill, it may be held, though it is not clear, that the Court has jurisdiction under § 90 to remove from the register, on the application of any person aggrieved, a trade mark which has lost its right to existence by the discontinuance of its proprietor's business.

Loss of trade mark by abandonment.

"That the right to use a trade mark may be lost by abandonment or disuse is too clear to need argument or the support of authority" (*d*), and the neglect on the part of the owner which is fatal to his exclusive right may either take the shape of a cessation of user on his own part, or of the growth of a concurrent right in others. Each of these depends upon intention. "To constitute abandonment" (*i.e.*, by cessation of user) "an intention to abandon must be shown. Mere non-user of a trade mark can no more be said to constitute abandonment than the mere non-user of a right to foul a stream

How. Pr. 455; *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461; *Morgan* v. *Rogers*, 26 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1113.

(*a*) *Moët* v. *Pickering*, 8 Ch. D. 372; *Moët* v. *Clybouw*, Dig. 533.

(*b*) § 75. This is so also in the United States: *In re Dutcher Temple Co.*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 248. See *Sternberger* v. *Thalheimer*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 120.

(*c*) 25 Ch. D. 194.

(*d*) Per Hughes, J., in *Blackwell* v. *Dibrell*, 14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 633.

belonging to a mill as an easement can be said to constitute an abandonment of the easement" (*a*). "The question of abandonment" (*i.e.*, by non-interference with infringers) "is one of intention, and the burden of establishing it lies upon the party who affirms it," said an American judge (*b*), and in the same way it was said in the High Court of Bengal (*c*) that the right of property in a trade mark acquired by user "would continue until it had been proved by evidence that the proprietor had abandoned it." In particular, where the trade mark owner is ignorant of infringements taking place, it will not be held that he has abandoned his rights because of his failure to enforce them, that failure being due to his ignorance of what was going on (*d*), but it may be assumed that there must be reasonable diligence shown in the defence of his rights.

Fancy words become descriptive.

With respect to trade marks consisting of words which originally were fancy names, it has occasionally happened that they have ceased to denote the manufacture of any particular person, and have become simply descriptive of a certain article or a certain principle of manufacture. When that has become the case, such words have ceased to be capable of protection as trade marks, having become *publici juris*, open to the use of all (*e*). But a composite mark is not abandoned by isolated words or symbols

(*a*) Per Chitty, J., in *Monson* v. *Boehm*, 28 Sol. J. 361. It would be evidence of intention to abandon if a trade mark owner were to break up his moulds and erase the mark from his books and lists: *Ib.*

(*b*) Morris, Comm., in *Julian* v. *Hoosier Drill Co.*, 75 Ind. 408, in which a delay of three years was held not to amount to abandonment.

(*c*) In *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Grant, Smith & Co.*, 2 Hyde, 185, per Levinge, J.

(*d*) *Weldon* v. *Dicks*, 10 Ch. D. 247; *In re Farina* (2), 27 W. R. 456; *Monson* v. *Boehm*, 28 Sol. J. 361; *Williams* v. *Adams*, 8 Bies. 452; *Sawyer* v. *Kellogg*, 19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1627.

(*e*) Per Sir G. Mellish, L. J., in *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611. And see *Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Co.* v. *Shakespeare*, 39 L. J. Ch. 36; *Liebig's Extract of Meat Co.* v. *Hanbury*, 17 L. T. N. S. 298; *Same* v. *Anderson*, W. N. 1883, p. 185; *Lazenby* v. *White*, 41 L. J. Ch. 354; *In re Hyde & Co.*, 7 Ch. D. 724; *Browne* v. *Freeman*, W. N. 1873, p. 178; *Lea* v. *Millar*, Dig. 513; *Wolfe* v. *Goulard*, 18 How. Pr. 64; R. Cox, 226; *Burke* v. *Cassin*, 45 Cal. 467; 13 Amer. Rep. 204. See also the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, § 9.

contained in it being used by others (*a*). Where a name, which it has been attempted to appropriate as a trade mark, has been in fact descriptive throughout, the case can hardly be said to have arisen of a discontinuance of a trade mark, inasmuch as it was invalid throughout (*b*).

The Three Mark Rule.

In this connection the "three-mark rule," as it is called, becomes of importance. This rule originated in the discovery—soon after the Act of 1875 came into operation—that the same or substantially the same trade mark was in many instances in use by more firms than one, generally carrying on business in different parts of the country, and in order to avoid injustice being done in such cases the rule was laid down by the Commissioners of Patents and acted on in various decisions of the Courts, that where two or three firms could prove that they had used the same or substantially the same mark on the same or substantially the same goods, to a substantial extent, before the passing of the Act of 1875, each should be allowed to register; but that where the mark had been used by more than three firms it was common to the trade (*c*), and on this principle it has been held that various marks were common in different trades (*d*). This rule is now incorporated in § 74, so far as is necessary for the purpose of determining what parts of a composite mark must be disclaimed as common.

Trade mark not abandoned by habitual user in combination with name.

In *Braham* v. *Bustard* (*e*) and *Ford* v. *Foster* (*f*), it was held that the habitual use of the manufacturer's name (which was alone a sufficient trade mark), before the special and distinctive appellation of "Excelsior" in the one case, and "Eureka" in the other, did not amount to an abandonment of the manufacturer's right in those appel-

(*a*) *Sohl* v. *Geisendorf*, 1 Wils. (Ind.) 60; *Filley* v. *Child*, 16 Bl. C. C. 376.

(*b*) *Young* v. *Macrae*, 9 Jur. N. S. 322; *Raggett* v. *Findlater*, L. R. 17 Eq. 29; *In re Horsburgh*, 53 L. J. Ch. 237; *Rowland* v. *Breidenbach*, Dig. 386; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 53 L. J. Ch. 233; 32 W. R. 530; *Bulloch, Lade & Co.* v. *Gray*, 19 Journ. of Jurisp. 218; and see p. 50, note (*a*), *suprà*.

(*c*) See note (*c*) to § 72, *infrà*.

(*d*) See notes to § 74, *infrà*.

(*e*) 1 H. & M. 447.

(*f*) L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

lations when used without the name, but that the manufacturer remained entitled to his essential mark. In *Lea* v. *Millar* (*a*) it was held that, in addition to the evidence as to the common use of the alleged trade mark by persons other than the plaintiff, the fact that the plaintiff had recently adopted a new label upon these goods, on the ground that his existing label did not afford sufficient protection, was a public abandonment of the latter. And in *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood* (*b*), it was held that a trade mark had been lost by abandonment, a new form of bottle and label having been adopted in place of the old ones. An exclusive right to a mark may be lost by its owner using it habitually and exclusively upon goods which pass through other persons' hands so that they acquire a right in it (*c*).

Abandonment by a retiring partner.

It has been held in the United States that a partner who, on retiring from the partnership, sets up no claim to an interest in the trade mark, and sees, without objection, the remaining partner continuing to use it, must be taken to have abandoned all interest in it (*d*). But it has also been held in America that the continued use of the mark by the retiring partner, even on a spurious article, is evidence that he does not intend to abandon his interest (*e*).

Abandonment by dismissal of suit.

In *Browne* v. *Freeman* (*f*) it was held that the plaintiff, having previously commenced a suit against an infringer of his trade mark, and then having got his bill dismissed with costs, in consequence of being advised that his right was doubtful, had lost all rights in the trade mark. Under the registration system such a loss of trade mark can seldom occur except in the case of unregistered though cer-

(*a*) Dig. 513.

(*b*) 23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1925.

(*c*) *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487.

(*d*) *Kidd & Co.* v. *Mills, Johnson & Co.*, 5 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 337; but see *Kidd* v. *Johnson*, 100 U. S. Rep. 617. See also *Swift* v. *Peters*, 11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1110; *Simpson* v. *Wright* (1), 15 *ib.* 248.

(*e*) *Wright* v. *Simpson*, 15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 968.

(*f*) 12 W. R 305; and see W. N. 1873, p. 178. See *Massam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.*, 14 Ch. D. 748.

tified marks, since the rights of a proprietor of a registered mark are such that it is impossible to suppose that in many cases such a proprietor would resign his claims without a struggle. With respect to marks unregistered, or even uncertified, there does not appear to be anything in the Act to prevent proof of the imitation of such marks being given in support of an action for unfair competition in trade carried on by means of actual intentional fraud, and not depending solely on the similarity of the marks.

Abandonment of registered marks not to be anticipated.

On the whole, it may be expected that, while with respect to unregistered marks things will remain much as they were, with respect to registered ones there will be in the future but little discontinuance or abandonment, except where registration has been discontinued, in consequence of non-compliance on the part of the registered proprietor with the requirements of the Act with respect to prolonged registration.

Infringement of disused mark.

In *Lemoine* v. *Ganton* (*a*), a plaintiff was allowed to recover nominal damages for the infringement by the defendant of a trade mark which the plaintiff had formerly used, but had ceased to use for a year. And it has also been held by the United States Commissioner of Patents that a person who, after having acquired certain rights in a trade mark, has discontinued his business for several years, recovers, on again commencing business, superior rights in the trade mark to those possessed by another person who has used the mark during the period of discontinuance (*b*).

Effect of removed mark.

By § 79 (5) a registered trade mark removed from the register is, for the purpose of any application for registration during the five years next after the date of such removal, to be deemed to be a trade mark already registered.

(*a*) 2 E. D. Smith, 343; R. Cox, 142.

(*b*) *Armistead* v. *Blackwell*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 603.

Cancellation.

By § 91 power is given to the comptroller upon a proper application to cancel the whole or a part of the entry of a trade mark on the register. In this case a statutory declaration by the registered proprietor is necessary (*a*).

(*a*) See notes to § 91, *infrà*, and Forms O. and P.

CHAPTER IV.

INFRINGEMENT.

Requisites for infringement.

WHEN an action has been commenced, having for its object the restraint of an unfair competition in trade, carried on by means of an employment by the defendant of a trade mark identical, or nearly identical, with the plaintiff's, there must be established, in order for the action to be successful, the existence of the trade mark, the plaintiff's exclusive right therein (*a*), the fact of an imitation, and the absence of licence or acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff (*b*).

Fact of infringement.

Assuming, then, the validity of the trade mark and the rights of the plaintiff therein to be established, the next and most important point for the plaintiff to prove is the fact of infringement. The plaintiff has no right to say that the defendant shall not sell exactly the same article, better or worse, or an article looking exactly like his own unpatented article, but he has a right to say that the defendant shall not sell such article in such a way as to steal (so to call it) the plaintiff's trade mark, and make purchasers believe that it is the manufacture to which that trade mark was originally applied (*c*). In the language of

(*a*) As to this, see *Willhaus* v. *Braun*, 44 Md. 303; *Popham* v. *Wilcox*, 38 N. Y. Super. Ct. 274; *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1) and (2) 39 *ib.* 54; 51 How. Pr. 455; and *Compagnie Laferme* v. *Hendrickx*, Dig. 512.

(*b*) See *Kinahan* v. *Bolton*, 15 Ir. Ch. 75; and *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 4 De G. J. & S. 137.

(*c*) See per Lord Cranworth, C., in *Farina* v. *Silverlock*, 6 De G. M. & G. 214; and per Lord Langdale, M.R., in *Franks* v. *Weaver*, 10 Beav. 297.

the Common Law, the defendant has no right to sell his goods "as and for" those of the plaintiff (*a*); and "where it is shown that a dealer has the imitated article in his store, and offers it for sale as genuine, even though but a single sale is proved (*b*), that is sufficient to sustain an injunction against a continuance of the wrong, and an action for such injunction will not be defeated solely on the ground that on the day it is brought the dealer happens not to have any of the article on hand" (*c*).

Fraudulent intention.

The question of how far a fraudulent intention in the mind of the defendant was necessary to entitle the plaintiff to obtain redress from him long remained a subject of discussion in connection with trade marks. The doctrine of the Common Law was that, inasmuch as the only manner in which the Common Law could be set in motion to repair the wrongful proceedings of an infringer was by the institution of an action on the case (*d*), an allegation of intentional fraud (*e*), supported by evidence, was necessary to enable the plaintiff to bring his action to a successful conclusion (*f*).

First purchaser not deceived.

While, however, it was necessary at Common Law for a fraudulent intention to be proved, it was not required that the defendant should have represented to his immediate purchaser that the goods marked were of the plaintiff's manufacture, it was sufficient to bring the case within the reach of the law if he had sold the goods for the purpose of their being resold as and for goods of the plaintiff's manufacture, which object the mark attached to them by

(*a*) *Sykes* v. *Sykes*, 3 B. & Cr. 541; *Morison* v. *Salmon*, 2 Man. & G. 385; *Crawshay* v. *Thompson*, 4 *ib.* 357.

(*b*) See *Bondier* v. *Depatie*, Montreal Q. B., May 29th, 1883.

(*c*) Per the New York Court of Appeals in *Low* v. *Hart*, 90 N. Y. 457.

(*d*) See *Crawshay* v. *Thompson*, 4 Man. & G. 357.

(*e*) *I.e.*, that the defendant had acted knowingly—*scienter*.

(*f*) *Singleton* v. *Bolton*, 3 Doug. 293; *Morison* v. *Salmon*, 2 Man. & G. 385; *Crawshay* v. *Thompson*, 4 *ib.* 357; *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 5 C. B. 109; and *Myers* v. *Baker*, 3 H. & N. 802. See, too, per Parke, B., in *Taylor* v. *Ashton*, 11 M. & W. 415.

the defendant would be calculated to facilitate (*a*). "No man is entitled to represent his goods as being the goods of another man, and no man is permitted to use any mark, sign, or symbol, device, or other means, whereby, without making a direct false representation himself to a purchaser who purchases from him, he enables such purchaser to tell a lie or to make a false representation to somebody else who is the ultimate customer" (*b*). "If a man does that, the natural consequence of which (although it does not deceive the person with whom he deals, and is therefore no misrepresentation to him) is to enable that other person to deceive and pass off his goods as somebody else's, for that he is answerable. But this is confined to those things which in their necessary or natural uses accompany the things sold. For instance, the corks of champagne bottles marked "Moet and Chandon" must be in the bottles sold, and must accompany the bottles. They must necessarily accompany the thing to the retail buyer, and so must labels to be put on the bottles. The very reason for their existence is that they must be put on the bottles, and if they are deceptive and fraudulent, then the person who prepares them is answerable for it. Such things must not be used if their natural and legitimate consequence is, not to deceive the person to whom they are sold, but to enable the purchaser to pass off the goods as being the goods of other persons" (*c*). These observations apply equally at Law and in Equity.

Early doctrine in Chancery.

When plaintiffs in trade mark cases began to seek redress in the Court of Chancery, desirous of obtaining the more convenient remedy by way of injunction and account, which was superior to the damages to be gained at

(*a*) *Sykes* v. *Sykes*, 3 B. & Cr. 541; and see *Chappell* v. *Davidson*, 2 K. & J. 123; *Rose* v. *Loftus*, 47 L. J. Ch. 576; *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 7 App. Cas. 219; *Balfour & Co.* v. *Kilburn & Co.*, 1 Hyde, 270.

(*b*) Per James, L.J., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 18 Ch. D. 412.

(*c*) Per Cotton, L.J., in S. C., 18 Ch. D. 422.

Common Law alike in the compensation for the past and in the security for the future, the Chancery judges held that the Courts in which they presided could act only in aid of, and as ancillary to the legal right (*a*). And acting upon this same principle, they held that the rules by which they had to judge of infringement must be identical with those of the Common Law, the plaintiff's right to his remedy being considered to be based, not on any right of property in him, but on the fraudulent proceedings of the defendant (*b*). The cases which were frequently sent by Chancery judges to be tried at Common Law by a jury were, of course, tried in accordance with Common Law principles (*c*).

Same injury caused, whether actual fraud or not.

It is, however, apparent that the seriousness of the injury inflicted on the manufacturer who has acquired a reputation for excellence in a particular class of goods, denoted by a special trade mark, by the offering for sale in the market of other goods, side by side with his, bearing the same mark, is not affected by the question whether such rival goods are made and marked by a person who is aware of the reputation of the original goods and desirous of attracting to himself some of the profits of that reputation, or by one who is actuated by no such motives, and is even ignorant of the prior use of the mark. As Lord Cairns, C., said, in a well-known case (*d*):—"A man may take the trade mark of another ignorantly, not knowing it was the trade mark of the other; or he may take it in the belief, mistaken but sincerely entertained, that in the manner in which he is taking it he is within the law, and

(*a*) See per Lord Cottenham, C., in *Motley* v. *Downman*, 3 My. & Cr. 1.

(*b*) *Blanchard* v. *Hill*, 2 Atk. 484; *Canham* v. *Jones*, 2 V. & B. 218; *Perry* v. *Truefitt*, 6 Beav. 66; *Croft* v. *Day*, 7 Beav. 84. And see the observations of V.-C. Wood in *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78; *Collins Co.* v. *Cowen*, 3 K. & J. 428; *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 1 H. & M. 271; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 32 L. J. Ch. 548; and *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 33 L. J. Ch. 561.

(*c*) *E.g.*, *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 5 C. B. 109.

(*d*) *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 3 App. Cas. 391.

doing nothing which the law forbids; or he may take it knowing it is the trade mark of his neighbour, and intending and desiring to injure his neighbour by so doing. But in all these cases it is the same act that is done, and in all these cases the injury to the plaintiff is just the same." "If a man has acquired legitimately a right to the property in an exclusive use of a name, it is of small account to him, should it be invaded, whether the invasion comes from a purpose to deceive, or from ignorance, or inadvertence, or an honest misconception of the relative rights of the parties, and the law ought not to permit, and will not permit, the continuance of the invasion, whatever may have been its origin" (*a*). The first maker is defrauded, even though his rival's conduct be not intentionally fraudulent.

Later doctrine in Chancery.

In 1838, Lord Cottenham, C., awarded a perpetual injunction in a case in which he rejected any imputation of intentional fraud (*b*), and this is not now necessary to obtain redress in Equity. The principles in accordance with which relief will be given in Equity were summed up as follows by Lord Westbury, C.:—"At Law the proper remedy is by an action on the case for deceit, and proof of fraud on the part of the defendant is of the essence of the action; but the Court will act on the principle of protecting property alone, and it is not necessary for the injunction to prove fraud in the defendant, or that the credit of the plaintiff is injured by the sale of an inferior article. The injury done to the plaintiff in his trade by loss of custom is sufficient to support his title to relief. Neither will the plaintiff be deprived of remedy in Equity, even if it be shown by the defendant that all the persons who bought from him goods bearing the plaintiff's trade mark were well aware that they were not of the plaintiff's

(*a*) Per Lord O'Hagan, S. C., 3 App. Cas. 396; and see per Cotton, L.J., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 18 Ch. D. 412; and *Blackwell* v. *Wright*, 73 N. Car. 310.

(*b*) *Millington* v. *Fox*, 3 My. & Cr. 338.

manufacture. If the goods were so supplied by the defendant for the purpose of being sold again in the market the injury to the plaintiff is sufficient. Again, it is not necessary for relief in Equity that proof should be given of persons having been actually deceived, and having bought goods with the defendant's mark, under the belief that they were of the manufacture of the plaintiff, provided that the Court be satisfied that the resemblance is such as would be likely to cause the one mark to be mistaken for the other" (*a*). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to show that the defendant knew whose trade mark his resembled (*b*), nor, in fact, to show that the defendant knew that his trade mark resembled any existing mark (*c*). "The action of the Court must depend upon the right of the plaintiff, and the injury done to that right. What the motive of the defendant may be, the Court has very imperfect means of knowing. If he was ignorant of the plaintiff's rights in the first instance, he is, as soon as he becomes acquainted with them and perseveres in infringing upon them, as culpable as if he had originally known them" (*d*). In short, "the absence of fraudulent intention is no defence against an application to the Court for an injunction by the person whose property has been injured" (*e*); and even if a person

(*a*) *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185. That the rule of the Court of Chancery was as here stated, was recognised by the Court of Queen's Bench in *Dixon* v. *Fawcus*, 3 Ell. & Ell. 537.

(*b*) *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292.

(*c*) *Kinahan* v. *Bolton*, 15 Ir. Ch. 75; *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *Burgess* v. *Hills*, 26 Beav. 244; *Harrison* v. *Taylor*, 11 Jur. N. S. 408; *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Grant, Smith & Co.*, 2 Hyde, 185; and see per Cotton, L.J., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 18 Ch. D. 412.

(*d*) Per Lord Cairns, C., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 3 App. Cas. 376—391.

(*e*) Per Sir J. Stuart, V.-C., in *Clement* v. *Maddick*, 1 Giff. 98; *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 13 Ch. D. 434; *Rose* v. *Loftus*, 47 L. J. Ch. 576; *Upmann* v. *Forester*, 24 Ch. D. 231; *Cowen* v. *Hulton*, 46 L. T. N. S. 897. The same principle holds good in the United States: *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Stonebraker* v. *Stonebraker*, 33 Md. 252; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner* (2), 54 How. Pr. 298; *Colman* v. *Crump*, 70 N. Y. 573; *Blackwell* v. *Wright*, 73 N. Car. 310;

who has in his possession a quantity of goods bearing a spurious trade mark, is not intending to sell them or part with them, but to use them for his own consumption, relief will be granted against him (*a*).

Indulgence to innocent offender.

It was, however, suggested by Lord Romilly, M. R., that the Court would not require a person to completely change a trade mark which he had taken *bonâ fide*, and without any intention of deception, but which did in point of fact resemble the trade mark of another person, since the complete change of trade mark might be of so serious consequence to the unintentional offender (*b*); and it has been held in America that a plaintiff may lose by delay his right to an injunction against an innocent vendor of goods spuriously marked, whatever might be the case with regard to the guilty manufacturer (*c*).

Fraudulent intention, as affecting account, or damages.

It is also important to prove the fact of fraudulent intention, having regard to the account to be obtained, which may not be given in respect of sales by the defendant during such time as he continued in ignorance that he was infringing the plaintiff's rights (*d*), or with a view to the question of damages (*e*).

Fraudulent intention in case of delay.

Again, in *Rodgers* v. *Rodgers* (*f*), Sir G. Mellish, L. J., expressed an opinion that, in a case in which the application for an injunction would, in the absence of proof of actual fraud, have to be rejected on the ground of long user by the defendants without assertion by the plaintiffs of their right, yet if it were clearly made out that the

in India: *Balfour & Co.* v. *Kilburn & Co.*, 1 Hyde, 270; *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Grant, Smith & Co.*, 2 Hyde, 185; *Graham & Co* v. *Kerr, Dods & Co.*, 3 Beng. L. R. App. 4; and in Australia: *Hennessy* v. *White*, 6 W. W. & A'B. Eq. 213; *Hennessy* v. *Hogan*, 6 W. W. & A'B. Eq. 225.

(*a*) *Upmann* v. *Forester*, 24 Ch. D. 231.

(*b*) *Bass* v. *Dawber*, 19 L. T. N. S. 626.

(*c*) *Rodgers* v. *Philp*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 29.

(*d*) *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 Beav. 578. See *Rose* v. *Loftus*, 47 L. J. Ch. 576.

(*e*) See *Faber* v. *D'Utassey*, 11 Abb. Pr. N. S. 399.

(*f*) 31 L. T. N. S. 285. And see *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245, where an injunction which had been granted was confirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court, notwithstanding a delay of many years.

use of the trade mark by the defendants was fraudulent, and that it had the practical effect of deceiving the public, then that in such a case the intentional fraud would operate to prevent the application for the injunction from being defeated on the ground of lapse of time.

In other respects.

Further, in *Radde* v. *Norman* (*a*), it was held by Sir J. Wickens, V.-C., to be quite obvious that much less absolute proof of the plaintiff's title would be required where there was reason to doubt the defendant's good faith; and in *Cope* v. *Evans* (*b*), Sir C. Hall, V.-C., said that where fraudulent intention was proved, the Court would restrain the defendants without further inquiry.

Circumstances pointing to fraudulent intention.

In default of direct proof of fraudulent intention, there are various circumstances which may serve to point to the conclusion that such intention has existed: thus, the continuing to use a mark after objections raised (*c*); the exact imitation of peculiar characteristics (*d*); the addition to an existing mark of a feature taken from the plaintiff's mark (*e*); the imitating changes introduced by the plaintiff (*f*); the removal, one by one, of points of difference, which originally served to distinguish the defendant's mark from the plaintiff's (*g*); the marking goods in obedience

(*a*) L. R. 14 Eq. 348.

(*b*) L. R. 18 Eq. 138. And see *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268, 766; *Wilson* v. *Maxfield*, L. J. N. of C. 1875, p. 51; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245.

(*c*) See per Lord Cairns in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 3 App. Cas. 376; and per Cotton, L.J., and Lord Blackburn in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 18 Ch. D. 395; 8 App. Cas. 15. Also *Williams* v. *Osborne*, 13 L. T. N. S. 498; *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380; *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 13 Ch. D. 434; and *Walker* v. *Alley*, 13 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 366.

(*d*) *Hine* v. *Lart*, 10 Jur. 106; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Frese* v. *Bachof* (2), 14 Bl. C. C. 432; *Davis* v. *Reid*, 17 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 69; *Rodgers* v. *Philp*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 29.

(*e*) *Dixon* v. *Jackson*, Court of Session Cases, 3rd Series. V. 826 (a star added).

(*f*) *Braham* v. *Beachim* (1), 7 Ch. D. 848; *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, *ib.* 801.

(*g*) *Farina* v. *Cathery*, L. J. Notes of Cases, 1867, p. 134; *Brown* v. *Mercer*, 37 N. Y. Super. Ct. 265; *Bell, Black & Co.* v. *Bell & Co.*, Dig. 514.

to an order to imitate the plaintiff's mark (*a*); the giving orders for that to be done (*b*); the adoption of an essential part of the plaintiff's mark, with a trifling and colourable alteration (*c*); the statement that the sources from which both plaintiff and defendant derive their raw material, and after which the plaintiff's works are named, are the defendant's sole property (*d*); the copying directions for use (*e*); the giving thanks to the plaintiff's customers for past favours (*f*); the adoption of similar type to the plaintiff's (*g*); the use of large type for a catchword (*h*); or of small type for a word showing the article not to be the original (*i*); the imitation of the barrels (*k*), or bottles (*l*), containing the plaintiff's article; the buying up and using the plaintiff's old bottles (*m*); the use by the defendant of a name not his own (*n*), possibly under the authority of

(*a*) *Woollam* v. *Ratcliff*, 1 H. & M. 259.

(*b*) *Godillot* v. *Hazard*, 81 N. Y. 263; *Twentsche Stoom Bleekery Goor* v. *Ellinger & Co.*, 26 W. R. 70.

(*c*) *Radde* v. *Norman*, L. R. 14 Eq. 348 ("Leopoldsalt" for "Leopoldshall"); *Davis* v. *Reid*, 17 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 69; *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 13 Ch. D. 434; *Balfour & Co.* v. *Kilburn & Co.*, 1 Hyde 270.

(*d*) *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284.

(*e*) *Franks* v. *Weaver*, 10 Beav. 297; *Sedon* v. *Senate*, Dig. 18; *Yovatt* v. *Winyard*, 1 Jac. & W. 394; *Blofeld* v. *Payne*, 4 B. & Ad. 410; *Day* v. *Walls*, 12 Phila. 274; and many other cases.

(*f*) *Mogford* v. *Courtenay*, 45 L. T. N. S. 308; *Walker* v. *Alley*, 13 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 366.

(*g*) *India Rubber Comb Co.* v. *Rubber Comb and Jewelry Co.*, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 258; *Potter* v. *McPherson*, 28 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 559.

(*h*) *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; *Metzler* v. *Wood*, 8 Ch. D. 606; *Dence* v. *Mason* (1), Dig. 534; *Foot* v. *Lea*, 13 Ir. Eq. 484.

(*i*) *Day* v. *Binning*, C. P. Coop. 489; *Glenny* v. *Smith*, 2 Dr. & Sm. 476; *Hookham* v. *Pottage*, L. R. 8 Ch. 91; *Robineau* v. *Charbonnel*, W. N., 1876, p. 160; *Dence* v. *Mason* (1), Dig. 534; 41 L. T. N. S. 573; *Colton* v. *Thomas*, 7 Phila. 257; *Chubb* v. *Priest*, 1 L. T. 142; *Hennessy* v. *White*, 6 W. W. & A'B., Eq. 216; *Morgan* v. *Schuyler*, 79 N. Y. 490.

(*k*) *Moorman* v. *Hoge*, 2 Sawy. 78; *Cook* v. *Starkweather*, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392.

(*l*) *Henry* v. *Price*, 1 Leg. Obs. 364; *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801; *Wolfe* v. *Goulard*, 18 How. Pr. 64; *Laird* v. *Wilder*, 9 Bush 131; *Congress Co.* v. *High Rock Co.*, 45 N. Y. 291; *Wilder* v. *Wilder*, Dig. 372; *Wolfe* v. *Hart*, 4 Vict. L. R. Eq. 125; *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (1), W. N. 1878, p. 93, 185.

(*m*) *Rose* v. *Henley*, Dig. 551; *Allen* v. *Richards*, 26 Sol. J. 658; *Hostetter* v. *Anderson*, 1 V. R. Eq. 7

(*n*) *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518.

some person who bore the same name as the plaintiff (*a*): the formation of a partnership with another person, whose name or initial was such as to enable the defendant to imitate the plaintiff's mark with some specious pretence of legality (*b*); the addition of "and Co." after the name (*c*); the removal into the plaintiff's neighbourhood (*d*); the adoption of a name for a manufactory similar to that used by another, and placing it on goods, but keeping it out of the Directory (*e*); the making an improper use of the defendant's relationship to the plaintiff (*f*); the making an intentional misstatement as to the date of the commencement of a business (*g*); or as to prizes gained at an exhibition (*h*); the false pretence of an appointment as purveyor to a royal personage (*h*); have all been held to afford ground for reasonable suspicion of the presence of an *animus fraudandi*.

Circumstances pointing to absence of fraud.

On the other hand, if the defendant uses, on the goods which he is alleged to be endeavouring to pass off as the plaintiff's, a distinct and obvious trade mark of his own, or if he states plainly and in fair sized and clear type that such goods are in fact manufactured by himself, there is a strong indication that the defendant has no intention of attempting deception (*i*). So, again, if the defendant has

(*a*) *Meriden Britannia Co.* v. *Parker*, 39 Conn. 450; 12 Amer. Rep. 401; *Perks* v. *Hall & Co.*, W. N. 1881, p. 111.

(*b*) *Croft* v. *Day*, 7 Beav. 84 (Day & Martin); *Moet* v. *Olyboun*, Dig. 533 (M. & C.). And see *Schweitzer* v. *Atkins*, 37 L. J. Ch. 847; and *Hallett* v. *Cumston*, 110 Mass. 29.

(*c*) *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (1), W.N. 1878, pp. 93, 185; *Devlin* v. *Devlin*, 69 N. Y. 212; *Brooklyn White Lead Co.* v. *Masury*, 25 Barb. 416.

(*d*) *Lee* v. *Haley*, L. R. 5 Ch. 155; *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (1), *ubi sup.*

(*e*) *Rodgers* v. *Rodgers*, 31 L. T. N. S. 285.

(*f*) *Gouraud* v. *Trust*, 10 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 627.

(*g*) *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (2), 9 Ch. D. 176; *Blackwell* v. *Armistead*, 5 Amer. L. T. 85.

(*h*) *Cave* v. *Myers*, Dig. 304.

(*i*) *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—434; so, too, in *Chcavin* v. *Walker*, 5 Ch. D. 850, where the goods were stated to be manufactured by the defendants. And see *Beard* v. *Turner*, 13 L. T. N. S. 746; *Raggett* v. *Findlater*, L. R. 17 Eq. 29; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 18 Ch. D. 395; *Magee Furnace Co.* v. *Le Barron*, 127 Mass. 115; *Wolfe* v. *Goulard*, 18 How. Pr. 64; *McCartney* v. *Garnhart*, 45 Mo. 593; *Gilman*

ventured to display at a public exhibition goods bearing the mark to which exception is afterwards taken (*a*); or if he has truly stated the connection between himself and the original adopter of the trade mark (*b*); or if, when using bottles moulded with the plaintiff's name, which have come into his possession without fraud, he places his own labels on the bottles in place of the plaintiff's (*c*).

Fraud unnecessary where mark registered.

A registered trade mark is property, and evidence of fraudulent intention is unnecessary in a case of alleged infringement of such a mark, as appears from the Patents Act, 1883, § 76 (*d*), in accordance with which the registration of a person as proprietor of a trade mark is *primâ facie* evidence of his right to the *exclusive use* of such trade mark, and, after the expiration of five years from the date of such registration, conclusive evidence of his right to the exclusive use of such trade mark, subject to the provisions of the Act.

Where mark registered, infringement must be of mark as registered.

But when infringement of a registered trade mark is in question, the point is, not whether there has been infringement of the mark which the plaintiff has used in his business, but whether there has been infringement of the mark which he has actually registered. Thus Jessel, M. R.,

v. *Hunnewell*, 122 Mass. 139; *Ayer* v. *Rushton*, 7 Daly 9. But compare *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 3 App.-Cas. 376; *Perry* v. *Truefitt*, 6 Beav. 66; *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447; *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611; *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801; *Reinhardt* v. *Spalding*, 49 L. J. Ch. 57; *Henderson* v. *Jorss*, Dig. 198; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Kimball & Morton*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. XI. 267; *Lea* v. *Wolff*, 46 How. Pr. 157; *Field* v. *Lewis*, Dig. 280; *Rose* v. *Loftus*, 47 L. J. Ch. 576; *Eno* v. *Stephens*, Dig. 609; *Kinahan* v. *Bolton*, 15 Ir. Ch. 75; *Williams* v. *Johnson*, 2 Bos. 1; *Phalon* v. *Wright*, 5 Phila. 464; *Boardman* v. *Meriden Britannia Co.*, 35 Conn. 402; *Whitney* v. *Hickling*, 5 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 605; *Hier* v. *Abrahams*, 82 N. Y. 519; *Thornton* v. *Crowley*, 47 N. Y. Super. Ct. 527; *Hegeman & Co.* v. *O'Byrne*, 9 Daly 264; *Frese* v. *Bachof* (2), 14 Bl. C. C. 432; *Carroll* v. *Ertheiler*, 21 Alb. L. J. 503; *Fleischmann* v. *Schuckmann*, 62 How. Pr. 92.

(*a*) *Beard* v. *Turner*, 13 L. T. N S. 746.

(*b*) *Emerson* v. *Badger*, 101 Mass. 82; *Gilman* v. *Hunnewell*, 122 *ib.* 139.

(*c*) *Rose* v. *Loftus*, 47 L. J. Ch. 576; *Barrett* v. *Gomm*, 74 L. T. 388; *Barrett* v. *White*, North, J., May 12th, 1883.

(*d*) This re-enacts § 3 of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875.

said, in *Ellis & Sons* v. *Ruthin Soda Water Co.* (*a*), "As I understand the Trade Marks Act, if you come for trade mark and not for actual fraud, you can only sue in respect of what you had registered as a trade mark." And in considering whether there has been infringement of the registered mark, it is necessary to see whether the essential particular in that registered mark has been imitated. Thus it was held by Jessel, M. R., in *In re Horsburgh* (*b*), that there was no conflict between two marks which combined substantially the same descriptive word with different devices, since the essential particulars, the devices, being different, it was immaterial that the marks resembled each other in a non-essential feature.

Burden of proof.

When a defendant has taken the material and essential part of the plaintiff's trade mark, the burden is upon the defendant to disprove the probability of deception, not upon the plaintiff to prove it (*c*).

Infringement of names as old marks.

With respect to trade marks used before the passing of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, and consisting of a name printed or stamped in ordinary characters, which might be the case independently of the Act, it has been held that it is not necessary, in order to obtain an injunction, to prove the *scienter* where the infringer does not bear the name he has assumed (*d*), but that, on the other hand, where he does bear that name, such evidence must be produced (*e*); and, in the same way, where two firms have become entitled to use the same trade mark or firm name, it is only in a case of fraud that an injunction will be granted; and an allegation that the defendants use the

(*a*) M. R., Nov. 21st, 1879. And see *Nuthall* v. *Vining*, C. A., Jan. 21st, 1880; *Lamplough* v. *Beedzler*, C. A., Nov. 12th, 1880; *Russell & Sons, Limited* v. *Smith*, M. R., June 18th, 1880.

(*b*) 53 L. J. Ch. 287. And see *Lucke* v. *Webster*, M. R., April 4th, 1879.

(*c*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7. Ch. 611; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 3 App. Cas. 376; *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 13 Ch. D. 434.

(*d*) *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245.

(*e*) *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, 3 De G. M. & G. 896; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245.

mark on inferior goods is not sufficient, since, if they have the right to use it, they can use it as they please (*a*).

Infringement of names as new marks.

With respect to names first used as trade marks after the passing of the Act of 1875, the requirement that they shall be "printed, impressed, or woven, in some particular and distinctive manner" (*b*), renders the mere use of the same name no infringement, unless the particular and distinctive manner is also copied, in which case evidence of actual intentional fraud will be unnecessary, whatever may be the name of the infringer.

Colour.

In the same way, where a trade mark consisting of the coloured threads which form the heading to a piece of stuff (*c*), or of the representation of a coin (*d*), or of any other mark in which colour is essential, and which would lose its distinctiveness by being registered in the ordinary way, has been registered by deposit, it will not be infringed unless the colour and arrangement have been imitated. But, where the trade mark does not substantially consist in colour, then, though the mark has been registered in colour, the exclusive right to use the mark in any colour is now given to the registered proprietor (*e*).

Mode of comparing uncoloured marks.

When it is alleged that a trade mark registered without colour has been infringed, it has been said that the proper manner of comparing the two trade marks is to compare their designs in the same size and free from colour, and that similarities in respect of colour should only be regarded in order either to prove fraud or to turn the scale when the question of infringement, leaving colour out of sight, is very difficult to decide (*f*). Where the plaintiffs had used a label for coffee, coloured red, white and blue, and con-

(*a*) *Rogers* v. *Taintor*, 97 Mass. 291; *Emerson* v. *Badger*, 101 *ib.* 182.

(*b*) Patents Act, 1883, § 64.

(*c*) *Mitchell* v. *Henry*, 15 Ch. D. 181.

(*d*) *In re Robinson*, 29 W. R. 31. And see *In re Horsburgh*, 53 L. J. Ch. 237. In America it has been held that where the identical form, size, colour, and style of a numeral registered a trade mark had been copied an infringement had been committed, although it would have been no infringement to have used the numeral without copying those peculiarities, *Kinney* v. *Allen*, 1 Hughes, 106.

(*e*) Patents Act, 1883, § 67.

(*f*) Per Ct. of App. in *Nuthall* v *Vining*, C. A., Jan. 21st, 1880.

taining the words "red, white and blue label," and had registered it without colour, the use by others of labels similarly coloured and containing the words was restrained (*a*). Another mode of comparing them is to compare the designs in the same colour (*b*), but this is more appropriate to cases of opposed registration.

What is infringement.

The real question which the Court has to try in a case of alleged infringement of trade mark, is whether what the defendant has done is calculated to deceive, whether there is so much imitation that goods bearing the one mark may be readily mistaken for goods bearing the other, whether a careful inspection is necessary to distinguish the mark and appearance of the former goods from those of the latter (*c*).

Croft v. *Day*.

In *Croft* v. *Day* (*d*), it was remarked by Lord Langdale, M. R., that two things were necessary for the accomplishment of a fraud such as was there contemplated: "First, there must be such a general resemblance of the forms, words, symbols, and accompaniments as to mislead the public; and, secondly, a sufficient distinctive individuality must be preserved, so as to procure for the person himself the benefit of that deception which the general resemblance was calculated to produce. To have a copy of the thing would not do, for, though it might mislead the public in one respect, it would lead them back to the place where they were to get the genuine article, an imitation of which was improperly sought to be sold. For the accomplishment of such a fraud it was necessary in the first instance to mislead the public, and in the next place to secure a benefit to the party practising the deception by preserving his own individuality" (*e*). In that case, however, a deliberate attempt was made to represent the defendant's establishment as the plaintiff's, and the

(*a*) *Hanson* v. *British Tea and Trading Association (Ld.)*, Bacon, V.-C., April 9th, 1884.

(*b*) *In re Worthington*, 14 Ch. D. 8.

(*c*) See per Bynum, J., in *Blackwell* v. *Wright*, 73 N. Car. 310.

(*d*) 7 Beav. 84.

(*e*) And see *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78; *Rowley* v. *Houghton*, 2 Brewster, 303; R. Cox, 486; *Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co.* v. *Schwachhofer*, 55 How. Pr. 37.

injury done to the plaintiff by the sale of goods bearing the spurious marks instead of his genuine goods is ordinarily sufficient to entitle him to his remedy, independently of any habit induced in the customer to resort to the defendant instead of to the plaintiff.

Tests of infringement.

By what test, then, has it to be determined whether there is such a degree of similarity as to require the interference of the Court?

Actual deception.

In the first place, where one person has adopted the trade mark of another, or a mark nearly resembling it, and there is evidence of actual deception; that is to say, "that any one has in fact been thereby induced to buy the defendant's goods as being the goods of the plaintiff," the question of resemblance has been decided by the test of facts, and the Court will restrain the defendant without further enquiry (*a*), unless it is clearly of opinion that the resemblance is so slight that no rational person ought to have been deceived (*b*). It is not, indeed, necessary that there shall have been actual deception (*c*), or damage sustained (*d*); but since, unless that can be proved, the case which the Court has to try is a hypothetical case, in which honest evidence as to the likelihood of deception can in all probability be procured on both sides (*e*), it is always safer for a plaintiff to obtain proof of actual deception if pos-

(*a*) *Coxe* v. *Evans*, L. R. 18 Eq. 182; and see *Woollam* v. *Ratcliff*, 1 H. & M. 259; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Cook* v. *Starkweather*, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392; *Kinney* v. *Basch*, Dig. 542.

(*b*) *Civil Service Supply Association* v. *Dean*, 13 Ch. D. 512.

(*c*) *Abbott* v. *Bakers and Confectioners' Tea Association*, W. N. 1871, p. 207; *Field* v. *Lewis*, Dig. 280; and see *Filley* v. *Fassett*, 44 Mo. 173; R. Cox, 530; *Dixon Crucible Co.* v. *Guggenheim*, 2 Brews. 321; R. Cox, 559; and *India Rubber Comb Co.* v. *Rubber Comb & Jewelry Co.*, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 258.

(*d*) *Braham* v. *Beachim* (1), 7 Ch. D. 848.

(*e*) As a rule, not much weight is given to expert evidence on questions of similarity. See *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639; *Cook* v. *Starkweather*, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392; *Popham* v. *Wilcox*, 66 N. Y. 69; but there may be circumstances in which much weight will be given to it, *Mitchell* v. *Henry*, 15 Ch. D. 181. In *Wallace & Co.* v. *King & Co.*, Bomb. High Ct., April 30th, 1879, it was held in the High Court of Bombay that evidence given by European witnesses in Bombay and Manchester as to the probability of deception, was not admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, the witnesses not being experts, and the question not being one of science or art.

sible, and a certain degree of delay to enable him to obtain such proof will be excused (*a*).

Probable deception.

In most cases, however, there is not produced any evidence of actual deception, and the plaintiff then has to satisfy the Court or jury that the defendant has used a mark either identical with, or only colourably differing from his own (*b*). It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to produce evidence tending to show that in the opinion of the witnesses deception may occur: he has to convince the Court or jury that there is such reasonable probability of deception as to justify interference with the defendant (*c*); and if he "cannot allege and prove that the public are deceived, or that there is a reasonable probability of deception, he has no right to interfere with the use of the mark by others" (*d*). But where this burden is discharged, the defendant's conduct "cannot be justified by showing that the device or inscription upon the imitated mark is ambiguous, and capable of being understood by different persons in different ways" (*e*).

When is

It is obvious that in these cases questions of considerable

(*a*) *Lee* v. *Haley*, L. R. 5 Ch. 155; *Cave* v. *Myers*, Dig. 304.

(*b*) See *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292; and *Cope* v. *Evans*, L. R. 18 Eq. 138.

(*c*) *Blackwell* v. *Crabb*, 36 L. J. Ch. 504; *Bass* v. *Duxber*, 19 L. T. N. S. 626; *Cope* v. *Evans*, L. R. 18 Eq. 138; *Snowden* v. *Noah*, Hopk. 347; R. Cox, 1; *Colladay* v. *Baird*, 4 Phila. 139; R. Cox, 257; *Colton* v. *Thomas*, 2 Brewster, 308; R. Cox, 507; *Falkinburg* v. *Lucy*, 35 Cal. 52; R. Cox, 448; *Bell* v. *Locke*, 8 Paige, 75; R. Cox, 11; *Ledyer* v. *Ray*, Dig. 550; *Stephens* v. *De Conto*, 7 Robertson, 343; R. Cox, 442; *Wylam* v. *Clarke*, W. N. 1876, p. 68; *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268, 766; *Wilson* v. *Maxfield*, L. J. N. of C. 1875, p. 51; *Ellis* v. *Zeilen & Co.*, 42 Ga. 91; *Blackwell* v. *Wright*, 73 N. Car. 310; *Cook* v. *Starkweather*, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392; *Degraves* v. *Whiteman*, 5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 304; *Lamplough* v. *Beelzler*, C. A., Nov. 12th, 1880; *Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co.* v. *Troxell*, 89 N. Y. 292; *American Grocer Publishing Association* v. *Grocer Publishing Co.*, 32 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 398; *Massam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.*, 14 Ch. D. 748; *In re Imbs*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 463; *Dawes* v. *Davies*, Dig. 426; *Prince Metallic Paint Co.* v. *Carbon Metallic Paint Co.*, Dig. 573; *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284; *Chinn* v. *Thomas*, 5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 188; *Goodwin* v. *Venning*, 24 Sol. J. 690; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Trainer*, 101 U. S. Rep. 51; *Hurricane Patent Lantern Co.* v. *Miller & Co.*, 56 How. Pr. 234.

(*d*) Per Lord Watson in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 39.

(*e*) Per Lord Selborne, C., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog*, 8 App. Cas. 18.

nicety may arise; and, in the language of Lord Cranworth, C., in *Seixo* v. *Provezende* (*a*), "it is hardly necessary to say that, in order to entitle a party to relief, it is by no means necessary that there should be absolute identity (*b*). What degree of resemblance is necessary, is, from the nature of things, a matter incapable of definition *à priori* (*c*). All that Courts of Justice can do is to say that no trader can adopt a trade mark so resembling that of a rival as that *ordinary purchasers, purchasing with ordinary caution*, are likely to be misled (*d*).

deception probable.

"It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the resemblance must be such as would deceive persons who

(*a*) L. R. 1 Ch. 192.

(*b*) As to this, see per Lord Chelmsford in *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; and per Sir R. Malins, V.-C., in *Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Co.* v. *Swiss Condensed Milk Co.*, W. N. 1871, p. 163. And see *post*, p. 125.

(*c*) What will constitute infringement is not to be defined. See per Stawell, C. J., in the Sup. Ct. of Victoria in *Hennessy* v. *White*, 6 W. W. & A'B. Eq. 216.

(*d*) As to this criterion, see *Archbold* v. *Sweet*, 1 Mo. & Rob. 162; *Shrimpton* v. *Laight*, 18 Beav. 164; *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 11 H. L. C. 523 (per Lord Cranworth); *Barnard* v. *Pillow*, W. N. 1868, p. 94; *Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Co.* v. *Swiss Condensed Milk Co.*, W. N. 1871, p. 163; *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268, 766; *Abbott* v. *Bakers and Confectioners' Tea Association, Limited*, W. N. 1872, p. 31; L. J., N. of C. 1871, p. 199; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 3 App. Cas. 376, 392, 394; *London & County Banking Co.* v. *Hampshire & North Wilts Bank*, Dig. 618; *Moses* v. *Sargood*, Dig. 636; *In re Worthington*, 14 Ch. D. 8; *Liebig's Extract of Meat Co.* v. *Anderson*, W. N. 1883, p. 185; *Hennessy* v. *White*, 6 W. W. & A'B. Eq. 216; *Hennessy* v. *Hogan*, *ib.* 225; *Partridge* v. *Menck*, 1 How. App. Cas. 558; R. Cox, 72; *Walton* v. *Crowley*, 3 Bl. C. C. 440; R. Cox, 166; *Clark* v. *Clark*, 25 Barb. 76; R. Cox, 206; *Brooklyn White Lead Co.* v. *Masury*, 25 Barb. 416; R. Cox, 210; *Swift* v. *Dey*, 4 Robertson, 611; R. Cox, 319; *Rowley* v. *Houghton*, 2 Brewster, 303; R. Cox, 486; *Colton* v. *Thomas*, 2 Brewster, 308; R. Cox, 507; *Lockwood* v. *Bostwick*, 2 Daly, 521; R. Cox, 555; *Dixon Crucible Co.* v. *Guggenheim*, 2 Brewster, 321; R. Cox, 559; *Blackwell* v. *Wright*, 73 N. Car. 310; *Gilman* v. *Hunnewell*, 122 Mass. 139; *Popham* v. *Wilcox*, 66 N. Y. 69; *Tallcott* v. *Moore*, 18 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 106; *Brown* v. *Mercer*, 37 N. Y. Super. Ct. 265; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Dawes* v. *Davies*, Dig. 426; *Colman* v. *Crump*, 70 N. Y. 573; *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461; *Wolfe* v. *Hart*, 4 Vict. L. R. Eq. 125; *Ex parte Caire*, 15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 243; *Robertson* v. *Berry*, 50 Md. 591. In *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3) (8 App. Cas. 18), Lord Selborne, C., says: "The imitation of a man's trade mark, in a manner liable to mislead the unwary, cannot be justified by showing either that the device or inscription upon the imitated mark is ambiguous, and capable of being understood by different persons in different ways, or that a person who carefully and intelligently examined and studied it might not be misled."

should see the two marks placed side by side (*a*). The rule so restricted would be of no practical use. If a purchaser looking at the article offered to him would naturally be led, from the mark impressed on it, to suppose it to be the production of the rival manufacturer, and would purchase it in that belief, the Court considers the use of such a mark to be fraudulent. But I go farther. I do not consider the actual physical resemblance of the two marks to be the sole question for consideration. If the goods of a manufacturer have, from the mark or device he has used, become known in the market by a particular name, I think that the adoption by a rival trader of *any mark which will cause his goods to bear the same name in the market* (*b*), may be as much a violation of the rights of that rival as the actual copy of his device."

(*a*) See *Moses* v. *Sargood*, Dig. 636; *Read* v. *Richardson*, 45 L. T. N. S. 57; *Kohl* v. *Geisendorf*, 1 Wils. (Ind.) 60; *Alleghany Fertilizer Co.* v. *Woodside*, 1 Hughes, 115; *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461; *Sawyer* v. *Kellogg*, 19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1627; 20 *ib.* 1893.

(*b*) Thus, where the plaintiff's yarn had become known as "Bhe Hathi," or "two elephant" yarn, from the representation of two elephants on the trade mark, the defendants were restrained from using two different elephants (*Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 7 App. Cas. 219); where the plaintiff's beer was known as "Dog's Head Beer," the defendants were restrained from using on their beer the head of a different kind of dog from that used by the plaintiffs (*Read* v. *Richardson*, 45 L. T. N. S. 54); where the plaintiff's clothing was known as "Crown Clothing," from the use of a royal crown, the defendants were restrained from using an imperial crown between two standards (*Moses* v. *Sargood*, Dig. 636). So, if in *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185, the defendant had called his wire "Anchor Wire," without using the figure of an anchor, the plaintiff's wire having acquired the name of "Anchor Wire" because of the trade mark being an anchor. See *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292; *Cartier* v. *Westhead*, Dig. 199; *Cartier* v. *May*, Dig. 200 ("Cross Cottam"); *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639 ("Dog-brand Files"); *In re Whiteley*, 48 L. T N. S. 627 ("Globe Steel"); *In re Rabone*, Dig. 648 ("Lion" edge tools"); *In re Worthington*, 14 Ch. D. 8 ("Triangle Beer"). In the U. S. Patent Office there was held to be a fatal conflict between two trade marks for hams, of which the one consisted of the word "Bouquet," the other of a bouquet of flowers: *Schrauder* v. *Beresford & Co.*, U. S. Patent Office, June 27, 1872; and in *In re American Lubricating Oil Co.*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 687, registration was refused to the word "Star" for oil, the device of a star having already been registered for that article. But in *Curtis, Harvey & Co.* v. *Kraft, Meyer & Co.*, Chitty, J., June 16, 1892, it was thought that the German words "Diamant Pulver" were not likely to be mistaken for the English

Infringement of essential part, or of combination.

The infringement may consist in the adoption of the essential part of the plaintiff's trade mark by the defendant, as the word "Eureka" (*a*), or "Glenfield" (*b*), or "Apollinaris" (*c*). And where there is no imitation of the essential part, a resemblance in particulars common to the trade does not constitute an infringement (*d*). But, on the other hand, the infringement may consist in the imitation of the general appearance of the plaintiff's mark, and where both trade marks are of a composite character, it is possible that, though no one particular mark has been exactly imitated, or the principal mark which has been reproduced cannot, for some reason or other, be protected as a trade mark, the combination may be very similar and likely to deceive, and will therefore be restrained by injunction (*e*).

words "Diamond Powder." See *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Morrison* v. *Case*, 9 Bl. C. C. 548; *In re Weaver*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1; *In re Pratt* v. *Farmer*, *ib.*, 866; *In re Park*, 12 *ib.* 2.

(*a*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

(*b*) *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508.

(*c*) *Apollinaris Co.* v. *Norrish*, 33 L. T. N. S. 242; and see *Filley* v. *Fassett*, 44 Mo. 173; R. Cox, 530 ("Charter Oak" stoves); *Siegert* v. *Ehlers*, Dig. 432, and *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801 ("Angostura Bitters"); *Eno* v. *Stephens*, Dig. 609 ("Fruit Salt"); *Reinhardt* v. *Spalding*, 49 L. J. Ch. 57 ("Family Salve"); *Berliner Brauerei Gesellschaft Tivoli* v. *Knight, Stocks & Co.*, W. N. 1883, p. 70 ("Tivoli" beer); *Dunbar* v. *Glenn*, 42 Wisc. 118 ("Bethesda" water); *Blackwell* v. *Armistead*, 5 Am. L. T. 85 ("Durham" tobacco); *In re Coggin, Kidder & Co.*, 11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1109 ("Haxall"); *Rillet* v. *Carlier*, 61 Barb. S. C. 435 ("Grenade Syrup"); *Davis* v. *Kennedy*, 13 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 523 ("Pain Killer"); *Crawford* v. *Shuttock*, *ib.* 149 ("Imperial" soap); *Carroll* v. *Ertheiler*, 21 Alb. L. J. 503 ("Lone Jack" tobacco); *Fleischmann* v. *Schuckmann*, 62 How. Pr. 92 ("Vienna Bread"); *Lauferty* v. *Wheeler*, 63 *ib.* 488 ("Alderney" oleomargarine). See, also, per Cotton, L. J., in *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530.

(*d*) *Lucke* v. *Webster*, M. R., April 4, 1879; *In re Horsburgh*, 53 L. J. Ch. 237; *Wallace & Co.* v. *King & Co.*, Bomb. High Ct., April 30, 1879; *Tucker Manufacturing Co.* v. *Boyington*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 455; *Thornton* v. *Crowley*, 47 N. Y. Super. Ct. 527.

(*e*) *Abbott* v. *Bakers and Confectioners' Tea Association*, W. N. 1871, p. 207; *ib.* 1872, p. 31; *Hargreaves* v. *Smith*, Dig. 338; *Lazenby* v. *Lazenby*, Dig. 160; *Brown* v. *Mercer*, 37 N. Y. Super. Ct. 265; *Godillot* v. *Hazard*, 81 N. Y. 263; *Lea* v. *Wolff* (S. T.), 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 389; *Whitney* v. *Hickling*, 5 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 605; *Davis* v. *Reid*, 17 *ib.* 69; *Day* v. *Walls*, 12 Phila. 274; *Sawyer* v. *Kellogg*, 19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1627, 20 *ib.* 1893; *Hostetter* v. *Adams*, 22 *ib.* 943; *Conrad* v. *Joseph Uhrig Brewing Co.*, 8 Mo. App. 277; *Electro-Silicon Co.* v. *Levy*, 59 How. Pr. 469; but see *Blackwell* v. *Crabb*, 36 L. J. Ch. 504; and *Blackwell* v. *Wright*, 73 N. Car. 310.

Infringer's mark need not be identical with mark infringed. Colourable differences.

"For the purpose of establishing a case of infringement it is not necessary to show that there has been the use of a mark in all respects corresponding with that which another person has acquired an exclusive right to use, if the resemblance is such as, not only to show an intention to deceive, but also such as to be likely to make unwary purchasers suppose that they are purchasing the article sold by the party to whom the right to use the trade mark belongs" (*a*). It is seldom that the mark employed by the infringer does correspond in all respects with that of the person whose rights he is attacking; the usual practice is to introduce some colourable variation, which may supply the infringer with a plausible excuse for his fraud. "In every case," however, "the Court must ascertain whether the differences are made *bonâ fide* in order to distinguish the one article from the other; whether the resemblances and the differences are such as naturally arise from the necessity of the case, or whether, on the other hand, the differences are simply colourable, and the resemblances are such as are obviously intended to deceive the purchaser of the one article into the belief of its being the manufacture of another person. Resemblance is a circumstance which is of primary importance for the Court to consider, because if the Court finds, as it almost invariably does find in such cases as this, that there is no reason for the resemblance, excepting for the purpose of misleading, it will infer

(*a*) Per Lord Chelmsford, in *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508. And see *Moses* v. *Sargood*, Dig. 636; *In re Farina* (2), 27 W. R. 456; *Hennessy* v. *White*, 6 W. W. & A'B. Eq. 216; *Hennessy* v. *Hogan*, *ib.* 225; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Alleghany Fertilizer Co.* v. *Woodside*, 1 Hughes 115; *Barrows* v. *Knight*, 6 R. I. 434; *Cook* v. *Starkweather*, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392; *Brown* v. *Mercer*, 37 N. Y. Super. Ct. 265; *Shaver* v. *Shaver*, 54 Iowa 208; *Godillot* v. *Hazard*, 81 N. Y. 263; *Rodgers* v. *Philp*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 29; *Colman* v. *Crump*, 70 N. Y. 573; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner* (2), 54 How. Pr. 298; *Wolfe* v. *Hart*, 4 Vict. L. R. Eq. 125; *Actien Gesellschaft Apollinaris Brunnen* v. *Somborn*, 14 Bl. C. C. 380; *Hegeman & Co.* v. *O'Byrne*, 9 Daly 264; *Leidersdorf* v. *Flint* (2), 50 Wisc. 401.

that the resemblance is adopted for the purpose of misleading" (*a*).

Examples.

Thus, it was held that "Cacaotine" was a colourable imitation of "Cocoatina" (*b*), "Steel pens" of "Stephens" (*c*), "Tung's" of "Tonge's" (*d*), "Leopoldsalt" of "Leopoldshall" (*e*), "Lactopepsine" of "Lactopeptine" (*f*), "Cocoine" of "Cocoaine" (*g*), "Bovina" of "Bovilene" (*h*). Again, a beehive was held to be a colourable imitation of a bell of a similar shape, similarly printed on a label (*i*).

Seixo v. *Provezende*.

In *Seixo* v. *Provezende* (*k*) the plaintiff, a Portuguese nobleman and wine grower, sold his wine in casks branded

(*a*) Per Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., *Taylor* v. *Taylor*, 23 L. J. Ch. 255; and in the case of a prosecution for obtaining money by false pretences, see per Erle, J., in *R.* v. *Dundas*, 6 Cox, 380.

(*b*) *Schweitzer* v. *Atkins*, 37 L. J. Ch. 847.

(*c*) *Stephens* v. *Peel*, 16 L. T. N. S. 145.

(*d*) *Tonge* v. *Ward*, 21 L. T. N. S. 480.

(*e*) *Radde* v. *Norman*, L. R. 14 Eq. 348.

(*f*) *Carnrick* v. *Morson*, L. J., Notes of Cases, 1877, p. 71.

(*g*) *Burnett* v. *Phalon*, 9 Bos. 192; R. Cox, 376.

(*h*) *Lockwood* v. *Bostwick*, 2 Daly, 521; R. Cox, 555. Other instances are:—"Schrewsbury-Marchal Patent Thread" put for "Shrewsbury-Marshall & Co. Patent Thread," *Marshall* v. *Ross*, L. R. 8 Eq. 651; "Burgiss" for "Burgess," *Burgess* v. *Hills*, 26 Beav. 244; "Genuine" for "Guinness," *Guinness* v. *Heap*, Dig. 617; "Holsteter & Smyte" for "Hostetter & Smith," *Hostetter* v. *Vowinkle*, 1 Dill. 329; "Rogers & Son" for "J. Rodgers & Sons," *Rodgers* v. *Philp*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 29; "Andrew Coe's Superphosphate of Lime" for "Coe's Superphosphate of Lime," *Coe* v. *Bradley*, 9 *ib.* 541; "Star" for "Stark," *Gardner* v. *Bailey*, Dig. 365; "Wamyesta" for "Wamsutta," *Wamsutta Mills* v. *Allen*, 12 Phila. 535; "Royal Standard" baking powder for "Royal" baking powder, *Royal Baking Powder Co.* v. *Sherrill*, 50 How. Pr. 17; "Electrio-Silicon" for "Electro-Silicon," *Electro-Silicon Co.* v. *Trask*, 59 *ib.* 189; "Pride of Syracuse" for "Pride," *Hier* v. *Abrahams*, 82 N. Y. 519.

(*i*) *Bell, Black & Co.* v. *Bell & Co.*, Dig. 514. Other instances are:—A crown with "B. B. S." in italics put for a crown with "B. B. H." in Roman characters, *Barrows* v. *Pelsall Coal and Iron Co.*, Dig. 530; a volcano with a man coming out of it and the words "Volcanic Paraffin Matches," for a volcano with the words "The Vulcan Paraffin Matches," *Vulcan Match Manufacturing Co.* v. *Knox & Co.*, Pearson, J., June 22, 1883; a pelican, with an inscription in gold on a green ground, for a crane with an inscription in gold on a green ground, *Balfour & Co.* v. *Kilburn & Co.*, 1 Hyde 270; an orb rising over a piece of water, with the words "Rising Moon Stove Polish," for an orb with rays rising over a piece of water, with the words "Rising Sun Stove Polish": *Morse* v. *Worrell*, 10 Phila. 168. But in *McCartney* v. *Garnhart*, 45 Mo. 593, it was held that two picks with a pair of scales and the words "J. H. Garnhart's Old Bourbon," were not too similar to two anchors and the initials "S. McC."

(*k*) L. R. 1 Ch. 192.

on the head with a crown and eagle, and the letters "B. S.," and also at the bung-hole with a crown, the word "Seixo," and the year of vintage. This wine had acquired a reputation as "Crown Seixo Wine," when the defendant began to sell wine which he called "Seixo de Cima," and placed in casks branded in a somewhat similar manner to the plaintiff's. The injunction was granted and affirmed, although the defendants contended that parts of their own vineyards were called "Seixo," and that the name was an ordinary Portuguese adjective, signifying "stony."

Wotherspoon v. Currie.

In *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie* (*a*) the plaintiffs manufactured starch, which, under the name of "Glenfield Starch"—a name derived from a small place near Paisley, where it was made—acquired a great reputation. They subsequently removed their works to Paisley, and there continued to make "Glenfield Starch." The defendants, also starch manufacturers at Paisley, bought a small plot of land at Glenfield, and began selling "Glenfield Starch." It was held by V.-C. Malins and the House of Lords that the use of the word "Glenfield" in connexion with starch had the effect of inducing people to buy the defendants' manufacture, under the impression that it was the plaintiffs', and that there was a colourable imitation of the mark to which the plaintiffs were entitled (*b*).

Similarity of packing.

Where the goods of one manufacturer are so packed or arranged as externally to resemble those of others engaged in the same trade, as where starch was put up commonly in the trade in packets of a certain colour and appearance, the similarity common to all does not of itself expose the manufacturer to an action, but it makes it incumbent upon

(*a*) L. R. 5 H. L. 508.

(*b*) See also the American cases, *Coffeen* v. *Brunton*, 4 McLean, 516, R. Cox, 82; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Spear*, 2 Sand. S. C. 599, R. Cox, 87; *Davis* v. *Kendall*, 2 R. I. 566, R. Cox, 112; *Williams* v. *Johnson*, 2 Bos. 1, R. Cox, 214; *Bradley* v. *Norton*, 33 Conn. 157, R. Cox, 331; *Boardman* v. *Meriden Britannia Co.*, 35 Conn. 402, R. Cox, 490; *Gillis* v. *Hall*, R. Cox, 596; *Meriden Britannia Co.* v. *Parker*, 39 Conn. 450, 12 Amer. Rep. 401; *Burke* v. *Cazin*, 45 Cal. 467, 13 Amer. Rep. 204.

him to take care that his distinguishing mark is really distinguishing (*a*). And where a plaintiff has been in the habit of packing his goods in a peculiar and distinctive manner, he will be entitled to restrain another from imitating his packages (*b*); and the imitation of bottles (*c*) or barrels (*d*) of a peculiar design, such as is used only by the plaintiff, will afford a strong presumption that fraud is intended.

Not conclusive.

However, where a defendant had, in obedience to express directions, put up his silk in imitation of the plaintiff's bundles, his execution of the order was held not to be conclusive against him (*e*). So, too, where a defendant packed inferior brandy in the plaintiff's cases at the express request of an agent of the plaintiff, who was seeking to entrap him, Sir R. Malins, V.-C., refused the injunction with costs (*f*).

Infringement must be by use on same class of goods.

The use by one manufacturer of a trade mark resembling or even identical with that used by another, is not an infringement of that other's rights, unless the class of goods on which the two marks are used is the same (*g*) or, at least, of so similar a description that they may fairly be supposed to be of the same manufacture as the goods to which the mark is properly applied (*h*).

(*a*) See per Lord Hatherley, C., *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*, 5 H. L. 508; and *Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co.* v. *Troxell*, 89 N. Y. 292.

(*b*) *Frese* v. *Bachof* (2), 14 Bl. C. C. 432; *Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co.* v. *Schwachhofer*, 55 How. Pr. 37.

(*c*) *Henry* v. *Price*, 1 Leg. Obs. 364; *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801; *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (1), W. N. 1878, 185; *Wolfe* v. *Goulard*, 18 How. Pr. 64; *Laird* v. *Wilder*, 9 Bush 131; *Congress Co.* v. *High Rock Co.*, 45 N. Y. 291; *Wilder* v. *Wilder*, Dig. 372.

(*d*) *Cook* v. *Starkweather*, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392. See *Moorman* v. *Hoge*, 2 Sawy. 78.

(*e*) *Woollam* v. *Ratcliff*, 1 H. & M. 259. And see *Frese* v. *Bachof* (1), 13 Bl. C. C. 234.

(*f*) *Hennessy* v. *Kennett*, Dig. 556. But in the Indian case of *Orr-Ewing* v. *Chooneeloll Mullick*, Cor. 150, the defendant was restrained, though there was no evidence of his having sold the spurious goods (which he had bought ready marked) to any one but the plaintiff's agent.

(*g*) *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518; *Moxes* v. *Sargood*, Dig. 636; *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639; *In re Whiteley*, 43 L. T. N. S. 627; *In re Rabone*, Dig. 643; *In re Ashton*, V.-C. H., Feb. 26, 1881; *Colman* v. *Crump*, 70 N. Y. 573; *Société Anonyme* v. *Baxter*, 14 Bl. C. C. 261.

(*h*) *Wamsutta Mills* v. *Allen*, 12

Infringement of disused mark.

It has been held in America that the use by a manufacturer of a mark previously used by another manufacturer, but discontinued by him for a year, is an infringement of the rights of the latter (*a*).

Infringement by use of a registered mark.

Registration of a trade mark which resembles a prior trade mark, which is registered, so nearly as to be calculated to deceive does not, for five years from the date of registration, prevent the owner of the prior mark from obtaining an injunction to restrain its use (*b*); but it seems that after the lapse of five years an absolute title to use the mark, irrespective of the rights of others, will have been obtained, if the only objection to it is a claim of superior title on the part of another person (*c*).

Infringement by improper use of genuine mark.

It is an infringement to use a genuine trade mark of a manufacturer upon goods not of his production (*d*); and it is no less an infringement to use it upon goods to which he did not intend it to be applied, even though the goods upon which the infringer uses it are of the make of the owner of the mark (*e*).

Moulded bottles.

In some cases a rather difficult question has arisen with respect to the use of bottles moulded with the plaintiff's name or trade mark. Where such bottles have been systematically bought up and refilled with spurious waters, &c., so as to pass them off as being of the plaintiff's manu-

Phila. 535; *Carroll* v. *Ertheiler*, 21 Alb. L. J. 503.

(*a*) *Lemoine* v. *Ganton*, 2 E. D. Smith, 343, R. Cox, 142.

(*b*) *Read* v. *Richardson*, 45 L. T. N. S. 54. In *Goodwin* v. *Venning*, 24 Sol. J. 690, the defendant's mark was a registered one. Since registration is for the first five years only a qualification for bringing an action (see *Nuthall* v. *Vining*, C.A., Jan. 21st, 1880), it would appear that if the second of two registered marks was used first, the owner of that mark would, by virtue of his prior user, be entitled to restrain the owner of the mark which was used later but registered first.

(*c*) See Patents Act, 1883, § 76.

(*d*) *Barnett* v. *Leuchars*, 13 L. T. N. S. 495 (boxes for "Pharaoh's Serpents"); *Richards* v. *Williamson*, 30 L. T. N. S. 746 (gun stamps); *Hennessy* v. *Rohmann*, 36 L. T. N. S. 51; *Hennessy* v. *Cooper*, Dig. 549 (cases for brandy).

(*e*) *Hennessy* v. *Kennett*, Dig. 556; *Hennessy* v. *White*, 6 W. W. & A'B. Eq. 216; *Hennessy* v. *Hogan*, *ib.* 225 (cases intended for brandy of superior quality used for brandy of inferior quality); *Gillott* v. *Kettle*, 3 Ducr, 624, R. Cox, 148 (labels indicating superior pens placed on boxes of inferior ones).

facture, an injunction will be granted to restrain the continuance of the fraud (*a*); but where the bottles have been bought by the defendant in the ordinary course of his business, it does not appear that he will be restrained from using what he has bought, merely because the bottles are moulded, so long as he uses them in a fair manner, and places on them his own adhesive labels (*b*). There does not, indeed, seem to be a clear decision on the point, as the question has not been raised free from complications. Thus, in *Barrett* v. *Gomm* (*c*), the Court of Appeal held that no injunction could be granted against soda-water manufacturers whose labels were found to be placed on two bottles of soda-water moulded with the plaintiff's name and trade mark, but in this case there was no evidence to show that the soda-water in the bottles was of the defendants' manufacture, or that the defendants had filled or sold them. The Master of the Rolls (Sir G. Jessel), however, stated that if some of the plaintiff's engraved bottles had come fairly into the defendants' possession, they would have been entitled to refill and sell them, at all events if they had placed on them their own adhesive labels, so as to cover the plaintiff's name and trade mark. And this opinion appears to have been adopted by North, J., in *Barrett* v. *White* (*d*).

Infringement by engraver.

It is an infringement for an engraver to prepare and supply to one person printing-blocks engraved with the trade mark, or an important part of the trade mark of another, inasmuch as the piracy would be impossible without the blocks; and Sir L. Shadwell, V.-C. of E., went so far as to say that if a thing contained twenty-five parts, and one only was taken, such an imitation would be sufficient to contribute to a deception, and the law would

(*a*) *Rose* v. *Henley*, Dig. 551; *Allen* v. *Richards*, 26 Sol. J. 658; *Hostetter* v. *Anderson*, 1 V. R. Eq. 7.
(*b*) *Welch* v. *Knott*, 4 K. & J. 747; *Rose* v. *Loftus*, 47 L. J. Ch. 576.
(*c*) 74 L. T. 388.
(*d*) North, J., May 12, 1883.

hold those responsible who had contributed to the fraud (*a*.) The principle is the same where the engraver, though retaining the blocks in his own possession, yet facilitates fraud by the dissemination of labels bearing pirated trade marks (*b*). Lord Cranworth, C., thought, however, that a man who had A.'s goods, but none of his labels, might rightfully employ a printer or engraver to supply him with imitated labels, and that A. could have no ground of complaint against the sale of his goods with something on them to represent his trade mark, though not his genuine mark (*c*).

Untrue allegation of registration.

It does not appear that the position of a defendant in an action for infringement is altered for the worse by the fact of his having alleged his trade mark to be registered, before it in fact was so (*d*); but by so doing he will expose himself to penalties under section 105 of the Patents Act, 1883.

Use by a trade mark owner of his mark upon another's goods.

It seems that a manufacturer is entitled to place his trade mark on articles not of his own make, unless there is some trade custom or contract that he shall not do so, and to remove the maker's mark for the purpose of substituting his own, and that such a course would not be actionable (*e*). Nor is there any reason why it should be so. The maker's mark has already performed its function when the goods are sold, and when it is removed from the goods the maker ceases to be responsible for the guarantee implied by its presence on them. The purchaser, by substituting his own mark, undertakes the responsibility for the quality of the goods, which are, in effect, selected and guaranteed by him (*f*).

(*a*) *Guinness* v. *Ullmer*, 10 L. T. (Old Series) 127.

(*b*) *Farina* v. *Silverlock*, 1 K. & J. 509; 6 De G. M. & G. 214; 4 K. & J. 650.

(*c*) *Ib.* 6 De G. M. & G. 214.

(*d*) *Ellis & Sons* v. *Ruthin Soda Water Co.*, M. R., Nov. 21, 1879.

(*e*) See *Johnson* v. *Raylton*, 7 Q. B. D. 438.

(*f*) See *Hirsch* v. *Jonas*, 3 Ch. D. 584.

CHAPTER V.

THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION.

Remedies for fraudulent imitations.

"In cases like the present" (*i.e.*, in cases of imitation of a wrapper imprinted with a trade mark), "the remedy," said Willes, J., "is well known. The prosecutor may, if he pleases, file a bill in Equity to restrain the defendant from using the wrappers, or he may bring an action at law for damages, or he may indict him for obtaining money under false pretences" (*a*).

Infringement of trade mark not forgery at Common Law.

At Common Law the imitation of a trade mark or of a trade wrapper is not a forgery. "A forgery must be of some document or writing" (*b*); "it is the forging of a false document to represent a genuine document" (*c*). In a case in which the prisoner had imitated the label used on Borwick's baking powder, and was indicted for forgery (*d*), the Court of Crown Cases Reserved, consisting of Pollock, C. B., Willes and Byles, JJ., and Bramwell and Channell, BB., decided that the conviction for forgery was not sustainable, though an indictment for false pretences would have been good. The grounds of the decision are thus stated by Bramwell, B.: "I think that this was not a forgery. Forgery supposes the possibility of a genuine document, and that the false document is not so good as

(*a*) *R.* v. *John Smith*, D. & B. 566; 8 Cox, 32. This was in 1858, before the Merchandise Marks Act of 1862.

(*b*) Per Cockburn, C. J., *R.* v. *Closs*, D. & B. 460; 7 Cox, 494.

(*c*) Per Willes, J., *R.* v. *John Smith*, *ubi suprà*.

(*d*) *R.* v. *John Smith*, *ubi suprd*.

the genuine document, and that the one is not so efficacious for all purposes as the other. In the present case, one of these documents is as good as the other; the one asserts what the other does; the one is as true as the other; but one gets improperly used. But the question is whether the document itself is a false document. It is said that the wrapper is so like one used by somebody else, that it may mislead; but that is not material to the question we have to decide. The prisoner may have committed a gross fraud in using the wrappers for that which was not the genuine powder, and may possibly be indicted for obtaining money by false pretences, but I think he cannot be convicted of forgery" (*a*).

Not even if the mark consists of a signature.

It might be thought that where the trade mark consisted of a signature, an imitation of this would amount to forgery; but this has been decided not to be so, in the case of *R.* v. *Closs* (*b*), in which the prisoner imitated the signature of the artist, J. Linnell, in the corner of a spurious picture. Cockburn, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved, said that the stamp was merely in the nature of a mark put upon the painting with a view to identifying it, and was no more than if the painter put any other arbitrary mark as a recognition of the painting being his, and in the course of the argument he expressed a similar opinion with respect to the imitation of a signature stamped on a gun.

The Merchandise Marks Act, 1862.

Under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862 (*c*), the forgery of trade marks is now made a misdemeanour, and the Criminal Law made to cover such offences as those committed in *R.* v. *John Smith* (*d*), and *R.* v. *Closs* (*e*).

(*a*) Taking the same view, Pollock, C. B., said that the real offence was the enclosing the false powder in the false wrapper; that the issuing of the wrapper without the stuff within it would be no offence; but that the real offence was the issuing them with the fraudulent matter in them.

(*b*) D. & B. 460; 7 Cox, 494. 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, § 7, now provides for spurious pictures with a forged signature.

(*c*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 88.

(*d*) D. & B. 566; 8 Cox, 32.

(*e*) D. & B. 460; 7 Cox, 494. See *R.* v. *Lloyd* (Recorder of Birmingham, Oct. 13, 1851), in which the infringement of a gunmaker's trade

What offences are punishable under that Act.

By that Act the following offences are made punishable:

1. Forging or counterfeiting a trade mark, with intent to defraud (*a*).
2. Applying any trade mark, or any forged trade mark (*b*), with intent to defraud, to any article not being the manufacture, &c., of any person denoted or intended to be denoted by such trade mark, or by such forged trade mark, or not being the manufacture, &c., of any person whose trade mark shall be so forged (*a*).
3. Applying any trade mark, or forged trade mark, with intent to defraud, to any article not being the particular or peculiar description of manufacture, &c. (*c*), denoted or intended to be denoted by such trade mark or forged trade mark (*a*).
4. Applying any trade mark, or forged trade mark, with intent to defraud, to any cask, &c., in, on, or with which any article shall be intended to be sold, or shall be sold, or uttered, or exposed for sale, or intended for any purpose of trade or manufacture (*d*).
5. Enclosing or placing, with intent to defraud, any article in, upon, under, or with any cask, &c., to which any trade mark shall have been falsely applied, or to which any forged trade mark shall have been applied (*d*).
6. Applying or attaching with intent to defraud, to any article, any case, &c., to which any trade mark shall have been falsely applied, or to which any forged trade mark shall have been applied (*d*).
7. Enclosing, placing, or attaching, with intent to defraud, any article in, upon, under, with or to any

mark was punished under the Merchandise Marks Act with six months' imprisonment.

(*a*) § 2 of the Merchandise Marks Act.

(*b*) As to what is included in a "forged trade mark," see § 5.

(*c*) See cases at p. 128, and notes.

(*d*) § 3 of the Merchandise Marks Act.

cask, &c., having thereon any trade mark of any other person (*a*).

8. Selling, uttering, or exposing, either for sale, or for any purpose of trade or manufacture, any article, together with any forged trade mark, which he shall know to be forged, or together with the trade mark of any other person applied or used falsely or wrongfully, or without lawful authority or excuse, knowing such trade mark of another person to have been so applied or used; and that, whether such trade mark or forged trade mark shall be in, upon, about, or with such article, or in, upon, about, or with any cask, &c., in, upon, about, or with which such article shall be so sold, &c. (*b*).
9. Putting, with intent to defraud, or to enable another to defraud, upon any article, or upon any cask, &c., together with which any article shall be intended to be or shall be sold, or uttered, or exposed for sale, or for any purpose of trade or manufacture, or upon any case, &c., in or by means of which any article shall be intended to be or shall be exposed for sale, any false description, statement, or other indication, of or respecting the number, quantity, measure, or weight (*c*) of such article, or any part thereof, or of the place or country in which such article shall have been made, manufactured, or produced (*d*).
10. Putting, with intent to defraud, or to enable another to defraud, upon such article, cask, &c., any word, letter, figure, signature, or mark, for the purpose of falsely indicating such article, or the mode of manufacturing or producing the same, or the ornamentation, shape, or configuration thereof, to be the subject of any existing patent (*e*), privilege, or copyright.

(*a*) § 2 of the Merchandise Marks Act.

(*b*) § 4 of the Merchandise Marks Act.

(*c*) See *R.* v. *Sherwood*, 7 Cox, 270; *R.* v. *Ragg*, 8 Cox, 265; *R.* v. *Lee*, 9 Cox, 460.

(*d*) § 7.

(*e*) See § 9, and the cases cited in Ch. 7. See also § 105 of the Patents Act, 1883.

11. Selling, uttering, or exposing for sale, or for any purpose of trade or manufacture, any article upon which shall have been, to the offender's knowledge, put, or upon any cask, &c., together with which such article shall be sold or uttered, or exposed for sale, or other purpose as aforesaid, shall have been so put, or upon any case, &c., used to expose or exhibit such article for sale, shall have been so put, any false description, statement, or other indication of or respecting the number, quantity, measure, or weight, of such article or any part thereof, or the place or country in which such article shall have been made, manufactured, or produced (*a*).

13. Aiding, abetting, counselling, or procuring the commission of any offence made a misdemeanour by the Merchandise Marks Act (*b*).

Intention of defrauding a particular person not necessary.

By § 12, there is no necessity to allege in the indictment, or to prove any intention to defraud any particular person. In the same way it seems that on the principle that "the making of any false instrument which is the subject of forgery, with a fraudulent intent, although in the name of a non-existing person, is as much a forgery as if it had been made in the name of one who was known to exist, and to whom credit was due" (*c*); the making and using a fictitious trade mark, with intent to defraud, by representing it to be the known trade mark of a person of established reputation, would be punishable.

Fraudulent additions to and alterations of marks.

By § 5, fraudulent additions to and alterations of a trade mark are made forged trade marks within the Act. At Common Law "it is forgery to alter a material part of a true instrument" (*d*). Thus, where in a bill of exchange

(*a*) § 8.
(*b*) § 13.
(*c*) 2 East, Pleas of the Crown, 957; and see *R.* v. *Lewis*, Foster Cr. Cas. 116; *R.* v. *Avery*, 8 C. & P. 596; *R.* v. *White*, 72 C. C. C. Sessions Papers, 222.
(*d*) 2 East, Pleas of the Crown, 978.

"0" was added to "£8," and "y" to "eight," so as to make it appear to be for £80 (*a*).

Expressions generally understood may be employed.

It is not an offence for persons to use any name, word, or expression generally used for indicating the article with which it is used to be of some particular class or description of manufacture only (*b*). Thus, patent leather, patent thread (*c*), patent pins (*d*).

Civil remedy not affected by conviction.

A conviction under this Act does not take away or affect any civil remedy of the person aggrieved (*e*).

Exact *fac-simile* not required.

"An exact resemblance, or *fac-simile*, is not required to constitute the crime of forgery, for if there be a sufficient resemblance to show that a false making was intended, and that the false stamp is so made as to have an aptitude to deceive, that is sufficient" (*f*).

Where deception succeeds, indictment for false pretences will lie.

While, apart from the Merchandise Marks Act, the fraudulent imitation of a trade mark is not forgery, such an imitation, when it has been intended to be and has been the means of inducing persons to part with their money, in the belief that they were buying one thing, when in fact they were buying another, is sufficient to support a conviction on an indictment for obtaining money by false pretences. This affords sufficient protection to the innocent purchaser of goods falsely marked; the Act gives protection to the manufacturer who has suffered in his custom and in his reputation by piracies.

Convictions.

"There is no difference in principle between a misrepresentation of a mark, and one that an acceptance was the acceptance of John Jones or any other person" (*g*); and it is established that the fraudulent imitation of a trade mark will be punished in the same way, where the necessary circumstances exist. Thus, in *R.* v. *Dundas* (*h*), the

(*a*) *R.* v. *Elsworth*, 2 East P.C. 986.
(*b*) § 9.
(*c*) *Marshall* v. *Ross*, L. R. 8 Eq. 651.
(*d*) *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78.
(*e*) § 11.
(*f*) Per Grose, J., in *R.* v. *Cellicott*, 2 Leach, 1048, a Stamp case.
(*g*) Per Kelly, C.B., in *R.* v. *Suter & Coulson*, 10 Cox, 577.
(*h*) 6 Cox, 380.

prisoner, who asserted his own name to be Everett, sold blacking in bottles labelled "Everett's Premier," in a similar manner, with only trifling variations, to the bottles of a well-known manufacturer of that name. Erle, J., told the jury that "with respect to the difference between the labels, the jury should consider whether it was a small and colourable difference only, and intended to deceive. It was of little consequence whether the man's name was Everett, as he had stated, or not, for even if it were, and he went about the country and offered blacking for sale as 'Everett's Premier,' representing it to be the well-known article of that name, knowing that it was *not* so, and intending to cheat the prosecutor by passing upon him a spurious article as the true one, his conduct was equally fraudulent" (*a*). The prisoner was convicted. In *R.* v. *Smith* (*b*), the conviction for forgery being quashed, the prisoner afterwards pleaded guilty to an indictment for false pretences (*c*). In *R.* v. *Suter & Coulson* (*d*), it was held by the Court of Crown Cases Reserved that a representation that a mark of "18" on a watch was a genuine hall-mark of the Goldsmiths' Company was clearly a false pretence within the statute (*e*).

R. v. *Bryan.* Question as to misrepresentation of quality.

The case of *R.* v. *Bryan* (*f*) gave rise to some differences of opinion in respect to the Law of False Pretences. The prisoner in that case was found by the jury to have obtained money from pawnbrokers on spoons which he had fraudulently represented to have as much silver on them as Elkington's "A" spoons. They also found that he had represented the foundations to be of the best material, knowing that to be untrue, and that in con-

(*a*) It was also held that an offer to sell on sale or return was immaterial, the actual bargain being for cash.

(*b*) D. & B. 566; 8 Cox, 32.

(*c*) 8 Cox, 37; and 48 C. C. C. Sessions Papers, 8.

(*d*) 10 Cox, 577.

(*e*) And in *R.* v. *Gray & Gosling*, Dig. 183, the imitation of Messrs. Allsopp's labels was punished; and in *R.* v. *S. Jones*, Dig. 182, the imitation of Mr. Borwick's wrappers. See, too, *R.* v. *Closs*, D. & B. 460; 7 Cox, 494.

(*f*) D. & B. 265; 7 Cox, 312.

sequence of this he obtained the moneys mentioned in the indictment. The Recorder of London reserved the case for the consideration of the Court of Crown Cases Reserved. Twelve judges heard the case, and of these ten held that the conviction must be quashed, Willes, J., and Bramwell, B., dissenting. The language employed by some of the judges on that occasion, and in particular by Lord Campbell, C. J. (*a*), led to an impression that in the opinion of the judges it was impossible to convict under the Statute of False Pretences, when the misrepresentation had reference only to quality and not to substance; that is to say, that where, for instance, an infinitesimal quantity of gold was found in a ring represented to be of eighteen carat gold, the presence of that infinitesimal quantity of gold prevented the false representations from supporting a criminal charge (*b*). Where the jewellery contained no metal of the kind specified, the prisoner was convicted (*c*). Anticipating such a result, Bramwell, B., said (*d*) that the result of the decision would be that the prisoner would be indictable if Elkington's spoons had half an ounce of silver, and his none, but not if Elkington's had one ounce and his a quarter of an ounce.

The interpretation thus put upon the decision in *R.* v. *Bryan* was unfortunate, tending, as it did, to encourage an idea of fraud being possible with impunity; and some of the judges who had decided *R.* v. *Bryan* (*e*) took

(*a*) He said, for instance, that the conviction proceeded upon "a mere misrepresentation, during the bargaining for the purchase of a commodity, of the quality of that commodity." "If the seller were criminally liable for unduly exaggerating the value of the article, the buyer would be for unduly depreciating." He "found no case in which a mere misrepresentation at the time of sale of the quality of the goods had been held to be an indictable offence."

(*b*) *R.* v. *Suter & Coulson*, 10 Cox, 577; and see *R.* v. *Lee*, 5 Cox, 233; *R.* v. *Levine & Wood*, 10 Cox, 374. Previously to *R.* v. *Bryan*, D. & B. 265, 7 Cox, 312, in *R.* v. *Hall*, 45 C. C. C. Sessions Papers, 451, the prisoner was convicted, though there was a minute quantity of gold.

(*c*) *R.* v. *Roebuck*, 7 Cox, 126; D. & B. 24; and see *R.* v. *Ball*, C. & M. 249; *R.* v. *Stevens*, 1 Cox, 83; and *R.* v. *Priestley*, 63 C. C. C. Sessions Papers, 541.

(*d*) *R.* v. *Bryan*, D. & B. 265; 7 Cox, 312.

(*e*) D. & B. 265; 7 Cox, 312.

opportunities of explaining what the real principle of the judgment was (*a*). It was also difficult to reconcile such a conclusion with such cases as those in which the prisoner sold a cheese, by means of the representation that a taster taken from a cheese of superior quality was in fact taken from the one in question (*b*). There was, indeed, in those cases, a certain misrepresentation as to substance, but the real grievance was that a cheese was sold as being of one quality, when it was in fact of another (*c*).

R. v. Ardley.

The whole question is now fully explained and set at rest by the judgment in *R.* v. *Ardley* (*d*). There the prisoner obtained money for a watch chain which he represented to be of fifteen carat gold, stamped on every link, but which representation was untrue. In giving judgment, Bovill, C.J., said: "The case which has been most pressed upon us is *R.* v. *Bryan* (*e*). The representation in that case was that certain plated spoons were 'equal to Elkington's A.' *Primâ facie* that representation would seem to be a mere matter of opinion, and the Court held that it was not sufficient to support the conviction. But many of the judges expressed the opinion that there might well be cases in which misrepresentations, though as to quality, would be within the statute. Cockburn, C.J., says, 'If the prisoner had represented these articles as being of Elkington's manufacture, when in point of fact they were not, and he knew it, that would be an entirely different thing.' Pollock, C.B., says, 'I think if a tradesman or a merchant were to concoct an article of merchandise expressly for the purpose of deceit, and were to sell it as and for something very different even in quality from what

(*a*) See, for instance, per Erle, C. J., in *R.* v. *Goss*, Bell, 208; 8 Cox, 262; and per Willes, J., in *R.* v. *Suter & Coulson*, 10 Cox, 577.

(*b*) *R.* v. *Abbott*, 1 Den. 273; *R.* v. *Dark*, 1 Den. 276; *R.* v. *Garlick*, 1 Den. 276; *R.* v. *Goss*, Bell, 208; 8 Cox, 262.

(*c*) And on this ground Lord Campbell, C. J., in *R.* v. *Roebuck*, 7 Cox. 126, D. & B. 24, dissented from *R.* v. *Abbott*.

(*d*) L. R. 1 C. C. R. 301, 12 Cox, 23; *R.* v *Foster*, 13 Cox, 393.

(*e*) D. & B. 265; 7 Cox, 312.

it was, the statute would apply.' It is plain that these learned judges considered that a specific representation of quality, if known to be false, would be within the statute. Coleridge, J., expressly concurs in the observations of Pollock, C. B. Erle, J., at the close of his judgment says: 'No doubt it is difficult to draw the line between the substance of the contract and the praise of an article in respect of a matter of opinion; still it must be done, and the present case appears to me not to support a conviction, upon the ground that there is no affirmation of a definite triable fact in saying the goods were equal to Elkington's "A," but the affirmation is of what is mere matter of opinion, and falls within the category of untrue praise in the course of a contract of sale, where the vendor has in substance the article contracted for, namely, plated spoons.' Crompton, J., also considered that the statute applies 'where the thing sold is of an entirely different description from what it is represented to be.' Willes, J., who dissented from the judgment of the Court, goes the whole length of saying that a representation as to quality, if known to be false, is enough to support a conviction. And Bramwell, B., leans to the same opinion.

"Applying these observations to the present case, the statement here made is not in form an expression of opinion or mere praise. It is a distinct statement, accompanied by other circumstances, that the chain was fifteen carat gold. That statement was untrue, was known to be untrue, and was made with intent to defraud. How does that differ from the case of a man who makes a chain of one material and fraudulently represents it to be of another? Therefore, whether we look at the whole of the evidence, or only at that which goes to the quality of the chain, the conviction is good. The case differs from *R.* v. *Bryan* (*a*), because here there was a statement as to a

(*a*) D. & B. 265; 7 Cox, 312.

specific fact within the actual knowledge of the prisoner, namely, the proportion of pure gold in the chain."

Intentional mis-statement as to fact punishable.

From this case it follows that where a person has made a false statement in regard to a specific question of fact, knowing that statement to be false, with intent to defraud, and he does defraud by means of that statement, then, even though the statement have reference to the quality of the article, he will be liable to be convicted.

Wrongful user of trade marks.

Placing a forged trade mark on goods not the make of the manufacturer whom the trade mark denotes will amount to such a statement, and it seems that the shifting a genuine label from goods of superior quality to goods of inferior quality, though of the same maker, will also come within the principle of *R.* v. *Ardley* (*a*).

False pretences as to weight.

In the sale of goods by weight, if money is obtained by representing the weight sold to be greater than it really is, an indictment for false pretences will be good, and it will make no difference that the goods were sold as a whole, for instance, by the load, if the price was calculated on the assumption that the load was of the weight represented by the prisoner (*b*).

False pretences as to registration of trade marks.

By § 105 of the Patents Act, 1883, penalties are now imposed on persons untruly representing that a trade mark is registered (*c*).

False pretences without words.

Words are not necessary to constitute the false representation. Thus, where hewers at a colliery placed in their tubs of coal tokens to represent a greater weight of coal than they had in fact worked, it was held that they were properly convicted (*d*).

(*a*) L. R. 1 C. C. R. 301; 12 Cox, 23.

(*b*) *R.* v. *Sherwood*, 7 Cox, 270; *R.* v. *Ridgway*, 3 F. & F. 838; *R.* v. *Ragg*, 8 Cox, 265; *R.* v. *Lee*, 9 Cox, 460.

(*c*) See § 9 of the Merchandise Marks Act.

(*d*) *R.* v. *Hunter*, 10 Cox, 642; *R.* v. *Carter*, *ib.*

CHAPTER VI.

THE CIVIL REMEDY. I.

Common Law. THE proper remedy at Common Law for a fraud committed by means of the infringement of a trade mark belonging to a rival trader is by an action on the case for deceit. The manner in which that form of action was made applicable to cases of trade mark and developed to meet the necessities of such cases, which in some respects differ from other cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, may be well stated in the language employed by Sir G. Mellish, L. J., who says (*a*), "In my opinion, all actions of this nature must be founded upon false representations. Originally, I apprehend, the right to bring an action in respect of the improper use of a trade mark arose out of the Common Law right to bring an action for a false representation, which, of course, must be a false representation made fraudulently. It differed from an ordinary action for false representation in this respect, that an action for false representation is generally brought by the person to whom the false representation is made; but in the case of the improper use of a trade mark, the Common Law Courts noticed that the false representation which is made by putting another man's trade mark, or the trade name of another manufacturer, on the goods which the wrongdoer sells, is calculated to do an injury, not only to the person to whom the false or fraudulent representation is made,

(*a*) *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—53.

but to the manufacturer whose trade mark is imitated; and, therefore, the Common Law Courts held that such a manufacturer had a right of action for the improper use of his trade mark. Then the Common Law Courts extended that doctrine one step farther; first, if I recollect rightly, in the case of *Sykes* v. *Sykes* (*a*). There it was held that, although the representation was perfectly true as between the original vendor and the original purchaser, in this sense, that the original purchaser knew perfectly well who was the real manufacturer of the goods, and therefore was not deceived into believing that he had bought goods manufactured by another person; yet if the trade mark was put on the goods for the purpose of enabling that purchaser, when he came to resell the goods, to deceive any one of the public into thinking that he was purchasing the goods of the manufacturer to whom the trade mark properly belonged, then that was equally a deception, a selling of goods with a false representation, which would give the original user of the trade mark a right of action. That was the Common Law right."

Action may be brought by manufacturer defrauded.

An action on the case for deceit at Common Law may then be brought, not only by the person who has been induced to purchase goods manufactured by one maker in the faith that they have been manufactured by another, but also by the maker of whose manufacture the goods in question have falsely been represented to be. It seems at least probable that this principle was recognised as early as the reign of Queen Elizabeth. In *Southern* v. *How* (*b*) a case was quoted by Doderidge, J., in which, in that reign, a clothier of Gloucester, who manufactured better cloth than any other person in the trade, had invented and applied to his cloth a special mark to denote his manufacture. Another clothier then pirated this mark

(*a*) 3 B. & Cr. 541. And see per Lord Blackburn, in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15.

(*b*) 3 Cro. 47; Poph. 144; 2 Rolle, 28.

and applied it to his own inferior cloth, and it was held in the Court of Common Pleas that an action on the case for deceit would lie against the fraudulent clothier. Whether the action was brought by the buyer of the cloth or by the rival clothier cannot be determined, since the reporters differ on this point; but this much is clear, that Chief Justice Popham (*a*) reported the case as establishing the right of the defrauded clothier to compensation for the injury done him.

Right to redress.

Whatever the circumstances in that particular case may have been, the principle that a person who has suffered by reason of his trade mark being intentionally imitated by another has a right at Common Law to redress from the infringer has been repeatedly acted on, and is thus clearly stated by Coltman, J., in *Rodgers* v. *Nowill* (*b*), where, after expressing his agreement with the law laid down by Williams, J., that no man had a right to sell goods of his own manufacture upon a false and deceitful representation that they were of the manufacture of another, he says: "To this I would add that an action is clearly maintainable by the party whose name is so fraudulently used, if any damage results to him from the false representation."

At Common Law, fraudulent intention must be proved.

According to the strict principles of the Common Law, for an action in respect of a trade mark to be successful, it must be proved that the defendant acted with fraudulent intention. "Proof of fraud on the part of the defendant," says Lord Westbury, C., "is of the essence of the action" (*c*).

(*a*) The great weight to be given to any statement by Popham, C. J., appears from the terms applied to him in 6 Co. Rep. 75, where he is described as "the venerable and honourable Chief Justice of England, and Councillor of State to Queen Elizabeth and to our Lord the King that now is. . . . . Who was a most reverent judge, of a ready apprehension, profound judgment, most excellent understanding in the true reason of the law, and of universal and admirable experience and knowledge of all business which concerned the commonwealth; accompanied with a rare memory, with perpetual industry and labour for the maintenance of the tranquillity and public good of the realm, and in all things behaving with great constancy, integrity, and patience." And Eyre, C. J. (1 B & P. 610), speaks of him as "a very able judge."

(*b*) 5 C. B. 109.

(*c*) *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185.

The general law on the subject of false representations is summed up by Parke, B., in *Taylor* v. *Ashton* (*a*), as being that, independently of any contract between the parties, no one can be made responsible for a representation of such kind as there was in that case (*i.e.*, a false representation of the flourishing state of a bank, which had induced the plaintiff to take shares), unless it be fraudulently made. The law so enunciated was applied in a succession of trade mark cases at Common Law (*b*), the effect of which was stated by Lord Westbury as above.

Defendant must have expected deception.

It has been held that intentional fraud cannot be inferred from the fact alone that the plaintiff has informed the defendant that in his opinion the defendant was using a trade mark calculated to deceive, nor even from the fact being that the trade mark so used is really calculated to deceive; there must be evidence that the defendant believed such deception to be probable (*c*); in other words, that the defendant has sold his goods "as and for" the plaintiff's goods (*d*). "But," said Lord Blackburn, in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3) (*e*), "it is to my mind obvious that, though the defendants might have committed no action-

(*a*) 11 M. & W. 415.

(*b*) See, among other cases, *Singleton* v. *Bolton*, 3 Doug. 293; *Crawshay* v. *Thompson*, 4 Man. & G. 357; *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 5 C. B. 109; *Myers* v. *Baker*, 3 H. & N. 802. In *Crawshay* v. *Thompson*. Coltman, J. expressed himself thus: "It appears to me that an intention to deceive is a necessary ingredient in this case. The intention is for the jury; and fraud must be made out by proof of an intention existing in the mind of the party that the iron should pass as the iron of the plaintiff." And in *Hargreaves* v. *Smith*, Dig. 338, Lush, J., told the jury that an intention to divert customers from the plaintiffs to the defendant must be proved. See per Lord Blackburn in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15, in the House of Lords.

(*c*) *Crawshay* v. *Thompson*, 4 Man. & G. 357.

(*d*) *Sykes* v. *Sykes*, 3 B. & Cr. 541; *Morison* v. *Salmon*, 2 Scott, N. R. 449, 2 Man. & G. 385; *Crawshay* v. *Thompson*, *ubi suprd.* In Equity, it is not necessary to prove fraudulent intention, otherwise than by proving that the defendant has used a mark which is, in fact, calculated to deceive, and this was recognised by the Court of Queen's Bench in *Dixon* v. *Fawcus*, 3 Ell. & Ell. 537. Since by the Judicature Act of 1873, § 25, the rules of Equity are to prevail where they conflict with those of the Common Law, it appears that at least nominal damages should now be recoverable in the Queen's Bench Division on proof of such facts as would be satisfactory to a Court of Equity.

(*e*) 8 App. Cas. 15.

able wrong whilst using the plaintiff's trade mark innocently, yet, if they persevered with the use of it after they had knowledge of the facts, they would do wrong, and there would be evidence to support a claim at law for damages for knowingly selling the defendants' goods as and for the plaintiff's." And in a recent Canadian case at Law (*a*), it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to damages, though the defendant denied any fraudulent intention, since the mark had been registered for a year as the plaintiff's, and the defendant must be taken to have known it.

Deception of first purchaser not necessary.

It is not necessary, in order for the plaintiffs to recover, for them to show that the defendants made fraudulent representations directly to the persons to whom they sold the goods, "although they did not themselves sell them as goods of the plaintiffs' manufacture, yet if they sold them to retail dealers for the express purpose of being resold as goods of the plaintiffs' manufacture" (*b*), thus "scattering over the world the means of enabling parties to commit frauds upon the plaintiffs" (*c*), proof of that would be sufficient for the plaintiffs' case (*d*).

Merchandise Marks Act.

In proceedings under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, where it is necessary to allege or mention an intent to defraud, or to enable another to defraud, it is sufficient to allege or mention that the defendant acted with intent to defraud or to enable some other person to defraud, without alleging an intention hostile to any particular person (*e*).

Questions for jury.

The question of fraudulent intention is for the jury, with whom it rests to say whether or not such intention is proved by the evidence before them (*f*). And it was held under

(*a*) *Bondier* v. *Depatie*, Montreal Q. B., May 29, 1883.

(*b*) *Sykes* v. *Sykes*, 3 B. & Cr. 541.

(*c*) Per Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in *Farina* v. *Silverlock*, 1 K. & J. 509.

(*d*) Compare the language of the Court of King's Bench in *Polhill* v. *Walter*, 3 B. & Ad. 114; and see *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—42—51—53, and *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15.

(*e*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 88, s. 12.

(*f*) *Crawshay* v. *Thompson*, 4 Man. & G. 357; *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 5 C. B. 109.

the old practice that the plaintiff's pleadings must allege with sufficient distinctness a false representation on the part of the defendant (*a*), when it was left to the jury to say whether the defendant had adopted the particular mode of deceit charged (*b*).

Plaintiff must be injured.

In order to entitle the plaintiff to recover, it must be shown that the defendant's conduct has injuriously affected the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's pleadings must be so framed as to disclose a sufficient cause of action, so that where a banking business was established in London under the same name as a previously existing bank, it was held that the proprietor of the earlier bank could not recover, since he had not averred that he was a banker or had ever carried on a banking business (*c*). This case was decided on the same principle on which it was held, in the Court of Chancery, that there was no infringement of trade mark unless there was actually in the market a vendible article to which the mark was in some way attached, and that no right to an injunction existed before the article had in fact been produced, even though it had been repeatedly advertised, and considerable outlay so incurred (*d*).

Merchandise Marks Act.

By § 22 of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, "every person aggrieved" by the forgery of a trade mark, or use of a forged trade mark, is entitled to maintain an action for damages for the injury done him by the wrongful act, and for an injunction to prevent the repetition or continuance of the same or a similar act.

Costs incurred by defendant's fraud reco-

Where A. ordered from B. a quantity of fire-bricks, marked with the name of C., who used it as his own trade

(*a*) *Morison* v. *Salmon*, 2 Scott, N. R. 449; 2 Man. & G. 385.

(*b*) *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 5 C. B. 109. In *Hargreaves* v. *Smith*, Dig. 338, Lush, J., left it to the jury to say (1) whether the plaintiffs' mark was a good one; (2) whether it had been imitated; (3) whether, if there was imitation, it was with intent to deceive. And see *Gillespie & Co.* v. *Marshall*, Dig. 648.

(*c*) *Lawson* v. *Bank of London*, 18 C. B. 84. And see per Lord Blackburn in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15.

(*d*) *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380; *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307.

vered from him.

mark, and the order was being executed by B. in ignorance of C.'s rights, C. filed a bill in Chancery to restrain B., who compromised the matter on paying a sum amounting in all, including costs, to over £200. On B. bringing an action against A. to recover the sum which he had so been compelled to pay, it was held by the Court of Queen's Bench that he was entitled to recover that sum, C. being entitled to an injunction in Equity on mere proof of the imitation, though at Common Law he would have had to prove fraud on the part of B. (*a*).

Innocent vendor of goods falsely marked.

It has been held in America that an innocent vendor of goods falsely marked, the genuineness of which he has not warranted, is entitled to maintain an action to recover the price of the goods from a person to whom he has sold them (*b*).

Damages.

Although it cannot be assumed by the Court, in default of evidence, that the same quantity of goods which a defendant has sold under a trade mark imitated from that of the plaintiff would have been sold by the plaintiff, but for the defendant's unfair competition (*c*), yet, where the whole profit made by an infringer upon the sale of the goods wrongfully marked was awarded by the jury as damages, the American Court held that this was not excessive, and said that the fact that it was impossible to apportion the profit, rendered it just that the infringer should lose the whole (*d*). And in *Taylor* v. *Carpenter* (*e*), when the defendant, against whom a verdict had been found with substantial damages, moved for a new trial, urging, among other arguments, that the jury should have been told that if the defendant's goods were not inferior to the plaintiffs', the latter could not recover, or at all

(*a*) *Dixon* v. *Fawcus*, 3 Ell. & Ell. 537.

(*b*) *Rudderow* v. *Huntington*, 3 Sand. S. C. 252, R. Cox, 106.

(*c*) *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *Hirschfeld*, L. R. 1 Eq. 299.

(*d*) *Graham* v. *Plate*, 40 Cal. 593, 6 Amer. Rep. 639. And see *Hostetter* v. *Vowinkle*, 1 Dill. 329.

(*e*) 2 Wood. & M. 1; 9 L. T. (Old Series) 514, R. Cox, 82—42,

events could recover only nominal damages, it was held that the plaintiffs were not only not debarred from recovering at all, but that they could recover substantial damages, "since the actual damage suffered by loss of sales by the plaintiffs, which was the ground of recovery, was just as great as if the thread had been inferior, though the credit of their mark and thread might not suffer as much thereby, if it did at all."

Nominal damages where right infringed.

That a plaintiff is entitled to recover some damages where his trade mark has been infringed, appears clearly from *Blofeld* v. *Payne* (*a*), in which Lord Denman, C. J., told the jury that even if the defendants' hones were not inferior, the plaintiff was still entitled to some damages, inasmuch as his right had been invaded by the fraudulent act of the defendants. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, with a farthing damages, and also found that the defendants' hones were not inferior to the plaintiff's. The verdict was upheld by the Court of King's Bench, Littledale, J., saying that "the act of the defendants was a fraud against the plaintiff, and that even if it occasioned him no specific damage, it was still, to a certain extent, an injury to his right." It is evident that in this case, although the plaintiff did not suffer in reputation by the sale of inferior hones as his, yet he suffered in another way, his custom being diminished to an undetermined extent by goods being sold as his, so as to compete with those really of his make (*b*).

Equity—*Blanchard* v. *Hill*.

The first recorded case of trade mark brought before the judicial notice of the Court of Chancery was that of *Blanchard* v. *Hill* (*c*), in 1742, which, however, resulted in a statement by Lord Hardwicke, C., that he did not

(*a*) 4 B. & Ad. 410.

(*b*) See per Erskine, J., in *Morison* v. *Salmon*, 2 Scott, N. R. 449; 2 Man. & G. 385; and per Wilde, C. J., in *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 5 C. B. 109; also *Coffeen* v. *Brunton*, 4 McLean, 516, R. Cox, 82; *Lemoine* v. *Ganton*, 2 E. D. Smith, 343, R. Cox, 142; *Chappell* v. *Davidson*, 2 K. & J. 123; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—42—51—54; and *Bondier* v. *Depatie*, Montreal Q. B., May 29, 1883.

(*c*) 2 Atk. 484.

know "any instance of granting an injunction in Chancery to restrain one trader from using the same mark with another," and that he thought "it would be of mischievous consequence to do it."

Growth of jurisdiction of Chancery.

In *Day* v. *Day* (1816) (*a*), *Henry* v. *Price* (1831) (*b*), and *Gout* v. *Aleploglu* (1833) (*c*), however, injunctions were granted to restrain the infringement of the plaintiffs' trade marks, and from this time the steadily increasing number of such cases coming before the Court of Chancery shows the growing favour with which that Court was regarded by suitors, the chief incentive no doubt being the more beneficial character of the remedy awarded, by injunction and account, as compared with the Common Law remedy of damages. By degrees the Court of Chancery absorbed the jurisdiction in trade mark cases, until such cases were rarely if ever tried in the Common Law Courts, except when they were remitted by a Chancery judge for trial of the Common Law right. That practice was discontinued in consequence of Sir John Rolt's Act (*d*), and the effect has been, notwithstanding the extended power given to the Common Law Courts by the Merchandise Marks Act of the same year (*e*), to confine the consideration of this class of cases more strictly, if possible, than before to the Court of Chancery.

Registration Acts administered by Chancery Division.

This fact was recognised by the Chancery Division being appointed to administer the Trade Marks Registration Acts (*f*), and although the High Court of Justice generally is now substituted for the Chancery Division (*g*), it seems probable that trade mark cases will continue to be brought before that Division.

(*a*) Dig. 21.

(*b*) 1 Leg. Obs. 364.

(*c*) 5 Leg. Obs. 495, and 6 Beav. 69 n.; and see *Day* v. *Binning*, C. P. Cooper, 489; and 1 Leg. Obs. 205.

(*d*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 27. But in some of the American Courts cases of doubtful right are still sent for trial at law: *Seltzer* v. *Powell*, 8 Phila. 296.

(*e*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 88, § 21.

(*f*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 91; 39 & 40 Vict. c. 33; and 40 & 41 Vict. c. 37. See the old Rule 42, and *In re Orr-Ewing* (2), 28 W. R. 412.

(*g*) § 117 of Patents Act, 1883.

Board of Trade.

The comptroller appointed under the Patents Act is, however, subject to the superintendence of the Board of Trade, the extent of whose jurisdiction is not yet clearly ascertained, though it may be presumed that cases of difficulty will be reserved for the consideration of the Court (*a*).

Principles adopted in Equity with respect to trade marks.

The principles on which the Courts of Equity have long acted in cases where a valid trade mark has been affixed to the goods or to wrappers or vessels containing them—principles by which those cases must, as it seems, be governed for the future, before whichever branch of the High Court of Justice they may come (*b*)—are thus explained by Sir G. Jessel, M. R., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson* (*c*).

"It is quite immaterial that the maker of the goods to which what I will call, for sake of shortness, the trade mark is affixed, did not know that it was a trade mark, and had not the slightest intention of defrauding anybody. He must not put as a mark on goods, even though he intends to establish it as his own trade mark, that which is the known trade mark of other people, and he would be restrained by injunction, though he thought he himself had invented the trade mark, and *bonâ fide* intended it to designate goods of his own manufacture. And the reason is obvious, because the goods pass from hand to hand, and though he may act with the utmost *bona fides*, yet the ultimate purchasers might believe that they were the real goods, that is to say, that they were manufactured by the person entitled to the original trade mark. Therefore, in that case, knowledge that he is doing anything wrong is immaterial, even in the maker.

"Another element which is sometimes imported into these cases has also no material bearing; that is, that if

(*a*) As to the position of the late Commissioners of Patents, whose functions are now transferred to the Board of Trade, see *In re Meikle*, 24 W. R. 1067; *In re Barrows*, 5 Ch. D. 353; *In re Rotherham*, 14 *ib.* 585.

(*b*) See Judicature Act of 1873, § 25.

(*c*) 2 Ch. D. 434.

*

the maker knows that they are not the goods of the person entitled to use the trade mark, and communicates that knowledge to the immediate purchaser, it makes, as I have said, no difference; and even if he does not know it, and tells the immediate purchaser that the goods are of his own manufacture, it will still not save him from an injunction, because, although the immediate purchaser from him is aware that the goods in question are not manufactured by any other person than the vendor, yet, as he passes them on, the representation does not necessarily pass on with them, and therefore the next purchaser, or the following or some other purchaser, or the public at large, who are the ultimate purchasers, would be as much deceived as if no such communication took place. Consequently, you have nothing more to do than to show that the trade mark has been taken" (*a*).

At first Equity followed the Common Law.

When trade mark cases were first brought into the Court of Chancery, they were treated on the same principle as they were at Common Law, and redress was refused where actual intentional fraud was not alleged and substantiated. The existence of anything that could be called a right of property in a trade mark was denied, and a fear expressed that, if that should be admitted, a stronger monopoly than even a patent-right would be created (*b*).

Millington v. *Fox.*

In the year 1838, however, when the case of *Millington*

(*a*) And see per Lord Cairns, C., *Singer Manufacturiny Co.* v. *Wilson*, 3 App. Cas. 391, and Lord O'Hagan, *ib.* 396. So, in Scotland, "on an application for an interdict it is not only not necessary to prove any pecuniary damage, but it is not necessary to prove that any injury has been actually inflicted. A threat of injury is a sufficient ground for an application for an interdict; and in like manner a reasonable apprehension of injury from the proceedings of the parties complained against is also in many circumstances a very good ground for such an application." (Per the Lord President, in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Kimball & Morton*, Ct. Seas. Cas. 3rd Ser. XI., 267.) And in India "it is not enough to say that there was no fraudulent intention. That is no reason why an injunction should not be granted." (Per Phear, J., *Graham & Co. v. Kerr, Dods & Co.*, 3 Beng. L. R. App. 4.)

(*b*) *Blanchard* v. *Hill*, 2 Atk. 484; *Canham* v. *Jones*, 2 V. & B. 218.

v. *Fox* (*a*) came before Lord Cottenham, C., the Lord Chancellor perceived that when goods made by one man were put upon the market bearing the trade mark of another, the same evil effects were produced, whether the mark was so affixed for fraudulent purposes or with innocent intentions, since purchasers would buy A.'s goods in the belief that they were B.'s, and B. would be deprived of the custom intended for him; so that A., whether by his own contrivance or not, would profit at the expense of B. and the public. In that case it was accordingly held by the Lord Chancellor that the plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction, although he stated in express terms that he saw no reason for thinking that there had been any fraudulent user by the defendant of the plaintiffs' mark (*b*).

Question as to foundation of jurisdiction.

The decision in this case gave rise to some difference of opinion among the judges, some holding that the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in these cases, like that of the Common Law Courts, was founded on intentional fraud, and denying any exclusive right in trade marks (*c*), while others held that, intentional fraud not being necessary for the injunction, the jurisdiction must be held to be founded on the protection of a right of property in the trade mark (*d*).

(*a*) 3 My. & Cr. 338; and see the earlier case of *Gout* v. *Aleploylu*, 5 Leg. Obs. 495.

(*b*) See per Lord Blackburn in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15.

(*c*) *Perry* v. *Truefitt*, 6 Beav. 66; *Croft* v. *Day*, 7 Beav. 84; *Foot* v. *Lea*, 13 Ir. Eq. 484; *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78; *Collins Co.* v. *Brown*, 3 K. & J. 423; *Collins Co.* v. *Cowen*, 3 K. & J. 428; *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 1 H. & M. 271; *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 33 L. J. Ch. 561; *Walton* v. *Crowley*, 3 Bl. C. C. 440, R. Cox, 166.

(*d*) *Farina* v. *Silverlock*, 6 De G. M. & G. 214; *Burgess* v. *Hills*, 26 Beav. 244; *Clement* v. *Maddick*, 1 Giff. 98; *Emperor of Austria* v. *Day*, 3 De G. F. & J. 217; *Welch* v. *Knott*, 4 K. & J. 747; *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 *ib.* 150; *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 *ib.* 380; *Leather Cloth Co.s' case*, 4 *ib.* 137; 11 H. L. C. 523; *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292; *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 *ib.* 578; *Barnett* v. *Leuchars*, 13 L. T. N. S. 495; *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307; *Collins Co.* v. *Reeves*, 28 L. J. Ch. 56; *Bradbury* v. *Beeton*, 39 *ib.* 57; *Radde* v. *Norman*, L. R. 14 Eq. 348; *Hirst* v. *Denham*, *ib.* 542; *Smith* v. *Mason*, W. N. 1875, p. 62; *Apollinaris Co.* v. *Norris*, 33 L. T. N. S. 242; *Cheavin* v. *Walker*, 5 Ch. D. 850; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 3 App.

Deference to Common Law.

In *Motley* v. *Downman* (*a*), it was laid down broadly that the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery was merely ancillary to that of the Common Law, and that the right to redress must be determined by the rules of the Common Law; and accordingly cases were frequently referred to the Common Law Courts for the determination of the right, before the equitable remedy was awarded (*b*). That practice, however, gradually died out as the principle of interference in the absence of intentional fraud came to be recognised, and Sir John Rolt's Act (*c*) finally put an end to it.

Principle of *Millington* v. *Fox* explained by V.-C. Wood.

The explanation given by Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., of the decision in *Millington* v. *Fox* (*d*) and other cases in which relief was given without proof of fraudulent user, was, that it was on the principle "that although a person had used another man's trade mark perfectly innocently, yet if he continued for one moment after he had been told of it to use another man's trade mark, he did so fraudulently, and if he sought to keep in his pocket profits which he had

Cas. 376; *Same* v. *Loog* (3), 8 *ib.* 15; *Grillon* v. *Guénin*, W. N. 1877, p. 14; *Ransome* v. *Graham*, 51 L. J. Ch. 897; *Cowen* v. *Hulton*, 46 L. T. N. S. 897. So in Scotland—*Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Kimball & Morton*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. XI., 267; in Ireland—*Kinahan* v. *Bolton*, 15 Ir. Ch. 75; *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284; in India—*Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Grant, Smith & Co.*, 2 Hyde, 185; in Canada—*Walker* v. *Alley*, 13 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 366; in the United States—*Davis* v. *Kendall*, 2 R. I. 566, R. Cox, 112; *Clark* v. *Clark*, 25 Barb. 76, R. Cox, 206; *Dale* v. *Smithson*, 12 Abb. Pr. 237, R. Cox, 282; *Woodward* v. *Lazar*, 21 Cal. 448, R. Cox, 300; *Derringer* v. *Plate*, 29 Cal. 292, R. Cox, 324; *Bradley* v. *Norton*, 33 Conn. 157, R. Cox, 331; *Gillott* v. *Esterbrook*, 47 Barb. 455, R. Cox, 340, 3 Sickels, 374; *Burnett* v. *Phalon*, 9 Bos. 192; R. Cox, 376; *Filley* v. *Fassett*, 44 Mo. 173, R. Cox, 530; *Dixon Crucible Co.* v. *Guggenheim*, 2 Brewster, 321, R. Cox. 559; *Stonebraker* v. *Stonebraker*, 33 Md. 252; *State of Missouri* v. *Gibbs*, 56 Mo. 133; *Winsor* v. *Clyde*, 9 Phila. 513; *Blackwell* v. *Armistead*, 5 Am. L. T. 85; *Colman* v. *Crump*, 70 N. Y. 573; *Rillet* v. *Carlier*, 61 Barb. S. C. 435; *Gilman* v. *Hunnewell*, 122 Mass. 139; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Kidd* v. *Johnson*, 100 *ib.* 617; *Robertson* v. *Berry*, 50 Md. 591.

(*a*) 3 My. & Cr. 1.

(*b*) *Perry* v. *Truefitt*, 6 Beav. 66; *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 6 Hare, 325; *Foot* v. *Lea*, 13 Ir. Eq. 484; *Farina* v. *Silverlock*, 1 K. & J. 509; and others. In some of the American States, *e.g.*, in Pennsylvania, the same practice is still followed: *Seltzer* v. *Powell*, 8 Phila. 296.

(*c*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 27.

(*d*) 3 My. & Cr. 338.

made by representing, however innocently, that his goods were another person's, after he had been told of the fact, it was fraud" (*a*).

By Lord Westbury.

From this view Lord Westbury, C., dissented (*b*), and the view now generally accepted as to the principles governing the action of the Courts of Equity was thus stated by him, in the *Leather Cloth Co.s' case* (*c*): "The representation which the defendant is supposed to make that his goods are the goods of another person is not actually made otherwise than by his appropriating and using the trade mark which such other person has an exclusive right to use in connection with the sale of some commodity; and if the plaintiff has an exclusive right to use any particular mark or symbol, it becomes his property for the purposes of such application, and the act of the defendant is a violation of such right of property, corresponding with the piracy of copyright or the infringement of a patent. I cannot therefore assent to the dictum that there is no property in a trade mark. It is correct to say that there is no exclusive ownership of the symbols which constitute a trade mark, apart from the use or application of them, but the word 'trade-mark' is the designation of marks or symbols when applied to a vendible commodity, and the exclusive right to make such user or application is rightly called 'property.'" "The true principle, therefore, seems to be that the jurisdiction of the Court in the protection given to trade marks rests upon property; and that the Court interferes by injunction, because that is the only mode by which such property can be effectually protected. The same things are necessary to constitute a title to relief in Equity in the case of the infringement

(*a*) *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 33 L. J. Ch. 561. See per Lord Cairns, in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 3 App. Cas. 376—391, and per Lord Blackburn in that case (*ib.* 400) and in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15

(*b*) *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *Leather Cloth Co.s' case*, 4 *ib.* 137; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, *ib.* 150; *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, *ib.* 380.

(*c*) 4 De G. J. & S. 137.

of the right to a trade mark as in the case of the violation of any other kind of property. First, the plaintiff must prove that he has an exclusive right to use some particular mark or symbol in connection with some manufacture or vendible commodity; and secondly, that this mark or symbol has been adopted or is used by the defendant so as to prejudice the plaintiff's custom and injure him in his trade or business" (*a*).

In what sense fraud is required in Equity.

Still, even though it be admitted that the Law of Trade Marks is based upon a right of property, fraud also is necessary to entitle the owner of the trade mark to redress (*b*). But the fraud does not consist in an intention to deceive on the part of the defendant, but in an actual deception, or in the creation of a probability of deception (*c*), independently of any fraudulent intention. "Imposition on the public," says Lord Westbury (*d*), "is indeed necessary for the plaintiff's title; but in this way only, that it is the test of the invasion by the defendant of the plaintiff's right of property; for there is no injury done to the plaintiff if the mark used by the defendant be not such as may be mistaken, or is not likely to be mistaken, by the public for the mark of the plaintiff. But the true ground of the Court's jurisdiction is property."

Intention immaterial in Equity.

The exact language in which the principle on which the Court of Chancery has acted is to be described is really immaterial, and in fact "merely a question of nomen-

(*a*) In *Walker* v. *Alley*, 13 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 366, Van Koughnet, Chancellor of Upper Canada, said: "Some difficulty may be created by the use of the word 'property' in trade marks. It may be said, 'What is property, unless it be something tangible?' I take property, when used in this connection and sense, to be a means by which money or money's worth, in the shape of profit or otherwise, is created or obtained."

(*b*) See per Sir G. Mellish, L. J., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—53.

(*c*) Compare per Sir C. Hall, V.-C., in *Cope* v. *Evans*, L. R. 18 Eq. 138. And see *Kinney* v. *Basch*, Dig. 542.

(*d*) *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; and see per Lord Cranworth, C., in *Farina* v. *Silverlock*, 6 De G. M. & G. 214, and per Jessel, M. R., in *Chearin* v. *Walker*, 5 Ch. D. 850.

clature" (*a*), since the important and substantial point is completely established, that in cases of trade mark nothing more has to be done "than to show that the trade mark has been taken" (*b*).

Right of property in registered mark.

The right in a trade mark registered under the Trade Marks Acts or the present Patents Act is strictly a right of property (*c*), the person entitled to it is the proprietor (*d*); he is entitled to the exclusive use of it (*e*); and though his rights in regard to it are in some respects less unlimited than those of owners of other kinds of property, *e.g.*, the inability to transfer it except in connection with the goodwill of the business (*f*), still, subject to the provisions of the Patents Act, he is entitled to deal with it as he chooses.

Elements necessary to found jurisdiction.

In trade mark cases, "in order to found the jurisdiction of the Court," says the Lord Chancellor of Ireland (*g*), "there must be established, first, the existence of the trade mark; next, the fact of an imitation, whether a direct imitation, or one with such variations that the Court must regard them as merely colourable; and thirdly, the fact that the imitations were made without licence (*h*) or anything that the Court could regard as acquiescence in their use." The law is the same in the three kingdoms, for, said Bacon, V.-C., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3) (*i*), "the law of Scotland does not in this respect

(*a*) Per Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 33 L. J. Ch. 561.

(*b*) Sir G. Jessel, M.R., in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434; and see *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 13 Ch. D. 434, and the cases collected at note (*d*) on p. 153, *suprd.*

(*c*) See *Eno* v. *Stephens*, Dig. 609.

(*d*) §§ 3, 4, 5 of the Act of 1875; §§ 62, 66, 71, 72, 76 of the Act of 1883.

(*e*) § 3 of the Act of 1875; § 76 of the Act of 1883.

(*f*) § 2 of the Act of 1875; § 70 of the Act of 1883.

(*g*) *Kinahan* v. *Bolton*, 15 Ir. Ch. 75. See *Linde* v. *Bensel*, 29 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 601.

(*h*) It has been held in America that if the defendant is the holder of a licence from the plaintiff, he cannot contest the validity of the plaintiff's mark, but that he may set up that he was induced to enter into the agreement by fraudulent representations: *Hilsen* v. *Libby*, 44 N. Y. Super. Ct. 12. And see the observations in that case with respect to pleading.

(*i*) 18 Ch. D. 395.

(*i.e.*, with respect to trade marks) differ from the law of England." The principles which govern the one govern the other.

Proceedings in Equity.

In order to ensure a full disclosure of the facts bearing upon these points, the Court will grant, if necessary, discovery and inspection, and upon the satisfactory establishment of the plaintiff's case, will award its appropriate remedy of an injunction (*a*), framed in such terms as best to counteract the illicit designs of the infringer. And the injunction will be granted, even though the defendant has ceased to use the pirated trade mark (*b*), and has offered to undertake not to use any of the old labels in stock (*c*), or has actually retired from the business in which the pirated marks were used (*d*). But if a plaintiff continues the litigation after having received an offer of all he is entitled to get, he may fail to obtain his costs (*e*). The liability to account for profits is usually, as Sir J. Romilly, M.R., said in *Cartier* v. *Carlile* (*f*), incident to the injunction (*g*), or the plaintiff may, at his option, have an inquiry as to damages in lieu of the account, but not both (*h*). The Court will further, where necessary, order the delivery up and destruction of the spurious labels, cards, or tickets (*i*), or the production of the goods wrongfully marked, for the

(*a*) In *Glen & Hall Manufacturing Co.* v. *Hall*, 16 Sickels, 226, a case of the class analogous to trade mark cases, an injunction was granted against the original plaintiffs, on counter-claim. The injunction will be granted, notwithstanding an offer of submission by the defendants: *Geary* v. *Norton*, 1 De G. & Sm. 9; *Tonge* v. *Ward*, 21 L. T. N. S. 480.

(*b*) *Guinness* v. *Heap*, Dig. 617; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Frese* v. *Bachof* (1), 13 Bl. C. C. 234; and see *Reid* v. *Sibbald*, 18 Journ. of Jurisp. 302.

(*c*) *Guinness* v. *Heap*, Dig. 617.

(*d*) *Weed* v. *Peterson*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 178.

(*e*) See *infrd*, p. 219.

(*f*) 31 Beav. 292.

(*g*) Unless the defendant can prove that he has bought and resold the improperly marked goods without being aware of the true ownership of the trade mark which he is shown to have infringed: *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 Beav. 578.

(*h*) *Neilson* v. *Betts*, L. R. 5 H. L. 1. See *Leidersdorf* v. *Flint* (2), 50 Wisc. 401.

(*i*) *Farina* v. *Silverlock*, 1 K. & J. 500, 6 De G. M. & G. 214, 4 K. & J. 650; *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *Apollinaris Co.* v. *Edwards*, Seton, 4th ed. 237; *Grazebey* v. *Winchester*, *ib.* 257.

purpose of the erasure and cancellation of the spurious marks (*a*).

Consideration shown for innocent infringer.

While, however, the Court will give protection where it is required, "it must not be forgotten that such protection by injunction when granted is, or may be, attended with loss to the defendant in rendering useless or depreciating in value articles to which the trade mark has already been affixed, and in compelling him otherwise to vary the mode in which he has been carrying on business" (*b*). And it seems that where it is proved that a defendant has adopted a trade mark in *bonâ fide* ignorance of its infringing the plaintiff's rights, the Court will be satisfied with the least amount of alteration of the defendant's mark which will effectually distinguish it from the plaintiff's (*c*).

But innocent infringement checked.

Sufficient distinction must, however, be made; and in the even harder case, where a man has not affixed the spurious mark to his own goods at all, but has bought goods already stamped with a mark which he did not know to belong to any one, he must submit to an injunction, though he will not have to account for profits, if he does not delay his submission (*d*). Where, however, A. has, without notice of fraud, advanced money on goods fraudulently marked, he will not be prevented from asserting his rights by reason of the illicit mark (*e*).

Scandal and impertinence.

In asking for his remedy a plaintiff must not make scandalous and impertinent charges against the defendant. Where such charges were made exceptions for scandal and

(*a*) *Dent* v. *Turpin*, 2 J. & H. 139; *Upmann* v. *Elkan*, L. R. 12 Eq. 140, L. R. 7 Ch. 130; *Jurgensen* v. *Alexander*, 24 How. Pr. 269, R. Cox, 298. In *Meriden Britannia Co.* v. *Parker*, 39 Conn. 450, 12 Amer. Rep. 401, it was held that goods already stamped might be sold, subject to the remedy at law. See also the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 88), § 21, as to the powers thereby given to the Court.

(*b*) *Cope* v. *Evans*, L. R. 18 Eq. 138; and see *Liebig's Extract of Meat Co.* v *Hanbury*, 17 L. T. N. S. 298, and *Bass* v. *Dawber*, 19 *ib.* 626; also *Ransome* v. *Graham*, 51 L. J. Ch. 897.

(*c*) *Bass* v. *Dawber*, 19 L. T. N. S. 626.

(*d*) *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 Beav. 578; *Orr-Ewing* v. *Choonedoll Mullick*, Cor. 150.

(*e*) *Ponsardin* v. *Peto*, 33 Beav. 642. See *Rudderow* v. *Huntington*, 3 Sand. S. C. 252, R. Cox, 106.

impertinence were allowed (*a*), and under the present practice the defendant would succeed on a motion to strike out such statements, under Order XIX., Rule 27.

Trial without a jury appropriate.

The appropriate mode of trial of cases in which, as in most trade mark cases, law and fact are closely united, is by a judge without a jury, and therefore, where a defendant gave notice of trial of a trade mark case before a judge and special jury, it was held that, notwithstanding the notice, the case must be heard without a jury (*b*). If the defendant allows the action to proceed to trial without applying for the questions at issue to be submitted to a jury, it will be too late for him to make such an application when the case comes on for trial (*c*).

Interlocutory injunction.

It is usual for the plaintiff in trade mark cases to apply for an interlocutory injunction at an early period. When such an application is to be made, it is the duty of the plaintiff to make it speedily (*d*), and delay on his part in coming to the Court is liable to be construed as signifying that the case is one which he does not consider to be of an urgent nature, and which therefore does not deserve the special favour of the Court (*e*). The plaintiff is, however, entitled to delay long enough to secure the necessary evidence to establish his case (*f*); and even if no interlocutory injunction is asked for, as, for instance, where it is rendered unnecessary by reason of the defendant having discontinued the acts of which the plaintiff is complaining, the plaintiff is not precluded from his right to a perpetual injunction, if in other respects he has such a right (*g*), nor from his right to state, if true,

(*a*) *Christie* v. *Christie*, L. R. 8 Ch. 499.

(*b*) *Spratt's Patent* v. *Ward & Co.* 11 Ch. D. 240; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (2), *ib.* 656.

(*c*) *Thomas* v. *Williams*, 14 Ch. D. 864.

(*d*) Per Sir J. Romilly, M. R., in *Chubb* v. *Griffiths*, 35 Beav. 127.

(*e*) *Pickford* v. *Grand Junction Railway Co.*, 3 Railway Cas. 538; *Flavel* v. *Harrison*, 10 Hare, 467; *Isaacson* v. *Thompson*, 20 W. R. 196.

(*f*) *Lee* v. *Haley*, L. R. 5 Ch. 155; *Cave* v. *Myers*, Dig. 304.

(*g*) *Collins Co.* v. *Walker*, 7 W. R. 222.

that the defendant is acting without authority in what he is doing (*a*).

In the older cases (*b*), the tendency of the Court was to refuse to grant an injunction on an interlocutory application, unless the clearest evidence of the plaintiff's right was producible, but rather to send that right to be tested at Common Law. That course of proceeding being now extinct (*c*), some relaxation has taken place, and, in particular, where there is reason to suspect intentional deceit on the part of the defendant, much less absolute proof of the plaintiff's title is required (*d*), and it occasionally happens that after an interlocutory injunction has been granted, it is held at the hearing that the evidence is insufficient to justify any relief being given (*e*). The interlocutory injunction will, however, not be granted where the defendant has innocently infringed, and has withdrawn the offending articles from sale and offered an undertaking immediately on being served with the writ (*f*), nor where there is any considerable conflict (*g*), nor where the

When granted.

(*a*) *Anderson* v. *Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. Ld.*, 45 L. T. N. S. 757.

(*b*) *E.g.*, *Spottiswoode* v. *Clarke*, 2 Ph. 154; *Stevens* v. *Keating*, 2 Ph. 333; *Motley* v. *Downman*, 3 My. & Cr. 1.

(*c*) Since Sir John Rolt's Act, 25 & 26 Vict. c. 27.

(*d*) *Rudde* v. *Norman*, L. R. 14 Eq. 348. It has been held in America that a defendant, who demurs on the ground that the two marks are so different as to negative the probability of deception, will be held to admit for the purposes of the demurrer any charges of fraud in the plaintiff's pleadings, and that an injunction will therefore be granted against him: *Enoch Morgan's Sons' Co.* v. *Hunkele*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1092. And if a defendant's defence and counterclaim contain any allegations of fact which the plaintiff does not desire to admit, he must deal specifically with them: *Benbow* v. *Low* (2), 13 Ch. D. 553.

(*e*) *E.g.*, in *Degraves* v. *Whiteman*, 5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 304.

(*f*) *Caruncho* v. *Highmoor*, 27 Sol. J. 199.

(*g*) *Green* v. *Rooke*, W. N. 1872, p. 49, L. J. Notes of Cases, 1872, p. 54; *Farina* v. *Cathery*, L. J. Notes of Cases, 1867, p. 134; *Hennessy* v. *Rohmann*, 36 L. T. N. S. 51; *Mitchell* v. *Henry*, 15 Ch. D. 181; *American Grocer Publishing Association* v. *Grocer Publishing Co.*, 32 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 398; *Witthaus* v. *Braun*, 44 Md. 303; and other cases. If an interlocutory injunction is asked for on the ground that the defendant claims a right to use the plaintiff's trade mark, but there is evidence that he is not in fact using the mark or threatening an immediate exercise of his alleged right of user, the motion will be ordered to stand to the hearing, as in *Linoleum Manufacturing Co.* v. *Nairn*, Dig. 536, or refused, with costs, as in *Davis* v. *Tylor*, M. R., July 27, 1877 ("*Ferndale*" *coal*).

plaintiff has been guilty of delay (*a*), and if it is granted the plaintiff will often be required to give an undertaking as to damages (*b*).

Liberty given to move to dissolve.

Where an injunction was granted on motion, but the defendant alleged that he had not had sufficient time to answer the affidavits on the other side, Lord Langdale, M. R., directed that the order should be prefaced by a statement to that effect, and giving the defendant leave to move to dissolve the injunction (*c*).

Form of injunction.

The injunction may be granted in such a form as to restrain the imitation of the general style of the plaintiff's mark, while not interfering with the use of particular features (*d*), or, if granted so as to restrain the use of particular features, it may be limited so as not to interfere with the use of them absolutely and in all events (*e*); or, again, it may be granted in such terms as to restrain any imitation of a composite mark as a whole, or of any of the elements of which it is composed (*f*).

Appeal.

In the case of an appeal delay is no less fatal than in the proceedings in the Court below (*g*); but no appeal ought to be brought from a refusal to grant an interlocutory injunction if the defendant, while refusing to submit to an injunction or to give an undertaking, removes the cause of

(*a*) *Isaacson* v. *Thompson*, 41 L. J. Ch. 101; *China* v. *Thomas*, 5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 188. In the Scotch case of *Green* v. *Shepherd*, Court of Session Cases, Third Series, IV. 1028, the plaintiff having by his summons asked for damages and an interdict, the Court refused a motion for an interim interdict, on the ground that the summons was framed on the footing that there was no case for an interim interdict, and that the plaintiff must first establish his right by recovering damages.

(*b*) In *Actien Gesellschaft Apollinaris Brunnen* v. *Somborn*, 14 Bl. C. C. 380, an American case, a bond was given to secure the possible damages.

(*c*) *Holloway* v. *Holloway*, 13 Beav. 209.

(*d*) *Compagnie Laferme* v. *Hendrickx*, Dig. 512; *Wolfe* v. *Hart*, 4 Vict. L. R. Eq. 125.

(*e*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611; *Braham* v. *Beachim* (1), 7 Ch. D. 848; *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801; *Massam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.*, 14 Ch. D. 748; *Dence* v. *Mason* (1), Dig. 534; *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284.

(*f*) See *India Rubber Comb Co.* v. *Rubber Comb and Jewelry Co.*, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 258.

(*g*) See per Sir J. L. Knight-Bruce, L. J., in *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, 3 De G. M. & G. 896.

complaint (*a*). Where an injunction had been granted to restrain the sale by the defendant of "The Original Lazenby's Harvey's Sauce," an appeal against the decision was ordered to be advanced, on the ground of the irreparable damage the continuance of the injunction would occasion (*b*). It seems that when the Court of Appeal has overruled a demurrer or objection on a point of law, it will not stay the further hearing of the case with the evidence until after an appeal to the House of Lords from this decision on the point of law is decided (*c*).

Committal for contempt.

Where a defendant in a trade mark action continues to use the prohibited mark, or a mark insufficiently altered from it (*d*), after an injunction has been issued against him, he renders himself liable to committal (*e*). In order to support the motion to commit, "it should appear clearly that the ordinary mass of customers, paying that attention which persons usually do in buying the article in question, would be easily deceived" (*f*). It was said by Lord

(*a*) *Dale* v. *Smith*, W. N. 1882, p. 145.

(*b*) *Lazenby* v. *White*, L. R. 6 Ch. 89.

(*c*) See *In re Palmer* (2), 22 Ch. D. 88. In that case the question was with reference to an application to strike a mark off the register.

(*d*) *Derlin* v. *Derlin*, 69 N. Y. 212.

(*e*) *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 3 De G. M. & G. 614; *Gillis* v. *Hall*, R. Cox, 596. On August 8, 1877, V.-C. Malins made an order to commit the defendant in *Dence* v. *Mason* (Dig. 534), who had, notwithstanding the injunction, continued to sell goods and issue labels using the name "Brand" thus—"Frank Mason & Co.'s ('Brand's') Essence of Beef," and so on. He was discharged on December 18, on undertaking not to use the name "Brand" until the hearing of the action (Dig. 570). In *Derlin* v. *Derlin*, 69 N. Y. 212, the Supreme Court of New York imposed a fine. In *U. S.* v. *Roche*, 1 M'Crary, 385, it was held that the declaration that the U. S. Statute of 1870 was invalid did not affect the validity of an injunction granted independently of the Act, and that an attachment must issue against a defendant who had committed breaches of the injunction.

(*f*) *Swift* v. *Dey*, 4 Robertson, 611, R. Cox, 319—24; and see per Lord Langdale, M. R., in *Croft* v. *Day*, 28 Leg. Obs. 378. In *Braham* v. *Beachim* (1), 7 Ch. D. 848, an injunction was granted to restrain the defendants from calling themselves "The Radstock Colliery Proprietors," or saying that they were the proprietors of collieries at Radstock; and it was afterwards held (*Braham* v. *Beachim* (2), Dig. 633) that the defendants had committed no breach of the injunction by styling themselves "The Radstock Coal and Waggon Co., Colliery Proprietors, Radstock, Somerset." In *Dence* v. *Brand*, W. N. 1881, p. 31, it was held that the defendant had not committed a breach of an injunction restraining him from representing

Langdale, M. R., in *Croft* v. *Day* (*a*), that "if the defendants were willing to make a proper distinction, and the plaintiffs refused to attend to their proposal, the Court would itself determine whether the proposed distinction was sufficient." If the defendant sets up acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff, he must make out a case amounting almost to such a licence as to entitle him to proceed against other infringers, such acquiescence, in fact, as to create a new right in him; and in default of such a licence, the order for committal will be made, unless the defendant satisfies the Court of his intention to use a trade mark which will not interfere with the plaintiff's rights (*b*). Where the contempt committed has not been gross, it is usual not to make an actual order for committal, but only to order the person in contempt to pay the costs of the motion for committal, *e.g.*, where an auctioneer, in contempt of an injunction, offered for sale "Vanity Fair" cigarettes, supposing the notice of motion served on him not to be properly authenticated, but did not actually effect any sale, V.-C. Malins made no order for committal, on his apologizing, submitting to the injunction, and paying all the costs (*c*). But a defendant can only be ordered to pay the costs of a motion for committal, if his conduct has been such that a committal might have been ordered (*d*). Where an injunction had been granted to restrain the infringement of a mark on cotton, in which a conspicuous feature consisted of a cross, from which the cotton had become known as "Cross Cotton," and the defendant adopted an altered label, containing the words "Cross Cotton," and otherwise calculated to deceive, Wood, V.-C., refused to order a committal, on the ground that the defendant had ingeniously avoided committing a breach of

that he was the original inventor of essence of beef by stating that he was the original manufacturer of that article.

(*a*) 28 Leg. Obs. 378.

(*b*) *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 3 De G. M. & G. 614.

(*c*) *Marcovitch* v. *Bramble*, *Wilkins & Co.*, Dig. 595.

(*d*) *Dence* v. *Brand*, W. N. 1881, p. 31.

the injunction, and that the plaintiff had delayed to enforce his right for fifteen months; but he enlarged the terms of the injunction so as to effectually put a stop to the new fraud, and ordered the defendant to pay all the costs (*a*). Sometimes an application is made to commit the editor or publisher of a newspaper on the ground that he has published something prejudicial to the fair trial of a pending action for infringement; but such a motion in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (*b*), based on a newspaper paragraph stating that further proceedings would be taken on the conclusion of the action, was refused, on the ground that the paragraph would have no influence on the trial of the action.

Action not continued.

Where an injunction had been granted without opposition by the defendant, the Superior Court of New York refused a motion by the defendant's administratrix to have the action continued against her, on the ground that it was not shown that the defendant had acquired any rights in the litigation, or that his estate would be prejudiced by the action not being continued (*c*).

Where two marks used.

It has sometimes happened that more marks than one have been used by a person on his goods, the infringement of either of which would be visited by the Court with the penalties at its command. Thus, where A.'s soft soap was denoted, not only by a specific device, but also by the name "Excelsior," it was held that the infringement of the latter alone was punishable by the Court, the Vice-Chancellor remarking that he could not hold it to be any justification for a defendant to say that the plaintiff had two ways of identifying the goods, and he (the defendant) had only stolen one (*d*). And so in *Wheeler* v. *Johnston* (*e*), the V.-C. of Ireland said that "a man may have two, or three, or more trade marks, which he

(*a*) *Cartier* v. *May*, Dig. 200.
(*b*) Dig. 635.
(*c*) *Republic of Peru* v. *Reeves*, 40 N. Y. Super. Ct. 316.
(*d*) *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447.
(*e*) 3 L. R. Ir. 284.

may put on his goods as he likes." But where it was shown that the goods to which a certain mark was affixed were known by a distinct name, and not by the mark, and the mark was not commonly used by the plaintiff before bill filed, the injunction was refused (*a*).

Name used with trade mark.

Moreover, the habitual use of his own name in combination with his verbal trade mark by the manufacturer of the "Eureka" shirts was held not to disentitle him to relief against defendants who had made use of the word "Eureka," though in combination with the name of their own firm (*b*). But where the name is the only distinctive part of the mark, and that is not taken, no injunction will be granted in respect of the use by the defendant of a non-distinctive part of the mark. There has, in fact, been no infringement (*c*).

Singer Mf'g. Co v. *Wilson.*

Where, however, a manufacturing company affixed their special device to their machines, and also their name, the Master of the Rolls and Court of Appeal declined to restrain another company who manufactured similar goods bearing their own mark and name, but did not affix to them the plaintiffs' name, from using the plaintiffs' name as descriptive of the principle on which the machines were constructed (*d*); and this part of the decision was not disapproved by the House of Lords when they remitted to the Court below that question whether the name was in fact descriptive of the principle of the machines, which was

(*a*) *Wilson* v. *Maxfield*, L. J., N. of C. 1875, p. 51. This was before the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, was passed.

(*b*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611. So in *Reinhardt* v. *Spalding*, 49 L. J. Ch. 57; and *Hoby* v. *Grosvenor Library Co.*, 28 W. R. 386.

(*c*) *E.g.*, it was held in Scotland that the fact that one firm called their goods "Wotherspoon's Victoria Lozenges," could not prevent another firm from styling theirs "Gray's Victoria Lozenges": *Wotherspoon* v. *Gray*, Court of Session Cases, 3rd Series, II. 38. So in the United States Patent Office, it was held that the use of the words "Pfeiffer's Egg Macaroni," before the United States Act of 1870, did not entitle the applicants to sever the mark and register the descriptive words "Egg Macaroni" alone, without the name, as having been a lawful trade mark at that time: *In re Dole Brothers*, 12 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 939.

(*d*) *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434.

afterwards decided against the plaintiffs in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (*a*).

Questions of title to trade marks.

Courts of Equity have sometimes had to decide somewhat nice questions as to who should be recognised as having a right to protection in Equity in respect of a trade mark, such questions being usually raised by the right of the plaintiff in an action to restrain infringement being contested.

Between landlord and tenant of iron works.

In *Motley* v. *Downman* (*b*), Lord Cottenham, C., was of opinion that a trade mark habitually applied to the iron manufactured at certain works, could not be sold with the business by the tenants of the works, so as to give the purchasers an exclusive right as against the landlord of the works, or as against tenants of the works who had leased them after the purchasers of the business and trade mark had removed from those works, and gone elsewhere.

Successive lessees of brick works.

In another case (*c*) A., having for some time leased certain brick works, and also certain mines, from which fire-clay was taken for manufacture at the works, removed his business elsewhere, whereupon B. commenced business at the brick works in question, but did not lease the same mines. A. having filed a bill against B., as fraudulently representing (in effect) that the latter had succeeded to his business, Vice-Chancellor Wood, in the course of his judgment in favour of the plaintiff, took occasion to intimate that it would have been almost a matter of course to have granted an injunction to the owner of the mines of fire-clay used by A. but not by B., if he had made application for it. This was, indeed, rather a case of fraudulent misrepresentation than of trade mark.

Manufacturer and printer of cotton goods.

Where manufacturers of cotton cloths which were afterwards printed elsewhere sought to restrain other manufacturers who made and printed similar cloths, and

(*a*) 8 App. Cas. 15.

(*b*) 3 My. & Cr. 1. See *Dickson* v. *McMaster & Co.*, 18 Ir. Jur. 202.

(*c*) *Harper* v. *Pearson*, 3 L. T. N. S. 547. And see *Carmichel* v. *Latimer*, 11 R. I. 395, and *Armstrong* v. *Kleinhaus*, 1 Ky. L. Rep. 112.

marked them similarly to the goods made by the plaintiffs, it was held that the mark on the plaintiffs' goods were indicative of the printer and not of the manufacturer (*a*). And in *Wamsutta Mills* v. *Allen* (*b*), it was held that muslin manufacturers were entitled to restrain the use of a colourable imitation of their mark on shirts made from inferior muslin, which might, from the mark, have been identified with their manufacture.

Principal and agent.

Where a London tradesman, who dealt in goods supplied to him by a foreign manufacturer, had invented a trade mark for those goods which stated the name of the foreign manufacturer, but made no reference to the London vendor, it was held by the Master of the Rolls that the latter could not restrain the use of the mark by a subsequent consignee of the same goods, though if the trade mark had referred to the goods having been of his selection, the case might have been different (*c*).

Manufacturer and exporter.

In another case (*d*), a combination mark, which was used on cotton goods manufactured by Ward, and consigned through Robinson, the exporting agent, to Galbraith, the merchant, at Rangoon, consisted of five separate stamps or labels, of which three had been used separately by Robinson, one (in a slightly different form) by Robinson and Galbraith, and the remaining one was used for the first time by the three on the goods which passed through the course of dealing above stated, and it was held on appeal that neither Ward nor Robinson had such an exclusive right to the combination as to be entitled to restrain the other from using it. And there are other cases in

(*a*) *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner*, 55 Barb. 151, R. Cox, 541; and see *In re Sykes*, 43 L. T. N. S. 626. But see *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner* (2), 54 How. Pr. 298.

(*b*) 12 Phila. 535.

(*c*) *Hirsch* v. *Jonas*, 3 Ch. D. 584. See *Dover* v. *Mason* (1), Dig. 534; *Swift* v. *Peters*, 11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1110; and *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245.

(*d*) *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487. In this case Bacon, V.-C. had held that the mark belonged to the exporter, and it seems that this may be so in a proper case. In *Godillot* v. *Hazard*, 81 N. Y. 263, the importer was recognised as the proprietor of the mark.

which both parties have been held to be entitled by long user to use the same mark (*a*); but for this to be so the user must have been substantial (*b*).

Shipper and shipowner.

In *Winsor* v. *Clyde* (*c*), it was held that a firm who had carried on business as shippers of merchandise by ships which they did not own, but of which they had the entire management while loading and unloading, &c., and who had denominated each line of vessels used by them and plying in a particular direction by the name of "The Keystone Line for ——," had acquired a right of property in the name, and were entitled to restrain the use of the name by another firm who owned the ships employed by the former firm for a certain period on one of their lines, after the termination of the connection, the latter firm having had at best a revocable licence to use the name.

Secret recipe.

Again, in *Cotton* v. *Gillard* (*d*), it was decided by the Master of the Rolls that a man had no right to use a trade mark applied to a sauce with the composition of which he was unacquainted, even though he had, as he believed, bought that right from the person entitled to the same; it followed that he could not prevent its use by the person acquainted with the secret, of which he had in fact been the inventor. But it has been held in America (*e*) that a person who has been accustomed to manufacture for another, in accordance with the latter's instructions, may receive an assignment of the trade mark which has been habitually used on the goods so manufactured. And it seems that where an article known by a particular name or mark has been manufactured by partners, of whom one has been acquainted with the secret of the process and the

(*a*) *Day* v. *Neale*, V. C. B., May 24, 1881; *Benbow* v. *Low* (4), 44 L. T. N. S. 875; and other cases cited at p. 97, note (*b*).

(*b*) *In re Hodson & Co.*, 26 Sol. J. 43.

(*c*) 9 Phila. 513.

(*d*) 44 L. J. Ch. 90. Compare *Coffeen* v. *Brunton*, 5 McLean, 256, R. Cox, 132; *Taylor* v. *Bemis*, 4 Biss. 406.

(*e*) *Witthaus* v. *Braun*, 44 Md. 303. See *Helmbold* v. *Helmbold Manufacturing Co.*, 53 How. Pr. 452.

other not, the former cannot, after the dissolution of the partnership, restrain the other from using the name or mark, for the right therein of the one partner is equal to that of the other (*a*).

Registered trade marks.

With respect to registered trade marks, such difficulties can hardly arise in the future, since it is the registered proprietor who has, *primâ facie*, the exclusive right to the mark, and after five years has that right conclusively (*b*). It is, therefore, of great importance that the registration should be effected in a form which will recognise all existing rights. Thus, in *Ex parte Hemming & Son* (*c*), in which recent occupiers of a needle mill were registering the name of the mill as their trade mark, a note was appended to the entry on the register, stating that the registered proprietors did not claim the exclusive right to the use of the name so as to prevent the owner or occupier for the time being from using the name for any legitimate purpose.

More than one proprietor.

It occasionally happens that a trade mark becomes vested in more than one person. The question then arises whether either of these is entitled to succeed in a suit against an infringer, to which the other person entitled is not a party. In a case of this description, Sir L. Shadwell, V.-C., gave it as his opinion, that whether the plaintiff had the right in himself, or jointly with some other persons, he still had sufficient right to bring forward the case (*d*). In *Dent* v. *Turpin* (*e*), Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., decided in

(*a*) *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1) and (2), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; 51 How. Pr. 455; and see *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461.

(*b*) Patents Act, 1883, § 76. In the Scotch case of *Dunnachie* v. *Young & Sons*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 4th ser. X. 874, the name "Glenboig" was used and registered by two companies trading as brickmakers on the Glenboig estate for the bricks made there, and a third firm carrying on the same business in the neighbourhood of the Glenboig estate began to use the name, alleging that it was descriptive of all bricks made of the seam of clay which ran through the Glenboig estate, and which they alleged that they were working. The Court of Session, however, decided against this contention, and granted an interdict at the suit of the two companies.

(*c*) M. R., April 27, 1881.

(*d*) *Hine* v. *Dart*, 10 Jur. 106.

(*e*) 2 J. & H. 139.

accordance with this view, saying that the plaintiff had a clear right to an injunction and the erasure of the spurious marks, without making the other person interested a party, while as to the account, only the plaintiff's share having been prayed for, that, though it might be difficult to ascertain, was yet ascertainable. In any case, the wrongdoer had no right to complain of any technical difficulty arising from his own wrongful act, though the result was to involve him in two suits instead of one. In *Southorn* v. *Reynolds* (*a*), he decided in the same way, saying that his previous decision had not been interfered with (*b*). So, in the Scotch case of *Dunnachie* v. *Young & Sons* (*c*), the name "Glenboig" was used and registered as the trade mark of one company, and as part of the trade mark of another company, and an interdict was granted in an action in which the two companies were co-plaintiffs, to restrain the use of the name by a third company.

Partnership trade mark.

It seems that where the use of a trade mark is improperly secured for himself by one member of a partnership, he being bound to obtain it for the partnership, he will be held to be a trustee of it for the benefit of the partnership (*d*).

Delondre v. *Shaw*.

In *Delondre* v. *Shaw* (*e*), it was held that, inasmuch as one of the plaintiffs had no interest in the account (*f*), he

(*a*) 12 L. T. N. S. 75.

(*b*) And see *Leather Cloth Co.*, v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 1 H. & M. 271; and *Newman* v. *Alvord*, 49 Barb. 588; R. Cox, 404; 6 Sickels, 189; and consider *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487.

(*c*) Ct. Sess. Cas. 4th ser. X. 874.

(*d*) *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; and see *Ex parte Lawrence Bros.*, 44 L. T. N. S. 98; *In re Rust & Co.*, *ib.*, 98; and *In re Farina* (4), *ib.* 99.

(*e*) 2 Sim. 237; and see *Paye* v. *Townsend*, 5 Sim. 395.

(*f*) It should be observed that the reason given by Mr. Bickersteth (afterwards Lord Langdale and M.R.), who argued the case, for the joinder of Pelletier as a co-plaintiff, was that though having no interest in the medicine, he yet was entitled to prevent his name being used. It is further to be observed, that the subsequent decision of Lord Langdale, in *Clark* v. *Freeman*, 11 Beav. 112, does not conflict with the position taken up by him in *Delondre* v. *Shaw*, since Pelletier not only manufactured the medicine, but supplied it to Delondre, so that he had a pecuniary interest in the maintenance of his reputation. *Clark* v. *Freeman* was decided on the point that the

was improperly joined as a co-plaintiff, the injunction being thus made ancillary to the account. In *Farina* v. *Silverlock* (*a*), the same question was raised, but without success, and no such objection would prevail at the present day (*b*).

Prize medallist.

In *Batty* v. *Hill* (*c*), an attempt was made by a prize medallist at the Exhibition of 1862, to restrain the use by the defendant, who had not been awarded a medal, of a label which had been prepared before the award, bearing the words "Prize Medal, 1862." The Vice-Chancellor was, however, of opinion that he could not interfere merely on the ground of a misrepresentation, and that the plaintiff was not entitled to claim the label as a trade mark for various reasons, among which was the fact that whatever rights the plaintiff could have must be shared with all those who had been awarded medals (*d*).

Infringement by servants.

The person sought to be enjoined in a trade mark case is commonly a rival manufacturer, who is using the spurious mark to promote the sale of his own commodities. The fact that the fraud has been committed by a servant of the trader makes no difference, for principals "are bound to know what their agents do, and if they do not know, they are responsible exactly as if they did know." Hence, where a defendant's manager had affixed to his master's goods, without the knowledge of the latter, as he alleged, a ticket infringing the rights of the plaintiff, an injunction was

plaintiff did not manufacture or sell pills.

(*a*) 1 K. & J. 509; 6 De G. M. & G. 214; 4 K. & J. 650.

(*b*) In *Millington* v. *Fox*, 3 My. & Cr. 338, the account was waived; and see *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380; *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, *ib.* 137; *Barnett* v. *Leuchars*, 13 L. T. N. S. 495; and many other cases.

(*c*) 1 H. & M. 264.

(*d*) See Exhibition Medals Act, 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. c. 119); also *Taylor* v. *Gillies*, 14 Sickels, 331; and *Roper's, &c. Co.* v. *Copeman's, &c. Association, Ld.*, 28 Fol. J. 218. But representations of prize medals have been registered as parts of all combination marks, both in England (see *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791, and *In re Farina* (2), 27 W. R. 456) and in America (see *In re Bigh & Co.*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 164).

granted against the master, with costs (*a*). And, similarly, where a clerk had sold goods in a spurious wrapper, with a verbal representation that the goods and wrapper were genuine (*b*).

And English agents of foreign traders will be restrained from selling goods received from their principals falsely marked, to the injury of other manufacturers (*c*). And similarly in America, with American agents of foreign manufacturers (*d*). So, too, commission merchants, selling with the knowledge that the goods they sell are so marked as to deceive (*e*). Agents.

The remedy will, however, not only be awarded against such persons as are to profit directly by the perpetration of a fraud, but also against all who connect themselves with and assist in the same. Thus, persons who engrave or print a trade mark for one not entitled to use it may be restrained. Engravers.

In *Guinness* v. *Ullmer* (*f*), where the defendants had supplied to one Taylor blocks engraved with the main part of the plaintiffs' trade mark, including their names, from which blocks Taylor had printed labels similar to the plaintiffs', the Vice-Chancellor of England, Sir L. Shadwell, was of opinion, that, as the matter complained of could not have happened without the prints which had been made from the blocks, the defendants had made themselves ancillary to the piracy, and he accordingly granted the injunction. It had been contended for the defendants that it had been only with a part of the plaintiffs' mark that they had been concerned; but the Vice-Chancellor thought that if a thing contained twenty-five parts, and one only was taken, such an imitation would be sufficient *Guinness* v. *Ullmer*.

(*a*) *Tonge* v. *Ward*, 21 L. T. N. S. 480; and see *Twentsche Stoom Bleekerij Oost* v. *Ellinger & Co.*, 26 W. R. 70.

(*b*) *Low* v. *Hart*, 90 N. Y. 457.

(*c*) *Farina* v. *Cathery*, L. J. Notes of Cases, 1867, p. 134; *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801; and see *Siegert* v. *Ehlers*, Dig. 432.

(*d*) *Roberts* v. *Sheldon*, 8 Biss. 398.

(*e*) *Coats* v. *Holbrook*, 2 Sandf. 586, R. Cox, 20.

(*f*) 10 L. T. (Old Series), 127.

to contribute to a deception, and that the law would hold those responsible who had contributed to the fraud. In *Farina* v. *Shaw* (*a*), and *Farina* v. *Silverlock* (*b*), injunctions were granted to restrain the printing of labels similar to those used by the plaintiff. In the latter case, on appeal (*c*), Lord Cranworth, C., dissolved the injunction, and sent the right to be tried at law (*d*); but this can no longer be done (*e*).

Spurious goods in innocent hands.

A different combination of circumstances arises when the goods improperly marked are in the charge of an innocent third party, for purposes of conveyance, storage, or the like. In such a case, although that person be merely a carrier receiving goods, which, though fraudulently marked, are not for his own use, nor to be sold by him for his own benefit, but have been received by him merely for the purpose of transmission to the persons to whom they are consigned, yet an injunction will issue to restrain the defendant from parting with the goods spuriously marked (*f*). "It is the duty of the person in charge of the marked goods at once to give all the information required, and to undertake that the goods shall not be removed or dealt with, unless the spurious brand has been removed, and to offer to give all facilities to the person injured for that purpose." He should also on discovering the fraud at once inform his correspondent abroad (*g*). If, on the other hand, the carrier declines to give information required by the injured party for the purpose of an action against the author of the fraud, even after the marked goods have passed out of his control, the

(*a*) Decided by V.-C. Parker, and referred to in *Farina* v. *Silverlock*, 1 K. & J. 509—12. See 3 Eq. Rep. 886—90.

(*b*) 1 K. & J. 509.

(*c*) 6 De G. M. & G. 214.

(*d*) Where the plaintiff obtained a verdict. See 4 K. & J. 650.

(*e*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 27.

(*f*) *Upmann* v. *Elkan*, L. R. 12 Eq. 140; L. R. 7 Ch. 130; and see *Rivero* v. *Norris*, Seton, 4th ed. 236; *Del Valle* v. *Mayer*, *ib.*; *Moet* v. *Pickering*, 8 Ch. D. 372.

(*g*) Per Sir J. Romilly, M. R., and Lord Hatherley, C., in *Upmann* v. *Elkan*, L. R. 12 Eq. 140, and L. R. 7 Ch. 130.

person injured is entitled to succeed in an action brought against him to compel discovery (*a*). Supposing the carrier, &c., to give the required information and undertaking, and to seek to facilitate the proceedings, then, "if after that the person injured files a bill, though he will be entitled to all that he seeks in the shape of relief, as he might have got it all without suit, he will not get from the defendants the costs of the suit, and he may have to pay them (*b*). On the fact of the fraudulent mark being discovered, it is no redress for the carrier, &c., to send back the goods, or to offer to do so, for that would only put it in the power of the consignor to repeat his fraud; but if the carrier, &c., offers as an alternative to erase the mark, he has done all he can be reasonably required to do" (*c*).

Innocent mortgagee.

Where wines bearing a spurious trade mark were in the custody of a dock company, and an innocent third party had advanced money on the security of the wines, it was ordered by Sir J. Romilly, M. R., that the wines should be delivered to the mortgagee, on the spurious brands being removed and destroyed (*d*).

Wharfinger's lien.

In *Moet* v. *Pickering* (*e*) wharfingers were in possession of wines spuriously branded, but they had no knowledge that the brand was spurious, and they offered to act with respect to the wine as the Court should direct, upon having their charges and costs paid or provided for. The Court of Appeal held that they were entitled to a lien on the wine for their charges, and that, even if the plaintiffs in the action for infringement were entitled to any lien on the wine for their costs, which was doubted, that lien must at all events be postponed to that of the wharfingers; and

(*a*) *Orr* v. *Diaper*, 4 Ch. D. 92.

(*b*) *Upmann* v. *Elkan*, L. R. 12 Eq. 140. See *Moet* v. *Pickering*, 8 Ch. D. 372; and *Upmann* v. *Forester*, 24 Ch. D. 231.

(*c*) Per Lord Hatherley, C., in *Upmann* v. *Elkan*, L. R. 7 Ch. 130.

(*d*) *Ponsardin* v. *Peto*, 33 Beav. 642.

(*e*) 6 Ch. D. 770; S *ib.* 372.

the Court also held that the latter had not done anything to disentitle them to their costs, which must be paid in both Courts by the plaintiffs.

Warehousemen.

In *Hunt* v. *Maniere* (*a*), where warehousemen, at the request of the owners of a certain brand on wines, refused to deliver (*b*) to the indorsee of the dock warrants wines improperly marked with that brand, Sir J. Romilly, M.R., restrained the indorsee from proceeding with an action at law against the warehousemen for their refusal. The jurisdiction of the old Court of Chancery to restrain actions at law is now gone, but the warehousemen would have a good defence in the Common Law Divisions to an action there commenced (*c*).

Questions of contract.

In exercising its jurisdiction to restrain breach, and enforce specific performance of contract, the Court has sometimes had to deal with questions of trade mark, or akin thereto. Thus, where an injunction was granted to restrain the use of a man's name (*d*) otherwise than in accordance with a contract into which he had entered, or of an initial (*e*), or of the name of a business (*f*), or of a singer's voice (*g*), or of a publication (*h*).

Steinthal v. *Samson.*

Where, among other symbols, the arms, crest, and motto (the latter being the word "Excelsior") of one of the partners were used as trade marks of a partnership, and on dissolution of the partnership it was agreed that the other partner might use all the trade marks of the firm, except such private arms, crest, and motto, it was held that no breach of the agreement had been committed by

(*a*) 34 Beav. 157.

(*b*) On the same day, but subsequently, an injunction was granted to restrain them from doing so.

(*c*) Judicature Act, 1873, § 24.

(*d*) *Ainsworth* v. *Bentley*, 14 W. R. 630; *Ward* v. *Beton*, L. R. 19 Eq. 207; *Probasco* v. *Bouyon*, 1 Mc. App. 241.

(*e*) *Tudor* v. *Tudor*, W. N. 1873, p. 72; *Pullwood* v. *Pullwood*, 9 Ch. D. 176.

(*f*) *Hogg* v. *Darley*, 47 L. J. Ch. 567 ("Old Government Sanitary Company"); and see *McGowan Brothers Pump & Machine Co.* v. *McGowan*, 2 Cinc. 313.

(*g*) *Lumley* v. *Wagner*, 5 De G. & Sm. 485; 1 De G. M. & G. 604; and see *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518, as to a singer's voice.

(*h*) *Cloves* v. *Hogg*, W. N. 1870 p. 268.

the continuing partner in using the word "Excelsior," apart from the arms and crest, on some of his goods, since it had been so used alone previously as a trade mark, and it was not then used as a motto, but as a trade mark (*a*).

Barrows v. Pelsall Coal and Iron Co.

In *Barrows* v. *Pelsall Coal and Iron Co.* (*b*), the plaintiffs used a trade mark consisting of the letters "B. B. H." in Roman type, with a crown, and the defendants, who had compromised a suit commenced for the purpose of restraining them from using the letters "B. B. S.," also in Roman type, with a crown, by undertaking to discontinue the use of the mark, were restrained by injunction from committing a breach of the contract by applying to register the letters "B. B. S." in italics, with a crown.

Fraudulent agreement.

The Court will not specifically enforce an agreement the object of which is to defraud the public by putting goods spuriously marked on the market (*c*), nor will it protect a person who has used his trade mark on spurious as well as on genuine goods (*d*), or has intended to commit fraud by buying the right to stamp on his own goods the name of another person who has acquired a reputation in the trade (*e*). And where an action for damages was brought against a person who had filled with inferior seed seed-bags which he had bought from the plaintiffs, marked with their labels, it was held on demurrer that the plaintiffs, having knowingly been parties to a fraud upon the public, were not entitled to recover (*f*).

Contract with trade mark owner for purchase of goods.

"Where the manufacture of a person or firm," said Cotton, L. J., in *Johnson* v. *Raylton* (*g*), "has acquired with the public a name or reputation, as Broadwood's or Erard's pianos, Purday's or Lancaster's guns, a purchaser from them of articles of which they are the makers is entitled to

(*a*) *Steinthal* v. *Samson*, Dig. 546.
(*b*) Dig. 530.
(*c*) *Oldham* v. *James*, 13 Ir. Ch. 393; 14 *ib.* 81.
(*d*) *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461.
(*e*) *Samuel* v. *Berger*, 24 Barb. 163; R. Cox, 178. See *Rodgers* v. *Philp*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 29; *In re Tolle*, 2 *ib.* 415.
(*f*) *Bloss* v. *Bloomer*, 23 Barb. 604; R. Cox, 200.
(*g*) 7 Q. B. D. 438.

refuse any not made by the firm with whom he contracts. In such a case the purchaser relies on reputation or public opinion that the maker to whom he goes supplies good articles. In other cases, where a man contracts with a particular firm of makers for goods such as they make, in the absence of evidence that in the particular trade, or as regards particular goods, there is a known practice that a maker of whom the goods are ordered is at liberty, in the absence of such a stipulation, to supply goods of the kind, though made by other firms, I should come to the conclusion that the purchaser is induced to go to the particular firm of manufacturers by his reliance, in part at least, on the opinion which he forms, either on his own experience or from information of others, as to the average or general excellence of the goods which are manufactured by them. He is trusting to his own experience, or to that of his friends, as a purchaser who goes to a firm which has acquired a public reputation trusts to the opinion of the public." So that where a manufacturer has contracted to sell goods of his own manufacture and bearing his trade mark, the purchaser is justified in refusing to accept other goods, though of the same quality. But it seems that if what is wanted is the particular manufacturer's trade mark on the goods, as a guarantee of quality, the proprietor of the mark is justified in placing that mark on goods not of his own make, since by so doing he makes himself responsible for the quality of them, just as if he had made them himself (*a*).

Contract for purchase of goods with a specified mark.

Where a contract has been entered into for the purchase of goods of a particular stamp, the question arises whether the stamp was specified as indicative of a particular quality, or as possessing some value in itself, so that the goods would be of less value if stamped differently. Thus, in *Hopkins* v. *Hitchcock* (*b*), where iron stamped with "S. & H." and a crown had been contracted for, and iron

(*a*) See per Brett, L. J., in S. C. (*b*) 14 C. B. N. S. 65.

stamped with "H. & Co." and a crown was supplied, the firm having become differently constituted, and having consequently marked their iron of the quality originally denoted by the former brand with the latter stamp in substitution for the former, it was decided that the contract turned upon the quality of the iron, and not upon the brand (*a*); if, however, the brand had possessed a special value, and the object of the purchase had been to resell the iron at a price which would have had to be lowered in the absence of the special mark, or even if it had been clear that the defendant had contracted for the brand for its own sake, and not as indicative of quality, it seems that the decision would have been the other way. Such questions must, however, depend in each case upon the terms in which the intention of the contracting parties is expressed; and it seems that a contract to supply goods bearing a particular trade mark may be implied from that trade mark being printed at the head of the order form (*b*).

Painter's name on paintings.

In the case of paintings, described in a catalogue as being the work of Claude Lorraine and Teniers, it was held by Lord Kenyon, C. J., that the description was merely an expression of the vendor's opinion, and not a warranty of the authenticity of the paintings (*c*); in a similar case, however, where the painter was said to be Canaletto, it was held by the Court of King's Bench to be for the jury to say whether or not the description amounted to a warranty (*d*). The paintings being so much more modern, it was more reasonable in this case to suppose that the vendor intended to make an assertion as to the fact of their authenticity, as within his own knowledge.

(*a*) Compare *Nichol* v. *Godts*, 10 Ex. 191. Similarly, in *Gillespie & Co.* v. *Marshall*, Dig. 648, the question was discussed whether a contract to supply "Marshall's Canada Plates" was performed by the delivery of plates such as were usually supplied by Marshall, but which were not "Canada Plates" in the strict commercial sense.

(*b*) *Johnson* v. *Raylton*, 7 Q. B. D. 438.

(*c*) *Jendwine* v. *Slade*, 2 Esp. N. P. C. 572.

(*d*) *Power* v. *Barham*, 4 Ad. & E. 473.

Merchandise Marks Act.

By the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, any person selling or contracting to sell any article bearing a trade mark (*a*), or any description, &c., of its number, quantity, measure, weight, or place of production (*b*), is held to warrant the genuineness of the trade mark, or the correctness of the description, &c., unless he expresses the contrary in signed writing, delivered to and accepted by the vendee.

By § 21 the Court has power to direct the destruction or other disposal of goods wrongfully marked, to award an injunction, and to make an order for inspection.

By § 11 the punishment of an offender under that Act does not take away the civil remedy to which any person aggrieved by his conduct is entitled.

Risks incurred by infringement.

That under some circumstances an infringement of another person's trade mark may expose the infringer to liabilities even beyond those involved in an action brought to restrain the wrong, appears from the Victorian case of *In re Brebner* (*c*), in which an insolvent, who had wasted his means in litigation occasioned by his having infringed a trade mark, had his certificate suspended for a year.

(*a*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 88, § 19.

(*b*) *Ib.* § 20.

(*c*) 2 W. & W. 12.

CHAPTER VII.

THE CIVIL REMEDY. II.

DEFENCES, DISCOVERY AND INSPECTION, ACCOUNT, DAMAGES, COSTS.

Defences.

Defences.

THE possible defences to an action to restrain an infringement of trade mark are numerous, some being of a somewhat special character. The following are some of the most important.

1. *Non-infringement.*

1. Non-infringement.

The first and usual defence is that the conduct on the part of the defendant, of which the plaintiff complains, has not been, in fact, such as to have for its object or its result the appropriation by the defendant of what was the plaintiff's due, the fruits of his enterprise and reputation; shortly, that the defendant has not infringed (*a*).

2. *Plaintiff's Trade Mark bad in itself.*

2. Plaintiff's trade mark bad.

This defence must for the future be founded mainly on the definition of a trade mark in § 64 of the Patents Act, 1883 (*b*). A *quasi* trade mark adopted since August 13th, 1875, which possesses none of the essential par-

(*a*) *E.g.*, *Crawshay* v. *Thompson*, 4 Man. & G. 357; *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *Blackwell* v. *Crabb*, 36 L. J. Ch. 504; *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; *Blackwell* v. *Wright*, 73 N. Car. 310.

(*b*) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57.

ticulars therein enumerated, or one used before the date above mentioned which contains no special and distinctive feature, even though it should, by some oversight, obtain registration, will yet be incapable of protection. Both in § 3 of the Act of 1875, and in § 76 of the Act of 1883, the exclusive right for which provision is made relates to the use of "a trade mark," and it cannot be that that which the Act, by excluding it from the definition of "a trade mark," declares not to be a trade mark for the purposes of the Act, can yet participate in the privileges which are conferred on trade marks which the Act recognises. The process of registration, whether for five years or for any shorter period, cannot make that a trade mark which does not contain at least one of the elements declared by the definition clause to be essential, unless the definition clause is to be entirely disregarded. This view was upheld by the Court of Appeal in *In re Palmer* (1) (*a*), in which the late Master of the Rolls fully discussed the point, and Lindley, L. J., said that "after careful examination of §§ 3, 5, and 10 of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, I am satisfied that a mark which is not a trade mark, and which therefore ought never to have been registered, does not become a trade mark by being on the register for five years." And the same conclusion has been arrived at in America under the United States Statute (*b*). Thus, any mere letters or numerals not used as a trade mark before the passing of the Act cannot be registered (*c*), or if registered, could not be upheld as a valid trade mark. Thus, too, at no time could a mere adjective used in its ordinary sense be protected, as the word "nourishing" applied to stout (*d*), "superfine" or "superior" to soap (*e*). So, too, any scandalous design (*f*).

(*a*) 21 Ch. D. 47.

(*b*) *Moorman* v. *Hoge*, 2 Sawy. 78.

(*c*) See *Ex parte Stephens*, 3 Ch. D. 659, and *Rose* v. *Evans*, 48 L. J. Ch. 618.

(*d*) *Baggett* v. *Findlater*, L. R. 17 Eq. 29.

(*e*) *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447; *Spottiswoode* v. *Clarke*, 1 G. Coop. 254; *Gillott* v. *Esterbrook*, R. Cox, 353.

(*f*) See § 73 of the Act of 1883.

3. *No Registration or Certificate of Non-registration.*

3. No registration or certificate.

The trade mark, so called, may present some one or more of the essential particulars required by the Act, and may not be objectionable in itself, but yet the fact of non-registration under the Acts will, if it is a new mark, effectually debar the person who has used it from obtaining the injunction, which would otherwise be awarded as a matter of course (*a*). And this is so, even though the trade mark owner has taken all steps in his power to protect his rights, and the Patent Office is responsible for the delay (*b*). If it is an old mark, a certificate of refusal to register will preserve the existing right to protection (*c*). However, it does not at all appear that, when a case of actual intentional fraud can be proved, there is anything in the Acts to prevent proof of imitation of marks, though unregistered, &c., being given as corroborative evidence of the fraud (*d*). In such a case the state of things would be similar to that in which it is a mode of packing that has been imitated (*e*). The injunction which would not be granted to restrain the infringement of the unregistered and uncertified trade mark would, as it seems, be granted to restrain the intentional fraud, in which the imitation of marks was a mere incident.

4. *The Plaintiff not the Registered Proprietor.*

4. Plaintiff

By § 76 of the Act of 1883 (*f*), it is provided that

(*a*) See Patents Act of 1883, § 77. Registration is "a condition precedent to suing." Per Chitty, J., in *Monson* v. *Boehm*, 28 Sol. J. 361. It does not appear that in America it is equally essential to have obtained registration. See *Rodgers* v. *Philp*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 29.

(*b*) *Hazzopulo* v. *Kaufmann*, 23 Sol. J. 819.

(*c*) See per Lord Blackburn in *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 498. In *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 13 Ch. D. 434, a certificate of registration or of refusal to register does not appear to have been called for.

(*d*) The late Master of the Rolls has intimated from the bench that this view is correct; and see per Pearson, J., in *In re Riviere & Co.*, W. N. 1884, p. 75.

(*e*) *Woollam* v. *Ratcliff*, 1 H. & M. 259; *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78; *Frese* v. *Bachof* (2), 14 Bl. C. C. 432; *Orr* v. *Diaper*, 4 Ch. D. 92.

(*f*) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, § 76.

not the registered proprietor.

"the registration of a person as proprietor of a trade mark shall be *primâ facie* evidence of his right to the exclusive use of the trade mark, and shall, after the expiration of five years from the date of the registration, be conclusive evidence of his right to the exclusive use of the trade mark, subject to the provisions of this Act." The effect of this seems to be to prevent a person, whose established trade mark has been registered without his knowledge or *laches* in the name of another, from taking steps to prevent infringement until he has first secured the rectification of the register (*a*).

The trade mark being duly registered, the objection which formerly prevailed, by which a trade mark was excluded from protection when there were no vendible goods in the market stamped therewith (*b*), will be avoided, for registration is to be deemed to be equivalent to public use of the mark (*c*).

5. *Trade Mark severed from Goodwill.*

5. Trade mark severed from goodwill.

It is a good defence to an action for infringement of trade mark, to prove that the plaintiff is not the owner of the business and goodwill concerned in the particular goods or classes of goods in respect of which the trade mark is registered (*d*).

6. *Licence.*

6. Licence.

The defendant may plead a licence from the plaintiff (*e*), or from a co-proprietor of the mark (*f*). In one American

(*a*) See § 5 of the Act of 1875.

(*b*) *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380; *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307.

(*c*) § 75 of Act of 1883. This is so also in the United States: *In re The Dutcher Temple Co.*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, p. 248.

(*d*) See §§ 65 and 70 of Act of 1883. There can be no trade mark in gross: *Cotton* v. *Gillard*, 44 L. J. Ch. 90. See *Witthaus* v. *Braun*, 44 Md. 303; *Taylor* v. *Bemis*, 4 Biss. 406; *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), (2), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; 51 How. Pr. 455; *Skinner* v. *Oakes*, 10 Mo. App. 45; *Moryan* v. *Rogers*, 26 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1113.

(*e*) See Patents Act, 1883, § 87. It does not appear that this section can be intended to authorise the user of a trade mark on goods not being the goods of the trade mark owner, or, at least, equivalent to them.

(*f*) *Marshall* v. *Pinkham*, 52 Wisc. 572.

case (*a*) it was held that the plaintiffs, who had received an exclusive license from the owner of a trade mark, were entitled to an injunction against the successors in business of persons who had been partners in business with the licensor, but had tacitly acquiesced in his retaining the sole right in the mark. However, the Court would not allow a licensee to defraud the public by the sale of goods the mark on which was similar to that on the licensor's own goods, while the goods themselves were not the goods or goods equivalent to the goods of the licensor (*b*).

7. *Delay and Acquiescence.*

7. Delay and acquiescence.

A man may by his own *laches* lose his right to that protection which he would have obtained at once, had he come to the court with reasonable promptitude (*c*). In fact, that which has originally been a valid trade mark, the property of an individual or firm, entitled to protection, may become *publici juris*, that is to say, the use of it may be thrown open to the public, by its proprietor allowing his right to be so habitually infringed that the trade mark no longer conveys to those who see it the impression that the goods to which it is attached are of his manufacture (*d*). Thus, in *In re Hyde & Co.* (*e*), it was held that the words

(*a*) *Kidd* v. *Johnson*, 100 U. S. Rep. 617. See *Kidd & Co.* v. *Mills, Johnson & Co.*, 5 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 337.

(*b*) *Oldham* v. *James*, 13 Ir. Ch. 393; 14 *ib.* 81; *Bloss* v. *Bloomer*, 23 Barb. 604, R. Cox, 200; *Samuel* v. *Berger*, 24 Barb. 163; R. Cox, 178; *Rodgers* v. *Philp*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 29; *In re Tolle*, 2 *ib.* 415.

(*c*) *Motley* v. *Downman*, 3 My. & Cr. 1; *Morison* v. *Moat*, 9 Hare, 241; *Fluvel* v. *Harrison*, 10 Hare, 467; *Wason* v. *Waring*, 15 Beav. 151; *Attorney-General* v. *Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co.*, 3 De G. M. & G. 327; *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, *ib.* 896; *Farina* v. *Gebhardt*, 3 Eq. Rep. 891; *Chappell* v. *Sheard*, 2 K. & J. 117; *Coles* v. *Sims*, 5 De G. M. & G. 1; *Kinahan* v. *Bolton*, 15 Ir. Ch. 75; *Hovenden* v. *Lloyd*, 18 W. R. 1132; *Isaacson* v. *Thompson*, 41 L. J. Ch. 101; *Estcourt* v. *Estcourt Hop Essence Co.*, L. R. 10 Ch. 276; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner*, 55 Barb. 151; R. Cox, 541; *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461; *Marshall* v. *Pinkham*, 52 Wisc. 572; and other cases cited below.

(*d*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611; *Wheeler & Wilson* v. *Shakespeare*, 39 L. J. Ch. 36; *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238; *Rodgers* v. *Philp*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 29; *Filley* v. *Child*, 16 Bl. C. C. 370.

(*e*) 7 Ch. D. 724.

"Bank of England" had long ceased to be a trade mark in respect of sealing-wax by reason of the user for six years of those words on sealing-wax by persons other than those who had originally adopted it, without interference by the latter, and the registration of the lapsed trade mark was accordingly rescinded.

Principle of this defence.

The principle on which the Court allows the plaintiff's delay to be pleaded by way of defence is thus stated by Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in *Beard* v. *Turner* (*a*). "By not complaining at the time when you might complain (I do not say that it is your intention, we must judge of the intention by the necessary result), you are lying by, the man continuing to use your property, with the hope (and such is the prayer of your bill filed two or three years afterwards) of obtaining those profits which you stood by allowing him to make under this designation, without apprising him of your intention to make any such use of it. On that ground it falls within the principle enunciated by Lord St. Leonards in the Irish case referred to, in which it is stated that it is a fraud to allow a plaintiff to avail himself of delay to obtain benefit for himself. In that case you will not grant him relief."

On motion for injunction.

In the case of a motion for an injunction "the argument as to acquiescence is no doubt very important. A short acquiescence may properly induce the Court not to interfere *ex parte*. A longer acquiescence may, under the circumstances, throw serious doubt upon the right of the plaintiff, and induce the Court not to interfere by any interlocutory order, even when applied for on notice" (*b*). And it is not sufficient for the plaintiff to commence proceedings promptly; if he wishes for an interlocutory injunction he must bring on his motion at once, or the Court

(*a*) 13 L. T. N. S. 746.

(*b*) Per Lord Langdale, M. R., in *Gordon* v. *Cheltenham Railway Co.*, 5 Beav. 233; and see *Isaacson* v. *Thompson*, 41 L. J. Ch. 101, where an interlocutory injunction was refused on the ground of delay, and *Chinn* v. *Thomas*, 5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 188.

will hold that he has shown by his own conduct that he does not consider such interference to be imperative (*a*).

At the hearing or on demurrer.

Where, however, the case has arrived at the hearing, or is being argued on demurrer, the degree of delay or acquiescence must be much greater; there must be such an acquiescence as to amount, not only to a positive licence, but to an implication of an actual grant, before the parties can be for ever deprived of their rights (*b*). In *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (2) (*c*), Fry, J., laid down that mere lapse of time, short of the statutory period fixed for the limitation of actions, would not deprive a plaintiff in an action for infringement of a trade mark, which is an action for the assertion of a legal right, of his right to the injunction. And in an American case (*d*), while it was held that a delay of twenty-five years effectually disentitled the plaintiffs to relief as against an innocent vendor of goods falsely marked, the question as to the rights of a trade mark owner, after a similar delay, against a guilty manufacturer, was left open.

Rights must be actively defended.

It is not a sufficient answer to a plea of delay on the part of the plaintiff for the plaintiff to allege continual assertions of his right. He must take some more decided measures. "What the plaintiffs mainly relied on was the continual claim on their part," says Sir G. Turner, L.J. (*e*), "and no doubt they have not ceased to assert their claim; but I cannot agree to a doctrine so dangerous as that the mere assertion of a claim, unaccompanied by any

(*a*) *Pickford* v. *The Grand Junction Railway Co.*, 3 Railway Cas. 538.

(*b*) *Patching* v. *Dubbins*, Kay, 11; *Gordon* v. *The Cheltenham Railway Co.*, 5 Beav. 233; *Rodgers* v. *Rodgers*, 31 L. T. N. S. 285; and see *Lazenby* v. *White*, 41 L. J. Ch. 354; *Gillott* v. *Esterbrook*, 47 Barb. 455; R Cox, 340; 3 Sickles, 374; *Filley* v. *Fassett*, 44 Mo. 173; R. Cox, 530; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Sawyer* v. *Kellogg*, 19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1627; 20 *ib.* 1893; *Gamble* v. *Stephenson*, 10 Mo. App. 581; *Julian* v. *Hoosier Drill Co.*, 75 Ind. 408.

(*c*) 9 Ch. D. 176.

(*d*) *Rodgers* v. *Philp*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 29; and see *Wolfe* v. *Barnett*, 24 La. Ann. 97.

(*e*) *Clegg* v. *Edmonton*, 8 De G. M. & G. 810.

*

act to give effect to it, can avail to keep alive a right which would otherwise be precluded" (*a*).

No delay where no knowledge.

But where a trade mark has been infringed, and the owner has not been aware that this has been the case, he has been guilty of no delay in taking no steps to put an end to the fraud, and he will, therefore, not be deprived of his rights by reason of his having taken no proceedings while he was ignorant of the infringement (*b*). Hence, where a defence of delay is set up, the evidence must go to show, not merely that the plaintiff might have been aware of the infringement which was going on, but that he actually was so, and that it was with such knowledge that he remained quiescent (*c*).

Delay by retiring partner.

It has been held in America that if a member of a partnership retires therefrom without setting up any claim to an interest in the trade mark, and makes no objection to its being used by the continuing partner, he must be taken to acquiesce in its being appropriated by the latter (*d*); but that if, on the other hand, a partner submits to the appropriation of the firm trade mark by his partner, at a time when he is, in a measure, in the latter's power, by reason of the latter being in sole possession of an important secret used in the business, he will be held not to have lost his right (*e*); and that a continued user of the mark by the retiring partner, even on a spurious article, is evidence that he does not intend to give up his rights therein (*f*).

Delay for purpose of securing evidence.

Inasmuch as in a case where no proof of actual deception is produced, the Court has to try a hypothetical case,

(*a*) This dictum was approved and followed by Wood and Selwyn, L. JJ., in *Lehmann* v. *McArthur*, L. R. 3 Ch. 496; but see *Attorney-General* v. *Sheffield Gas Consumers' Co.*, 3 De G. M. & G. 327; and *Kinahan* v. *Bolton*, 15 Ir. Ch. 75.

(*b*) *Weldon* v. *Dicks*, 10 Ch. D. 247; *In re Parina* (2), 27 W. R. 456; *Williams* v. *Adams*, 8 Biss. 452; *Sawyer* v. *Kellogg*, 19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1627; 20 *ib.* 1893; *Monson* v. *Boehm*, 28 Sol. J., 361.

(*c*) *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801.

(*d*) *Kidd & Co.* v. *Mills, Johnson & Co.*, 5 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 337; *Simpson* v. *Wright* (1), 15 *ib.* 248.

(*e*) *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54.

(*f*) *Wright* v. *Simpson*, 15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 968.

turning on the probabilities of deception, as to which witnesses could probably be brought forward by both sides, a person who believes others to be infringing his trade mark is entitled to wait until he can collect a sufficient number of cases to prove to the Court that the proceedings of which he complains do actually deceive the public; and his right to protection is not gone by reason of such delay (*a*). It seems that in *Rodgers* v. *Rodgers* (*b*), and *Estcourt* v. *Estcourt Hop Essence Co.* (*c*), the delay would have been condoned had it resulted in the production of satisfactory evidence of deception. On the other hand, where a plaintiff delayed his motion until December, having been in possession of sufficient evidence in May, the delay was fatal to the motion (*d*).

Delay in regard to motion to commit.

Where an injunction has been granted by the Court, there must, in order to deprive the party who has obtained the injunction of his right to move for committal upon the breach of it, be a case made out almost amounting to such a licence to the party enjoined to do the act enjoined against as would entitle him to maintain an action against others for doing that act (*e*).

Indulgence to defendant, plaintiff having delayed.

Even if the delay has not been such as to disentitle the plaintiff to his injunction, it may yet obtain some indulgence for the defendant; as, for instance, the permission to dispose of the wares on which he expended money in consequence of the plaintiff's delay (*f*).

Account or damages withheld.

Or, the injunction may be granted and the account of profits or damages, by which it is usually accompanied, withheld (*g*).

(*a*) *Lee* v. *Haley*, L. R. 5 Ch. 155; *Cave* v. *Myers*, Dig. 304.

(*b*) 31 L. T. N. S. 285.

(*c*) L. R. 10 Ch. 276.

(*d*) *Isaacson* v. *Thompson*, 41 L. J. Ch. 101.

(*e*) Per Sir G. Turner, L. J., in *Rodgers* v. *Nowill*, 3 De G. M. & G. 614. In *Cartier* v. *May*, Dig. 200, a delay of eighteen months was one of the grounds on which the motion to commit was refused.

(*f*) *Clowes* v. *Hogg*, W. N. 1870, p. 268; S. C. on appeal, W. N. 1871, p. 40; *Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Co.* v. *Swiss Condensed Milk Co.*, W. N. 1871, p. 163.

(*g*) *Harrison* v. *Taylor*, 11 Jur. N. S. 408; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner* (2), 54 How. Pr. 298;

Costs not given.

Lastly, the delay of the plaintiff may be punished by his being left to pay his own costs, though successful in his main contention (*a*). On the other hand, a defendant who has only defeated the plaintiff's claim by pleading the latter's delay, may fail to obtain thereby the costs of the proceedings occasioned by his own fraud (*b*).

8. *Plaintiff's Misrepresentation.*

8. Plaintiff's misrepresentation.

"The administration of Equity is founded on perfect truth" (*c*), and "when the owner of a trade mark applies for an injunction to restrain the defendant from injuring his property by making false representations to the public, it is essential that the plaintiff should not, in his trade mark, or in the business connected with it, be himself guilty of any false or misleading representation; for if the plaintiff makes any material false statement in connection with the property which he seeks to protect, he loses, and very justly, his right to claim the assistance of a Court of Equity. He must come there with clean hands" (*d*).

It is impossible to define what misrepresentation will disentitle the plaintiff to relief; all that can be said is,

McLean v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Carver* v. *Bowker*, Dig. 581; and see *Beard* v. *Turner*, 13 L. T. N. S. 746.

(*a*) See *Millington* v. *Fox*, 3 My. & Cr. 338; *Beard* v. *Turner*, 13 L. T. N. S. 746; *Day* v. *Neale*, V. C. B., May 24, 1881; *Perks* v. *Hall & Co.*, W. N. 1881, p. 111; *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner* (2), 54 How. Pr. 298.

(*b*) *Rodgers* v. *Rodgers*, 31 L. T. N. S. 285.

(*c*) Per Lord Romilly, M. R., in *Cocks* v. *Chandler*, L. R. 11 Eq. 446.

(*d*) Per Lord Westbury, C., in *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 4 De G. J. & S. 137; and see *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78; *Post* v. *Marsh*, 16 Ch. D. 395; *Petridge* v. *Wells*, 13 How. Pr. 385, R. Cox, 180; *Palmer* v. *Harris*, 60 Penn. 156, R. Cox, 523; *Laird* v. *Wilder*, 9 Bush, 131, 15 Amer. Rep. 707; *Wolfe* v. *Burke*, 11 Sickles, 115; *Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.* v. *Dorflinger*, 6 Am. L. T. N. S. 511; *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1925; *Seabury* v. *Grosvenor*, 14 Bl. C. C. 262; *Helmbold* v. *Helmbold Manufacturing Co.*, 53 How. Pr. 453; *Connell* v. *Reed*, 128 Mass. 477; *Burton* v. *Stratton*, 73 L. T. 349; *McNair* v. *Cleave*, 10 Phila. 155. Words which would be disentitled to protection in a court of justice by reason of their being calculated to deceive, are not to be registered under the Patents Act, 1883, § 73.

that "he that hath committed iniquity shall not have equity" (*a*).

Misstatements in plaintiff's marks.

The trade marks, labels, &c., of the plaintiff, who is complaining of fraud on the part of another, may themselves contain statements calculated to mislead and defraud the public, who are induced by such statements to buy goods which otherwise they would not buy. Thus, in *Pidding* v. *How* (*b*), the plaintiff sold tea which he termed "Howqua's Mixture," and which he put up in packets labelled with extravagant and false statements as to its origin and quality. Sir L. Shadwell, V.-C., declined to protect the plaintiff until he had established his title in a Court of Law, saying that it was a clear rule laid down by Courts of Equity not to extend their protection to persons whose case was not founded in truth.

Perry v. *Truefitt*.

In *Perry* v. *Truefitt* (*c*), the plaintiff sold "Perry's Medicated Mexican Balm," the secret of which he had bought from a Mr. Leathart. On his show-cards he falsely stated that the hair-mixture in question was made from a recipe of Von Blumenbach, and he also alleged in the same way that it was compounded from Mexican plants, which was not in the least borne out by evidence at the trial. Lord Langdale, M. R., agreeing with the observations of the Vice-Chancellor of England in *Pidding* v. *How* (*b*), did not think it a favourable case for the interposition of the Court, and ordered the matter to stand over, with liberty to bring an action.

Leather Cloth Co.' case.

In *The Leather Cloth Co.* v. *The American Leather Cloth Co.* (*d*), the House of Lords sustained the judgment of Lord Westbury, C. (*e*), and declined to protect the plaintiffs, who used a label or advertisement containing false statements as to the character and manufacture of their goods. Lord Westbury, C. (*e*), remarked, that he "could not

(*a*) *Palmer* v. *Harris*, 60 Penn. 156; R. Cox, 523. See *Blackwell* v. *Armistead*, 5 Am L. T. 85.
(*b*) 8 Sim. 477.
(*c*) 6 Beav. 66.
(*d*) 11 H. L. C. 523.
(*e*) 4 De G. J. & S. 137.

receive it as a rule either of morality or of equity, that the plaintiffs were not answerable for a fraud because it might be so gross and palpable that no one was likely to be deceived by it. If there was a wilfully false statement, he would not stop to enquire whether it was too gross to mislead."

Puffing.

In short, the Court will not protect a trade mark, label, &c., which contains, or has attached to it, a serious misstatement calculated to deceive (*a*). Mere puffing, however, or exaggerated statements as to the value, &c., of patent medicines, and similar preparations, will not disentitle their owners, since every one knows how to estimate the value of such statements correctly (*b*). Thus, in *Holloway* v. *Holloway* (*c*), the assumption of the title of "Professor" was disregarded; in *Metzler* v. *Wood* (*d*) it was held that the plaintiffs were not disentitled either by a representation that the publication was the 600th edition of the work, it being shown to be a trade custom to call 250 copies an edition, or by a statement that the work was specially revised by the author, the fact being that a previous edition which the present one followed had been so revised. In *Hogg* v. *Kirby* (*e*), the defendant, who had brought out what he intended to be taken for a continuation of the plaintiff's magazine, set up in his defence the fact that the plaintiff's magazine untruly professed to be by "William Granger, Esq." Lord Eldon granted the injunction, and it is certainly improbable that

(*a*) In *Raggett* v. *Findlater*, L. R. 17 Eq. 29, costs were given against the plaintiff mainly on account of a mis-statement by him.

(*b*) *Holloway* v. *Holloway*, 13 Beav. 209; *Comstock* v. *White*, 18 How. Pr. 421; R. Cox, 232; *Smith* v. *Woodruff*, 48 Barb. 438; R. Cox, 373. In America puffing has been treated somewhat more severely: *Foale* v. *Spear*, 7 Penn. L. J. 176; R. Cox, 67; *Heath* v. *Wright*, 3 Wall. Jr.; R. Cox, 151; *Partridge* v. *Wells*, 13 How. Pr. 385; R. Cox, 180; *Partridge* v. *Merchant*, 4 Abb. Pr. 156; *Hobbs* v. *Français*, 19 How. Pr. 567; R. Cox, 287; *Phalon* v. *Wright*, 5 Phila. 464; R. Cox, 307; *Laird* v. *Wilder*, 9 Bush, 131; 15 Amer. Rep. 707; *Wolfe* v. *Burke*, 11 Sickels, 115. But see *Ellis* v *Zeilen & Co.*, 42 Ga. 91.

(*c*) 13 Beav. 209.

(*d*) 8 Ch. D. 606.

(*e*) 8 Ves. 215.

any one could be injured by the use of a name previously unknown (*a*).

If the misrepresentation is in other respects such as to disentitle, the fact of its being made in a foreign language does not necessarily save the plaintiff from losing the rights which he would have had if no such statements had been made (*b*). False statement in foreign language.

The use of the name of his predecessor by one who has succeeded him in business, when such use will not lead to any other supposition than that the business is the same (*c*), or the use of his own name, without more, by one whose name happens to be the same as that of another manufacturer (*d*), is not such a misrepresentation as to disentitle such a person to relief against fraud. But where a trader has been in the habit of labelling his goods (*e.g.*, a particular medicine) with statements which refer to himself personally, and his successor in business continues to use the same statements, "a Court of Equity will extend no aid to sustain a claim to a trade mark of an article which is put forth with a misrepresentation to the public as to the manufacturer of the article, and as to the place where it is manufactured, both of which particulars were originally circumstances to guide the purchaser of the medicine" (*e*). Use of predecessor's name.

Collateral misrepresentations made by the plaintiff, as, for instance, in an advertisement in the newspapers, do not necessarily disentitle him to protection (*f*). Nor do misstatements of so trifling a character as not to mislead Collateral misrepresentations.

(*a*) And see *Dale* v. *Smithson*, 12 Abb. Pr. 237; R. Cox, 282; *Meriden Britannia Co.* v. *Parker*, 39 Conn. 450; 12 Amer. Rep. 401.

(*b*) *Palmer* v. *Harris*, 60 Penn. 156; R. Cox, 523.

(*c*) *Leather Cloth Co.s'* case, 1 H. & M. 271; 4 De G. J. & S. 137; 11 H. L. C. 523: *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79; *Massam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.*, 14 Ch. D. 748; *Fulton* v. *Sellers*, 4 Brews. 42. But see *Sherwood* v. *Andrews*, 3 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 588; *Partridge* v. *Menck*, 2 Sandf. Ch. 622; and *Carmichel* v. *Latimer*, 11 R. I. 395.

(*d*) *Holloway* v. *Holloway*, 13 Beav. 209; *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, 3 De G. M. & G. 896.

(*e*) Per U. S. Supreme Court in *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1925.

(*f*) *Curtis* v. *Bryan*, 2 Daly, 212: R. Cox, 434; and see *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

purchasers (*a*), or statements not made till after the institution of the action (*a*).

Fraudulent speculation.

It is not the province of the Court, however, to protect speculations which aim at inducing the public to buy one thing when they think they are buying another, and therefore, where both plaintiffs and defendant were engaged in speculations of that character, although the Court refused, on the ground of the plaintiffs' delay, to grant the injunction they prayed, it declined to give costs to the defendant, who was *in pari delicto* (*b*). And on similar grounds relief will be refused to a plaintiff who has used his trade mark on goods of inferior quality to those with which the mark has become associated (*c*), or who has used the mark beyond the limits to which he was confined on the assignment of it to him (*c*).

Hogg v. *Maxwell.*

In *Hogg* v. *Maxwell* (*d*), the plaintiff registered, under the Copyright Acts, the title of an intended magazine in 1863, but did not bring out the work. In June, 1866, the defendant registered the same name. The plaintiff discovered this in August. He then hastened on his own publication, which was first announced on September 24, and published next day. In the meantime the plaintiff had, on the 19th, undertaken to advertise the defendant's intended magazine, but retracted the undertaking, and gave the defendant notice of his claim to the title on the 25th. Proceedings were taken by both parties with a view to an injunction, which was refused in both cases, the Court

(*a*) *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801. Thus, in *Blackwell* v. *Armistead*, 5 Am. L. T. 85, a misstatement as to the date of commencement of the business, made in *bonâ fide* error by a junior partner, was condoned.

(*b*) *Estcourt* v. *Estcourt Hop Essence Co.*, L. R. 10 Ch. 276; and see *In re Saunion & Co.*, Dig. 625; *Samuel* v. *Berger*, 24 Barb. 163; R. Cox, 178; *Bloss* v. *Bloomer*, 23 Barb. 604; R. Cox, 200; *In re American Sardine Co.*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 495; *In re Dole Bros.*, 12 *ib.* 939; *In re Warbury & Co.*, 13 *ib.* 44; *Ex parte Marsching & Co.*, 15 *ib.* 294; *Ex parte Knapp*, 16 *ib.* 318; *Fairbanks* v. *Jacobus*, 14 Bl. C. C. 337, with which compare *In re Green*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 729.

(*c*) *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461.

(*d*) L. R. 2 Ch. 316.

being of opinion, in *Hogg* v. *Maxwell*, that the plaintiff had got beforehand by improper means, which disentitled him to relief.

The Court will not protect persons in carrying on a trade in which short weight is given systematically and knowingly (*a*). And in *Hennessy* v. *Wheeler* (*b*), the New York Court of Common Pleas refused relief to brandy merchants who sold their brandy in bottles containing quarts and pints of nominal measure, but really considerably less. But this decision was reversed on appeal on the ground that the bottles were not bought on the faith of their containing any particular quantity of brandy, and that no one was proved to have been deceived or was likely to be so. Short weight.

9. *Word "Patent" improperly used by Plaintiff.*

"It is impossible not to see," says Sir G. Mellish, L.J., "that persons do try to use their right in trade marks for the purpose of getting a monopoly in particular articles, just as if they had a patent for the goods which they manufacture" (*c*). A special form of misrepresentation consists in the use by persons in their trade marks of words inducing the belief that they have a patent for the articles to which those trade marks are affixed, and the tendency which the use of such words has to procure for the persons using them an unfair monopoly, or to prolong a monopoly granted only for a limited time, causes it to be regarded with special disfavour. The importance of the point is forcibly pointed out by Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in *Morgan* v. *McAdam* (*d*). He says: "All those who are induced to buy these crucibles thus described as 'Patent Plumbago Crucibles,' are to a certain extent deceived, because 9. Improper use of word "patent."

(*a*) See per Sir G. M. Giffard, L.J., in *Lee* v. *Haley*, L. R. 5 Ch. 155.

(*b*) 51 How. Pr. 457; 69 N. Y. 271.

(*c*) *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 2 Ch. D. 434—56.

(*d*) 36 L. J. Ch. 228.

they are led to believe that the article is protected by a patent, and thus may be induced to purchase it from the plaintiffs, under the belief that there is a patent, and that the plaintiffs, or at least some limited number of persons, are the only persons authorized to sell it; and further, they are led to believe that if they should be minded to set up any manufactory of the same kind for themselves, they would be unable to do so in consequence of the plaintiffs being the possessors, either by way of licence or ownership, of a patent preventing the world at large from imitating the article which is sold by them under this particular designation" (*a*).

Plaintiff disentitled.

Where, therefore, the plaintiff has used in his trade mark the word "patent," or words to that effect, although, in point of fact, he has never had a patent for the goods to which the mark is applied, the Court will refuse to extend to him the protection which he has forfeited. Previously to Sir John Rolt's Act (*b*), liberty was given to the plaintiff to bring an action at Law (*c*); but since then the action has been simply dismissed, with or without costs (*d*). And the course would be the same if the words were first inserted in the trade mark, after the expiration of a patent which had existed (*e*). In *Sykes* v. *Sykes* (*f*), a patent had been taken out by the plaintiff's father. That patent was held to be invalid, on account of a defect in the specification, but the use of the word "patent" was not

(*a*) And see per the same learned judge, in *Flavel* v. *Harrison*, 10 Hare, 467.

(*b*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 27.

(*c*) *Flavel* v. *Harrison*, 10 Hare, 467.

(*d*) *Morgan* v. *Meldam*, 36 L. J. Ch. 228; *Lamplough* v. *Balmer*, W. N. 1867, p. 293; *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *Lorsont*, L. R. 9 Eq. 352; *Nicey* v. *Roffey*, W. N. 1870, p. 227; and see *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611. In *Stewart* v. *Smithson*, 1 Hilt. 119, R. Cox, 175, the Court of C. P. of New York refused to recognise this as a defence; but the word "patent" has been refused registration in America in connection with an article made under an expired patent (*In re Richardson*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 120), and in *In re Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.*, 14 *ib.* 269, the name of a patentee was refused registration. But see *Ex parte Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.*, 16 *ib.* 679.

(*e*) *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78

(*f*) 3 B. & Cr. 541.

held to disqualify the plaintiff from recovering at Law. The question does not seem, however, to have been fairly raised in that early case, and it has been held in America that marks containing a reference to a patent declared to be invalid could not be protected by injunction (*a*).

Retention of word after expiration of patent.

There has been some apparent difference of opinion in regard to the case in which the word "patent" has been inserted in the trade mark while the article was still patented, and has been retained there after the patent has run out. In such a case (*b*), Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, the blocks for the labels having been made during the existence of the patent, when the representation was perfectly true. Lord Kingsdown, in discussing this judgment (*c*), said that he agreed with it, if the word "patent" were only used as part of the designation of an article, but that he could not do so if the trade mark represented the article as protected by an existing patent. In a subsequent case (*d*), the Vice-Chancellor explained his meaning as being in harmony with that of Lord Kingsdown. "If originally you have a patent, and the article is in the market as a patent article, and you stamp all your goods which are sent out with these words 'patent pins,' or 'patent wire,' or whatever the particular article might be, at the end or the expiration of the patent, it is not necessary, as I thought, to call in the whole of the previous stamps, and remodel the whole of your stamps, and have a new form of packing your article, in order that you may inform the world that the patent, which did exist, has expired. Of course, it would be better, and those who are inclined to act with scrupulous honesty would take care, to put the date of their patent, which would obviate all difficulty (*e*), upon

(*a*) *Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.* v. *Dorflinger*, 6 Am. L. T. N. S. 511.

(*b*) *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78.

(*c*) *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 11 H. L. C. 523.

(*d*) *Moryan* v. *McAdam*, 36 L. J. Ch. 228.

(*e*) See *Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.* v. *Dorflinger*, 6 Am. L. T. N. S. 511; *Wilson* v. *Singer Manufacturing Co.*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1091; *Fairbanks* v. *Jacobus*, 14 Bl. C. C. 337.

the articles which they designate as patented." In a later case (*a*), it was clearly established by the Court of Appeal that the principle enunciated by Lord Kingsdown is the rule of the Court, and that the use of the word "patent," so as to indicate an existing patent, is equally fatal, whether there has never been a patent for the article in question, or the patent which did exist has expired (*b*).

Word so used as not to deceive.

As has been seen, Lord Hatherley, when V.-C. (*c*), and Lord Kingsdown (*d*), were of opinion that when the word "patent" formed part of the name of an article, and did not operate so as to induce a belief in the existence of a patent, the trade mark in which the word appeared might be protected. A distinct decision to this effect was pronounced by Sir W. M. James, V.-C., in *Marshall* v. *Ross* (*e*), where "patent thread" was compared by the learned judge to "patent leather boots" (*f*). And where the plaintiffs had described themselves as "patentees" of an article of which they had secured the exclusive manufacture by registration, though not by letters patent, it was held that they were not disentitled (*g*). In *Lauferty* v. *Wheeler* (*h*), it was held that the plaintiff was not disentitled by reason of having described his goods as "Patent, Sept.," after being officially informed that his application for a patent had been allowed, but before the actual issue of letters patent. Similarly, it seems that a statement that a trade mark is registered before it in fact is so, does not disentitle the proprietor to sue, after registration has been effected (*i*), though it exposes the proprietor to a penalty (*k*).

(*a*) *Chearin* v. *Walker*, 5 Ch. D. 850. And see *Fairbanks* v. *Jacobus*, 14 Bl. C. C. 337.

(*b*) The penalties inflicted under § 105 of the Patents Act, 1883, for the improper use of the word "patent," are not, however, incurred by the continued use of the word upon goods for which a patent has previously been possessed.

(*c*) *Morgan* v. *Meadam*, 36 L. J. Ch 228.

(*d*) *Leather Cloth Co's* case, 11 H. L. C. 523.

(*e*) L. R. 8 Eq. 651.

(*f*) See the observations on this case, in *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *Lorsont*, L. R. 9 Eq. 345. And see, too, *Ransome* v. *Graham*, 51 L. J. Ch. 897.

(*g*) *Cure* v. *Myers*, Dig. 304.

(*h*) 63 How. Pr. 488.

(*i*) See per Brett, L.J., in *Read* v. *Richardson*, 45 L. T. N. S. 54.

(*k*) See Patents Act, 1883, § 105.

Grossness of misrepresentation no excuse.

The fact that the misrepresentation is so gross as hardly to be capable of deceiving will not exonerate the person making it from the consequences. Thus, the use on untanned leather cloth of the words "tanned patented" was a ground for refusing assistance (*a*).

"Manufacturer and patentee."

Where a plaintiff described himself on his labels as "manufacturer and patentee," it was held that this was equivalent to describing the article as "patent," and the bill was dismissed, without costs (*b*). And in *Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.* v. *Dorflinger* (*c*), it was held that certain trade marks consisting of the words "Mason's Patent, November 30th, 1858," "Mason's Improved," and "The Mason Jar of 1858," were bad, the patent of 1858 being invalid by judicial decision.

Lamplough v. *Balmer.*

When a plaintiff used on his stopper labels with the words "Royal Letters Patent," the explanation that he had for twenty-five years paid the stamp duty on "patent medicines," and that he was only continuing to use the labels he had had on hand when he discovered his medicines did not belong to that class, was not accepted as satisfactory, and his motion for an injunction to restrain an imitator was refused (*d*).

Collateral use of word.

If, however, the plaintiff's trade is a perfectly honest trade, and the trade mark is a perfectly honest trade mark, the fact that the plaintiff has committed a purely collateral misrepresentation, by describing himself, though not in the trade mark itself, as "patentee," will not disentitle him to his remedy (*e*).

Word "patent" not registered.

With respect to trade marks registered under the Patents Act, 1883, the improper use of the word "patent" will not in the future often form a subject for consideration, since that word will not be registered in connection with

(*a*) *Leather Cloth Co.s' case*, 4 De G. J. & S. 137; 11 H. L. C. 523.

(*b*) *Nixey* v. *Roffey*, W. N. 1870, p. 227. And see Patents Act, 1883, § 105.

(*c*) 6 Am. L. T. N. S. 511.

(*d*) *Lamplough* v. *Balmer*, W N. 1867, p. 293.

(*e*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

such a trade mark (*a*), but the old rules will no doubt prevail if the word is used untruly, though not registered.

Patents Act.

By § 105 of the Patents Act, 1883 (*b*), it is provided that "any person who represents that any article sold by him is a patented article, when no patent has been granted for the same, or describes any design or trade mark applied to any article sold by him as registered, which is not so, shall be liable for every offence on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding £5." And it is also provided that "a person shall be deemed, for the purposes of this enactment, to represent that an article is patented, or a design or a trade mark is registered, if he sells the article with the word 'patent,' 'patented,' 'registered,' or any word or words expressing or implying that a patent or registration has been obtained for the article stamped, engraved, or impressed on, or otherwise applied to the article."

Merchandise Marks Act.

By the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, § 7 (*c*), a penalty is imposed upon every one who shall mark, &c., upon any goods any word, &c., for the purpose of falsely indicating such goods, or the mode of manufacturing them, or the ornamentation, shape, or configuration thereof, to be the subject of any existing patent, privilege, or copyright.

Under § 9, however, the use of the word "patent" and words of that class is not punishable under the 7th section, when used in such combinations as "patent thread," in *Marshall* v. *Ross* (*d*), or "patent leather boots."

(*a*) See Instructions, par. 30.

(*b*) This replaces § 7 of 5 & 6 Will IV. c. 83. See *Myers* v. *Baker*, 3 H. & N. 802. In America a penalty is similarly assigned for the use of the word "Patented" on an unpatented article (U. S. Rev. St. § 4901. See *Wilson* v. *Singer Manufacturing Co.*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1091; *Stimpson* v. *Pond*, 2 Curtis, 502); but this is only if there is an intent to defraud, and that question is for the jury (*Walker* v. *Hawxhurst*, 5 Bl. C. C. 494). In *U. S.* v. *Morris* (2 Bond, 23), Leavitt, J., held that the statute did not apply unless the goods were patentable; but in *Oliphant* v. *Salem Flouring Mills* (5 Sawy. 128), Deady, J. held that it applied whether the goods were patentable or not.

(*c*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 88.

(*d*) L. R. 8 Eq. 651.

INOPERATIVE DEFENCES.

Among the defences which have occasionally been set up in actions for infringement of trade mark, but without success, are the following:

Ignorance of the plaintiff's rights. This will not suffice to prevent the issue of the injunction (*a*); although it may have the effect of relieving the defendant from the necessity of accounting (*b*). Ignorance.

Absence of intention to sell the goods bearing the spurious mark is no defence (*c*). No intention to sell.

Absence of proof of actual deception or fraudulent intention is no defence, if in the opinion of the Court or jury there is such imitation as to be calculated to deceive (*d*). No actual deception or fraud.

It is no defence to prove that all the persons who bought from the defendant goods bearing the plaintiff's mark were well aware that they were not of the plaintiff's manufacture (*e*). Immediate purchasers not deceived.

Nor to show that the words, of the use of which the plaintiff complains, are ambiguous and capable of being understood by different persons in different ways (*f*). Words ambiguous.

Nor to say that the plaintiff's entire mark has not been copied (*g*). Only part of mark taken.

(*a*) *Burgess* v. *Hills*, 26 Beav. 244; *Geary* v. *Norton*, 1 De G. & S. 9; *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292; *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 Beav. 578; *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Grant, Smith & Co.*, 2 Hyde, 185; *Weed* v. *Peterson*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 178; *Upmann* v. *Forester*, 24 Ch. D. 231; and other cases.

(*b*) *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten, ubi suprà*; *Moet* v. *Couston, ubi suprà*; *Rose* v. *Loftus*, 47 L. J. Ch. 576.

(*c*) *Upmann* v. *Forester*, 24 Ch. D. 231.

(*d*) *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *Cope* v. *Evans*, L. R. 18 Eq. 138; *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Grant, Smith & Co.*, 2 Hyde, 185; *Coats* v. *Holbrook*, 2 Sandf. 586, R. Cox, 20; *Taylor* v. *Carpenter*, 11 Paige, 292; 2 Sandf. 603; R. Cox, 45; *Coffeen* v. *Brunton*, 4 McLean, 516, 5 *ib.* 256; R. Cox, 82, 132; *Davis* v. *Kendall*, 2 R. I. 566; R. Cox, 112; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Shaver* v. *Shaver*, 54 Iowa, 208; and see Ch. IV., on Infringement.

(*e*) *Sykes* v. *Sykes*, 3 P. & Cr. 541; *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten, ubi suprà*; *Rose* v. *Loftus*, 47 L. J. Ch. 576; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15; *Balfour & Co.* v. *Kilburn & Co.*, 1 Hyde, 270.

(*f*) *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15, per Lord Selborne, C.

(*g*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611; *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; *Shaver* v. *Shaver*, 54 Iowa, 208; and see cases at p. 125, *suprà*.

Name used is defendant's own.

Nor to say that the name, to the use of which by the defendant the plaintiff objects, is the defendant's own, if he has used it so as to deceive (*a*).

Colourable authority.

Nor to produce a colourable authority to use the name of a person having the same name as that used by the plaintiff in his business (*b*).

Goods plaintiff's own of different quality.

Nor to say that the goods which the defendant is selling under the mark in question are goods manufactured by the plaintiff; if they are of a different quality from that of which the defendant represents them to be (*c*).

Equality in quality.

Nor to say that the spurious goods are equal in quality to the genuine ones, for the plaintiff's right is equally invaded (*d*).

Addition of defendant's name.

The defendant will not escape by showing that he has used his own name in conjunction with the mark or word which is alleged to be used in infringement of the plaintiff's rights (*e*).

(*a*) *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, 3 De G. M. & G. 896; *Pullar* v. *Pullar*, Fry, J., April 9, 1883; *Shaver* v. *Shaver*, 54 Iowa, 208; *India-Rubber Comb Co.* v. *Rubber Comb and Jewelry Co*, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 258; and see cases at p. 116.

(*b*) *Perry* v. *Truefitt*, 6 Beav. 66; *Croft* v. *Day*, 7 Beav. 84; *Moet* v. *Clybouw*, Dig. 533; *Dence* v. *Mason* (1), Dig. 534; 41 L. T. N. S. 573; *Williams* v. *Johnson*, 2 Bos. 1; *Phalon* v. *Wright*, 5 Phila. 464; *Perks* v. *Hall & Co.*, W. N. 1881, p. 111; *Sawyer* v. *Kellogg*, 19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1627, 20 *ib.* 1893; *Meriden Britannia Co.* v. *Parker*, 39 Conn. 450, 12 Amer. Rep. 401; *Wolfe* v. *Barnett*, 24 La. Ann. 97, 13 Amer. Rep. 111. But see *Beard* v. *Turner*, 13 L. T. N. S. 746; *Hallett* v. *Cumston*, 110 Mass. 29; *Ayer* v. *Rushton*, 7 Daly, 9; *Dence* v. *Brand*, W. N. 1881, p. 31.

(*c*) *Hennessy* v. *Kennett*, Dig. 556; *Hennessy* v. *White*, 6 W. W. & A'B. Eq. 216; *Hennessy* v. *Hogan*, *ib.* 225; *Gillott* v. *Kettle*, 3 Duer, 624.

(*d*) *Blofeld* v. *Payne*, 4 B. & Ad. 410; *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185 (per Lord Westbury, C. "It is not necessary, for the injunction, to prove . . . that the credit of the plaintiff is injured by the sale of an inferior article. The injury done to the plaintiff in his trade by loss of custom is sufficient to support his title to relief"); *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15, per Lord Blackburn; *Coats* v. *Holbrook*, 2 Sandf. 586, R. Cox, 20; *Taylor* v. *Carpenter*, 11 Paige, 292; 2 Sandf. 603; R. Cox, 45; *Partridge* v. *Menck*, 2 Barb. 101; 1 How. App. Cas. 558; R. Cox, 72; *Cook* v. *Starkweather*, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392; *Shaver* v. *Shaver*, 54 Iowa, 208; *Coffeen* v. *Brunton*, 5 McLean, 256; R. Cox, 132.

(*e*) *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*, L. R. 5 H. L. 508; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 3 App. Cas. 376; *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801; *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447; *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611; *Kinahan* v. *Bolton*, 15 Ir. Ch. 75; *Eno* v. *Stephens*, Dig. 609; *Rose* v.

Addition of address.

Nor by showing that he has always placed his own address on the goods (*a*).

User by others.

Nor by showing that the same mark has been used by other persons on goods of another class (*b*), or by less than three firms besides the plaintiff on goods of the same class (*c*), or by different firms abroad, if not in England (*d*).

Infringement by others.

Nor by showing that the plaintiff's trade mark has been infringed by others without his knowledge or acquiescence (*e*).

A plurality of marks or names.

It is no defence to say that the plaintiff uses more than one trade mark on the same goods (*f*), nor that his goods have been known by a variety of names (*g*).

Puffing.

Mere exaggerated statements of the merits of medical or other compounds on the part of the plaintiff, which do not amount to fraud, will not exonerate the defendant from the consequences of his own fraud (*h*). Nor will other statements by the plaintiff, which, though not absolutely correct, cannot mislead in any important respect (*i*), *e.g.*,

Loftus, 47 L. J. Ch. 576; *Field* v. *Lewis*, Dig. 280; *Reinhardt* v. *Spalding*, 49 L. J. Ch. 57; *Berliner Brauerei Gesellschaft Tivoli* v. *Knight, Stocks & Co.*, W. N. 1883, p. 70; *Lea* v. *Wolff*, 15 Abb. Pr. N. S. 1; *Frese* v. *Bachof* (2), 14 Bl. C. C. 432; *Boardman* v. *Meriden Britannia Co.*, 35 Conn. 402; *Siegert* v. *Ehlers*, Dig. 432; *Davis* v. *Kennedy*, 13 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 523; *Roberts* v. *Sheldon*, 8 Biss. 398; *Hier* v. *Abrahams*, 82 N. Y. 519; *Hegeman & Co.* v. *O'Byrne*, 9 Daly, 264; *Carroll* v. *Ertheiler*, 21 Alb. L. J. 503; *Fleischmann* v. *Schuckmann*, 62 How. Pr. 92. But compare *Cheavin* v. *Walker*, 5 Ch. D. 850; *Barrett* v. *Gomm*, 74 L. T. 388; *Barrett* v. *White*, North, J., May 12, 1883; *Mages Furnace Co.* v. *Le Barron*, 127 Mass. 115; *Thornton* v. *Crowley*, 47 N Y. Super. Ct. 527.

(*a*) *Gray* v. *Taper Sleeve Pulley Works*, 24 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 602.

(*b*) *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518; *Colman* v. *Crump*, 70 N. Y. 573; *Hegeman & Co.* v. *O'Byrne*, 9 Daly, 264.

(*c*) *Dent* v. *Turpin*, 2 J. & H. 139; *Dunnachie* v. *Young & Sons*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 4th ser. X. 874; and cases at p. 97.

(*d*) *Berliner Brauerei Gesellschaft Tivoli* v. *Knight, Stocks & Co.*, W. N. 1883, p. 70.

(*e*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611; *Taylor* v. *Carpenter*, 3 Story, 458; R. Cox, 14; *Filley* v. *Fassett*, 44 Mo. 173; R. Cox, 530.

(*f*) *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson*, 3 App. Cas. 376; *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284.

(*g*) *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 13 Ch. D. 434.

(*h*) *Holloway* v. *Holloway*, 13 Beav. 209; *Metzler* v. *Wood*, 8 Ch. D. 606; *Comstock* v. *White*, 18 How. Pr. 421. See cases at p. 192.

(*i*) *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801.

an allegation that the plaintiff's mark was registered before registration had actually been effected (*a*).

Slight delay.

The defendant will not escape by alleging laches on the part of the plaintiff in prosecuting his action, if no greater delay has taken place than was requisite to enable necessary evidence to be obtained (*b*).

Infancy.

Infancy is no defence, for "if an infant practises a fraud, he is liable for the consequences" (*c*), and he will be in the same position as an adult with respect to the payment of costs (*d*).

Defendant's mark registered.

Registration of the defendant's mark at Stationers' Hall, or in the trade marks register (*a*), is no defence (*e*).

Interference with defendant's business.

Nor is it any defence to say that an injunction, if granted, would interfere with the defendant's business, or with that of other manufacturers, since they will be able to trade as they please, with the sole exception of using the plaintiff's trade mark (*f*).

Discovery and Inspection.

Discovery.

The plaintiff in a trade-mark case sometimes thinks it advisable, for the purposes of his action, to obtain from the defendant a disclosure of certain particulars of his business, as, for instance, of the names of customers to whom the goods alleged to be marked with the plaintiff's trade mark have been sold, or, on whose account such goods have been conveyed.

Principles on which given.

The principles on which this advantage is given or withheld are thus stated by Lord Hatherley, C. (*g*): "The Court

(*a*) *Read* v. *Richardson*, 45 L. T. N. S. 54.

(*b*) *Lee* v. *Haley*, L. R. 5 Ch. 155; *Cave* v. *Myers*, Dig. 304. See *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245.

(*c*) Per Sir T. Plumer, V.-C., in *Cory* v. *Gertcken*, 2 Madd. 49.

(*d*) *Chubb* v. *Griffiths*, 35 Beav. 127.

(*e*) *Reinhardt* v. *Spalding*, 49 L. J. Ch. 57.

(*f*) *Ransome* v. *Graham*, 51 L. J. Ch. 897. See *Cope* v. *Evans*, L. R. 18 Eq. 138; *Bass* v. *Dawber*, 19 L. T. N. S. 626.

(*g*) *Moore* v. *Craven*, L. R. 7 Ch. 94.

does not, when discovery is a matter of indifference to the defendant, weigh in golden scales the question of materiality or immateriality; but where the nature of the discovery required is such that the giving of it may be prejudicial to the defendant, the Court takes into consideration the special circumstances of the case, and whilst, on the one hand, it takes care that the plaintiff obtains all the discovery which can be of use to him, on the other, it is bound to protect the defendant against undue inquisition into his affairs. The question of materiality must be tested by reference to the case made by the plaintiff's pleadings, and to what will be in issue at the hearing."

Not given where oppressive.

"The more strict the Court is in compelling a full answer, the more necessary it is that the Court should be vigilant in seeing that the process of the Court is not made use of in an oppressive manner" (*a*). Where, therefore, the L.JJ. were of opinion that the discovery asked was such as the plaintiff, even if he failed at the hearing, might yet afterwards use in a manner prejudicial to the defendant, and were not satisfied that there was any real prospect of its being of material service to the plaintiff at the hearing, they reversed the order of the Duchy Court of Lancaster, by which such discovery had been granted (*b*).

Benbow v. *Low.*

So in *Benbow v. Low* (*c*) the defendants exhibited interrogatories requiring the plaintiffs to state (*inter alia*) what quantities of soap had been sold by them bearing the name in dispute, between the dissolution of the original partnership and the date of the action, distinguishing between the quantities sold in each year, and between the quantities sold in England, and in the United States, and in the continent of Europe, and Bacon, V.-C.,

(*a*) Per Sir C. J. Selwyn, L.J., in *Lockett* v. *Lockett*, L. R. 4 Ch. 341. And see *Piggott* v. *Anglo-American Telegraph Co.*, 19 L. T. N. S. 46.

(*b*) *Carver* v. *Pinto Leite*, L. R. 7 Ch. 90. "If the Court sees that all fair and legitimate purposes will be answered by a restricted discovery, it will so restrict it;" per Sir C. Hall, V.-C., in *Orr* v. *Diaper*, 4 Ch. D. 92, commenting on this case.

(*c*) 16 Ch. D. 93.

and the Court of Appeal held that the plaintiffs were justified in refusing to answer, as the question was framed, not for the ordinary purposes of discovery, but in order to get at the details of a part of the plaintiff's evidence.

Given when necessary.

On the other hand, "the Court, while it takes care that no oppressive use is made of its forms of procedure, must take care that parties are not allowed to refuse discovery which they ought to make" (*a*). Where, therefore, a defendant who, having been the agent in London of the plaintiff, an American sewing-machine maker, continued, after dismissal, to advertise himself as the plaintiff's agent, and to sell as "the Howe Sewing Machine" machines not made by the plaintiff, and refused to give discovery of all the machines sold by him, with the prices, profits, names of purchasers, and other particulars, on the ground that he would thereby disclose the names of his customers and the secrets of his trade, Sir J. Romilly, M.R., held that the discovery might be extremely material to the plaintiff, and ordered it to be given (*b*). Again, where the plaintiff obtained an injunction against the defendants, and the defendants offered to submit to an injunction and pay costs, and then moved to stay proceedings, the answer to the plaintiff's interrogatories not having yet been given, Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., said that the plaintiff had a right to ascertain the facts in his own way, by the answer of the defendants to his interrogatories, and that until the defendants had put in their answer, it was impossible for the Court to say whether or not he had done rightly in rejecting the terms offered by the defendants. The motion was dismissed, with costs (*c*).

(*a*) Per Sir G. M. Giffard, L.J., in *Thompson* v. *Dunn*, L. R. 5 Ch. 576. And see *Renard* v. *Levinstein*, 10 L. T. N. S. 94; *Russell* v. *Crichton*, Ct. Sess. Cas., 1st ser., XV., 1270; *Union Paper Collar Co.* v. *Metropolitan Collar Co., Ld.*, 3 Daly, 171; *Byass* v. *Sullivan*, 21 How. Pr. 50.

(*b*) *Hoxe* v. *McKernan*, 30 Beav. 547.

(*c*) *Stephens* v. *Brett*, 10 L.T. N.S. 231.

In *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *Hirschfeld* (*a*), a decree having been made directing the defendant to account for all goods sold by him with a particular stamp, it was decided by the same learned judge that the defendant was compellable to disclose the names of all persons to whom he had sold any such goods, and that if he could not say to which of his customers the stamped goods were sold, he was then (but not otherwise) compellable to disclose the names of all customers to whom he had sold goods which he would not swear positively were unstamped. *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *Hirschfeld.*

In *Orr* v. *Diaper* (*b*) the plaintiffs discovered that the defendants, who were shippers, had exported large quantities of goods packed and marked in imitation of theirs, for certain persons unknown. Being unable to discover the infringers, they applied to the defendants for discovery, and this being refused, instituted an action against them, in which discovery was prayed. The defendants having demurred, on the ground that no relief was prayed or intended to be prayed against them, Sir C. Hall, V.-C., held that the fact that the plaintiffs required the information for the purposes of an action against the infringers was sufficient, without their intending to bring an action against the shippers, and granted the discovery. Action for discovery.

By the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862 (*c*), any person who has sold, &c., any goods marked with a spurious trade mark, is bound, within forty-eight hours after delivery of a demand in writing, to give full information in writing of the name and address of the person from whom he obtained the goods, and of the time when he obtained them. In case of refusal, a justice of the peace may summon and fine the person refusing, and such refusal is *primâ facie* evidence that the person refusing was acquainted with the illegal circumstances. Discovery under Merchandise Marks Act.

Again, by sect. 21, the Court or a judge is empowered, Inspection.

(*a*) 1 H. & M. 295.
(*b*) 4 Ch. D. 92.
(*c*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 88, § 6.

in a trade mark case, to make such order as such Court or judge shall think fit for inspection; and it is provided that any person who shall refuse or neglect any such order shall be guilty of a contempt of Court.

Inspection under Judicature Act.

In *Hennessy* v. *Rohmann* (*a*), Sir R. Malins, V.-C., granted inspection of cases and bottles used by the defendants. In *Smith* v. *Harris* (*b*), the plaintiff in a trade mark case alleged by his statement of claim that he had for many years used the word "Glenlivet" on his invoices, letters, billheads, and whiskey casks, and, on the defendant's application, he was ordered to produce for inspection the invoices, letters and billheads in his possession so marked, but not the casks.

Particulars.

In the last-mentioned case the defendant alleged by his statement of defence that the plaintiff had for many years been well aware of the word "Glenlivet" being widely used in the trade in connection with other makes of whiskey, and the Court of Appeal ordered (*c*) the defendant within an appointed time to deliver particulars of the names of the persons alleged to have used the word with the plaintiff's knowledge, and the times when and places where they had done so, and ordered that, if the defendant should not do so, the paragraph in the defence should be struck out.

Account.

Account.

A most important part of the remedy given in Equity for the infringement of the rights of the owner of a trade mark is the account of the profits, by which such profits as have been dishonestly acquired by a defendant by means of the reputation of another are restored to the

(*a*) 36 L. T. N. S. 51. This was under Order LII., r. 3, of the Rules of Court lately abrogated.

(*b*) 48 L. T. N. S. 869.

(*c*) Feb. 6th, 1884.

plaintiff, whose they ought to have been at first. The principle is the same as where a man is made to account for the profits which he has improperly received, arising from the fraudulent manufacture of a secret medicine (*a*), or the publication of a newspaper (*b*).

Incident to injunction.

"The liability to account for the profits is incident to the injunction" (*c*), and "on authority and principle it is clear that if a man manufactures goods and knowingly marks them with the trade mark of another person, he is accountable for the profits so made" (*d*).

Wherever another's mark is placed on the goods by the defendant.

So long as the defendant is aware that he is using a trade mark which is not his, the fact that he does not know to whom the trade mark belongs which is on the goods he is selling, does not in the slightest degree affect the right of the owner to an injunction and an account of profits. And since the defendant cannot himself have placed on the goods another's trade mark without being aware that he was infringing someone's trade mark rights, though he may not have known exactly whose it was, he will be accountable in all cases in which he has himself placed the mark on the goods (*e*).

Not so, where he bought goods ready marked.

But where the defendant has bought marked goods and re-sold them in ignorance that the trade mark on them was forged, although the plaintiff will be entitled to his injunction, he will not be entitled to an account, except in respect of any user by the defendant after he became aware of the prior ownership (*f*). On this principle, in *Ellin* v. *Slack* (*g*), a defendant who had bought and re-sold goods bearing a mark which infringed the plaintiff's trade mark, but without knowledge of the infringement,

(*a*) *Green* v. *Folgham*, 1 S. & S. 398.

(*b*) *Gilbett* v. *Read*, 9 Mod. 459.

(*c*) Per Sir J. Romilly, M.R., in *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292.

(*d*) Per Sir J. Romilly, M.R., in *Moet* v. *Couston*. 33 Beav. 578. See *Carver* v. *Bowker*, Dig. 581. The account only extends to goods actually sold under the spurious mark, not to goods manufactured but not sold. See *Stonebraker* v. *Stonebraker*, 33 Md. 252.

(*e*) *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, *ubi suprà*; *Moet* v. *Couston*, *ubi suprà*. And see S. C. 10 L. T. N. S. 395.

(*f*) *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G J. & S. 185; *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 Beav. 578.

(*g*) 24 Sol. J. 290.

and who, on hearing of the infringement, had at once desisted from any further sales and offered to submit to a perpetual injunction with costs, was relieved from accounting.

Account sometimes useless.

In many cases the main object of the action is to obtain the injunction, the account being of very secondary importance (*a*), and occasionally the injury suffered by the plaintiff, and the profits received by the defendant, have been so small that the account has not formed part of the relief awarded, so that the old rule that the injunction was subordinate to the account (*b*) no longer holds good.

No account where laches.

As a plaintiff may be disentitled to his injunction by reason of his own laches, so he may be disentitled by the same reason to the account of profits. If he permits the defendant to continue his infringement for a prolonged period, he will not then be allowed to treat him as his salesman, and claim an account (*c*). But if the plaintiff has not been aware of the fact of the defendant's user, the length of that user will not deprive him of his right to an account (*d*).

Offer of submission.

Where a defendant offered, among other things, to account for profits, but the plaintiff, declining the offer of submission, insisted upon his own terms, including an account, the Court granted the account, but only upon the plaintiff's request, and at his peril in respect of costs, in case it should turn out that the account furnished by the defendant of his own accord was accurate (*e*).

Subdivided account.

In *Dent* v. *Turpin* (*f*), where a defendant had infringed a trade mark, which had become by bequest the property of two different persons, and those persons brought distinct

(*a*) *Pierce* v. *Franks*, 15 L. J. Ch. 122; *Burgess* v. *Hately*, 26 Beav. 249; *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 4 De G. J. & S. 137; *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, *ib.* 380; *Barnett* v. *Leuchars*, 13 L. T. N. S. 495; *Shipwright* v. *Clements*, 19 W. R. 599, &c.

(*b*) *Delondre* v. *Shaw*, 2 Sim. 237.

(*c*) *Beard* v. *Turner*, 13 L.T.N.S. 746; *Harrison* v. *Taylor*, 11 Jur. N. S. 408; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner* (2), 54 How. Pr. 298.

(*d*) *Sawyer* v. *Kellogg*, 19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1627; 20 *ib.* 1893.

(*e*) *Nunn* v. *D'Albuquerque*, 34 Beav. 595.

(*f*) 2 J. & H. 139.

actions against the defendant, the prayer in each case including an account and payment of such share of the profits as should be shown to be attributable to the individual plaintiff's share, it was held that such an account and payment could be granted.

Extent of account.

As to the extent of the account, it will not be given for a period of more than six years before the commencement of the action, and it will not include every species of profit made by the defendant during that period, but only so much as is properly attributable to the use of the plaintiff's trade mark (*a*). If the defendant was at first ignorant that he was using a trade mark, the account will commence from the date when he became aware of that fact (*b*); and where the defendant had himself been guilty of misrepresentation, and the defendant's business was carried on upon so much larger a scale than the plaintiff's as to render it impossible to suppose that the use of the plaintiff's mark had alone brought the defendant his customers, the account was only given from the date of filing the bill, and not earlier (*c*).

Account directed at plaintiff's risk.

Sometimes an account of profits is directed at the plaintiff's risk (*d*). Where an account had been directed of the sale and profits of a book published in infringement of the plaintiff's rights, notwithstanding an affidavit by the defendant that about half of 11,000 copies printed had been sold, and the account showed that 9000 copies had been sold, but that instead of a profit there had been a small loss, it was held that the affidavit had been shown to be untrustworthy, and that the plaintiff was justified in requiring the account to be taken, and was entitled to the costs thereby occasioned (*e*).

Election between account and damages.

The acceptance of an account of profits by the plaintiff operates as a condonation of the infringement, so that a

(*a*) *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292.

(*b*) *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 Beav. 578; *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185.

(*c*) *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

(*d*) As an inquiry as to damages may be. See *Tonge* v. *Ward*, 21 L. T. N. S. 480.

(*e*) *Dicks* v. *Jackson*, Chitty, J., March 31st, 1884.

plaintiff must elect between the account and an inquiry as to damages, but cannot insist on both (*a*), though he may at the outset claim both, reserving his election till a later stage (*b*).

Damages.

Damages. It is in the option of a successful plaintiff in a trade-mark action to elect between an account of profits and an inquiry as to damages, although, as before stated, he cannot have both (*c*). Damages being the appropriate remedy at Common Law, while the account of profits was peculiar to Equity, the result, and probably the cause of the great majority of trade mark cases being brought into Equity, has been that an account has been commonly awarded and not damages. This has been the case notwithstanding that the Courts of Equity have had the power of giving relief in the shape of damages (*d*), since in most cases the account forms the most convenient remedy.

When given. Some of the remarks made in reference to the account apply in respect of damages: thus, the defendant is liable in damages for the user of what he has reason to know, or suppose to be, a forged trade mark, though he may be ignorant of the owner; but not for user of a mark which he did not at all know to be forged (*e*); while, on the other hand, the plaintiff may be held to be disentitled to damages by reason of his own delay (*f*).

Special damage need not be proved. For damages to be recovered it is not necessary that special damage should be proved; it is sufficient to show

(*a*) *Neilson* v. *Betts*, L. R. 5 H. L. 1.

(*b*) See *Leidersdorf* v. *Flint* (2), 50 Wisc. 401.

(*c*) *Neilson* v. *Betts*, L. R. 5 H. L. 1. See *Leidersdorf* v. *Flint* (2), 50 Wisc. 401.

(*d*) Thus, inquiries as to damages were given in *Chearin* v. *Walker*, 5 Ch. D. 850—61; and *Graveley* v. *Winchester*, Seton, 4th ed. 257.

(*e*) *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *Cartier* v. *Carlile*, 31 Beav. 292; *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 Beav. 578; 10 L. T. N. S. 395. Thus, in *Weed* v. *Peterson*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 178, it was held that, though an injunction must be granted with costs, yet, as the defendants had acted perfectly *bonâ fide*, no damages could be given.

(*f*) *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner* (2), 54 How. Pr. 298.

that the plaintiff's right has been invaded, in which case some damages, even if only nominal, will be given (*a*).

Measure of damages.

The measure of damages which can be recovered when special damage is proved is not yet clearly settled by authority; but in *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *Hirschfeld* (*b*), it was held by Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., that it would not be assumed in the absence of evidence that the amount of goods sold by the defendant under the fraudulent trade mark would have been sold by the plaintiff but for the defendant's unlawful use of the plaintiff's trade mark, for how could the Court assume that the persons who bought what the plaintiff averred were inferior articles, at an inferior price, would necessarily, if they had not done so, have bought the superior articles at the higher prices. In America, however, it has been said that "every consideration of reason, justice, and sound policy demands that one who fraudulently uses the trade mark of another should not be allowed to shield himself from liability for the profit he has made by the use of the trade mark on the plea that it is impossible to determine how much of the profit is due to the trade mark and how much to the intrinsic value of the commodity. The fact that it is impossible to apportion the profit renders it just that he should lose the whole" (*c*), and the usual practice in America appears to be to assess damages at the amount of the profits which the plaintiffs would have made if they had sold the same quantity of the genuine goods as the defendants had sold of the spurious ones (*d*), or, at all events, at the amount of the actual profits reaped by the defendants from the infringement (*e*).

Offer of submission.

Where a defendant offered submission in terms which

(*a*) *Blofeld* v. *Payne*, 4 B. & Ad. 410; and see *Sykes* v. *Sykes*, 3 B. & Cr. 541; *Morison* v. *Salmon*, 2 Scott, N. R. 449; 2 Man. & G. 385; and cases at p. 149, n. (*b*).

(*b*) L. R. 1 Eq. 229. See *Davenport* v. *Rylands*, L. R. 1 Eq. 302.

(*c*) Per Crockett, J., in *Graham* v. *Plate*, 40 Cal. 593, 6 Amer. Rep. 639.

(*d*) *Hostetter* v. *Vowinkle*, 1 Dill. 329; *Faber* v. *Hovey*, Dig. 481.

(*e*) *Graham* v. *Plate*, *ubi suprd*; *Peltz* v. *Eichele*, 62 Mo. 171.

were rejected by the plaintiff, the latter was allowed an inquiry as to damages at his own risk (*a*).

Merchandise Marks Act.

By § 22 of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862 (*b*), a person who forges a trade mark, or applies a forged trade mark to goods for the purpose of sale, or in any other of certain specified ways attempts to pass off spurious goods as genuine, is liable in damages to every person aggrieved by such wrongful acts.

Costs.

General rule as to costs—follow event.

The same general principles on which costs are given in other cases prevail in those in which a question of trade mark is at issue. Thus, the primary rule is that costs follow the event; that is to say, that where a plaintiff succeeds, he will get his costs (*c*); where he is unsuccessful, he will have to pay costs (*d*). And the fact that merely nominal damages have been awarded will not deprive a successful plaintiff of his right to his costs, since a question of his right has been involved (*e*).

Relief sometimes granted without costs.

Costs, however, being in the discretion of the Court, the Court will, under some circumstances, grant the injunction, but without costs, as where the plaintiff has persisted in litigation which had become unnecessary (*f*), or where the successful plaintiff has been guilty of delay (*g*). So, again, where forwarding agents, who had been made the medium for importing spuriously marked cigars, had not participated in the fraud, had offered to give what information they

(*a*) *Tonge* v. *Ward*, 21 L. T. N. S. 480. See *Dicks* v. *Jackson*, Chitty, J., March 31st, 1884.

(*b*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 88.

(*c*) *Chappell* v. *Davidson*, 2 K. & J. 123; *Farina* v. *Silverlock*, 1 K. & J. 509; 6 De G. M. & G. 214; 4 K. & J. 650; *Collins Co.* v. *Walker*, 7 W. R. 222; *Edelsten* v. *Edelsten*, 1 De G. J. & S. 185; *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 *ib.* 380.

(*d*) *Woollam* v. *Ratcliff*, 1 H. & M. 259; *Williams* v. *Osborne*, 13 L. T. N. S. 498; *Morgan* v. *McAdam*, 36 L. J. Ch. 228; *Bass* v. *Dawber*, 19 L. T. N. S. 626; *Lucke* v. *Webster*, M. R., April 4th, 1879.

(*e*) *Morison* v. *Salmon*, 2 Scott, N. R. 449; 2 Man. & G. 385. But in a similar case the Canadian Court gave no costs: *Bondier* v *Depatie*, Montreal Q. B. May 29, 1883.

(*f*) *Millington* v. *Fox*, 3 My. & Cr. 338; *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 Beav. 578; *Hudson* v. *Bennett*, 12 Jur. N. S. 519.

(*g*) *Millington* v. *Fox*, 3 My. & Cr. 338; *Beard* v. *Turner*, 13 L. T. N. S. 746; *Perks* v. *Hall & Co.*, W. N. 1881, p. 111; *Amoskeag Manufacturing Co.* v. *Garner* (2), 54 How. Pr. 298.

could, and had submitted to act as the Court should direct (*a*).

Under some circumstances the plaintiff may obtain his injunction and yet have to pay the costs of some defendants, as where a dock company was innocently in possession of spuriously marked goods (*b*). And again, where wine bearing a spurious brand was in the possession of wharfingers, it was held by the Court of Appeal that they were entitled to their costs of being made defendants to an action for infringement, notwithstanding that they had submitted to act as the Court should direct only upon having their charges and costs paid or provided for (*c*).

Relief granted, plaintiff to pay costs.

On the other hand, while the relief claimed by the plaintiff is refused, the defendant may still be left to pay his own costs, as where the plaintiff has lost his remedy by lapse of time (*d*), or improper use of the word "patentee" (*e*), or other similar reasons (*f*), the defendant's fraudulent intention being evident; or, more commonly, where the defendant's conduct, though not so clearly fraudulent as to entitle the plaintiff to an injunction, has yet been so suspicious and uncandid as to call for some punishment (*g*). Thus, where the Vice-Chancellor considered that the defendant had acted fraudulently, but thought himself bound by a decision of the Court of Appeal on the motion to dismiss the bill, he did so without costs (*h*). Where the defendant had filled with his own lime juice bottles brought

Relief refused, no costs.

(*a*) *Upmann* v. *Elkan*, L. R. 7 Ch. 130. See *Moet* v. *Pickering*, 8 Ch. D. 372.

(*b*) *Upmann* v. *Elkan*, *ubi suprd.*

(*c*) *Moet* v. *Pickering*, *ubi suprà.*

(*d*) *Rodgers* v. *Rodgers*, 31 L. T. N. S. 285.

(*e*) *Nixey* v. *Raffey*, W. N. 1870, p. 227. And where a plaintiff company was held to be disentitled to an injunction by reason of the wrongful use of the word "patent," and the defendant, as having been the company's manager, was in some sense responsible for this, he was deprived of the costs which would otherwise have been given him: *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *Lorsont*, L. R. 9 Eq. 345.

(*f*) *E.g.*, *Fetridge* v. *Wells*, 13 How. Pr. 385; R. Cox, 180.

(*g*) *Edgington* v. *Edgington*, 11 L. T. N. S. 299; *Bass* v. *Dawber*, 19 L. T. N. S. 626; *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518; *Wylam* v. *Clarke*, W. N. 1876, p. 68; *Robineau* v. *Charbonnel*, W. N. 1876, p. 160; *Tallcot* v. *Moore*, 13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 100; *Degraves* v. *Whiteman*, 5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 304.

(*h*) *Wotherspoon* v. *Currie*. See L. R. 5 H. L. 510.

to him for the purpose, though they were stamped with the plaintiff's name, and the plaintiff brought an action, making charges which amounted to fraud, but which the Court did not consider to be justified, though the defendant had done that which he was not entitled to do, and the defendant gave an undertaking not to repeat the offence, no order was made, and each party was left to pay his own costs (*a*). In some cases the costs of interlocutory proceedings will be made costs in the cause, as where, on motion for injunction, the plaintiff failed on the score of delay (*b*).

Apportionment of costs.

In some cases a portion only of the relief asked for has been granted, and the costs have either been apportioned in a manner corresponding to the amount of success achieved, or each party has been left to pay his own costs. Thus, where a plaintiff company succeeded on the question of imitation of labels and wrappers, but failed as to trade mark, the plaintiffs were given their costs up to the motion for injunction, each party having to bear his own after that (*c*). In *Day* v. *Neale* (*d*) no costs were given on either side, the plaintiffs having asked for an injunction in respect of several trade marks, in only two of which they had an exclusive right, and having delayed to take proceedings for more than two years, while the defendants were in the wrong as to the two marks. In *Metzler* v. *Wood* (*e*) the plaintiffs, who succeeded on the main question of imitation of the title of their publication, were deprived of half their costs, on the ground of their having made claims as to copyright which failed. Where a plaintiff succeeded in establishing a limited right in a word, and also that the defendant had acted fraudulently, but he failed to show a general right in the word, and that certain labels used by the defendant were deceptive, the defendant

(*a*) *Rose* v. *Loftus*, 47 L. J. Ch. 576; and see *Perks* v. *Hall & Co.*, W. N. 1881, p. 111.

(*b*) *Isaacson* v. *Thompson*, 41 L. J. Ch. 101. And see *Brook* v. *Evans*, 2 L. T. N. S. 740; *Wallis* v. *Wallis*, 4 Dr. 458.

(*c*) *Compagnie Laferme* v. *Hendrickx*, Dig. 512.

(*d*) V. C. B. May 24, 1881.

(*e*) 8 Ch. D. 606.

was ordered by the Irish Court to pay the general costs of the suit, but the plaintiff was ordered to pay and set off against his own costs the costs of all the affidavits of the defendant's witnesses (except that of the defendant himself), since they had been addressed to the part of the case on which the plaintiff failed (*a*). In a Bombay case (*b*), in which six marks were in question, and the defendants succeeded as to all but one, which they had offered to give up within six days after the commencement of the suit, it was held that the defendants must only pay their costs with regard to that mark, and one-sixth of the plaintiffs' costs up to and including the day on which the offer was made, and that all the remaining costs of both parties must be paid by the plaintiffs.

Costs of unfounded charges, &c.

If a plaintiff makes charges which he is unable to substantiate, he may obtain an injunction with costs, and yet have to pay all costs occasioned by the making of that charge (*c*). In the same way, if a plaintiff insists upon having an account taken, after the defendant has given full information, the plaintiff will have to pay the costs of that account, if it turn out to have been unnecessary (*d*).

Scale of costs when defendant submits.

When a defendant in a trade mark action submits to a perpetual injunction with costs, the mere fact of his having submitted constitutes no special ground, under R. S. C., 1883, Order LXV., r. 9, for directing the costs to be taxed on the higher scale, but in such a case the Court will refuse to punish him for submitting at once, and will leave the costs to be taxed on the lower scale (*e*).

Costs of motion to commit.

A motion to commit for breach of an injunction is not unfrequently made without any intention of obtaining an order for actual committal, but the defendant can only be ordered to pay the costs of such a motion if the facts

(*a*) *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284.

(*b*) *Wallace & Co.* v. *King & Co.*, Bombay High Ct., April 30, 1879.

(*c*) *Pierce* v. *Franks*, 15 L. J. Ch. 122; *Standish* v. *Whitwell*, 14 W. R. 512; *Wylam* v. *Clarke*, W. N. 1876, p. 68.

(*d*) *Nunn* v. *D'Albuquerque*, 34 Beav. 595.

(*e*) *Hudson* v. *Osgerby*, 50 L. T. N. S. 323.

would have warranted a committal (*a*). But where an order for committal was rescinded by the Court of Appeal, no costs were given the defendant, on account of the equivocal conduct of some of his agents (*a*). Where a motion to commit was dismissed on the ground of delay, as well as that the actual terms of the injunction had not been disobeyed, though its spirit had been, the Vice-Chancellor, while refusing the motion, enlarged the injunction and made the defendant pay the costs (*b*). In a case in which the Supreme Court of New York had fined a defendant for contempt, the Court of Appeals, while considering itself bound by the decision of the Supreme Court as to the fact of the breach, yet thought the decision so doubtful that it gave no costs of the appeal (*c*).

Costs of appeals.

The costs of appeals are usually governed by the same principle as those in the Courts of First Instance, and follow the event. Thus, in *McLean* v. *Fleming* (*d*), in which the U. S. Circuit Court considered the plaintiff to be entitled to an injunction and an account, but the Supreme Court reversed the decision with respect to the account, on the ground of the plaintiff's own laches, it was held that the plaintiff must have his costs in the Court below, but the defendant (appellant) his costs of the appeal. The costs of an unnecessary appeal must be paid by the appellant. Thus, where a respondent appeared at the hearing of an appeal, after having received notice from the appellant that no alteration would be asked in the order in the Court below with respect to his costs, which the appellant had been ordered to pay, that respondent was left to pay the costs of such appearance (*e*). And where, in an action for imitation of the name of the plaintiffs' journal, the plaintiffs brought on an appeal from the decision of the judge directing the motion for injunction to stand to the hearing, after the defendants had changed the name of their publi-

(*a*) *Dence* v. *Brand*, W. N. 1881, p. 81.
(*b*) *Cartier* v. *May*, Dig. 200.
(*c*) *Devlin* v. *Devlin*, 69 N. Y. 212.
(*d*) 96 U. S. Rep. 245.
(*e*) *Upmann* v. *Elkan*, L. R. 7 Ch. 130.

cation, the plaintiffs were ordered to pay the costs of the appeal, notwithstanding that the defendants had refused to submit to an injunction, or to give an undertaking as to their original title (*a*).

Costs in case of compromise.

One of the main objects which the Court has in view in the exercise of its jurisdiction is "to repress unnecessary litigation, and to keep litigation within those bounds which are essential to enable the parties to vindicate and establish their rights" (*b*). Although, therefore, a plaintiff whose rights have been attacked is not bound to rely on the assurance of his assailant that the act will not be repeated, but is entitled to the protection of an injunction (*c*), yet if he, immediately after the suit is commenced, is offered and may obtain all he seeks, and still thinks proper to go on with his suit, the Court may give him his decree, but will not give him the costs of the suit so unnecessarily prosecuted (*d*). The defendant is, however, the aggressor, since the litigation has been first occasioned by his unwarrantable interference with the plaintiff's rights in respect of his trade mark, and this is equally the case whether the aggression was made with knowledge or in ignorance of those rights of the plaintiff. The defendant must therefore offer all the plaintiff has a right to obtain, and the offer must include all the costs which have been occasioned by his improper conduct (*e*).

(*a*) *Dale* v. *Smith*, W. N. 1882, p. 145.

(*b*) Per Lord Cottenham, C., in *Millington* v. *Fox*, 3 My. & Cr. 338.

(*c*) *Geary* v. *Norton*, 1 De G. & S. 9; *Routh* v. *Webster*, 10 Beav. 561; *Tonge* v. *Ward*, 21 L. T. N. S. 480; *Coats* v. *Holbrook*, 2 Sandf. 586; R. Cox, 20; *Radway* v. *Coleman*, 15 Grant, Up. Can. Ch. 50; *Guardian Fire and Life Assurance Co.* v. *Guardian and General Insurance Co., Ld.* 50 L. J. Ch. 252.

(*d*) Per Sir J. Wigram, V.-C., in *Colburn* v. *Simms*, 2 Hare, 560, commenting on *Millington* v. *Fox*; and see *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380; *Hudson* v. *Bennett*, 12 Jur. N. S. 519; *Upmann* v. *Elkan*, L. R. 12 Eq. 140, 7 Ch. 130; *Williams* v. *Osborne*, 13 L. T. N. S. 498.

(*e*) *Fradella* v. *Weller*, 2 R. & M. 247; *Kelly* v. *Hooper*, 1 Y. & C. 197; *Geary* v. *Norton*, 1 De G. & S. 9; *Burgess* v. *Hills*, 26 Beav. 244; *Burgess* v. *Hately*, 26 Beav. 249; *Wallis* v. *Wallis*, 4 Dr. 453; *Collins Co.* v. *Walker*, 7 W. R. 222; *Moet* v. *Couston*, 33 Beav. 578; *Nunn* v. *D'Albuquerque*, 34 Beav. 595; *Coats* v. *Holbrook*, 2 Sandf. 586; R. Cox, 20; *Weed* v. *Peterson*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 178.

Thus, where in a patent case an injunction was granted, the defendants having previously promised to commit no further infringement and to pay the costs of preparing the bill, Sir J. L. Knight Bruce, V.-C., gave the plaintiffs their costs at the hearing, since the defendants ought to have offered, on the injunction being obtained, to pay all costs up to that time (*a*). The same result followed where a defendant, who had offered to pay the taxed costs as between party and party, but refused to pay them as between solicitor and client, put in his answer, and then the plaintiff offering to accept the costs as between party and party, declined to pay the costs of the answer (*b*). But if an innocent infringer withdraws all marked articles from sale, and offers an undertaking immediately upon being served with the writ, and the plaintiff afterwards moves for an injunction, the motion will be refused with all costs, less the costs of the writ, which will have been incurred before the defendant's offer (*c*).

Notice to infringer.

It has been thought that a person whose trade mark has been infringed should give notice to the infringer of his intention to take proceedings, so as to give him an opportunity of explaining his conduct or submitting (*d*); and if he does so, and a fair offer is made, he should not hasten to incur needless expense (*e*), or he may be punished in respect of costs. Lord Romilly, M.R., was, however, of opinion (*f*) that the defendant having been the aggressor,

(*a*) *Geary* v. *Norton*, *ubi suprd.* See *Lochgelly Co.* (*Limited*) v. *Lumphinnans Iron Co.*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 4th Ser. VI. 482.

(*b*) *Kelly* v. *Hooper*, 1 Y. & C. 197.

(*c*) *Caruncho* v. *Highmoor*, 27 Sol. J. 199.

(*d*) *Chappell* v. *Davidson*, 2 K. & J. 123; *Wallis* v. *Wallis*, 4 Dr. 458; *Twentsche Stoom Bleekery Goor* v. *Ellinger & Co.*, 26 W. R. 70.

(*e*) *Williams* v. *Osborne*, 13 L. T. N. S. 498. And see the opinion of Jessel, M. R., cited in *Upmann* v. *Forester*, 24 Ch. D. 231, and *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238.

(*f*) In *Burgess* v. *Hately*, 26 Beav. 249. In *Field* v. *Lewis*, Dig. 280, Wood, V.-C., granted an injunction with costs, though no notice had been given before bill filed. And see *Coats* v. *Holbrook*, 2 Sandf. 586; R. Cox, 20; and *Sawyer* v. *Kellogg*, 19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1627; 20 *ib.* 1893.

the plaintiff would be justified in filing his bill, without making any application to the defendant; and in *Upmann* v. *Elkan* (*a*) he indicated his adherence to the same view, saying that he did not mean to lay down that the person whose trade mark had been imitated might not file a bill without making any inquiry at all. In the very recent case of *Upmann* v. *Forester* (*b*), Chitty, J., actually decided in accordance with this opinion, giving costs to a plaintiff who had moved for an injunction without giving any previous notice, though the defendant had acted perfectly innocently, and would have submitted if notice had been given him. And he stated that this was also the opinion of Jessel, M.R. (*c*). The reason assigned by Chitty, J., for this decision appears to be that, if the plaintiff were to give notice to the defendant, and the defendant were to submit, the plaintiff would lose his costs; but it might be thought that the plaintiff would be sufficiently secured in this respect by the rule above stated, that an offer of submission must, to be effectual, include an offer of all costs occasioned to the plaintiff, and that no injustice would be done to the plaintiff, but a very possible injustice to an innocent defendant might be minimised, by requiring notice to be given.

Infancy does not excuse from costs.

A plea of infancy will not excuse an infant infringer from paying the costs which his conduct has occasioned (*d*).

Costs occasioned to a third party by defendant's fraud.

A person who has induced another person to manufacture for him goods marked with the trade mark of a third person is liable to repay to the person he has made the instrument of his fraud the costs of legal proceedings brought about by the infringement, including any sum which that person may have reasonably paid to compromise the matter (*e*).

(*a*) L. R. 12 Eq. 140; L. R. 7 Ch. 130.

(*b*) 24 Ch. D. 231.

(*c*) See per Jessel, M.R., in *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238, and *Barrett* v. *Gomm*, 74 L. T. 388.

(*d*) *Cory* v. *Gerticken*, 2 Madd. 49; *Chubb* v. *Griffiths*, 35 Beav. 127.

(*e*) *Dixon* v. *Fawcus*, 3 Ell. & Ell. 537.

Costs in registration cases.

When an application for the registration of a trade mark is opposed and brought before the Court, the costs are usually ordered to be paid by the unsuccessful party, as having been occasioned by his wrongful claim or opposition. Thus, where a claim was made to register and use a trade mark, which would have been an infringement of an existing mark, the persons who wrongly claimed the mark were ordered to pay the costs of cross-adjourned summonses, as well as of an action for an injunction which had been rendered necessary by the claim (*a*). And in *In re Rosing* (*b*), the Cutlers' Co. of Sheffield, who had opposed an application in what they believed to be the interest of the public (and whose opposition succeeded in the Court of Appeal), were ordered by V.-C. Bacon to pay the costs of their opposition, which failed before him.

No costs.

If, on the other hand, each party is partially successful, no costs will be given on either side (*c*).

Costs paid by successful applicant.

Where an applicant took advantage of the precise wording of the Act to obtain registration as a part of his trade mark of words to the exclusive use of which he was not entitled, and the application was unsuccessfully opposed, Jessel, M.R., held that, notwithstanding the success of the applicant, he must still pay the costs of the application, as he was taking advantage of the Act to do that which the Act did not intend him to do (*d*).

Costs of comptroller.

Where the comptroller (formerly the registrar) is served with notice of an application to the Court, he is entitled to appear at the hearing of the application, and to receive his costs of so doing, since it is proper that he should know what order is made (*e*).

When he opposes.

Where the comptroller opposes an application, and his

(*a*) *Davis* v. *Tylor*, M. R., April 24th, 1879.
(*b*) Dig. 621.
(*c*) *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639; *In re Rosing*, Dig. 621; *Monson* v. *Boehm*, 28 Sol. J. 361.
(*d*) *In re Maignen*, 28 W. R. 759.
(*e*) This has been repeatedly so laid down; *e.g.*, *In re Orr-Ewing* (2), 28 W. R. 412.

opposition fails, he will not usually be required to pay the costs of the successful applicant (*a*); but it seems that costs may be given against him if he opposes in a case in which the Court pronounces the applicant's mark not only to be distinct from the mark which the comptroller supposes it to resemble, but to be so distinct that the comptroller was acting wrongly in objecting (*b*). And in one case (*c*) in which the comptroller's objection succeeded no costs were given him, because he had not merely submitted the claim to the Court, but had actively disputed it and filed evidence.

Extent of costs.

Since, by the terms of the old Rule 16 (*d*), an opposed application did not stand for the determination of the Court until the comptroller informed the applicant that the opponent had given security, no costs incurred before that point in the proceedings, but only those incurred after it, could formerly be given by the Court or be included in an order to pay costs (*e*); but the Court has now full power over the costs in all cases which come within § 90 of the Patents Act, 1883.

Costs of application to remove.

If a person registers as his property a trade mark to which he is not entitled, he will have to pay the costs of the necessary application to remove it from the register (*f*), though there may be exceptional cases in which this rule will not be followed, as if the mark was originally his property, but has become common through the common piracy of the trade, and they have delayed to apply for removal for some time after his registration, and have then done so without notice to him, he being a foreigner (*g*).

(*a*) *In re Rotherham*, 14 Ch. D. 585.

(*b*) *In re Patent Plumbago Crucible Co.*, M. R., August 1st, 1879.

(*c*) *In re Jones Bros.*, V.-C. H., July 10th, 1880.

(*d*) Now repeated in § 69 of the Patents Act, 1883.

(*e*) *In re Brandreth*, 9 Ch. D. 618.

(*f*) *In re Hyde & Co.*, 7 Ch. D. 724; *In re Palmer* (3), 24 Ch. D. 504; *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238.

(*g*) *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238.

CHAPTER VIII.

CASES ANALOGOUS TO THOSE OF TRADE MARK.

Cases not strictly trade mark cases.

In addition to the cases in which there has been an infringement of trade mark properly so called, a variety of cases have been decided in which the Court has restrained the practice of fraud by one person at the expense of another, the means adopted to perpetrate the fraud resembling to some extent the infringement of a trade mark, but yet being distinguishable therefrom.

Cases of true trade mark.

A trade mark is a highly technical matter, and for there to be an infringement of trade mark there must be a valid trade mark in existence; that is to say, there must not only be such a device in existence as is capable of forming a trade mark, but it must be actually attached to vendible articles in the market (*a*), or must (at least, if first used since the Trade Marks Act of 1875) be properly registered under the Patents Act, 1883 (*b*).

Cases not of true trade mark.

Where, however, there has been a representation that one thing is another, by means of which one person has secured custom intended for another, so that both the purchaser and the genuine trader have been defrauded, there the Court will interfere and protect the right of both parties to trade freely without fraudulent deceptions, although the fraud has taken another form than that of imitating a trade mark.

(*a*) *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380; *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307. See also *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530.

(*b*) See the Patents Act, 1883, § 77.

Trade name.

An important class of cases of this description consists of cases in which there has been a wrongful assumption by one person or firm of the trade or firm name under which a reputation has been gained by another person or firm, and which has therefore become a very important part of the goodwill of the business of such person or firm (*a*), although when used as a name, and not as a mark on vendible goods, it is not used as a trade mark. The imitation of such a name falsely represents not merely a certain class of goods, but the entire business to be that of one not the true proprietor.

No exclusive right in name apart from business.

"In this country," says Lord Chelmsford (*b*), "we do not recognise the absolute right of a person to a particular name, to the extent of entitling him to prevent the assumption of that name by a stranger. The right to the exclusive use of a name in connection with a trade or business is familiar to our law; and any person using that name, after a relative right of this description has been acquired by another, is considered to have been guilty of a fraud, or at least of an invasion of another's right, and renders himself liable to an action, or he may be restrained from the use of the name by injunction." But a man who has never carried on business under a particular name cannot, even though he has some kind of right to use that name, interfere with its being used by another. Thus, where the plaintiff was the mortgagee of the goodwill of a business, including the right to use the name under which the business was carried on, but had never exercised his right so to do (*c*).

Name by which goods identified.

There is another kind of trade name besides the trade name which is synonymous with firm name, viz., the trade name which is applied, not to the firm by whom the goods are manufactured and sold, but to the goods themselves;

(*a*) Per Wood, V.-C., in *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174.

(*b*) *Du Boulay* v. *Du Boulay*, L. R. 2 P. C. 441.

(*c*) *Beazley* v. *Soares*, 22 Ch. D. 660.

and it was with immediate reference to a trade name of this description (*a*), though the principles laid down by him are equally applicable to both classes of trade names, that Lord Blackburn (*b*), after referring to frauds committed by the infringement of trade marks, went on to say:—"There is another way in which goods not the plaintiff's may be sold as and for the plaintiff's. A name may be so appropriated by user as to come to mean the goods of the plaintiff, though it is not, and never was, impressed on the goods or on the packages in which they are contained, so as to be a trade mark, properly so called, or within the recent statutes. Where it is established that such a trade name bears that meaning, I think the use of that name, or one so nearly resembling it as to be likely to deceive, as applicable to goods not the plaintiff's, may be the means of passing off those goods as and for the plaintiff's, just as much as the use of a trade mark; and I think the law (so far as not altered by legislation) is the same. And I think it settled by a series of cases that both trade marks and trade names are in a certain sense property, and that the right to use them passes with the goodwill of the business to the successors of the firm which originally established them, even though the name of that firm be changed so that they are no longer strictly correct."

Fraud not necessary to be proved.

It was formerly sometimes supposed, and was held by the late Master of the Rolls and the Court of Appeal in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson* (*c*), that for an action to restrain the use of a trade name to be successful fraud must be proved; on the ground that when a trade mark was once affixed to the goods it passed with the goods from hand to hand, thus silently repeating to each successive purchaser the original misrepresentation of the original infringer, while the improper use of a name not affixed to the goods was not the necessary consequence of

(*a*) "Singer" sewing machines.
(*b*) In *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15.
(*c*) 2 Ch. D. 434.

being in possession of marked goods, but was the individual act of each person who used it in respect of the goods; so that there might be held to be an infringement of a trade mark when, in analogous circumstances, there would be no infringement of a trade name. And when the case of *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Wilson* was remitted by the House of Lords to the Court of First Instance (*a*), on the ground of insufficiency of evidence, some of the law peers seem to have thought that different principles of law might possibly be applicable to trade marks and trade names. But Lord Cairns, C. (*b*), said, "It may well be that if an imitated trade mark is attached to the article manufactured, there will, from that circumstance, be the certainty that it will pass into every hand into which the article passes, and be thus a continuing and ever present representation with regard to it; but a representation made by advertisements that the articles sold at a particular shop are articles manufactured by A. B. (if that is the legitimate effect of the advertisements, which is a separate question) must, in my opinion, be as injurious in principle, and may possibly be quite as injurious in operation, as the same representation made upon the articles themselves." And in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (*c*), Lord Blackburn took the view that the law of trade marks and trade names when not affected by legislation was the same.

False representation sufficient.

Whether there is or is not property in a trade name, as Lord Blackburn suggested (*d*), it is a fraud on the part of one person to attract to himself the custom intended for another, by a false representation, direct or indirect, that the business carried on by himself is identical with that of the other person by whose ability and exertions the name

(*a*) 3 App. Cas 376.
(*b*) 3 App. Cas. 389.
(*c*) 8 App. Cas. 15. As to the differences between trade marks and trade names in Massachusetts, see *Bowman* v. *Floyd*, 85 Mass. 76.

(*d*) And see per the Court of Session in *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Kimball & Morton*, Ct. of Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. XI. 267; also *Boulnois* v. *Peake*, 13 Ch. D. 513 n.

has acquired the reputation it possesses (*a*). The question is not whether the defendants' business is represented as being similar to the plaintiffs', but whether it is represented as being that very identical business (*b*). If such a false representation has been made, whatever may have been the motive of the persons making it, when proceedings are taken in consequence of it, "all the Court requires is to be satisfied that the names are so similar as to be calculated to produce confusion between the two—so calculated to do it that, when it is drawn to the attention of those adopting the name complained of that that would be the result, it is not honest for them to persevere in their intention, though originally the intention might not have been otherwise than honest" (*c*).

Act originally innocent may become fraudulent.

"The question is this," said Cotton, L. J., in the Court of Appeal (*d*), "whether the defendant has represented that the goods manufactured by him were manufactured by the plaintiffs, or whether he has done anything calculated so to represent. I quite agree that it is unnecessary that a fraudulent intention in issuing the circulars complained of should be established. If the natural consequence of those things, even in circumstances not known to him, is that they will represent the goods to be those of another person, it is wrongful, and, as this Court says, a fraud in him to continue the user after those circumstances are brought to his knowledge. We must consider whether he has represented, or done that which is reasonably calculated to give that misrepresentation." In the same spirit, Wood, V.-C., had laid down long previously (*e*) that if the plaintiffs had represented to the defendants that the course which the latter had been taking was calculated to deceive

(*a*) *Lee* v. *Haley*, L. R. 5 Ch. 155.
(*b*) *Cruttwell* v. *Lye*, 17 Ves. 335; *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Civil Service Supply Association* v. *Dean* 13 Ch. D. 512.
(*c*) Per James, L. J., in *Hendricks* v. *Montagu*, 17 Ch. D. 638.
(*d*) In *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 18 Ch. D. 417.
(*e*) In *Williams* v. *Osborne*, 13 L. T. N. S. 498. And see *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380, and *Magee Furnace Co.* v. *Le Barron*, 127 Mass. 115.

the public, and, "after such representation, the defendants persisted in continuing the use of the name in the same manner, then, on the plaintiffs bringing the case before the Court, the Court would be justified in saying that that which was not fraudulent at first became so by the defendants' persisting in the same course, and that therefore the plaintiffs would be entitled to the relief they claimed."

Name of company.

When the name which is alleged to have been imitated is that of a company, and is composed of such words as are in ordinary use in the language, very clear evidence indeed of probability of deception will be required for an action for infringement to be successful. Thus, where a bill was filed by the London and Provincial Law Assurance Society against the London and Provincial Joint Stock Life Assurance Company (*a*), the injunction was refused, an action at law being directed; and in suits by the Colonial Life Assurance Company against the Home and Colonial Assurance Company, Limited (*b*), and by the London Assurance Company against The London and Westminster Assurance Corporation, Limited (*c*), the injunction was simply refused. In *Lee* v. *Haley* (*d*), the plaintiffs were coal merchants, trading under the name of The Guinea Coal Company, and having their business premises at No. 22, Pall Mall. The defendant had been in their service as manager, and on leaving them set up in business at Beaufort Buildings,

(*a*) *London and Provincial Law Assurance Society* v. *London and Provincial Joint Stock Life Assurance Co.*, 17 L. J. Ch. 37. In *Purser* v. *Brain*, 17 L. J. Ch. 141, it was held that the circulars of "The London Patent Manure Co." were clearly fraudulent imitations of those of "The London Manure Co.," but the case was sent to a jury for the purpose of deciding whether the plaintiffs' user of their title had been sufficiently long. And in *Lawson* v. *Bank of London*, 18 C. B. 84, a case at Common Law, the plaintiff was defeated on the ground of a want of averment in the declaration that he was a banker or had ever carried on that business; but Willes, J., remarked that "he was not prepared to say that the defendant would not be liable if the cause of complaint were properly alleged."

(*b*) *Colonial Life Assurance Co.* v. *Home and Colonial Assurance Co.*, 33 Beav. 548.

(*c*) *London Assurance Co.* v. *London and Westminster Assurance Corporation*, 32 L. J. Ch. 664.

(*d*) L. R. 5 Ch. 155.

Strand, under the name of the Pall Mall Guinea Coal Company. From Beaufort Buildings he removed to No. 48, Pall Mall. In that case fraud was held to be proved, and the injunction was granted, but the Court being of opinion that the only reasonable chance of successful deceit depended upon the residence of the defendant in Pall Mall, the injunction against the user by the defendant of his trade name as above was restricted to Pall Mall. Where a plaintiff company sold white lead in kegs marked "Brooklyn White Lead Company," or "Co.," and the defendant, who had formerly marked his "Brooklyn White Lead, pure, 100 lbs.," changed the name to "Brooklyn White Lead and Zinc Company," it was held that, though he was entitled to continue to mark his goods "Brooklyn White Lead and Zinc," he had no right to add "Company" or "Co." (*a*).

(*a*) *Brooklyn White Lead Co.* v. *Masury*, 25 Barb. 416; R. Cox, 210. And see *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174. In *Hendricks* v. *Montagu*, 17 Ch. D. 638, an injunction was granted at the instance of "The Universal Life Assurance Society" to restrain the use of the name "The Universe Life Assurance Association, Ld.," on the ground of similarity; in *Simpson* v. *Anglo-Indian Tea Co., Ld.*, V.-C. B., May 4th, 1883, the defendant company was not allowed to trade under the same name as the plaintiff; in *Guardian Fire & Life Assurance Co.* v. *Guardian & General Insurance Co., Ld.*, 50 L. J. Ch. 252, it was held that the defendant company's name was likely to deceive, but that the name of the "Guardian Horse, Vehicle and General Insurance Co." might fairly be taken; in *Capital & Counties Bank, Ld.* v. *Capital & County Deposit Bank*, Chitty, J., Feb. 9th, 1884, an injunction was granted to restrain the use of the latter name; in *Holmes, Booth & Haydens* v. *Holmes, Booth & Atwood Manufacturing Co.*, 37 Conn. 278, the defendants were restrained from using the names of Holmes and Booth. In *Newby* v. *Oregon Central Railway Co.*, 1 Deady, 609, it was held that the original Oregon Central Railway Co. would be entitled to restrain the assumption of its name by a new company, though a single bondholder in the former company was not entitled to sue until the company had refused to do it. And see *Braham* v. *Beachim*, 7 Ch. D. 848 ("Radstock Colliery Proprietors"); *Campbell* v. *Hollins*, Dig. 548 ("Minton & Co."); *Batchellors* v. *Batchellor Manufacturing Co.*, 12 Amer. Rep. 414 n.; and *McGowan Bros. Pump & Machine Co.* v. *McGowan*, 2 Cinc. 313. In the following cases injunctions were refused:—*London & County Banking Co.* v. *Hampshire & North Wilts Bank*, Dig. 618, in which the defendant company was proposing to take the name of "The Capital & Counties Bank"; *Merchant Banking Co. of London* v. *Merchants' Joint Stock Bank, Ld.*, 9 Ch. D. 560; *Army & Navy Co-operative Society, Ld.* v. *Junior Army & Navy Stores, Ld.*, Dig. 640;

Descriptive name of company.

In *Australian Mortgage, Land, & Finance Co.* v. *Australian & New Zealand Mortgage Co.* (*a*), the Court of Appeal pointed out the difficulty of monopolizing the exclusive use of a name which correctly described the nature of a company's business, or the locality of its operations. And in *India & China Tea Co.* v. *Teede* (*b*), it was held that a firm of tea merchants were entitled to assume the name of "The India & China Packet Tea Co." notwithstanding that the name of the plaintiff company was as above, the name assumed by the defendants being simply descriptive, and there being no evidence of deception. In the American case of *Gray* v. *The Taper Sleeve Pulley Works* (*c*), the defendants were held not to be entitled to trade under the name they had assumed, which had been previously used by the plaintiffs, though they were entitled to make and sell "taper-sleeve pulleys."

The Companies Act, 1862.

By § 20 of the Companies Act, 1862 (*d*), it is enacted that "no company shall be registered under a name identical with that by which a subsisting company is already registered, or so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, except in a case where such subsisting company is in the course of being dissolved, and testifies its consent in such manner as the registrar requires; and if any company, through inadvertence or

Australian Mortgage, Land & Finance Co. v. *Australian & New Zealand Mortgage Co.*, W. N. 1880, p. 6; *Midland Electric Light & Power Co.* v. *Brush Midland Electric Light & Power Co.*, 26 Sol. J. 465; and see *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268. 766 ("Condy's Fluid Co."); *Massam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.*, 14 Ch. D. 748 ("Thorley's Cattle Food Co."); *Ottoman Calvey Co.* v. *Dane*, 95 Ill. 203, in which the plaintiff company was held not entitled to restrain the defendants from trading under the same name in Illinois, notwithstanding that the defendants were incorporated in Michigan and the plaintiffs in Illinois, the defendants having been the first to trade under the name in Illinois; and *McNair* v. *Cleave*, 10 Phila. 155, in which the plaintiffs, trading as the "Galaxy Publishing Co.," were held not to be entitled to the exclusive use of the name because it represented, contrary to the fact, that they were incorporated as a company.

(*a*) W. N. 1880, p. 6.
(*b*) W. N. 1871, p. 241.
(*c*) 24 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 602.
(*d*) 25 & 26 Vict. c. 89.

otherwise, is, without such consent as aforesaid, registered by a name identical with that by which a subsisting company is registered, or so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, such first-mentioned company may, with the sanction of the registrar, change its name" (*a*). This section does not authorise a company to use or register a name so nearly resembling one previously used by another company as to be calculated to deceive, even though the name of the earlier company has not itself been registered (*b*); and, on the other hand, since the section only affects the registration of the name of a company, the rights of a company to a name which has been registered cannot be attacked *under the section*, whatever may be the rights outside the section of another company which has previously used the name (*c*).

Name of individual.

If the trade name which has been imitated is that of an individual, and this has been assumed by another person of different name, little is required to prove the fraud. In fact, the assumption of another's name is almost sufficient proof if taken alone (*d*). But in *Olin* v. *Bate* (*e*), the plaintiff Olin failed to succeed in restraining the defendant Bate from carrying on the same profession (the medical) in the same town as himself under the name of Olin, the defendant having so done before the plaintiff came to the town in question. And where "Liebig's Extract of Meat" had come to be the proper designation of an article first invented by Baron Von Liebig, Field, J., and the Court of Appeal declined to restrain a manufacturer of the article

(*a*) As to the registration of names of companies under the U. S. Trade Marks Acts, see *In re Rowe & Post*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 496; *In re India Rubber Comb Co.*, 8 *ib.* 905; *India Rubber Comb Co.* v. *Meyer*, 8 *ib.* 905; *India Rubber Comb Co.* v. *Rubber Comb & Jewelry Co.*, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 258; *In re Rubber Clothing Co.*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 111, and Appendix E., *infrà*.

(*b*) *Hendricks* v. *Montagu*, 17 Ch. D. 638.

(*c*) *Merchant Banking Co. of London* v. *Merchants' Joint Stock Bank, Ld.*, 9 Ch. D. 560.

(*d*) Per Sir G. J. Turner, L.J., in *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, 3 De G. M. & G. 896. See *Binninger* v. *Wattles*, 28 How. Pr. 206; R. Cox, 318.

(*e*) 98 Ill. 55; 38 Amer. Rep. 78.

from styling his preparation "'Baron' Liebig's Extract of Meat," and placing on the pots a photograph of the Baron (*a*).

Assumed name.

Sometimes the plaintiff's name is itself an assumed or fanciful one; thus the use of the name "Christy's Minstrels" has been restrained (*b*); and that of the name "The Oldfield Lane Doctor" (*c*); and in *Isaacson* v. *Thompson* (*d*) the plaintiff kept a millinery establishment, as "Madame Elise," which being imitated by the defendant, an injunction would have been awarded, had not the plaintiff's own delay disentitled her to relief.

Man's own name.

In some cases the use of a man's own name may be such as to deceive, and where this is so the person aggrieved is entitled to obtain an injunction against such use of the name (*e*), but he must prove clearly the fraudulent intent, and "it is a question of evidence in each case whether there is false representation or not" (*f*).

Evidence of fraud.

Such evidence was supplied in one case (*g*) by a removal by the defendant into the neighbourhood in which the plaintiff was carrying on his business, and the addition of "and Co." to the name, "H. Fullwood," the plaintiff's trade name being "R. J. Fullwood & Co"; and in another case (*h*), in which the same person was plaintiff,

(*a*) *Liebig's Extract of Meat Co., Ld.* v. *Anderson*, W. N. 1882, p. 147; *ib.* 1883, p. 185.

(*b*) *Christy* v. *Murphy*, 12 How. Pr. 77; R. Cox, 164; *Montague* v. *Moore*, Seton, 4th ed. 238.

(*c*) *Milner* v. *Reed*, Dig. 328.

(*d*) 41 L. J. Ch. 101.

(*e*) *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, 3 De G. M. & G. 896; *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood*, W. N. 1873, pp. 93, 185; *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (2), 9 Ch. D. 176; *Holloway* v. *Holloway*, 13 Beav. 209; *Pullar* v. *Pullar*, Fry, J., April 9th, 1883; *Holmes* v. *Holmes*, 37 Conn. 278; 9 Amer. Rep. 324; *Gillis* v. *Hall*, R. Cox, 596; *Devlin* v. *Devlin*, 69 N. Y. 212; *Shaver* v. *Shaver*, 54 Iowa, 208; *India Rubber Comb Co.* v. *Rubber Comb & Jewelry Co.*, 45 N. Y. Super. Ct. 258. See *Christie* v. *Christie*, L. R. 8 Ch. 499; *McGowan Bros. Pump & Machine Co.* v. *McGowan*, 2 Cinc. 313.

(*f*) Per Turner, L. J., in *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, *ubi supra*.

(*g*) *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood*, W. N. 1873, pp. 93, 185.

(*h*) *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (2), 9 Ch. D. 176. And see *Glen & Hall Manufacturing Co.* v. *Hall*, 16 Sickels, 226. Where Robert Minton Taylor, formerly a member of the firm of Minton, Hollins & Co., set up for himself as Robert Minton Taylor & Co., and, on being threatened with legal proceedings, undertook to trade only as Robert Minton Taylor, it was held that a purchaser of R. M. Taylor's business could not carry it on under the style of "The Minton Brick and Tile Co.": *Campbell* v. *Hollins*, Dig. 548.

by a representation that the business of M. Fullwood and E. Fullwood, trading as "E. Fullwood & Co.," had been established in 1785 and was carried on at Hoxton, those facts being true of the business of R. J. Fullwood & Co., but not of that carried on by the defendants. In a third case (*a*), the defendant, who had sold his business and the goodwill, including the name, "John Douglas & Co.," recommenced business, and employing the three managing men of his former business, styled his new business "John Douglas & Co.," and sent round circulars informing the public that his firm was so well known that it was unnecessary to say anything about it; thus, in fact, "representing himself to be the owner of that which he had sold." So, too, it was held to be fraud for a person who had recently come into the neighbourhood of the "Carriage Bazaar" in Baker Street, and set up a "Carriage Repository," to change that name to the "New Carriage Bazaar," with some incorrect additions (*b*). But where the plaintiff had changed his name to Frank Leslie, and his son had, by his orders, assumed the same name, and the plaintiff had afterwards brought out "Frank Leslie's Illustrated News," and other publications of the titles of which his new name formed part, it was held that there was no ground for restraining the publication by the son of "Frank Leslie Junior's Sporting and Dramatic Times" (*c*). On the other hand, where Dr. Trust had changed his name to Gouraud, but his sons had not changed their name, the latter were restrained from selling a preparation with a statement that it was prepared by Dr. Gouraud's sons, there being a representation which, though not strictly false, was yet calculated to mislead (*d*).

(*a*) *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174. But see the American cases of *Howe* v. *Searing*, 10 Abb. Pr. 264; R. Cox, 244; *Reeves* v. *Denicke*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 92; and *Booth* v. *Jarrett*, 52 How. Pr. 169.

(*b*) *Boulnois* v. *Peake*, 13 Ch. D. 513 n. And see *Cave* v. *Myers*, Dig. 304, and *Glen & Hall Manufacturing Co.* v. *Hall*, 16 Sickels, 226.

(*c*) *England* v. *New York Publishiny Co.*, 8 Daly, 375.

(*d*) *Gouraud* v. *Trust*, 10 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 627.

Deceptive circulars.

Again, a fraudulent intention may be shown to exist by the production of deceptive circulars so framed by the defendant as to represent his business to be identical with, or a continuation of that carried on by the plaintiff; and such a fraud will be restrained (*a*). Thus in *Mogford* v. *Courtenay* (*b*), the defendant issued a circular of which the effect was to represent that he was carrying on the business which he had previously carried on in partnership with the plaintiff, although under the partnership articles the entire goodwill vested in the plaintiff on dissolution.

Opening letters.

So, too, one person will not be allowed to defraud another by opening letters addressed to him, and executing orders intended for him (*c*). Where, however, various acts of misrepresentation by the defendant were alleged, pointing to an intention to simulate the plaintiff, but only one case was made out, in which the defendant had opened a letter addressed to the plaintiff, answered it in his own name, and endeavoured to obtain the custom offered by that letter to the plaintiff, it was held that, though this raised grave suspicion of the defendant's motives, yet it was not sufficient ground for an injunction. The defendant, however, was refused his costs (*d*).

Fraudulent partnership.

Nor will fraud be permitted to be perpetrated under cover of a partnership got up for the purpose of fraud (*e*). Thus, in *Olayton* v. *Day* (*f*) an ironmonger's assistant

(*a*) *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Stevens* v. *Paine*, 18 L. T. N. S. 600; *Purser* v. *Brain*, 17 L. J. Ch. 141; *Christie* v. *Christie*, L. R. 8 Ch. 499; *Burrows* v. *Foster*, 1 N. R. 156; *Graveley* v. *Winchester*, Seton, 4th ed. 257; *Selby* v. *Anchor Tube Co.*, W. N. 1877, p. 191.

(*b*) 45 L. T. N. S. 303.

(*c*) *Scheile* v. *Brakell*, 11 W. R. 796; Seton, 4th ed. 258; *Witt* v. *Corcoran*, *ib.* 257; *England* v. *Curling*, 8 Beav. 129.

(*d*) *Edgington* v. *Edgington*, 11 L. T. N. S. 299.

(*e*) *Croft* v. *Day*, 7 Beav. 84; *Moet* v. *Clybouw*, Dig. 533; *Schweitzer* v. *Atkins*, 37 L. J. Ch. 847; *Dence* v. *Mason*, Dig. 534; 41 L. T. N. S. 578; *Dence* v. *Brand*, W. N. 1881, p. 31; *Holmes* v. *Holmes*, 37 Conn. 278; 9 Amer. Rep. 324.

(*f*) 26 Sol. J. 43, 76 L. T. 79. But in America a fictitious partnership has been permitted to give to one of two partners, who had become the successor to the partnership business, a right to use the same trade name which had been formerly used by the partnership, and which consisted of the united names of the two former partners,

named Day, and a general shop-keeper named Martin, were not allowed to carry on the business of blacking manufacturers under the name of "Day and Martin," though they were left free to trade as "Martin and Day."

Vendor of business may recommence business.

On the sale of the goodwill of a business, the vendor, in the absence of a special stipulation on the point, retains the right of recommencing business, even in his own name, however similar that may be to the trade name of the business the goodwill of which has been sold; provided that he scrupulously abstains from doing anything to induce the public to believe that his new business is in fact the old one which he has sold. If, however, he does anything calculated to induce the belief that his new business is not merely similar to, but is identical with the old one, the purchaser of the old business is entitled to restrain him by injunction (*a*).

Dissolution of partnership.

On the dissolution of a partnership, if the whole concern and the goodwill are sold, the trade name is sold with them (*b*). But if the partners merely divide the partnership assets, and there are no express stipulations in the articles as to the disposal of the trade name, then each is at liberty to use the old name just as the partnership did before (*c*); at all events, if no injury will be thereby caused to a partner whose name the firm have used (*d*). Where there are express stipulations in a deed, the parties are of course

although, apart from the fictitious partnership, he would have been prevented from so doing by the Massachusetts Gen. Stat. c. 56, which requires the consent of a former partner, or of his personal representative, to the continued use of his name in the business, and such consent was refused: *Hallett* v. *Cumston*, 110 Mass. 29.

(*a*) *Cruttwell* v. *Lye*, 17 Ves. 335; *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Johnson* v. *Helleley*, 34 Beav. 63; *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79. *Tudor* v. *Tudor*, W. N. 1873, p. 72, depended on an express stipulation in the deed under which the plaintiff retired from the business.

(*b*) *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566. See *Hoffman* v. *Duncan*, Seton, 4th ed. 256; *Witt* v. *Corcoran*, *ib.* 257.

(*c*) *Ib.* See *Clark* v. *Leach*, 32 Beav. 14; *Dence* v. *Mason*, Dig. 534; *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268, 766; *Levy* v. *Walker*, 10 Ch. D. 436; *Rogers* v. *Taintor*, 97 Mass. 291.

(*d*) *Scott* v. *Rowland*, 20 W. R. 508; *Levy* v. *Walker*, 10 Ch. D. 436.

bound. Thus, in *Day* v. *Finch* (*a*) a member of the dissolved firm of "Benjamin Finch & Co.," who had agreed to carry on business after the dissolution in his own name only, was restrained from continuing to use the words "and Co." after the name "Benjamin Finch." If, again, on the dissolution of partnership, one partner takes over the whole concern by arrangement, he must compensate the other partner for his interest in the trade name (*b*), and the retiring partner is at liberty to set up a similar business in his own name, even on adjoining premises (*c*).

Scott v. *Scott*.

In *Scott* v. *Scott* (*d*), R. & W. Scott carried on business in partnership in Nithsdale, and in Glasshouse Street, Regent Street, as "R. & W. Scott." The partnership being dissolved, the agreement for the dissolution contained no stipulation by either party not to continue the business, but neither of the parties was to use the name of the firm, except so far as might be necessary for winding up the partnership affairs. W. Scott retiring from the business, and setting up for himself in the neighbourhood of Nithsdale, R. Scott retained the London premises of the late firm, and made them over with his business to the defendants Scott & Nixon. The inscription used by the late firm over their house at Glasshouse Street having been "R. & W. Scott of Nithsdale," the defendants replaced this by "Scott & Nixon, late R. & W. Scott, of Nithsdale." Upon this W. Scott filed a bill against them, and on motion for injunction, the injunction was granted to restrain the defendants from permitting that inscription to remain, and from representing their business to be in continuance of that carried on by the late partnership of R. & W. Scott (*e*).

The injury caused by the defendants to the plaintiffs is Representa-

(*a*) 25 Sol. J. 354. And see *Tudor* v. *Tudor*, W. N. 1878, p. 72.

(*b*) *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566.

(*c*) *Bond* v. *Milbourn*, 20 W. R. 197; *Mogford* v. *Courtenay*, 45 L. T. N. S. 303.

(*d*) 16 L. T. N. S. 143.

(*e*) See *Selby* v. *Anchor Tube Co.*, W. N. 1877, p. 191.

tions that plaintiff has retired.

even greater than in an ordinary case of misappropriation of a trade name, when the representations made by the defendants go to show that the plaintiffs have retired from business, and that the defendants have succeeded to the business formerly carried on by them. Thus, where the defendants had acquired a lease of works at which the plaintiffs had formerly manufactured bricks, but not of the mines from which the brick-clay used by the plaintiffs had been obtained, and then issued cards and circulars, styling themselves "E. J. & J. Pearson (late Harpers & Moore)," and otherwise representing themselves to have succeeded to the business of the plaintiffs, who were, as a matter of fact, carrying on their business on other works, the defendants were restrained by injunction from their misrepresentations (*a*); and Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., expressed an opinion that, on application by the owner of the mines of fire-clay used by the plaintiffs, but not by the defendants, the issue of an injunction would have been almost a matter of course.

Former firm or employer may be stated.

A person who has been a member or employé of a firm of reputation, and who sets up in business on his own account, is entitled, unless he has contracted not to do so (*b*), to derive what benefit he may from a fair statement of the fact of his former employment (*c*), which is usually expressed by the addition after his own name of the name of his former firm or employer, with the words "late of," or

(*a*) *Harper* v. *Pearson*, 3 L. T. N. S. 547; also *Scott* v. *Scott*, 16 L. T. N. S. 143; *Stevens* v. *Paine*, 18 L. T. N. S. 600; *Reeves* v. *Denicke*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 92; *Gouraud* v. *Trust*, 10 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 627. And as to a representation of one business being a continuation of another, see *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Burrows* v. *Foster*, 1 N. R. 156; *Witt* v. *Corcoran*, Seton 4th ed. 257; *Graveley* v. *Winchester*, *ib.* 257; *Montague* v. *Moore*, *ib.* 238; *Selby* v. *Anchor Tube Co.*, W. N. 1877, p. 191; *Reeves* v. *Denicke*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 92; *England* v. *Curling*, 8 Beav. 129.

(*b*) *Wolmershausen* v. *O'Connor*, 36 L. T. N. S. 921.

(*c*) See per Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 1 H. & M. 271; also *Clark* v. *Leach*, 32 Beav. 14; *Emerson* v. *Badger*, 101 Mass. 82; and cases *infrà*. But see *Selby* v. *Anchor Tube Co.*, W. N. 1877 p. 191.

"late with." But such statement must be made in an unambiguous way, and not in such a manner as to induce the belief that the tradesman in question is selling the goods of his former firm or employer. For the purposes of the plaintiff's right to relief it is a matter of indifference whether or not the defendant has acted with a fraudulent intention; if what he has done is, though unintentionally, calculated to deceive "the unwary, the heedless, the incautious portion of the public" (*a*), the plaintiff is entitled to protection just as much as if there were intentional fraud.

Glenny v. *Smith*.

In *Glenny* v. *Smith* (*b*), the defendant, who had been in the plaintiff's service, opened a shop in Oxford Street, where he placed his own name over the door, but on the brass plates and on the awning the words, "from Thresher & Glenny," "from" being in much smaller letters than the plaintiff's name. It further appeared that the defendant's own name over the door was quite hidden when the awning was let down. Sir R. T. Kindersley, V.-C., granted an injunction (*c*).

Hookham v. *Pottage*.

In *Hookham* v. *Pottage* (*d*), the parties had been tailors in partnership at Oxford, the defendant having been formerly the plaintiff's manager, and afterwards taken into partnership by him. On the dissolution of the partnership it was arranged that the plaintiff was to continue the business, the defendant receiving from the plaintiff such an amount as should be found to be due to him. The plaintiff, in continuing the business, styled himself "Hookham & Co.," and the defendant setting up close to him, put over his shop, "S. Pottage, from Hookham & Pottage." There was some evidence of deception, and Sir R. Malins,

(*a*) V.-C. Kindersley, in *Glenny* v. *Smith*, 2 Dr. & Sm. 476.

(*b*) *Ubi suprà*.

(*c*) See, too, *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, 3 De G. M. & G. 896; *Dence* v. *Mason* (1), Dig. 534; and *Colton* v. *Thomas*, 2 Brewster, 308; R. Cox, 507.

(*d*) L. R. 8 Ch. 91. And see *Selby* v. *Anchor Tube Co.*, W. N. 1877, p. 191.

V.-C., granted an injunction, which decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

Other cases.

In *Foot* v. *Lea* (*a*), an older case, the Master of the Rolls in Ireland was of opinion that there was no attempt to deceive on the part of the defendant, who had used show-boards and labels on which his own name was followed by "late of Lundy Foot & Co.," the latter name being of equal size with the defendant's, and he accordingly refused the injunction, with leave to bring an action at law. In *Williams* v. *Osborne* (*b*), Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., was of a similar opinion, and dismissed the bill, and, on account of the extreme haste with which it had been filed, with costs. In a more recent case (*c*), the defendants, who had been forewomen in the plaintiff's shop in Paris, used on their window blinds in Bond Street, the words "Ex 1ères de la," in small letters, followed by "Maison Boissier de Paris," in large letters, to signify their former employment; and although V.-C. Malins declined to restrain the use of those words, notwithstanding that they were not generally understood in London as equivalent to "from," he left the defendants to pay their own costs.

Name of establishment.

Deception of the same kind will be restrained when what is imitated is not a name of an individual or firm, but a designation of the place at which the business of an individual or firm is carried on, and by which it is known and recognised. Thus, "Osborne House" (*d*), "The Carriage Bazaar," &c. (*e*). But in such cases the plaintiff must prove that there is something distinctive in the appellation which he has given to his establishment, since no relief can be given him if that appellation is merely descriptive, as "The Antiquarian Book Store" (*f*), "The

(*a*) 13 Ir. Eq. 490.
(*b*) 13 L. T. N. S. 498.
(*c*) *Robineau* v. *Charbonnel*, W. N. 1876, p. 160.
(*d*) *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79.
(*e*) *Boulnois* v. *Peake*, 13 Ch. D. 513 n.
(*f*) *Choynski* v. *Cohen*, 39 Cal. 501; R. Cox, 593.

Mammoth Wardrobe" (*a*), "The Tower Palace" (*b*), and he must also prove that the result of the defendant's acts is to represent that his business is identical with that carried on by the plaintiff, as in *Cave* v. *Myers* (*c*), where the defendant, whose shop was in a corner house close to the establishment of the plaintiffs, Messrs. Cave, adopted for his shop the name of "Cavendish House," and had it so painted up that "Cave" appeared on the side of the street in which was the plaintiffs' shop, and the remainder round the corner, and *Genin* v. *Chadsey* (*d*), where the plaintiff was the proprietor of "The Captain's Live-and-Let Live Oyster and Dining Saloon," and the defendant set up "G. W. Chadsey & Co.'s Great Eastern Live-and-Let-Live Dining Saloon." On the other hand, it was held (*e*) that "Great I X L Auction Company" was not likely to be mistaken for "I X L General Merchandise Auction Store," and where the defendant had put up a sign with the words "Depôt of the Cherry Pectoral Company," and inside his premises a notice, "Ayer's Cherry Pectoral, One Dollar; Rushton's Cherry Pectoral, Fifty Cents. Which will you have?" it was held that the defendant had done no more than trade in fair competition with the plaintiff, as he was entitled to do (*f*).

Sign-board.

In *Walker* v. *Alley* (*g*) it was decided that the name and sign of "The Golden Lion" was so connected with the plaintiff's dry goods business that it could not be taken by another trader; and the Chancellor of Upper Canada said that "where it is clear to the Court that the defendant himself intended an advantage by the use of a particular

(*a*) *Gray* v. *Koch*, 2 Mich. N. P. 119.

(*b*) *Armstrong* v. *Kleinhaus*, 1 Ky. L. Rep. 112.

(*c*) Dig. 304.

(*d*) Cited in *Dixon Crucible Co.* v. *Guggenheim*, R. Cox, 567. And see *Hoby* v. *Grosvenor Library Co.*, 28 W. R. 386 ("Grosvenor Library"); *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284 ("Cromac Springs"); and *Glen & Hall Manufacturing Co.* v. *Hall*, 16 Sick. 226, 19 Amer. Rep. 278 ("No. 10, South Water Street, Rochester, New York.")

(*e*) *Lichtenstein* v. *Mellis*, 8 Oreg. 464.

(*f*) *Ayer* v. *Rushton*, 7 Daly, 9.

(*g*) 13 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 366.

sign or mark in use by another, and believes he has obtained it, or, in other words, that the defendant himself thought the use of it was calculated to advertise him at the expense of the plaintiff, and this was his object in using it, and where such has been the effect of the user, I think the Court should say to him, 'Remove that sign; its use by you may, as you intend, damage the plaintiff. It cannot be necessary or valuable to you for any other purpose. You have your choice of many signs which, as a mere attraction, or to give your store a marked designation, must answer a fair business purpose equally well.'"

No right in name of private house.

Apart from a business of some kind, no exclusive right can be acquired in the name of a house, any more than in the name of a person, and no right of action arises from the annoyance occasioned by a person re-naming his residence after the neighbouring residence of another householder (*a*).

Hotel.

The same principle which governs the names of business establishments has been extended to hotels, and a proprietor of one already established has been held entitled to protection against the setting up of hotels in the same neighbourhood under a similar title. Thus, "The Irving House" (*b*), "The What Cheer House" (*c*), and "The McCardel House" (*d*), have been protected. In *Mossop* v. *Mason* (*e*), the purchasers of "The Western or Mason's Hotel" were protected in their exclusive right to the name, as against the vendor, who had re-occupied his former premises after the purchasers had been driven out by a fire; and in *Woods* v. *Sands* (*f*) it was held that the founder of "Woods' Hotel," who had sold and afterwards re-purchased his interest in it, had recovered by the re-

(*a*) *Day* v. *Brownrigg*, 10 Ch. D. 294.

(*b*) *Howard* v. *Henriques*, 3 Sand. S. C. 725; R. Cox, 129.

(*c*) *Woodward* v. *Lazar*, 21 Cal. 448; R. Cox, 300; *Gamble* v. *Stephenson*, 10 Mo. App. 581.

(*d*) *McCardel* v. *Peck*, 28 How. Pr. 120; R. Cox, 312.

(*e*) 18 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 453.

(*f*) Dig. 467.

assignment his exclusive right in the name, and the use of it by another person was prohibited. In *Booth* v. *Jarrett* (*a*), the founder of "Booth's Theatre," who had gained a reputation for it by his skill in acting, and had named it after himself, attempted, without success, to prevent the continued use of the name by a person into whose possession the theatre had subsequently come, the name having passed to the defendant with the building and goodwill. On the other hand, the Scotch Court of Session has held that the proprietor of "The Station Hotel" was not entitled to interfere with the use of the name "The Royal Station Hotel" for another hotel in the same neighbourhood, the plaintiff's name not being distinctive, and the defendant's name being sufficiently distinguished by the insertion of the word "Royal" (*b*).

Name of hotel on conveyances.

In the same way, the proprietor of the "Prescott House" Hotel was held entitled to restrain the use of the name by a coach proprietor upon his coaches, an agreement between the latter and a former owner of the hotel being treated as having been in the nature of a revocable license, which had been revoked upon the sale of the hotel to the plaintiff (*c*). And not only the proprietors of such establishments have been protected in respect of the names by which they have been known, but other persons who have contracted with such proprietors for the exclusive conveyance of visitors to and from their hotels, have been held entitled to restrain the use by others not so authorised upon their vehicles and servants' clothing of the name of the establishment with which they were connected (*d*).

Similar cases.

So, again, the name of a line of steamships (*e*), of

(*a*) 52 How. Pr. 169.

(*b*) *Charleson* v. *Campbell*, Ct. of Sess. Cas. 4th Ser. IV. 149.

(*c*) *Deiz* v. *Lamb*, 29 N. Y. Super. Ct. 537.

(*d*) *Stone* v. *Carlan*, 13 Mo. L. R. 360; R. Cox, 115; *Marsh* v. *Billings*, 7 Cush. 322; R. Cox, 118. And compare *Knott* v. *Morgan*, 2 Keen, 213.

(*e*) *Winsor* v. *Clyde*, 9 Phila. 513 ("Keystone Line").

collieries (*a*), of particular waggons (*b*), has been protected.

Name not used in ordinary business.

Closely connected with the cases which concern the rights of an individual or firm in the trade name under which his or their business is carried on, are the cases in which it has been sought by one person to restrain the unauthorised use of his name by another, though he does not himself use that name over a shop, or, in fact, as a trade name usually so called.

Where articles are produced under a certain name.

Where a person produces certain articles, and a representation is made by another that articles not the production of that person are in fact produced by him, there is an injury to the right of property in the name, which has in fact, though not used as a trade mark, yet come to be the producer's means of selling the articles produced.

Poet.

Thus, a poet is entitled to protection for the name which sells his poems for him. In *Lord Byron* v. *Johnston* (*c*), the defendant, who had advertised for sale poems which he represented to be by the plaintiff, but as to which he declined to swear to his belief in their genuineness, was restrained by injunction.

Humourist.

In *Clemens* v. *Such* (*d*), a humorous writer, whose works were published under the *nom de plume* of "Mark Twain," was held to be entitled to restrain the unauthorised use of that designation by another person.

Legal author.

So, again, a legal author is entitled to prevent the issue as his of works or editions not of his production. In *Archbold* v. *Sweet* (*e*) the plaintiff was the author of a book on a legal subject, of which he had sold the copyright to the defendant. The plaintiff refusing to re-edit the book, the defendant had it edited by another, and the plaintiff thereupon came forward to complain of the inaccuracies which he alleged to be contained in the new

(*a*) *Eraham* v. *Beachim*, 7 Ch. D. 848 ("Radstock Collieries").
(*b*) *Shaver* v. *Shaver*, 54 Iowa, 208 ("Shaver Waggons").
(*c*) 2 Mer. 29.
(*d*) Dig. 429.
(*e*) 1 M. & Rob. 162.

edition. Lord Tenterden, C. J., after remarking on the close analogy between that case and those in which an inferior article was sold in the name of a well-known manufacturer, the injury being in the latter case to the sale of the goods, in the former to the character of the author, laid down to the jury that if the new edition, in the form in which it was put forth, would be understood by purchasers who paid reasonable attention to its contents to be by the plaintiff, their verdict must be in his favour.

Painter. Medical man.

So, again, a painter will be protected from having exhibited as his a picture which he has not painted (*a*), and a medical man who compounds medicines from having spurious medicines sold as his (*b*).

Deception must be probable.

In all such cases the plaintiff must, of course, show that deception is probable, or he cannot succeed in obtaining the relief he seeks. Thus, where an artist painted a picture, and another person exhibited a diorama imitated from it, it was held that there could be no deception or injury, though if the plaintiff's picture had been a diorama the case would have been different (*c*). So where a person who wrote songs under the name of Claribel sought to restrain the publication of a song described as "written by Claribel," no mention being made of the composer's name, though the music given was not that of Claribel, it was decided that the words "written by" did not imply that the music was also composed by Claribel, and the injunction was refused (*d*).

Clark v. *Freeman*.

The decision in *Clark* v. *Freeman* (*e*) has been much discussed with respect to the right a man has in his name. In that case the plaintiff, Sir James Clark, was an eminent

(*a*) *Martin* v. *Wright*, 6 Sim. 297.
(*b*) *Clark* v. *Freeman*, 11 Beav. 112.
(*c*) *Martin* v. *Wright*, 6 Sim. 297.
(*d*) *Barnard* v. *Pillow*, W. N. 1868, p. 94; and see *Seeley* v. *Fisher*, 11 Sim. 581; and *Archbold* v. *Sweet* 1 M. & Rob. 162.
(*e*) 11 Beav. 112.

physician, who filed a bill to restrain the advertisement and sale by the defendant of certain pills termed by him "Sir J. Clarke's Consumption Pills," the advertisements being so framed as to be calculated to induce the public to buy the pills as being of the plaintiff's invention. Lord Langdale, M. R., refused to grant the injunction, on the ground that there was no injury to property, but apparently not without some doubt, since he gave leave for the case to be mentioned again to him if cases in support of the bill could be produced. He did not, however, think the cases mentioned to him (*a*) sufficient to warrant him in granting the injunction, but at the same time he remarked that "if Sir James Clark had been in the habit of manufacturing and selling pills, it would have been very like the other cases in which the Court had interfered for the protection of property." The principle on which Lord Langdale's decision was based was that the Court would not interfere where the name pirated by the defendant had not become known to the public in connection with a manufactured article, but was merely a name under which an individual had acquired a certain reputation (*b*). It is evident, however, that the sale of quack medicines under the name of an eminent physician would tend to destroy his reputation and the confidence of his patients in him, and thereby to cause him a far more severe pecuniary loss than would be incurred by the sale of a few boxes of pills or copies of a book being lost to him. Later judges have, therefore, been of opinion that the case in question "might have been decided in favour of the plaintiff, on the ground that he had a property in his own name" (*c*).

(*a*) *Lord Byron* v. *Johnston*, 2 Mer. 29; and *Routh* v. *Webster*, 10 Beav. 561.

(*b*) See *Delondre* v. *Shaw*, 2 Sim. 237.

(*c*) Per Sir H. M. Cairns, L.J., in *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307. In *Springhead Spinning Co.* v. *Riley*, L. R. 6 Eq. 561, Sir R. Malins, V.-C., went even farther. Lord Westbury, C., however, spoke of the decision at all events without disapprobation: *Leather Cloth Cos.' case*, 4 De G. J. & S. 137.

Contracts in respect of names.

Whatever rights a man may, irrespective of contract, have in his own name, so as to be able to prevent the unauthorised use of it by another, it is always open to him to modify those rights by contract, whether by way of permitting others to use his name in a certain manner (*a*), or by way of restraining his own use of it to a certain extent (*b*). Thus, where a publisher had sold to the defendants the copyright of an annual, entitled "Beeton's Christmas Annual," he himself entering into their service, it was held that the defendants were entitled to continue the annual publication under that same name, even after the plaintiff had ceased to remain in their employ, and had become unwilling for his name to be used by them in connection with a work not of his production (*c*). But it seems that, although a contract by which a man binds himself to limit in some way his use of his own name can be enforced, a contract so binding him cannot be made by the representative of his estate in bankruptcy, and if such a contract has been entered into, the bankrupt will be entitled to disregard it (*d*).

Name of editor.

The name of the editor of a publication, appearing upon the title page, forms no part of the title. Sir J. Romilly, M. R., refused, therefore, to restrain the proprietors of a paper, who had agreed with their editor not to alter the title of their paper without mutual consent, from omitting the publication on the title-page of the editor's name as such (*e*).

Where name is used so as to injure.

It is clear that a man has a right to prevent the unauthorised use of his name by another person, apart from

(*a*) *Ward* v. *Beeton*, L. R. 19 Eq. 207. See *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268, 766; *Hallett* v. *Cumston*, 110 Mass. 29; *Weed* v. *Peterson*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 178; *Coe* v. *Bradley*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 541.

(*b*) *Ainsworth* v. *Bentley*, 14 W. R. 630; *Ward* v. *Beeton*, *ubi suprà*; *Peltz* v. *Eichele*, 62 Mo. 171; *Coe* v. *Bradley*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 541.

(*c*) *Ward* v. *Beeton*, *ubi suprà*.

(*d*) *Helmbold* v. *Helmbold Manufacturing Co.*, 53 How Pr. 453; and see *Walker* v. *Mottram*, 19 Ch. D. 355.

(*e*) *Crookes* v. *Petter*, 6 Jur. N. S. 1131.

any special manufacture, where such use of it might involve him in legal or other difficulties. Thus, in *Routh* v. *Webster* (*a*) a bill was filed to restrain the provisional directors of a joint-stock company, called "The Economic Conveyance Company," from using the plaintiff's name in their prospectuses as a trustee of the company without his authority. The defendants setting up by way of defence that what had been done had been done inadvertently, and stating their intention of discontinuing their misrepresentations, the Master of the Rolls granted the injunction, holding that the defendants were not entitled "to use the name of any person they pleased, representing him as responsible in their speculations, and to involve him in all sorts of liabilities, and then to be allowed to escape the consequences by saying they had done it by inadvertence," and also that the plaintiff was in nowise bound to surrender his right to the injunction, trusting to the assurances of the defendants as to their intentions for the future. This decision has been generally approved as an "authority for preventing the improper use of a man's name against his will; not for the restraint of a libel, for no libel was involved" (*b*).

Trade libel.

Where, however, a man's name has been used against his will in such a manner as to be libellous, or where statements have been made disparaging the goods sold under his name or trade mark, or threatening persons dealing in his goods, a more difficult question is raised, and one which has not always been answered in the same way. With respect to libels, Lord Cottenham, C., said (*c*) that the

(*a*) 10 Beav. 561.

(*b*) Per Lord Cairns, C., in *Prudential Assurance Co.* v. *Knott*, L. R. 10 Ch. 142. In *Webster* v. *Webster*, 3 Swanst. 490 n, the injunction was refused because there was no injury to be apprehended. In *Tudor* v. *Tudor*, W. N. 1873, p. 72, there was an express contract. See *Bullock* v. *Chapman*, 2 De G. & Sm. 211; *Dixon* v. *Holden*, L. R. 7 Eq. 488; *Reid* v. *Sibbald*, 18 Journ. of Juris. 392; and cases *infrd.*

(*c*) *Fleming* v. *Newton*, 1 H. L. C. 376. This case was a Scotch one, and the Lord Chancellor was speaking with reference to the Scotch Libel Act, but his remarks are equally applicable to cases arising in England, and under Order

Libel Act "appointed a jury as the proper tribunal for trial of injuries to the person by libel or defamation; and that the liberty of the press consisted in the unrestricted right of publishing, subject to the responsibilities attached to the publication of libels, public or private." The principle that the publication of a libel was a crime, and that the Court of Chancery had no jurisdiction to prevent the commission of crimes, except in such cases as those relating to the protection of infants, was laid down by Lord Eldon in 1818 (*a*), and after that time Equity judges frequently stated that it was not within the proper scope of their authority to restrain the publication of libels (*b*). There were indeed cases in which it was thought that where an injury was occasioned or threatened to a right of property by a libellous statement, the Court had jurisdiction to interfere to protect that right of property (*c*), but, practically speaking, cases which involved the consideration of libellous statements were left to the Courts of Common Law (*d*).

Effect of the Judicature Act, 1873.

The Judicature Act, 1873, however, introduced a new element into the discussion by enacting (§ 25, subs. 8) that "an injunction may be granted by an interlocutory order of the Court in all cases in which it shall appear to the

XXXVI., rule 2, of the new Rules of 1883, a defendant in a libel case can still insist upon a jury.

(*a*) *Gee* v. *Pritchard*, 2 Swanst. 413.

(*b*) *Martin* v. *Wright*, 6 Sim. 297; *Seeley* v. *Fisher*, 11 Sim. 581; *Clark* v. *Freeman*, 11 Beav. 112; *Emperor of Austria* v. *Day*, 2 Giff. 628, 3 De G. F. & J. 217 (in particular per Turner, L.J.); *Mulkern* v. *Ward*, L. R. 13 Eq. 619; *Browne* v. *Freeman*, W. N. 1873, p. 178; *Prudential Assurance Co.* v. *Knott*, L. R. 10 Ch. 142; *Fisher* v. *Apollinaris Co.*, *ib.* 297. The same view has been taken in India: *Shepherd* v. *Trustees of the Port of Bombay*, Ind. L. R. 1 Bomb. 132; and in America: *Mauger* v. *Dick*, 55 How. Pr. 132.

(*c*) This was especially the view of Malins, V.-C. See *Dixon* v. *Holden*, L. R. 7 Eq. 488; *Springhead Spinning Co.* v. *Riley*, L. R. 6 Eq. 561; *Rollins* v. *Hinks*, L. R. 13 Eq. 355; *Axmann* v. *Lund*, L. R. 18 Eq. 330. And see also *Emperor of Austria* v. *Day*, 3 De G. F. & J. 217; *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307; *James* v. *James*, L. R. 13 Eq. 421.

(*d*) For the principles by which the Courts of Common Law were guided, see *Wren* v. *Weild*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 730; *Western Counties Manure Co.* v. *Lawes Chemical Manure Co.*, L. R. 9 Ex. 218.

Court to be just or convenient that such order should be made"; and in *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* v. *Massam* (*a*), Vice-Chancellor Malins suggested that this enactment had conferred upon the Court more extensive powers than those which it previously possessed, and that an injunction might have been granted by virtue of those powers to restrain an injurious and unjust statement. Numerous cases have since been decided with respect to the effect of the section, in some of which expressions were employed which were calculated to lead to the belief that the power to grant injunctions where it was thought to be "just or convenient" conferred a power to grant injunctions in cases in which no legal remedy previously existed (*b*). It is now, however, settled—and this is not opposed to the observations before referred to—that the right view is that the section has enlarged the powers of the Court, not by enabling the Court to grant relief in cases where none was obtainable before in any of the Superior Courts, but by way of giving each branch of the High Court power to grant relief in cases which could previously be brought only in the same or a different form before some other branch of the Court (*c*), so that, as Cotton, L. J., said in the latest case of *North London Railway Co.* v. *Great Northern Railway Co.* (*d*), "where there is a legal right which was, independently of the Act, capable of being enforced either at law or in equity, there, whatever may have been the previous practice, the High Court may interfere by injunction in protection of that right."

Conditions necessary for injunction.

The injunction may be granted to restrain the continued publication of a libel which has been found to be so by the verdict of a jury (*e*), or it may be granted to restrain the

(*a*) 6 Ch. D. 582.

(*b*) See *Beddow* v. *Beddow*, 9 Ch. D. 89; *Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co.* v. *Beall*, 20 Ch. D. 501.

(*c*) *Day* v. *Brownrigg*, 10 Ch. D. 294; *Ward* v. *Drat*, L. J., N. of C. 1878, p. 67; *Gaskin* v. *Balls*, 13 Ch. D. 324; *Dicks* v. *Brooks*, 15 Ch. D. 22 (per Bacon, V.-C.).

(*d*) 11 Q. B. D. 30.

(*e*) *Saxby* v. *Easterbrook*, 3 C. P. D 339; *Hinrichs* v. *Berndes*, W. N. 1878, p. 11.

publication of statements which have not been submitted to a jury (*a*). But where the Court is asked to grant an injunction, especially on an interlocutory application, without the assistance of a jury, the jurisdiction which it possesses so to do is one which must be exercised very carefully (*b*), and it ought not to be exercised unless the statements of which complaint is made are proved to be untrue (*c*), unless they are injurious to the plaintiff (*d*), unless it is proved that the defendant intends to continue to make them (*e*), and unless (in cases of privilege) express malice is also established (*f*). Thus, in *Halsey* v. *Brotherhood* (*g*) the defendant had threatened intending purchasers from the plaintiff, alleging that the plaintiff was manufacturing in infringement of his, the defendant's, patent rights, and Jessel, M. R., and the Court of Appeal held that an injunction could not be granted unless the defendant persisted in making the statements after they had been proved to be false. And in *Anderson* v. *Liebig's Extract of Meat Co., Ld.* (*h*), Chitty, J., refused to restrain the company (who were taking proceedings to stop the plaintiff from selling his goods as "Baron Liebig's Extract of Meat" and using on the pots a photograph of the Baron) from circulating letters among the plaintiff's customers, stating that he was using the name and photograph without authority, on the ground that the company was

(*a*) As in *Thomas* v. *Williams*, 14 Ch. D. 864.

(*b*) See *Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co.* v. *Beall*, 20 Ch. D. 501.

(*c*) *Halsey* v. *Brotherhood*, 15 Ch. D. 514; 19 *ib.* 386; *Burnett* v. *Tate*, 45 L. T. N. S. 743; *Anderson* v. *Liebig's Extract of Meat Co., Ld.*, *ib.* 757; *Quartz Hill, &c., Co.* v. *Beall*, *ubi suprd*; *Benbow* v. *Low* (1), 23 Sol. J. 819; *Roper's, &c., Co.* v. *Copeman's, &c., Association, Ld.*, 28 *ib.* 218. And see *Clover* v. *Royden*, L. R. 17 Eq. 190.

(*d*) *Dicks* v. *Brooks*, 15 Ch. D. 22; and see *Brook* v. *Evans*, 2 L. T. N. S. 740; *Bullock* v. *Chapman*, 2 De G. & Sm. 211.

(*e*) *Quartz Hill, &c., Co.* v. *Beall*, *ubi suprd.*

(*f*) *Quartz Hill, &c., Co.* v. *Beall*, *ubi suprd.* See *Burnett* v. *Tate*, 45 L. T. N. S. 743.

(*g*) 15 Ch. D. 514; 19 *ib.* 386. See the New York case of *Wolfe* v. *Burke*, 11 Sick. 115. The precise question raised in *Halsey* v. *Brotherhood* is now settled by § 32 of the Patents Act, 1883, but the general question of injunctions to restrain trade libels remains.

(*h*) 45 L. T. N. S. 757.

not shown to be acting otherwise than *bonâ fide*, or to be stating that which was untrue.

When granted.

On the other hand, where the necessary facts are present, an injunction will be granted, as in *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* v. *Massam* (2) (*a*), where it was established that the plaintiffs and defendants were both in possession of and entitled to use the same secret recipe in their respective businesses, and Malins, V.-C., and the Court of Appeal granted an injunction to restrain the defendants from publicly advertising that they alone were acquainted with the secret.

Misrepresentations by subsequent manufacturer.

The same principle on which misrepresentations by an original manufacturer with respect to the goods and business of a subsequent manufacturer are restrained, applies with even greater force to similar misrepresentations by the latter, and while it is open to any one to manufacture an unpatented article with the process of manufacture of which he has become acquainted, and also to describe it by the name applied to it by the original inventor, so soon as that name shall have become *publici juris*, that is to say, descriptive of a specific article, but not of a specific maker, yet at the same time such subsequent manufacturer is not entitled to carry on an unfair competition in trade with the original maker or his successors in business, by means of assertions or representations that his own article is the only genuine one, or that the article of the original maker or his successors is spurious (*b*).

"Original."

And where such an assertion or representation is embodied in the title of the later manufacturer's article by its being styled the "original," an appellation which would naturally suggest the idea of the article in question being the make of the original manufacturer, such fraudulent representation will usually be restrained (*c*).

(*a*) 14 Ch. D. 763; and see *Hill* v. *Hart-Davies*, 21 Ch. D. 798.

(*b*) *James* v. *James*, L. R. 13 Eq. 421; *Thomas* v. *Williams*, 14 Ch. D. 864.

(*c*) *Cocks* v. *Chandler*, L. R. 11

But in the entire absence of evidence as to deception, Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., refused to grant an injunction in a similar case (*a*), and from the result of later litigation between the same parties (*b*), it is clear that the presumption against a person who styles an article of his own manufacture, but not of his invention, "the original," may be rebutted. In *Dence* v. *Mason* (1) (*c*) the defendant was restrained from styling himself the original maker of the "essence of beef," Malins, V.-C., holding that even if he had been the first to actually compound the article, which was not satisfactorily proved, he was not entitled to make such statements as those complained of, since he was in the employ of the plaintiff's predecessor in business at the time when he said he made it for the first time. In *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (2) (*d*) the defendants attempted to represent their business to be the original one, by assuming for it the date of establishment of the business which was really the first.

Deceptive labels and notices.

In other cases the attempt to deceive has been made in different forms; thus, in an early case (*e*), the defendant attempted to attract to himself the custom intended for the plaintiffs by an ingenious variation of their labels, his own labels being *facsimiles* of those of the plaintiffs, with only the difference that whereas theirs contained the sentence "Manufactured by Day and Martin," his bore the words "Equal to Day and Martin's," the "Equal to" being in very small type. So, in an American case (*f*), a dentist formerly employed by the Colton Dental Association, on

Eq. 446; *Lazenby* v. *White*, 41 L. J. Ch. 354. And see *Hagg* v. *Darley*, 47 L. J. Ch. 567.

(*a*) *Browne* v. *Freeman*, 12 W. R. 305.

(*b*) *Browne* v. *Freeman*, W. N. 1873, p. 178. This was, however, before the cases under the Judicature Act, 1873, which see *suprà*.

(*c*) Dig. 534; 41 L. T. N. S. 573.

(*d*) 9 Ch. D. 176. And see *Green* v. *Rooke*, W. N. 1872, p. 49; *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284; *Whitney* v. *Hickling*, 5 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 605; *Mossop* v. *Mason*, 18 *ib.* 453; *Blackwell* v. *Wright*, 73 N. Car. 310; *Woods* v. *Sands*, Dig. 467.

(*e*) *Day* v. *Binning*, C. P. Cooper, 489; 1 Leg. Obs. 205.

(*f*) *Colton* v. *Thomas*, 2 Brewster, 308; R. Cox, 507.

setting up in business for himself, described himself in his notice as "formerly operator at the Colton Dental Rooms," "formerly operator at the" being printed very small. And in another American case (*a*) a former partner in a firm of dentists trading as "Morgan and Schuyler," continued to carry on business at the old premises as "B. F. Schuyler, successor to Morgan and Schuyler," the words preceding the old firm name being in such small letters as to be almost invisible.

Franks v. Weaver.

Again, in *Franks* v. *Weaver* (*b*), the plaintiff sold a medicine which he had invented, and which he termed "Franks' Specific Solution of Copaiba," in bottles enclosed in wrappers, on which were printed directions for use, and testimonials. The defendant, an agent of the plaintiff, sold a preparation of his own, labelled "Chemical Solution of Copaiba." The label went on to state that the plaintiff had invented the "Specific Solution," and then gave the testimonials printed by the plaintiff as commendatory of the plaintiff's medicine, and also the same directions for use as those given by the plaintiff. In *Sedon* v. *Senate* (*c*), a person who had sold a medicine to another, set up a new medicine under a similar description, and in his advertisement adopted verses which had been attached to the original medicine. In all these cases injunctions were granted.

Directions for use.

With respect to directions for the use of the article, it seems that, as Malins, V.-C., said in *Massam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* (1) (*d*), if the article produced by one person is the same as that produced by another, and the former is quite at liberty to produce the same article, then the directions used by the latter are the correct directions for the use of the former's article, and he can only repeat

(*a*) *Morgan* v. *Schuyler*, 79 N. Y. 490.

(*b*) 10 Beav. 297. And see *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801; *Siegert* v. *Ehlers*, Dig. 432; *Dunbar* v. *Glenn*, 42 Wisc. 118.

(*c*) 2 V. & B. 220. And see *Wotherspoon* v. *Gray*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 3rd Ser. II. 38, where the interdict was refused.

(*d*) 6 Ch. D. 574, 581. And see per Cotton, L.J., in *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530.

them. In fact, if he could not give the appropriate directions for using the article which he is entitled to make, his liberty to manufacture would be unduly interfered with. The decision in the above case was, however, reversed by the Court of Appeal (*a*) on the general question of representation, the imitation of the directions being referred to as an indication of fraudulent intention, and any trader who uses the same directions as another ought to take great care to prevent the possibility of deception.

Name of patentee.

To describe articles formerly patented by the name of the former patentee is not necessarily fraudulent, since the name may be used as indicative of a principle of construction (*b*); but in an American case (*c*) an injunction was granted to restrain the defendant from marking goods of his own make as being made under the plaintiff's subsisting patent, notwithstanding an allegation by the defendant that the patent was invalid.

Mode of packing.

The imitation of a peculiar manner of making up and packing goods may, in combination with other circumstances, be held to prove a fraudulent intention, and it seems that, even in the absence of other circumstances of fraud, if the imitation is very significant, and the evidence very conclusive, an injunction will be awarded (*d*).

Imitation of line of omnibuses.

The manner in which the Court interferes by way of injunction to prevent unfair competition in trade is well illustrated by a case which has always attracted a good deal of attention, that of the omnibus companies (*e*). In that case the plaintiffs were the proprietors of a line

(*a*) 14 Ch. D. 748.

(*b*) *Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Co.* v. *Shakespear*, 39 L. J. Ch. 36; *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15; and other cases in Ch. 4.

(*c*) *Washburn & Moen Manufacturing Co.* v. *Haish*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 465.

(*d*) See *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78; *Woollam* v. *Ratcliff*, 1 H. & M. 259; *Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk Co.* v. *Swiss Condensed Milk Co.*, W. N. 1871, p. 163; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. 245; *Frese* v. *Bachof* (1), 13 Bl. C. C. 234; *S. C.* (2), 14 *ib.* 432. See also *Orr* v. *Diaper*, L. R. 4 Ch. D. 92.

(*e*) *Knott* v. *Morgan*, 2 Keen, 213. See also *Stone* v. *Carlan*, 13 Mo. L. R. 360; R. Cox, 115; *Marsh* v. *Billings*, 7 Cush. 322; R. Cox, 118; *Deiz* v. *Lamb*, 29 N. Y. Super. Ct. 537.

of omnibuses painted in a particular manner, with the words "Conveyance Company" and "London Conveyance Company" upon them. The defendant ran omnibuses similarly painted, and dressed his servants in a livery imitated from that of the plaintiffs' employés. On his being required to alter this, he made some mere colourable alterations, but really left the matter as it stood at first. Lord Langdale, M. R., on the case coming before him on motion to dissolve an interlocutory injunction, said that he had not the least doubt that the defendant intended to represent his omnibuses to the public as those of the plaintiffs. He said "it was not to be said that the plaintiffs had any exclusive right to the words 'Conveyance Company' or 'London Conveyance Company,' or any other words, but they had a right to call upon that Court to restrain the defendant from fraudulently using precisely the same words and devices which they had taken for the purpose of distinguishing their property, and thereby depriving them of the fair profits of their business by attracting custom on the false representation that carriages, really the defendant's, belonged to and were under the management of the plaintiffs." This case was not at all a case of trade mark, though reference has been made to it as such; the Master of the Rolls expressly denied any exclusive right in the words painted on the vehicles, and personally altered the terms of the injunction so as to avoid creating such a right. In the language of Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C. (*a*), "the defendant might have had those words painted on a yellow omnibus without objection, and so of the other resemblances; the wrong lay in their accumulation, not in any one of them alone." The value of the case really consists in the example it affords of the way in which the aggregation of a number of circumstances, individually comparatively harmless, may produce a result injurious to an individual and obnoxious to the law; and

(*a*) *Woollam* v. *Ratcliff*, 1 H. & M. 259.

also of the manner in which the law will interfere to protect the interests of honest trade.

Where A. had surreptitiously obtained possession of some etchings by B., and had advertised them for exhibition, and a catalogue of them, Lord Cottenham, C., held that there was a title to relief alike on the ground of injury to property and on that of breach of trust (*a*). Etchings.

As to the cases which have been decided in respect of trade secrets, the general rule may be stated as being that any person who has, without the use of unfair means, become acquainted with the mode of compounding a secret unpatented preparation, may make and sell the compound, provided he does not lead the public to suppose that his preparation is the manufacture of the original discoverer or of his successors in business, and he may even call the compound made by himself by the same name as that given by the original discoverer to his, so long as he does not sell his own goods as and for those of another (*b*). On the other hand, where the knowledge of the secret process has been acquired by means of a breach of trust, neither the person who has committed the breach of trust, nor anyone to whom he has imparted his discovery, will be allowed to make use of the information so surreptitiously acquired (*c*). Trade secrets.

Again, "there is no doubt whatever that where a party who has a secret in a trade employs persons under contract express or implied, or under duty express or implied, those Contract not to use or divulge another's secret.

(*a*) *Prince Albert* v. *Strange*, 1 Mac. & G. 25.

(*b*) *James* v. *James*, L. R. 13 Eq. 421; *Liebig's Extract of Meat Co.* v. *Hanbury*, 17 L. T. N. S. 298; *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268, 766; *Carter* v. *Goetze*, 2 Keen 581; *Singleton* v. *Bolton*, 3 Doug. 293; *Williams* v. *Williams*, 3 Mer. 157; *Canham* v. *Jones*, 2 V. & B. 218. And see the comments on that case, in *Morison* v. *Moat*, 9 Hare, 241. But of course, when the name has become a trade mark, no one but the proprietor can use it. The question is whether the name is descriptive of the article or distinctive of the manufactory. See *Massam* v. *Thorley's Cattle Food Co.* (2), 14 Ch. D. 748.

(*c*) *Williams* v. *Williams*, 3 Mer. 157; *Yoratt* v. *Winyard*, 1 Jac. & W. 394; *Tipping* v. *Clarke*, 2 Hare, 383; *Morison* v. *Moat*, 9 Hare, 241, 21 L. J. Ch. 248; *Estcourt* v. *Estcourt Hop Essence Co.*, L. R. 10 Ch. 276.

persons cannot gain the knowledge of that secret and then set it up against their employer" (*a*), and, stating it generally, where one person has entered into a contract, express or implied (*b*), with another person, to keep that other person's secret, and not to divulge it, nor to use it for his own advantage, he will be restrained by an injunction from so divulging or using the secret in question (*c*); and so will a person who is acting in collusion with him (*d*); and a contract by which, on the sale of a trade secret, the vendor has bound himself not to use that secret, is not invalid as being in restraint of trade (*e*).

Name of secret manufacture.

Where the defendant is availing himself of a breach of faith or of contract by means of the use of a certain designation for his goods, in such a case the defendant will be restrained from the use of such designation, although the plaintiff may have no exclusive right in the same, apart from such special circumstances (*f*).

Cannot be used in ignorance of true recipe.

No one will be allowed to use the name of a well-known article, with the secret recipe of which he is unacquainted, upon goods of his own make, so as to represent the spurious

(*a*) Per Lord Cranworth, L. J., in *Morison* v. *Moat*, 21 L. J. Ch., 248.

(*b*) See *Tipping* v. *Clarke*, 2 Hare, 383; *Weston* v. *Hemmons*, 2 Vict. L. R. Eq. 121.

(*c*) *Sedon* v. *Senate*, 2 V. & B. 220; *Bryson* v. *Whitehead*, 1 S. & S. 74; *Green* v. *Folgham*, *ib.* 398; *Tipping* v. *Clarke*, 2 Hare, 383; *Morison* v. *Moat*, 9 Hare, 241; 21 L. J. Ch. 248; *Hagg* v. *Darley*, 47 *ib.* 567; *Whitney* v. *Hickling*, 5 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 605; *Weston* v. *Hemmons*, 2 Vict. L. R. Eq. 121; *Peabody* v. *Norfolk*, 98 Mass. 452. But see *Newbery* v. *James*, 2 Mer. 446, in which Lord Eldon declined to issue an injunction, on the ground that the Court could have no means of judging as to its infringement.

(*d*) *Peabody* v. *Norfolk*, 98 Mass. 452.

(*e*) *Bryson* v. *Whitehead*, 1 S. & S. 74; *Hagg* v. *Darley*, 47 L. J. Ch. 567; *Jarvis* v. *Peck*, 10 Paige 118. And see *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *Lorsont*, L. R. 9 Eq. 352; and *Allsopp* v. *Wheatcroft*, L. R. 15 Eq. 59. In *Vickery* v. *Welch*, 19 Pick. 523, the Sup. Ct. of Mass. held that a person who had agreed to sell a secret process, ought to have covenanted to communicate the secret to the purchaser and to no one else.

(*f*) *Morison* v. *Moat*, 9 Hare, 241. And see *Green* v. *Folgham*, 1 S. & S. 398; *James* v. *James*, L. R. 13 Eq. 421; *Estcourt* v. *Estcourt Hop Essence Co.*, L. R. 10 Ch. 276; *Weston* v. *Hemmons*, 2 Vict. L. R. Eq. 121. In *Canham* v. *Jones*, 2 V. & B. 218, and *Green* v. *Rooke*, W. N. 1872, p. 49, L. J. Notes of Cases, 1872, p. 54, no fraud was proved.

goods to be genuine (*a*); but it seems that if a person has an equal right to the use of the name with the person who is acquainted with the secret in accordance with which the goods are manufactured, the latter, at all events, cannot restrain him from the use of the mark, whatever remedy may be open to the public (*b*). If the person of whom complaint is made is acquainted with the secret process, and has been accustomed to use it, the objection to his use of the name does not arise (*c*), and such a person will not be restrained from using it at the suit of a person who has no right to use the recipe in the district in which the defendant trades (*d*).

Secret passes with owner's personal estate.

After the death of an inventor of a secret process, his son, who had learnt the secret in his employ, continued to make the article, but did not take out administration to the father, and it was held that without becoming his father's personal representative, he could acquire no right to prevent the use of the secret by another (*e*).

Green v. *Folgham.*

The manner in which the Court deals with a secret process is well exemplified by the case of *Green* v. *Folgham* (*f*). There the grandfather of the plaintiffs and defendant possessed the secret of a recipe for an ointment called "Dr. Johnson's Ointment for the Eyes." This secret he settled on his daughter at her marriage, and directed that at the death of the survivor of her and her husband it should be sold for the benefit of the children. The daughter communicated the secret to her eldest son and destroyed the recipe. On a bill being filed against the eldest son by the younger children, Sir

(*a*) *Cotton* v. *Gillard*, 44 L. J. Ch. 90; *Ansell* v. *Gaubert*, Dig. 163.

(*b*) *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; *S. C.* (2) 51 How. Pr. 455.

(*c*) *Witthaus* v. *Braun*, 44 Md. 303; and see *Helmbold* v. *Helmbold Manufacturing Co.*, 53 How. Pr. 453.

(*d*) *Manhattan Medicine Co.* v. *Wood*, 4 Cliff. 461; 23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1925.

(*e*) *Hovenden* v. *Lloyd*, 18 W. R. 1132. And see *Singleton* v. *Bolton*, 3 Doug. 293.

(*f*) 1 S. & S. 398.

J. Leach, V.-C., decreed an account of the profits made by the defendant since his mother's death by the sale of the ointment, a reasonable allowance being made him for his time and trouble in preparing and vending the same. And the Vice-Chancellor went on to remark that if the secret could be made a subject of sale, the plaintiffs would be next entitled to ask from the Court that a sale should be directed accordingly. But inasmuch as the Court had no possible means either to communicate the secret to a purchaser with certainty, or to protect him in the enjoyment of it, a sale was, he said, impracticable (*a*). But, he continued, although the Court could not direct a sale, it had the power of taking a course which, in point of advantage, would be equivalent to the plaintiffs. It could enquire what would be the value of the secret to sell, provided it could be made the subject of sale; and the annual profits which had actually been made by the sale of the ointment from the death of the mother would be a fair criterion by which that value might be estimated. And the Vice-Chancellor accordingly decreed the value to be ascertained at law, as at the date of the decree.

Fraudulent secret.

In connexion with this subject it should be mentioned that when, as is frequently the case, the article manufactured by the secret process is a quack medicine, or an article intended to deceive the public, the Court will not struggle to protect the secret or to punish those who invade it (*b*).

Literary production.

The rights which are possessed by the owner of a magazine, newspaper, or other literary publication, are of a very similar character to those which a person has in the goodwill of a business carried on by him. Just as a name affixed to a shop conveys to customers the idea of a certain degree of excellence, with which the articles sold by the

(*a*) See *Newbery* v. *James*, 2 Mer. 446.

(*b*) *Williams* v. *Williams*, 3 Mer. 157; *Estcourt* v. *Estcourt Hop Essence Co.*, L. R. 10 Ch. 276.

person using that name are associated in their minds; so the title prefixed to a periodical, or its general appearance, conveys to those who take it up the impression that the contents of that publication will be found to be up to the standard to which former editions of the simulated publication have attained. Like goods bearing a trade mark, literary publications carry with them wherever they go the guarantee for their quality, and the representations conveyed by their titles are made to all into whose hands they may come, not merely to the original purchaser. With the doctrine of trade marks that of the titles of literary works has also progressed, so that in this case also that which was formerly protected on the general ground of repression of fraud is now protected as property, and "a publisher or author has either in the title of his work, or in the application of his name to the work, or in the particular marks which designate it, a species of property similar to that which a trader has in his trade mark, and may, like a trader, claim the protection of a Court of Equity against such a use or imitation of the name, mark, or designations as is likely, in the opinion of the Court, to be a cause of damage to him in respect of that property" (*a*).

Hogg v. *Kirby.*

The earliest of the cases with respect to the titles of publications was *Hogg* v. *Kirby* (*b*), before Lord Eldon, C., in 1803. The plaintiff was the proprietor of a monthly magazine, called "The Wonderful Magazine," which was in fact edited by the plaintiff, though the defendant's name was used as that of the publisher. At the completion of the fifth number, the defendant refused to allow the longer use of his name, and the arrangement was accordingly discontinued, and the accounts between the parties finally settled. The plaintiff then put out a notice stating that he would publish the sixth number, which he

(*a*) Per Miller, J., in *Robertson* v. *Berry*, 50 Md. 591.

(*b*) 8 Ves. 215. And see the early Scotch cases of *In re Edinburgh Correspondent Newspaper*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 1st Ser. I. 407 n., and *Constable & Co.* v. *Brewster*, *ib.* III. 215.

did, but on the following day a new magazine was published by the defendant, under the same title as the old one, but with the addition of "New Series Improved, printed for Kirby & Scott," and it was announced that it was intended to issue this monthly. The plaintiff then instituted a suit to check the piracy, and was able to point to several circumstances, in addition to the title, which indicated an intention of inducing the belief that the work was in fact a continuation of the plaintiff's. Lord Eldon, in his judgment, after alluding to the circumstance that the plaintiff's counsel had argued the case on the several grounds of copyright, fraud, and contract, said that he should state the question to be, "not whether the defendant's work was the same as the plaintiff's, but, in a question between those parties, whether the defendant had not represented it to be the same," in fact, resting the case upon fraud on the part of the defendant. His Lordship held that the defendant's intention did appear to be to represent his work as a continuation of the plaintiff's, "taking the credit which had been acquired by that to his own" (*a*), and the injunction was accordingly granted, but in such terms as to extend only to the pretence of the defendant's work being a continuation of the plaintiff's (*b*).

Spottiswoode v. *Clarke.*

In *Spottiswoode* v. *Clarke* (*c*), where the plaintiff published "The Pictorial Almanack," the defendant, "Old Moore's Pictorial Almanack," there being certain similarities between the wrappers of the two works, Lord Cottenham, denying that trade marks had anything to do with the case, said that it was difficult to believe that no fraud

(*a*) See *Longman* v. *Winchester*, 16 Ves. 269, in which Lord Eldon explained his decision in the present case.

(*b*) In *Strahan* v *King*, Dig. 539, the proprietors of the "Contemporary Review" sought to restrain their publishers and a former assistant editor from issuing the "Nineteenth Century," alleging among other things that the defendants were representing the latter to be the plaintiffs' Review; the Vice-Chancellor, however, held that the charges failed, and refused to grant an injunction. And see *Clowes* v. *Hogg*, W. N. 1870, p. 268; *ib.* 1871, p. 40.

(*c*) 2 Ph. 154.

was intended, but that if such were the case, the attempt was very clumsy. And he felt so much doubt as to the legal right that, on the balance of convenience, he dissolved the injunction which had been granted by the Vice-Chancellor of England, giving the plaintiff leave to bring an action, and ordering the defendant to keep an account.

Title of periodical.

In both of the above cases fraud was the *ratio decidendi*, the actions of the defendants being examined with a view to the discovery of their motives and intentions. But at the present date the rule is that even though one person may have adopted in ignorance and *bonâ fide* a name coincident or nearly coincident with that employed by another person, yet he is bound to discontinue the use of that name so assumed as soon as he is made acquainted with the fact of its earlier employment, and the previous employer of the name is entitled to obtain an injunction against him, unless by his own laches or other default he has lost the rights which he otherwise would have had. The principle enunciated by Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in *McAndrew* v. *Bassett* (*a*), would be equally applicable to the case of a title of a periodical, that is to say, that although A. may have innocently used the title employed by B., yet if he continues to trade upon B.'s reputation after being made aware of his error, he does so fraudulently.

Fraudulent intention need not be proved.

The modern doctrine was thus stated by the L. JJ. in the "Sporting Life" case (*b*): "It appears to us that there is nothing analogous to copyright in the name of a newspaper, but that the proprietor has a right to prevent any other person from adopting the same name for any other similar publication." And in *Clement* v. *Maddick* (*c*), the principle was even more plainly stated by Sir J. Stuart, V.-C. The plaintiffs were the publishers of "Bell's Life," the defendants the originators of a "Penny Bell's Life."

(*a*) 33 L. J. Ch. 561. And see *Williams* v. *Osborne*, 13 L. T. N. S. 498; and *Singer Manufacturing Co.* v. *Loog* (3), 8 App. Cas. 15 (per Lord Blackburn).

(*b*) *Kelly* v. *Hutton*, L. R. 3 Ch. 708.

(*c*) 1 Giff. 98.

The Vice-Chancellor said: "This is an application in support of the right to property. It has been argued on behalf of the defendants that, unless a fraudulent intention is made out, the plaintiffs are not entitled to an injunction. That is a view of the law to which I cannot accede. Lord Cottenham, in the case of *Millington* v. *Fox* (*a*), has declared that where a trade mark has been innocently and even unconsciously made use of to the injury of another, the owner of the trade mark is entitled to the protection of this Court."—"The defendants' whole case appears to rest on the fact that they intended to commit no fraud; that they had no fraudulent intention in adopting the words 'Bell's Life,' and thought that by prefixing the word 'Penny' to the title they had sufficiently warned the public that they were not purchasing the plaintiffs' paper. But the absence of fraudulent intention is no defence against an application to the Court for an injunction by the person whose property has been injured," and where deception is probable, an injunction will be granted (*b*).

(*a*) 3 My. & Cr. 338.

(*b*) Thus, injunctions were granted in the following cases:—*Edmonds* v. *Benbow*, Dig. 33 ("The Real John Bull" imitated by "The Old Real John Bull"); *In re The Edinburgh Correspondent Newspaper*, Ct. of Sess. Cas. 1st Ser. I. (new ed..) 407 n. ("The Edinburgh Correspondent," name copied); *Constable & Co.* v. *Brewster*, Ct. of Sess. Cas. 1st Ser. III. 215 (new ed. 152) ("The Edinburgh Philosophical Journal" by "The New Series of the Edinburgh Philosophical Journal"); *Prowett* v. *Mortimer*, 2 Jur. N. S. 414 ("The John Bull and Britannia" by "The True Britannia"); *Ingram* v. *Stiff*, 5 Jur. N. S. 947 ("The London Journal" by "The London Daily Journal"); *Chance* v. *Sheppard*, Dig. 317 ("The Bedfordshire Express and General Advertiser for the Counties of Cambridge, Hertfordshire, Huntingdonshire, and Middlesex" by "The Bedfordshire Express and General Advertiser for the County"); *Corns* v. *Griffiths*, W. N. 1873, p. 93 ("The Iron Trade Circular—Ryland's" by "The Iron Trade Circular—edited by Samuel Griffiths"); *Metzler* v. *Wood*, 8 Ch. D. 606 ("Hemy's Royal Modern Tutor for the Pianoforte" by "Hemy's New and Revised Edition of Jousse's Royal Standard Pianoforte Tutor"); *Hutchings* v. *Sheard*, W. N. 1881, p. 20 ("The Violin School, by J. D. Loder" by "J. D. Loder's Celebrated Violin School, edited, revised, and enlarged by T. Westrop"); *Matsell* v. *Flanagan*, 2 Abb. Pr. N. S. 459; R. Cox. 367 ("The National Police Gazette" by "The United States Police Gazette"); *Potter* v. *McPherson*, 28 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 559 ("Payson, Dunton, and Scribner's National System of Penmanship" by "Independent National System of Penmanship"). And see *Keene* v. *Harris*, 17 Ves. 338; *Walter* v. *Head*, 25 Sol. J. 742, 757 (imitations of "The Times"),

But deception must be probable.

While, however, the fact that the defendant has adopted a title calculated to deceive is sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to his remedy, without it being necessary for him to go into the defendant's motives, he must prove the probability of deception, and if he cannot do this, he will fail, even though there may be circumstances pointing to a fraudulent intention. Thus, where the proprietors of the "Era," one of the principal writers in which paper used the pseudonym of "Touchstone," sought to restrain the publication of "Touchstone, or the New Era," and alleged certain further resemblances between the two papers, the Court of Appeal rescinded the injunction which had been granted, on the ground that no deception could occur (*a*). And where the plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from using the name "Post Office Directory," and it was shown that the name had been used by others than the plaintiff, and that the defendant had had the assistance of post office servants, it was held that no injunction could be granted (*b*).

Titles of literary works protected generally.

Although the title of a periodical publication as a newspaper, magazine, or almanack, most closely resembles a trade mark, on account of its repeated and continued use from time to time upon articles of a certain class, the protec-

and *American Grocer Publishing Association* v. *Grocer Publishing Co.*, 32 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 398 (imitations of "The American Grocer").

(*a*) *Ledger* v. *Ray*, Dig. 550. And no injunctions were granted in *Bradbury* v. *Beeton*, 39 L. J. Ch. 57 ("Punch" and "Punch and Judy"); *Dicks* v. *Yates*, 18 Ch. D. 76 ("Splendid Misery, or East End and West End, by C. H. Hazlewood," and "Splendid Misery, by the author of Lady Audley's Secret, Vixen, &c."); *Dale* v. *Smith*, W. N. 1882, p. 145 ("The Plumber and Decorator and Journal of Gas and Sanitary Engineering" and "The Decorator, Plumber, and Gasfitter's Journal"); *Cowen* v. *Hulton*, 46 L. T. N. S. 897 ("The Newcastle Daily Chronicle" and "The Sporting Chronicle and Prophetic Bell"); *Snowden* v. *Noah*, Hopk. 347, R. Cox, 1 ("The National Advocate" and "The New York National Advocate"); *Bell* v. *Locke*, 8 Paige, 75, R. Cox, 11 ("The Democratic Republican New Era" and "The New Era"); *Stephens* v. *De Conto*, 7 Robertson, 343, R. Cox, 442 ("La Cronica" and "El Cronista"); *Osgood* v. *Allen*, 1 Holmes, 185 ("Our Young Folks, an Illustrated Magazine for Boys and Girls," and "Our Young Folks' Illustrated Paper"); *Tallcot* v. *Moore*, 13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 106 ("The Little Red Book" and "The Red and White Book.")

(*d*) *Kelly* v. *Byles*, 13 Ch. D. 682.

tion afforded by the Court is extended to the title of any kind of literary production. Thus, the publishers of "The Birthday Scripture Text Book" succeeded in obtaining an injunction against persons who had brought out "The Children's Birthday Text Book," Lord Romilly, M. R., remarking that the defendants were not entitled to publish a work "with such a title, or in such form as to binding or general appearance as to be a colourable imitation of that of the plaintiffs" (*a*). And so, where the title of a song was imitated in such a manner as to be calculated to induce the public to buy the spurious publication in mistake for the genuine, the continuance of the fraud was restrained (*b*).

Incidents of title of publication.

The right which exists in the title of a publication is a right of property (*c*), a chattel interest (*d*), capable of assignment (*e*) or bequest (*f*), passing, in the event of its proprietor's bankruptcy, to his trustee, but incapable of seizure by a sheriff (*g*), and which, in the event of a dissolution of partnership between joint proprietors, must be sold for the purpose of the proceeds of the sale being included in the assets of the partnership (*h*).

No copyright in title.

Although the term copyright has been sometimes applied to the right in the title of a publication (*i*), there "cannot

(*a*) *Mack* v. *Petter*, L. R. 14 Eq. 431. See *Weldon* v. *Dicks*, 10 Ch. D. 247.

(*b*) *Chappell* v. *Sheard*, 2 K. & J. 117; *Chappell* v. *Davidson*, *ib.* 123. But in *Isaacs* v. *Daly*, 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 511, it was held that no injunction could be granted to restrain the use of the word "Charity" as the name of a play, the word being one of general application, and the use by the defendant *bond fide*.

(*c*) *Clement* v. *Maddick*, 1 Giff. 98; *Kelly* v. *Hutton*, L. R. 3 Ch. 708.

(*d*) Per Wood, L. J., in *Kelly* v. *Hutton*, *ubi suprâ*.

(*e*) *Longman* v. *Tripp*, 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 67; *Ex parte Foss*, 2 De G. & J. 230; *Kelly* v. *Hutton*, L. R. 3 Ch. 708; *Clowes* v. *Hogg*, W. N. 1870, p. 268; *ib.* 1871, p. 40; *Ward* v. *Beeton*, L. R. 19 Eq. 207; *Snowden* v. *Noah*, Hopk. 347; R. Cox, 1.

(*f*) *Keene* v. *Harris*, 17 Ves. 338. In *McCormick* v. *McCubbin*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 1st Ser. I. 541 (New Ed. 496) it was held by the Court of Session that the executors of the proprietor of a half share in a newspaper were entitled to proceed to a sale of his share.

(*g*) *Ex parte Foss*, 2 De G. & J. 230.

(*h*) *Bradbury* v. *Dickens*, 27 Beav. 53; *Dayton* v. *Wilkes*, 17 How. Pr. 510; R. Cox, 224.

(*i*) *E.g.* per Lord Romilly, M. R. in *Mack* v. *Petter*, L. R. 14 Eq. 431, per Malins, V.C., in *Weldon* v. *Dicks*, 10 Ch. D. 247, per Bacon,

in general be any copyright in the title or name of a book" (*a*), but copyright and trade mark are things "totally distinct" (*b*), and registration under the Copyright Acts gives no further right to protection than exists independently of such registration (*c*).

Must be actual user.

Just as a trade mark must, in order to be entitled to protection, be affixed to a vendible article in the market (*d*), so a title of a publication must be actually used. The mere intention, previous to publication, of using a particular name as the title of a literary work, even if followed by the registration of the proposed title as copyright, the advertisement of the forthcoming work, or the actual preparation of its contents, confers no right to protection, for, "in the case of advertisement, followed by publication, the party publishing has given something to the world, and there is some consideration for the world's giving him a right; but in the case of mere advertisement, he has neither given, nor come under any obligation to give anything to the world, so that there is a total want of consideration for the right which he claims" (*e*). Where, on the other hand, a book has been once published under a particular title, it seems that the right in the title remains, notwithstanding that the book has been long out of print, and has, in fact, been treated as obsolete (*f*).

V. C., in *Dicks* v. *Yates*, 18 Ch. D. 76.

(*a*) Per James, L. J., in *Dicks* v. *Yates*, 18 Ch. D. 76. And see *Kelly* v. *Hutton*, L. R. 3 Ch. 708; *Correspondent Newspaper Co.* v. *Saunders*, 11 Jur. N. S. 540; *Osgood* v. *Allen*, 1 Holmes 185.

(*b*) Per Jessel, M. R., in *Dicks* v. *Yates*, 18 Ch. D. 76.

(*c*) *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307. In the American case of *Jollie* v. *Jaques*, 1 Bl. C. C. 618, it was, however, held that the right to the title of a work, the copyright of which turned out to be invalid, must fail with the copyright. See *Osgood* v. *Allen*, 1 Holmes 185; *Isaacs* v. *Daly*, 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 511; *Scoville* v. *Toland*, 6 West. L. J. 84; and *Hirsch* v. *Jonas*, 3 Ch. D. 584.

(*d*) Or registered, since the Trade Marks Act of 1875.

(*e*) Per Sir G. J. Turner, L. J., in *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307. And see *Correspondent Newspaper Co.* v. *Saunders*, 11 Jur. N. S. 540.

(*f*) *Weldon* v. *Dicks*, 10 Ch. D. 247.

CHAPTER IX.

GOODWILL.

Value of goodwill.

So early as the time of Lord Hardwicke (*a*) it was fully recognised that the goodwill of a trade might be of considerable value, and by the beginning of the present century it was said at the bar (*b*) to be a matter of common experience that contracts for the sale of a goodwill were enforced by actions at Law at every sittings.

Connexion between goodwill and trade marks.

The connexion between goodwill and trade marks is very intimate. Thus, where in a suit for specific performance of a contract for sale of a business (*c*), one of the subjects of the contract was "goodwill, &c.," Sir J. Romilly, M.R., said that those words united such things as were necessarily connected with and belonged to the goodwill, many of which were easily pointed out; for instance, the use of trade marks. Such things would be included in the words "et cætera," and would be included in the conveyance. The sale of a business carries with it the goodwill and trade marks (*d*), and the sale of a business

(*a*) *Giblett* v. *Read*, 9 Mod. 459.

(*b*) *Bunn* v. *Guy*, 4 East, 190.

(*c*) *Cooper* v. *Hood*, 26 Beav. 293.

(*d*) *Shipwright* v. *Clements*, 19 W. R. 599. And see *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150. In *Young* v. *Jones Bros. & Co.*, 3 Hughes 274, the American Court held the contrary. In *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174, V.-C. Wood went so far as to say that the question of trade mark was in fact the same as the question of firm name, which, it was obvious, was an important part of the goodwill, and in *Young* v. *Jones Bros. & Co*, *ubi suprd*, it was said that "rights in the trade mark are analogous to rights in the goodwill of a partnership." See, too, *England* v. *Curling*, 8 Beav. 129; *Dickson* v. *McMaster & Co.*, 18 Ir. Jur. 202; *Congress & Empire Spring Co.* v. *High Rock Congress Spring Co.*, 57 Barb. 526, R. Cox, 599; *Dixon Crucible Co.* v. *Guggenheim*, 2 Brewster, 321, R. Cox, 559; *Sohier* v. *Johnson*, 111 Mass. 238; *Witthaus* v. *Braun*, 44 Md. 303; *Ex*

and goodwill carries with it the right to the trade name (*a*), and the words "assets and effects of every kind and nature," in a bill of sale of a business, cover the trade marks used in the business (*b*). Again, a trade mark cannot exist in gross and apart from the goodwill of the business with which it has been connected (*c*).

Connexion recognised by Registration Act of 1875. and Patents Act, 1883.

This close connexion was fully recognised in the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875 (*d*), by the second section of which it was provided that a registered trade mark should be assigned and transmitted only in connexion with the goodwill of the business concerned in such particular goods or classes of goods, and should be determinable with such goodwill. By the third section the right of the registered proprietor to the exclusive use of the trade mark was made subject to the provisions in respect of its connexion with the goodwill. These provisions are now repeated in sections 70 and 76 of the Patents Act, 1883 (*e*),

What constitutes goodwill

"Goodwill, I apprehend," said Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in the important case of *Churton* v. *Douglas* (*f*), "must mean every advantage, every positive advantage, if I may so express it, as contrasted with the negative advantage of the late partner not carrying on the business himself, that has been acquired by the old firm in carrying on its business, whether connected with the premises in which the business was previously carried on, or with the name of the late firm, or with any other matter carrying with it the benefit of the business."—"Very frequently the goodwill of a business or profession, without any interest in

parte Young, Dig. 537; *Fulton* v. *Sellers*, 4 Brews. 42; *Hazard* v. *Caswell*, 47 N. Y. Super. Ct. 537.

(*a*) Per James, L. J., in *Levy* v. *Walker*, 10 Ch. D. 436.

(*b*) *Moryan* v. *Rogers*, 26 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1113.

(*c*) *Cotton* v. *Gillard*, 44 L. J. Ch. 90; *Dixon Crucible Co.* v. *Guggenheim*, 2 Brewster 321, R. Cox, 559; *Derringer* v. *Plate*, 29 Cal. 292, R. Cox, 324; *Witthaus* v. *Braun*, 44 Md. 303; *Taylor* v. *Bemis*, 4 Biss. 406; *Kidd* v. *Johnson*, 100 U. S. Rep. 617; *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; *S. C.* (2), 51 How. Pr. 455; *Morgan* v. *Rogers*, 26 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1113.

(*d*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 91.

(*e*) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57.

(*f*) Johns. 174. And see per Hugans, J., in *McGowan Bros. Pump & Machine Co.* v. *McGowan*, 2 Cinc. 313.

land connected with it, is made the subject of sale, though there is nothing tangible in it" (*a*). And it carries with it the benefit of such matters as a covenant by a servant not to carry on a similar business within prescribed limits (*b*).

Formerly treated as always local.

Previously to the case of *Churton* v. *Douglas* (*c*), the language of various eminent judges as to what constituted "goodwill" had rather tended to connect the goodwill with the premises on which the business was carried on, than with the business carried on there, probably because that language, though in general terms, was directed to the circumstances of the case then in course of decision (*d*). Thus, Lord Eldon, C., in *Cruttwell* v. *Lye* (*e*), describes goodwill as "nothing more than the probability that the old customers will resort to the old place" (*f*). Sir J. Leach, M.R., describes it (*g*) as "an advantage attaching to the possession of the house" in which the business had been carried on; and Lord Langdale, M.R. (*h*), as "the chance or probability that custom will be had at a certain place of business in consequence of the way in which that business has been previously carried on" (*d*). In *King* v. *Midland Railway Co.* (*i*), Giffard, V.-C., gave effect to this view by holding that the assignees in liquidation of a mortgagor, whose business premises were taken by a railway company, were entitled to no part of the purchase money, as having been paid in respect of the goodwill of the business, as against the mortgagee of the premises, whose debt exceeded the

(*a*) Per Pollock, C. B., in *Potter* v. *The Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, 10 Ex. 147.

(*b*) *Jacoby* v. *Whitmore*, 49 L. T. N. S. 335.

(*c*) Johns. 174.

(*d*) See *Churton* v. *Douglas*, *ubi suprâ*.

(*e*) 17 Ves. 335.

(*f*) In this case Sir A. Piggott, in the course of his argument, said that "goodwill" was "the advantage belonging to a house long accustomed to carry on a particular trade." See, too, Sir T. Plumer, V.-C., in *Harrison* v. *Gardner*, 2 Madd. 198.

(*g*) In *Chissum* v. *Dewes*, 5 Russ. 29.

(*h*) In *England* v. *Downs*, 6 Beav. 269.

(*i*) 17 W. R. 113. See *Rutter* v. *Daniel*, 30 W. R. 724, 801; *Mitchell* v. *Read* (2), 26 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 418.

purchase money; but that the goodwill was incident to the mortgaged premises and passed with them.

Not so now.

The judgment in *Churton* v. *Douglas* has now established that the dictum of Lord Eldon in *Cruttwell* v. *Lye* (*a*) must be read as meaning that goodwill is the probability that the old customers will buy the old goods from the old firm or their successors in business, whether the means of identification be the place of business or otherwise (*b*). The customers of a large wholesale house cannot be supposed to pay much attention to the exact site of the establishment, and "there may even be a species of goodwill which may be the subject of bargain and sale, although not dependent on the business being carried on in any particular place; for instance, in the case of what are called quack medicines" (*c*).

Local connexion important.

While, however, there may be a species of goodwill not intimately connected with a particular spot, in many trades there can hardly be any goodwill apart from the premises on which business has been carried on. Thus, "it is quite plain that the goodwill of a public-house passes with the public-house. In such a case the goodwill is the mere habit of the customers resorting to the house. It is not what is called a personal goodwill" (*d*). Such a goodwill carries with it the public-house licences, since without them the business cannot be carried on (*e*). And wherever there is a connection between the goodwill and a particular locality it will be of great consequence, and a house of little value in itself, at a rack rent, may have a peculiar value

(*a*) 17 Ves. 335.

(*b*) And compare *Labouchere* v. *Dawson*, L. R. 13 Eq. 322; *Cooper* v. *Metropolitan Board of Works*, 25 Ch. D. 472.

(*c*) Brett, J., in *Llewellyn* v. *Rutherford*, L. R. 10 C. P. 456. The goodwill of a newspaper is another example. See *Boon* v. *Moss*, 70 N. Y. 465, and the observations of Lindley, L. J., in his work on Partnership. See, too, *Potter* v. *The Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, 10 Ex. 147, and *Huwer* v. *Dannenhoffer*, 82 N. Y. 499.

(*d*) Per Jessel, M. R., in *Ex parte Punnett; In re Kitchin*, 16 Ch. D. 226. See *Mitchell* v. *Reed* (2), 26 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 418.

(*e*) *Rutter* v. *Daniel*, 30 W. R. 724, 801.

attached to it from the fact of a long-established business having been carried on there (*a*).

Another view of goodwill.

Looked at from another point of view, the goodwill may be said to be the money value of what has just been described as the goodwill (*b*)

Goodwill in learned professions.

While the value of most businesses is determined partly by the personal qualifications of the proprietor, partly by those of his subordinates, partly (sometimes principally) by local situation, partly, it may be, by yet other considerations, there is one class of business in which the personal character and ability of the head of the establishment are of paramount and almost exclusive importance. That class comprehends the medical and legal, or "learned" professions.

Division into personal and local.

Adverting to this distinction, Sir J. Cross, in *Ex parte Thomas* (*c*), divided goodwill into personal and local, adding that there might be a goodwill partly personal and partly local (*d*). But the employment of the word "local" as descriptive of one of the two principal heads under which goodwill falls seems open to objection, on the ground that it tends to produce the misconception exposed and removed by Vice-Chancellor Wood, in *Churton* v. *Douglas* (*e*), and to unduly narrow the meaning to be assigned to "goodwill," which, as has been seen, comprehends, not merely the advantage of local situation, but every positive advantage connected with an established trade.

Division into goodwill of profession and of trade.

The two classes of goodwill may more satisfactorily be distinguished, from the classes of pursuit to which they respectively relate, as the goodwill of a profession on the

(*a*) *Parsons* v. *Hayward*. 31 L. J. Ch. 666; *Llewellyn* v. *Rutherford*, L. R. 10 C. P. 456. See *Cooper* v. *Metropolitan Board of Works*, 25 Ch. D. 472, per Cotton, L. J.

(*b*) *Austen* v. *Boys*, 2 De G. & J. 626; *Llewellyn* v. *Rutherford*, (Brett, J.), *ubi suprd.*

(*c*) 2 Mont. D. & De G. 294; and see *Ex parte Punnett*, 16 Ch. D. 226.

(*d*) This division corresponds to that of trade marks into personal and local, made by Sir J. Romilly, M. R., in *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 32 L. J. Ch. 548, which, however, was not indorsed by Lord Westbury, C. See 4 De G. J. & S. 150.

(*e*) Johns. 174.

one hand, and that of a trade on the other. It is, indeed, true that the goodwill of a trade, the more usual kind, possesses so many characteristics which that of a profession has not, that the latter has been thought to be hardly entitled to the name of goodwill at all (*a*), and in *Arundell* v. *Bell* (*b*), Sir G. Jessel, M. R., went so far as to say that "there is nothing analogous to the goodwill in an ordinary trade, which you can sell, in the case of a partnership of living solicitors;" but, on the other hand, there are points of resemblance in which both classes are governed by the same general rule, and there is a convenience in following an established phraseology.

Contract by attorney to transfer goodwill enforced

In *Bunn* v. *Guy* (*c*), the Lord Chancellor was impressed by the difference between the goodwill of a profession and that of a trade, and caused the opinion of the Court of King's Bench to be taken as to whether a contract by a practising attorney (among other things) to relinquish his business and recommend his clients to two other attorneys for valuable consideration, and not to practise within certain limits, and to permit them to use his name for a certain time, was good at Law, so that the vendor could recover in an action. The answer was that the contract was good in Law.

Decision doubted.

This decision did not long remain uncriticised. In *Bozon* v. *Farlow* (*d*), Sir W. Grant, M. R., refused to grant specific performance of an agreement for the sale of an attorney's business, the terms of the agreement not being sufficiently specified to enable the Court to give the purchaser the proper return for his money, and he took the opportunity of questioning the propriety of a sale of an attorney's business, which depended so much on the in-

(*a*) See *Austen* v. *Boys*, 2 De G. & J. 626, and *Bain* v. *Munro*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 4th Ser. V. 416, per Lord Curriehill.

(*b*) 52 L. J. Ch. 537.

(*c*) 4 East, 190, in 1803. See the medical cases of *Rawlinson* v. *Clarke*, 14 M. & W. 187; *Smith* v. *Smith*, 4 Wend. 468; *Butler* v. *Burleson*, 16 Vt. 176.

(*d*) 1 Mer. 459.

cumbent's own character. And in *Farr* v. *Pearce* (*a*), Sir J. Leach, V.-C., strongly supported the personal character of a profession as contrasted with a commercial business.

Sale of solicitor's practice.

Where, however, a solicitor had actually sold his practice for valuable consideration, and undertaken not to practise as a solicitor in Great Britain for twenty years, Lord Langdale, M. R., granted an injunction to restrain him from so practising, and from endeavouring to induce any persons who were the clients of the former and then present firm to cease to employ that firm (*b*).

Thornbury v. *Bevill.*

In a case (*c*) which was "not quite a case of dissolution of partnership, but something between a dissolution of the partnership and a purchase of an attorney's business and firm name," Sir J. L. Knight-Bruce, V.-C., having refused specific performance of the alleged contract, on the ground of non-acceptance by the plaintiff, said that, "notwithstanding the case of *Bunn* v. *Guy* (*d*), from which he did not mean to express dissent, decided as it was by judges of high authority, he was not prepared to say that it was fit that a Court of Equity should enforce an agreement between two solicitors that one on retiring from the business should permit the other to carry on the business in his name. Whether such an agreement were or were not within the strict policy of the law, it might be doubtful whether the Court of Chancery ought to assist it."

Partnership between solicitors dissolved.

But where, on a dissolution by two solicitors of a *bonâ fide* partnership between them, it was agreed that one should carry on the business under the old firm name, paying the other certain annuities, it was held by Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., that the agreement contained nothing illegal or contrary to public policy (*e*),

Rights on dissolution.

Again, on a dissolution of a professional partnership, a

(*a*) 3 Madd. 74.
(*b*) *Whittaker* v. *Howe*, 3 Beav. 383.
(*c*) *Thornbury* v. *Bevill*, 1 Y. & C. Ch. 554.
(*d*) 4 East, 190.
(*e*) *Aubin* v. *Holt*, 2 K. & J. 66.

retiring partner is not entitled to compensation in respect of his share in the goodwill (*a*), and a surviving partner may continue the business (*b*).

Goodwill of deceased solicitor.

In *Spicer* v. *James* (*c*), a country attorney having died intestate, his administrator carried on the business until the intestate's son came of age, when he handed over the business to the son. The son becoming insolvent, a bill for an account of profits, and insisting that a sum was due to the intestate's estate in respect of the goodwill, was filed against the administrator by a creditor of the son, but was dismissed by Sir J. Leach, M. R., on the ground that the goodwill of an attorney's business was not a subject of administration. So, in *Arundell* v. *Bell* (*d*), the Court of Appeal decided that the estate of a solicitor, who had retired from a partnership and shortly afterwards died, was not entitled to any allowance in respect of his interest in the goodwill of the business, and Jessel, M. R., said that "as a general rule there is nothing in the nature of a partnership asset to be sold which can fairly be termed goodwill in an ordinary partnership between solicitors."

Estate of professional man interested in proceeds of goodwill.

Where, however, the widow of a surgeon-dentist, being one of his executors, sold the goodwill of his business with an introduction to patients, Vice-Chancellor Knight-Bruce held that either the whole, or, at all events, some part of the price paid belonged to the testator's estate (*e*). But in the similar Scotch case of *Bain* v. *Munro* (*f*), it was held by the Lord Ordinary and Court of Session that the price which was paid was in fact the price of the widow's recommendation, and that she was entitled to retain it for her own benefit.

Goodwill of professional business.

The goodwill of a professional business may, in short, be sold, and a breach of a contract to sell may be a ground for

(*a*) *Austen* v. *Boys*, 2 De G. & J. 626; *Farr* v. *Pearce*, 3 Madd. 74.
(*b*) *Farr* v. *Pearce*, 3 Madd. 74. And see *Milner* v. *Reed*, Dig. 328.
(*c*) Collyer on Partnership, 2nd ed. p. 104.
(*d*) 52 L. J. Ch. 537.
(*e*) *Smale* v. *Graves*, 3 De G. & S. 706.
(*f*) Ct. Sess. Cas. 4th Ser. V. 416.

Recapitulation.

damages, but the authorities are against the enforcement of the specific performance of such a contract, though when the sale is complete, the terms of the sale will be carried into execution. Such a goodwill, in the case of a partnership, survives to the surviving partner, and is not a subject of compensation to an outgoing partner. Special stipulations will, however, be enforced. Such a goodwill will not be considered in the administration of the proprietor's estate unless actually sold; but if that has been done, the price paid or some part of it may be attributed to the estate.

Goodwill of a trade.

"The goodwill of a trade," said Tindal, C. J. (*a*), "is a subject of value and price. It may be sold (*b*), bequeathed (*c*), or become assets in the hands of the personal representatives of a trader" (*d*). A sale may be conditional (*e*), and may be effected by a mortgagee (*f*). Though incapable, by reason of its incorporeal nature, of seizure by a sheriff (*g*), goodwill is "goods and chattels within the Bankruptcy Acts (*h*), and may be dealt with by the trustee in bankruptcy just as the bankrupt's other property" (*i*). It is also "property" within the Stamp Acts (*k*).

Universally valuable.

The valuable character of goodwill is not confined to a few trades, but is recognised throughout the commercial world. Thus, among the cases on this subject which have come before the Courts, instances are to be found in

(*a*) In *Hitchcock* v. *Coker*, 6 Ad. & E. 438—54.

(*b*) See *Darbey* v. *Whitaker*, 4 Dr. 139; *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Cooper* v. *Hood*, 26 Beav. 293; *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79; *Shipwright* v. *Clements*, 19 W. R. 599; *Howe* v. *Searing*, 10 Abb. Pr. 264; R. Cox, 244.

(*c*) See *Keene* v. *Harris*, 17 Ves. 338; *Robertson* v. *Quiddington*, 28 Beav. 529.

(*d*) See *Worral* v. *Hand*, Peake 105; *Dakin* v. *Cope*, 2 Russ. 170; *Chissum* v. *Dewes*, 5 Russ. 29; *McCormick* v. *McCubbin*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 1st Ser. I. 541.

(*e*) *Boon* v. *Moss*, 70 N. Y. 465.

(*f*) *Ex parte Punnett; In re Kitchin*, 16 Ch. D. 226.

(*g*) *Ex parte Foss*, 2 De G. & J. 230.

(*h*) *Longman* v. *Tripp*, 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 67; *Ex parte Foss*, *ubi suprd.*

(*i*) See *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79; *Hegeman & Co.* v. *Hegeman*, 8 Daly 1.

(*k*) *Potter* v. *The Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, 10 Ex. 147. And see *Morgan* v. *Perhamus*, 36 Ohio St. 517.

which the traders were public-house keepers (*a*), brewers (*b*), bankers (*c*), tailors (*d*), mercers (*e*), dyers (*f*), milliners (*g*), upholsterers (*h*), pencil-makers (*i*), tobacco-brokers (*k*) snuff-makers (*l*), paper-makers (*m*), provision merchants (*n*), cheesemongers (*o*) glass-blowers (*p*), glass-stainers (*q*), manufacturing chemists (*r*), commission agents (*s*), iron-masters (*t*), carriers (*u*). The goodwill of a newspaper or magazine, consisting of the right to use the title under which reputation has been acquired by a publication, is another instance of valuable goodwill (*x*).

Firm name part of goodwill.

"The name of a firm," says Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., in *Churton* v. *Douglas* (*y*), "is a very important part of the goodwill of the business carried on by the firm. A person says, 'I have always bought good articles at such a house of business; I know it by that name, and I send to the house of business identified by that name for that purpose.' There are cases every day in this Court with reference to

(*a*) *Coslake* v. *Till*, 1 Russ. 376; *Spratt* v. *Jeffery*, 10 B. & C. 249; *Ex parte Thomas*, 2 Mont. D. & De G. 294; *Tweed* v. *Mills*, L. R. 1 C. P. 39; *Llewellyn* v. *Rutherford*, L. R. 10 C. P. 456; *Ex parte Punnett*; *In re Kitchin*, 16 Ch. D. 226.

(*b*) *Cooper* v. *Watson*, 3 Doug. 413; *Wade* v. *Jenkins*, 2 Giff. 509; *Hall* v. *Hall*, 20 Beav. 139.

(*c*) *Smith* v. *Everett*, 27 Beav. 446.

(*d*) *Newling* v. *Dobell*, 38 L. J. Ch. 111; *Parsons* v. *Hayward*, 31 L. J. Ch. 666.

(*e*) *Morris* v. *Moss*, 25 L. J. Ch. 194.

(*f*) *Bryson* v. *Whitehead*, 1 S. & S. 74.

(*g*) *Shackle* v. *Baker*, 14 Ves. 468.

(*h*) *Chissum* v. *Dewes*, 5 Russ. 29.

(*i*) *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566.

(*k*) *Davies* v. *Hodgson*, 25 Beav. 177.

(*l*) *Hammond* v. *Douglas*, 5 Ves. 539

(*m*) *Potter* v. *The Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, 10 Ex. 147.

(*n*) *Scott* v. *Mackintosh*, 1 V. & B. 503.

(*o*) *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79.

(*p*) *Featherstonhaugh* v. *Fenwick*, 17 Ves. 298.

(*q*) *Scott* v. *Rowland*, 20 W. R. 508.

(*r*) *Turner* v. *Major*, 3 Giff. 442.

(*s*) *Macdonald* v. *Richardson*, 1 Giff. 81.

(*t*) *Cooper* v. *Hood*, 26 Beav. 293; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150.

(*u*) *Cruttwell* v. *Lye*, 17 Ves. 335.

(*x*) *Giblett* v. *Read*, 9 Mod. 459; *Keene* v. *Harris*, 17 Ves. 338; *Longman* v. *Tripp*, 2 Bos. & P. N. R. 67; *Ex parte Foss*, 2 De G. & J. 230; *Marshall* v. *Watson*, 25 Beav. 501; *Bradbury* v. *Dickens*, 27 Beav. 53; *McCormick* v. *McCubbin*, Ct. Sess. Cas. 1st Ser. I. 541; *Snowden* v. *Noah*, Hopk. 347; R. Cox, 1; *Dayton* v. *Wilkes*, 17 How. Pr. 510; R. Cox, 224.

(*y*) Johns. 174.

the use of the name of a particular firm, connected generally, no doubt, with the question of trade mark. But the question of trade mark is in fact the same question. The firm stamps its name on the articles. It stamps the name of the firm which is carrying on the business on each article, as a proof that they emanate from the firm; and it becomes the known firm to which applications are made, just as much as when a man enters a shop in a particular locality. And when you are parting with the goodwill of a business, you mean to part with all that good disposition which customers entertain towards the house of business identified by the particular name or firm, and which may induce them to continue giving their custom to it. You cannot put it anything short of that. That the name is an important part of the goodwill of a business is obvious, when we consider that there are at this moment large banking firms, and brewing firms, and others, in this metropolis, which do not contain a single member of the individual name exposed in the firm" (*a*).

Sale of goodwill.

Goodwill is a subject of sale (*b*), and may fetch a considerable price. There was formerly a doubt whether a contract for the sale of a goodwill would be specifically enforced in Equity (*c*), but this question was set at rest by Sir R. T. Kindersley, V.-C., in *Darbey* v. *Whitaker* (*d*). "It is said there can be no specific performance of a

(*a*) And see *Lewis* v. *Langdon*, 7 Sim. 421; *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566; *Bond* v. *Milbourn*, 20 W. R. 197; *Scott* v. *Rowland*, 20 W. R. 508; *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268, 766; *Levy* v. *Walker*, 10 Ch. D. 436; *Beazley* v. *Soares*, 22 Ch. D. 660; *Rogers* v. *Taintor*, 97 Mass. 291; *Solicr* v. *Johnson*, 111 Mass. 238; *Peterson* v. *Humphrey*, 4 Abb. Pr. 394; R. Cox, 212; and *Howe* v. *Searing*, 10 Abb. Pr. 264; R. Cox, 244.

(*b*) See, among other cases, *Bunn* v. *Guy*, 4 East, 190; *Smale* v. *Graves*, 3 De G. & S. 706; *Cooper* v. *Hood*, 26 Beav. 293; *Bradbury* v. *Dickens*, 27 Beav. 53; *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Ex parte Bennett; In re Kitchin*, 16 Ch. D. 226; *Buckingham* v. *Waters*, 14 Cal. 246; *Williams* v. *Wilson*, 4 Sandf. Ch. 379.

(*c*) *Baxter* v. *Connolly*, 1 Jac. & W. 580. And see *Coslake* v. *Till*, 1 Russ. 376; *Bozon* v. *Farlow*, 1 Mer. 459; *Cassidy* v. *Metcalf*, 1 Mo. App. 593.

(*d*) 4 Dr. 139. As to the relation between the lease of a trader's premises and the goodwill of his business, see *Dougherty* v. *Van Nostrand*, Hoff. 68.

contract to purchase a goodwill. No doubt you cannot have a specific performance of a contract to purchase a goodwill alone, unconnected with business premises, by reason of the uncertainty of the subject-matter. But when a goodwill is entirely or mainly annexed to the premises, and the contract is for the sale of the premises and goodwill, there is not the slightest ground for doubt that such a contract is a fit matter for a decree in a suit for specific performance." It seems, however, that there may be cases in which a contract for sale of a goodwill would be specifically enforced, the business and goodwill being included together, though there was no such dependence on the business premises (*a*). Such would be the case with the goodwill of a quack medicine or a newspaper, which is practically independent of locality (*b*). The connection between the business and the goodwill is such that the sale of the business (*c*), or of a share in the business (*d*) as a going concern, carries with it the goodwill, or the corresponding share in the goodwill, even without its being specifically mentioned, and so does the sale of a hotel or public-house (*e*). And if the goodwill is sold, the trade name goes with it (*f*).

Rights of vendor of goodwill.

As to the rights of the vendor after the sale of his business and goodwill, "it has been settled that there is

(*a*) Thus, Sir J. Romilly, M. R., says in *Robertson* v. *Quiddington*, 28 Beav. 529: "Goodwill is never a tangible thing unless it is connected with the *business* itself, from which it cannot be separated. I never knew a case in which it has been so treated." In *England* v. *Downs*, 6 Beav. 269, and *Morris* v. *Moss*, 25 L. J. Ch. 194, the goodwill of a business was held, under the circumstances, to pass with the stock, and not with the premises. And see *Woodward* v. *Lazar*, 21 Cal. 448; R. Cox, 300. In *Llewellyn* v. *Rutherford*, L. R. 10 C. P. 456, the price of the goodwill was held to belong to the previous lessee, under the contract between him and the lessor.

(*b*) See *Bryson* v. *Whitehead*, 1 S. & S. 74; *Llewellyn* v. *Rutherford*, L. R. 10 C. P. 456 (per Brett, J.); *Snowden* v. *Noah*, Hopk. 347; R. Cox, 1.

(*c*) *Shipwright* v. *Clements*, 19 W. R. 599. And see *Rolt* v. *Bulmer*, W. N. 1878, p. 119; *Reynolds* v. *Bullock*, 47 L. J. Ch. 773; *Boon* v. *Moss*, 70 N. Y. 465.

(*d*) *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174.

(*e*) *Ex parte Punnett; In re Kitchin*, 16 Ch. D. 226.

(*f*) *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566; *Churton* v. *Douglas*, *ubi suprd*; *Levy* v. *Walker*, 10 Ch. D. 436.

After sale may set up new business.

no implied covenant of any kind" (*a*), and in the absence of any express restrictive covenant, the vendor is at liberty to set up a business of precisely the same description as that of which he has sold the goodwill, and that next door to the place where his former business was carried on; but he is not entitled to represent that he is carrying on the same identical business, either by direct representations, or by assuming the trade name under which the business he has sold acquired its reputation, or the trade marks by which its goods have become known in the market (*b*). If the trade name consisted simply of the vendor's own name, the restraint upon his continuing to use that name will have to depend upon the evidence of that user being fraudulent (*c*), but in the absence of such evidence, the *bonâ fide* use by a man of his own name will not be prohibited (*d*). But where the trade name in question consisted of the name of the defendant, John Douglas, with the addition "and Co.," it was held that the use of that was an important ingredient in the case, as proving fraudulent intention (*e*). And so where the name of the firm had been "Benjamin Finch & Co.," and on dissolution B. Finch agreed to carry on business only

(*a*) *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79. And see *Harrison* v. *Gardner*, 2 Madd. 198; *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174.

(*b*) *Shackle* v. *Baker*, 14 Ves. 468; *Cruttwell* v. *Lye*, 17 Ves. 335; *Kennedy* v. *Lee*, 3 Mer. 441—52; *Sedon* v. *Senate*, 2 V. & B. 220; *Harrison* v. *Gardner*, 2 Madd. 198; *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. 79; *Labouchere* v. *Dawson*, L. R. 13 Eq. 322; *Ginesi* v. *Cooper*, 14 Ch. D. 596; *Leggott* v. *Barrett*, 15 *ib.*, 306; *Walker* v. *Mottram*, 19 *ib.* 355; *Dawson* v. *Beeson*, 22 *ib.*, 504; *Mossop* v. *Mason*, 18 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 453; *Peltz* v. *Eichele*, 62 Mo. 171.

(*c*) *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Holloway* v. *Holloway*, 13 Beav. 209.

(*d*) *Burgess* v. *Burgess*, 3 De G. M. & G. 896; *Bond* v. *Milbourn*, 20 W. R. 197.

(*e*) *Churton* v. *Douglas*, *ubi suprd*, and see *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood* (1), W. N. 1873, p. 185; *Devlin* v. *Devlin*, 69 N. Y. 212; *Zimmerman* v. *Erhard*, 83 N. Y. 74; *Hegeman & Co.* v. *Hegeman*, 8 Daly, 1. In *Bond* v. *Milbourn*, 20 W. R. 197 (very shortly reported) it seems that the plaintiff would have been entitled to an injunction at all events against the use of the words "and Co." by the defendant, if that had been the relief prayed.

under his own name, he was restrained from trading as "Benjamin Finch & Co." (*a*).

But must not interfere unfairly with purchaser.

When the vendor of a goodwill has established a new firm for the purpose of carrying on a business similar to that which has been sold, "the new firm," says Lord Romilly, M. R. (*b*), "is entitled to publish any advertisement he pleases in the papers, stating that he is carrying on such business. He is entitled to publish any circulars to all the world to say that he is carrying on such a business, but he is not entitled, either by private letter, or by a visit, or by his traveller or agent, to go to any person who was a customer of the old firm, and solicit him not to continue his business with the old firm, but to transfer it to him, the new firm" (*c*). Sir G. Jessel, M. R., was, indeed, of opinion that this doctrine should be extended so as to entitle the purchaser of the goodwill of a business to restrain the vendor from having any dealings with his former customers, irrespective of whether he had solicited their custom or not (*d*); but the Court of Appeal has decided that the vendor can only be restrained from actually soliciting his old customers, as in *Labouchere* v. *Dawson* (*e*), and cannot be restrained from dealing with them, even though he has solicited them previous to the injunction (*f*). In short, the vendor may set up a new business, just as any one else may, but he is not at liberty to resume the advantages connected with the old firm, which he has sold, although it is perfectly allowable for him to state his connection with the

(*a*) *Day* v. *Finch*, 25 Sol. J. 354.

(*b*) In *Labouchere* v. *Dawson*, L. R. 13 Eq. 322; a case which, though doubted in *Walker* v. *Mottram*, 19 Ch. D. 355, has not been overruled. See *Pearson* v. *Pearson*, 77 L. T. 30; also *Selby* v. *Anchor Tube Co.*, W. N. 1877, p. 191.

(*c*) As to the surrender of a business by A. "for the benefit" of B., see *Clark* v. *Leach*, 32 Beav. 14; and also *Harrison* v. *Gardner*, 2 Madd. 198; and *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174.

(*d*) *Ginesi* v. *Cooper & Co.*, 14 Ch. D. 596.

(*e*) L. R. 13 Eq. 322.

(*f*) *Leggott* v. *Barrett*, 15 Ch. D. 306.

former business, so long as he does not represent that he is still carrying it on (*a*).

No restriction when alienation compulsory.

When, however, the goodwill has not been voluntarily alienated by the person entitled to it, the case is quite different, as was clearly pointed out in *Walker* v. *Mottram* (*b*), in which Jessel, M. R., and the Court of Appeal held that a trader, the goodwill of whose business had been sold by his trustees in liquidation, could not be prevented from actually soliciting his former customers. "An assignment of a business and its goodwill, without more, appears to us," said Lush and Lindley, L.J.J., "to pass now just as much as and no more than in the days of Lord Eldon. As against the assignor it confers on the assignee the exclusive right to carry on the business assigned, and, as incidental to this, it also confers on him the exclusive right to represent himself as carrying on that business, and consequently the right, not only to sue the assignor for damages if he has infringed these rights, but also to restrain him from infringing them if he manifests an intention to infringe them. Moreover, to this extent a bankrupt who does not concur in his trustee's assignment is in no better position than a bankrupt who does. Every bankrupt, whether he concurs or not, is bound by every lawful disposition of his property by the trustee, and whatever rights such a disposition confers on a purchaser must be respected by the bankrupt, whether he joins in the conveyance or not. But, in our opinion, the right of a purchaser of the goodwill of a business from the trustee in bankruptcy does not extend to restrain the bankrupt (even if he joins in the conveyance) from *bonâ fide* commencing a fresh business, and from seeking assistance in it from his old friends and customers. It would,

(*a*) *Clark* v. *Leach*, 32 Beav. 14; *Hookham* v. *Pottage*, L. R. 8 Ch. 91; *Shipwright* v. *Clements*, 19 W. R. 599; *Cassidy* v. *Metcalf*, 1 Mo. App. 593. And in the same way the vendor cannot afterwards give a right to others to use the trade mark, *Sohl* v. *Geisendorf*, 1 Wils. (Ind.) 60.

(*b*) 19 Ch. D. 355.

in our opinion, be contrary to the policy of the bankruptcy laws to extend *Labouchere* v. *Dawson* (*a*) to such a case. It is not necessary to overrule that decision; we leave it where it is, that is to say, it will still be applicable to voluntary sales. But we do not think it ought to be extended to alienations which are compulsory" (*b*). On this principle it was held by the Court of Appeal in *Dawson* v. *Beeson* (*c*) that an expelled partner was entitled to solicit the customers of his old firm.

Vendor restrained, though no express covenant.

Although there is no implied covenant on the sale of a goodwill, without more, that the vendor will not set up a similar business in the same neighbourhood, yet where a vendor had received in payment for his share of a goodwill a sum calculated by arbitrators upon the understanding (to which he had assented) that he would not carry on business in the same street, it was held to be contrary to Equity that he should carry on business in that street, and he was accordingly enjoined (*d*).

Express restrictive covenant usual.

In the sale of a business and goodwill, it is customary to insert an express restrictive covenant, which will be binding on the vendor, restraining him from setting up the same trade within a certain limit of time or space, or using his name or allowing it to be used for that purpose (*e*);

(*a*) L. R. 13 Eq. 322.

(*b*) See *Helmbold* v. *Helmbold Manufacturing Co.*, 53 How. Pr. 453, and *Hegeman & Co.* v. *Hegeman*, 8 Daly 1.

(*c*) 22 Ch. D. 504.

(*d*) *Harrison* v. *Gardner*, 2 Madd. 198. See *Cassidy* v. *Metcalf*, 1 Mo. App. 593.

(*e*) *Cooper* v. *Watson*, 3 Doug. 413; *Bryson* v. *Whitehead*, 1 S. & S. 74; *Williams* v. *Williams*, 2 Swanst. 253; *Whittaker* v. *Howe*, 3 Beav. 383; *Turner* v. *Evans*, 2 De G. M. & G. 740; *Newling* v. *Dobell*, 38 L. J. Ch. 111; *Wolmershausen* v. *O'Connor*, 36 L. T. N. S. 921; *Rawlinson* v. *Clarke*, 14 M. & W. 187; *Rolfe* v. *Rolfe*, 15 Sim. 88; *Shipwright* v. *Clements*, 19 W. R. 599; *Lee* v. *Ehrhart*, 19 L. T. N. S. 637; *Hagg* v. *Darley*, 47 L. J. Ch. 567; *Vickery* v. *Welch*, 19 Pick. 523; *Smith* v. *Smith*, 4 Wend. 468; *Sander* v. *Hoffman*, 64 N. Y. 248; *Peltz* v. *Eichele*, 62 Mo. 171; *Butler* v. *Burleson*, 16 Vt. 176; *Baumgarten* v. *Broadaway*, 77 N. Car. 8; *Woods* v. *Sands*, Dig. 467; *Morgan* v. *Perhamus*, 36 Ohio St. 517; *Williams* v. *Wilson*, 4 Sandf. Ch. 379; *Gillis* v. *Hall*, 2 Brewster, 342; R. Cox, 580; and similarly upon the sale of a trade mark together with the right to manufacture according to a secret recipe, *Filkins* v. *Blackman*, 13 Bl. C. C. 440.

and this has become so usual that where (*a*), in a contract for sale, one of the items was "goodwill &c.," Sir J. Romilly, M. R., held that in the "&c." would be included, amongst other things, a covenant by the vendor not to carry on a similar business in Great Britain, for a reasonable time, to be limited in the conveyance, having regard to the nature of such undertakings. Such a covenant may even have the effect of compelling the vendor to quit his trade altogether for the period specified, as was held by Lord Mansfield, C. J., and the Court of King's Bench, in *Cooper* v. *Watson* (*b*); and it has been held that a breach of a covenant "not to carry on or be concerned or interested in" a certain business, was committed by the vendor entering into the service of a nephew, who carried on the same trade, under the same name, within the proscribed limits (*c*). Again, a covenant not to carry on a certain business directly or indirectly within the counties of C., A., and M., was broken by soliciting orders on three occasions within C., though the offices of the new business were outside the limits (*d*). A vendor of a business, who has covenanted not to carry on such a business, will not be allowed to do so under the pretext of acting as a commission merchant (*e*), and the fact that former customers have requested the vendor to supply them does not prevent his so doing from being a breach of his covenant (*f*). But where the defendant was shown to have so acted in a few instances only, and with the plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and in fact at his request, it was held that there was no breach (*g*).

(*a*) *Cooper* v. *Hood*, 26 Beav. 293. See *Jacoby* v. *Whitmore*, 49 L. T. N. S. 335.

(*b*) 3 Doug. 413.

(*c*) *Newling* v. *Dobell*, 38 L. J. Ch. 111. See *Rolfe* v. *Rolfe*, 15 Sim. 88, and compare *Lee* v. *Ehrhardt*, 19 L. T. N. S. 637, where there was held to be no breach.

(*d*) *Turner* v. *Evans*, 2 De G. M. & G. 740. And see *Smith* v. *Smith*, 4 Wend. 468; *Butler* v. *Burleson*, 16 Vt. 176; *Sander* v. *Hoffman*, 64 N. Y. 248.

(*e*) *Richardson* v. *Peacock*, 26 N. J. Eq. 40.

(*f*) *Sander* v. *Hoffman*, 64 N. Y. 215.

(*g*) *Rawlinson* v. *Clarke*, 14 M. & W. 187.

Damages in respect of improper solicitation.

In an American case (*a*) it was held that a person who had retired from a firm by sale of his interest and had agreed not to trade in C. under the old firm name, but had nevertheless traded there under the same name, and had solicited former customers of the firm, must pay damages calculated not upon the total amount of improper solicitation of such customers but upon the amount of business which could be proved to have been lost through such solicitation.

Covenant to make profitable.

"Where a man sells the goodwill of a trade, and covenants to make it as profitable as he can, the actual profit made is not that which the vendee is bound to take; but he will have an action of covenant, if he can establish his title to more, through the default of the vendor" (*b*). But no such covenant will be implied where it is not expressed; thus the sale of the goodwill of a school involves no personal effort on the part of the vendor to influence the attendance of pupils (*c*). Where a servant has covenanted not to carry on a business similar to his master's within certain limits, the benefit of the covenant passes to a purchaser of the goodwill of the business (*d*).

Rights of purchaser of goodwill.

The purchaser of a business and goodwill is entitled to all the advantages of the reputation and connection of the business as previously conducted, except such benefit as the vendor, on setting up a *bonâ fide* new business, as he is at liberty to do if there is no covenant to the contrary, may derive from the fact of his being known to have belonged to the former business; and the purchaser is entitled to restrain the vendor by injunction from interfering with what he has sold. With respect to the right of the purchaser to continue to trade under the old trade name, it has been thought that, at all events if it consisted in whole or in part of the name of the vendor, injury (*e*),

(*a*) *Burckhardt* v. *Burckhardt*, 36 Ohio St. 261.

(*b*) Per Lord Eldon, C., in *Scott* v. *Mackintosh*, 1 V. & B. 503.

(*c*) *McCord* v. *Williams*, 96 Pa. St. 78.

(*d*) *Jacoby* v. *Whitmore*, 49 L. T. N. S. 335.

(*e*) Per Wickens, V.-C., in *Scott* v. *Rowland*, 20 W. R. 508, and Hall, V.-C., in *Levy* v. *Walker*, 10 Ch. D. 436.

or at least inconvenience (*a*), might result to the latter from its continued use by the purchaser, and in *Scott* v. *Rowland* (*b*) Wickens, V.-C., granted an injunction to restrain the purchaser of the business of "John Scott & Co." from trading under that name; but in *Banks* v. *Gibson* (*c*) Romilly, M. R., said that the firm name was an asset of the business, and would pass as a trade mark upon a sale of the business and goodwill, and it seems that the question of the purchaser's right to use the name must now be taken to be settled in the affirmative by the decision of the Court of Appeal in *Levy* v. *Walker* (*d*), in which Jessel, M. R. and James and Bramwell, L. J. J., denied that any liability could be occasioned to the vendor by the use of his name, and held that the plaintiff (Mrs. Levy) who, while Miss Charbonnel, had traded in partnership with the defendant as "Charbonnel & Walker," was not entitled to restrain the defendant, who had bought the goodwill of the business as a going concern, from continuing to use the old name. James, L. J., said:—"It should never be forgotten in these cases that the sole right

Levy v. *Walker.*

(*a*) Per Wood, V.-C., in *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174.

(*b*) 20 W. R. 508. And see *Lewis* v. *Langdon*, 7 Sim. 421; *Turner* v. *Major*, 3 Giff. 442; *Dence* v. *Mason*, 41 L. T. N. S. 573; *Dickson* v. *McMaster & Co.*, 18 Ir. Jur. 202—212; *Howe* v. *Searing*, 10 Abb. Pr. 264, R. Cox, 244; *Peterson* v. *Humphrey*, 4 Abb. Pr. 394, R. Cox, 212; *McGowan Bros. Pump and Machine Co.* v. *McGowan*, 2 Cinc. 313; *Reeves* v. *Denicke*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 92. In *Tudor* v. *Tudor*, W.N. 1873, p. 72, and *Probasco* v. *Bouyon*, 1 Mo. App. 241, there was an express contract. For decisions on the Massachusetts Gen. Stat. c. 56, requiring the concurrence of an ex-partner or his personal representatives in the continued use of his name by the continuing or surviving partners, see *Bowman* v. *Floyd*, 85 Mass. 76; *Rogers* v. *Taintor*, 97 *ib.* 291; *Morse* v. *Hall*, 109 *ib.* 409; *Hallett* v. *Cumston*, 110 *ib.* 29; *Sohier* v. *Johnson*, 111 *ib.* 238. By the New York statute the purchaser of a business and goodwill is not entitled to trade under the old name, but only to describe himself as successor to the old firm. See *Hegeman & Co.* v. *Hegeman*, 8 Daly, 1.

(*c*) 34 Beav. 566.

(*d*) 10 Ch. D. 436. And see *Webster* v. *Webster*, 3 Swanst. 490 n.; *Clark* v. *Leach*, 32 Beav. 14; *Bond* v. *Milbourn*, 20 W. R. 197; *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268, 766; *Phelan* v. *Collender*, 13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 244; *Booth* v. *Jarrett*, 52 How. Pr. 160; *Woods* v. *Sands*, Dig. 467; *Mossop* v. *Mason*, 18 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 453; Lindley on Partnership, 4th ed. 863.

to restrain anybody from using any name that he likes in the course of any business he chooses to carry on is a right in the nature of a trade mark, that is to say, a man has a right to say, 'You must not use a name, whether fictitious or real; you must not use a description, whether true or not; which is intended to represent, or calculated to represent, to the world that your business is my business, and so, by a fraudulent misstatement, deprive me of the profits of the business which would otherwise come to me.' That is the principle, and the sole principle, on which this Court interferes. The Court interferes solely for the purpose of protecting the owner of a trade or business from a fraudulent invasion of that business by somebody else. It does not interfere to prevent the world outside from being misled into anything. If there is any misleading, that may be for the Criminal Courts of the country to take notice of, or for the Attorney-General to interfere with, but an individual plaintiff can only proceed on the ground that, having established a business reputation under a particular name, he has a right to restrain any one else from injuring his business by using that name. . . . But there is another point upon which I myself cannot entertain any doubt, which is this, that the assignment of the goodwill and business of Charbonnel & Walker did convey the right to use the name of Charbonnel & Walker, and the exclusive right to use that name, as between the vendor and the purchaser of that business. Whether it would prevent another person from afterwards using the name of Charbonnel, I do not say; but the trade name, made up of parts of two real names, as the Master of the Rolls says, the trade name of Charbonnel & Walker (whether it was entirely a fictitious name can make no difference) was the name of the business, and that business was sold. That was a name with which every article sold might have been impressed, just as in the case of *Milling-*

ton v. *Fox* (*a*), where the name was continued as part of the designation of the article sold. I think it right to say that the sale of the goodwill and business conveyed the right to the use of the partnership name as a description of the articles sold in that trade, and that that right is an exclusive right as against the person who sold it, and an exclusive right as against all the world, so that no other person could represent himself as carrying on the same business."

Rights of purchaser.

The purchaser of the goodwill is, *à fortiori*, entitled to represent himself as continuing the old business; thus, where the business of John Douglas & Co. was sold, it was held that the purchasers alone had the right to describe themselves as "late John Douglas & Co.," and the vendor was restrained from calling his new firm "John Douglas & Co.," that being an interference with that right (*b*). But a purchaser has no right to use the name of the business he has bought in such a way as to create confusion in the minds of the public (*c*); and it is a fraud for a person to purchase the goodwill of a small business in order to gain a right to use a name generally identified with a different and important business (*d*). The mortgagee of the goodwill of a business, including the right to use the name under which the business is carried on, has no such right in that name as to be able to restrain the use of it by another person, if he has himself never traded under it (*e*).

Implied contract to keep up business.

Where, in a purchase of a business and goodwill, it was agreed that the purchaser should pay the vendor at the

(*a*) 3 My. & Cr. 338.

(*b*) *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174. And see *Lewis* v. *Langdon*, 7 Sim. 421; *McGowan Bros. Pump and Machine Co.* v. *McGowan*, 2 Cinc. 313; *Phelan* v. *Collender*, 13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 244. But see *Howe* v. *Searing*, 10 Abb. Pr. 264; R. Cox, 244; *Reeves* v. *Denicke*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 92; *Young* v. *Jones Bros. & Co.*, 3 Hughes, 274.

(*c*) *Chinn* v. *Thomas*, 5 Vict. L. R. Eq. 188.

(*d*) *Perks* v. *Hall & Co.*, W. N. 1881, p. 111.

(*e*) *Beazley* v. *Soares*, 22 Ch. D. 600.

end of each of the first ten years a certain proportion of the profits, but there was no special agreement by the purchaser to keep up the business; it was held by Erle, C. J., and the Court of Common Pleas, that the purchaser had entered into an implied contract to keep up the business, at all events for the ten years over which the instalments were to extend (*a*). It seems that while such an implied contract would give a right to damages, if broken, it could not be specifically enforced in Equity (*b*), though carrying on a similar business under a different style could be restrained (*c*).

Goodwill of mortgaged property.

In some cases questions have been raised with respect to the ownership of the goodwill of a business carried on on mortgaged premises. This has most frequently been when the mortgaged premises have been taken under compulsory powers, so that it has been necessary to decide to whom, or in what proportions, the purchase money was payable. The principle which governs such cases was thus laid down by Cotton, L. J., in a very recent case (*d*). "Goodwill is a word of which few people understand the meaning. It is obvious that to certain kinds of goodwill a mortgagee will be entitled. The goodwill which attaches to a house increases the value of that house, and therefore the mortgagee is entitled to that. By that I mean, for instance, there is a well-known public house, and from its position being well known, people go to it; or a well-known shop, from its being situated in a good thoroughfare, people go to it. The goodwill is attaching to the house, and adds to the value of the house. But there may be other goodwills attaching to the personal reputation

(*a*) *McIntyre* v. *Belcher*, 14 C. B. N. S. 654. Compare *Harrison* v. *Gardner*, 2 Madd. 198.

(*b*) *Lewis* v. *Langdon*, 7 Sim. 421.

(*c*) *Evans* v. *Hughes*, 18 Jur. 691. And see *Turner* v. *Major*, 3 Giff. 442.

(*d*) *Cooper* v. *Metropolitan Board of Works*, 53 L. J. Ch. 109 (this passage is given rather less fully at 25 Ch. D. 479), and see *Chissum* v. *Dewes*, 5 Russ. 29; *King* v. *Midland Ry. Co.*, 17 W. R. 113; *Pile* v. *Pile*, 3 Ch. D. 36; *Ex parte Punnett; In re Kitchin*, 16 *ib.* 226.

which a man has made for himself. That, of course, does not go to the mortgagee, but is a thing personal to the man whose skill and whose name have acquired that goodwill. It does not follow at all that because it is called 'goodwill' the mortgagee will be entitled to it. So far as it is incident to the house, and is connected with the house, and increases the value of the house, it goes as part of the value of the house to the mortgagee."

Goodwill is partnership assets.

In a case of partnership, the goodwill of a business, newspaper, &c., including the firm name, is partnership assets, and, on a sale of the partnership business, must be sold with it, for the benefit of the partners or their creditors (*a*), and a receiver may be appointed until the sale (*b*).

Disposal on dissolution.

On a dissolution of partnership the business and goodwill may be disposed of in three different ways: by sale, for the benefit of the partners or their creditors; by the whole concern, including the trade name, being taken by one partner at a valuation; or by a simple division of the tangible assets of the partnership, in which case each is at liberty to use the trade name just as the partnership did previously (*c*), or at all events to state his connection with the old firm (*d*). But where a partnership was entered into for a certain term, an injunction was granted to restrain one of the partners from carrying on business with others under the old partnership name, the partnership term not having expired (*e*).

Compensation

On a dissolution of a partnership governed by articles,

(*a*) *Bradbury* v. *Dickens*, 27 Beav. 53; *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *McCormick* v. *McCubbin*, 1 Ct. Sess. Cas. 1st ser. I. 541; *Dayton* v. *Wilkes*, 17 How. Pr. 510; R. Cox, 224.

(*b*) *Marten* v. *Van Schaick*, 4 Paige, 479; *Williams* v. *Wilson*, 4 Sandf. Ch. 379.

(*c*) *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566; *Condy* v. *Mitchell*, 37 L. T. N. S. 268, 766; *Levy* v. *Walker*, 10 Ch. D. 436. See *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54; S. C. (2) 51 How. Pr. 455.

(*d*) *Clark* v. *Leach*, 32 Beav. 14; *Hookham* v. *Pottage*, L. R. 8 Ch. 91; *Dickson* v. *McMaster & Co.*, 18 Ir. Jur. 202; *Peterson* v. *Humphrey*, 4 Abb. Pr. 394; R. Cox, 212.

(*e*) *England* v. *Curling*, 8 Beav. 129.

the retiring partner will not be entitled to compensation for his share in the goodwill, except in accordance with the articles (*a*). Thus, in a case where provision was not made for such compensation, it was held that the premises on which the business had been carried on for many years, and which the continuing partner was entitled on dissolution to take at a valuation, were to be valued without regard to the fact of previous occupation, as, if that were taken into account, it would have the effect of making the partner in question pay for the goodwill (*b*). governed by articles.

But for a retiring partner to be entitled to compensation for his share in the goodwill, it is not necessary for the word "goodwill" to be mentioned in the article governing the distribution of the partnership property. In *Hall* v. *Hall* (*c*), indeed, it was held that a provision in the articles for the valuation, on the determination of the partnership, of the "property, credits and effects," and "the stock in trade and effects," did not include the goodwill; and so in *Dickson* v. *McMaster & Co.* (*d*), with respect to the term "stock in trade, goods, chattels and effects." But those cases must be taken to be overruled by the cases in which the terms "stock belonging to the partnership" (*e*), "property and effects" (*f*), and "effects and things" (*g*) have been held to include goodwill. What terms include goodwill.

Where, however, the partnership articles of a firm of commission merchants provided that a retiring partner should receive the share in "the partnership property to *Stewart* v. *Gladstone.*

(*a*) *Hall* v. *Hall*, 20 Beav. 139; *Kennedy* v. *Lee*, 3 Mer. 441—52; *Farr* v. *Pearce*, 3 Madd. 74; *Stewart* v. *Gladstone*, 10 Ch. D. 626.

(*b*) *Burfield* v. *Rouch*, 31 Beav. 241. But see *Dougherty* v. *Van Nostrand*, Hoff. 68.

(*c*) 20 Beav. 130.

(*d*) 18 Ir. Jur. 202.

(*e*) *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150.

(*f*) *Reynolds* v. *Bullock*, 47 L. J. Ch. 773.

(*g*) *Barrow* v. *Barrow*, 27 L. T. N. S. 431; *Rolt* v. *Bulmer*, W. N. 1878, p. 119; and see *Shipwright* v. *Clements*, 19 W. R. 599. Where the interest of a deceased partner is purchased by the surviving partner at a valuation, under the Ohio statute, the value of the goodwill must be included. *Rammelsberg* v. *Mitchell*, 29 Ohio St. 22.

which he was entitled upon the basis of annual accounts taken, under another article, of the partnership "estate and effects," provision being made thereby for a fair valuation and appraisement of all the particulars included in such accounts, which might be in their nature susceptible of valuation, but no mention being made of the goodwill of the business, it was held by the Court of Appeal that, the share of partners in the goodwill of a commission business not being ordinarily estimated in calculating their annual shares of profits, and that not having been the practice in the case before them, the goodwill could not be taken into account and valued as being included in the partnership "estate and effects" (*a*).

Goodwill included in valuation.

On the other hand, where the articles of partnership provided that the goodwill should belong to the partners in the proportion of their shares in the business, but should not be taken into account in the accounts of the partnership, and that on the determination of the partnership a general account and valuation of the property and effects of the partnership should be taken, the partnership being dissolved by the death of one of the partners, it was held by Sir J. Stuart, V.-C., that the goodwill must be included in the valuation of the partnership property (*b*).

One partner cannot monopolise goodwill, when no articles.

In *Featherstonhaugh* v. *Fenwick* (*c*), it was decided that on a dissolution of a partnership, not provided for by articles, one partner could not secure to himself the whole benefit of the goodwill by claiming to take the share of the other at a valuation, or requiring him to remove his proportion from the premises, or clandestinely obtaining a renewal to himself of the lease of the premises occupied by the partnership; but where the goodwill goes with the premises, it has been held in America that the partners

(*a*) *Stewart* v. *Gladstone*, 10 Ch. D. 626.

(*b*) *Wade* v. *Jenkins*, 2 Giff. 509.

(*c*) 17 Vee. 298; and so in *Mitchell* v. *Reed* (1), 61 N. Y. 123. As to a trade mark, see *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54.

who quit the premises have no claim in respect of goodwill against a partner who remains on the premises (*a*); and where, under a power contained in the articles, a majority of the partners in a firm expelled another partner, it was decided that in the valuation of the amount to which he was entitled the value of the goodwill could not be taken into account (*b*).

Estate of dead partner shares in partnership profits until settlement.

If, after a dissolution of partnership by the death of a partner, "the surviving partners think proper to make that which is in Equity the joint property of the deceased and them the foundation and plant of increased profit, if they do not think proper to settle with the executors and put an end to the concern, they must be understood to proceed upon the principle which regulated the property before the death of their partner" (*c*); that is to say, capital belonging to the estate of the deceased partner having been risked, such a proportion of the total profits as are attributable to that capital will belong to that estate.

Subject to circumstances.

But in the computation of what profits are attributable to that capital a variety of circumstances have to be taken into consideration: thus, "the nature of the trade, the manner of carrying it on, the capital employed, the state of the account between the partnership and the deceased partner at the time of his death, the conduct of parties after his death, all of which may materially affect the rights of the parties" (*d*).

Similarly with goodwill.

In the same manner, on the death of a partner, the

(*a*) *Musselman and Clarkson's Appeal*, 62 Pa. St. 81.

(*b*) *Steuart* v. *Gladstone*, 10 Ch. D. 626.

(*c*) Per Lord Eldon, C., in *Crawshay* v. *Collins*, 15 Ves. 227. And see *Featherstonhaugh* v. *Fenwick*, 17 Ves. 298; *Heathcote* v. *Hulme*, 1 Jac. & W. 122; *Brown* v. *De Tastet*, Jac. 284; *Cook* v. *Collingridge*, Jac. 607; *Macdonald* v. *Richardson*, 1 Giff. 81; and *Parsons* v. *Hayward*, 31 L. J. Ch 666.

(*d*) Per Sir J. Wigram, V.-C., in *Willett* v. *Blanford*, 1 Hare, 253. And see *Simpson* v. *Chapman*, 4 De G. M. & G. 154, where these remarks were highly approved by Sir G. Turner, L. J., and it was held that, under the circumstances of the case, nothing was due to the estate of the deceased partner.

goodwill ought, if there is no provision regulating its destination in such an event, to be sold for the benefit of the partnership, and if that is not done, the continuing partners will have to account to the estate of the deceased partner for his share in the goodwill.

Goodwill does not survive.

There is, indeed, a distinct decision (*a*) by Lord Loughborough, C., that upon a dissolution of a partnership without articles the goodwill survives to the surviving partner. This position was, however, doubted by Lord Eldon, C., in *Crawshay* v. *Collins* (*b*); and it is now thoroughly established that the goodwill is partnership assets. "The goodwill of a trade, although inseparable from the business, is an appreciable part of the assets of a concern, both in fact and in the estimation of a Court of Equity. Accordingly, in reported cases, Lord Eldon held that a share of it properly and as of right belonged to the estate of the deceased partner. It does not survive to the remaining partners, unless by express agreement; but it may by agreement, as it may be agreed that any particular portion of the partnership assets shall so survive. Goodwill manifestly forms a portion of the subject-matter which produces profits, which constitutes partnership property, and which is to be divided between the surviving partners and the estate of the deceased partner, according to the terms of the contract, and when that is silent, according to their shares in the concern" (*c*). The share of the deceased partner in the concern is not, however, the sole guide to the interest of his estate in the goodwill. The various circumstances

(*a*) *Hammond* v. *Douglas*, 5 Ves. 539. And see *Lewis* v. *Langdon*, 7 Sim. 421; *Robertson* v. *Quiddington*, 28 Beav. 529; *Young* v. *Jones Brothers & Co.*, 3 Hughes, 274.

(*b*) 15 Ves. 227.

(*c*) Per Sir J. Romilly, M.R., in *Wedderburn* v. *Wedderburn*, 22 Beav. 124. And see *Macdonald* v. *Richardson*, 1 Giff. 81; *Bradbury* v. *Dickens*, 27 Beav. 53; *Smith* v. *Everett*, 27 Beav. 446; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *McCormick* v. *McCubbin*, Ct. Sess. Cas., 1st ser. I. 541; *Dougherty* v. *Van Nostrand*, Hoff. 68; *Dayton* v. *Wilkes*, 17 How. Pr. 510; R. Cox, 224.

alluded to by Vice-Chancellor Wigram, in *Willett* v. *Blanford* (*a*) must be considered. Thus, where at the time of the death of one of two partners the partnership was insolvent and the deceased partner indebted to the partnership, and the surviving partner subsequently carried on the business with such energy and success that he was able at a later period to sell the goodwill for £1700, it was held by Sir G. Jessel, M.R., that the surviving partner was only liable to account to the estate of his deceased partner for the value of a moiety of the goodwill at the time of the latter's death (*b*).

Firm name.

With respect to the trade name, Sir L. Shadwell, V.-C., in *Lewis* v. *Langdon* (*c*), expressed an opinion that it survived, but the decision in that case only amounted to this: that one of three executors of a deceased partner in the firm of "Brookman & Langdon" had no right to set up in business as "Brookman & Langdon," and that the surviving partner, who was carrying on business as "James Lewis & Co., successors to Brookman & Langdon," had sufficient interest in the name of the old firm to restrain an unauthorised use of it (*d*), and it seems that one member of a firm cannot, on the death of his partner, monopolise all the benefit to be derived from the use of the firm name (*e*), although, if he purchases the interest of his deceased partner from the latter's executors, he will be entitled to the exclusive use of the old firm name (*f*).

Firm continued by certain partners.

When, on a dissolution of partnership, the goodwill of the business becomes the property of some of the former partners, with it they acquire the right of representing

(*a*) 1 Hare, 253.

(*b*) *Broughton* v. *Broughton*, 44 L. J. Ch. 526. And compare *Simpson* v. *Chapman*, 4 De G. M. & G. 154.

(*c*) 7 Sim. 421. See *Milner* v. *Reed*, Dig. 328.

(*d*) In this respect, *Hine* v. *Lart*, 10 Jur. 106, and *Dent* v. *Turpin*, 2 J. & H. 139, seem to be in point, as in those cases the plaintiff had a certain right, but not an exclusive right, in the trade marks. See *Scott* v. *Scott*, 16 L. T. N. S. 143.

(*e*) A decided opinion to this effect is expressed in Lindley on Partnership, 4th ed. 862. And see *Fenn* v. *Bolles*, 7 Abb. Pr. 202.

(*f*) *Phelan* v. *Collender*, 13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 244.

their remodelled business as being the continuation of the old one; and they are at liberty to express this by styling themselves "B. & C., late A. and B.," or "B. & C., successors to A. & B.," or by using any similar words (*a*). If they continue to use the style of the old business, "A. & B.," as before, then, as regards the partner by whose retirement or death the dissolution has been brought about, it does not appear that he or his estate will be exposed to loss or inconvenience, or that he or his representatives have any ground for complaint (*b*); and, as regards the public, it seems that the use of the old name does not, as a rule, constitute any false representation, the only statement being that the new firm is carrying on the business of the old one (*c*). Such continued user, however, will not be permitted when it can be only for an improper and fraudulent purpose, and in order to deceive the public (*d*); nor where the partnership has been only contrived with a view to giving the purchaser of a professional business the means of appropriating to himself the personal reputation of the vendor (*e*).

Rights on dissolution by retirement or by death and sale of goodwill.

When a partner has retired from a business, his share and interest therein being taken over by the continuing partners, or when, on the death of a partner, the partnership business has been sold, the retiring or surviving partner, as the case may be, has full liberty to set up a precisely similar business to that which the partnership carried on, but he must not represent it to be the same

(*a*) *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Lewis* v. *Langdon*, 7 Sim. 421; *Hookham* v. *Pottage*, L. R. 8 Ch. 91; *Peterson* v. *Humphrey*, 4 Abb. Pr. 394; R. Cox, 212; *McGowan Brothers' Pump Machine Co.* v. *McGowan*, 2 Cinc. 313; *Phelan* v. *Collender*, 13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 244; *Young* v. *Jones Brothers & Co.*, 3 Hughes, 274. But see *Reeves* v. *Denicke*, 12 Abb. Pr. N. S. 92.

(*b*) See *Levy* v. *Walker*, 10 Ch. D. 436, and cases at p. 286, *suprà*.

(*c*) *Banks* v. *Gibson*, 34 Beav. 566; *Aubin* v. *Holt*, 2 K. & J. 66. And see *Leather Cloth Co.* v. *American Leather Cloth Co.*, 1 H. & M. 271; 4 De G. J. & S. 137; 11 H. L. C. 523; *Phelan* v. *Collender*, 13 N. Y. Sup. Ct. 244; *Probasco* v. *Bouyon*, 1 Mo. App. 241.

(*d*) *Dence* v. *Mason*, Dig. 534; 41 L. T. N. S. 573.

(*e*) *Thornbury* v. *Bevill*, 1 Y. & C. Ch. 554.

business (*a*). To use the language of Fry, J., in *Mogford* v. *Courtenay* (*b*) "the rights of a late partner who has no interest in the goodwill of the old business, to carry on trade are somewhat refined. They amount shortly to this—that he may carry on a similar trade or similar business; he cannot carry on the identical business. He is at liberty to do everything which flows from the right to carry on a similar business; he is prohibited or liable to be restrained from doing anything which conduces to his carrying on the identical business; but what acts come within either of those classes is a question of very considerable nicety." To this extent the rights of an expelled partner are the same as if he had retired voluntarily (*c*). In the valuation, therefore, of the share of a retiring or dead partner, which is to be taken over by the surviving partner, this fact should be taken into consideration, as it may materially affect and even destroy the value of the share (*d*); and when the business is to be sold, that fact should be stated in the particulars of sale, in order that the purchaser may be able to buy with a full knowledge of the facts (*e*). In *Smith* v. *Everett* (*f*), the survivor of two partners in a banking business sold the business, and it was held that the estate of the deceased partner was entitled to a share of so much of the purchase-money as was attributable to the goodwill. Sir J. Romilly, M. R., directed that this value should be ascertained, regard being had to the facts that: 1st, the partnership premises belonged to the survivor;

(*a*) *Kennedy* v. *Lee*, 3 Mer. 441—52; *Harrison* v. *Gardner*, 2 Madd. 198; *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *Clark* v. *Leach*, 32 Beav. 14; *Bond* v. *Milbourn*, 20 W. R. 197; *Hookham* v. *Pottage*, L. R. 8 Ch. 91; *Selby* v. *Anchor Tube Co.*, W. N. 1877, p. 191; *Wolmershausen* v. *O'Connor*, 36 L. T. N. S. 921; *Leggott* v. *Barrett*, 15 Ch. D. 306; *Rammelsberg* v. *Mitchell*, 29 Ohio St. 22.

(*b*) 45 L. T. N. S. 303.

(*c*) *Dawson* v. *Beeson*, 22 Ch. D. 504.

(*d*) *Mellersh* v. *Keen*, 28 Beav. 453; *Davies* v. *Hodgson*, 25 Beav. 177; *Rammelsberg* v. *Mitchell*, *ubi suprà*.

(*e*) *Cook* v. *Collingridge*, Jac. 607; *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150. And see the form settled by the L. JJ. in *Johnson* v. *Helleley*, 2 De G. J. & S. 446.

(*f*) 27 Beav. 446.

2ndly, the survivor had the right to carry on the business of a banker on the same premises after the sale of the goodwill; 3rdly, the sole right of issuing bank notes survived to him.

Retiring or surviving partner may state former connection.

Unless he has specially contracted not to do so (*a*), a retiring or surviving partner may advertise generally the facts that he was connected with the former business, and that he is establishing a new business, and he may style himself "formerly" or "late" of the firm, and, if he occupies the premises formerly occupied by the firm, may state that they were so occupied; but he may not describe himself as "successor to" the old firm, nor, except in the case of a partner who is leaving the firm involuntarily (*b*), may he address any special solicitations to the customers of his former firm (*c*).

And the termination of that connection.

A retiring partner may advertise the discontinuance of his participation in a periodical issued by the partnership, but he is not at liberty to advertise its discontinuance generally, any more than he might represent the partnership to have ceased to carry on business, upon his own retirement (*d*).

Necessary announcements may be made.

While, however, a retiring partner is not at liberty to depreciate the property, his share in which has passed to others (*e*), a partner who has bought the share of his partner may, even before the purchase is in all respects completed, publish statements which are necessary to induce others to join him, and to enable him to carry on the business, though, in the opinion of the selling partner,

(*a*) *Wolmershausen* v. *O'Connor*, 36 L. T. N. S. 921.

(*b*) *Walker* v. *Mottram*, 19 Ch. D. 355; *Dawson* v. *Beeson*, 22 *ib.* 504.

(*c*) *Bradbury* v. *Dickens*, 27 Beav. 53; *Clark* v. *Leach*, 32 Beav. 14; *Labouchere* v. *Dawson*, L. R. 13 Eq. 322; *Gravely* v. *Winchester*, Seton, 4th ed, 257; *Burrows* v. *Foster*, 1 N. R. 156; *Selby* v. *Anchor Tube Co.*, W. N. 1877, p. 191; *Leggott* v. *Barrett*, 15 Ch. D. 306; *Morgan* v. *Schuyler*, 79 N. Y. 490.

(*d*) *Bradbury* v. *Dickens*, 27 Beav. 53. In *England* v. *Curling*, 8 Beav. 129, an injunction was granted to restrain a partner from publishing notices of the dissolution of the partnership during the term for which it was to subsist.

(*e*) *Bradbury* v. *Dickens*, *ubi suprd.*

that may have a prejudicial effect on what is still in a sense the partnership property (*a*).

Business carried on in separate districts.

Where two partners, having been in the habit of carrying on the partnership business, each in a separate district, agreed to dissolve partnership, the premises, stock, and goodwill to be sold, or until sale to vest in a receiver, Sir J. Stuart, V.-C., restrained one partner from carrying on the business on his own account in one district, and directed him to account for the profits (*b*).

Right of election protected.

Again, where it was provided by the partnership articles that, on the death of one of the partners, his personal representative should have the right to elect, within three months, to take the deceased partner's share in the business, Sir W. P. Wood, V.-C., restrained the surviving partner from carrying on the business under any other firm or style than that used in the lifetime of the deceased partner, for three months, or until election by his representative (*c*). But it seems that though the Court can restrain the surviving partner from carrying on the business in any other name, it has no means of compelling him to carry it on in the original name (*d*).

Valuation of goodwill.

The value of a goodwill, or share of a goodwill, is usually estimated at so many years' purchase upon the amount of the profits (*e*); thus, in *Mellersh* v. *Keen* (*f*), it was fixed at one year's purchase of the net annual profits, calculated on an average of three years (*g*).

(*a*) *Marshall* v. *Watson*, 25 Beav. 501.
(*b*) *Turner* v. *Major*, 3 Giff. 442.
(*c*) *Evans* v. *Hughes*, 18 Jur. 691.
(*d*) *Lewis* v. *Langdon*, 7 Sim. 421.
(*e*) *Austen* v. *Boys*, 2 De G. & J. 626.
(*f*) 28 Beav. 453.
(*g*) As to other circumstances to be considered, see *Smith* v. *Everett*, 27 Beav. 446; *Johnson* v. *Helleley*, 34 Beav. 63; 2 De G. J. & S. 446.

See amending Act of 1888

APPENDIX A.

THE PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

46 & 47 VICT. c. 57.

An Act to amend and consolidate the Law relating to Patents for Inventions, Registration of Designs, and of Trade Marks.
[25*th August*, 1883.]

BE it enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

PART I.

PRELIMINARY.

Part I.

Preliminary.

Short title.

1. This Act may be cited as the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883.

Division of Act into parts.

2. This Act is divided into parts, as follows:—

Part I.—PRELIMINARY.
Part II.—PATENTS.
Part III.—DESIGNS.
Part IV.—TRADE MARKS.
Part V.—GENERAL.

Commencement of Act.

3. This Act, except where it is otherwise expressed, shall commence from and immediately after the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-three.

PART II. (Secs. 4—46).

Patents.

PART III. (Secs. 47—61).

Designs (*a*).

(*a*) For § 51, requiring articles bearing a registered design to be marked so as to denote the fact of registration, see Appendix C.

PART IV.

Trade Marks.

Registration of Trade Marks.

Application for registration.

62. (1.) The comptroller (*a*) may, on application by or on behalf of any person (*b*) claiming to be the proprietor (*c*) of a trade mark (*d*), register the trade mark (*e*).

(2.) The application (*f*) must be made in the form set forth in the first schedule to this Act, or in such other form (*g*) as may be from time to time prescribed (*h*), and must be left at, or sent by post to, the Patent Office in the prescribed manner (*i*).

(3.) The application must be accompanied by the prescribed number of representations (*k*) of the trade mark, and must state the particular goods or classes of goods (*l*) in connection with which the applicant desires the trade mark to be registered.

(4.) The comptroller may, if he thinks fit, refuse to register a trade mark (*m*), but any such refusal shall be subject to appeal to the Board of Trade (*n*), who shall, if required, hear the applicant and the comptroller, and may make an order determining whether, and subject to what conditions (*o*), if any, registration is to be permitted.

(5.) The Board of Trade may, however, if it appears expedient, refer the appeal to the Court (*p*); and in that event the Court shall have jurisdiction (*q*) to hear and determine the appeal and may make such order as aforesaid.

(*a*) The Comptroller General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks: —§ 117.

(*b*) "Person" includes a body corporate, § 117, Rule 39. There is no limitation to British subjects, and the practice hitherto has been to grant registration to aliens. See, however, *In re Riviere & Co.*, 49 L. T. N. S. 506; C. A., 32 W. R. 390. § 103 (3) seems to mean that a foreign subject must apply for registration in his own country before he can obtain registration here. See that section.

(*c*) By "claiming to be the proprietor" nothing more is probably meant than "claiming to be the first to adopt," whether there has been any user or not. Since by § 77 a trade mark cannot be protected until either it has been registered or registration has been refused, it hardly seems that there can be any proprietorship until registration has been granted, or, in the case of an old mark, *i.e.*, a mark used before August 13, 1875, refused.

(*d*) As to what is a trade mark, see § 64, *infrd*, and Ch. 2.

(*e*) As to the mode of registration, see Rules 30—33. By Rule 31, if an applicant dies before registration, the trade mark may be registered for the successor to the goodwill of his business.

(*f*) For the mode of making application, see Rules 7—15. By § 81 (3) applications for registration of Hallamshire cutlery marks must be made to the Cutlers' Company.

(*g*) Form F. in the second Schedule to the Rules is substituted for Form F. in the Schedule to the Act. See Rules 4, 5.

(*h*) "Prescribed," *i.e.*, by the Rules. See § 117.

(*i*) See Rule 16.

(*k*) Four in classes 23—35; three in other classes. See Rule 13 and Form G.

(*l*) The application may be for any goods in a class, see Form F. For the classification of goods, see Rule 6 and the Third Schedule to the Rules.

(*m*) Before refusing to register a mark, the comptroller is to give the applicant ten days' notice of a time when he may be heard personally or by his agent. § 94 and Rules 17—19.

(*n*) See Rules 20—24 and Form H. It would appear that by § 90, the wording of which is very similar to that of § 5 of the Act of 1875, under which the Court has hitherto acted, a concurrent jurisdiction in cases of refusal by the comptroller is given to the Court, and that the effect of the present section and § 90, taken together, is that the appellant may elect to go either to the Board or to the Court, but that, in the event of his electing to go to the Board, the Board may, if it appears expedient, refer him to the Court. The object appears to be to give the applicant an opportunity of going to the Board of Trade instead of to the Court, if he thinks that course likely to be cheaper, or the result likely to be more favourable. In the event of the case being heard by the Board of Trade, and decided adversely to the applicant, it will apparently still be open to him to take the decision of the Court under § 90. See Rule 44 as to entering orders of the Court on the Register.

(*o*) As to limited registration, see note (*c*) to § 72 *infrd*.

(*p*) The Court is the High Court of Justice in England.

(*q*) *I.e.*, notwithstanding that the appellant has selected the Board as his tribunal.

Limit of time for proceeding with application.

63. Where registration of a trade mark has not been or shall not be completed within twelve months from the date of the application, by reason of default on the part of the applicant, the application shall be deemed to be abandoned (*a*).

(*a*) This provision was first made by the edition of March, 1883, of the Rules under the old Acts.

Conditions of registration of trade mark.

64. (1.) For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark must consist of or contain at least one of the following essential particulars (*a*):

(a.) A name of an individual or firm printed, impressed, or woven in some particular and distinctive manner (*b*); or

(b.) A written signature or copy of a written signature of the individual or firm applying for registration thereof as a trade mark (*c*); or

(c.) A distinctive device, mark, brand, heading, label, ticket, or fancy word or words not in common use (*d*).

(2.) There may be added to any one or more of these particulars any letters, words, or figures, or combination of letters, words, or figures, or of any of them (*e*).

(3.) Provided that any special and distinctive word or words, letter, figure, or combination of letters or figures or of letters and figures used as a trade mark before the thirteenth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, may be registered as a trade mark under this part of this Act (*f*).

(*a*) This section is enlarged from § 10 of the Act of 1875. The essential particular is that which causes a mark which, without it, would not be a registrable trade mark, to be a registrable trade mark; it is that by virtue of which registration is granted to a mark. Consequently it is provided by § 92 that, though non-essential particulars of registered trade marks may be altered with the leave of the Court, essential particulars may not be. Where, therefore, two trade marks had been registered, one of which contained the name of the firm in ordinary type, and the other contained it printed in the form of a signature, Jessel, M.R., allowed a firm who had acquired the trade mark by assignment, to substitute their own name for the name printed in ordinary type, but refused to allow any alteration of the signature in the second mark: *In re Dewhurst*, M. R., June 11th, 1880. A trade mark which does not contain any essential particular, and is therefore not registrable, does not become a good trade mark by remaining five years on the register: *In re Palmer* (1), 21 Ch. D. 47; (3) 24 Ch. D. 504; *In re Ralph*, 25 Ch. D. 194; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530.

(*b*) See *ante*, p. 25.

(*c*) See *ante*, p. 34; and *In re Dewhurst*, M. R., June 11th, 1880.

(*d*) See *ante*, p. 35. Fancy words were not registrable under the old Act: *Ex parte Stephens*, 3 Ch. D. 659; and see *Rose v. Evans*, 48 L. J. Ch. 618. An old mark is not considered to be in common use unless it has been used by more than three firms, but the leave of the Court is necessary for the second or third registration of the same, or substantially the same, old mark. See note (*c*) to § 72 and § 74.

(*e*) "Figures" mean numerals. See *Ex parte Stephens*, 3 Ch. D. 659. When it is wished to register the same essential (or "material," by which the same thing appears to be meant,) particular, with a number of varying additions, the proper course is to register the marks as a series, under § 66, *q.v.* See also note (*c*) to § 72 *infrd.* Inasmuch as the parts of a combination mark which are not within the definition of "essential particulars," are not entitled to registration or protection when standing alone, it seems that there cannot well be infringement of a combination mark unless the

essential particular is taken. In *In re Horsburgh*, 53 L. J. Ch. 237, where a registered trade mark consisted of a distinctive device and a descriptive word, it was held that substantially the same descriptive word might be registered by another firm with a different device, from which it follows that the use of the second trade mark would be no infringement of the first.

There will not be registered as new marks or prominent parts of new marks:—

Representations of the Queen, or of any member of the Royal Family.

Representations of the Royal Crown.

National Arms or Flags. (See *Ex parte Davids & Co.*, 16 U.S. Pat. Gaz. 94, as to the American practice).

Prize or exhibition Medals. (See *Batty v. Hill*, 1 H. & M. 264; *Taylor v. Gillies*, 14 Sick. 331; *In re Bush & Co.*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 164; *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791; *In re Farina* (2), 27 W. R. 456). See Instructions, par. 31, *infrd.*

Old marks.

(*f*) See *ante*, p. 66. The wording of this sub-section is wider than that of the corresponding provision in § 10 of the Act of 1875. *E.g.*, a single letter may now be registered as an old mark, though it was formerly excluded from registration: *In re Mitchell* (1), 7 Ch. D. 36. For a mark to be registrable as an old mark there must have been user before August 13th, 1875, within the kingdom. Foreign user gives no such right: *In re Münch*, 50 L. T. N. S. 12; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530, per Fry, L. J.; though in *In re Eastman*, W. N. 1880, p. 128, the opposite view seems to have prevailed; and for an old mark to be registered under the three mark rule the user must have been of a substantial kind: *In re Hodson & Co.*, 26 Sol. J. 43. Old user for some goods does not make a mark an old mark for all goods, but application must be made as for a new mark when it is sought to register it for goods in respect of which there has been no old user: *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639. When it is sought to register a mark under this provision as an old trade mark, it must have been used as a trade mark before the Act of 1875, and not as a descriptive term: *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530, and it must have been used alone, and not in combination with a distinctive device, &c., *ib.* An old mark must be registered as a whole, and in the exact form in which it has been actually used. Thus, in *In re Royal Baking Powder Co.*, W. N. 1880, p. 49, the applicants were not allowed to register the word "Royal," or the words "Royal Baking Powder," apart from the rest of the label with which they had been used. So in *In re Simpson, Davies & Sons*, M. R. January 12th, 1881, the registration of a trade mark consisting of a cross would have been held to be wrongful, by reason of the points of the cross registered being differently shaped from the points of the cross used, had it not been proved that there had been user in both forms. So in *Russell & Sons, Limited* v. *Smith*, M. R., June 18th, 1880, it was held that a registration was wrongful because the user had been of a rough outline of a crown and the registration was of an elaborate crown, with all the shading filled in. And see *In re Horsburgh*, 53 L. J. Ch. 237; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, *ib.*, 233, and (App.) 32 W. R. 530; and *In re Palmer* (3), 24 Ch. D. 5[illegible] On the other hand, in *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. C[illegible] 9, the House of Lords directed registration of the essential particular, omitting the immaterial additions. Now by § 74, the entire mark would be registered, with a disclaimer of the additions.

The Royal Arms, or arms so nearly resembling them as to be calculated to deceive, and the words "Registered," "Registered Design," "Copyright," "Entered at Stationers' Hall," "To Counterfeit this is Forgery," "Patent," "Patented," will not be registered under the Act. See Instructions, par. 30, *infrd.* As to ornamental or coloured groundwork, see *ib.*, par. 20.

Connection of trade mark with goods.

65. A trade mark must be registered for particular goods or classes of goods (*a*).

(*a*) This comes from § 2 of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875. The appropriation of a trade mark to particular goods or classes of goods was not new. See *Hall* v. *Barrows*, 4 De G. J. & S. 150; *Ainsworth* v. *Walmsley*, L. R. 1 Eq. 518. See Rule 6 and Schedule 3 to the Rules with respect to the classification of goods for the purposes of the Act. The Third Schedule divides the various descriptions of goods into fifty classes. By the Rules under the Act of 1875 it was provided that where a trade mark was registered, a similar trade mark should not be registered in the name of another proprietor for any goods in the same class without the leave of the Court; but this requirement of the leave of the Court is now limited to cases in which the second application is in respect of the same goods or description of goods (see § 72). Under the old Act, registration for part of a class was granted to old marks: in *Ex parte Barrows*, W. N. 1877, p. 119; L. J. N. of C. 1877, p. 110; *In re Lysaght*, Dig. 623; *In re Rabone*, Dig. 643; *In re Ashton & Sons*, V.-C. H., February 26th, 1881; and to new marks in *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639; *In re Braby & Co.*, 21 Ch. D. 223; and *In re Clark & Co.*, 27 Sol. J. 396 (though in this case the mark was common for other goods in the class); and refused to a new mark in *In re Hargreaves*, 11 Ch. D. 669. In America, registration of the same mark in the same class may be granted to different persons if the goods are different: *Sorg* v. *Welsh*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 910. It has been held under the United States Statute of 1870 (now replaced by that of 1881) that registration in respect of too wide a class of goods is bad altogether: *Smith* v. *Reynolds* (2), 10 Bl. C. C. 100; S. C. (3), 13 *ib.* 458.

Registration of a series of marks.

66. When a person claiming to be the proprietor of several trade marks which, while resembling each other in the material particulars thereof, yet differ in respect of (a) the statement of the goods for which they are respectively used or proposed to be used, or (b) statements of numbers, or (c) statements of price, or (d) statements of quality, or (e) statements of names of places, seeks to register such trade marks, they may be registered as a series in one registration. A series of trade marks shall be assignable and transmissible only as a whole, but for all other purposes each of the trade marks composing a series shall be deemed and treated as registered separately (*a*).

(*a*) This section is entirely new, but the mode of registration for which provision is here made was suggested by the Court of Appeal as the right one in *In re Barrows*, 5 Ch. D. 353, and was occasionally adopted. See note (*c*) to § 72, *infra*, and cases there cited. In some cases, however, this form of registration was not considered satisfactory by the applicant, usually because, the different combinations not being individually registered, the registered proprietor was unable to get such a certificate of registration as would enable him to obtain registration in foreign countries. In *In re Fox & Co.*, V.-C. H., May 7th, 1881, Hall, V.-C., allowed a person who had registered a device together with a word (which, under the Act of 1875, could not be an essential particular in a new trade mark) to obtain a separate registration of the same device with a different word, so that the same one essential particular was separately registered twice over, with additions

which, for the purposes of the Act, were immaterial. After this decision, separate registration was generally granted by the registrar to marks which would more properly have been registered in a series, or, as it was more generally called, by representation. The concluding words of this section render separate registration unnecessary, but there is nothing to prevent it.

The only rules specially relating to applications for registration of a series of trade marks are Rule 14, (by which a representation of each trade mark included in the series is to be placed on the application form and on each of the half sheets containing the additional representations required by Rule 13,) and Rule 28, relating to the mode of advertisement.

Trade marks may be registered in any colour.

67. A trade mark may be registered in any colour, and such registration shall (subject to the provisions of this Act) confer on the registered owner the exclusive right to use the same in that or any other colour (*a*).

(*a*) In the old Acts and Rules no mention was made of colour, on account of the difficulty of properly advertising marks applied for in colour. See per Jessel, M.R., in *In re Robinson*, 29 W. R. 31. A trade mark registered in black and white consisted of the device registered, whatever might be the colour in which it was used, and it was, therefore, regarded as entitled to protection in whatever colour it might be used, and against rival marks in whatever colour: *Nuthall* v. *Vining*. C. A., Jan. 21st, 1880. There it was said that, in cases of alleged infringement, the true test of comparison was to compare the designs of the two trade marks in the same size and free from colour, and that similarities in respect of colour would only be regarded in order either to prove fraud, or to turn the scale when the question of infringement, leaving colour out of sight, was very difficult to decide. In *Hanson* v. *British Tea and Trading Association, Limited*, V.-C. B., April 9th, 1884, a label had been used, coloured red, white, and blue, and containing the words, "red, white, and blue label," and though it was registered without colour, an injunction was granted to restrain the use of a label similarly coloured and containing the same words. When the question was whether a trade mark sent in for registration was too similar to one already registered for registration to be permitted, and the trade mark already on the register was in practice used in colour, the question was taken into consideration whether the subsequent trade mark, if similarly coloured, would be likely to cause deception: *In re Worthington*, 14 Ch. D. 8.

In some exceptional cases, however, trade marks were found to be incapable of advertisement or registration in black and white, the only peculiarity being the combination of colours; *e.g.*, where coloured threads were twisted in the wick of a candle, or combined in the selvage of a piece of stuff. In such cases the marks were registered by deposit, actual specimens of the marked article being sent in to the registrar and deposited by him at the Patent Museum. For instance, there were so deposited specimens of certain marks for worsted stuffs in Class 34, numbered 5844 to 5850, and consisting of selvages containing distinctive coloured threads. See Trade Marks Journal, Vol. 2, No. 51, p. 88. The use of colour being very frequently of importance in the cotton trade, it was decided that all marks for goods in the cotton classes (23–5) should be registered by deposit. When a trade mark was thus registered by deposit, the actual thing deposited, colour included, constituted the trade mark, so that in questions of infringement the point was whether the device, plus colour, was imitated in the offending mark with sufficient exactness to deceive. And the same rule was applied in registration cases, colour being taken into consideration in

estimating the degree of resemblance. Thus, in *In re Robinson*, 29 W. R. 31, a device of a silver rupee being already registered, another applicant sought to obtain registration of a device of a gold mohur, and this was granted, on the ground that all that was registered was a silver coin, notwithstanding that if the second mark were to be coloured silver, deception would be probable. In such cases it was held that the proper manner of regarding the colour was a question for the trade, and that if, in the opinion of the trade, deception might arise, the Court would act on that opinion: *Mitchell* v. *Henry*, 15 Ch. D. 181. Besides the cases above referred to, see *In re Orr-Ewing*, 8 Ch. D. 798, 4 App. Cas. 479; *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791; and *In re Jones Bros. & Co.* V.-C. H., July 10th, 1880.

The present section appears to have the effect of giving trade marks registered by deposit at the Patent Office Library, or registered in pursuance of an application accompanied by coloured representations, the same advantages as registration in black and white, so that for the future the colour of a trade mark registered in colour will not, except in very exceptional cases, such as that of the coloured selvage, be a part of the mark, but after one trade mark is so registered, another will not be entitled to be used or registered, if it would be likely to be mistaken for the first, on the supposition that the first mark was used in any different colour from that in which it was registered.

See Rules 13 and 25 as to the deposit of specimens of trade marks.

Advertisement of application.

68. Every application for registration of a trade mark under this part of this Act shall as soon as may be after its receipt be advertised by the comptroller (*a*).

(*a*) "The object of the advertisement is to give to persons who might be claimants of the trade mark proposed to be registered the opportunity of coming forward and objecting": per Hall, V.-C., in *In re Meikle*, 24 W. R. 1067. Consequently, as was there held, when a refusal of the comptroller to register a trade mark is overruled, the only order that can be made is an order for him to proceed with the application, so that the usual course of advertisement, &c., may be followed. This course was adopted by Hall, V.-C., in *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 479, and subsequent cases. It is not, however, incumbent on persons to see the advertisement, so that if a common mark has been registered, in consequence of the firms interested in opposing it having failed to see the advertisement of the application, they are able to obtain the removal of the mark from the register, with costs, on application within a reasonable time after the registration was brought to their knowledge: *In re Hyde & Co.* 7 Ch. D. 724. See *In re Palmer* (3), 24 Ch. D. 504; and *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238.

As to the mode of advertisement, see Rules 25–28.

Opposition to registration.

69.—(1.) Any person (*a*) may within two months of the first advertisement of the application, give notice in duplicate at the patent office of opposition (*b*) to registration of the trade mark, and the comptroller shall send one copy of such notice to the applicant.

(2.) Within two months after receipt of such notice or such further time as the comptroller may allow, the applicant may send to the comptroller a counter statement (*c*) in duplicate of the grounds on which he relies for his application, and if he does not do so, shall be deemed to have abandoned his application.

(3.) If the applicant sends such counter statement, the comptroller shall furnish a copy thereof to the person who gave notice of opposition, and shall require him to give security in such manner and to such amount as the comptroller may require for such costs as may be awarded in respect of such opposition (*d*); and if such security is not given within fourteen days after such requirement was made or such further time as the comptroller may allow, the opposition shall be deemed to be withdrawn.

(4.) If the person who gave notice of opposition duly gives such security as aforesaid, the comptroller shall inform the applicant thereof in writing, and thereupon the case shall be deemed to stand for the determination of the Court (*e*).

(*a*) This section comes from the old rules.

There is no limitation of the right of opposing to persons who can themselves claim registration: *In re Riviere & Co.*, 32 W. R. 390; nor is there any limitation of the right of opposing on the ground of similarity to proprietors of trade marks registered for the same goods, or even for goods in the same class, as the goods for which the applicant is seeking to register. But an opposition on this ground would, of course, not succeed unless the two marks would come into collision in some way when being used. Thus, in *In re Simpson, Davies & Sons*, M.R., Jan. 12th, 1881, the application was for registration in class 22 for railway waggons, and the successful opposition was by a firm registered in class 4 for coal, whose trade mark was used by placing it on the waggons in which the coal was conveyed and sold.

If what is desired is, not to have the registration altogether refused, but to have it limited by the addition of a note stating, *e.g.*, that the mark is only to be used in trade with a particular country, and the applicant is willing to consent to such limitation, it is not necessary to go through the process of entering a notice of opposition, but an order directing that the mark, if registered, is to be registered with the addition of a note to the desired effect, may be obtained by the applicant on an *ex parte* application: *Ex parte Keep*, 32 W. R. 427.

(*b*) See Form J. for notice of opposition.

(*c*) See Appendix B., *infrd.*

(*d*) See Appendix B., *infrd*, for form of security.

(*e*) This being the time at which the case stands for the determination of the Court, it was formerly held that the costs subsequent to this period would be given to a successful opponent, but that the costs of the previous proceedings in the office could not be given him: *In re Brandreth*, 9 Ch. D. 618. See, however, § 90, *infrd.* Where a claim had been wrongfully set up to use a certain trade mark, the claimants were ordered to pay the costs of cross-adjourned summonses, as well as of an action which had been brought to enforce the right, even though they had not actually used the mark in question: *Davis* v. *Tylor*, M.R., April 24th, 1879. As to the course which the proceedings subsequent to the case standing for the determination of the Court are to take, see Rule 29, by which the opposed applicant is to apply to the Court by summons for leave to register. Under the old Acts and Rules the opponent was required to take out a summons for directions, which almost always resulted in the applicant being directed to apply for leave to register. See *In re Simpson, Davies & Sons*, 15 Ch. D. 525; also *In re Johnston*, 43 L. T. N. S. 672. The summons for directions is now swept away. See rule 44 as to notifying the order of the Court to the comptroller.

Assignment and transmission of trade mark.

70. A trade mark, when registered, shall be assigned and transmitted (*a*) only in connection with the goodwill (*b*) of the business concerned in the particular goods or classes of goods for which it has been registered, and shall be determinable with that goodwill (*c*).

(*a*) This section comes from § 2 of the Act of 1875. As to assignment and transmission, see Rules 34 to 38 and 58, and Form K in the Second Schedule to the Rules. See, too, Ch. 3, *suprd.*

Assignments and transmissions are to be entered in the register: See §§ 78, 87, *infrd.* By § 4 of the Act of 1875, it was enacted that every proprietor registered in respect of a trade mark subsequently to the first registered proprietor should, as respected his title to that trade mark, stand in the same position as if his title were a continuation of the title of the first registered proprietor. This enactment is not now repeated, the same result being effected by generalizing the language of § 76. Compare the American case of *Walton* v. *Crowley*, 3 Bl. C. C. 440; R. Cox, 166.

(*b*) As to the connection between trade marks and the goodwill of the business, see *Cooper* v. *Hood*, 26 Beav. 293; *Churton* v. *Douglas*, Johns. 174; *Shipwright* v. *Clements*, 19 W. R. 599, and *Cotton* v. *Gillard*, 44 L. J. Ch. 90; and the American cases of *Sohier* v. *Johnson*, 111 Mass. 238; *Willhaus* v. *Braun*, 44 Md. 303; *Taylor* v. *Bemis*, 4 Biss. 406; *Weston* v. *Ketcham* (1), 39 N. Y. Super. Ct. 54, and S. C. (2), 51 How. Pr. 455, and *Morgan* v. *Rogers*, 26 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1113. Where a trade mark has been placed on the register, but no business exists in which it is used, the mark cannot be assigned, since there is no goodwill to be assigned with it. *Ex parte Lawrence Bros.*, 44 L. T. N. S. 98. See *In re Farina* (4), 44 L. T. N. S. 99. As to goodwill, see ch. 9, *ante.*

(*c*) It would appear that, since a trade mark is to determine when the goodwill of the business in connection with which it has been used determines, the registration should also be determined upon that event happening. So long as the registration continues, there is, under § 75, public use of the mark, which may be thought to imply the existence of a goodwill. It will, however, be noticed that sub-section 1 of § 90 only gives power to expunge an entry *made* without sufficient cause, so that it would appear that an entry made at a time when a goodwill was in existence is not within the wording of the sub-section. However this may be, registration of a trade mark is, by § 76, only evidence of the proprietor's right, *subject to the provisions of the Act.* Rule 34 of the old Trade Mark Rules (renumbered 33 in the edition of March, 1883) gave power to the Court, on the application of any person aggrieved, to remove any trade mark from the register on the ground, after the expiration of five years from the date of the registry thereof, that the registered proprietor was not engaged in any business concerned in the goods within the same class as the goods with respect to which the trade mark was registered, and under this rule a trade mark was removed from the register in *In re Ralph*, 25 Ch. D. 194.

A patentee is carrying on business, and has, therefore, an existing goodwill, as long as he receives royalties from licensees, though he does not himself manufacture: *In re Ralph, ubi suprd.* This rule is not re-enacted, but there is no reason to suppose that this omission is due to an intention to allow a trade mark to be protected after the goodwill has determined, and after, by this section, the mark has itself determined.

Conflicting claims to registration.

71. Where each of several persons claims to be registered as proprietor of the same trade mark, the comptroller may refuse

to register any of them until their rights have been determined according to law, and the comptroller may himself submit or require the claimants to submit their rights to the Court (*a*).

(*a*) This section comes from § 5 of the Act of 1875. Rules 40—43 direct that the mode of submission to the Court shall be by special case. This was also provided by the Rules under the old Acts, and *Allsopp* v. *Walker*, Dig. 545, was heard on special case, and in *Ex parte Grimshaw*, W. N. 1877, p. 24, Hall, V.-C., refused to order otherwise. It was, however, found to be so difficult in practice to settle the statement of facts that in all cases of rival claim the practice was adopted of applying to the Court by way of motion or summons, asking at the same time for the leave of the Court to have the matter decided in that way, and it is believed that after the first year or two from the passing of the Act of 1875 there is no instance of a special case to be found. *Allsopp* v. *Walker* was a case in which the registration of a trade mark was objected to on the ground of its similarity to another trade mark, but the cases which this section and the rules under it appear to be really intended to govern are cases in which not similar, nor even identical, trade marks are claimed, but in which *the same* trade mark is claimed, *e. g.*, where a partnership has been dissolved and a question has arisen between the former co-partners as to the way in which the trade marks of the partnership have been transmitted.

Restrictions on registration.

72. (1.) Except where the Court has decided (*a*) that two or more persons are entitled to be registered as proprietors of the same trade mark, the comptroller shall not register in respect of the same goods or description of goods (*b*) a trade mark identical with one already on the register with respect to such goods or description of goods.

(2.) The comptroller shall not register with respect to the same goods or description of goods (*b*) a trade mark so nearly resembling a trade mark already on the register with respect to such goods or description of goods as to be calculated to deceive (*c*).

(*a*) This section comes from § 6 of the Act of 1875, by which the "special leave" of the Court was required for such subsequent registration. Of this leave of the Court, Jessel, M. R., said in *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639, that it "is not a capricious leave. It merely means that the second man must show his title." The same principle will still govern the decisions of the Court, which will usually be obtained by way of adjourned summons, though motions do not appear to be inadmissible. It is for the Court to judge as to the similarity, so that registration may be granted notwithstanding the adverse decision of the Manchester Committee of Experts, (see notes to cotton rules, *infrd*), or refused, notwithstanding the favourable decision of a foreign Court (*In re Farina* (2), 27 W. R. 456). "The Court" being the High Court of Justice, an order of the House of Lords should be made an order of the High Court of Justice. See *In re Orr-Ewing* (2), 28 W. R. 412.

(*b*) The prohibition of § 6 of the old Act was of registration "in respect of the same goods or *classes* of goods." The alteration in the language confines the prohibition to cases in which the goods are substantially the same, so that it no longer applies to cases of different goods which happen to be grouped together in the same class. Even under the old Act registration was sometimes granted to similar marks for different goods included in the same class, when no clashing could take place. See note (*a*) to § 65.

Registration as a series.

(c) The restriction imposed on the registration of similar trade marks does not extend to similar marks of the same owner, but when one person applies for the registration of an essential particular, or combination of essential particulars, together with varying additions, the proper course is to register the mark as a series under § 66, *ante*. The old Acts contained no provision corresponding to those of § 66, but the same course was considered to be the right one, viz., either to register the essential particular, omitting the additions, but stating that they were to be such, or else to register the essential particular with one form of addition, but stating that that might be varied. See *In re Barrows*, 5 Ch. D. 353; *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791; *In re William Dixon & Co.*, M. R., April 4th, 1879; *Davis* v. *Tylor*, M. R., April 24th, 1879; *In re Clippens Oil Co.*, M. R., March 11th, 1881; *In re Steedman*, L. J., N. of C. 1883, p. 83; though occasionally separate registration was granted to marks which differed only in non-essential respects, as in *In re Fox & Co.*, V. C. H., May 7th, 1881. See the observations of Jessel, M.R., in *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238, as to registration with a note of disclaimer. Also *infra*.

Old marks favoured.

When the second of two trade marks which it is thought may conflict is claimed by a different person from the registered proprietor of the first one, it makes a considerable difference whether the second mark is an old one or a new one, for it is the duty of a manufacturer, when adopting a new mark, to take especial care to select a distinctive one, and the Court will be far more strict in deciding whether this has been done, than it will be in deciding as to similarities between old marks. So that old marks bearing a certain similarity to each other may sometimes be allowed to be registered, though if the mark last applied for were a new one, registration would be refused to it. *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639; *In re Roxing*, Dig. 621; and see per Lord Blackburn in *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 499.

The "Three Mark Rule."

When the Act of 1875 came into operation it was soon discovered that trade marks which were for practical purposes indistinguishable had in various instances been used by two or more firms, generally in different parts of the country, for the same or substantially the same goods, and the injustice of giving an exclusive right to the first of these firms was felt to be so great that what is known as the "Three Mark Rule" was promulgated by the Commissioners of Patents. The first public announcement of the new Rule was made by Sir G. Jessel, M. R., in *In re Walkden Aërated Waters Co.*, Dig. 558, when he stated that the Lord Chancellor was of opinion that the number of times that a device or emblem might be registered as a trade mark for articles of the same class ought, for the sake of distinctiveness, in no case to exceed three. That was a case in which the application was for the registration of a mark similar in its main features to two others already on the register. The mark was a new one, and the application was only allowed upon condition of the consent of both the previously registered proprietors being produced. On account of the mark in that case having been a ne[illegible]e, an idea arose that the rule was only applicable to new marks, but in *In re Hyde & Co.*, 7 Ch. D. 724, the Master of the Rolls took another opportunity of referring to the rule, and stated that the Lord Chancellor had personally come to the decision that not more than three registrations of the same, or practically the same, mark should be allowed, and that this was also his own decision; and, in fact, that of the Commissioners of Patents, having been communicated to the Attorney and Solicitor General. This decision was intended to cover old marks, and not merely new ones. A mark used in substance by more than three firms could not be registered, but must be treated as open. The rule therefore is that where a mark has been used by more than three firms it is common to the trade and incapable of registration; that where a mark has been used by two firms or

three firms before the 13th of August, 1875 (the date of the passing of the Act of 1875), it is the old mark of each firm, and each firm is entitled to registration, almost as of right, on proof of the facts; but that where a mark has been registered by one firm or two firms, another firm will not be allowed to register substantially the same mark for the same goods as a new mark, except by the consent of the previously registered proprietors. See *In re Leonardt*, Dig. 610; *In re Mitchell* (2), Dig. 611; *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639; *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791; *In re Powell*, Dig. 589; *Ex parte Sales, Pollard & Co.*, Dig. 620; *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238; *Benbow* v. *Low* (4), 44 L. T. N. S. 875; *Monson* v. *Boehm*, 28 Sol. J. 361; and *In re Vergaras*, V.-C. H., June 3rd, 1881, in which last case, as in *In re Walkden Co.*, Dig. 558, the same mark was allowed to be registered by three firms as a new mark, all consenting. Where a new mark had been registered and much used, and another similar mark which had not been much used, was proved to be an old mark and was allowed to be registered, the new mark was not removed from the register, but was allowed to remain there side by side with the old one: *Monson* v. *Boehm*, 28 Sol. J. 361. To bring a mark within the rule and entitle it to registration, notwithstanding a previous similar registration for the same goods, foreign user is insufficient, and there must have been user within the United Kingdom: *In re Münch*, 50 L. T. N. S. 12. And that user must have been substantial, and not merely nominal and unknown to the other proprietor: *In re Hodson & Co.*, 26 Sol. J. 43.

Registration with a note.

In some cases the similarity between marks has been got over by registering for different goods, though in the same class (see note (*a*) to § 65, *ante*); or restricting the manner of user (*In re Whitcley*, 43 L. T. N. S. 627; *In re Sykes*, 43 L. T. N. S. 626; *In re Farina* (3), Dig. 654); or the locality within which the mark is to be used (*In re Rabone*, Dig. 643). And in the same spirit, the improper grant of an exclusive right in common elements has been avoided by the use of disclaimers (*In re Leonardt*, Dig. 610; *In re Mitchell* (2), Dig. 611; *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238; *In re Hoyle & Sons Ld.* (2) Chitty, J., Nov. 30th, 1883); and permission to use a mark has been reserved to certain persons, on registration as against all others being granted (*Ex parte Hemming & Son*, M. R. April 27th, 1881).

Marks compared as used.

In considering whether there is in fact such similarity between two marks as to exclude the second from registration, it is very important to compare them in the actual mode of user, *e. g.*, as branded on metal goods (*In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639; *In re Rosing*, Dig. 621; *Nuthall* v. *Vining*, C. A. Jan. 21st, 1880; and compare *Davis* v. *Reid*, 17 Grant Up. Can. Ch. 69); and if one trade mark has been registered without colour, but is in practice used in a particular colour, and another trade mark is offered for registration which is distinguishable without colour, but might by the addition of colour be made to resemble the first mark, registration will be refused (*In re Worthington*, 14 Ch. D. 8). Any trade marks may now be registered in colour (§ 67), an advantage which was previously reserved for cotton marks and other marks of a special character requiring registration by deposit. In such a case it was formerly held that the colour was part of the mark, so that a gold coin might be registered for goods for which a silver coin was already registered, though if both were in gold, or both in silver, there would be similarity (*In re Robinson*, 29 W. R. 31), but having regard to the provisions of § 67, it hardly seems that this decision could now be repeated.

Cotton marks.

In the case of cotton marks which were brought before the Manchester Committee of Experts, due weight should be given to their opinion as to the distinctiveness of the marks (*Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 479), but they seem to have given somewhat too wide an interpretation to the expression "substantial similarity," in their instructions. See *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791. The cotton rules being now repealed,

a B. list mark may be registered without an application to the Court, if the comptroller considers that a mistake has been made.

Cases of refusal.

For instances of cases in which registration has been refused on the ground of similarity, reference may be made to *Allsopp* v. *Walker*, Dig. 545, in which the first mark was a man's hand held upwards, and the second was a female hand pointed horizontally; *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch. 639, in which the first mark was a pointer at a point, with the word "staunch," and the second was a pointer feeding out of a porridge pot; *In re Rosing*, Dig. 621, in which the first mark was a plain horn with a looped cord, and the second was a sprig of two roses with a twisted horn; *Barrows* v. *Pelsall Coal and Iron Co.*, Dig 530, in which the marks were a crown with "B. B. H." in Roman letters, and a crown with "B. B. S." in italics; *In re Worthington & Co.*, 14 Ch. D. 8, a plain triangle, and a triangle containing a church with an inscription; and see *In re Farina* (2), 27 W. R. 456; *In re Hargreaves*, 11 Ch. D. 669, and other cases.

Cases of non-refusal.

For instances of cases in which registration has not been refused on the ground of similarity, see *In re Farina* (1), 26 W. R. 261; *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 479, and the other cotton cases mentioned in the notes to the cotton rules. Except in the cases of cotton marks the opposition has usually been successful, and registration has either been refused altogether or only granted subject to limitations.

American cases.

Under the similar section in the United States Act, registration was refused where the first mark was the figure of a star and the second was the word "star" (*In re the American Lubricating Oil Co.*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 637); where the first mark was the name Haxall, and the principal part of the second consisted of the same name and a Maltese cross (*In re Coggin, Kidder & Co.*, 11 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1109); where the marks were the word "Swan" and the words "Black Swan" (*Ex parte Caire*, 15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 248); so where a trade mark was tendered which consisted of three parts, each of which was already registered, one by the applicant and the others by other firms (*In re Bush & Co.*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz., 164), and where the new mark consisted of "A. S. California Family * Soap," and "California" and "*" were already on the register (*Ex parte Smith* (1), 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz., 679); and see *Ex parte Weisert Bros.*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz., 680. In *In re Cornwall* (1), 12 U. S. Pat. Gaz., 138, registration was granted to a star and crescent, a star being on the register; and see *In re Imbs*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 463.

The comptroller is entitled to his costs of opposing an application on the ground of similarity to a registered mark; at all events, unless the marks are very clearly distinct. See *In re Patent Plumbago Crucible Co.*, M. R., Aug. 1st, 1879.

See Rule 44 as to notifying the order of the Court to the comptroller.

Where the registrar had refused to register on the ground of similarity to a registered mark, and the marks did not appear to be similar, but the owner of the registered mark had not been served with the notice of motion of the person applying for the registration of the second mark, Chitty, J., directed the registered owner to be served, and on that being done, and no objection being made, ordered the registration to proceed: *In re Milne & Co.*, Chitty, J., July 6th, 1883.

Further restriction on registration.

73. It shall not be lawful to register as part of or in combination with a trade mark any words the exclusive use of which would, by reason of their being calculated to deceive or otherwise, be deemed disentitled to protection in a Court of justice (*a*), or any scandalous design.

(*a*) This section is taken from § 6 of the Act of 1875. The wording of that was "would not be deemed entitled," which was somewhat ambiguous, but the present wording, "would be deemed disentitled," is open to no misinterpretation. That the original enactment also only referred to deceptiveness inherent in the mark itself, and not to liability to be mistaken for another mark, was held by Jessel, M.R., in *In re Horsburgh*, 53 L. J. Ch. 237.

Words which are descriptive or deceptive.

Where it is sought to register as a trade mark a word or words which are or may be appropriate to the article to which the trade mark is to be applied, the applicant is in the dilemma that the alleged trade mark is either descriptive or deceptive; if the word or words are properly applicable to the article and may be truly used with respect to it, they are descriptive and are not "fancy words" within § 64; if they may be read as stating something with respect to the article which is untrue, they are deceptive within the present section; so that *qudcunque viâ* the application must fail. Thus in *In re Saunion & Co.*, Dig. 625, where the mark was "Anglo-Portugo Oysters," either the oysters were of Anglo-Portuguese origin, in which case anyone had a right to say that they were so, or they were not of such origin, in which case no one had a right to say so. There are numerous similar cases under the U. S. Acts. Thus *In re American Sardine Co.*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 495 ("American Sardines"); *In re Dole Bros.*, 12 *ib.* 930 ("Egg Macaroni"); *In re Warburg & Co.*, 13 *ib.* 44 ("Cachemire Milano"); *Ex parte Marsching*, 15 *ib.* 294 ("French" paints); *Ex parte Knapp*, 16 *ib.* 318 ("London" Animal Foods); *Ginter* v. *Kinney Tobacco Co.* 22 *ib.* 770 ("Straight-cut" Cigarettes). Compare *In re Green*, 8 *ib.* 729 ("German Sirup"), where registration was allowed.

In the American case of *Ex parte Cigar Makers' Association*, 16 *ib.* 958 it was held that a mark could not be registered which was intended to be used by any member of an association on goods of any quality, nor one which was intended to be used for the furtherance of a scheme in restraint of trade.

As to what will be deemed to disentitle to protection in a Court of justice, see further Ch. 7, *ante*.

Saving for power to provide for entry on register of common marks as additions to trade marks.

74.—(1.) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to prevent the comptroller entering on the register, in the prescribed manner, and subject to the prescribed conditions, as an addition to any trade mark (*a*).

(a.) In the case of an application for registration of a trade mark used before the thirteenth day of August one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five—

Any distinctive (*b*) device, mark, brand, heading, label, ticket, letter, word, or figure, or combination of letters, words, or figures, though the same is common to the trade (*c*) in the goods with respect to which the application is made;

(b.) In the case of an application for registration of a trade mark not used before the thirteenth day of August one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five—

Any distinctive (*b*) word or combination of words, though the same is common to the trade (*c*) in the goods with respect to which the application is made;

(2.) The applicant for entry of any such common particular or particulars must, however, disclaim (*d*) in his application any right to the exclusive use of the same, and a copy of the disclaimer shall be entered on the register.

(3) Any device, mark, brand, heading, label, ticket, letter, word, figure, or combination of letters words or figures, which was or were, before the thirteenth day of August one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, publicly used by more than three persons on the same or a similar description of goods shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed common to the trade in such goods (*e*).

(*a*) This section is new and is not very clearly expressed, but what is intended appears to be that when a trade mark sent in for registration contains, together with an essential particular, a feature which is in common use in the trade, that common feature must be disclaimed, so that the rest of the trade may not be deprived of their right to use it. The additions to which this section relates are apparently not quite the same as the additions to an essential particular referred to in § 64 (2), but such as would be capable of distinguishing the goods, were it not that in point of fact they have been used by several different firms. Thus, if a device of an animal were registered in combination with the words "First quality," for iron, the case would be within § 64, and there would be no need to disclaim the words, they being obviously open to the use of all the world; but if the same device were to be registered in combination with a crown, the case would be within the present section, and the crown, being *primâ facie* distinctive but in point of fact common to the trade, would have to be disclaimed. No manner or conditions of registration have at present been prescribed, except so far as paragraph 19 of the Instructions governs the case.

(*b*) There is at first sight a contradiction in terms here, as a mark common to the trade cannot, of course, be distinctive; but what is intended appears to be that any mark which is *primâ facie* distinctive, but which is really common to the trade, must be disclaimed when registered as part of a combination. The epithet "Distinctive," would thus be here applied to every mark which is not inherently incapable of appropriation by an individual.

Common marks.

(*c*) When it is alleged adversely to an applicant for registration that the whole or a part of his trade mark is common to the trade, the onus is upon the person alleging that this is so to prove it, not upon the applicant for registration to prove the contrary. Compare per C. A. in *In re Leonard* v. *Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530. And the entries in the registry office books of applications for registration do not prove that a mark is in common use, as they only prove that the applications entered have been made, not that they have all been properly made, or upon true allegations, or that the marks applied for have in fact been used: *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 13 Ch. D. 434. In a number of cases since the Registration Acts marks have been found to be common to different trades; thus, a number of words and devices to the iron trade: *In re Barrows*, 5 Ch. D. 353; the words "Bank of England," to the sealing-wax trade; *In re Hyde & Co.*, 7 Ch. D. 724; the word "Selected," and other words and devices, to the steel-pen trade: *In re Leonardt*, Dig. 610; *In re Mitchell* (2), Dig. 611; *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238; the letters "S. P." to the snuff trade: *Ex parte Sales, Pollard & Co.*, Dig. 620; the Eton arms to the hat trade: *Lucke* v. *Webster*, M. R., April 4th, 1879; the words "Braided Fixed Stars," to the match trade: *In re Palmer* (3), 24 Ch. D. 504; various animals, devices, and colours to the cotton trade: *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 7 App. Cas.

219; *Wallace & Co.* v. *King & Co.*, Bombay High Ct., April 30th, 1879; *In re Hoyle & Sons*, Ld. (2), Chitty, J., Nov. 30th, 1883; and see *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 479; and *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791.

(*d*) The practice of entering disclaimers in the register appears to have originated with the cases of *In re Leonardt*, Dig. 610, and *In re Mitchell* (2), Dig. 611. In those cases the consent of the owner of the mark was required, but in *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 233, an order for a disclaimer was made notwithstanding that the owner did not formally consent, and in other cases the registration was subjected to limitations entered on the register. See cases cited in note (*c*) to § 72 *suprd*. The practice has been carried so far that in *In re Hoyle & Sons*, Ld. (2), Chitty, J., Nov. 30th, 1883, a trade mark consisting of a pheasant sitting on a gate was registered with a disclaimer of the bird, leaving only the gate. See the order of the House of Lords in *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 479, and see also the statement by Jessel, M.R., in *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238. Disclaimers.

(*e*) The intention of this sub-section is to introduce here the "Three Mark Rule," as to which see note (*c*) to § 72, *suprd*. That rule is that registration of the same or substantially the same mark may be granted to not more than three persons, who can prove real user before August 13th, 1875, but that proof of user by more than three persons before that date debars all persons from registering. For there to have been "public user" by more than three persons, it would seem that the user by each must have been substantial (*In re Hodson & Co.*, 26 Sol. J., 43), and such as came or ought to have come to the knowledge of each of the others. It will be noticed that the sub-section only relates to old marks. In the case of new marks a second registration of the same device would not be granted under § 72, except by the consent of the previously registered proprietor, and a disclaimer might even then be required as a condition of his consent. User is not proved by the books of applications for registration, as the allegations therein contained are not proved: *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 13 Ch. D. 434.

Effect of Registration.

75. Registration of a trade mark shall be deemed to be equivalent to public use of the trade mark (*a*). Registration equivalent to public use.

(*a*) This comes from § 2 of the Act of 1875, but the provision in that Act was made subject to the existence of a connexion with goodwill. Now there is to be deemed to be public use of a trade mark as long as it is registered, whether there is or is not any goodwill, which points to the propriety of the removal of a trade mark from the register as soon as the goodwill has determined. It is, however, doubtful whether there is power under § 90 to obtain this. And see the last words of § 76, and note (*c*) to § 70. In the United States also registration is equivalent to public use. See *In re Dutcher Temple Co.*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis., 1871, 248. Apart from the legislation on the subject, public use of a trade mark gives a property in it. See per Lord Blackburn, in *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 496. It has been decided that to constitute public use it is not sufficient for the marked goods to be advertized; they must be actually in the market. But so long as that is the case, length of user is not necessary. See *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380; *Maxwell* v. *Hogg*, L. R. 2 Ch. 307; *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 234; *In re Simpson, Davies & Sons*, M. R. Jan. 12th, 1881.

Right of first proprietor to exclusive use of trade mark.

76. The registration of a person as proprietor of a trade mark shall be *primâ facie* evidence (*a*) of his right to the exclusive use (*b*) of the trade mark, and shall, after the expiration of five years from the date of the registration, be conclusive evidence (*a*) of his right to the exclusive use of the trade mark, subject to the provisions of this Act (*c*).

Effect of registration.

(*a*) This section comes from § 3 of the Act of 1875. Until the end of five years from registration the only effect of it is, as was said in the Court of Appeal in *Nuthall* v. *Vining*, C. A. Jan. 21st, 1880, to qualify the registered proprietor for suing infringers, in other words, registration is "simply a condition precedent to suing," per Chitty, J., in *Monson* v. *Boehm*, 28 Sol. J. 361, and the mark remains liable to removal from the register, *e. g.*, on application by the true proprietor of it, when it has been wrongfully registered in the name of another person, as in *Ex parte Laurence Bros.*, 44 L. T. N. S. 93. After the expiration of five years from registration the title of the registered proprietor appears to be secure against individual rival claimants, but as "the Act only says that after five years the person who has registered a trade mark shall be entitled to the trade mark, but does not say that the mark as registered shall be deemed to be a trade mark" (see per Jessel, M.R., in *In re Palmer*, (1) 21 Ch. D. 47), the trade mark remains liable to removal for inherent defects in it, *e.g.*, that it contains no one of the essential particulars specified by § 64. Thus in *In re Palmer* (1), 21 Ch. D. 47, and (3) 24 *ib.*, 504, the words "Braided fixed stars," registered for matches, were expunged, on the ground that at the date of the registration and ever since they had been merely descriptive of matches prepared in a particular way. So where the word "Valvoline" had been registered, though it had been used as a descriptive term, *In re Leonard* v. *Ellis*, 53 L. J. Ch. 233, and 32 W. R. 530. Again, in *In re Ralph*, 25 Ch. D. 194, a five years' mark was expunged. In *Lamplough* v. *Beedzler*, C. A., Nov. 12th, 1880, it was held that the registered words "Pyretic Saline" were purely descriptive. See *Reinhardt* v. *Spalding*, 49 L. J. Ch. 57, and *Wheeler* v. *Johnston*, 3 L. R. Ir. 284. It has been held in America that registration of descriptive words confers no right in them: *Van Beil* v. *Prescott*, 82 N. Y. 630.

(*b*) The right to the exclusive use of a trade mark, first asserted in *Gout* v. *Aleploglu*, 5 Leg. Obs. 496, and *Millington* v. *Fox*, 3 My. & Cr. 338, and after much discussion affirmed by the chancery judges (see Ch. 6, *ante*), is now given by statute upon registration. Under the Canadian statute it has been held that registration gives no right of action for anything done before registration: *Morse* v. *Martir*, Montreal Super. Ct. Feb. 28th, 1882, but the Court of Appeal at Montreal did not decide the point, S. C. Feb. 23, 1884.

(*c*) See § 70 as to the connexion with goodwill.

Restrictions on actions for infringement, and on defence to action in certain cases.

77. A person shall not be entitled to institute any proceeding to prevent or to recover damages for the infringement of a trade mark unless, in the case of a trade mark capable of being registered under this Act, it has been registered in pursuance of this Act, or of an enactment repealed by this Act, or, in the case of any other trade mark in use before the thirteenth of August one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, registration thereof under this part of this Act, or of an enactment

repealed by this Act, has been refused (*a*). The comptroller may, on request, and on payment of the prescribed fee, grant a certificate that such registration has been refused (*b*).

Necessity for applying for registration.

(*a*) This part of this section comes from § 1 of the Act of 1876. By § 1 of the Act of 1875, failure to obtain registration was fatal to the owner of a trade mark, whether old or new. The effect of the alteration introduced by the Act of 1876 was clearly explained by Lord Blackburn in the House of Lords in *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 498, in which he said: "This alters the Act of 1875 in two respects; it renders registration a condition precedent to a proceeding to recover damages, as well as to a proceeding to prevent infringement, and it provides that if the proprietor of a trade mark in use before the passing of the principal Act has been refused registration, he may, notwithstanding such refusal, institute proceedings, either for prevention of, or damages for, the infringement of such trade mark, and need not wait till he has got the register rectified." And again he said: "It seems to me that the effect of the Act of 1876 is, that if one who says he is the proprietor of a trade mark wishes to institute proceedings against someone who, as he says, is infringing it, he must first try to have his trade mark registered. If the registration is refused for any reason, he may apply (under § 5 of the Act of 1875) to have the register rectified, and then the Court will have to determine as the principal question whether the reason of the refusal was sufficient. But he may also seek for more speedy redress. He may obtain a certificate of the refusal and then institute proceedings to prevent the infringement, and then the Court will have to determine whether he was the proprietor of the trade mark." See, also, per Malins, V.-C., in *In re Barrows*, 5 Ch. D. 353—359, and *Twentsche Stoom Bleekery Goor* v. *Ellinger & Co.*, 26 W. R. 70. The present section differs from § 1 of the Act of 1876, in that by that section the alternative of registering or procuring a certificate of refusal was given to an owner of any old mark, whether the old mark was or was not capable of being registered, so that an owner of such a mark might safely be content with a certificate of refusal, however obviously wrong the refusal might be. In the present section it will be seen that this alternative is no longer given to owners of old marks capable of being registered. Such marks must now be registered or left unprotected. New marks, which are incapable of being registered under § 64, can hardly constitute trade marks, but this section does not require registration or refusal in such cases. If the owner of a trade mark is unable, when suing an infringer, to produce a certificate of registration or of refusal to register, his remedy is barred, though he has made application for registration and has only failed to obtain it because of delay in the office: *Hazzopulo* v. *Kaufmann*, 23 Sol. J. 819. Under the Canadian statute it has been held that registration only qualifies for suing in respect of acts done after registration, and not in respect of earlier acts: *Morse* v. *Martin*, Montreal Super. Ct., Feb. 28th, 1882. But the Court of Appeal abstained from deciding the point, Feb. 23rd, 1884.

By § 1 of the Act of 1875, as amended by § 1 of the Act of 1876, the disability for suing without registration was to begin from July 1st, 1877. The time thus allowed for registration was extended, in the case of marks used in respect of any goods in classes 23 to 35 ("textiles") by § 1 of the Act of 1877, and Orders in Council of Dec. 12th, 1877, and June 29th, 1878, to Dec. 31st, 1878, and in the case of marks used in respect of cotton piece goods, by further Orders in Council of Nov. 27th, 1878, and May 17th, 1879, to July 31st, 1879. Since the date last mentioned a certificate of registration or of refusal to register has been a *sine qud non* in all cases.

(*b*) See § 96, rule 57, and forms L. and TI.

Register of Trade Marks.

Register of trade marks.

78. There shall be kept at the Patent Office a book called the Register of Trade Marks (*a*), wherein shall be entered the names and addresses of proprietors of registered trade marks, notifications of assignments and of transmissions of trade marks, and such other matters as may be from time to time prescribed.

(*a*) The register of trade marks was previously kept under the authority of § 1 of the Act of 1875. As to entries in the register, see § 87, 91, and 92, and Rules 30–32, and 44–46, *infrd.*

Removal of trade mark after fourteen years unless fee paid.

79.—(1.) At a time not being less than two months nor more than three months before the expiration of fourteen years (*a*) from the date of the registration of a trade mark, the comptroller shall send notice to the registered proprietor that the trade mark will be removed from the register unless the proprietor pays to the comptroller before the expiration of such fourteen years (naming the date at which the same will expire) the prescribed fee (*b*); and if such fee be not previously paid, he shall at the expiration of one month from the date of the giving of the first notice send a second notice to the same effect.

(2.) If such fee be not paid before the expiration of such fourteen years the comptroller may after the end of three months from the expiration of such fourteen years remove the mark from the register (*c*), and so from time to time at the expiration of every period of fourteen years.

(3.) If before the expiration of the said three months the registered proprietor pays the said fee together with the additional prescribed fee (*d*), the comptroller may without removing such trade mark from the register accept the said fee as if it had been paid before the expiration of the said fourteen years.

(4.) Where after the said three months a trade mark has been removed from the register for non payment of the prescribed fee, the comptroller may, if satisfied that it is just so to do, restore such trade mark to the register on payment of the prescribed additional fee (*e*).

(5.) Where a trade mark has been removed from the register for non-payment of the fee or otherwise, such trade mark shall nevertheless, for the purpose of any application (*f*) for registration during the five years next after the date of such removal, be deemed to be a trade mark which is already registered.

(*a*) This section comes from the old Rules.
(*b*) *i.e.*, £1. See First Schedule.
(*c*) The removal and its cause are to be recorded, under Rule 45.
(*d*) *i.e.*, 10*s*. See First Schedule.
(*e*) *i.e.*, £1. See First Schedule.
(*f*) The effect of this is that (under § 72) the comptroller cannot, for five years after a mark has been removed from the register, place another similar mark on the register for similar goods.

Fees.

Fees for registration, &c.

80. There shall be paid in respect of applications and registration and other matters under this part of this Act, such fees as may be from time to time, with the sanction of the Treasury, prescribed by the Board of Trade (*a*); and such fees shall be levied and paid to the account of Her Majesty's Exchequer in such manner as the Treasury may from time to time direct.

(*a*) Under § 7 of the Act of 1875, these fees were fixed by the Lord Chancellor, with the assent of the Treasury. For the list of fees now fixed by the Board of Trade, see the First Schedule to the Rules. Also Rule 3.

Sheffield Marks.

Registration by Cutlers' Company of Sheffield marks.

81. With respect to the master, wardens, searchers, assistants, and commonalty of the Company of Cutlers in Hallamshire, in the county of York, (in this Act called the Cutlers' Company), and the marks or devices (in this Act called Sheffield marks) assigned or registered by the master, wardens, searchers, and assistants of that company (*a*), the following provisions shall have effect:

(1.) The Cutlers' Company shall establish and keep at Sheffield a new register of trade marks (in this Act called the Sheffield register):

(2.) The Cutlers' Company shall enter in the Sheffield register, in respect of cutlery, edge tools, or raw steel and the goods mentioned in the next sub-section, all the trade marks entered before the commencement of this Act in respect of cutlery, edge tools, or raw steel and such goods in the register established under the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, belonging to persons carrying on business in Hallamshire, or within six miles thereof, and shall also enter in such register, in respect of the same goods, all the trade marks which shall have been assigned by the Cutlers' Company and actually used before the commencement of this Act, but which have not been entered in the register established under the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875 (*b*).

(3.) An application for registration of a trade mark used on cutlery, edge tools, or on raw steel, or on goods made of steel, or of steel and iron combined, whether with or without a cutting edge, shall, if made after the commencement of this Act by a person carrying on business in Hallamshire, or within six miles thereof, be made to the Cutlers' Company (*c*).

(4.) Every application so made to the Cutlers' Company shall be notified to the comptroller in the prescribed manner (*d*), and unless the comptroller within the prescribed time (*e*) gives notice to the Cutlers' Company that he objects to the acceptance of the application, it shall be proceeded with by the Cutlers' Company in the prescribed manner (*f*):

(5.) If the comptroller gives notice of objection as aforesaid, the application shall not be proceeded with by the Cutlers' Company, but any person aggrieved may appeal to the Court:

(6.) Upon the registration of a trade mark in the Sheffield register the Cutlers' Company shall give notice thereof to the comptroller, who shall thereupon enter the mark in the register of trade marks; and such registration shall bear date as of the day of application to the Cutlers' Company, and have the same effect as if the application had been made to the comptroller on that day:

(7.) The provisions of this Act, and of any general rules made under this Act, with respect to application for registration in the register of trade marks, the effect of such registration, and the assignment and transmission of rights in a registered trade mark shall apply in the case of applications and registration in the Sheffield register; and notice of every entry made in the Sheffield register must be given to the comptroller by the Cutlers' Company, save and except that the provisions of this sub-section shall not prejudice or affect any life estate and interest of a widow of the holder of any Sheffield mark which may be in force in respect of such mark at the time when it shall be placed upon the Sheffield register (*g*):

(8.) Where the comptroller receives from any person not carrying on business in Hallamshire or within six miles thereof an application for registration of a trade mark used on cutlery, edge tools, or on raw steel, or on goods made of steel, or of steel and iron combined, whether with or without a cutting edge, he shall in

the prescribed manner (*h*) notify the application and proceedings thereon to the Cutlers' Company (*i*):

(9.) At the expiration of five years from the commencement of this Act the Cutlers' Company shall close the Cutlers' register of corporate trade marks, and thereupon all marks entered therein shall, unless entered in the Sheffield register, be deemed to have been abandoned:

(10.) A person may (notwithstanding anything in any Act relating to the Cutlers' Company) be registered in the Sheffield register as proprietor of two or more trade marks:

(11.) A body of persons, corporate or not corporate, may (notwithstanding anything in any Act relating to the Cutlers' Company) be registered in the Sheffield register as proprietor of a trade mark or trade marks (*k*):

(12.) Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Cutlers' Company in respect of anything done or omitted under this Act may, in the prescribed manner, appeal (*l*) to the comptroller, who shall have power to confirm, reverse, or modify the decision, but the decision of the comptroller shall be subject to a further appeal to the Court:

(13.) So much of the Cutlers' Company's Acts as applies to the summary punishment of persons counterfeiting Sheffield corporate marks, that is to say, the fifth section of the Cutlers' Company's Act of 1814, and the provisions in relation to the recovery and application of the penalty imposed by such last-mentioned section contained in the Cutlers' Company's Act of 1791, shall apply to any mark entered in the Sheffield register (*m*).

(*a*) As to the Cutlers' Company, the old Sheffield corporate marks, and the system which prevailed with respect to Sheffield marks under the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, see Appendix D, *infrd.* The specified goods now form a much wider class than formerly. The present section provides for the closing of the old Cutlers' register and the immediate establishment of a new one, which will be an exact duplicate of the general register, so far as it relates to marks used for the specified goods within the specified limits.

(*b*) By § 9 (6) of the Act of 1875, Sheffield corporate marks were allowed to be registered in the trade marks register in the same manner and upon the same terms and conditions in and upon which they might have been registered if they were not corporate marks. Under this provision it was held that where a corporate mark had been assigned by its proprietor, but had not been surrendered to the Company and re-awarded by them to the assignee, he must perfect his title with the Company before he could obtain registra-

tion under the Act: *In re Rabone*, Dig. 643. There was, however, no requirement for corporate marks to be registered.

(c) Applications under this section are to be made in duplicate, accompanied by the prescribed fees and representations: Rule 53.

(d) By sending to the comptroller one copy of the application and two representations of the mark for each class, within seven days after receipt of the application: Rule 54.

(e) One month from the receipt by the comptroller of the notice from the Company: Rule 55 (1).

(f) The Company is to require the applicant to send the comptroller a wood block or electrotype, and the comptroller is to advertise the application as in other cases: Rule 55 (2).

(g) See Rule 56, by which the proceedings at Sheffield are assimilated to those at London.

(h) By sending a copy of the official paper, with a note distinguishing the application: Rule 55 (3).

(i) In *In re Rosing*, Dig. 621, the Company opposed the registration of a trade mark on the ground of similarity to a corporate mark, but, the objection failing in the Court of first instance, were ordered to pay the costs of the motion. On appeal, however, the objection taken by the Company was supported.

(k) Compare Rule 39.

(l) For Form of Notice of Appeal, see Form W.

(m) These provisions are, shortly, that a counterfeiter may be fined not exceeding £20 by a justice or justices of the peace, subject to an appeal to Quarter Sessions. See Appendix D, *infrd.*

PART V.

General.

Patent Office and Proceedings thereat.

Patent Office.

82.—(1.) The Treasury may provide for the purposes of this Act an office with all requisite buildings and conveniences, which shall be called, and is in this Act referred to as, the Patent Office:

(2.) Until a new Patent Office is provided, the offices of the Commissioners of Patents for inventions and for the registration of designs and trade marks existing at the commencement of this Act (*a*) shall be the Patent Office within the meaning of this Act.

(3.) The Patent Office shall be under the immediate control of an officer called the comptroller general of patents, designs, and trade marks (*b*), who shall act under the superintendence and direction of the Board of Trade.

(4.) Any act or thing directed to be done by or to the comptroller may, in his absence, be done by or to any officer for the time being in that behalf authorised by the Board of Trade.

(*a*) This is in Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane, W.C.
(*b*) Under the Trade Marks Registration Acts the registrar was at the head of the Registry Office.

Officers and clerks.

83.—(1.) The Board of Trade (*a*) may at any time after the passing of this Act, and from time to time, subject to the approval of the Treasury, appoint the comptroller-general of patents, designs, and trade marks, and so many examiners and other officers and clerks, with such designations and duties as the Board of Trade think fit, and may from time to time remove any of those officers and clerks.

(2.) The salaries of those officers and clerks shall be appointed by the Board of Trade, with the concurrence of the Treasury, and the same and the other expenses of the execution of this Act shall be paid out of money provided by Parliament.

(*a*) The authority given by this section to the Board of Trade was formerly possessed by the Lord Chancellor, under § 7 of the Act of 1875.

Seal of Patent Office.

84. There shall be a seal for the Patent Office, and impressions thereof shall be judicially noticed and admitted in evidence.

Trust not to be entered in registers.

85. There shall not be entered in any register kept under this Act, or be receivable by the comptroller, any notice of any trust expressed implied or constructive (*a*).

(*a*) This section, so far as it relates to trade marks, comes from the old Rules.

Refusal to grant patent, &c., in certain cases.

86. The comptroller may refuse to grant a patent for an invention, or to register a design or trade mark, of which the use would, in his opinion, be contrary to law or morality (*a*).

(*a*) This is a new section, and, so far as it relates to trade marks, does not seem to carry much farther the provisions of § 6 of the Act of 1875, now re-enacted in § 73, *suprd*, prohibiting the registration of a scandalous design as a trade mark.

Entry of assignments and transmissions in registers.

87. Where a person becomes entitled by assignment, transmission, or other operation of law to a patent, or to the copyright in a registered design, or to a registered trade mark, the comptroller shall on request, and on proof of title to his satisfaction, cause the name of such person to be entered as proprietor of the patent, copyright in the design, or trade mark, in the register of patents, designs, or trade marks, as the case may be (*a*). The person for the time being entered in the register of patents, designs, or trade marks, as proprietor of a patent, copyright in a design, or trade mark, as the case may be, shall, subject to any rights appearing from such register to be vested in any other person, have power absolutely to assign (*b*), grant

licenses (*c*) as to, or otherwise deal with, the same and to give effectual receipts for any consideration for such assignment, license, or dealing. Provided that any equities in respect of such patent, design, or trade mark may be enforced in like manner as in respect of any other personal property.

(*a*) As to the mode of obtaining registration as a subsequent proprietor, see Rules 34–38 and Form K. Though § 4 of the Act of 1875 is not re-enacted, it seems that a subsequent proprietor will still, as regards his title to the trade mark, be in the same position as if his title were a continuation of the title of the first registered proprietor.

(*b*) A trade mark can be assigned only in connection with the goodwill of the business. See § 70, *suprd.*

(*c*) The power of granting licenses must not be exercised so as to deceive the public, *e.g.*, so as to authorise the use of the mark on inferior goods. See ch. 7. The power of granting licenses at all seems, in the case of trade marks, rather to conflict with § 70; the intention of which appears to be that only the person entitled to the goodwill shall have the right of using the trade mark.

Inspection of and extracts from registers.

88. Every register kept under this Act shall at all convenient times be open to the inspection of the public, subject to such regulations as may be prescribed (*a*); and certified copies, sealed with the seal of the Patent Office, of any entry in any such register shall be given to any person requiring the same on payment of the prescribed fee (*b*).

(*a*) This section is taken from the old Rules. See Rule 49 for the present regulations. The fee for inspection is 1*s.* for every quarter of an hour.

(*b*) See First Schedule.

Sealed copies to be received in evidence.

89. Printed or written copies or extracts, purporting to be certified by the comptroller and sealed with the seal of the Patent Office, of or from patents, specifications, disclaimers and other documents in the Patent Office, and of or from registers and other books kept there, shall be admitted in evidence in all courts in Her Majesty's dominions, and in all proceedings, without further proof or production of the originals.

Rectification of registers by Court.

90.—(1.) The Court may on the application of any person aggrieved (*a*) by the omission without sufficient cause of the name of any person from any register kept under this Act, or by any entry made without sufficient cause in any such register, make such order (*b*) for making (*c*), expunging (*d*), or varying (*e*) the entry, as the Court thinks fit; or the Court may refuse the application; and in either case may make such order with respect to the costs of the proceedings as the Court thinks fit (*f*).

(2.) The Court may in any proceeding under this section decide any question that it may be necessary or expedient to decide for the rectification of a register, and may direct an issue to be tried for the decision of any question of fact, and may award damages to the party aggrieved.

(3.) Any order of the Court rectifying a register shall direct that due notice of the rectification be given to the comptroller (*g*).

(*a*) This section comes from § 5 of the Act of 1875, but is in rather different terms. As to a person aggrieved in a case of wrongful registration, see *Rose* v. *Evans*, 48 L. J. Ch. 618, in which it was said that "any person interested in the same trade as the registered proprietor" was a person aggrieved by a wrongful registration, and *In re Ralph*, 25 Ch. D. 194, in which the successful applicant for removal was a person attacked for infringement by the wrongfully registered proprietor. It has been thought that a person who only carries on business abroad is not a person aggrieved by a wrongful entry: *In re Riviere & Co.*, 49 L. T. N. S. 506; but this view did not meet with the approval of Lord Selborne, C., and Cotton, L. J., in the Court of Appeal (32 W. R. 390), who held that even if a person were not entitled to register in this country a trade mark exclusively intended for use abroad, which they did not decide, yet there was no ground for thinking that only a person who was himself entitled to registration could be a person aggrieved. And the Lord Chancellor pointed out that all that was necessary to constitute a "person aggrieved" was that the thing complained of should be one of the grievances mentioned in the section, and that it should tend to his injury, to inflict upon him some damage, in a legal sense. If a registered proprietor becomes insolvent while proceedings to rectify his registration are pending, his representative in bankruptcy may be added as a respondent to the application for rectification: *In re Rowe*, 48 L. T. N. S. 388. "Person aggrieved."

(*b*) See note (*n*) to § 62, *ante*.

(*c*) Where the grievance consists in a refusal to register, "the first duty cast upon the Court," said Lord Cairns, C., in *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 484, "is to ascertain whether some one, or more than one, of the essential particulars of a trade mark, as defined by this Act, is found to exist, so that the mark may be described with the one, or more than one, essential particular or particulars which distinguish it." With reference to the same state of circumstances, Lord Blackburn said in the same case (4 App. Cas. 497), "I cannot construe this section as meaning anything else than that, where the Court of Chancery is satisfied that the applicant is a person who is for the time being entitled to the exclusive use of a trade mark in accordance with law, and that the trade mark is one within the definition in the Act, the Court is, *ex debito justitiæ*, to rectify the register, just as it would, before the Act of 1875, have been bound *ex debito justitiæ*, on similar proof, to prevent any one infringing the trade mark shown to be his property," and his lordship went on to say that though the burden of proof lay upon the person making the application to amend the register, yet if he did produce such proof as would, in the opinion of the Court, entitle him to an injunction, he did not think that the Court had any discretion to consider whether the registration would be inconvenient. See note (*c*) to § 72, as to limiting registration by a note on the register. Rectification by registration.

(*d*) On an application to remove a mark from the register, the burden of proof is upon the applicant for removal, but he may prove his case by the statements in or omissions from the evidence tendered on behalf of the registered proprietor: Per Court of Appeal in *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 32 W. R. 530. Consequently if the mark is one which was inherently capable of being used as a trade mark, and the application for removal is based on an allegation that it was not used as a trade mark, but as a descriptive term, the burden of proving that it was not used as a trade mark is on the applicant. See per Cotton, L. J., *ib.* Burden of proof.

For instances of expunging trade marks, see *Ex parte Lawrence Bros.*, 44 L. T. N. S. 98, where a servant had registered his master's trade mark; Rectification by removal.

In re Ralph, 25 Ch. D. 194, where the registered proprietor was carrying on no business; and *In re Hyde & Co.*, 7 Ch. D. 724; *In re Palmer* (1), 21 Ch. D. 47, and (3) 24 Ch. D. 504; and *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 53 L. J. Ch. 233, and 32 W. R. 530, where marks *publici juris* had been registered as private property. In *In re Palmer*, *In re Ralph*, and *In re Leonard & Ellis*, the marks had been respectively registered for five years. In *In re Palmer* (2), 22 Ch. D. 88, when the Court of Appeal had decided that the fact of five years' registration was not a legal bar to an application to expunge a mark, they refused to stay the hearing of the case with the evidence till after the determination by the House of Lords of an appeal from their decision on the point of law. It seems that an appeal from a decision upon an application for the removal of a trade mark from the register will not be treated as an interlocutory appeal, but that the case must be heard by three judges: *In re Riviere & Co.*, 32 W. R. 390; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, *ib.* 530.

Rectification by varying.

(*c*) In *In re Leonardt*, Dig. 610; *In re Mitchell* (2), Dig. 611; *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238; *Ex parte Sales, Pollard & Co.*, Dig. 620, and other cases, the Court has varied an entry by causing a partial disclaimer to be entered on the register. In some of these cases the consent of the registered proprietor has been required, but in a proper case the order will be made notwithstanding his opposition, as in *In re Kuhn & Co.* When registration has been effected in accordance with the application, but the application was wrong in some respect, it seems that the Court will amend the register by expunging the entry, but not by varying it so as to make the registration stand in another name. Thus Hall, V.-C., said, in *In re Ward, Sturt & Sharp*, 50 L. J. Ch. 347, "I cannot rectify the register where no error has been committed. The term 'rectification' is only applicable to cases in which there has been some mistake or error in the registration. In other cases the applicant must follow the course laid down for cases of assignment or transmission." So in *Ex parte Lawrence Bros.*, 44 L. T. N. S. 98, the Master of the Rolls expunged the entry, and left the rightful owners of the mark to make a fresh application in their own names. So in *In re Farina* (4), 44 L. T. N. S. 99, he directed administration to be taken out to the estate of the deceased registered proprietor, and the administrator, when appointed, to assign to the rightful proprietor. In *In re Rust & Co.*, 44 L. T. N. S. 98, however, the same learned judge allowed a mark to be transferred from the name of an individual member of a firm, stated to be trading under the name of the firm, into the names of all the partners trading under the name of the firm. It is not quite clear that the Court will refuse to transfer a registration from one name into another, if the registered proprietor has registered another's trade mark in his own name when he was actually employed by the true owner to register it for him, and was so the agent and trustee for the other. Sir G. Jessel, M. R., in *Ex parte Lawrence Bros.*, 44 L. T. N. S. 98, appears at least not to have thought it impossible that that might be done, but in that case there was no agency. In *In re Riviere & Co.*, 49 L. T. N. S. 506, an application for such an order was cut short by a preliminary objection, and after this had been overruled by the Court of Appeal, the application was refused upon the facts; W. N. 1884, p. 75. In America, a partner who registered in his own name a trade mark of the firm was ordered to assign to his partner an equal interest in it: *Taylor* v. *Bothin*, 5 Sawy. 584.

(*f*) This provision appears to overrule the decision in *In re Brandreth*, 9 Ch. D. 618, in cases of opposed applications which come before the Court. As to the costs of applications to remove marks, see *In re Hyde & Co.*, 7 Ch. D. 724; *In re Kuhn & Co.*, 53 L. J. Ch. 238. Where the comptroller is served with notice of the application and appears, his costs are ordered to be paid by the unsuccessful party. But there does not appear to be any

necessity for serving him in cases under this section, as there is in cases under § 92.

(*g*) See Rule 44 and Form N in the 2nd Schedule. The order is to be carried into effect by the comptroller (Rule 44), and to be made public if he thinks fit (Rule 47).

Power for comptroller to correct clerical errors.

91. The comptroller may (*a*), on request in writing accompanied by the prescribed fee (*b*),—

(a.) Correct any clerical error (*c*) in or in connection with an application for a patent, or for registration of a design or trade mark; or

(b.) Correct any clerical error (*c*) in the name style or address of the registered proprietor of a patent, design, or trade mark.

(c.) Cancel the entry or part of the entry of a trade mark on the register (*d*): Provided that the applicant accompanies his request by a statutory declaration made by himself, stating his name, address, and calling, and that he is the person whose name appears on the register as the proprietor of the said trade mark (*e*).

(*a*) In addition to the powers given by this section, the comptroller has authority, under Rule 46, to alter in the register the address of the proprietor of a trade mark (see Form M), and, under Rule 51, to allow amendments of documents.

(*b*) By the First Schedule the fee for altering address, or allowing correction of a clerical error, or cancelling the whole or part of an entry, is 5*s*.

(*c*) For form of request, see Form Q.

(*d*) This comes from the old Rules. For form of application for cancellation, see Form O. In *In re Lysaght*, Dig. 623, a registration for all the goods in Class 5 was, on application by the proprietor, corrected by limitation to galvanized sheet iron only. In *Ex parte Sales, Pollard & Co.*, Dig. 620, the registered proprietors of a trade mark for snuff, consisting of the letters "S. P.," the initials of their firm, discovered that that mark had been for many years in common use in the snuff trade, though used originally by themselves, and procured the cancellation of the registration.

(*e*) See Rule 58, and for Form of Declaration, see Form P.

Alteration of registered mark.

92.—(1.) The registered proprietor of any registered trade mark may apply to the Court for leave to add to or alter (*a*) such mark in any particular, not being an essential particular (*b*) within the meaning of this Act, and the Court may refuse or grant leave on such terms as it may think fit.

(2.) Notice of any intended application to the Court under this section shall be given to the comptroller by the applicant (*c*); and the comptroller shall be entitled to be heard on the application.

(3.) If the Court grants leave, the comptroller shall, on proof thereof (*d*) and on payment of the prescribed fee (*e*), cause the register to be altered in conformity with the order of leave.

(a) This section is taken from the old Rules.

Alteration of trade marks.

(b) For what is an "essential particular," see § 64, *suprd.* In *Ex parte Walker & Co.*, Dig. 624, a trade mark consisting of the letter "W," a crown, and the word "Netherton" was allowed to be altered by substituting "Dudley" for "Netherton." In *Ex parte Lazenby*, V.-C. M., Feb. 26th, 1880, a trade mark was allowed to be altered by varying the address and changing the type in which it was printed. In *In re Deanhurst*, M. R., June 11th, 1880, a trade mark which had been assigned was not allowed to be altered by substituting the name of the assignee for that of the assignor, that being printed in the form of a signature, so as to constitute an essential particular; but in a similar trade mark, which had the name of the assignor printed in ordinary type, the substitution was allowed to be made. In *In re Boord*, M. R., March 25th, 1881, persons who were registered as proprietors of a trade mark which contained a former name of their firm in ordinary type, were allowed to remove the name from the mark, leaving the space a blank, with permission, when using the mark, to insert in that space the name of the firm for the time being.

(c) Notice must be given to the comptroller fourteen days before the application. See Rule 48.

(d) As to mode of notifying the order to the comptroller, see Rule 44 and Form N.

(e) *I.e.*, 10*s.* See First Schedule. Representations of the mark as altered are also to be supplied. See Rule 48.

Falsification of entries in registers.

93. If any person makes or causes to be made a false entry in any register kept under this Act, or a writing falsely purporting to be a copy of an entry in any such register, or produces or tenders, or causes to be produced or tendered, in evidence any such writing, knowing the entry or writing to be false, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.

Exercise of discretionary power by comptroller.

94. Where any discretionary power is by this Act given to the comptroller, he shall not exercise that power adversely to the applicant for a patent, or for amendment of a specification, or for registration of a trade mark or design, without (if so required within the prescribed time by the applicant) giving the applicant an opportunity of being heard personally or by his agent (*a*).

(*a*) See Rules 17—19 as to the exercise by the comptroller of his discretionary powers.

Power of comptroller to take directions of law officers.

95. The comptroller may, in any case of doubt or difficulty arising in the administration of any of the provisions of this Act, apply to either of the law officers (*a*) for directions in the matter.

(*a*) The Attorney General or Solicitor-General for England. See § 117.

Certificate of comptroller to be evidence.

96. A certificate purporting to be under the hand of the comptroller as to any entry, matter, or thing which he is authorised by this Act, or any general rules made thereunder, to make or do, shall be *primâ facie* evidence of the entry having been made, and of the contents thereof, and of the matter or thing having been done or left undone (*a*).

(*a*) This section is somewhat modified from § 8 of the Act of 1875, by which the certificate of the registrar was made evidence. Now the certificate is to be *primâ facie* evidence only.

By § 77, *suprâ*, the comptroller is authorised to grant a certificate of refusal to register an old mark (see Forms L and T), and by Rule 57 he *may* give a certificate, when required so to do, for the purpose of any legal proceeding or other special purpose, and on so doing *shall* specify on the face of it the purpose for which it is granted. (See Forms R, S, and T 1.)

See Instructions *infrâ*, paragraphs 39—41, in which it is stated that the comptroller's certificate in relation to a trade mark is of four kinds, viz.:—

(i.) For use in legal proceedings.
(ii.) For use in applying for registration in foreign countries.
(iii.) Of any application made and of proceedings thereon.
(iv.) A certificate of refusal of a mark in use before the 13th August, 1875, and not registrable.

Applications and notices by post.

97.—(1.) Any application, notice or other document authorised or required to be left, made, or given at the Patent Office or to the comptroller, or to any other person under this Act, may be sent by a prepaid letter through the post; and if so sent shall be deemed to have been left, made, or given respectively at the time when the letter containing the same would be delivered in the ordinary course of post.

(2.) In proving such service or sending, it shall be sufficient to prove that the letter was properly addressed and put into the post (*a*).

(*a*) See Rule 16.

Provision as to days for leaving documents at office.

98. Whenever the last day fixed by this Act, or by any rule for the time being in force, for leaving any document or paying any fee at the Patent Office shall fall on Christmas Day, Good Friday, or on a Saturday or Sunday, or any day observed as a holiday at the Bank of England, or any day observed as a day of public fast or thanksgiving, herein referred to as excluded days, it shall be lawful to leave such document or to pay such fee on the day next following such excluded day, or days if two or more of them occur consecutively.

Declaration by infant, lunatic, &c.

99. If any person is, by reason of infancy, lunacy, or other inability, incapable of making any declaration or doing anything required or permitted by this Act or by any rules made under the authority of this Act, then the guardian or committee (if any) of such incapable person, or if there be none, any person appointed by any court or judge possessing jurisdiction in respect of the property of incapable persons, upon the petition of any person on behalf of such incapable person, or of any other person interested in the making such declaration or doing such thing, may make such declaration or a declaration as nearly corresponding thereto as circumstances permit, and do such thing in the name and on behalf of such incapable person, and all acts done by such sub-

stitute shall for the purposes of this Act be as effectual as if done by the person for whom he is substituted (*a*).

(*a*) This section, so far as it relates to trade marks, comes from the old Rules.

Transmission of certified printed copies of specifications, &c.

100. Copies of all specifications, drawings, and amendments left at the Patent Office after the commencement of this Act, printed for and sealed with the seal of the Patent Office, shall be transmitted to the Edinburgh Museum of Science and Art, and to the Enrolments Office of the Chancery Division in Ireland, and to the Rolls Office in the Isle of Man, within twenty-one days after the same shall respectively have been accepted or allowed at the Patent Office; and certified copies of or extracts from any such documents shall be given to any person requiring the same on payment of the prescribed fee; and any such copy or extract shall be admitted in evidence in all courts in Scotland and Ireland and in the Isle of Man without further proof or production of the originals.

Power for Board of Trade to make general rules for classifying goods and regulating business of Patent Office.

101.—(1.) The Board of Trade may from time to time make such general rules (*a*) and do such things as they think expedient, subject to the provisions of this Act—

(a.) For regulating the practice of registration under this Act:

(b.) For classifying goods for the purposes of designs and trade marks (*b*):

(c.) For making or requiring duplicates of specifications, amendments, drawings, and other documents:

(d.) For securing and regulating the publishing and selling of copies, at such prices and in such manner as the Board of Trade think fit, of specifications, drawings, amendments, and other documents:

(e.) For securing and regulating the making, printing, publishing, and selling of indexes to, and abridgments of, specifications and other documents in the Patent Office; and providing for the inspection of indexes and abridgments and other documents:

(f.) For regulating (with the approval of the Treasury) the presentation of copies of Patent Office publications to patentees and to public authorities, bodies, and institutions at home and abroad:

(g.) Generally for regulating the business of the Patent Office, and all things by this Act placed under the direction or control of the comptroller, or of the Board of Trade.

(2.) Any of the forms in the First Schedule to this Act may be altered or amended by rules made by the Board as aforesaid (*c*).

(3.) General rules may be made under this section at any time after the passing of this Act, but not so as to take effect before the commencement of this Act, and shall (subject as hereinafter mentioned) be of the same effect as if they were contained in this Act, and shall be judicially noticed.

(4.) Any rules made in pursuance of this section shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament, if Parliament be in session at the time of making thereof, or, if not, then as soon as practicable after the beginning of the then next session of Parliament, and they shall also be advertised twice in the official journal to be issued by the comptroller.

(5.) If either House of Parliament, within the next forty days after any rules have been so laid before such House, resolve that such rules or any of them ought to be annulled, the same shall after the date of such resolution be of no effect, without prejudice to the validity of anything done in the meantime under such rules or rule or to the making of any new rules or rule.

(*a*) The power of making rules was formerly, by § 7 of the Act of 1875, vested in the Lord Chancellor. For the rules which have been made by the Board of Trade, see *infrd.*

(*b*) See classification in Third Schedule to Rules.

(*c*) See Forms in Second Schedule to Rules. A new Form F. is thereby substituted for Form F. appended to the Act.

Annual reports of comptroller.

102. The comptroller shall, before the first day of June in every year, cause a report respecting the execution by or under him of this Act to be laid before both Houses of Parliament, and therein shall include for the year to which each report relates all general rules made in that year under or for the purposes of this Act, and an account of all fees, salaries and allowances, and other money received and paid under this Act.

International and Colonial Arrangements.

International arrangements for protection of inventions, designs, and trade marks.

103.—(1.) If Her Majesty is pleased to make any arrangement with the government or governments of any foreign state or states for mutual protection of inventions, designs, and trade marks, or any of them, then any person who has applied for protection for any invention, design, or trade mark in any such state, shall be entitled to a patent for his invention or to registration of his design or trade mark (as the case may be) under this Act, in priority to other applicants (*a*); and such patent or registration shall have the same date as the date of the protection obtained in such foreign state.

Provided that his application is made, in the case of a patent

within seven months, and in the case of a design or trade mark within four months, from his applying for protection in the foreign state with which the arrangement is in force.

Provided that nothing in this section contained shall entitle the patentee or proprietor of the design or trade mark to recover damages for infringements happening prior to the date of the actual acceptance of his complete specification, or the actual registration of his design or trade mark in this country, as the case may be.

(2.) The publication in the United Kingdom or the Isle of Man during the respective periods aforesaid of any description of the invention, or the use therein during such periods of the invention, or the exhibition or use therein during such periods of the design, or the publication therein during such periods of a description or representation of the design, or the use therein during such periods of the trade mark, shall not invalidate the patent which may be granted for the invention, or the registration of the design or trade mark:

(3.) The application for the grant of a patent, or the registration of a design, or the registration of a trade mark under this section, must be made in the same manner as an ordinary application under this Act: Provided that, in the case of trade marks, any trade mark the registration of which has been duly applied for in the country of origin may be registered under this Act (*b*):

(4.) The provisions of this section shall apply only in the case of those foreign states with respect to which Her Majesty shall from time to time by Order in Council declare them to be applicable, and so long only in the case of each state as the Order in Council shall continue in force with respect to that state.

(*a*) This section is new. In the case of trade marks used by aliens, the existence of a convention between the state to which the alien belongs and the British Government is not a necessary condition precedent to his registration here. If he has applied for registration in his own country, he may be registered here (see sub-s. 3), but if there is a convention between his country and this, he will have the advantage of priority to other applicants. The Act does not say that to obtain priority the application for registration in a foreign state with which there is a convention must have been made by a subject of that state. That is apparently the intention of the section, but there is nothing to say that the same priority is to be refused to a subject of a different state, with which there may possibly be no convention, or even to a British subject, who has applied in a country with which there is a convention. On the other hand, in the proviso in sub-s. (3) the term "country of origin" is employed. Again, in sub-s. (3) the words are "has been *duly* applied for," whereas in sub-s. (1) there is nothing about "duly," and for all that appears the application may be one which could not possibly succeed in the foreign country. Of course a foreign trade mark could not be registered here unless it complied with the conditions of § 64.

(*b*) The effect of this seems to be that a foreign trade mark owner must apply for registration in his own country before he can be registered here (compare *In re Riviere & Co.*, 49 L. T. N. S. 506; and see per C. A. in S. C. 32 W. R. 390). But a foreign subject trading and using trade marks in this country would not be within this provision.

The case where an alien belongs to a country which has no system of registration does not appear to be provided for; but it would seem that in such a case an application abroad would be dispensed with.

Provision for Colonies and India.

104.—(1.) Where it is made to appear to Her Majesty that the legislature of any British possession (*a*) has made satisfactory provision for the protection of inventions, designs, and trade marks, patented or registered in this country, it shall be lawful for Her Majesty from time to time, by Order in Council, to apply the provisions of the last preceding section, with such variations or additions, if any, as to Her Majesty in Council may seem fit, to such British possession.

(2.) An Order in Council under this Act shall, from a date to be mentioned for the purpose in the Order, take effect as if its provisions had been contained in this Act; but it shall be lawful for Her Majesty in Council to revoke any Order in Council made under this Act.

(*a*) See the definition of "British possession" in § 117, *infrd.*

Offences.

Penalty on falsely representing articles to be patented.

105.—(1.) Any person who represents that any article sold by him is a patented article, when no patent has been granted for the same (*a*), or describes any design or trade mark (*b*) applied to any article sold by him as registered which is not so, shall be liable for every offence on summary conviction (*c*) to a fine not exceeding five pounds.

(2.) A person shall be deemed, for the purposes of this enactment, to represent that an article is patented or a design or a trade mark is registered, if he sells the article with the word "patent," "patented," "registered," or any word or words expressing or implying that a patent or registration has been obtained for the article stamped, engraved, or impressed on, or otherwise applied to, the article (*d*).

(*a*) This section, so far as it relates to an untrue representation as to the existence of a patent, is in substance a re-enactment of § 7 of 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 83. In that case, however, the penalty of £50 was imposed, recoverable in an action, and a fraudulent intention was of the essence of the offence. See *Myers* v. *Baker*, 3 H. & N. 802. This section appears to follow that in not imposing a penalty where there has been a patent, though it may have expired. Under the U. S. Revised Statutes a penalty is imposed for a misrepresentation as to the existence of a patent, but there is no offence if there has been a patent, and the date of the patent is given. See *Wilson* v. *Singer Manufacturing Co.*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1091.

See § 7 of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862.

(*b*) Hitherto no penalty has been recoverable for untruly representing that a trade mark is registered.

(*c*) As to "summary conviction" in Ireland, see § 117.

(*d*) See Ch. 7, *ante*.

Penalty on unauthorised assumption of Royal Arms.

106. Any person who, without the authority of Her Majesty, or any of the Royal Family, or of any Government Department, assumes or uses in connection with any trade, business, calling, or profession, the Royal Arms, or arms so nearly resembling the same as to be calculated to deceive, in such a manner as to be calculated to lead other persons to believe that he is carrying on his trade, business, calling, or profession by or under such authority as aforesaid (*a*), shall be liable on summary conviction (*b*) to a fine not exceeding twenty pounds (*c*).

(*a*) This section is new. For an offence against it to be committed it is not sufficient to prove that a person is using the Royal Arms without authority, or that what he is doing is calculated to lead to the belief that the user of the arms is authorised; but it must be proved that that user is calculated to lead to the belief that the trader is *carrying on his business* by Royal or Governmental authority.

(*b*) As to "summary conviction" in Ireland, see § 117.

(*c*) The following notice has been published in the *London Gazette*:—

"FRIDAY, FEB. 22.

"BOARD OF GREEN CLOTH, BUCKINGHAM PALACE, FEB. 19.

"Notice is hereby given that by section 106 of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Victoria, cap. 57), a penalty of £20 is incurred by any persons who, without proper authority, assume the Royal Arms with a view to lead other persons to believe that they are employed under any department of Her Majesty's Household.

"SYDNEY, Lord Steward."

It will be observed that the above notice treats fraudulent intention as of the essence of the offence; but this does not appear to be in accordance with the provisions of the section.

Scotland; Ireland; &c.

Saving for courts in Scotland.

107. In any action for infringement of a patent in Scotland the provisions of this Act, with respect to calling in the aid of an assessor, shall apply, and the action shall be tried without a jury, unless the court shall otherwise direct, but otherwise nothing shall affect the jurisdiction and forms of process of the courts in Scotland in such an action or in any action or proceeding respecting a patent hitherto competent to those courts.

For the purposes of this section "Court of Appeal" shall mean any court to which such action is appealed.

Summary proceedings in Scotland.

108. In Scotland any offence under this Act declared to be punishable on summary conviction may be prosecuted in the Sheriff Court.

Proceedings for revocation of patent in Scotland.

109.—(1.) Proceedings in Scotland for revocation of a patent shall be in the form of an action of reduction at the instance of the Lord Advocate, or at the instance of a party having interest with his concurrence, which concurrence may be given on just cause shown only.

(2.) Service of all writs and summonses in that action shall be made according to the forms and practice existing at the commencement of this Act.

Reservation of remedies in Ireland.

110. All parties shall, notwithstanding anything in this Act, have in Ireland their remedies under or in respect of a patent as if the same had been granted to extend to Ireland only.

General saving for jurisdiction of courts.

111.—(1.) The provisions of this Act conferring a special jurisdiction on the Court as defined by this Act, shall not, except so far as the jurisdiction extends, affect the jurisdiction of any Court in Scotland or Ireland in any proceedings relating to patents or to designs or to trade marks; and with reference to any such proceedings in Scotland, the term "the Court" shall mean any Lord Ordinary of the Court of Session, and the term "Court of Appeal" shall mean either Division of the said Court; and with reference to any such proceedings in Ireland, the terms "the Court" and "the Court of Appeal" respectively mean the High Court of Justice in Ireland and Her Majesty's Court of Appéal in Ireland.

(2.) If any rectification of a register under this Act is required in pursuance of any proceeding in a Court in Scotland or Ireland, a copy of the order, decree, or other authority for the rectification, shall be served on the Comptroller, and he shall rectify the register accordingly.

Isle of Man.

112. This Act shall extend to the Isle of Man, and—

(1.) Nothing in this Act shall affect the jurisdiction of the Courts in the Isle of Man, in proceedings for infringement or in any action or proceeding respecting a patent, design, or trade mark competent to those Courts;

(2.) The punishment for a misdemeanor under this Act in the Isle of Man shall be imprisonment for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds, at the discretion of the Court;

(3.) Any offence under this Act committed in the Isle of Man which would in England be punishable on summary conviction may be prosecuted, and any fine in respect thereof recovered at the instance of any person aggrieved, in the manner in which offences punishable on summary conviction may for the time being be prosecuted.

Repeal; Transitional Provisions; Savings.

Repeal and saving for past operation

113. The enactments described in the Third Schedule to this Act are hereby repealed. But this repeal of enactments shall not—

of repealed enactments, &c.

(a.) Affect the past operation of any of those enactments, or any patent or copyright or right to use a trade mark granted or acquired, or application pending, or appointment made, or compensation granted, or order or direction made or given, or right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred, or anything duly done or suffered under or by any of those enactments before or at the commencement of this Act; or

(b.) Interfere with the institution or prosecution of any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, in respect thereof, and any such proceeding may be carried on as if this Act had not been passed; or

(c.) Take away or abridge any protection or benefit in relation to any such action or proceeding.

Former registers to be deemed continued.

114.—(1.) The registers of patents and of proprietors kept under any enactment repealed by this Act shall respectively be deemed parts of the same book as the register of patents kept under this Act.

(2.) The registers of designs and of trade marks (*a*) kept under any enactment repealed by this Act shall respectively be deemed parts of the same book as the register of designs and the register of trade marks kept under this Act.

(*a*) The register of trade marks was previously to this Act kept under the authority of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 91, by § 1 of which it was established), and the amending Acts (39 & 40 Vict. c. 33, and 40 & 41 Vict. c. 37). Those Acts placed the register under the superintendence of the then Commissioners of Patents, now abolished. See *In re Meikle*, 24 W. R. 1067; *In re Barrows*, 5 Ch. D. 353—61; *In re Rotherham*, 11 Ch. D. 250; 14 *ib.* 585.

Saving for existing rules.

115. All general rules made by the Lord Chancellor or by any other authority under any enactment repealed by this Act, and in force at the commencement of this Act, may at any time after the passing of this Act be repealed, altered, or amended by the Board of Trade, as if they had been made by the Board under this Act, but so that no such repeal, alteration, or amendment shall take effect before the commencement of this Act; and, subject as aforesaid, such general rules shall, so far as they are consistent with and are not superseded by this Act, continue in force as if they had been made by the Board of Trade under this Act (*a*).

(*a*) Rule 60 repeals all the old Rules.

Saving for prerogative.

116. Nothing in this Act shall take away, abridge, or prejudicially affect the prerogative of the Crown in relation to the granting of any letters patent or to the withholding of a grant thereof.

General Definitions.

117. In and for the purposes of this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,— General definitions.

"Person" includes a body corporate:

"The Court" means (subject to the provisions for Scotland, Ireland, and the Isle of Man) Her Majesty's High Court of Justice in England:

"Law officer" means Her Majesty's Attorney-General or Solicitor-General for England:

"The Treasury" means the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury:

"Comptroller" means the Comptroller General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks:

"Prescribed" means prescribed by any of the Schedules to this Act, or by general rules under or within the meaning of this Act:

"British possession" means any territory or place situate within Her Majesty's dominions, and not being or forming part of the United Kingdom, or of the Channel Islands, or of the Isle of Man, and all territories and places under one legislature, as hereinafter defined, are deemed to be one British possession for the purposes of this Act:

"Legislature" includes any person or persons who exercise legislative authority in the British possession; and where there are local legislatures as well as a central legislature, means the central legislature only.

In the application of this Act to Ireland "summary conviction" means a conviction under the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, that is to say, with reference to the Dublin Metropolitan Police District the Acts regulating the duties of justices of the peace and of the police for such district, and elsewhere in Ireland the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act, 1851, and any Act amending it.

SCHEDULES.

THE FIRST SCHEDULE.

Forms of Application, &c. (*a*).

(*a*) The only Form relating to trade marks is Form F., for which an amended Form F. is substituted by the Trade Marks Rules, *q. v. infrà*.

THE SECOND SCHEDULE.

Fees on Instruments for obtaining Patents and Renewal.

THE THIRD SCHEDULE.

Enactments Repealed.

* * * * * *

38 & 39 Vict. c. 91.	[1875].—The Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875.
39 & 40 Vict. c. 33.	[1876].—The Trade Marks Registration Amendment Act, 1876.
40 & 41 Vict. c. 37.	[1877].—The Trade Marks Registration Extension Act, 1877.

TRADE MARKS RULES.

By virtue of the provisions of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, the Board of Trade do hereby make the following Rules *:—

Preliminary.

1. These Rules may be cited as the Trade Marks Rules, 1883, and shall come into operation from and immediately after the 31st day of December, 1883.

Interpretation.

2. In the construction of these Rules any words herein used defined by the said Act (*a*) shall have the meanings thereby assigned to them respectively. Interpretation.

(*a*) See § 117.

Fees.

3. The fees to be paid in pursuance of the said Act, so far as it relates to trade marks, shall be the fees specified in the First Schedule hereto (*a*). Fees.

(*a*) See § 80. The fees are to be paid by stamps. See Instructions, pars. 2 and 36, *infrd.*

Forms.

4. The Form F. in the First Schedule to the said Act shall be altered or amended by the substitution therefor of the Form F. in the Second Schedule to these Rules (*a*). Forms.

(*a*) For this Schedule see Appendix B., *infrd.* See Instructions, par. 3, *infrd*, for list of stamped forms.

5.—(1) An application for registration of a trade mark shall be made in the Form F. in the Second Schedule to these Rules;

(2) The remaining forms in such schedule may be used in all cases to which they are applicable.

* Under the old Acts three successive sets of Rules were made, one in 1875, one in 1876 (which was considerably altered from time to time), and the last in March, 1883. All these are now repealed (see Rule 60, *infrd*). The repealed Rules as to cotton marks are printed *infrd*, in order to enable the position of such marks to be understood.

Classification of Goods.

Classification of goods.

6. For the purposes of trade marks registration and of these Rules goods are classified in the manner appearing in the Third Schedule hereto.

If any doubt arises as to what class any particular description of goods belongs to, the doubt shall be determined by the comptroller (*a*).

(*a*) See § 65. A guide to the classification can be obtained on application at the office. See Instructions, par. 20, *infrd.*

Application for Registration.

Application by firm.

7. An application (*a*) for registration of a trade mark, if made by any firm or partnership, may be signed (*b*) by some one or more members of such firm or partnership, as the case may be.

If the application be made by a body corporate it may be signed (*c*) by the Secretary or other principal officer of such body corporate.

(*a*) See § 62. For mode of making application, see also Instructions, pars. 7–20, *infrd.* A separate form is required for each class—par. 10. As to disclaimer of open marks see § 74, and Instructions, par. 19.

(*b*) A member signing an application should add after his signature "A member of the Firm." See Instructions, par. 11.

(*c*) The officer signing should add after his signature and designation "For the Company." See Instructions, par. 11.

Agency.

8. An application for registration and all other communications between the applicant and the comptroller may be made by or through an agent duly authorised to the satisfaction of the comptroller (*a*).

(*a*) An agent signing should add after his signature the word "Agent." See Instructions, par. 12.

Acknowledgment of application.

9. On receipt of the application the comptroller shall furnish the applicant with an acknowledgment thereof.

Contents of form of application.

10. Where application is made to register a trade mark which was used (*a*) by the applicant or his predecessors in business before the 13th of August, 1875 (*b*), the application shall contain a statement (*c*) of the time during which and of the person by whom it has been so used in respect of the goods mentioned in the application.

(*a*) *i.e.*, in respect of the same goods for which the application is being made. Registration must be applied for as for a new mark when the mark has been used on different goods. See *In re Jelley, Son & Jones*, 51 L. J. Ch., 639.

(*b*) This is the date of the passing of the Act of 1875, and at this point the line is drawn between old and new marks, various indulgences being

allowed to the former which are not to the latter. See notes to § 64 and 72.

(c) A mere statement is now required, see note to Form F. Formerly a statutory declaration was necessary.

Size, &c., of documents.

11. Subject to any other directions that may be given by the comptroller, all applications, notices, counter-statements, representations of marks, papers having representations affixed, or other documents required by the said Act or by these Rules to be left with or sent to the comptroller or to the Cutlers' Company (*a*), shall be upon foolscap paper of a size of 13 inches by 8 inches, and shall have on the left-hand part thereof a margin of not less than one inch and a half.

(*a*) See § 81, and Rules 53–56.

Qualification of metal goods.

12. In the case of an application for the registration of a trade mark used on any metal goods, other than cutlery, edge tools, and raw steel, the applicant shall state in the specification of goods in the form of application of what metal or metals the goods in respect to which he applies are made (*a*).

(*a*) See Instructions, par. 14.

Representations of trade mark.

13. Subject to any other directions that may be given by the comptroller, three representations (*a*) of each trade mark, except in the case of marks applied for in classes 23 to 35 inclusive (*b*), must be supplied upon paper of the size aforesaid, and must be of a durable nature. One of such representations must be made upon or affixed to the form of application, the others upon separate half-sheets. In the case of trade marks exceeding the limits of the foolscap paper of the size aforesaid, such marks may be pasted and folded upon the sheets of foolscap (*c*).

In the case of marks applied for in classes 23 to 35 inclusive, the applicant shall supply four representations (*d*) of each mark for each class.

Where a drawing or other representation or specimen cannot be given in manner aforesaid, a specimen or copy of the trade mark may be sent either of full size or on a reduced scale, and in such form as the comptroller may think most convenient.

The comptroller may, if dissatisfied with the representation of a trade mark, require a fresh representation, either before he proceeds with the application or before he registers the trade mark.

The comptroller may also, in exceptional cases, deposit in the Patent Office a specimen or copy of any trade mark which cannot conveniently be shown by a representation, and may refer thereto in the register in such manner as he may think fit (*e*).

(*a*) See § 62 (3), and Instructions, para. 13, 16 and 17.
(*b*) These are the textile classes.
(*c*) See Instructions, par. 17.
(*d*) One of these will be exhibited at the Office, 48, Royal Exchange, Manchester.
(*e*) As to deposit, see note to § 67. Hitherto all cotton marks have been deposited, but other marks have been deposited in exceptional cases only. See *In re Robinson*, 29 W. R., 31; *Mitchell* v. *Henry*, 15 Ch. D., 181; *In re Jones Bros. & Co.*, V. C. H., July 10th, 1880.

Representations of a series of trade marks.

14. When an application relates to a series of trade marks differing from one another in respect of the particulars mentioned in section 66 of the said Act, a representation of each trade mark of the series shall be made or affixed upon the form of application and also upon each of the separate half sheets of paper aforesaid (*a*).

(*a*) See Instructions, par. 18.

Translation of foreign characters.

15. Wherever a mark consists of or includes words printed in other than Roman character, there shall be given at the foot or on the back of each representation a translation of such words, signed by the applicant or his agent (*a*).

(*a*) See Instructions, par. 15, and *In re Rotherham*, 11 Ch. D., 250; 14 *ib.* 585.

Mode of sending notices, &c.

16. Any application, statement, notice, or other document authorised or required to be left, made, or given at the Patent Office, or to the comptroller, or to any other person under these Rules, may be sent by a prepaid letter through the post, and if so sent shall be deemed to have been left, made, or given respectively at the time when the letter containing the same would be delivered in the ordinary course of post (*a*).

In proving such service or sending, it shall be sufficient to prove that the letter was properly addressed and put into the post.

(*a*) See § 67, and Instructions, para. 1, 8. Communications relating to different applications should be made in separate letters. See Instructions, par. 8.

Exercise of Discretionary Powers.

Hearing by Comptroller.

17. Before exercising any discretionary power (*a*) given to the comptroller by the said Act adversely to the applicant for registration of a trade mark, the comptroller shall give him ten days notice of the time when he may be heard personally or by his agent before the comptroller.

(*a*) See § 94.

18. Within five days from the date when such notice would be delivered in the ordinary course of post, the applicant shall notify to the comptroller whether or not he intends to be heard upon the matter. Notice of wish to be heard before Comptroller.

19. The decision of the comptroller in the exercise of any such discretionary power as aforesaid shall be notified to the applicant. Notification of decision.

Appeal to the Board of Trade.

20. Where the comptroller refuses to register a trade mark, and the applicant intends to appeal to the Board of Trade from such refusal, he shall, within one month from the date of the decision appealed against, leave at the Patent Office, Trade Marks Branch, a notice of such his intention (*a*). Appeal to Board of Trade.

(*a*) As to the appeal to the Board of Trade, see § 62 (4).

21. Such notice shall be accompanied by a statement of the grounds of appeal, and of the applicant's case in support thereof (*a*). Statement of grounds of appeal.

(*a*) See Form H.

22. The applicant shall forthwith on leaving such notice send a copy thereof to the Secretary of the Board of Trade, No. 7, Whitehall Gardens, London. Copy of notice to Board of Trade.

23. The Board of Trade may thereupon give such directions (if any) as they may think fit with respect to evidence, or otherwise, for the purpose of the hearing of the appeal by the Board of Trade, or for the purpose of their referring the appeal to the Court to hear and determine the same (*a*). Directions by Board.

(*a*) See § 62 (5).

24. Where the Board of Trade intend to hear the appeal, seven days' notice, or such shorter notice as the Board of Trade may in any particular case direct, of the time and place appointed for the hearing, shall be given to the comptroller and the applicant. Notice of time of hearing.

Advertisement of Application.

25. Every application shall be advertised (*a*) by the comptroller in the official paper, during such times, and in such manner as the comptroller may direct. Advertisement of application.

If no representation of the trade mark be inserted in the official paper in connection with the advertisement of an application, the comptroller shall refer in such advertisement to the place or

places where a specimen or representation of the trade mark is deposited for exhibition (*b*).

(*a*) As to advertisement, see § 68, and Instructions, pars. 21–28. "The object of the advertisement is to give to persons who might be claimants of the trade mark proposed to be registered the opportunity of coming forward and objecting," said Hall, V.-C., in *In re Meikle*, 24 W. R., 1067, and advertisement is therefore indispensable, *ib.* It is not, however, incumbent on persons to see the advertisement, and if a common mark has been registered, after advertisement, and without opposition, it may be removed from the register on application by persons aggrieved: *In re Hyde & Co.*, 7 Ch. D., 724; and descriptive words may be removed from the register even after they have been there for five years. *In re Palmer* (3), 24 Ch. D., 504; *In re Leonard & Ellis*, 53 L. J. Ch., 233, and C. A., 32 W. R. 530.

(*b*) See Rule 13, *suprd.*

Definition of official paper.

26. The official paper (*a*) for the purposes of these Rules shall be some paper published under the direction of the Board of Trade, or such other paper as such Board may from time to time direct.

(*a*) The official paper is at present *The Trade Marks Journal*, published once a week. It contains illustrations of all the trade marks for which application is made, or a reference to the places where they may be seen, as well as the name, address, and calling of each applicant, the description of the goods, and the length of user as an old mark, if any, thus affording all persons interested in the use of trade marks authentic information as to the nature of the marks applied for in their respective trades. Each number of the journal consists of 24 pages quarto, and may be obtained at 1*s.* per number from the Patent Office, Sale Branch, 38, Cursitor Street, Chancery Lane. Copies of the journal are open to inspection at the Patent Office Library, Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane. Up to the end of December, 1883, 300 numbers of the journal had been published.

Means of advertising trade mark to be supplied to official paper.

27. For the purposes of such advertisement the applicant may be required to furnish a wood block or electrotype (or more than one, if necessary) of the trade mark, of such dimensions as may from time to time be directed by the comptroller, or with such other information or means of advertising the trade mark as may be required by the comptroller; and the comptroller, if dissatisfied with the block or electrotype furnished by the applicant or his agent, may require a fresh block or electrotype before proceeding with the advertisement (*a*).

(*a*) See Instructions, pars. 22–28. In Classes 23–25 (the cotton classes) no blocks or electrotypes are required. See par. 22.

Advertisement of series.

28. When an application relates to a series of trade marks differing from one another in respect of the particulars mentioned in section 66 of the said Act, the applicant may be required to furnish a wood block or electrotype (or more than one, if necessary) of any or of each of the trade marks constituting the

series (*a*); and the comptroller may, if he thinks fit, insert with the advertisement of the application a statement of the manner in respect of which the several trade marks differ from one another.

(*a*) See Instructions, par. 23.

Opposition to Registration.

Manner of bringing case before Court.

29.—(1.) Where a case stands for the determination of the Court under the provisions of section 69 of the said Act (*a*), the comptroller shall require the applicant (*b*) within one month, or such further time as the comptroller may allow, to issue a summons in the chambers of a judge of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice for an order that notwithstanding the opposition of which notice has been given the registration of the trade mark be proceeded with by the comptroller, or to take such other proceedings as may be proper and necessary for the determination of the case by the Court.

(2.) The applicant shall thereupon issue such summons, or take such other proceedings as aforesaid, within the period of one month above named, or such further time as the comptroller may allow, and shall also within the like period give notice thereof to the comptroller.

(3.) If the applicant shall fail to issue such summons, or to take such other proceedings, of which failure the non-receipt by the comptroller of the said notice shall be sufficient proof, the applicant shall be deemed to have abandoned his application (*c*).

Mode of giving notice that the matter has been brought before the Court.

(4.) Such notice to the comptroller shall be given by delivering at or sending to the Patent Office a copy of the summons or other initiatory proceeding bearing an endorsement of service signed by the applicant or his solicitor, or an endorsement of acceptance of service signed by the opponent or his solicitor (*d*).

(*a*) The case stands for the determination of the Court upon security for costs being given by the opponent. From this point formerly the costs were in the discretion of the Court: *In re Brandreth*, 9 Ch. D. 618; but it seems that the Court will now have full jurisdiction from the outset. See § 90.

(*b*) Under the old Acts and Rules the practice was to require the opponent to take proceedings for the purpose of bringing the matter before the Court. The opponent thereupon took out a summons for directions as to the course to be followed, upon which it was usual for the applicant to be directed to apply for registration by way of motion or summons. In *In re Salamon*, Dig. 569, Jessel, M.R., said that the best mode of trying the case was by special case, when it was a simple question of law; by summons, when it was a question as to directions for carrying out the Act; by motion, when it was a question as to disputed facts. In *In re Simpson, Davies & Sons*, 15 Ch. D. 525, he said he usually directed a summons, but had in

one or two cases directed a motion. In *Ex parte King of Saxony*, Dig. 598, Hall, V.-C., directed a motion. Latterly a summons was almost invariably directed. See also *In re Johnston*, 43 L. T. N. S. 672, as to the course of procedure where there is an action pending. The summons for directions is now discontinued, and a summons for leave to register will have to be taken out by the applicant, unless he can show that some other form of proceeding is proper and necessary.

Cases of omission to give notice.

(*c*) Under the old Rules, and while the first step had to be taken by the opponent, who had to give notice thereof to the office, two cases occurred in which trade marks were registered, though the registration was opposed, in consequence of no notice having been given to the office by the opponents of their having brought the matter before the Court. In one of these cases, *In re The Patent Nut & Bolt Screw Co.*, Chitty, J., March 9th, 1883, with a view to remedying the slip, a consent order was taken to rescind the registration, without prejudice to the applicant's summons for leave to register, the object being to restore matters to their *status quo ante* the registration. The opposition was subsequently withdrawn, but the registrar now objected to register, on the ground that the application had been finally disposed of, and that a new application was necessary. It was, however, held that the proper course was to discharge the former order for the removal of the mark from the register, and to direct the registrar to restore the register to its condition previous to such removal. In the other case, *In re Esbensen*, Pearson, J., Jan. 25th, 1883, the opponent moved to cancel the registration, with a view to the prosecution of the opposition as if there had been no registration, but it was held that the proper course was for the opponent to move to rectify the register in the ordinary way.

An omission to give notice to the comptroller would not now have the same effect in the above cases, but other complications might occur.

(*d*) See *In re Paton*, Dig. 601.

REGISTER OF TRADE MARKS.

Time of registration of trade marks.

30. As soon as may be after the expiration of two months from the date of the first advertisement of the application, the comptroller shall, subject to any such summons or other proceeding as aforesaid and the determination of the Court thereon, if he is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to registration, and on payment of the prescribed fee (*a*), enter the name, address, and description of the applicant in the Register of Trade Marks as the registered proprietor of the trade mark in respect of the particular goods or classes of goods described in his application.

(*a*) See Form I. and Schedule 1.

Where applicant dies before registration, the trade mark may be registered for successor to goodwill of business.

31. In case of the death of any applicant for a trade mark after the date of his application, and before the trade mark applied for has been entered on the register, the comptroller, after the expiration of the prescribed period of advertisement, may, on being satisfied of the applicant's death, enter on the register, in place of the name of such deceased applicant, the name, address, and description of the person owning the goodwill of

the business, if such ownership be proved to the satisfaction of the comptroller.

Entries to be made in register.

32. Upon registering any trade mark the comptroller shall enter in the register the date on which the application for registration was received by the comptroller (which day shall be deemed to be the date of the registration) and such other particulars (*a*) as he may think necessary.

(*a*) It would appear that under this rule the comptroller would be at liberty to enter on the register limitations on the user of the mark registered, without requiring even an *ex parte* application to the Court, as in *In re Keep*, 32 W. R. 427.

Notice of registration.

33. The comptroller shall send notice to the applicant of the registration of his trade mark, together with a reference to the advertisement of such trade mark in the official paper.

Request by subsequent proprietor.

34. Where a person becomes entitled to a registered trade mark by assignment, transmission, or other operation of law, a request for the entry of his name in the register as proprietor of the trade mark shall be addressed to the comptroller, and left at the Patent Office (*a*).

(*a*) The request and accompanying declaration are to be made in Form K. See Instructions, par. 42.

Signature of request.

35. Such request shall in the case of an individual be made and signed by the person requiring to be registered as proprietor, and in the case of a firm or partnership by some one or more members of such firm or partnership, or in either case by his or their agent respectively duly authorised to the satisfaction of the comptroller, and in the case of a body corporate by their agent, authorised in like manner (*a*).

(*a*) See Rules 7, 8, *suprd.*

Contents of request.

36. Every such request shall state the name, address, and description of the person claiming to be entitled to the trade mark (hereinafter called the claimant), and the particulars of the assignment, transmission, or other operation of law, by virtue of which he requires to be entered in the register as proprietor, so as to show the manner in which, and the person or persons to whom, the trade mark has been assigned or transmitted, and so as to show further that it has been so assigned or transmitted in connection with the goodwill of the business concerned in the particular goods or classes of goods for which the trade mark has been registered (*a*).

(*a*) See *Ex parte Lawrence Bros.*, 44 L. T. N. S. 98; *In re Farina* (4), *ib.*, 99; *In re Ward, Sturt & Sharp*, 50 L. J. Ch. 347.

Declaration to accompany request.

37. Every such request shall be accompanied by a statutory declaration (*a*) to be thereunder written, verifying the several statements therein, and declaring that the particulars above described comprise every material fact and document affecting the proprietorship of the trade mark as claimed by such request.

(*a*) See Form K.

Further proof of title if required.

38. The claimant shall furnish to the comptroller such other proof of title and of the existence and ownership of such goodwill as aforesaid as he may require for his satisfaction.

Body corporate.

39. A body corporate may be registered as proprietor by its corporate name.

Definition of applicant.

40. The term "applicant" in Rules 17, 18, and 19 shall include each of several persons claiming to be registered as proprietor of the same trade mark (*a*).

(*a*) See § 71.

Comptroller may require statement from rival claimants.

41. Whether all of such persons so claiming require to be heard before the comptroller or not, he may, before exercising the discretion vested in him by section 71 of the said Act, require such persons, or any or either of them, to submit a statement in writing within a time to be notified by him, or to attend before him and make oral explanations with respect to such matters as the comptroller may require.

Submission to Court of conflicting claims.

42. Where each of several persons claims to be registered as proprietor of the same trade mark, and the comptroller refuses to register any of them until their rights have been determined according to law, the manner in which the rights of such claimants may be submitted to the Court by the comptroller or if the comptroller so require, by the claimants, shall, unless the Court otherwise order, be by a special case (*a*); and such special case shall be filed and proceeded with in like manner as any other special case submitted to the Court, or in such other manner as the Court may direct.

(*a*) See note to § 71.

Settlement of special case.

43. Where the special case is to be submitted to the parties it may be agreed to by them, or if they differ, may be settled by the comptroller on payment of the prescribed fees (*a*).

(*a*) For form of request to the comptroller to settle a special case, see Form T.

44. Where an order has been made by the Court in either of the following cases, viz. :—

(a) allowing an appeal under section 62 of the said Act;

(b) disallowing an opposition to registration under section 69; or,

(c) under the provisions of sections 72, 90, or 92 of the said Act,

the person in whose favour such order has been made, or such one of them, if more than one, as the comptroller may direct, shall forthwith leave at the Patent Office an office copy of such order (*a*). The register shall thereupon be rectified or altered, or the purport of such order shall otherwise be duly entered in the register, as the case may be.

(*a*) For form of request, see Form N.

Removal of mark from register.

45. Where a trade mark has been removed from the register for non-payment of the prescribed fee or otherwise, under the provisions of section 79 of the said Act, the comptroller shall cause to be entered in the register a record of such removal and the cause thereof.

Alteration of address in register.

46. If the registered proprietor of a trade mark send to the comptroller, together with the prescribed fee, notice of an alteration in his address, the comptroller shall alter the register accordingly (*a*).

(*a*) See Form M.

Publication of rectification or variation of register.

47. Whenever an order is made by the Court for making, expunging, or varying an entry from or in the register, the comptroller shall, if he thinks that such rectification or variation should be made public, and at the expense of the person applying for the same, publish, by advertisement or otherwise, and in such manner as he thinks just, the circumstances attending the rectification or variation in the register.

Notice to Comptroller of Order of Court for alteration of trade mark under section 92 of Act.

48. Whenever the registered proprietor of any trade mark intends to apply for the leave of the Court to add to or to alter such trade mark, under section 92 of the said Act, the notice to be given to the comptroller shall be given fourteen days at least before such application. If leave be granted on such application the applicant shall forthwith supply to the comptroller such a number of representations of the trade mark as altered as he may deem sufficient.

Inspection of Register.

Hours of inspection.

49. The Register of Trade Marks shall be open to the inspection of the public (*a*), on payment of the prescribed fee, on every weekday between the hours of ten and four, except on the days and at the times following:—

(a.) Christmas Day, Good Friday, the day observed as Her Majesty's birthday, days observed as days of public fast or thanksgiving, and days observed as holidays at the Bank of England; or

(b.) Days which may from time to time be notified by a placard posted in a conspicuous place at the Patent Office;

(c.) Times when the register is required for any purpose of official use.

(*a*) See § 88.

Power to Dispense with Evidence.

Dispensing with evidence.

50. Where under these Rules any person is required to do any act or thing, or to sign any document, or to make any declaration on behalf of himself or of any body corporate, or any document or evidence is required to be produced to or left with the comptroller, or at the Patent Office, and it is shown to the satisfaction of the comptroller that from any reasonable cause such person is unable to do such act or thing, or to sign such document, or make such declaration, or that such document or evidence cannot be produced or left as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the comptroller, with the sanction of the Board of Trade, and upon the production of such other evidence, and subject to such terms as they may think fit, to dispense with any such act or thing, document, declaration, or evidence.

Amendments.

Amendment of documents.

51. Any document or drawing or other representation of a trade mark for the amending of which no special provision is made by the said Act may be amended, and any irregularity in procedure which in the opinion of the comptroller may be obviated without detriment to the interests of any person may be corrected, if the comptroller think fit, and on such terms as he may direct (*a*).

(*a*) As to the comptroller's power to correct clerical errors, see § 91. See Form Q.

Enlargement of Time.

Comptroller may enlarge time.

52. The time prescribed by these Rules for doing any act, or taking any proceeding thereunder, may be enlarged by the comptroller, if he think fit, and upon such notice to other parties, and proceedings thereon, and upon such terms, as he may direct.

CUTLERS' COMPANY.

Sheffield applications in duplicate.

53. All applications to the Cutlers' Company (*a*) for registration of a trade mark, under section 81 of the said Act, shall be in duplicate, accompanied by the prescribed fees and representations.

(*a*) See § 81 and the notes thereto; also the Cutlers' Company's Acts in Appendix C. See Instructions, par. 37, as to the mode in which applications are to be made to the Cutlers' Company, and see Form W. for form of appeal from the Company to the comptroller.

Notice to Comptroller.

54. The Cutlers' Company shall, within seven days of the receipt by them of an application to register a trade mark, send the comptroller one copy of such application, by way of notice thereof, together with two representations of the mark for each class for which the applicant seeks registration.

Time within which Comptroller may object to application made at Sheffield.

55.—(1.) The time within which the comptroller shall give notice to the Cutlers' Company of any objection he may have to the acceptance of an application for registration made to the said Company shall be one month from the date of the receipt by the comptroller of the notice from the said Company of the making of the application.

Advertisement of application made at Sheffield.

(2.) If no such objection is made by the comptroller, the Cutlers' Company shall require the applicant to send the comptroller a wood block or electrotype as the comptroller may direct, and the comptroller shall, if satisfied with such wood block or electrotype, advertise the application in the same manner as an application made to him at the Patent Office.

Manner of notifying to Cutlers' Company application received by Comptroller.

(3.) The manner in which the comptroller shall notify to the Cutlers' Company an application and proceedings thereon made as mentioned in sub-section 8 of section 81 of the said Act shall be by sending to the Cutlers' Company a copy of the official paper containing the application of which notice is required to be given, with a note distinguishing such application.

Similarity of proceedings at London and at Sheffield.

56. The provisions of these Rules as to forms, representations, the proceedings on opposition to registration, registration, and all subsequent proceedings shall, as far as the circumstances allow, apply to all applications to register made to the Cutlers' Company, and to all proceedings consequent thereon.

CERTIFICATES.

Certificate by Comptroller.

57. The comptroller, when required for the purpose of any legal proceeding or other special purpose, to give a certificate as to any entry, matter, or thing which he is authorised by the said Act or any of these Rules to make or do, may, on receipt

of a request in writing, and on payment of the prescribed fee, give such certificate, and shall specify on the face of it the legal proceeding or other purpose for which such certificate is granted (*a*).

(*a*) See § 96, and Instructions, para. 39—41.

DECLARATIONS.

Manner in which, and persons before whom, declaration is to be taken.

58. The statutory declarations (*a*) required by the said Act and these Rules, or used in any proceedings thereunder, shall be made and subscribed as follows:—

(a.) In the United Kingdom, before any justice of the peace, or any commissioner or other officer authorised by law in any part of the United Kingdom to administer an oath for the purpose of any legal proceeding;

(b.) In any other part of Her Majesty's dominions, before any Court, judge, justice of the peace, or any officer authorised by law to administer an oath there for the purpose of a legal proceeding; and

(c.) If made out of Her Majesty's dominions, before a British minister, or person exercising the functions of a British minister, or a consul, vice-consul, or other person exercising the functions of a British consul, or a notary public, or before a judge or magistrate.

(*a*) Statutory declarations are necessary in the cases of a subsequent proprietor seeking registration (Rule 37 and Form K.), and of a registered proprietor seeking to have the whole or part of his registration cancelled (§ 91 and Form P.). As to declarations by infants and other persons under disability, see § 99.

Notice of seal of officer taking declaration to prove itself.

59. Any document purporting to have affixed, impressed, or subscribed thereto or thereon the seal or signature of any person hereby authorised to take such declaration in testimony of such declaration having been made and subscribed before him, may be admitted by the comptroller without proof of the genuineness of any such seal or signature, or of the official character of such person or his authority to take such declaration.

REPEAL.

Previous rules repealed.

60. All general rules as to the registration of trade marks heretofore made by the Lord Chancellor under the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, and in force on the 31st day of December, 1883, shall be, and they are hereby repealed, as from that date, without prejudice, nevertheless, to any proceeding which may have been taken under such Rules.

J. CHAMBERLAIN,
President of the Board of Trade.

21st December, 1883.

SCHEDULES.

FIRST SCHEDULE.

FEES.

	£	s.	d.
1. On application to register a trade mark for one or more articles included in one class . .	0	5	0
2. On appeal to Board of Trade on refusal of comptroller to register	1	0	0
3. For registration of a trade mark for one or more articles included in one class . . .	1	0	0
4. For registering a series of trade marks, for every additional representation after the first in each class	0	5	0
5. For entering notice of opposition, for each trade mark, whether in one or more classes . .	1	0	0
6. On application to register a subsequent proprietor in cases of assignment or transmission, the first mark	1	0	0
7. For every additional mark assigned or transmitted at the same time	0	2	0
8. For certificate of refusal to register a trade mark under section 77	1	0	0
9. For certificate of refusal at the same time for more than one trade mark, for each additional trade mark after the first	0	10	0
10. For continuance of mark at expiration of 14 years	1	0	0
11. Additional fee where fee is paid within three months after expiration of 14 years . .	0	10	0
12. Additional fee for restoration of trade mark where removed for non-payment of fee . . .	1	0	0
13. For altering address on the register, for every mark	0	5	0
14. For every entry in the register of a rectification thereof or an alteration therein, not otherwise charged	0	10	0
15. For cancelling the entry or part of the entry of a trade mark upon the register, on the application of the owner of such trade mark . . .	0	5	0
16. On request to comptroller to correct a clerical error	0	5	0
17. For certificate of registration to be used in legal proceedings	0	10	0

FEES—*continued.*

	£	s.	d.
18. For certificate of registration to be used for the purpose of obtaining registration in foreign countries	0	5	0
19. For copy of notification of registration . .	0	2	0
20. Settling a special case by comptroller . .	2	0	0
21. For inspecting register, for every quarter of an hour	0	1	0
22. For making a search amongst the classified representations of trade marks, for every quarter of an hour	0	1	0
23. For office copy of documents, for every 100 words (but never less than one shilling).	0	0	4
24. For certifying office copies, MS. or printed .	0	1	0
25. For certificate of comptroller under section 96 .	0	5	0
26. In cases where a trade mark requires a greater space than two inches of the depth of the page of the *Trade Marks Journal*, for each additional inch or part of an inch	0	2	0
27. Manchester Trade Marks Office . .	Same as above		
28. Sheffield Marks	Same as above		
29. On appeal from Cutlers' Company, Sheffield, to comptroller	1	0	0

J. CHAMBERLAIN,
President of the Board of Trade.

Approved,
CHARLES C. COTES,
HERBERT J. GLADSTONE,
Lords Commissioners of
Her Majesty's Treasury.

4th December, 1883.

SECOND SCHEDULE.

FORMS.

(See Appendix B., *infrd*).

THIRD SCHEDULE.

General Note.

Any wares made of mixed materials (for example, of both cotton and silk) shall be included in such one of the classes appropriated to those materials as the registrar may desire.

CLASSIFICATION OF GOODS.*

	Illustrations.
	Note.—Goods are mentioned in this column by way of illustration, and not as an exhaustive list of the contents of a class.
Class 1.	
Chemical substances used in manufactures, photography, or philosophical research, and anti-corrosives.	Such as— Acids, including vegetable acids. Alkalies. Artists' colours. Pigments. Mineral dyes.
Class 2.	
Chemical substances used for agricultural, horticultural, veterinary, and sanitary purposes.	Such as— Artificial manure. Cattle medicines. Deodorisers. Vermin destroyers.
Class 3.	
Chemical substances prepared for use in medicine and pharmacy.	Such as— Cod liver oil. Medicated articles. Patent medicines. Plasters. Rhubarb.

* For further information as to the classification of goods, see Guide to the Classification, obtainable at the Patent Office on application.

Class 4.	
Raw or partly prepared vegetable, animal, and mineral substances used in manufactures, not included in other classes.	Such as— Resins. Oils used in manufactures and not included in other classes. Dyes, other than mineral. Tanning substances. Fibrous substances (*e.g.*, cotton, hemp, flax, jute). Wool. Silk. Bristles. Hair. Feathers. Cork. Seeds. Coal. Coke. Bone. Sponge.
Class 5.	
Unwrought and partly wrought metals used in manufacture.	Such as— Iron and steel, pig or cast. Iron rough. „ bar and rail, including rails for railways. „ bolt and rod. „ sheet, and boiler and armour plates. „ hoop. Lead, pig. „ rolled. „ sheet. Wire. Copper. Zinc. Gold, in ingots.
Class 6.	
Machinery of all kinds, and parts of machinery, except agricultural and horticultural machines included in class 7.	Such as— Steam engines. Boilers. Pneumatic machines. Hydraulic machines. Locomotives.

Class 6 (continued).	Sewing machines. Weighing machines. Machine tools. Mining machinery. Fire engines.

Class 7.

Agricultural and horticultural machinery, and parts of such machinery.	Such as— Ploughs. Drilling machines. Reaping machines. Thrashing machines. Churns. Cyder presses. Chaff cutters.

Class 8.

Philosophical instruments, scientific instruments, and apparatus for useful purposes. Instruments and apparatus for teaching.	Such as— Mathematical instruments. Gauges. Logs. Spectacles. Educational appliances.

Class 9.

Musical instruments.

Class 10.

Horological instruments.

Class 11.

Instruments, apparatus, and contrivances, not medicated, for surgical or curative purposes, or in relation to the health of men or animals.	Such as— Bandages. Friction gloves. Lancets. Fleams. Enemas.

Class 12.

Cutlery and edge tools.	Such as— Knives. Forks. Scissors. Shears. Files. Saws.

Class 13.

Metal goods not included in other classes.	Such as— Anvils. Keys. Basins (metal). Needles. Hoes. Shovels. Corkscrews.

Class 14.

Goods of precious metals (including aluminium, nickel, Britannia metal, &c.) and jewellery, and imitations of such goods and jewellery.	Such as— Plate. Clock cases and pencil cases of such metals. Sheffield and other plated goods. Gilt and ormolu work.

Class 15.

Glass.	Such as— Window and plate glass. Painted glass. Glass mosaic. Glass beads.

Class 16.

Porcelain and earthenware.	Such as— China. Stoneware. Terra Cotta. Statuary porcelain. Tiles. Bricks.

Class 17.

Manufactures from mineral and other substances for building or decoration.	Such as— Cement. Plaster. Imitation marble. Asphalt.

Class 18.

Engineering, architectural, and building contrivances.	Such as— Diving apparatus. Warming apparatus. Ventilating apparatus. Filtering apparatus. Lighting contrivances. Drainage contrivances. Electric and pneumatic bells.

Class 19.

Arms, ammunition, and stores not included in Class 20.	Such as— Cannon. Small arms. Fowling pieces. Swords. Shot and other projectiles. Camp equipage. Equipments.

Class 20.

Explosive substances.	Such as— Gunpowder. Gun-cotton. Dynamite. Fog-signals. Percussion caps. Fireworks. Cartridges.

Class 21.

Naval architectural contrivances and naval equipments not included in Classes 19 and 20.	Such as— Boats. Anchors. Chain cables. Rigging.

Class 22.

Carriages.	Such as— Railway carriages. Waggons. Railway trucks. Bicycles. Bath chairs.

Class 23.	
Cotton yarn and thread.	Such as— Sewing cotton on spools or reels. Sewing cotton not on spools or reels. Dyed cotton yarns.
Class 24.	
Cotton piece goods of all kinds.	Such as— Cotton shirtings. Long cloth.
Class 25.	
Cotton goods not included in Classes 23, 24, or 38.	Such as— Cotton lace. Cotton braids. Cotton tapes.
Class 26.	
Linen and hemp yarn and thread.	
Class 27.	
Linen and hemp piece goods.	
Class 28.	
Linen and hemp goods not included in Classes 26, 27, and 50.	
Class 29.	
Jute yarns and tissues, and other articles made of jute not included in Class 50.	
Class 30.	
Silk, spun, thrown, or sewing.	
Class 31.	
Silk piece goods.	

Class 32.

Other silk goods not included in Classes 30 and 31.

Class 33.

Yarns of wool, worsted, or hair.

Class 34.

Cloths and stuffs of wool, worsted, or hair.

Class 35.

Woollen and worsted and hair goods not included in Classes 33 and 34.

Class 36.

Carpets, floor-cloth, and oil-cloth.	Such as— Drugget. Mats and matting. Rugs.

Class 37.

Leather, skins unwrought and wrought, and articles made of leather not included in other classes.	Such as— Saddlery. Harness. Whips. Portmanteaus. Furs.

Class 38.

Articles of clothing.	Such as— Hats of all kinds. Caps and bonnets. Hosiery. Gloves. Boots and shoes. Other ready-made clothing.

Class 39.

Paper (except paper-hangings), stationery, and book-binding.	Such as— Envelopes. Sealing wax. Pens (except gold pens). Ink. Playing cards. Blotting cases. Copying presses.

Class 40.

Goods manufactured from india-rubber and gutta-percha not included in other classes.	

Class 41.

Furniture and upholstery.	Such as— Paper hangings. Papier mâché. Mirrors. Mattresses.

Class 42.

Substances used as food, or as ingredients in food.	Such as— Cereals. Pulses. Olive oil. Hops. Malt. Dried fruits. Tea. Sago. Salt. Sugar. Preserved meats. Confectionery. Oil cakes. Pickles. Vinegar. Beer clarifiers.

Class 43.

Fermented liquors and spirits.	Such as— Beer. Cyder. Wine. Whiskey Liqueurs.

Class 44.

Mineral and aërated waters, natural and artificial, including ginger-beer.	

Class 45.

Tobacco, whether manufactured or unmanufactured.	

Class 46.

Seeds for agricultural and horticultural purposes.	

Class 47.

Candles, common soap, detergents; illuminating, heating, or lubricating oils; matches; and starch, blue, and other preparations for laundry purposes.	Such as— Washing powders. Benzine collas.

Class 48.

Perfumery (including toilet articles, preparations for the teeth and hair, and perfumed soap).	

Class 49.

Games of all kinds and sporting articles not included in other classes.	Such as— Billiard tables. Roller skates. Fishing nets and lines. Toys.

Class 50.

Miscellaneous, including— (1.) Goods manufactured from ivory, bone, or wood, not included in other classes. (2.) Goods manufactured from straw or grass, not included in other classes. (3.) Goods manufactured from animal and vegetable substances, not included in other classes. (4.) Tobacco pipes. (5.) Umbrellas, walking sticks, brushes and combs. (6.) Furniture cream, plate powder. (7.) Tarpaulins, tents, rick-cloths, rope, twine. (8.) Buttons of all kinds, other than of precious metal or imitations thereof. (9.) Packing and hose of all kinds. (10.) Goods not included in the foregoing classes.	Such as— Coopers' wares.

J. CHAMBERLAIN,
President of the Board of Trade.

21*st December*, 1883.

RULES OF AUGUST, 1876, WITH RESPECT TO COTTON MARKS, NOW REPEALED.*

Cotton Goods.

Establishment of office for exhibition of cotton trade marks at Manchester.

57. For the purpose of facilitating the granting of trade marks in respect of cotton goods in Classes 23, 24 and 25, there shall be established by the Commissioners of Patents (*a*), and subject to their control, an office at Manchester (*b*) for the exhibition of all devices, marks, headings, labels, tickets, letters, words, or figures, or combinations of letters, words, or figures used in the cotton trade, and in these Rules included under the expression "cotton marks" (*c*).

(*a*) Previous to the coming into operation of the Patents Act, 1883, on January 1st, 1884, the registration of trade marks was under the control of the Commissioners of Patents, now no longer in existence.

(*b*) This was opened and is still maintained at No. 48, Royal Exchange, Manchester. See Instructions, par. 38.

(*c*) All cotton marks are treated as exceptional, and advertised and registered by deposit. See *In re Robinson*, 29 W. R. 31.

Representations of cotton marks to be sent by owners resident in the United Kingdom on or before Jan. 1, 1877; by owners resident abroad on or before March 1, 1877.

58 (*a*). Every person who at the date of the passing of the Act used any cotton mark shall, if resident in the United Kingdom, on or before the first day of January one thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven, and if resident elsewhere, on or before the first day of March, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-seven, send to the Manchester office three representations of such cotton mark, in such form and with such a description as may be from time to time required by the Commissioners of Patents.

(*a*) This Rule was made on Dec. 1st, 1876, in substitution for the previous Rule 58, by which representations of old cotton marks were to be sent in at Manchester on or before Dec. 1st, 1876.

Extended time

58a (*a*). Every person who at the date of the passing of the

* These rules, though repealed, are given here in order that the position of cotton marks dealt with by the late Manchester Committee of Experts may be comprehended. Where it is not otherwise stated, the rules were included in the set of Rules issued in August, 1876. Various additions were made from time to time, and in March, 1883, after the Committee of Experts had completed their labours, an entirely new set was substituted (see p. 372, *infrd*). Those rules are now, in their turn, repealed, and the new rules now in force (*ante*, p. 341) place cotton marks on the same footing as other trade marks, and this would seem to be the case even with B list marks.

for sending representations of combination stamps for cotton piece goods.

Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, used any "combination stamp" (*b*) for cotton piece goods, shall on or before the first day of February, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-nine, send to the Manchester Branch of the Trade Marks Registry Office four representations of such "combination stamp," in such form and with such a description as may be from time to time required by the Commissioners of Patents.

(*a*) This Rule was made on Dec. 28th, 1878.

(*b*) Combination stamps are combinations of several different trade marks which dealers in cotton goods habitually use on such goods, treating the combination as equivalent to a single trade mark. See *Robinson* v. *Finlay*, 9 Ch. D. 487, for an example of such a combination.

Committee of experts to be appointed, and to divide cotton marks into two classes.

59. A committee (*a*) of persons versed in the usages of the cotton trade shall be appointed by the Commissioners of Patents, consisting of such number of persons as may from time to time be determined by them; and it shall be the duty of such committee, on or before a time to be named by the Commissioners of Patents, to divide the cotton marks, representations of which have been so sent in to the Manchester office, into two classes, the first class consisting of such of the said cotton marks as are, in the opinion of the committee, trade marks within the meaning of the Act, and the second class consisting of such of the said cotton marks as are not, in the opinion of the committee, trade marks within the meaning of the Act (*b*).

(*a*) A list of the Committee of Experts appointed under this Rule will be found in the Instructions issued during the existence of the committee.

(*b*) The committee were instructed by the Commissioners of Patents in a letter, dated April 4th, 1877, to act on the following principles in dividing the cotton marks into two classes, viz.: (i) To decide only from the evidence before them whether, in their opinion, a mark belonged to the first or second class of cotton marks; (ii) In case of further information being required, the keeper of the Manchester office was authorised to obtain such information for the use of the committee; (iii) In case of a difference of opinion among the committee as to the nature of marks applied for, their decision should be given according to the opinion of the majority, the chairman presiding at each meeting having a casting vote; (iv) Single letters were not trade marks within the meaning of the Act; (v) In all cases where more than three persons applied for registration of the same mark for the same description of goods, such mark must be considered as a trade mark not within the meaning of the Act, and must consequently be placed in the second class. By supplementary directions, the committee were instructed that Rule (v) extended to marks so similar, or so nearly resembling each other, as to be substantially the same marks, or calculated to deceive, and was not to be confined to identical marks. And they were also instructed that, in dealing with individual cases, they should bring to bear upon them the knowledge which the members of the committee might have of the state of things in the trade, and to decide with reference to that knowledge, and not merely upon such evidence as might be formally brought before them in the individual cases. Also that borders of marks should not be treated as parts of the marks. See *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791.

Acting on the principles thus laid down, the committee divided the marks submitted to them into two classes, known as the A list and the B list, of which the former contained registrable, and the latter non-registrable, cotton marks.

By Rule 62, *infrd*, the marks placed in the B list were not to be registered except in pursuance of an order of the court, and in *In re Orr-Ewing & Co.*, 8 Ch. D. 794, the question was raised how far the decision of the committee was a binding decision. Hall, V.-C. decided that the marks there in question, which had been placed in the B list, were good and valid trade marks, and that they ought to be registered; but the Court of Appeal reversed his decision, holding that the decision of the committee should not be interfered with except under special circumstances, James, L. J. saying that the court should not interfere, unless satisfied that the committee had proceeded upon some wrong principle or in some improper manner. When, however, the case was brought before the House of Lords (4 App. Cas. 479), the decision of Hall, V.-C. was restored, with the modification that only the essential particulars of the marks were admitted to registration, and the Lord Chancellor (Lord Cairns) said that "the Rules appear to provide a rough but useful way of separating, by means of the technical knowledge and judgment of the committee, the cotton trade marks into two classes. The first class is to consist of those marks which the committee is of opinion are trade marks within the Act, and proprietors in this class are to have the benefit, arising from this opinion, of being able at once to apply to be registered in respect of those marks. But in doing this they must satisfy the Registrar that they are the proprietors, and comply with the conditions of registration as any other applicants would do. With regard to the second class, there is no decision pronounced against them, but the proprietors cannot apply for registration as a matter of course. They must come to the court, and it must be for the court to say whether the registrar shall proceed on their application to register, or not. In deciding this the court will have before it the circumstance that the opinion of the committee was adverse to the claim of a trade mark; but this would be an opinion only, and not a decision arrived at after hearing both sides, or rendered in any judicial proceeding." *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 483, and see per Lords O'Hagan and Blackburn. See also, *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, 13 Ch. D. 434; 7 App. Cas. 219; and the cases noted under Rule 62, *infrd*.

The function of the committee was solely to decide on the question of registrability or non-registrability, and where they had assumed to decide a question of title, it was held by Sir G. Jessel, M. R, that the registrar must proceed with the application, leaving it to the owners of other marks to oppose the registration; *Ex parte Ede Bros. & Co.*, 28 W. R. 436.

Committee to form list of marks sent in to Manchester office.

60. The said committee shall form a list of the cotton marks sent to the Manchester office in each of the aforesaid classes (*a*), and shall transmit such lists to the Commissioners of Patents, accompanied by two representations of each of the marks specified in the second class in such list.

The third representation of each of the marks in the second class in such list shall be retained for reference in the Manchester office.

(*a*) *i.e.*, the A list and the B list.

Marks may be added to list.

61. The Commissioners of Patents may from time to time add

to the aforesaid list any cotton marks as they may think just, and such addition shall be deemed to be part of the original list.

Any person claiming to be the proprietor of a cotton mark in Class 1 may apply to be registered.

62. Any proprietor of a cotton mark not specified in the second class in such list may apply to be registered as proprietor of such cotton mark in manner and subject to the conditions in which he may apply to be registered as proprietor of any other trade mark (*a*), but it shall not be lawful for the registrar to register (*b*) any person as proprietor of any cotton mark in the second class of the aforesaid list except in pursuance of an order of the Court (*c*).

(*a*) After being passed by the committee, the marks in the A list had to be advertised, so that an opportunity for opposition might be afforded. In *In re Robinson*, 29 W. R. 31, an A list cotton mark was opposed, but without success.

(*b*) But he might grant a certificate of refusal to register, thus preserving any previous rights.

(*c*) For an order of the court to be obtained for the registration of a B list mark, such a case had to be made out as, in the opinion of the court, was sufficient to outweigh the opinion of the Committee of Experts: per Lord Blackburn in *Orr-Ewing* v. *Registrar of Trade Marks*, 4 App. Cas. 501. It is, however, believed that an application to the court by an owner of a B list mark has never been unsuccessful. Such applications were granted in *Ex parte Ede Bros & Co.*, 28 W. R. 436; *In re Dugdale*, 49 L. J. Ch. 303; *In re J. Hoyle & Sons, Limited*, (1) V.-C. H., May 8th, 1880; S. C. (2) Chitty, J., Nov. 30th, 1883; *In re Dickinson, Akroyd & Co.*, V.-C. H., July 8th, 1880; *In re Jones Bros. & Co.*, V.-C. H., July 10th, 1880; *In re Ward, Sturt & Sharp*, 50 L. J. Ch. 347; *In re Sykes*, 43 L. T. N. S. 626; *In re T. Ashton & Sons*, V.-C. H., Feb. 26th, 1881; *In re Framjee, Sands & Co.*, V.-C. B., Nov. 30th, 1883. In *In re Brook*, 26 W. R. 791, which was decided against the applicants on the authority of the decision of the Court of Appeal in *In re Orr-Ewing*, 8 Ch. D. 794, an arrangement satisfactory to the applicants was afterwards arrived at.

"The Court" being the Chancery Division (now the High Court of Justice), the order of the House of Lords was made an order of th Chancery Division in *In re Orr-Ewing* (2), 28 W. R. 412. The comptroller will now register a B list mark in a proper case, without requiring the applicant to go to the court.

Advertisement of cotton marks.

62a (*a*). As soon as may be after the receipt of an application, made as provided by the Trade Marks Rules, for the registration of a mark in Classes 23, 24, 25 aforesaid, or in any one or more of such classes, the registrar shall insert in the official paper an advertisement of such application, showing the name and address of the applicant, the class in which he applies, the number given to the mark by the registrar, the places in London and Manchester respectively where a specimen of such mark is deposited for exhibition, and distinguishing whether the mark has or has not been used prior to the thirteenth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five.

(*a*) This and the following Rule were made on Feb. 26th, 1877, in substitution, so far as related to cotton marks, for Rules 13, 15 and 17 of the General Rules of August, 1876, as to advertisement.

62b (*a*). On the expiration of three weeks from the date of the first appearance of the advertisement of a mark in Classes 23, 24, 25, or in any one or more of such classes, in the official paper, the registrar may, if he is satisfied that the applicant is entitled to registration, register such mark in respect of the description of goods for which he may be entitled to be registered, and the applicant as the proprietor thereof, on payment of the prescribed fee.

Time of registration of cotton marks.

(*a*) See note to previous Rule.

63. A cotton mark shall not be registered except in manner and subject to the conditions prescribed by these Rules with respect to the registry of cotton marks.

Cotton mark not to be registered except in manner herein prescribed.

63a (*a*). The Rules numbered 57 to 63 as aforesaid do not apply to such trade marks in respect of cotton goods in Classes 23, 24, and 25 as are not cotton marks which were in use at the date of the passing of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875; and applications for the registration of trade marks in respect of goods in Classes 23, 24, or 25, and which marks were not cotton marks in use at the date of the passing of the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, shall be made in manner and subject to the conditions in and subject to which applications for trade marks other than cotton marks may be made in conformity with the Rules in that behalf for the time being in force.

Applications for registration of *new* trade marks for cotton goods (classes 23, 24, and 25) to be made in the same manner as for all other classes of goods.

Provided that where application is made for the registration as a trade mark in respect of any goods in Classes 23, 24, or 25 of any mark being a cotton mark contained in the second class of the list mentioned in Rule 59 aforesaid, such registration shall not take place except in pursuance of an order of the Court.

(*a*) This Rule was made on Oct. 21st, 1879.

RULES OF MARCH, 1883, WITH RESPECT TO COTTON MARKS, NOW REPEALED.*

Establishment of office for exhibition of cotton trade marks at Manchester.

57. [This Rule is identical with Rule 57, *suprà*.]

Marks may be added to the first and second class lists of cotton marks.

58 (*a*). The Commissioners of Patents may from time to time add to the first and second class lists of cotton marks formed by the late Manchester Committee of Experts any cotton marks as they may think just, and such addition shall be deemed to be part of the original lists.

(*a*) This is taken from the old rule 61.

Any person claiming to be the proprietor of a cotton mark in first class may apply to be registered.

59 (*a*). Any proprietor of a cotton mark in the first class may apply to be registered as proprietor of such cotton mark in manner and subject to the conditions in which he may apply to be registered as proprietor of any other trade mark, but it shall not be lawful for the registrar to register any person as proprietor of any cotton mark in the second class aforesaid, except in pursuance of an order of the Court.

(*a*) This is taken from the old rule 62.

Advertisement of cotton marks.

60. [This Rule is identical with Rule 62a, *suprà*.]

Time of registration of cotton marks.

61. [This Rule is identical with Rule 62b, *suprà*.]

* See note, p. 367, *suprà*.

INSTRUCTIONS TO PERSONS WHO WISH TO REGISTER TRADE MARKS.

Preliminary.

1. All communications relating to trade marks, not being Sheffield marks, should be addressed to the Comptroller, Patent Office, Trade Marks Branch. All applications should be in the English language.

They may be made by post, or left at the Patent Office, Trade Marks Branch, 25, Southampton Buildings, Chancery Lane, London, W.C.

2. The fees in relation to trade marks registration cannot be received at the Patent Office. They should be paid in exchange for the stamped forms required, which may be obtained at the following places:—

List of Places at which Stamped Forms under the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, *may be obtained.*

(*a.*) At the Inland Revenue Office, Royal Courts of Justice, London.

(*b.*) At the following Post Offices in London:—

The General Post Office, London, E.C.
District Post Office, 226, Commercial Road, E.
" 9, Blackman Street, Borough, S.E
" Charing Cross, W.C.
" 28, Eversholt Street, Camden Town, N.W.
Post Office, 12, Parliament Street, S.W.

(c.) At the chief Post Office of—

ENGLAND AND WALES.

Accrington.
Altrincham.
Ashton-under-Lyne.
Barnsley.
Barrow-in-Furness.
Bedford.
Beverley.
Birkenhead.
Birmingham.
Blackburn.
Bolton.
Bradford.
Brighton.
Bristol.
Bromsgrove.
Burnley.
Burslem.
Burton-on-Trent.
Bury.
Cambridge.
Carlisle.
Chatham.
Chester.
Clitheroe.
Congleton.
Coventry.
Crewe.
Darlaston.
Derby.
Dewsbury.
Doncaster.
Dorchester.
Driffield.
Droitwich.
Dudley.
Durham.
Exeter.
Gateshead.
Goole.
Greenwich.
Guildford.
Halifax.
Hartlepool.
Huddersfield.
Hull.
Ipswich.
Keighley.
Kendal.
Kidderminster.
Knaresbro'.
Knutsford.
Lancaster.
Leamington.
Leeds.
Leicester.
Lichfield.
Lincoln.
Liverpool.
Macclesfield.
Manchester.
Middlesborough.
Nantwich.
Newcastle.
Newport (Mon.).
Northallerton.
Northampton.
Nottingham.
Nuneaton.
Oldbury.
Oldham.
Patrington.
Plymouth.
Pontefract.
Portsmouth.
Prescot.
Preston.
Reading.
Redditch.
Richmond (Yorks.).
Ripon.
Rochdale.
Rotherham.
Rugby.
Salford.
St. Helen's.
Scarborough.
Sedgley.
Sheffield.
Southampton.
Stafford.
Stalybridge.
Stockport.
Stoke-on-Trent.
Stourbridge.
Stourport.
Sunderland.
Swansea.
Tamworth.
Truro.
Tunstall.
Wakefield.
Walsall.
Warrington.
Wednesbury.
West Bromwich.
Whitby.
Widnes.
Wigan.
Wolverhampton.
Wolverton.
Woolwich.
York.

SCOTLAND.

Aberdeen.
Dumbarton.
Dundee.
Edinburgh.
Glasgow.
Greenock.
Inverness.
Lanark.
Paisley.
Perth.
Renfrew.

IRELAND.

Belfast.
Cork.
Dublin.
Dundalk.
Galway.
Wexford.

Any of the forms may also be ordered from the Postmaster of *any Money Order Office* in the United Kingdom.

3. The following is a list of the stamped forms under the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, which relate to trade marks, and which may be obtained at the places mentioned above :—

Trade Marks.

Letter.	Title of Form.	Fee. £ s. d.
F	Application for registration of trade mark . . .	0 5 0
G	Additional representation form	No stamp
H	Appeal to Board of Trade on refusal of a comptroller to register a trade mark	1 0 0
I	Registration fee	1 0 0
J	Notice of opposition to application for registration .	1 0 0
K	Request to enter name of subsequent proprietor, with declaration in support thereof	1 0 0
L	Request for certificate of refusal to register a trademark	1 0 0
M	Notice of application for alteration of address . .	0 5 0
N	Notice of application for alteration or rectification of register	0 10 0
O	Application to cancel entry of mark on register .	0 5 0
Q	Request for correction of clerical error . . .	0 5 0
R	Request for certificate of registration for use abroad .	0 5 0
S	Request for certificate of registration for use in legal proceedings	0 10 0
T	Application for settlement of a special case . .	2 0 0
T I	Request for general certificate of comptroller . .	0 5 0
V	Request for copy of official notification	0 2 0
W	Appeal from Cutlers' Company at Sheffield to comptroller	1 0 0

Of the above forms those bearing the letters F., G., and I. are kept in stock at the various offices named in paragraph 2. Any of the others when required must be bespoken.

Sale of Official Publications.

4. The Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, and the Rules thereunder in relation to the registration of trade marks, should be carefully studied. Copies of the Act and the Trade Marks Rules can be had on payment of 2*s.* 2*d.* for each copy, at 38, Cursitor Street, Chancery Lane, London, E.C.

Post Office Orders sent in payment for the Act and Rules should be for the sum of 2*s.* 2*d.*, made payable to H. Reader Lack, at the Chancery Lane Post Office.

5. The Act and the Trade Marks Rules may also be obtained for the above sum from any of the following publishers :—

Knight & Co., 90, Fleet Street.
Stevens & Sons, 119, Chancery Lane.
E. Stanford, 55, Charing Cross.
Shaw & Sons, Fetter Lane.
Butterworths, 7, Fleet Street.
G. Downing, 8, Quality Court, Chancery Lane.

Trübner & Co., 57 and 59, Ludgate Hill.
Waterlow & Sons, Limited, 25, 26 and 27, Great Winchester Street; 95 and 96, London Wall; Finsbury Stationery Works; and 49, Parliament Street.
J. M. Johnson & Sons, Limited, 1, Castle Street, Holborn.
Waterlow Bros. & Layton, 23, 24 and 25, Birchin Lane; and 28, 29 and 30 Lime Street.
Palmer & Howe, 73, 75 and 77, Princess Street, Manchester.
A. Thom & Co., 87 and 88, Abbey Street, Dublin.
A. and C. Black, Edinburgh.

Copies will also be sent by post by any of the above publishers on a prepaid application, containing the name and address of the sender, and accompanied by a Post Office Order for the amount due in respect of the copies required, together with 1½*d.* postage, for each copy of the Act and the Rules.

6. Copies of the *Trade Marks Journal* may be obtained at the price of 1*s.* a number from the Superintendent of the Sale Branch of the Patent Office, 38, Cursitor Street, Chancery Lane, London, E.C.

Definition of a Trade Mark.

7. The definition of a trade mark (not used prior to the 13th August, 1875) is given in the 64th section of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, as follows:—

"For the purposes of this Act, a trade mark must consist of or contain at least one of the following essential particulars:

"A name of an individual or firm printed, impressed, or woven in some particular and distinctive manner; or

"A written signature or copy of a written signature of the individual or firm applying for registration thereof as a trade mark; or

"A distinctive device, mark, brand, heading, label, ticket, or fancy word or words not in common use."

All new marks, therefore, which it is desired to register *must include one or more of the above essential particulars.*

The 64th section goes on—"There may be added to any one or more of these particulars any letters, words, or figures, or combination of letters, words or figures, or any of them."

In addition to the above—

"Any special and distinctive word or words, letter, figure, or combination of letters or figures, or of letters and

figures, used as a trade mark before the thirteenth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-five, may be registered as a trade mark under this part of this Act."

A person wishing to adopt a trade mark should, before engraving a block and circulating impressions of the mark among his customers, make a search or a formal application at the Trade Marks Branch of the Patent Office, with the view of ascertaining whether his proposed mark is already registered, or whether, from its being calculated to deceive by a resemblance to other marks already on record, it would be refused registration under the 72nd section of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883.

The fee for making a search amongst the classified representations of trade marks is 1*s.* for each quarter of an hour. The fee for a formal application is 5*s.*

The comptroller does not undertake to make searches amongst the trade marks recorded at his office except in connection with formal applications for registration.

Applications for Registration.

8. Applications sent by post should be addressed to—

The Comptroller,
Patent Office,
Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London, W.C.

Agents and other persons who may be interested in more than one application are particularly requested to make communications relating to different applications in *separate* letters.

9. An application for the registration of a trade mark consists of:—

(*a.*) An application form (Form F. in the Second Schedule to the Trade Marks Rules, 1883), giving certain particulars (specified in the form), and bearing an impressed stamp of *5s.*

(The applicant should, before filling up the form, carefully read the marginal notes).

(*b.*) Certain additional representations of the trade mark, mounted on forms (Form G.).

10. A *separate* application form is required for *each* class.

11. If the mark be the property of a firm, it should be signed by a member of the firm, who should add after his signature

"a member of the firm;" if of a company, by the secretary or other principal officer, who should add after his signature and designation, "for the company."

12. Applications may be made by agents in the names of and on behalf of the owners of trade marks. The agent must be duly authorised by the owner or owners; the necessary authority should be signed by the owner or owners.

Applications made by agents should have after the name of the agent the description "Agent."

13. A representation of the trade mark should be placed in the centre of the application form.

14. When an application is made for a trade mark used on any metal goods other than cutlery, edge tools, and raw steel, it should be stated in the application form of what metal or metals the goods are made. See section 81 of the Act as to Sheffield marks.

15. When the mark consists of or includes words printed in other than Roman characters, there should be given at the back of or at the foot of the application form, and of each of the additional representations, a translation of such words, signed by the applicant or his agent.

In the case of marks claimed in Classes 23, 24, or 25, the applicant should state by what name the particular mark claimed would be referred to in the invoices of his house.

Additional Representations of Mark.

16. Each of the additional representations should be placed in the centre of a separate form (Form G.).

In the case of a trade mark which is not claimed in Classes 23 to 35, *two* additional representations are required for *each* class claimed.

In the case of a trade mark claimed in any one or more of the Classes 23 to 35, *three* additional representations should be sent for *each* of such classes.

The representations of the mark on the Form G. must agree *in every respect* with each other, and with that on the Form F.

17. Representations of a mark of a large size may be folded. In that case they must, however, be backed with linen and firmly affixed to the forms. Representations must in no case be executed *in pencil*. They should be not only of a durable nature, but of such a kind as will admit of their being preserved and bound together in volumes as records of the property of the owners.

Series of Trade Marks.

18. By section 66 of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, the comptroller is empowered to register under one registration a series of trade marks which, whilst they resemble each other in the material particulars, differ from each other in respect of the statements of the goods for which they are used, of the statements of numbers, of the statements ofprice, of the statements of quality, or of the statements of names of places. When an application is made for such a series, a representation of each of the marks included in the series must be affixed to the Form F., and also to each of the Forms G.

Common or Open Marks.

19. In the case of a trade mark used before the 13th August, 1875, common or open marks of any kind may be registered in connection with it, but in the case of a trade mark not so used, common or open marks consisting of *a word or combination of words only* can be registered as a part of the mark.

In each case, the applicant for entry of such common particular or particulars must disclaim the right to the exclusive use of the same in a note at the back of or at the foot of the application form and of each of the additional representations, such note to be signed by the applicant or his agent.

See section 74 of the Act, sub-section 3, for definition of common marks.

Classification of Goods.

20. A Guide to the Classification of Goods under the Trade Marks Rules, 1883, can be obtained on application at the Patent Office, Trade Marks Branch, and should be asked for if the applicant feels any difficulty in determining to which of the classes set out in the Third Schedule to the Rules the goods for which he uses his mark belong.

Advertisement in the Trade Marks Journal.

21. A trade mark cannot in any case be entered upon the register until two months after its advertisement in the official paper.

22. A wood-block or electrotype must be furnished for each mark in each class claimed (except in the case of Classes 23, 24, and 25, for which no blocks or electrotypes are required), but no block or electrotype should be forwarded until a formal demand for it is sent by the comptroller.

23. In the case of a series of trade marks differing only in respect of the particulars mentioned in section 66 of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, a wood-block or electrotype must be furnished for each mark in the series for each class claimed.

24. The wood-blocks or electrotypes furnished must correspond *exactly* with the representations, must afford *perfectly distinct* impressions of the marks, and must be upon a scale sufficiently large to reproduce the marks faithfully. Worn or mutilated blocks or electrotypes cannot be accepted.

25. The largest space available for the insertion of any single block or electrotype is eight and a-half inches broad by ten inches deep.

When a block or electrotype *exceeds two inches in depth*, a charge for additional space is made, at the rate of 2*s.* for every inch or part of an inch beyond the two inches.

26. The number given by the comptroller should *not* be cut on the face of the block or electrotype, but should be *marked upon the side* in such a manner as to secure its identification.

27. All blocks or electrotypes should be sent to the Patent Office, Trade Marks Branch, together with the papers marked "Form 2," and with the representation of the mark sent for the guidance of the applicant in preparing the blocks or electrotypes.

28. The blocks or electrotypes supplied for the advertisement of trade marks cannot in any case be returned to applicants.

Restrictions on Registration.

29. Ornamental or coloured groundwork, such as tartans or checks, cannot be claimed as part of a mark unless such groundwork be included within the mark by some border or lines.

30. The royal arms, or arms so nearly resembling them as to be calculated to deceive, and the words "Registered," "Registered Design," "Copyright," "Entered at Stationers' Hall," "To counterfeit this is Forgery," "Patent," "Patented," will not be registered under the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, and should not, therefore, appear upon the representations of trade marks forming part of an application.

31. The following will not be registered as trade marks, or as prominent parts of trade marks, unless the marks have been used before 13th August, 1875:—

Representations of Her Majesty the Queen, or of any member of the royal family.

Representations of the royal crown.

National arms or flags.

Prize or exhibition medals.

32. When there appears on the face of a trade mark an indication of the goods to which the mark is applied, the claim for its registration must be in respect of those goods only.

Forms of Counter-Statement and Bond.

33. The following is a form of counter-statement.

[For this form see Appendix B., *infrd.*]

The following is a form of bond which the comptroller is able to accept from persons opposing applications, and who have been required to give security for costs:—

[For this form see Appendix B., *infrd.*]

34. Before he is required to bring an opposition matter before the Court under Rule 29, the applicant is afforded an opportunity of objecting, if he think fit, to the solvency of the security for the costs which may be awarded in respect of the opposition.

Fees.

35. See the First Schedule to the Trade Marks Rules, 1883, and the list of forms, par. 3 of these Instructions.

36. *An application for the registration of a trade mark will not be entered by the comptroller unless it be accompanied by the proper fees in impressed stamps.*

Cutlers' Company.

37. By section 81, sub-section 3, of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, application for the registration of trade marks used on cutlery, edge tools, or on raw steel, or on goods made of steel, or of steel and iron combined, whether with or without a cutting edge, shall, if made by a person carrying on business in Hallamshire, or within six miles thereof, be made to the Cutlers' Company.

See Rules 53 to 56, and par. 14 o .ese Instructions.

Applications made to the Cutlers' Company in pursuance of section 81 of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, should be made on Form F., the address in the left-hand corner to be, "To the Cutlers' Company, Sheffield," instead of "To the Comptroller," and should be left at, or sent by post to, the Cutlers Hall, Sheffield.

Each application should be accompanied by an unstamped copy on foolscap paper. *See* Rule 53.

Applications sent by post should be addressed—

CHAS. MACRO WILSON, Esq.,
The Law Clerk,
The Cutlers' Hall,
Sheffield.

MANCHESTER OFFICE.

38. For the convenience of merchants and manufacturers engaged in the cotton trade, and for the purpose of facilitating the recording of trade marks used in respect of cotton goods, an office will be opened at 48, Royal Exchange, Manchester, where searches can be made on payment of 1*s.* for each quarter of an hour for all marks in classes of textiles from Class 23 to Class 35.

CERTIFICATES.

39. The comptroller's certificate in relation to a trade mark is of four kinds, viz. :—

(i.) For use in legal proceedings.
(ii.) For use in applying for registration in foreign countries.
(iii.) Of any application made and of proceedings thereon.
(iv.) A certificate of refusal of a mark in use before 13th August, 1875, and not registrable.

40. A person desirous of obtaining any of the above certificates should forward Form R., Form S., Form T[1]., or Form L. (see par. 3), as the case may be, to the comptroller, giving the comptroller's official number of the mark, and stating whether the certificate is required for use in legal proceedings, or for use in applying for the registration of the mark in a foreign country, or for what other purpose.

The form should be accompanied by two unmounted copies of each mark for which a certificate is required.

41. In every case where a certificate is required in respect of a cotton mark, or in respect of any trade mark of which the

representations or specimens forming part of the application for registration are *coloured*, two unmounted copies of the mark must be supplied, agreeing *in every respect* with the representations forming part of the application for registration. Special attention should be paid to this requirement, as the certificate cannot in any such case be prepared until these unmounted copies are received by the comptroller.

Registration of Subsequent Proprietors of Registered Trade Marks.

42. The request and declaration to be made by a subsequent proprietor on application for the registration in his name of a registered trade mark must be made on Form K. (see par. 3).

H. Reader Lack,
Comptroller.

Patent Office, Trade Marks Branch,
London.
January, 1884.

N.B.—The Rules and Instructions under the Trade Marks Registration Acts, 1875–7, were frequently added to and altered, and it will be advisable for intending applicants under the Patents Act, 1883, to take care to proceed in accordance with the Rules and Instructions for the time being in force.

APPENDIX B.

FORMS AND PRECEDENTS.

PART I.

FORMS PRESCRIBED BY THE SECOND SCHEDULE TO THE RULES.

TRADE MARKS.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

F.

Application for Registration of Trade Mark.

One representation to be fixed within this square, and two others to be sent on separate sheets of foolscap.

Representations of a larger size may be folded, but must be mounted upon linen and affixed hereto.

You are hereby requested to register the accompanying trade mark in Class , in respect of (*a*) ,
in the name of (*b*) ,
who claims to be the proprietor thereof (*c*).

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, *Southampton Buildings,*
London.

(Signed) (*d*).

Dated this day of , 1883.

NOTE.—If the trade mark has been in use in respect of the goods since before August 13, 1875, state length of such user.

(*a*) Only goods contained *in one and the same class* should be set out here. A separate application form is required *for each separate class.*

(*b*) Here insert legibly the full name, address, and business of the individual, firm, or company. In the case of an individual, add trading style (if any).

(*c*) Alter to "claim to be the proprietors thereof" in the case of a firm or company.

(*d*) To be signed by the applicant; or, in the case of a firm, by a partner, adding "A member of the firm," or, in the case of a company, by the secretary or other principal officer, adding "For the Company." Or, *in any case*, an agent may sign, adding "Agent."

TRADE MARKS.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

G.

Additional Representation of Trade Mark to accompany Application for Registration.

One representation of the Trade Mark to be affixed within this square.

It must correspond *exactly*, in all respects, with the representation affixed to the Application Form.

Any representation of a larger size than foolscap may be folded but must then be mounted upon linen and affixed hereto.

Two of these Additional Representations of the Trade Mark must accompany *each* form of application.

In the case of a trade mark claimed in one of the Classes 23 to 35, Three of these Additional Representations of the mark must accompany the form of application.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

H.

TRADE MARKS.

FORM OF APPEAL TO BOARD OF TRADE ON REFUSAL OF COMPTROLLER TO REGISTER A TRADE MARK.

SIR,

I HEREBY give notice of my intention to appeal against your decision upon my application to register a trade mark No. in Class for and I beg to submit my case (*a*) for the decision of the Board of Trade.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, *Southampton Buildings,*
London.

(*a*) The statement of the case to be written upon foolscap paper (on one side only), with a margin of two inches on the left-hand side thereof.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

I.

TRADE MARKS.

FEE FOR REGISTRATION OF A TRADE MARK.

SIR,

IN reply to your request I hereby transmit the prescribed fee for the registration of the trade mark, No. in Class .

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, *Southampton Buildings,*
London.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

TRADE MARKS.

J.

NOTICE OF OPPOSITION TO APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.

[*To be accompanied by an unstamped duplicate.*]

In the matter of an application, No. by of

SIR,

NOTICE is hereby given that I of oppose the registration of the trade mark advertised under the above number for Class in the *Trade Marks Journal* of the day of 188 , No. , page .

The grounds of opposition are as follows:—(*a*)

(*b*)

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

(*a*) See page 406, *infrd*, for forms of grounds of opposition.
(*b*) To be dated and signed at the end by the opponent or his solicitor.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

K.

TRADE MARKS.

REQUEST TO ENTER NAME OF SUBSEQUENT PROPRIETOR OF TRADE MARK UPON THE REGISTER, WITH DECLARATION IN SUPPORT THEREOF.

I, (*a*)
hereby request that you will enter (*b*) name (*c*) in the register of trade marks as proprietor of the trade mark No. in Class .

(*d*) entitled to the said trade mark and to the goodwill of the business concerned in the goods with respect to which the said trade mark is registered.

(*e*)

And I do solemnly and sincerely declare that the above several statements are true, and the particulars above set out comprise every material fact and document affecting the proprietorship of the said trade mark as above claimed.

(*f*) And I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the provisions of the Statutory Declarations Act, 1835.

(*g*)

Declared at }
this day of 188 . }

Before me,
(*h*)

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

(*a*) *Or* We. Here insert name, full address, and description.
(*b*) My *or* our.
(*c*) *Or* names.
(*d*) I am, *or* We are.
(*e*) Here state whether trade mark transmitted by death, marriage, bankruptcy, or other operation of law, and if entitled by assignment, state the particulars thereof, as, *e.g.*, "by deed dated the day of , 188 , made between So-and-So of the one part."
(*f*) This paragraph is not required when the declaration is made out of the United Kingdom.
(*g*) To be signed here by the person making the declaration.
(*h*) Signature and title of the authority before whom the declaration is made.

TRADE MARKS.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

L.

Request for Certificate of Refusal to Register a Trade Mark in use before 13th August, 1875.

In the matter of an application for registration of an old trade mark, No.
in Class .

Sir,

I,

of

the applicant in the above matter, hereby request you to furnish me with your Certificate of Refusal to register the said trade mark.

(a)

Dated this day of 188 .

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

(a) Signature of applicant.

TRADE MARKS.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

M.

Notice of Application for Alteration of Address on Register of Trade Marks.

In the matter of the Trade Mark, No. registered in Class .

Sir,

Notice is hereby given that I

of

the registered proprietor of the trade mark numbered as above desire that my address on the register of trade marks be altered to

Dated this day of , 188 .

(a)

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

(a) Signature of proprietor.

TRADE MARKS.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

N.

Notice of Order for Alteration or Rectification of Register of Trade Marks.

In the matter of the trade mark, No. , registered in class in the name of

Sir,

Notice is hereby given that by an order of the Court made on the day of 188 , it was directed that the entry on the register of trade marks in respect of the trade mark numbered as above should be rectified in the manner therein specified.

An office copy of the order of the court is enclosed herewith.

Dated this day of , 188 .

(a)

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

(a) To be signed by the person interested or his agent.

TRADE MARKS.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

O.

Form of Application by Proprietor of Registered Trade Mark to cancel entry on Register.

Trade mark No. class advertised in "Trade Marks Journal," No. , page
Name of registered proprietor or firm
Place of business
I, the undersigned,
of

[*or* I, the undersigned,
a member of the firm of
of
on behalf of my said firm]
apply that the entry upon the register of the trade marks in Class of the trade mark No. may be cancelled.

The day of , 188 .

(*Signed*)

This is the statement marked O referred to in the declaration made
of
before me the of , 188 .

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

P.

Form of Declaration in support of Application for Cancellation of Trade Mark by Owner.

I, of ; [*or* a member of the firm of of] do hereby solemnly and sincerely declare, to the best of my knowledge and belief, as follows:—

(1) The application signed by me, and dated the day of , 18 , and marked with the letter O, and shown to me at the time of making this declaration, is true.

(2) I am the person whose name appears on the register of trade marks as the proprietor of the trade mark referred to in the said application marked with the letter O.

[*or* my said firm is the firm whose name appears on the register of trade marks as the proprietor of the trade mark referred to in the said application marked with the letter O.]

And I make this solemn declaration conscientiously believing the same to be true, and by virtue of the provisions of the Statutory Declarations Act, 1835.

(*Signed*)

Declared at this day of , 188 . before me,

If the declaration be made before a commissioner to administer oaths it will require to be stamped with a 2*s.* 6*d.* impressed Inland Revenue stamp.

TRADE MARKS.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

Q.

Form of Request for Correction of Clerical Error in regard to a Trade Mark.

Sir,

I hereby request that

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

TRADE MARKS.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

R.

Request for Certificate of Registration of Trade Mark for use in obtaining Registration Abroad.

In the matter of the trade mark,
No. , registered in
Class in the name of

Sir,

I
of
the registered proprietor of the above trade mark hereby request you to furnish me with your certificate of registration for use in obtaining registration of the same in (*a*)

(*b*)

Dated this day of , 188 .

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

(*a*) Here state name of country in which registration is to be sought.
(*b*) Signature.

TRADE MARKS.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

S.

REQUEST FOR CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION OF TRADE MARK FOR USE IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.

In the matter of the trade mark, No. , registered in Class in the name of

SIR,

I ,

of ,

the registered proprietor of the above trade mark hereby request you to furnish me with your certificate of registration for use in the following legal proceedings (*a*).

(*b*)

Dated this day of , 188 .

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, *Southampton Buildings,*
London.

(*a*) Here state exact title of legal proceedings.
(*b*) Signature.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

T.

TRADE MARKS.

APPLICATION FOR SETTLEMENT OF A SPECIAL CASE ON APPLICATION TO REGISTER A TRADE MARK.

In the matter of the application of and of the application of

SIR,

NOTICE is hereby given that I, , and I, of

of ,

are unable to agree upon the facts on which the opinion of the Court is to be taken, and that we request you to fix a day on which we may attend before you and obtain your finding on the matters of fact to be submitted to the Court as settled.

Dated this day of , 188 .

(*a*)
(*a*)

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, *Southampton Buildings,*
London:

(*a*) To be signed by both parties.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

TRADE MARKS.

T[1].

Request for Certificate of Comptroller as to Application for Registration of a Trade Mark.

In the matter of the trade mark,
No. , in Class .

Sir,

I, ,
of ,
hereby request you to furnish me with your certificate that (*a*)

(*b*)

Dated this day of , 188 .

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

N.B.—This form has been substituted for Form U in the Second Schedule.

(*a*) Here set out the particulars which the comptroller is requested to certify.
(*b*) Signature.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

TRADE MARKS.

V.

Request for Copy of Official Notification of Registration of Trade Mark.

In the matter of the trade mark,
No. , registered
in Class .

Sir,

I ,
of ,
the registered proprietor of the trade mark above named, hereby request that you will furnish me with a copy of the official notification of the registration of the same.

(*a*)

Dated this day of , 188

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

(*a*) Signature.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

W.

TRADE MARKS.

Form of Appeal from Cutlers' Company at Sheffield to Comptroller.

[*To be accompanied by an unstamped duplicate.*]

Sir,

I hereby give notice of appeal against the decision of the Cutlers' Company of Sheffield in regard to my application for registration of a trade mark, No. , in Class , for ,
and I beg to submit my case (*a*) for your decision accordingly.
(*b*)

Dated this day of , 188 .

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, *Southampton Buildings,*
London.

(*a*) The statement of the case to be written upon foolscap paper (on one side only), with a margin of two inches on the left hand side thereof.
(*b*) Signature.

FORMS SUGGESTED BY THE COMPTROLLER.

[*See Instructions, par.* 33.]

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a.

Form of Counter-Statement.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

Trade Marks.

In the matter of an application No. , and of the opposition thereto No. .

In reply to the notice of opposition in this matter by of , I give notice by way of counter-statement that I rely for my application on the following grounds (*a*):—

(To be dated and signed by the applicant or his solicitor.)

To the Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

(*a*) See page 409, *infrd*, for forms of grounds of counter-statement.

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b.

Form of Bond.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

Trade Marks.

In the matter of an application No. , and of the opposition thereto No. .

Know all men by these presents that we of , and of , are jointly and severally held and firmly bound to Henry Reader Lack, the Comptroller-General of patents, designs, and trade marks, in the penal sum of pounds of

good and lawful money of Great Britain, to be paid to the said Henry Reader Lack or to other the Comptroller-General of patents, designs, and trade marks for the time being, for which payment to be well and faithfully made we bind ourselves and each of us our and each of our heirs, executors, and administrators firmly by these presents sealed with our seals.

Dated this day of , 18 .

Whereas pursuant to the provisions of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, and of the Trade Marks Rules, 1883, an application (No.) has been made by , of , to the Comptroller-General of patents, designs, and trade marks, for the registration of a certain trade mark. And whereas the above-bounden have delivered a notice of opposition to such registration, and the said have sent to the said Comptroller General a counter-statement of the grounds on which they rely for their application. And whereas the said Comptroller-General, pursuant to the terms of the said Act, hath required the said to enter into the above-written obligation (subject to the condition hereinafter contained) as security for such costs as may be awarded in respect of such opposition.

Now the condition of the above-written obligation is such that if the said or either of them, their or either of their heirs, executors, or administrators, do and shall well and truly pay or cause to be paid to all such costs as the High Court of Justice shall think fit to award to the said in respect of the said opposition, then the above written obligation is to be void or else to remain in full force and virtue.

Signed sealed and delivered by the above-bounden and in the presence of .

FORMS IN USE IN THE PATENT OFFICE, TRADE MARKS BRANCH (SELECTED.)

c.

Form of Receipt of an Application.

Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
London.

Received this day of , 188 , an application for the registration of trade mark in the name of

Comptroller.

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d.

Form of Notification of Registration.

Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
London, 188 .

Sir,

I have to inform you, pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules under the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883, that the trade mark in your application No. , which was duly advertised in No. of the *Trade Marks Journal*, ha been registered in your name in respect of the goods specified by you under Class .

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Se

Comptroller.

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e.

Form of Advertisement.

FORM FOR "*TRADE MARKS JOURNAL.*"

Name, Address, and Calling of Applicant. 1.	Class of Goods. 2.	Description of Goods. 3.	Number. 4.	Date of Application received. 5.	If Mark used prior to 13th August, 1875, state how long used. 6.
			N.B.—For No. in your application.		

N.B.—This Paper is to be sent with the Block or Electrotype of the Mark relating to the above particulars, *prepaid*, to

The Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

f.

Form of Notice to Applicant to bring Opposed Application before the Court.

Any further communication on this subject should be addressed to—
The Comptroller,
Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, *Southampton Buildings,*
London.
and the following number should be quoted in the communication :—
Opp.

Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,

25, Southampton Buildings,

London.

18 .

Opp. *to App.*

Sir,

I have to inform you that this matter must now be submitted for the determination of the Chancery Division of Her Majesty's High Court of Justice, and that you should, within one month from this date, take the necessary steps, under Rule 29 of the Trade Marks Rules, 1883, to bring the matter before the said Division, and send me notice to that effect; and if you do not send me such notice within such time as aforesaid, you will be deemed to have abandoned your application.

I am,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,

Comptroller.

To *A. B.*,
c./o. *C. D.*

g.

Form of Certificate for use in Legal Proceedings.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

Certificate of Registration.

In the matter of Legal Proceedings
in the High Court of Justice,
No. Chancery Division.

Between *A. B.*, Plaintiff,
and
C. D., Defendant.

I, Henry Reader Lack, Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks, hereby certify that *A. B.*, of , is entered on the register of trade marks as proprietor of the trade mark No. in Class in respect of , for the registration of which mark application was made on the day of 18 .

A representation of the said trade mark is shown hereunder.

REPRESENTATION OF TRADE MARK.

Witness my hand and seal this day of 188 .

Comptroller-General.

Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, *Southampton Buildings,*
London.

h.

Form of Certificate for use in Applying for Registration in Foreign Countries.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

Certificate of Registration.

In the matter of an application to
No. register the Trade Mark No.
of *A. B.*, in [*France*].

I, Henry Reader Lack, Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks, hereby certify that *A. B.*, of , is entered on the register of trade marks as proprietor of the trade mark No. in Class in respect of , for the registration of which mark application was made on the day of 18 .

The user claimed for the said trade mark is [*one year before the* 13*th day of August,* 1875].

A representation of the said trade mark is annexed hereto.

REPRESENTATION OF TRADE MARK.

Witness my hand and seal this day of 188 .

Comptroller-General.

Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

i.

FORM OF GENERAL CERTIFICATE.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

General Certificate.

In the matter of

No.

I, HENRY READER LACK, Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks, hereby certify that

REPRESENTATION OF TRADE MARK.

Witness my hand and seal this day of 188 .

Comptroller-General.

Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

k.

Form of Certificate of Refusal to Register.

PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND TRADE MARKS ACT, 1883.

Certificate of Refusal, under section 77.

No.

I, Henry Reader Lack, Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks, hereby certify that on the day of 18 , of applied to register the mark, of which a representation is annexed, in Class , stating that the said mark had been in use as a trade mark before the 13th day of August, 1875; and I also certify that registration of the said mark has been refused by me as not coming within the 64th section of "The Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883."

REPRESENTATION OF TRADE MARK.

Witness my hand and seal this day of 188 .

Comptroller-General.

Patent Office: Trade Marks Branch,
25, Southampton Buildings,
London.

PART II.

FORMS FOR USE IN REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.

1. GROUNDS OF OPPOSITION (*a*).

(i.) The alleged trade mark to which the above-mentioned application relates is not a registrable trade mark within § 64 of the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883.

(ii.) The alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] does not consist of or contain any essential particular as defined by § 64 of the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, or any special and distinctive word, or words, letter, figure, or combination of letters or figures, or of letters and figures used as a trade mark before the 13th August, 1875.

(iii.) It is not the fact, as alleged by the applicant in his application, that he has used the trade mark No. for years. The said trade mark has in fact been used exclusively for years past by the opponent, who is now applying to register the same. If there has been any user by the applicant, the same has been clandestine and unknown to the opponent.

(iv.) It is not the fact as alleged [as in (iii.) to—years]. The applicant has never used the said alleged trade mark otherwise than as a mere descriptive term, and he is not now entitled to register it as his old trade mark.

(v.) The goods in respect of which the above-mentioned applicant is seeking to register the alleged trade mark No. are not goods comprised in Class of the classes under the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883.

(vi.) The alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] is a mere word in ordinary use in the English language descriptive of quality, and the applicant is not entitled to acquire an exclusive right therein by registration.

(*a*) See Form J., p. 388, *suprà*, for the formal parts of the notice of opposition. These forms are intended to be varied and combined as may be necessary, or they may suggest others more suitable to particular cases.

(vii.) The alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] is not distinctive of the above-named applicant's goods, but is merely descriptive of the nature and quality of the goods to which it is applied.

(viii.) The alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] is not a mark distinctive of the above-named applicant's goods, but has for many years past been in common use in the trade, and is generally understood by the trade and the public to denote a particular quality [*or* pattern] of goods [and was for that reason placed by the Manchester Committee of Experts in their second class or B. list], and no person is entitled to acquire an exclusive right therein by registration.

(ix.) The alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] consists of a name which has throughout the continuance of an expired patent been applied by the applicant as patentee, and by the trade and the public, to articles manufactured in accordance with the said patent. Upon the expiration of the said patent the trade became entitled to manufacture in accordance with the said patent, and to describe articles so manufactured by the name which was generally understood to be descriptive of them, and the applicant is not now entitled to exclude the trade from the use of the said name.

(x.) The alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] is identical with the opponent's trade mark No. registered with respect to the same goods or description of goods as those for which the applicant is now applying to register the same. If the applicant is allowed to register or use the said alleged trade mark, the trade and the public will be deceived and the opponent injured.

(xi.) The alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] so nearly resembles the opponent's [as in (x.) to—register the same] as to be calculated to deceive. An action is now pending in the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice in which the opponent is seeking to restrain the applicant from using the said alleged trade mark.

(xii.) The alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] so nearly resembles the opponent's Sheffield mark No. , registered in the Sheffield register with respect to the same goods or description of goods as those for which the applicant is now applying to register the said alleged trade mark, as to be calculated to deceive.

(xiii.) The trade mark [as in (i.) to—relates] is the trade mark of the opponent, and has been used by him in

his business for years last past, and an application by the opponent for the registration of the same is now pending. The applicant is a discharged servant of the opponent, in fraud of whose rights the present application is made.

(xiv.) The trade mark [as in (i.) to—relates] was months since adopted by the opponent and used upon his [describe the goods], and the applicant was employed by the opponent to obtain the registration of the same on his behalf, and he is not now entitled to obtain the registration of the same in his own name.

(xv.) The trade mark [as in (i.) to—relates] has for many years past been the exclusive property in [France] of the opponent, and it has for the same period been exclusively used in the United Kingdom upon goods of the opponent imported into this country. [The opponent has not hitherto registered the said trade mark in the United Kingdom from ignorance of the requirements of British law, but he is now about to apply for the registration of the same.]

(xvi.) The alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] contains several material mis-statements with respect to the nature and composition of the article to which it is applied by the applicant, and the said alleged trade mark is therefore calculated to deceive, and ought not to be registered.

(xvii.) The alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] contains a statement contrary to the fact, that the goods to which it is applied by the applicant are patented, and the said alleged trade mark ought not therefore to be registered.

(xviii.) By articles of partnership, dated , under which the opponent and the applicant carried on business until recently in partnership, it was agreed that on the dissolution of the partnership the goodwill of the partnership business and the trade marks used therein (of which the trade mark [as in (i.) to—relates] was one) should belong solely to the opponent. The said partnership is now dissolved, and the applicant is not entitled to use or register the said trade mark.

(xix.) By articles [as in (xviii.) to—dissolution of the partnership] neither of the partners should in any business carried on by him use the name or trade marks used by the said partnership. The trade mark [as in (i.) to —relates] is one of the trade marks which were used by the said partnership, and since the dissolution of the said partnership the applicant is not entitled to use or register the said trade mark.

(xx.) The word which forms part of the alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] is a word in common use in the trade, and the applicant is therefore not entitled to acquire any exclusive right in the said word by registration, or to obtain registration of the said alleged trade mark, except and unless he first disclaims any right to the exclusive use of the said word.

(xxi.) The device of a ["lion"] is in common use in the trade, and the applicant is therefore not entitled to obtain registration of the words ["Lion Brand"] as part of his alleged trade mark No. , except and unless he first disclaims any right to the exclusive use of the said words.

(xxii.) Goods of my manufacture [*or*, merchandise] of the same description as the goods for which the applicant is now applying to register his alleged trade mark, are constantly ordered and sold as ["Lion"] goods, and if the applicant is allowed to obtain registration of the device of a [lion] as [*or* as part of] his trade mark, it will cause his goods to be passed off as and for my goods.

(xxiii.) The alleged [as in (i.) to—relates] so nearly resembles the opponent's registered trade mark No. as to be calculated to deceive. The class of goods for the whole of which the above-mentioned applicant is now applying to register the said trade mark includes the goods in respect of which the opponent's said trade mark is registered, and the applicant is therefore not entitled to obtain registration of the said alleged trade mark except and unless the goods in respect of which registration is granted to him are so limited and defined as not to include the goods or description of goods for which the opponent's said trade mark is registered as aforesaid.

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2. GROUNDS OF COUNTER-STATEMENT (*a*).

(i.) The trade mark to which the above-mentioned application relates has been exclusively used for years last past by the applicant, and is a good, valid, and registrable trade mark.

(ii.) The trade mark [as in (i.) to—relates] consists of [*or* contains] an essential particular as defined by § 64 of the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, viz.,

(*a*) See Form *a*., p. 397, *suprà*, for the formal parts of the counter-statement.

[a distinctive device, mark, or label], and is therefore registrable as a new trade mark.

(iii.) The trade mark [as in (i.) to—relates] consists of a special and distinctive word used by the opponent as a trade mark before the 13th day of August, 1875, and is therefore a good and valid trade mark and is registrable as an old mark.

(iv.) I have publicly used the trade mark [as in (i.) to—relates] in the United Kingdom for years, as alleged in my above-mentioned application. Such user has not been clandestine, but has been generally known to the trade in ; and if it has not been known to the opponent, that must have been either because he was not engaged in such trade, or else because he conducted his business negligently.

(v.) The goods in respect of which I am applying to register my above-mentioned trade mark No. are goods comprised in Class of the classes under the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883 [as appears from the Guide to the Classification issued at the Patent Office].

(vi.) My above-mentioned trade mark is not a mere word in ordinary use in the English language descriptive of quality, but is a special and distinctive word by which my goods are generally recognised by the trade and the public, and I am entitled to register the same.

(vii.) My above-mentioned trade mark is not merely descriptive of the nature and quality of the goods to which it is applied, but it was first adopted and has since been exclusively used by myself for the purpose of distinguishing goods of my manufacture [*or* merchandise], and it is generally recognised as being distinctive of such goods.

(viii.) It is not the fact that my above-mentioned trade mark has for many years past, or at all, been in common use in the trade. In instances I have obtained injunctions to restrain infringements thereof, and if there has been any user by persons not so restrained it has been without my knowledge, or I should have taken proceedings against them.

(ix.) It is not the fact that my above-mentioned trade mark is generally understood by the trade or the public to denote a particular quality of goods; on the contrary, it is generally understood to denote goods of my manufacture [*or* merchandise], and the trade and the public

would be deceived and I should be injured if any other manufacturer were to use it.

(x.) My above-mentioned trade mark was placed by the Manchester Committee of Experts in their 2nd class, or B. list, in consequence of a misapprehension as to the principles by which their action was to be governed, and the said mark was wrongfully so placed, and ought to be admitted to registration.

(xi.) It is not the fact that I, or the trade, or the public, have used or understood my above-mentioned trade mark as describing articles made in accordance with my expired patent. On the contrary, I adopted it before the grant to me of the said patent, and it has always been used and understood as distinguishing goods of my make, and not goods of any particular pattern.

(xii.) My above-mentioned trade mark is not identical with the opponent's registered mark [*or* Sheffield mark], nor does it so nearly resemble the same as to be calculated to deceive.

(xiii.) The goods with respect to which the opponent's trade mark [*or* Sheffield mark] is registered are not the same goods nor goods of the same description as the goods with respect to which I am applying for registration of my above-mentioned trade mark.

(xiv.) The opponent's trade mark No. is not a good or valid trade mark, but was registered by mistake and wrongfully, and I am now applying for the rectification of the register by the removal therefrom of the said mark.

(xv.) Whether the trade mark which I am now applying to register is or is not the property of the opponent in a foreign country, as to which I have no knowledge, the said trade mark has not up to the present time been known in the United Kingdom in connection with [describe the goods], but the same is a new mark adopted for the first time by myself. months since.

(xvi.) The statements contained in my above-mentioned trade mark are true, and my said trade mark is not calculated to deceive. If any of such statements are exaggerated, such exaggerations are trifling and immaterial and not calculated to deceive.

(xvii.) The mention of a patent contained in my above-mentioned trade mark is not such as to lead to the belief that the patent there mentioned is an existing patent, and my said trade mark is not calculated to deceive.

(xviii.) The articles of partnership mentioned in the notice of opposition provided that the goodwill and trade marks of the partnership business should belong to the opponent only in the event of the partnership being dissolved by effluxion of time. The said partnership was dissolved at an earlier date by common consent, and the provisions of the said articles were varied in such manner that the goodwill and trade marks devolved upon the opponent and myself equally.

(xix.) The trade mark to which my above-mentioned application relates was used by me in my business concurrently with the opponent before the 13th day of August, 1875, and is an old trade mark, and was not used by any other person in the same trade, and I am therefore entitled to registration notwithstanding the opponent's registration.

(xx.) The opponent uses his trade mark No. only by stamping it on his goods. I only use mine by placing it on the wrappers in which the goods are placed, and the concurrent use of the two trade marks in such different ways is not calculated to deceive. I have used my trade mark for years, and am willing to undertake to use it in the future only as I have hitherto used it.

(xxi.) The opponent uses his trade mark No. only on goods exported by him to [the Colonies and the United States], I only use mine in [the United Kingdom], and the concurrent user of the two trade marks in such different parts of the world cannot deceive. I am willing [as in (xx.)].

(xxii.) The word , which forms part of my above-mentioned trade mark No. , and also of the opponent's registered mark No. , is a mere word of description, and is not an essential particular of the opponent's said registered mark, nor has he any exclusive rights therein by reason of his registration.

3. Special Case.

In the High Court of Justice, 188 . B. No. .
Chancery Division.
Mr. Justice .

Between [*A.B.*], Plaintiff,
and
[*C.D.*], Defendant.

Special case stated for the opinion of the High Court of Justice, pursuant to the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883, and the Rules made thereunder.

1. [The facts necessary to enable the Court to determine the
2. rights of the parties must be stated concisely in
3. numbered paragraphs.]
4.

The questions submitted for the opinion of the Court are:

1. Whether the plaintiff *A.B.*, or the defendant *C.D.*, or either of them, is entitled to have his name entered in the register of trade marks kept under the authority of the above-mentioned Act as the proprietor of the said trade mark, or whether both of them are so entitled.
2. By whom the costs of this special case should be paid.

E. F., Solicitor for Plaintiff.
G. H., Solicitor for Defendant.

Note.—This special case is filed by *E. F.* of , Solicitor for the above-named Plaintiff.

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4. Summons for Leave to Register.

In the High Court of Justice.
Chancery Division,
Mr. Justice .

In the matter of an application by *A. B.* for the registration of a trade mark No. ,
and
In the matter of the opposition thereto, No. of *C. D.*,
and
In the matter of the Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act, 1883.

Let all parties concerned attend at the chambers of Mr. Justice , at the Royal Courts of Justice, on

, the day of , 18 at o'clock in the noon, upon the application of the above-named *A. B.* that the Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks may be directed to proceed with the above-mentioned application of the said *A. B.* [notwithstanding the above-mentioned opposition thereto of *C. D.*] *or* [notwithstanding the registration of *C. D.'s* trade mark No.], *or* [notwithstanding the registration of *C. D.'s* trade mark No. in the Sheffield register].

Dated the day of 188 .

(Seal).

This summons was taken out by *E. F.* of , solicitor for the above-named *A. B.*

To the Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks, *or, where there is an opposition,* To the above-named *C. D.*

The following note to be added to the original summons, and when the time is altered by indorsement the indorsement to be referred to as below.

Note.—If you do not attend either personally or by your solicitor at the time and place above mentioned [*or*, at the place above mentioned at the time mentioned in the indorsement hereon] such order will be made and proceedings taken as the judge may think just and expedient.

---

5. Notice of Motion for Leave to Register.

[Heading as in No. 4.]

Take notice that the Court will be moved before His Lordship Mr. Justice on the day of 188 , or so soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, by Mr. , of counsel on behalf of the above-named *A. B.*, that you [*or*, that the Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks] may be directed to proceed [as in No. 4].

Dated the day of , 188 .

(Signed) *E. F.* of , Solicitor for the above-named *A. B.*

To the Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks *or, if there is an opposition,* To *Mr. C. D.*

6. NOTICE OF MOTION FOR LEAVE TO ADD TO, OR ALTER A REGISTERED TRADE MARK.

In the High Court of Justice,
Chancery Division.
Mr. Justice

In the matter of the registered trade mark
No. of *A. B.*
and
In the matter of the Patents, Designs, and
Trade Marks Act, 1883.

Take notice [as in No. 5 to—that] leave may be given to add to the above-mentioned trade mark in the register of trade marks [the words " ", *or*, as the case may be], *or*, that leave may be given to alter the registration of the above-mentioned trade mark in the following respects, that is to say by [diminishing the size of the words and altering the address from to , *or*, as the case may be].

[Dated and signed as in No. 5.]

To the Comptroller-General of Patents,
Designs, and Trade Marks.

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7. NOTICE OF MOTION FOR THE RECTIFICATION OF THE REGISTER.

[Heading as in No. 6.]

Take notice [as in No. 5 to—behalf of] *C. D.* of , that the register of trade marks kept under the authority of the above-mentioned Act may be rectified [by removing therefrom the above-mentioned trade mark No.], *or* [by removing therefrom the name of the above-mentioned *A. B.* as the proprietor of the above-mentioned trade mark and entering therein the name of the said *C. D.* as the proprietor of the said trade mark], *or* [by adding to the registration of the above-mentioned trade mark No. a note disclaiming any exclusive right in the above-named *A. B.* to the use of the word], *or* [by adding, &c., &c., a note stating that the above-named *A. B.* is only entitled to use the same in respect of goods intended for export to], *or* [by adding, &c., &c., entitled to use the same by placing it upon the wrappers in which the goods are sold, and not by placing it upon the goods themselves], *or* [by limiting the registration of the above-mentioned trade mark No. to (describe the goods), and not allowing it to remain in respect of all the goods in class], *or* that such further or other order may be made for the rectification of the said register as to the Court shall seem just.

[Dated and signed as in No. 5.]

To Mr. *A. B.* [and the Comptroller-General of
Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks.]

PART III.

FORMS FOR USE IN ACTIONS FOR INFRINGEMENT (*a*).

1. Writ of Summons, with Indorsement.

In the High Court of Justice, Chancery Division.
Mr. Justice

188 . B. No. .

Between *A. B.*, Plaintiff,
and
C. D., Defendant.

Victoria, by the Grace of God, &c.

To *C. D.*, of , in the county of .
We command you that within eight days after the service of this writ on you, inclusive of the day of such service, you do cause an appearance to be entered for you in an action at the suit of *A. B.*; and take notice that in default of your so doing the plaintiff may proceed therein, and judgment may be given in your absence.

Witness, Roundell, Earl of Selborne, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, the day of , in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and .

Memorandum to be subscribed on the writ.

N.B.—This writ is to be served within twelve calendar months from the date thereof, or, if renewed, within six calendar months from the date of the last renewal, including the day of such date, and not afterwards.

The defendant [*or* defendants] may appear hereto by entering an appearance [*or* appearances] either personally or by solicitor at the Central Office, Royal Courts of Justice, London.

(*a*) See Schedules to Rules of Supreme Court, 1883.

Indorsements to be made on the writ before issue thereof.

The plaintiff's claim is for an injunction to restrain the defendant from [*see forms of Injunction in Part IV. of this Appendix*], and for an account or damages;

or, The plaintiff's claim is for damages for wrongfully using [*or*, imitating] the plaintiff's trade mark, and for an injunction to restrain, &c.

This writ was issued by the said plaintiff, who resides at ;

or, This writ was issued by *E. F.* of , whose address for service is , solicitor for the said plaintiff, who resides at ;

or, This writ was issued by *G. H.* of , whose address for service is , agent for *E. F.* of , solicitor for the said plaintiff, who resides at [*mention the city, town, or parish, and also the name of the street and number of the house of the plaintiff's residence, if any.*]

Indorsement to be made on the writ after service thereof.

This writ was served by me at on the defendant on the day of , 18 .

Indorsed the day of 18 .
(Signed)
(Address)

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2. Notice of Motion for Injunction.

[Heading as in No. 1.]

Take notice that the Court will be moved before His Lordship Mr. Justice on the day of 18 , or so soon thereafter as counsel can be heard, by [Mr. of] counsel for the above-named plaintiff, that an injunction may be granted to restrain the defendant, &c., until judgment in this action or further order, from [*see Part IV. of this Appendix*] [and take also notice that special leave to serve you with this [short] notice for the day aforesaid [with the writ of summons] has been obtained from the said Mr. Justice .]

Dated the day of 18 .

(Signed) *E. F.* of ,
Solicitor for the above-named Plaintiff.

To the Defendant *C. D.*

3. Statement of Claim.

[Heading as in No. 1, inserting above the title of the action—"Writ issued the day of , 18 ."]

Statement of Claim (*a*).

1. The defendant has infringed the plaintiff's trade mark.
2. The trade mark is [*describe it*].

(*If the plaintiff is not the original proprietor of the trade mark, show shortly how his title is derived.*)

3. The following are the acts complained of, viz.:—

(*Set them out.*)

The plaintiff claims an injunction to restrain the defendant, his servants and agents, from infringing the plaintiff's said trade mark, and in particular from [*see forms of Injunction in Part IV. of this Appendix.*)

The plaintiff also claims an account or damages.

(Signed)

(Delivered)

(*a*) The above is the form appended to the Rules of Court, 1883, but it is thought that fuller particulars will usually be required. The Forms 3 (i.), 3 (ii.), and 3 (iii.) are therefore suggested.

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3 (i.). [Heading as above.]

Statement of Claim.

1. The plaintiff is the registered proprietor of a trade mark [consisting of] (*a*), which was advertised in the *Trade Marks Journal* of the day of , 18 , and is registered for in Class [the date of such registration being the day of , 18] (*b*).

2. The defendant has infringed the plaintiff's said trade mark in manner following; that is to say [he has].

[3. The plaintiff has applied to the defendant to desist from his wrongful acts aforesaid, but he has refused [*or* neglected] so to do] (*c*).

4. The defendant has made considerable profits by selling goods not being the plaintiff's goods under the trade mark of which the plaintiff complains [*or* in manner aforesaid].

5. The plaintiff has sustained considerable damage from the defendant's wrongful acts aforesaid.

The plaintiff claims—

1. An injunction [as above].

2. An account of profits or damages and delivery up to him of all goods in the possession or power of the defendant having thereon the trade mark of which complaint is hereby made in order that such trade mark may be obliterated therefrom, and also delivery up to him for the purpose of destruction of all copies in the possession or power of the defendant of the said trade mark and of all blocks, dies, or other apparatus in the like possession or power adapted for the production of the said trade mark.
3. Costs.

(*a*) The trade mark need not be described unless the nature of the infringement renders it necessary.
(*b*) The date of registration may be omitted, if not more than five years before writ issued.
(*c*) Though previous application is not necessary, if it has been made, it should be mentioned.

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3 (ii.). [Heading as above.]

Statement of Claim.

1. [As in 3 (i.), omitting the description of the plaintiff's trade mark].
2. The said trade mark consists of [*or* contains] the device of a [lion], and the plaintiff's goods bearing such trade mark are extensively known in the [Indian] markets as ["Lion"] goods, and are frequently ordered and invoiced under that name.
3. No other goods of the same kind are or ever have been known in the [Indian] markets as ["Lion"] goods.
4. The defendant is using on goods intended for export to the [Indian] markets a trade mark [*or* label, *or* wrapper] on which he places the device of a [lion], and such user is calculated to deceive by inducing purchasers to buy the defendant's goods in the belief that they are buying those of the plaintiff.
5. [As in 3 (i.), par. 4].
6. [As in 3 (i.), par. 5].

The plaintiff claims [as in 3 (i.). For form of injunction, see that in *Orr-Ewing & Co.* v. *Johnston & Co.*, Part IV., No. 4, *infrà*].

3. (iii.) [Heading as above.]

Statement of Claim (*a*).

1. The plaintiff has for years last past and upwards offered for sale and sold [a preparation for the human hair] of his manufacture under the title of [Robinson's Hair Stimulant], and previously to the defendant commencing his wrongful acts hereinafter stated no other person except the plaintiff offered for sale or sold under that title any similar preparation.

2. The plaintiff offers for sale and sells and always has offered for sale and sold [his said preparation] in bottles of a peculiar and distinctive shape packed in cases which are also of a peculiar and distinctive shape, and previously to the defendant commencing his wrongful acts hereinafter stated no other person except the plaintiff used for the purposes of trade in any [preparation for the human hair] bottles or cases similar in shape to the plaintiff's bottles and cases.

3. The plaintiff has recently ascertained as the fact is that the defendant for the purpose of passing off his goods as and for the plaintiff's goods is offering for sale and selling [a preparation] not of the plaintiff's manufacture under the title of [Robinson's Hair Stimulant], and in bottles similar in shape to the plaintiff's bottles and packed in cases similar in shape to the plaintiff's cases, whereby divers persons have been induced to purchase the defendant's [preparation] as and for the goods of the plaintiff [*or* and such acts are calculated to induce, &c.].

4. The defendant has made considerable profits by selling his goods as and for the goods of the plaintiff.

5. [As in 3 (i.), par. 5.]

The plaintiff claims—

1. An injunction to restrain the defendant his servants and agents from passing or attempting to pass off the defendant's goods as or for the plaintiff's goods and in particular from offering for sale or selling any [preparation for the human hair] not of the plaintiff's manufacture by means of the use of the title [Robinson's Hair Stimulant], and by means of the use of bottles similar in shape to the plaintiff's bottles, and by means of the use of cases similar in shape to the plaintiff's cases, or by any of such means [*or* as may be].
2. An account of profits or damages.
3. Costs.

(*a*) This is intended for a case in which no trade mark has been registered.

4. Defence.

[Heading as in No. 1.]

Defence (*a*).

The defendant says that:—
1. The trade mark is not the plaintiff's.
2. The alleged trade mark is not a trade mark.
3. The defendant did not infringe.

(Signed)
(Delivered).

(*a*) The above is the form appended to the Rules of Court, 1883, but a fuller form varying with the nature of the defence will generally be required.

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5. Reply.

[Heading as in No. 1.]

Reply.

The plaintiff as to the defence says that:—
1.
2.

(Signed)
(Delivered)

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6. Summons to Stay Proceedings by Consent, the Defendant submitting to an Injunction.

[Heading as in No. 1.]

Let all parties concerned attend at the chambers of Mr. Justice at the Royal Courts of Justice on the day of , 18 , at o'clock in the noon, on the hearing of an application on the part of the above-named defendant that the defendant submitting to a perpetual injunction restraining [*see forms of Injunction in Part IV. of this Appendix, infrà*] and submitting to pay the plaintiff £ in respect of [damages and] his taxed costs of this action, all further proceedings in this action may be stayed, or that such further or other order may be made as to the judge shall seem just.

Dated the day of , 18 .

This summons was taken out by *G. H.* of , Solicitor for the above-named Defendant.

To the above-named Plaintiff.

PART IV.

PRECEDENTS OF INJUNCTIONS, &c.

1. Croft *v.* Day, 7 Beav. 84—90.

Label on Blacking Bottles—Trade Cards—Injunction.

Injunction to restrain the defendant, his servants, &c., "from selling, or exposing for sale, or procuring to be sold, any composition or blacking described as, or purporting to be, blacking manufactured by Day and Martin, in bottles having affixed thereto such labels as in the complainant's bill mentioned, or any other labels so contrived or expressed as, by colourable imitation or otherwise, to represent the composition or blacking sold by the defendant to be the same as the composition or blacking manufactured and sold by John Weston (the manager), for the benefit of the estate of Charles Day, the testator; and from using trade cards so contrived or expressed as to represent that any composition or blacking sold or proposed to be sold by the defendant is the same as the composition or blacking manufactured or sold by John Weston" (*a*).

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2. Seixo *v.* Provezende, L. R. 1 Ch. 192—194.

Brand on Casks of Wine—Injunction.

Injunction to restrain the defendants, &c., "from affixing or causing to be affixed to any casks of wine shipped to their orders the brand or marks of a crown and the word *Seixo*, or any other combination of marks or words so contrived as, by colourable imitation or otherwise, to represent the marks or brands of the plaintiff, and from employing any marks or words which shall be so contrived as to represent, or induce the belief, that such wines are Crown Seixo, or the produce of the *Quinta do Seixo*, or otherwise using the word *Seixo* without clearly distinguishing the same from the wine produced by the *Quinta do Seixo*" (*b*).

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3. Stephens *v.* Peel, 16 L. T. N. S. 145.

Labels on Bottles of Ink—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from selling, or exposing, or advertising for sale, or procuring to be sold, any ink or writing fluid in

(*a*) Lord Langdale, M. R. (*b*) Wood, V.-C.

bottles bearing thereon such labels as after mentioned, and from using any labels, or stamps, or advertisements so contrived or expressed as by colourable imitation or otherwise to represent or lead to the belief that the ink sold by the defendant is the ink or writing fluid manufactured by the plaintiffs, and sold by them under the name of 'Stephens' Blue Black Writing Fluid'" (*a*).

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4. ORR-EWING & Co. *v.* JOHNSTON & Co., 7 App. Cas. 219—233.

"Two Elephant" Yarn—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from affixing or causing to be affixed to any Turkey red yarn not dyed by the plaintiffs the ticket marked 'B,' and from using two elephants on any ticket used on Turkey red yarn, without clearly distinguishing such ticket from the plaintiff's ticket mentioned in the pleadings, being the exhibit marked 'A' referred to in the depositions, or so as to represent or induce the belief that any of the said yarn was dyed by the plaintiffs" (*b*).

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5. READ BROTHERS *v.* RICHARDSON & Co., 45 L. T. N. S. 54—60.

"Dog's Head" Beer for Exportation—Undertaking—Injunction to the Hearing—Costs.

"The plaintiffs by their counsel undertaking to abide by any order this Court may make as to damages in case this Court shall hereafter be of opinion that the defendants have sustained any by reason of this order which the plaintiffs ought to pay, this Court doth order that the defendants, &c., be restrained from using the figure of a dog's head upon any labels, tickets, or wrappers, affixed or applied to bottles of beer or stout sold for exportation or exported by the defendants to any of the Australian Colonies or New Zealand, and from selling for exportation or exporting to any of the said colonies any bottles of beer or stout having affixed or applied thereto any such label, ticket, or wrapper, until judgment in this action or further order; and it is ordered that the plaintiffs' costs of this motion be their costs in the action" (*c*).

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6. BROADHURST *v.* BARLOW, L. J. Notes of Cases, 1872, p. 183.

Stamps on Shirtings—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from stamping, impressing, or affixing, or causing to be stamped, impressed, or affixed on or to

(*a*) Wood, V.-C. (*b*) House of Lords. (*c*) Court of Appeal.

any Spanish shirtings or pieces of white calico manufactured or sold by them, any mark consisting of words in the Turkish, Armenian, and Greek languages, meaning 'exactly 12 yards,' and placed between a figure or crest and the words 'Spanish Shirtings' enclosed in a scroll in the same manner as those are respectively placed in the plaintiff's trade mark, or in any manner only colourably differing therefrom" (*a*).

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7. Wotherspoon *v.* Currie, L. R. 5 H. L. 508—523.

"Glenfield Starch"—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the respondent, &c., "from using the word 'Glenfield' in or upon any labels affixed to packets of starch manufactured by or for him, and from in any other way representing the starch manufactured by or for him to be 'Glenfield Starch,' and from selling or causing the same to be sold as 'Glenfield Starch,' and from doing any act or thing to induce the belief that starch manufactured by or for him, the respondent, is 'Glenfield Starch,' or starch manufactured by the appellant" (*b*).

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8. Ford *v.* Foster, L. R. 7 Ch. 611—634.

"Eureka" Shirts—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from applying the mark or title 'Eureka' to any shirts manufactured by them, or to any shirts sold by them, unless manufactured by the plaintiffs, and from selling any shirts already marked with the mark and title 'Eureka,' unless such mark or title has been applied with the sanction of the plaintiffs; and from issuing any boxes or packages on which the mark or title of 'Eureka' shall be applied to shirts not of the plaintiff's manufacture; and from affixing or using any label, or card, or other mark containing the word 'Eureka' to or upon any shirts not of the plaintiffs' manufacture" (*c*).

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9. Apollinaris Co. *v.* Norrish, 33 L. T. N. S. 242.

"Apollinaris Water"—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from selling, &c., any mineral or other waters, not being the genuine Apollinaris water, under the name of 'Apollinaris Water,' or 'London Apollinaris Water,' or under any other

(*a*) Wickens, V.C. (*b*) House of Lords. (*c*) James, L. J.

name of which the word 'Apollinaris' so forms part as to be calculated to deceive the public" (*a*).

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10. Carungho *v.* Stephenson, 25 Sol. J. 929.

"*La Intimidad*" *Cigars—Injunction.*

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from selling or causing or allowing to be sold, and from in any manner representing, or causing or procuring to be represented, any cigars manufactured, sold, or dealt in by the defendant as "La Intimidad" cigars, or as cigars manufactured, imported, or sold by the plaintiffs or either of them; and also from affixing, or procuring or causing or allowing to be affixed, to any boxes of cigars manufactured, or bought, or procured, or sold, or attempted to be sold by the defendant, or otherwise using, or employing, or permitting to be used or employed, any labels, wrappers, brands, or marks used by the plaintiffs or either of them, or so contrived or prepared as to represent or lead to the belief that the cigars manufactured or sold by the defendant are cigars manufactured or sold by the plaintiffs or either of them, and from using the words "La Intimidad" on any cigars, or boxes, or wrappers containing cigars, so as to induce the belief that such cigars are manufactured or imported by the plaintiffs or either of them, pending the trial of this action" (*b*).

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11. Edelsten *v.* Edelsten, 1 De G. J. & S. 185—189.

"*Anchor Brand Wire*"*—Prayer of Bill—Injunction—Account—Delivery up.*

Prayer of Bill: "that an account may be taken of the gains and profits made and obtained by the defendants by the sale of wire having tallies or labels attached thereto with the plaintiff's trade mark, or a trade mark in imitation of, or only colourably differing from that of the plaintiff, stamped or impressed thereon; and that the defendants may be ordered to pay to the plaintiff the amount of such gains and profits. That the defendants may be restrained by injunction from attaching to wire, not the manufacture of the plaintiff, any tally or label with the plaintiff's trade mark,

(*a*) Bacon, V.-C. And see also forms of injunctions in *Apollinaris Co.* v. *Edwards*, Seton, 4th ed. 237; *Millington* v. *Fox*, 3 My. & Cr. 338; and Pemberton, 3rd ed. 238; *Edelsten* v. *Vick*, 11 Hare, 78; *Collins Co.* v. *Walker*, 7 W. R. 222, and Seton, 4th ed. 235; *Harrison* v. *Taylor*, 11 Jur. N. S. 408, and Pemberton, 3rd ed. 239; *Braham* v. *Bustard*, 1 H. & M. 447; *McAndrew* v. *Bassett*, 4 De G. J. & S. 380, and Pemberton, 3rd ed. 239; *Mickle* v. *Emery*, Seton, 4th ed. 234; *Siegert* v. *Findlater*, 7 Ch. D. 801—814; *McLean* v. *Fleming*, 96 U. S. Rep. (6 Otto) 245; 13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 913, 914.

(*b*) Cave, J.

or any mark in imitation thereof, or only colourably differing therefrom, stamped or impressed thereon, and from otherwise using the plaintiff's trade mark, or any mark in imitation thereof, so as to denote or represent that the said wire is the 'Anchor Brand Wire,' or is the manufacture of the plaintiff; and from selling, or offering for sale, or procuring to be sold, any wire not being of the plaintiff's manufacture, having a tally or label attached thereto with the plaintiff's trade mark, or a mark in imitation thereof, or only colourably differing therefrom, stamped or impressed thereon, or otherwise in any manner having the said trade mark, or a mark in imitation thereof, or only colourably differing therefrom, attached thereto. That the defendants may deliver up to be cancelled all tallies, labels, and papers in their possession, or in the possession of their servants or agents, having the said trade mark so in colourable imitation of the plaintiff's as hereinbefore mentioned; and also all tallies, labels, and papers in their possession, or in the possession of their servants or agents, having the plaintiff's trade mark, or any mark in imitation thereof, or only colourably differing therefrom, stamped or impressed thereon, and also all dies for stamping or impressing the same; and that the defendants may pay all the costs of the suit" (*a*).

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12. GUINNESS *v.* ULLMER, 10 L. T. (Old Series), 127.

Engraving Blocks for Printing Forged Labels—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from cutting, engraving, casting, or making, and from causing to be cut, engraved, cast, or made, and also from using or permitting to be used, and from selling, or otherwise disposing of or parting with any blocks or plates adapted for printing labels or sheets of labels in imitation of the label furnished by Sparkes Moline to and used by the agents appointed by him for sale of the plaintiffs' stout, as in the plaintiffs' bill mentioned, or any of them, or differing only colourably therefrom. And also from selling, or otherwise disposing of, and from delivering over or parting with any of such blocks or plates as are now in their possession, custody, or power, to any person other than the plaintiffs or such person as they shall appoint to receive the same" (*b*).

(*a*) Wood, V.-C., made a decree in the terms of the prayer of the bill. See 1 De G. J. & S. 196; Lord Westbury, C., affirmed the decree. As to the account, see also *Foster* v. *Megerand*, Pemberton, 3rd ed. 239; and the full decree in *Ford* v. *Foster*, Seton, 4th ed. 236. As to order restraining exportation of goods with forged trade marks, see *Henderson* v. *Jorss*, Seton, 4th ed. 236. As to order restraining the bringing into the market of imported goods with forged trade marks, see *Upmann* v. *Elkan*, L. R. 12 Eq. 140; 7 Ch. 130; *Rivero* v. *Norris*, Seton, 4th ed. 236; *Del Valle* v. *Mayer*, *ib.*; *Moet* v. *Pickering*, 6 Ch. D. 770—1; 8 *ib.* 372.

(*b*) Shadwell, V.-C. of Eng.

13. Farina *v.* Silverlock, 1 K. & J. 509.

Printing Forged Labels—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from printing or selling, or exposing for sale, or procuring to be printed or sold, any labels similar to those in use by the plaintiff, as in the bill in this cause mentioned, or containing copies of the signature, or address, or flourish, seal, or stamp, or other marks invented and used by the plaintiff as therein mentioned, or any signature, address, flourish, seal, stamp, or other mark merely colourably differing therefrom, or any other papers or labels so printed or contrived as, by colourable imitation or otherwise, to represent or lead to the belief that Eau de Cologne prepared by other parties was Eau de Cologne prepared by the plaintiff" (*a*).

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14. Clement *v.* Maddick, 1 Giff. 98—101.

Name of Newspaper—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from printing, publishing, or continuing to print or publish, any newspaper or other periodical paper with or under the name or style of 'The Penny Bell's Life and Sporting News,' or with or under any name or style of which the name, style, or words of 'Bell's Life' shall form a part, or in any way occur [therein]; and from using the said name, style, or title of 'Bell's Life' by way of name, style, or title to any newspaper or periodical without the licence or consent of the plaintiff" (*b*).

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15. Ingram *v.* Stiff, 5 Jur. N. S. 947.

Name of Newspaper—Injuring Plaintiff's Paper—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from printing, publishing, or selling any newspaper or other periodical under the name of 'The Daily London Journal,' or under any other name or style of which the words 'London Journal' form part, and from doing or committing any act or default which may tend to lessen or diminish the sale or circulation of the plaintiff's periodical, called 'The London Journal'" (*c*).

(*a*) Wood, V.-C.

(*b*) Stuart, V.-C. And see *Edmonds* v. *Benbow*, Seton, 3rd ed. 905; *Corns* v. *Griffiths*, Pemberton, 3rd ed. 238; *Macl* v. *Petter*, 41 L. J. Ch. 782.

(*c*) Wood, V.-C.

16. Walter *v.* Head, 25 Sol. J. 757.

Name of Newspaper—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from printing or publishing any newspaper or other publication in the form of a newspaper with or under the name or title of 'The Times,' and from doing any other act in invasion or infringement of the plaintiff's right or interest in the name or title of 'The Times'" (*a*).

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17. Prowett *v.* Mortimer, 2 Jur. N. S. 414.

Name of Newspaper—Soliciting Customers—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from printing, or publishing, or exposing for sale, or procuring to be printed or sold the newspaper publication called 'The True Britannia,' or any other newspaper or publication, as a continuation of the plaintiff's newspaper 'The Britannia,' in the bill mentioned, and from soliciting custom in the name of the plaintiff's trade and business as for 'The Britannia' newspaper" (*b*).

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18. Hogg *v.* Kirby, 8 Ves. 215—226.

Publication of a Magazine as a Continuation of Plaintiff's Magazine—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from publishing or exposing for sale any copy or copies of the defendant's said work, and from printing, publishing, or exposing for sale, any other work or publication as or being a continuation of the plaintiff's work, or of the defendant's work which has been so published as such continuation as aforesaid; and from printing all or any part or parts of the plaintiff's said work;" and Ordered "that the injunction shall be continued as to any letters, &c., admitted by the Answer to have been received from correspondents by the defendant, while publishing for the plaintiff" (*c*).

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19. Ainsworth *v.* Bentley, 14 W. R. 630.

Publication of Magazine in Breach of Contract—Order—Injunction.

Ordered, "That the defendant, &c., be restrained from carrying on, &c., the said 'Temple Bar Magazine,' but the order to be without pre-

(*a*) Court of Appeal. (*b*) Stuart, V.-C. (*c*) Lord Eldon, C.

judice to the publication of the said magazine until the hearing of the cause, so as the name of Bentley do not appear either in the title-page, or in any other part of the said publication, or in any advertisement of the said publication, and this order to be without prejudice to the right (if any) of the plaintiff to damages or profits in respect of any publication of the work" (*a*).

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20. PRINCE ALBERT *v.* STRANGE, 2 De G. & Sm. 652—717.

Etchings Improperly Obtained and Published—Catalogues Improperly Published—Decree—Delivery up—Injunction.

Decree, by which—"Declared that the plaintiff is entitled to have delivered to him the impressions (by the Answer of defendant J. admitted to be in his possession) of such of the several etchings in the pleadings mentioned as in the catalogue and in the pleadings are stated to have been etched by the plaintiff; that is to say (description by reference to Nos. in the catalogue); Ordered, that J. shall, within four days after the service of the decree, deliver up the impressions above specified on oath, and leave them with the Clerk of Records and Writs at the Record Office. Ordered, that the defendant S. shall, within four days after the service of the decree, deliver to the Clerk of Records and Writs, at the said office, the twenty-five copies of the catalogue, being the same as are mentioned in the decree in the other suit of even date. Similar directions as to six copies of the catalogue admitted by J. to be in his possession. Ordered, that the Clerk of Records and Writs shall destroy those copies of the catalogue, giving notice to the solicitors of the several parties of the time and place at which he intends to do so. Injunction, restraining the defendants, &c., from making or permitting to be made any engraving or copy of such etchings, or any of them, and from publishing the same; and from parting with or disposing of them or any of them, except in obedience to the decree; and from selling, or in any manner publishing the catalogue, or any work being or purporting to be a catalogue of the etchings made by the plaintiff. Provision made for costs. Liberty to apply reserved" (*b*).

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21. CHAPPELL *v.* SHEARD, 2 K. & J. 117—122.

Name and Title-page of Song—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from printing, publishing, selling, exposing for sale, or otherwise disposing of the song 'Minnie

(*a*) Wood, V.-C.

(*b*) Knight-Bruce, V.-C.

Dale,' or any copy or copies thereof, or any other publication containing a colourable imitation of the name, title, or title-page of the plaintiff's said song" (*a*).

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22. Morison *v.* Moat, 9 Hare, 241—267.

Name of Patent Medicine—Secret Recipe—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from selling, or causing or procuring to be sold, under the title or designation of 'Morison's Universal Medicine,' or 'Morison's Vegetable Universal Medicine,' any medicine made or manufactured by the defendant, or by or under his order or direction;" and restraining the defendant, &c., "from making or compounding any medicines according to the secret in, &c., and from in any manner using the secret of compounding the said medicines, or any part thereof" (*b*).

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23. Estcourt *v.* Estcourt Hop Essence Co., 31 L. T. N. S. 567.

Hop Essence—Secret Recipe—Trade Name—Representation of Succession in Business—Manufacturing Contrary to Agreement—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants C. Estcourt and the Estcourt Hop Essence Co., &c., "from manufacturing, or selling, or advertising for sale, an article called 'Hop Essence,' or any other substance identical with or only colourably differing from the 'Hop Supplement' manufactured and sold by the plaintiffs, and from using or disclosing to any persons the secret of compounding the said 'Hop Supplement'; and also restraining the defendant company from trading under the name of 'The Estcourt Hop Essence Co., Limited,' and from using any designation, either of the vendors or of the substance offered for sale, calculated to lead purchasers into the belief that such substance is the 'Hop Supplement' manufactured by the plaintiffs, or equivalent or substantially equivalent thereto, or that they, such defendants, or any of them, are the successors in business of the plaintiffs' firm, or the original firm who manufactured and sold the said article; and also restraining the defendant C. Estcourt from carrying on or being connected with the business of manufacturing or selling any substance intended to be used as a substitute for hops in brewing" (*c*).

(*a*) Wood, V.-C. And see *Emperor of Austria* v. *Day* (V.-C. Stuart, 2 Giff. 628—631; Court of Appeal, 3 De G. F. & J. 217—219), for injunction against printing spurious Hungarian notes, and order for delivery up of plates used in such printing.

(*b*) Turner, V.-C. And see *Ansell* v. *Gaubert*, Seton, 4th ed. 235; *Weston* v. *Hemmons*, 2 Vict. L. R. Eq. 121.

(*c*) Malins, V.-C. The injunction was afterwards rescinded, but on grounds independent of the form of it. L. R. 10 Ch. 276.

24. Franks *v.* Weaver, 8 L. T. (Old Series), 510.

Fraudulently Using Another's Testimonials—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from making, vending, or offering for sale, or in any manner disposing of any preparation, mixture, compound, or nostrum, having around, or upon, or in connection with the same, or the bottles or other vessels containing the same, any cover, wrapper, envelope, label, bill, circular, notice, advertisement, or other formula, in the terms or to the purport or effect of the cover, wrapper, envelope, label, bill, circular, notice, advertisement, or other formula in the plaintiff's bill stated to have been used by the said defendant, or any other cover, &c., containing any testimonial in favour of the plaintiff's medicine or medical preparation in the said bill described as 'Franks' Specific Solution of Copaiba,' or in which any statement or representation is made or contained indicating, or implying, or tending to induce the public or purchasers to suppose that such preparation, mixture, compound, or nostrum is the same as 'Franks' Specific Solution of Copaiba,' or referred to in connection with any preparation, mixture, compound, or nostrum made, vended, or disposed of by the said defendant, or in which any use is made of the character and reputation of the plaintiff, or his said specific solution of copaiba, and from publishing, or circulating, or causing to be published, or circulated, or in any manner using such cover, &c., as aforesaid" (*a*).

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25. Knott *v.* Morgan, 2 Keen, 213–219.

Imitating a Rival Line of Omnibuses—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from running, or in any manner using, or causing to be used, for the conveyance of passengers, his omnibus in the bill mentioned, or any other omnibus, having painted, stamped, printed, or written thereon the words or names 'London Conveyance,' or 'Original Conveyance Company,' or any other names, words, or devices painted, stamped, printed, or written thereon, in such manner as to form or be a colourable imitation of the names, words, and devices painted, stamped, printed, or written on the omnibuses of the plaintiffs" (*b*).

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26. Glenny *v.* Smith, 2 Dr. & Sm. 476.

Trade Name—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from continuing to use, or from exhibiting or using the words 'Thresher and Glenny,' or the name of

(*a*) Lord Langdale, M. R.

(*b*) Lord Langdale, M. R. The M. R. altered the form so as not to restrain all use of the words "London Conveyance Company."

the plaintiffs' said firm in any form in or about his said shop in such a way as to deceive the public, or to lead to the belief that his shop is a shop of the plaintiffs, or that the business carried on there is carried on by the plaintiffs, or is in any way connected with the business of the plaintiffs" (*a*).

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27. HENDRIKS *v.* MONTAGU, 17 Ch. D. 638—39—47.

Name of Company—Registration—User—Advertisements, &c.—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants "from applying to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies in England for registration under the Companies Acts of any company to be incorporated under the name of 'The Universe Life Assurance Association,' or any other name likely to mislead or deceive the public into the belief that the company, being incorporated as aforesaid, is the same as 'The Universal Life Assurance Society'; from issuing or publishing advertisements, circulars, or prospectuses representing that a company is to be incorporated pursuant to the Companies Act, 1862, under the name of 'The Universe Life Assurance Association, Limited,' or any such other name as aforesaid; and from carrying on or commencing any business under the name of 'The Universe Life Assurance Association, Limited,' or any such other name as aforesaid" (*b*).

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28. LEE *v.* HALEY, L. R. 5 Ch. 155.

Name of Company—Injunction against User within a certain Locality.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from continuing to use, and from exhibiting or using the words 'The Pall Mall Guinea Coal Company,' in Pall Mall, or any other name or style so framed as to be a colourable imitation of the name or style in which the plaintiffs' branch business mentioned in the bill is carried on, or so as to deceive the public, or to lead to the belief that the business carried on by the defendant is the same as the business carried on by the plaintiffs under the name or style of 'The Guinea Coal Company,' or is in any way connected therewith" (*c*).

(*a*) Kindersley, V.-C. And see *Hudson* v. *Osborne*, 39 L. J. Ch. 79; *Hookham* v. *Pottage*, L. R. 8 Ch. 92; *James* v. *James*, Seton, 4th ed. 237; *Montague* v. *Moore*, *ib.* 238; and *Cave* v. *Myers*, *ib.* 238; *Fullwood* v. *Fullwood*, 38 L. T. N. S. 381.

(*b*) Court of Appeal.

(*c*) Malins, V.-C.

29. Wheeler *v.* Johnston, 3 L. R. Ir. 284.

Name of Mineral Springs—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from using the words 'Cromac Springs' in connection with his trade or business as a manufacturer or seller of mineral waters, so as to represent that his said waters are so manufactured or sold by the plaintiffs at their works in the bill mentioned, called 'The Cromac Springs,' and from using the words 'Cromac Springs' as the name of the defendant's place of business so as to represent as aforesaid" (*a*).

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30. Braham *v.* Beachim, 7 Ch. D. 848—857.

Name of Collieries—Injunction until certain events.

Injunction restraining the defendants, "unless and until they shall acquire a colliery or coal mine within the parish of Radstock, from trading under or using the name or style of 'The Radstock Colliery Proprietors,' or any other name or style signifying that the defendants, or either of them, are proprietors of any colliery or collieries at Radstock," and restraining the defendants, "unless and until they shall become authorised to sell or supply any coals raised or gotten from any colliery or coal mine within the parish of Radstock, from using any style or name signifying or implying that the defendants are selling or supplying, or are authorised to sell or supply, any coal raised or gotten from any colliery or coal mine within the parish of Radstock" (*b*).

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31. Scott *v.* Scott, 16 L. T. N. S. 143.

False Representation of Continuation of Business—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from allowing or permitting the brass plate affixed by the defendants to the door of the premises in Regent Street to remain affixed, with any inscription thereon representing or holding out to the customers of the late partnership of 'R. & W. Scott,' or to any other persons whatsoever, that they are carrying on business in continuation of, or in succession to, the business carried on by the late firm of 'R. & W. Scott'" (*c*).

(*a*) Chatterton, V.-C. of I.
(*b*) Fry, J.
(*c*) Wood, V.-C. And see *Hoffman* v. *Duncan*, Seton, 4th ed. 256; *Witt* v. *Corcoran*, *ib*, 257; *Graveley* v. *Winchester*, *ib*. 257; *England* v. *Curling*, 8 Beav. 129.

32. Burrows *v* Foster, 1 N. R. 156.

False Representation of Continuation of Business—Soliciting former Customers - Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from issuing or sending, and from causing or procuring to be issued or sent, to any person or persons any further copies or copy of the circular or letter bearing date the 3rd April, 1862, in the plaintiffs' bill mentioned, or any other circular or letter signifying or importing that the business carried on by him the said defendant is, and from in any manner representing such business to be a continuation of the business formerly carried on by the firms of Foster, Lacy & Co., and Bashall, Lacy & Co., in the plaintiffs' bill mentioned, or by either of such firms, and from in any manner soliciting or inviting any person or persons who, at the date of the indenture of the 31st March, 1862, in the plaintiffs' bill mentioned, was or were a customer or correspondent, customers or correspondents of the firms of Foster, Lacy & Co., and Bashall, Lacy & Co., or of either of such firms, and from causing or procuring any such person or persons to be solicited or invited to become or be a customer or correspondent or customers or correspondents of, or to employ him the said defendant in the business carried on by him, or to cease from employing or not to employ the said plaintiffs in the business formerly carried on by the said firms of Foster, Lacy & Co., and Bashall, Lacy & Co., or either of them" (*a*).

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33 Massam *v.* Thorley's Cattle Food Co., 14 Ch. D. 748-762.

False Representation of Continuation of Business—Trade Name—Labels—Advertisements—Circulars—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from selling, shipping, or exporting, or causing or procuring, or allowing to be sold, shipped, or exported, and from in any manner representing, or causing or procuring to be represented, any goods manufactured by the defendant company as the manufacture or goods of the late Joseph Thorley, or of the plaintiffs, his trustees and successors in business; and also from in any manner representing, or causing or procuring to be represented, or doing anything which shall lead to the belief that the defendant company have been or are carrying on the business of the late Joseph Thorley; and also from affixing, or permitting, or causing to be affixed to any goods or articles manufactured, or bought, or procured, or sold, or shipped, or exported by the defendant company, or otherwise using or employing, or permitting to be used or employed, any labels, wrappers, or marks used by the late Joseph Thorley and the plaintiffs, his trustees and successors in business, or so contrived and prepared as to represent or lead to the belief that the goods or articles manufactured, or sold, or shipped; or exported by the defendant company, are the goods or manufacture of the late Joseph

(*a*) Turner, L. J.

Thorley or of the plaintiffs; and also from employing, using, or circulating, or causing to be employed, used, or circulated, any circulars, pamphlets, notices, or advertisements of the late Joseph Thorley or of the plaintiffs, or which shall in any manner represent or lead to the belief that the defendant company have been or are carrying on the business of the late Joseph Thorley, or that they are his successors in business" (*a*).

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34. Labouchere *v.* Dawson, L. R. 13 Eq. 322—327.

Soliciting former Customers, after Sale of Business—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from applying to any person who was a customer of the firm of B. Dawson & Co. prior to the 12th of June, 1871, privately, by letter, personally, or by a traveller, asking such customer to continue to deal with the defendant, or not to deal with the plaintiffs, the Kirkstall Brewery Co., Limited" (*b*).

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35. Wheeler & Wilson Manufacturing Co. *v.* Shakespear, 39 L. J. Ch. 36—38—41.

False Representation of Agency—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from, in manner aforesaid, or in any other manner, calling, or describing, or representing, his said shop or place of business, No. 32, Union Street, Birmingham, or any other shop, warehouse, or place, not belonging to the plaintiffs, as 'The Original Wheeler & Wilson Sewing Machine Depôt,' or 'Wheeler & Wilson Sewing Machine Depôt, established in 1860,' or as a place of business of the plaintiffs, or of 'Wheeler & Wilson,' manufacturers of sewing machines; and from in manner aforesaid, or in any other manner, calling, or describing, or representing, himself or his said firm of T. Shakespear & Co., as the agent or agents for the American 'Wheeler & Wilson sewing machines, in the same manner in which he has been since 1860, or as the agent of the 'Wheeler & Wilson' sewing machines; and from in any other manner representing himself as the agent of the plaintiffs, and from permitting the names 'Wheeler & Wilson' to remain over the door of his shop or business premises, at 32, Union Street, Birmingham, or on the brass plate under the window, or on the brass plate on the door jamb, or on any other part of his said shop or place of business, or

(*a*) James, L. J.

(*b*) Lord Romilly, M. R. And see *Leggott* v. *Barrett*, 15 Ch. D. 306; and *Selby* v. *Anchor Tube Co.*, W. N. 1877, p. 191. As to opening letters containing orders intended for another firm, see *Scheile* v. *Brukell*, 11 W. R. 796; and Seton, 4th ed. 253; *Witt* v. *Corcoran*, Seton, 4th ed. 257; *England* v. *Curling*, 8 Beav. 129.

on any placard in his said shop, or on the door, or in the window thereof; and from causing the names 'Wheeler & Wilson' to be inserted in any railway time table, or directory, or other book or publication, under the head of, or described as sewing machine manufacturers, as residing or carrying on business at No. 32, Union Street, Birmingham, or as in any other manner connected with that or any other shop or place of business of the said defendant, and from doing any other act, matter, or thing representing, or whereby the trade or the public may be led to believe that the defendant has any connection whatever in business with the plaintiffs" (*a*).

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36. JAMES *v.* JAMES, 41 L. J. Ch. 358.

Fraudulent disuse of Christian Name—Claim to be the "Only Genuine" —Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendant, &c., "from using the name of 'Robert James' singly, instead of 'Robert Joseph James,' or 'R. J. James'; also from stating or inserting in his advertisement or circular any words or expressions asserting or suggesting that the ointment manufactured and sold by the plaintiffs is spurious and not genuine" (*b*).

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37. THORLEY'S CATTLE FOOD CO. *v.* MASSAM, 14 Ch. D. 763—781.

Trade Libel—Representation that the Plaintiffs' Goods are Spurious— Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from advertising, or representing, or suggesting in their advertisements or circulars that they are alone possessed of the secret for compounding the condiment known as 'Thorley's Food for Cattle,' and from representing, or suggesting, or doing anything calculated to represent or suggest, that the cattle food manufactured and sold by the plaintiffs is spurious or not genuine" (*c*).

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38. THOMAS *v.* WILLIAMS, 14 Ch. D. 864—875.

Trade Libel—Representation that the Plaintiff's Goods are Spurious— Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from issuing or permitting the issue of the circular dated the 6th February, 1879, and from in any

(*a*) James, V.-C.
(*b*) Lord Romilly, M.R.
(*c*) Malins, V.-C., affirmed by Court of Appeal.

manner representing or suggesting that the goods now made or sold by the plaintiff are imitations of the goods made or sold by J. Thomas & Sons, or Edmund Holyoake" (*a*).

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39. Routh *v.* Webster, 10 Beav. 561—563.

Unauthorised and Injurious Use of a Person's Name—Injunction.

Injunction restraining the defendants, &c., "from printing, publishing, or circulating, any prospectus or other document of, or relating to, a certain company called 'The Economic Conveyance Company,' mentioned and referred to in the plaintiff's bill in this cause, with the plaintiff's name thereto, and from in any manner using the name of the plaintiff so as to identify him as a party interested in, or associated with, the said company" (*b*).

(*a*) Fry, J.

(*b*) Lord Langdale, M. R.

APPENDIX C.

STATUTORY ENACTMENTS WITH RESPECT TO MARKS ON GOODS, &c.

The Merchandise Marks Act, 1862.

25 & 26 Vict. c. 88 (*a*).

An Act to amend the Law relating to the Fraudulent Marking of Merchandise. [*7th August*, 1862.]

Whereas it is expedient to amend the laws relating to the fraudulent marking of merchandise, and to the sale of merchandise falsely marked for the purpose of fraud: Be it therefore enacted by the Queen's most excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual and temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows:—

Construction of words: "Person."

1. In the construction of this Act, the word "person" shall include any person, whether a subject of Her Majesty or not, and any body corporate, or body of the like nature, whether constituted according to the law of this country or of any of Her Majesty's colonies or dominions, or according to the law of any foreign country, and also any company, association, or society of persons, whether the members thereof be subjects of Her Majesty or not, or some of such persons subjects of Her Majesty, and some of them not, and whether such body corporate, body of the like nature, company, association, or society, be established or carry on business within Her Majesty's dominions or elsewhere, or partly within Her Majesty's dominions, and partly elsewhere; the word "mark" shall include any name, signature, word, letter, device, emblem, figure, sign, seal, stamp, diagram,

"Mark."

(*a*) It is not against the policy of the law for proceedings taken under this Act to be compromised: *Fisher* v. *Apollinaris Co.*, L. R. 10 Ch. 297.

label, ticket, or other mark of any other description; and the expression "trade mark" shall include any and every such name, signature, word, letter, device, emblem, figure, sign, seal, stamp, diagram, label, ticket, or other mark as aforesaid, lawfully used by any person to denote any chattel, or (in Scotland) any article of trade, manufacture, or merchandise, to be an article or thing of the manufacture, workmanship, production, or merchandise of such person, or to be an article or thing of any peculiar or particular description made or sold by such person, and shall also include any name, signature, word, letter, number, figure, mark, or sign, which in pursuance of any statute or statutes for the time being in force relating to registered designs (*a*) is to be put or placed upon or attached to any chattel or article during the existence or continuance of any copyright or other sole right acquired under the provisions of such statutes, or any of them (*b*); the word "misdemeanour" shall include crime and offence in Scotland; and the word "court" shall include any sheriff or sheriff-substitute in Scotland.

"Trade mark."

"Misdemeanour."

"Court."

2. Every person who, with intent to defraud, or to enable another to defraud any person, shall forge or counterfeit, or cause or procure to be forged or counterfeited any trade mark, or shall apply, or cause or procure to be applied, any trade mark, or any forged or counterfeited trade mark, to any chattel or article not being the manufacture, workmanship, production, or merchandise of any person denoted or intended to be denoted by such trade mark, or denoted or intended to be denoted by such forged or counterfeited trade mark, or not being the manufacture, workmanship, production, or merchandise of any person whose trade mark shall be so forged or counterfeited, or shall apply, or cause or procure to be applied, any trade mark or any forged or counterfeited trade mark to any chattel or article, not being the particular or peculiar description of manufacture, workmanship, production, or merchandise, denoted or intended to be denoted by such trade mark, or by such forged or counterfeited trade mark, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and every person so committing a misdemeanour shall also forfeit to Her Majesty every chattel and article belonging to such person, to which he shall have so unlawfully applied, or caused or procured to be applied, any such trade mark or forged or counterfeited trade mark as aforesaid, and every instrument in the possession or power of such person, and by means of which any such trade mark, or forged or counterfeited trade mark as aforesaid, shall

Forging a trade mark, or falsely applying any trade mark with intent to defraud, a misdemeanour.

(*a*) The Patents Act, 1883, is the only Act now in force relating to registered designs. See § 51, and Rule 32 of the Designs Rules, 1883, *infrd.*

(*b*) As to this definition of "trade mark," see per Sir J. Bacon, V.-C., in *Ford* v. *Foster*, L. R. 7 Ch. 611.

have been so applied, and every instrument in the possession or power of such person for applying any such trade mark, or forged or counterfeit trade mark as aforesaid, shall be forfeited to Her Majesty; and the Court before which any such misdemeanour shall be tried may order such forfeited articles as aforesaid to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of, as such Court shall think fit.

Applying a forged trade mark to any vessel, case, wrapper, &c., in or with which any article is sold or intended to be sold, a misdemeanour.

3. Every person who, with intent to defraud, or to enable another to defraud any person, shall apply or cause or procure to be applied any trade mark, or any forged or counterfeited trade mark, to any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing in, on, or with which any chattel or article shall be intended to be sold, or shall be sold or uttered or exposed for sale, or intended for any purpose of trade or manufacture, or shall enclose or place any chattel or article, or cause or procure any chattel or article to be enclosed or placed in, upon, under, or with any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing to which any trade mark shall have been falsely applied, or to which any forged or counterfeited trade mark shall have been applied, or shall apply or attach, or cause or procure to be applied or attached to any chattel or article, any case, cover, reel, ticket, label, or other thing to which any trade mark shall have been falsely applied, or to which any forged or counterfeited trade mark shall have been applied, or shall enclose, place, or attach any chattel or article, or cause or procure any chattel or article to be enclosed, placed, or attached in, upon, under, with, or to any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing having thereon any trade mark of any other person, shall be guilty of a misdemeanour, and every person so committing a misdemeanour shall also forfeit to Her Majesty every such chattel and article, and also every such cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing as aforesaid, in the possession or power of such person; and every other similar cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing made to be used in like manner as aforesaid, and every instrument in the possession or power of such person, and by means of which any such trade mark or forged or counterfeited trade mark as aforesaid shall have been applied; and also every instrument in the possession or power of such person for applying any such trade mark or forged or counterfeit trade mark as aforesaid, shall be forfeited to Her Majesty; and the Court before which any such misdemeanour shall be tried may order such forfeited articles as aforesaid to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as such Court shall think fit.

4. Every person who, after the 31st day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, shall sell, utter, or expose either for sale or for any purpose of trade or manufacture, or cause or procure to be sold, uttered, or exposed for sale or other purpose as aforesaid, any chattel or article, together with any forged or counterfeited trade mark, which he shall know to be forged or counterfeited, or together with the trade mark of any other person applied or used falsely or wrongfully or without lawful authority or excuse, knowing such trade mark of another person to have been so applied or used as aforesaid, and that whether any such trade mark or forged or counterfeited trade mark as aforesaid, together with which any such chattel or article shall be sold, uttered, or exposed for sale or other purpose as aforesaid, shall be in, upon, about, or with such chattel or article, or in, upon, about, or with any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing in, upon, about, or with which such chattel or article shall be so sold or uttered or exposed for sale or other purpose as aforesaid, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay to Her Majesty a sum of money equal to the value of the chattel or article so sold, uttered, offered, or exposed for sale or other purpose as aforesaid, and a further sum not exceeding five pounds and not less than ten shillings.

Selling articles with forged or false trade marks after 31st December, 1863, penalty equal to value of article sold, and a sum not exceeding £5, nor less than 10s.

5. Every addition to and every alteration of, and also every imitation of any trade mark which shall be made, applied, or used, with intent to defraud, or to enable any other person to defraud, or which shall cause a trade mark with such alteration or addition, or shall cause such imitation of a trade mark to resemble any genuine trade mark, so or in such manner as to be calculated or likely to deceive, shall be and be deemed to be a false, forged, and counterfeited trade mark within the meaning of this Act; and every act of making, applying, or otherwise using any such addition to or alteration of a trade mark, or any such imitation of a trade mark as aforesaid done by any person with intent to defraud, or to enable any other person to defraud, shall be and be deemed to be forging and counterfeiting a trade mark within the meaning of this Act.

Additions to and alterations of trade marks made with intent to defraud, to be deemed forgeries.

6. Where any person who, at any time after the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, shall have sold, uttered, or exposed for sale or other purpose as aforesaid, or shall have caused or procured to be sold, uttered, or exposed for sale or other purpose as aforesaid, any chattel or article, together with any forged or counterfeited trade mark, or together with the trade mark of any other person used without lawful authority or excuse as aforesaid, and that whether any such trade mark, or such forged or counterfeited trade mark as

Any person who, after 31st December, 1863, shall have sold an article having a false trade mark, to be bound to give information where he procured it.

aforesaid, be in, upon, about, or with such chattel or article, or in, upon, about, or with any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing in, upon, about, or with which such chattel or article shall have been sold or exposed for sale, such person shall be bound, upon demand in writing delivered to him or left for him at his last known dwelling-house, or at the place of sale or exposure for sale by or on the behalf of any person whose trade mark shall have been so forged or counterfeited, or used without lawful authority or excuse as aforesaid, to give to the person requiring the same, or his attorney or agent, within forty-eight hours after such demand, full information in writing of the name and address of the person from whom he shall have purchased or obtained such chattel or article, and of the time when he obtained the same: and it shall be lawful for any justice of the peace, on information on oath of such demand and refusal, to summon before him the party refusing, and, on being satisfied that such demand ought to be complied with, to order such information to be given within a certain time to be appointed by him; and any such party who shall refuse or neglect to comply with such order shall for every such offence forfeit and pay to Her Majesty the sum of five pounds, and such refusal or neglect shall be *primâ facie* evidence that the person so refusing or neglecting had full knowledge that the trade mark, together with which such chattel or article was sold, uttered, or exposed for sale, or other purpose as aforesaid, at the time of such selling, uttering, or exposing was a forged, counterfeited, and false trade mark, or was the trade mark of a person which had been used without lawful authority or excuse, as the case may be.

Power to justices to summon parties refusing to give information.

Penalty for refusal £5.

Marking any false indication of quantity, &c., upon an article with intent to defraud, penalty a sum equal to the value of the article and a further sum not exceeding £5 and not less than 10s.

7. Every person who, with intent to defraud or to enable another to defraud, shall put or cause or procure to be put upon any chattel or article, or upon any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing, together with which any chattel or article shall be or shall be sold or uttered or exposed for sale, or for any purpose of trade or manufacture, or upon any case, frame, or other thing in or by means of which any chattel or article shall be intended to be or shall be exposed for sale, any false description, statement, or other indication of, or respecting the number, quantity, measure, or weight of such chattel or article, or any part thereof, or of the place or country in which such chattel or article shall have been made, manufactured, or produced, or shall put or cause or procure to be put upon any such chattel or article, cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or thing as aforesaid, any word, letter, figure, signature, or mark for the purpose of falsely indicating such

chattel or article, or the mode of manufacturing or producing the same, or the ornamentation, shape, or configuration thereof, to be the subject of any existing patent (*a*), privilege, or copyright, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay to Her Majesty a sum of money equal to the value of the chattel or article so sold or uttered or exposed for sale, and a further sum not exceeding five pounds and not less than ten shillings.

Selling or exposing for sale after the 31st December, 1863, articles with false statement of quantities, &c., penalty not more than £5, nor less than 5*s*.

8. Every person who, after the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, shall sell, utter, or expose for sale, or for any purpose of trade or manufacture, or shall cause or procure to be sold, uttered, or exposed for sale or other purpose as aforesaid, any chattel or article upon which shall have been, to his knowledge, put, or upon any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing together with which such chattel or article shall be sold or uttered or exposed for sale or other purpose as aforesaid, shall have been so put, or upon any case, frame, or other thing used or employed to expose or exhibit such chattel or article for sale, shall have been so put, any false description, statement, or other indication of or respecting the number, quantity, measure, or weight of such chattel or article, or any part thereof, or the place or country in which such chattel or article shall have been made, manufactured, or produced, shall for every such offence forfeit and pay to Her Majesty a sum not exceeding five pounds and not less than five shillings.

Proviso that it shall not be an offence to apply names or words known to be used for indicating particular classes of manufactures.

9. Provided always, that the provisions of this Act shall not be construed so as to make it any offence for any person to apply to any chattel or article, or to any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label or other thing with which such chattel or article shall be sold or intended to be sold, any name, word, or expression generally used for indicating such chattel or article to be of some particular class or description of manufacture only, or so as to make it any offence for any person to sell, utter, or offer or expose for sale any chattel or article to which, or to any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label or other thing sold therewith, any such generally used name, word, or expression as aforesaid shall have been applied.

Description of trade marks and forged trade marks in indictments, &c

10. In every indictment, pleading, proceeding, and document whatsoever in which any trade mark shall be intended to be mentioned, it shall be sufficient to mention or state the same to be a trade mark, without further or otherwise describing such

(*a*) A person who himself wrongfully inserts or retains the word "patent" in his trade mark cannot avail himself of the benefits of this Act: *Morgan* v. *McAdam*, 36 L. J. Ch. 228.

trade mark, or setting forth any copy or facsimile thereof; and in every indictment, pleading, proceeding, and document whatsoever in which it shall be intended to mention any forged or counterfeit trade mark it shall be sufficient to mention or state the same to be a forged or counterfeit trade mark, without further or otherwise describing such forged or counterfeit trade mark, or setting forth any copy or facsimile thereof.

Conviction not to affect any right or civil remedy.

11. The provisions in this Act contained of or concerning any act, or any proceeding, judgment, or conviction for any act hereby declared to be a misdemeanour or offence, shall not nor shall any of them take away, diminish, or prejudicially affect any suit, process, proceeding, right, or remedy which any person aggrieved by such act may be entitled to at law, in equity, or otherwise, and shall not nor shall any of them exempt or excuse any person from answering or making discovery upon examination as a witness or upon interrogatories, or otherwise, in any suit or other civil proceeding: Provided always, that no evidence, statement, or discovery which any person shall be compelled to give or make shall be admissible in evidence against such person, in support of any indictment for a misdemeanour at common law or otherwise, or of any proceeding under the provisions of this Act.

Intent to defraud, &c., any particular person need not be alleged in an indictment, &c., or proved.

12. In every indictment, information, conviction, pleading, and proceeding against any person for any misdemeanour or other offence against the provisions of this Act in which it shall be necessary to allege or mention an intent to defraud, or to enable another to defraud, it shall be sufficient to allege or mention that the person accused of having done any act which is hereby made a misdemeanour or other offence, did such act with intent to defraud, or with intent to enable some other person to defraud, without alleging or mentioning an intent to defraud any particular person; and on the trial of any such indictment or information for any such misdemeanour, and on the hearing of any information or charge of or for any such other offence as aforesaid, and on the trial of any action against any person to recover a penalty for any such other offence as aforesaid, it shall not be necessary to prove an intent to defraud any particular person, or an intent to enable any particular person to defraud any particular person, but it shall be sufficient to prove with respect to every such misdemeanour and offence that the person accused did the act charged with intent to defraud, or with intent to enable some other person to defraud, or with the intent that any other person might be enabled to defraud.

Persons who

13. Every person who shall aid, abet, counsel, or procure the

commission of any offence which is by this Act made a misdemeanour shall also be guilty of a misdemeanour.

Aid in the commission of a misdemeanour to be also guilty.

14. Every person who shall be convicted or found guilty of any offence which is by this Act made a misdemeanour shall be liable, at the discretion of the Court and as the Court shall award, to suffer such punishment by imprisonment for not more than two years, with or without hard labour, or by fine, or both by imprisonment, with or without hard labour, and fine, and also by imprisonment until the fine (if any) shall have been paid and satisfied.

Punishment for misdemeanour under this Act.

Recovery of penalties.

15. In every case in which any person shall have committed or done any offence or act whereby he shall have forfeited or become liable to pay to Her Majesty any of the penalties or sums of money mentioned in the provisions of this Act, every such penalty or sum of money shall or may be recovered in England, Wales, or Ireland in an action of debt, which any person may as plaintiff for and on behalf of Her Majesty commence and prosecute to judgment in any Court of Record, and the amount of every such penalty or sum of money to be recovered in any such action shall or may be determined by the jury (if any) sworn to try any issue in such action, and if there shall be no such jury then by the Court or some other jury, as the Court shall think fit, or instead of any such action being commenced, such penalty or sum of money shall or may in England or Wales be recovered by a summary proceeding before two justices of the peace having jurisdiction in the county or place where the party offending shall reside or have any place of business, or in the county or place in which the offence shall have been committed; and shall or may in Ireland be recovered in like manner by civil bill in the Civil Bill Court of the county or place in which the offence was committed, or in which the offender shall reside or have any place of business; and shall or may in Scotland be recovered by action before the Court of Session in ordinary form, or by summary action before the sheriff of the county where the offence shall have been committed, or the offender may reside or have any place of business, which sheriff, upon proof of the offence, either by the confession of the person offending or by the oath or affirmation of one or more credible witnesses, shall convict the offender, and find him liable in the penalty or penalties aforesaid, as also in expenses; and it shall be lawful for the sheriff, in pronouncing such judgment for the penalty or penalties and costs, to insert in such judgment a warrant, in the event of such penalty or penalties and costs not being paid, to levy and recover the amount of the same by poinding: Provided always, that it shall be lawful to the sheriff, in the event of his dismissing the action and assoilzing the defender, to find the

complainer liable in expenses; and any judgment so to be pronounced by the sheriff in such summary action shall be final and conclusive, and not subject to review by advocation, suspension, reduction, or otherwise.

Summary proceedings before justices to be within 11 & 12 Vict. c. 43.

16. In every case in which any such penalty or sum of money forfeited to Her Majesty as hereinbefore mentioned shall be sought to be recovered by a summary proceeding before two justices of the peace, the offence or act by the committing or doing of which such penalty or sum of money shall have been so forfeited shall be and be deemed to be an offence and act within the meaning of a statute passed in the twelfth year of the reign of Her present Majesty, intituled *An Act to facilitate the performance of the duties of justices of the peace out of sessions within England and Wales with respect to summary convictions and orders;* and the information, conviction of the offender, and other proceedings for the recovery of the penalty or sum so forfeited shall be had according to the provisions of the said Act.

In actions penalties to be accounted for in like manner as other moneys payable to the Crown, and plaintiffs to recover full costs of suit.

17. In every case in which judgment shall be obtained in any such action as aforesaid for the amount of any such penalty or sum of money forfeited to Her Majesty, the amount thereof shall be paid by the defendant to the sheriff or the officer of the Court, who shall account for the same in like manner as other moneys payable to Her Majesty, and if it be not paid, may be recovered, or the amount thereof levied, or the payment thereof enforced, by execution or other proper proceeding, as money due to Her Majesty; and the plaintiff suing on behalf of Her Majesty, upon obtaining judgment, shall be entitled to recover and have execution for all his costs of suit, which shall include a full indemnity for all costs and charges which he shall or may have expended or incurred in, about, or for the purposes of the action, unless the Court or a judge thereof shall direct that costs of the ordinary amount only shall be allowed.

Limitations of actions, &c.

18. No person shall commence any action or proceeding for the recovery of any penalty, or procuring the conviction of any offender in manner hereinbefore provided, after the expiration of three years next after the committing of the offence, or one year next after the first discovery thereof by the person proceeding.

After 31st December, 1863, vendor of an article with a trade mark to be deemed to contract that the mark is genuine.

19. In every case in which at any time after the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, any person shall sell or contract to sell (whether by writing or not) to any other person any chattel or article with any trade mark thereon, or upon any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing together with which such chattel or article shall be sold or cou-

tracted to be sold, the sale or contract to sell shall in every such case be deemed to have been made with a warranty or contract by the vendor to or with the vendee that every trade mark upon such chattel or article, or upon any such cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing as aforesaid, was genuine and true, and not forged or counterfeit, and not wrongfully used, unless the contrary shall be expressed in some writing, signed by or on behalf of the vendor, and delivered to and accepted by the vendee.

After 31st December, 1863, vendor of an article with description upon it of its quantity to be deemed to contract that the description was true.

20. In every case in which at any time after the thirty-first day of December, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three, any person shall sell or contract to sell (whether by writing or not) to any other person any chattel or article upon which, or upon any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing together with which such chattel or article shall be sold or contracted to be sold, any description, statement, or other indication of or respecting the number, quantity, measure, or weight of such chattel or article, or the place or country in which such chattel or article shall have been made, manufactured, or produced, the sale or contract to sell shall in every such case be deemed to have been made with a warranty or contract by the vendor to or with the vendee that no such description, statement, or other indication was in any material respect false or untrue, unless the contrary shall be expressed in some writing signed by or on behalf of the vendor and delivered to and accepted by the vendee.

In suits at law or in equity against persons for using forged trade marks, Court may order article to be destroyed, and may award injunction, &c.

21. In every case in any suit at law or in equity against any person for forging or counterfeiting any trade mark, or for fraudulently applying any trade mark to any chattel or article, or for selling, exposing for sale, or uttering any chattel or article with any trade mark falsely or wrongfully applied thereto, or with any forged or counterfeit trade mark applied thereto, or for preventing the repetition or continuance of any such wrongful act, or the committal of any similar act, in which the plaintiff shall obtain a judgment or decree against the defendant, the Court shall have power to direct every such chattel and article to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of; and in every such suit in a Court of law the Court shall or may upon giving judgment for the plaintiff award a writ of injunction or injunctions to the defendant, commanding him to forbear from committing and not by himself or otherwise to repeat or commit any offence or wrongful act of the like nature as that of which he shall or may have been convicted by such judgment, and any disobedience of any such writ of injunction or injunctions shall be punished as a contempt of Court, and in every such suit at law or in equity it shall be lawful for the Court or a judge thereof to make such

order as such Court or judge shall think fit for the inspection of every or any manufacture or process carried on by the defendant in which any such forged or counterfeit trade mark, or any such trade mark as aforesaid, shall be alleged to be used or applied as aforesaid, and of every or any chattel, article, and thing in the possession or power of the defendant alleged to have thereon or in any way attached thereto any forged or counterfeit trade mark, or any trade mark falsely or wrongfully applied, and every or any instrument in the possession or power of the defendant used or intended to be or capable of being used for producing or making any forged or counterfeit trade mark, or trade mark alleged to be forged or counterfeit, or for falsely or wrongfully applying any trade mark; and any person who shall refuse or neglect to obey any such order shall be guilty of a contempt of Court.

Persons aggrieved by forgeries may recover damages against the guilty parties.

22. In every case in which any person shall do or cause to be done any of the wrongful acts following (that is to say,) shall forge or counterfeit any trade mark; or for the purpose of sale, or for the purpose of any manufacture or trade, shall apply any forged or counterfeit trade mark to any chattel or article, or to any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or thing in or with which any chattel or article shall be intended to be sold or shall be sold or uttered or exposed for sale, or for any purpose of trade or manufacture; or shall enclose or place any chattel or article in, upon, under, or with any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, wrapper, band, reel, ticket, label, or other thing, to which any trade mark shall have been falsely applied, or to which any forged or counterfeit trade mark shall have been applied; or shall apply or attach to any chattel or article any case, cover, reel, wrapper, band, ticket, label, or other thing to which any trade mark shall have been falsely applied, or to which any forged or counterfeit trade mark shall have been applied; or shall enclose, place, or attach any chattel or article in, upon, under, with, or to any cask, bottle, stopper, vessel, case, cover, reel, wrapper, band, ticket, label, or other thing having thereon any trade mark of any other person; every person aggrieved by any such wrongful act shall be entitled to maintain an action or suit for damages in respect thereof against the person who shall be guilty of having done such act or causing or procuring the same to be done, and for preventing the repetition or continuance of the wrongful act, and the committal of any similar act.

Defendant obtaining a verdict to have full indemnity for costs.

23. In every action which any person shall, under the provisions of this Act, commence as plaintiff for or on behalf of Her Majesty for recovering any penalty or sum of money, if the defendant shall obtain judgment, he shall be entitled to recover his costs of suit, which shall include a full indemnity for all the

costs, charges, and expenses by him expended or incurred in, about, or for the purposes of the action, unless the Court or a judge thereof shall direct that costs of the ordinary amount only shall be allowed.

A plaintiff suing for a penalty may be compelled to give security for costs.

24. In any action which any person shall, under the provisions of this Act, commence as plaintiff for or on behalf of Her Majesty for recovering any penalty or sum of money, if it shall be shown to the satisfaction of the Court or a judge thereof that the person suing as plaintiff for or on behalf of Her Majesty has no ground for alleging that he has been aggrieved by the committing of the alleged offence, in respect of which the penalty or sum of money is alleged to have become payable; and also that the person so suing as plaintiff is not resident within the jurisdiction of the Court, or not a person of sufficient property to be able to pay any costs which the defendant may recover in the action, the Court or judge shall or may order that the plaintiff shall give security by the bond or recognizance of himself and a surety, or by the deposit of a sum of money, or otherwise, as the Court or judge shall think fit, for the payment to the defendant of any costs which he may be entitled to recover in the action.

Act not to affect the Corporation of Cutlers of Hallamshire, nor to repeal 59 Geo. III. c. 7.

25. Nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to affect the rights and privileges of the Corporation of Cutlers of the liberty of Hallamshire, in the county of York, nor shall anything in this Act contained be construed in any way to repeal or make void any of the provisions contained in the fifty-ninth George Third, chapter seven, intituled *An Act to regulate the Cutlery Trade in England.*

Short title.

26. The expression "The Merchandise Marks Act, 1862," shall be a sufficient description of this Act.

The Weights and Measures Act, 1878.

41 & 42 Vict. c. 49.

PART I.—LAW OF WEIGHTS AND MEASURES.

Stamping and Verification of Weights and Measures.

Stamping of weights and measures with denomination.

§ 28. Every weight, except where the small size of the weight renders it impracticable, shall have the denomination of such weight stamped on the top or side thereof in legible figures and letters.

Every measure of capacity shall have the denomination thereof stamped on the outside of such measure in legible figures and letters.

A weight or measure not in conformity with this section shall not be stamped with such stamp of verification under this Act as is hereinafter mentioned.

Stamping of verification on measures and weights.

§ 29. Every measure and weight whatsoever used for trade shall be verified and stamped by an inspector with a stamp of verification under this Act.

Every person who uses or has in his possession for use for trade any measure or weight not stamped as required by this section, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding five pounds, or in the case of a second offence ten pounds, and shall be liable to forfeit the said measure or weight, and any contract, bargain, sale, or dealing made by such measure or weight shall be void.

Lead or pewter weights.

§ 30. A weight made of lead or pewter, or of any mixture thereof, shall not be stamped with a stamp of verification or used for trade, unless it be wholly and substantially cased with brass, copper, or iron, and legibly stamped or marked "cased:"

Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent the insertion into a weight of such a plug of lead or pewter as is *bonâ fide* necessary for the purpose of adjusting it and of affixing thereon the stamp of verification.

A person guilty of any offence against or disobedience to the provisions of this section, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding five pounds, or in case of a second offence ten pounds.

Stamping of verification on weights for coin.

§ 31. Every coin weight, not less in weight than the weight of the lightest coin for the time being current, shall be verified and stamped by the Board of Trade with a mark of verification under this Act, and otherwise shall not be deemed a just weight for determining the weight of gold and silver coin of the realm.

Every person who uses any weight declared by this section not to be a just weight shall be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds.

Forgery, &c., of stamps on measures or weights.

§ 32. If any person forges or counterfeits any stamp used for the stamping under this Act of any measure or weight, or used before the commencement of this Act for the stamping of any measure or weight, under any enactment repealed by this Act, or wilfully increases or diminishes a weight so stamped, he shall be liable to a fine not exceeding fifty pounds.

Any person who knowingly uses, sells, utters, disposes of, or exposes for sale any measure or weight with such forged or counterfeit stamp thereon, or a weight so increased or diminished, shall be liable to a fine not exceeding ten pounds.

All measures and weights with any such forged or counterfeit stamp shall be forfeited.

THE WEIGHTS AND MEASURES (IRELAND) AMENDMENT ACT, 1862.

25 & 26 Vict. c. 76 (*a*).

PART III.

Prevention of Frauds.

Penalty on counterfeiting brand.

§ 14. If any person commit any of the following offences, he shall for each offence be liable to a penalty not exceeding five pounds:

(1.) If he, with intent to defraud, counterfeit or procure to be counterfeited any brand or stamp used by or under the authority of the owner or lessee of a market or fair, or of any person having by law the control of a market or fair, to denote the weight, measure, or quality of any article sold in the market or fair, or within the prescribed limits, during the holding of the market or fair, or of any cask, firkin, or other vessel, covering, or thing in which such article is sold, or the impression of any such brand or stamp:

(2.) Or, with the like intent, use or procure to be used any such counterfeit brand, or stamp, or impression:

(3.) Or, with the like intent, alter an impression of any such genuine brand or stamp:

(4.) Or, with the like intent, have in his possession anything having thereon an impression of any such counterfeit brand or stamp, or a fraudulently altered impression of any such genuine brand or stamp:

(5.) Or, with the like intent, transfer or apply any cask, firkin, or other vessel, covering, or thing, having thereon an impression of any such genuine brand or stamp, to any article other than that for denoting the weight, measure, or quality whereof such impression was made on such cask, firkin, or other vessel, covering, or thing, or in any other manner alter the *bonâ fide* application of an impression of any such genuine brand or stamp:

(6.) Or knowingly weigh or cause to be weighed, contrary to the provisions of this Act, or act or assist in committing or connive at any fraud respecting the weighing or the weight or measure of any such article as in Part II. of this Act is mentioned:

(7.) Or, with intent to defraud, alter any ticket specifying the weight of any such article:

(*a*) This Act was repealed in part by 41 & 42 *Vict. c.* 49.

(8.) Or, with intent to defraud, make or use, or be privy to the making or using of any such ticket, falsely stating the weight of any such article, or of any covering, cart, or load:

(9.) Or shall dispose of, sell, or cause to be sold any weight or measure having a false or counterfeit stamp, or a stamp purporting to resemble a genuine stamp.

Penalty for fraudulently increasing weight of butter in casks.

§ 15. If any person shall wilfully pack up or mix, or cause to be packed up or mixed, with or in any butter contained in any firkin or cask, any salt, pickle, or other substance, with intent to increase the weight of such butter, and shall bring or send any butter so packed or mixed to any market for sale, he shall be liable to pay a fine not exceeding forty shillings, or be imprisoned for any period not exceeding one month, as the justice or justices shall determine.

Penalty for fraudulently increasing weight of fleeces.

§ 16. If any person shall wind or cause to be wound in any fleece or wool not being sufficiently rivered or washed, or wind or cause to be wound within any fleeces any deceitful locks, cots, skin, or lamb's wool, or any substance, matter, or thing, whereby the fleece may be rendered more weighty, to the deceit and loss of the buyer, such person shall be liable to a penalty of two shillings for every fleece so fraudulently made up.

THE EXHIBITION MEDALS ACT, 1863—26 & 27 Vict. c. 119.

Penalty on false representations.

As to having obtained medals.

§ 1. If any trader commits any of the offences following; that is to say—

(1.) Falsely represents that he has obtained a medal or certificate from the Exhibition Commissioners (*a*) in respect of any article or process for which a medal or certificate has been awarded by the Commissioners:

(2.) Falsely represents (knowing such representation to be false) that any other trader has obtained a medal or certificate from the Exhibition Commissioners:

(3.) Falsely represents (knowing such representation to be false) that any article sold or exposed for sale has been made by, or by any process invented by, a person who has obtained in respect of such article or process a medal or certificate from the Exhibition Commissioners:

(*a*) Of 1851 or 1862. See § 3.

He shall incur the following penalties, that is to say:

(1.) For the first offence he shall forfeit to Her Majesty a sum not exceeding five pounds:

(2.) For any subsequent offence he shall forfeit to Her Majesty a sum not exceeding twenty pounds, or be imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months.

By § 2, in proceedings under this Act, it is not necessary to prove that any person has sustained damage by the false representations.

By § 5 no provision of this Act is to affect any right or civil remedy.

Registered Designs.

The Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883.

46 & 47 Vict. c. 57.

Marking registered designs.

§ 51. Before delivery on sale of any articles to which a registered design has been applied, the proprietor of the design shall cause each such article to be marked with the prescribed mark, or with the prescribed word or words or figures, denoting that the design is registered; and if he fails to do so the copyright in the design shall cease, unless the proprietor shows that he took all proper steps to ensure the marking of the article.

The Designs Rules, 1883.

Registration mark.

32. Before the delivery on sale of any article to which a registered design has been applied, the proprietor of such design shall, if such article is included in any of the classes one to twelve in the Third Schedule hereto, cause each such article to be marked with the abbreviation "Rd." and the number appearing on the certificate of registration, and shall, if such article is included in the classes thirteen or fourteen in the Third Schedule hereto, cause each such article to be marked with the abbreviation "Regd."

Class 13 includes "Printed or woven designs on textile piece goods."

Class 14 includes "Printed or woven designs on handkerchiefs and shawls."

The first twelve classes include all other goods.

Customs Regulations.

The Customs Consolidation Act, 1876—39 & 40 *Vict. c.* 36.

Table of prohibitions and restrictions.

§ 42 (*a*). The goods enumerated and described in the following table of prohibitions and restrictions inwards are hereby prohibited to be imported or brought into the United Kingdom, save as thereby excepted, and if any goods so enumerated and described shall be imported or brought into the United Kingdom contrary to the prohibitions or restrictions contained therein, such goods shall be forfeited, and may be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the Commissioners of Customs may direct.

A Table of Prohibitions and Restrictions inwards.

Goods prohibited to be imported.

* * * * *

Clocks and watches, or any other article of metal impressed with any mark or stamp representing or in imitation of any legal British assay mark or stamp, or purporting by any mark or appearance to be of the manufacture of the United Kingdom (*b*).

* * * * *

Foreign manufactures with British marks.

§ 153. If any articles of foreign manufacture, and any packages of such articles, bearing any names, brands, or marks being or purporting to be the names, brands, or marks of manufacturers resident in the United Kingdom, shall be imported into any of the British possessions abroad, the same shall be forfeited (*c*).

The Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1879—42 & 43 *Vict. c.* 21.

PART I.—CUSTOMS.

Entry of British goods returned.

§ 6. * * Provided also, that if any British goods brought into the United Kingdom bear the name, brand, or mark of any British manufacturer, the same shall, either by bill of store, or by and with the consent in writing of the proprietor of such name, brand, or mark, or his legal representative, or on proof to the satisfaction of the Commissioners of Customs, by declaration of the importer, that such goods are of British manufacture, be admitted to entry as British (*d*).

(*a*) This section is amended by 46 & 47 *Vict. c.* 55, *q.v. infra.*

(*b*) This is re-enacted from 16 & 17 *Vict. c.* 107, § 44.

(*c*) This is re-enacted from 16 & 17 *Vict. c.* 107, § 161.

(*d*) This is re-enacted from 30 & 31 *Vict. c.* 82, § 6, and 39 & 40 *Vict. c.* 36, § 63.

The Revenue Act, 1883—46 & 47 *Vict. c.* 55.

PART I.—AMENDMENT OF LAW RELATING TO THE CUSTOMS.

Amendment of § 42 of 39 & 40 *Vict.* c. 36.

§ 2. The following enactments shall, on and after the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-four, have effect as if they were contained in section forty-two of the Customs Consolidation Act, 1876, in substitution for the portion of that section repealed by this Act, that is to say—

(1.) (a.) Articles of foreign manufacture not imported by, or for, but bearing the name and address or name and trade mark of a manufacturer of such articles resident, or having a place of business, in the United Kingdom (*a*).

(b.) Articles of foreign manufacture bearing, either alone or in conjunction with other names or words, the name of a part of, or a place in, the United Kingdom, which name in the opinion of the Commissioners of Customs has been placed upon such articles in order to impart to them a special character of British manufacture (*b*).

(2.) The proprietary right of a manufacturer in any name or mark on any articles of foreign manufacture shall be proved or evidenced in such manner and upon such conditions as the Commissioners of Customs shall prescribe.

(3.) Articles bearing the name of a place which would render them subject to prohibition under this section shall not be admissible by reason of there being another place of the same name out of the United Kingdom (*c*).

(4.) Names, addresses, and marks on boxes, cases, cards, or other things in which or attached to which articles of foreign manufacture are imported, shall be deemed to be borne by the articles themselves.

(5.) The Commissioners of Customs in administering this section, whether in the exercise of any discretion or opinion or otherwise, shall act under the control of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury.

(6.) In this section the word "name" as applied to a manufacturer shall include any abbreviation or imitation of a name, and the word "manufacturer" shall include a dealer, and a manufacturing or trading company having a place of business in the United Kingdom.

(*a*) See 39 & 40 *Vict. c.* 36, § 42, re-enacting 16 & 17 *Vict. c.* 107, § 44.

(*b*) See 39 & 40 *Vict. c.* 36, § 42, re-enacting 35 & 36 *Vict. c.* 20, § 4.

(*c*) See 39 & 40 *Vict. c.* 36, § 42, re-enacting 35 & 36 *Vict. c.* 20, § 4.

APPENDIX D.

STATUTORY ENACTMENTS WITH RESPECT TO MARKS ON SPECIAL CLASSES OF GOODS (*a*).

Cutlery.

59 *Geo. III. c.* 7 (*b*), "An Act to regulate the Cutlery Trade in England."

§ 1. Manufacturers may mark with the figure of a hammer articles of cutlery made by them by means of the hammer.

§ 3. No person is to mark articles of cutlery not made by means of the hammer with the figure of a hammer, or to possess for the purpose of sale, or offer for sale such articles so marked, under penalty of forfeiture of the articles so marked, together with a fine of 5*l.* a dozen.

§ 4. No person is to mark articles of cutlery, or possess for the purpose of sale, or offer for sale articles marked with any words indicative of a quality other than the true one, under similar penalties.

§ 5. No person is to mark articles, or possess, &c., articles marked with the words "London" or "London made," unless such articles were made within the City of London, or twenty miles distance therefrom, under penalty of forfeiture, together with a fine of 10*l.* a dozen.

§ 14. Articles of cutlery subject to forfeiture by virtue of the Act may be seized and destroyed, &c., by order of justices.

The remaining provisions refer chiefly to forms of procedure, recovery of penalties, &c.

The Cutlers' Company of Hallamshire.

21 *Jac. I. c.* 31 (1623).

§ 1 (*c*). The cutlers living in Hallamshire, or within six miles distance therefrom, are incorporated under the corporate name of "The Master,

(*a*) The Acts abstracted in the text are in force at present.

(*b*) The Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, does not interfere with this Act. See § 25 of that Act.

(*c*) The remainder of this Act is repealed by 31 *Geo. III. c.* 58.

Wardens, Searchers, Assistants and Commonalty of the Company of Cutlers in Hallamshire in the county of York."

31 *Geo. III. c.* 58 (1791) (*a*).

§ 1. The company to consist of the trades hereinafter mentioned, and of none other.

§ 3 enumerates "the arts or trades of makers of knives, sickles, shears, scissors, razors, files and forks."

§ 7. Apprentices who have served for seven years are to have, at twenty-one years of age, their freedom of the company and a mark to be assigned them.

§ 17. Members of the company counterfeiting marks assigned to others are for every offence to pay a penalty not exceeding 20*l.* nor less than 4*l.*

§ 26. Penalties may be sued for by the company, or by the party aggrieved, in the Courts at Westminster.

§ 27. One or more justice or justices of the peace for the West Riding of the county of York, or for the county of Derby, shall, upon information of an offence for which a penalty is imposed, summon the parties and witnesses, and hear and determine the matter in a summary way, and give judgment with costs, and issue a warrant for levying the penalties by distress, and if the goods are insufficient, then shall commit the offender to the House of Correction for one month. Costs may be given to a person wrongly accused.

§ 28 contains a form of conviction.

§ 29. An appeal is given to the Court of Quarter Sessions at Sheffield, Rotherham, Barnsley, Wakefield, or Pontefract.

§ 31. The penalties which come to the company are to be distributed among the poor of the company.

The Act contains other provisions with respect to the constitution of the company, procedure, &c.

41 *Geo. III. c.* 97 (1801), (Local).

§ 2. A freeman of the company is empowered to give his mark by will to any person or persons, in the same manner as his other personalty, subject to the life estate therein which his widow is to have during her widowhood or any future coverture, and which she may sell, though on her death the provisions of the husband's will take effect.

§ 3. In default of a will, the mark is to pass in the same manner as its owner's other personalty, subject to the widow's life estate (*b*).

§ 5. Parish apprentices who shall prove to the satisfaction of a justice that they have regularly served a freeman for seven years shall be entitled to their freedom and a mark.

54 *Geo. III. c.* 119 (1814), (Local).

This Act repeals several of the provisions of the Act of 1791, in favour of free trade.

(*a*) Considerable portions of this Act have been repealed by the Acts which follow.

(*b*) And see § 6 of the Act of 1814.

§ 3. Any person carrying on any of the specified trades within the specified limits has a right to have a mark assigned to him by the company on application, which mark is not to be one that is the property of another, nor a surname (*a*); and for such mark he is to pay forty shillings, and if the mark be one previously assigned but surrendered, 3*l.* in addition, besides, in either case, any stamp duty imposed by Act of Parliament (*b*).

§ 4. No mark is to be assigned by the company if they have notice that it is in common use, or in the use of any person within the district (*c*).

§ 5. Members of the company, or any other persons carrying on any of the specified trades within the specified limits, who shall use a mark assigned by the company to another person, with intent to counterfeit, shall for every offence forfeit and pay a sum not exceeding 20*l.*, half of the fine to go to the injured person, the other half to the company. The fine is to be recovered and applied as under the Act of 1791.

§ 6. The provisions made by § 2 of the Act of 1801, for the devolution of marks on the deaths of their owners, are to apply to marks assigned under the present Act (*d*), but not more than one person of the family shall be entitled to use the mark at the same time.

23 *Vict. c. xliii.* (1860), (Local).

§ 1. The provisions of the previous Acts are extended to "the arts or trades of manufacturers of steel and makers of saws and edge-tools and other articles of steel, or of steel and iron combined, having a cutting edge."

§ 2. Any person exercising any of the trades formerly or now specified, within the specified limits, may and shall, on application to the company and payment of 20*l.* in addition to any other fees payable, become a freeman of the company and have a mark assigned to him.

§ 3. The former and present Acts may be cited as "The Cutlers' Company's Acts, 1623, 1791, 1801, 1814, 1860," respectively.

The rights of the Cutlers' Company were expressly reserved by the

(*a*) The similar provision in § 24 of the Act of 1791 (repealed by the present Act), with respect to non-freemen, provided that, on a non-freeman having a mark assigned to him, he should become a freeman of the company. This is not repeated here.

(*b*) A mark assigned to a non-freeman is assignable by him. See *Bury* v. *Bedford*, 4 De G. J. & S. 352. But where a person to whom a Sheffield mark had been assigned had assigned it to another, and had not gone through the process of surrendering it to the company for reassignment to his assignee, the latter was not recognised by the company as the proprietor of the mark, nor admitted to registration under the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, until he had perfected his title: *In re Rabone*, Dig. 643.

(*c*) By the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, § 9, no mark was to be assigned by the company which had been registered under the Trade Marks Registration Acts, notice of the registration having been given to the Cutlers' Company. And see the Patents, &c., Act, 1883, § 81.

(*d*) Thus including non-freemen in possession of company's marks.

Merchandise Marks Act, 1862 (*a*), § 25, and also by the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, § 9.

See also the special provisions in regard to the Cutlers' Company contained in the Trade Marks Registration Act, 1875, § 9, and in 46—56 of the Rules under that Act, now repealed; the effect of which was that the registrar of trade marks was to be supplied with copies of all Sheffield corporate marks, and the Cutlers' Company with copies of all trade marks registered for goods or classes of goods within § 2 of the Cutlers' Company's Act, 1860; that notice of applications for assignment or registration of such marks, and of such assignment or registration, when complete, was to be given by the Cutlers' Company to the registrar and *vice versâ*; that marks identical with, or similar to marks already assigned or registered, were not to be registered or assigned respectively (except, in the former case, with the special leave of the Court); and that Sheffield marks might be registered under the Trade Marks Registration Acts.

By § 81 of the Patents, &c., Act, 1883 (*b*), and Rules 53—56 of the Trade Marks Rules (*c*), the Sheffield Cutlers' Register is reorganized. A new "Sheffield Register" is established, in which are to be entered all trade marks for cutlery, edge-tools, raw steel, or goods made of steel, or of steel and iron combined, whether with or without a cutting edge, belonging to persons carrying on business in Hallamshire, or within six miles thereof, and registered under the Act of 1875, or assigned by the Cutlers' Company and actually used before the commencement of the present Act. All applications for marks for similar goods are, when made by persons trading within the specified limits, to be made to the company. Notice of such applications is to be given by the company to the comptroller, who may give notice of objection; and notice of applications by persons trading outside the specified limits for marks for similar goods is to be given by the comptroller to the company. Notice of registrations in the Sheffield Register is to be given to the comptroller, who is to enter the mark in the general register; and notice of all other entries is also to be given to him. The practice at Sheffield is to follow generally that at London, and an appeal is given from the company's decisions to the comptroller, and from him to the Court. The provisions of the company's Acts for the summary punishment of persons counterfeiting Sheffield corporate marks are to apply to marks entered in the new Sheffield Register. The old cutlers' register of corporate marks is to be closed after five years from the commencement of the Act (*i.e.*, after five years from December 31st, 1883). The net result will be that the Sheffield Register will be an exact duplicate of the general register, so far as that relates to marks used for the specified goods within the specified limits.

(*a*) 25 & 26 *Vict. c.* 88. See p. 438-49. (*b*) See p. 321. (*c*) See p. 353.

Gold and Silver Plate.

England.

2 *Hen. VI. c.* 17 (in Ruffhead's ed. c. 14) (1423) (*a*).

No goldsmith or silversmith in the City of London to sell wrought silver of less than sterling fineness. No harness of silver to be offered for sale in that city, until touched with the touch of the leopard's head, if it may reasonably bear the same, and also with the workman's mark, under penalty of forfeiture of double value. The mark of every goldsmith to be known to the wardens of the same craft. In the cities of York, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, Lincoln, Norwich, Bristol, Salisbury, and Coventry, to be divers touches. In other places, where no touch is ordained, silver not to be worked of less than sterling fineness, nor to be offered for sale without the worker's mark. Penalty of double value (*b*).

18 *Eliz. c.* 15 (1576) (*c*).

If plate marked by the Goldsmiths' Company be found deceitful, the company to forfeit the value.

8 & 9 *Wm. III. c.* 8 (1697).

§ 8 (in Ruffhead's ed. § 9) (*d*). No silver plate to be made of less fineness than 11 oz. 10 dwt. in the lb. troy (*e*), nor offered for sale until marked (*f*).

If plate marked by the Goldsmiths' Company be found deceitful, the company to forfeit the value, half to the Crown, half to the informer.

12 & 13 *Wm. III. c.* 4 (1700), "An Act for appointing wardens and assay masters for assaying wrought plate in the cities of York, Exeter, Bristol, Chester, and Norwich" (*g*).

(*a*) The earliest statute on the subject was 28 *Edw. I. c.* 20 (1300), by which it was provided, among other things, that no vessel of silver should pass out of the worker's hands until assayed by the wardens of the craft, and marked with the leopard's head, and that no worse gold should be worked than that of the touch of Paris. This Act was repealed, saving the King's prerogative, by 19 & 20 *Vict. c.* 64.

(*b*) 4 *Hen. VII. c.* 2 (1487) (repealed by 19 & 20 *Vict. c.* 64) required finers of gold and silver to put their marks upon the metal.

(*c*) It was provided by the earlier part of this Act (repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1863) that gold should not be made or sold under 22 carats in fineness, nor silver under 11 oz. 2 dwt.; and that no silver plate should be sold without the worker's mark, under penalty of forfeiting the value.

(*d*) The remainder of the Act was repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1867.

(*e*) The standard was thus raised from that fixed by the preceding Act (11 oz. 2 dwt.), but by 6 *Geo. I. c.* 11, both standards were established. See *infrd.*

(*f*) The following marks are appointed by this Act:—

The worker's mark, to be expressed by the two first letters of his surname.

The mark of the mystery or craft of the goldsmiths, which, instead of the leopard's head and the lion, shall for this plate be the figure of a lion's head erased, and the figure of a woman commonly called Britannia.

A distinct variable mark to denote the year of manufacture of the plate.

Penalty—Forfeiture of the plate or its value, half to the Crown, half to the informer. See 12 *Geo. II. c.* 26, § 5.

(*g*) Bristol never exercised the powers

§ 2. Goldsmiths, &c., of the cities of York, Exeter, Bristol, Chester, and Norwich, incorporated into respective companies, to be called respectively "The Company of Goldsmiths of ——."

§ 3. No goldsmith, &c., in those cities to make silver plate of less fineness than the standard for the time being, nor sell it until marked with—

The worker's mark, to be expressed with the two first letters of his surname.

The lion's head erased and the figure of Britannia.

The arms of that one of the above cities in which the plate is assayed and marked.

A distinct variable mark or letter in Roman character to denote the year (*a*).

Penalty—Forfeiture of the plate or value, half to the Crown, half to the informer.

The Act also contains provisions with respect to the appointment of wardens and assayers, procedure, &c.

1 *Anne, c.* 3 (1 Anne, stat. 1, c. 9, in Ruffhead's ed.) (1701).

The provisions of the last Act extended to Newcastle upon-Tyne, and "The Company of Goldsmiths of Newcastle-upon-Tyne" incorporated.

6 *Geo. I. c.* 11 (1719) (*b*).

§ 1. The old silver standard of 11 oz. 2 dwt. restored.

§ 3. No goldsmith, &c., to work silver plate of less fineness than 11 oz. 2 dwt., nor to sell it, &c., until touched, assayed and marked, under the former penalties.

§ 41. Two standards of silver, 11 oz. 10 dwt. and 11 oz. 2 dwt. continued (*c*).

12 *Geo. II. c.* 26 (1739) (*d*).

§ 1. Gold plate not to be made under 22 carats in fineness, nor silver plate under 11 oz. 2 dwt. Penalty, 10*l.*

§ 5. Gold and silver plate not to be sold or exported until marked as follows:—

Gold plate of 22 carats fine and silver plate of 11 oz. 2 dwt. with—

The worker's mark, which shall be the first letters of his Christian and surname.

The figure of Britannia.

Silver plate of 11 oz. 2 dwt. to be marked with—

The workman's mark.

The mark of the wardens of the Goldsmiths' Company.

The figure of a lion passant.

The figure of a leopard's head.

See 12 *Geo. II. c.* 26, § 5.

(*d*) Repealed in part, 30 *Geo. III. c.* 31, § 1, Statute Law Revision Act, 1867.

(*a*) See 12 *Geo. II. c.* 26, § 5.

(*b*) The whole of this Act but §§ 1—3 and § 41 repealed by Statute Law Revision Act, 1870.

(*c*) Silver plate of 11 oz. 10 dwt. to be marked with—

The workman's mark.

The mark of the wardens of the Goldsmiths' Company.

The figure of a lion's head erased.

hereby conferred. York and Norwich have discontinued doing so.

These marks of the Company of Goldsmiths in London, viz., the leopard's head, the lion passant (*a*), and a distinct variable mark or letter to denote the year. Or,
The worker's mark, and
The marks appointed to be used by the assayers at York, Exeter, Bristol, Chester, Norwich, or Newcastle-upon-Tyne.
Silver plate of 11 oz. 10 dwt., with—
The worker's mark as before.
These marks of the said company, viz., the lion's head erased, the figure of Britannia, and the mark or letter to denote the year. Or,
The worker's mark, and
The mark of one of the said cities or towns.

Penalty—10*l.* fine, or, in default, hard labour not exceeding six months (*b*).

§ 21. All goldsmiths, &c., to enter their new marks, names, and places of abode in one of the assay offices at London, York, Exeter, Bristol, Chester, Norwich, or Newcastle-upon-Tyne. Such new marks to be of a character or alphabet different from their old marks; all old marks to be broken. Penalty—10*l.* fine, and 10*l.* more for using any other mark; in default, hard labour not exceeding six months.

13 *Geo. III. c.* 52 (1772), "An Act for appointing wardens and assay-masters for assaying wrought plate in the towns of Sheffield and Birmingham" (*c*).

§ 2. Incorporation of "The Guardians of the Standard of Wrought Plate for Birmingham" (*d*).

§ 4. No silversmith or plate worker in either of these towns, or within twenty miles thereof, to sell or export silver plate made in these towns, and the specified limits, until marked as follows:—
Silver plate of 11 oz. 2 dwt., with—
The mark of the worker or maker, which shall be the first letters of his Christian and surname.
The lion passant.
The mark of the company in whose assay office the plate was assayed and marked.
A distinct variable mark or letter to denote the year.
Silver plate of 11 oz. 10 dwt., with—
The worker's mark.
The figure of Britannia.
The mark of the company, and
The mark or letter to denote the year.

(*a*) By 38 *Geo. III. c.* 69, § 2, gold plate of 18 carats fine is to be marked with a crown and 18, instead of the lion passant, and by 7 & 8 *Vict. c.* 22, § 15, gold of 22 carats with a crown and 22.

(*b*) See *Robinson* v. *Currey*, 6 Q. B. D. 21; 7 *ib.* 465.

(*c*) Repealed as to Birmingham, by 5 *Geo. IV. c. lii.* (local). As to Sheffield, see 24 *Geo. III. sess.* 2, *c.* 20. The present Act only deals with silver.

(*d*) Or "Sheffield."

Penalty—Forfeiture of the plate or value, half to the Crown, half to the informer.

§ 5. The peculiar mark of the Birmingham company to be an anchor, *of the Sheffield company a crown.*

The Act also contains provisions for the election of wardens and assayers, the process of assaying, punishment of counterfeiting, &c.

24 *Geo. III. sess.* 2, *c.* 20 (1784), relates to Sheffield.

§ 2. Manufacturers of goods plated with silver, within Sheffield or 100 miles thereof, may strike upon such goods their surname or the name of their firm, together with some other mark, figure, or device.

§ 3. Names to be in legible characters and struck with only one punch, and marks to be approved and registered by the Guardians for Sheffield.

24 *Geo. III. sess.* 2, *c.* 53 (1784) (*a*).

§ 5. The assaying officer to mark with an additional new mark, of the King's head, all gold and silver plate sent to be touched, marked and assayed, but to ask and receive duty before touching, marking, or assaying.

§ 8. Gold and silver plate not to be sold or exported until marked with the King's head. Penalty—50*l.*, or, in default, hard labour of not more than one year, nor less than six months. Also, forfeiture of the unmarked plate, half to the Crown, half to the informer.

30 *Geo. III. c.* 31 (1790).

This Act regulates the exemptions from marking.

38 *Geo. III. c.* 69 (1798).

§ 1. Gold plate may be manufactured down to 18 carats fine.

§ 2. Such gold plate not to be sold or exported until marked with a crown and the figures 18, instead of the lion passant. Penalty—10*l.*

§ 3. Gold plate of 18 carats fine may be marked by the various goldsmiths' companies, &c., as before, with the exception of the alteration of this mark.

§ 4 Gold plate of 22 carats may still be made, sold, exported, &c.

§ 5. This Act not to authorise the application of the mark used before the Act to gold plate of less than 22 carats fine.

§ 6. Penalty of 50*l.* for selling, exporting, &c., gold plate not marked with one of the marks.

§ 8 (*b*). Previous regulations for gold of 22 carats, except as to the mark of the lion passant, to apply to gold of 18 carats.

55 *Geo. III. c.* 185 (1815).

§ 7 (*c*). Penalties for forging duty marks on plate, or selling or exporting plate so marked, or possessing dies, &c.

5 *Geo. IV. c. lii.* (1824) (Local—Birmingham and thirty miles round).

§ 1. 13 *Geo. III. c.* 52, repealed, so far as relates to Birmingham.

(*a*) Repealed in part 25 *Geo. III. c.* 64, § 2; 30 *Geo. III. c.* 31, § 1; Statute Law Revision Acts, 1861—71.

(*b*) § 7 provided penalties for counterfeiting, but this was repealed as to England by 7 & 8 *Vict. c.* 22, § 1, though still unrepealed for Scotland.

(*c*) The greater part of this Act is repealed by 33 & 34 *Vict. c.* 99, and 36 & 37 *Vict. c.* 91.

§ 4. Re-incorporation of "The Guardians of the Standard of Wrought Plate in Birmingham," with authority within a radius of thirty miles.

§ 20. No goldsmith, silversmith, &c., within Birmingham or thirty miles thereof, to sell or export gold or silver plate made within the specified limits until marked as follows:—

Gold of 22 carats fine with the lion passant (*a*).
" 18 " " crown and 18.
Silver of 11 oz. 2 dwt. fine with the lion passant.
" 11 oz. 10 dwt. " Britannia.

And all gold and silver alike with the following additional marks:—

The worker's mark (the first letters of his Christian and surname, or in case of any partnership, the initials of the name or firm of such partnership).

The company's mark (an anchor).

A distinct variable mark or letter, to denote the year.

Penalty—Forfeiture of the plate or its value, half to the Crown, half to the informer.

§ 21. Goldsmiths, silversmiths, &c., within Birmingham and thirty miles, to enter their names, marks, and places of abode with the company. Penalty—100*l.*, half to the informer, half to the purposes of the Act.

§ 22. Penalties of counterfeiting, &c.

The Act also contains numerous provisions with respect to the constitution of the company, the election of its officers, its procedure, &c.

7 & 8 *Vict. c.* 22 (1844).

This Act (which see) regulates the punishments and penalties for counterfeiting, &c., hall-marks (*b*).

§ 15. Gold plate of 22 carats fine to be marked with a crown and 22, instead of the lion passant.

17 & 18 *Vict. c.* 96 (1854).

This Act authorises Her Majesty, by Order in Council, to allow any standard for gold plate, not being less than one-third part of the whole, and to approve thereby of the instrument for stamping such plate, setting forth in figures the actual fineness of the metal (*c*).

(*a*) By 7 & 8 *Vict. c.* 22, § 15, a crown and 22.

(*b*) See *R.* v. *Lee*, 1 Leach, 416, and *R.* v. *Ogden*, 6 C. & P. 631, decided on the earlier statutes; also *R.* v. *Suter & Coulson*, 10 Cox, 577; and *R.* v. *Ardley*, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 301, 12 Cox, 23, in which a spurious hall mark was made the means of obtaining money by false pretences. In *R.* v. *Roberts*, 70 L. T. 265, the jury found that the marks used by the defendant were not imitations of the genuine hall-mark. An action by the Goldsmiths' Company for penalties under this Act is not an action by a common informer within 31 *Eliz. c.* 5, nor an action by a "party grieved" within 3 & 4 *Will. IV. c.* 42, § 3, and can, therefore, be maintained after the lapse of two years from the commission of the offence, but (in the opinion of Lush, L. J.) not after 20 years: *Robinson* v. *Currey*, 6 Q. B. D. 21; 7 *ib.* 465.

(*c*) Accordingly the following reduced standards were ordered by the Council:—

15 carats, to be marked with 15 and 625.
12 " " 12 " 500.
9 " " 9 " 375.

The crown and sovereign's head are not placed on plate of these qualities.

ENGLISH HALL MARKS AT THE PRESENT DAY (*a*).

	GOLD.					SILVER.	
	22 CARATS.	18 CARATS.	15 CARATS.	12 CARATS.	9 CARATS.	11 OZ. 2 DWT.	11 OZ. 10 DWT.
Quality Mark	22	18	15·625	12·5	9·375	None (*b*).	None.
Standard Mark	Crown.	Crown.	None.	None.	None.	Lion passant.	Britannia.
Date Mark	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.
Maker's Mark	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.
Duty Mark	Sovereign's head.	Sovereign's head.	None.	None.	None.	Sovereign's head.	Sovereign's head.
Assay Town Mark	On all qualities of gold and silver the special mark of the town.						

The special marks of the assay towns are as follows:—London, a leopard's head (except for silver of 11 oz. 10 dwt., for which it is a lion's head erased); Exeter, a castle; Chester, a dagger and 3 sheaves; Newcastle, 3 castles; Sheffield, a crown; Birmingham, an anchor (*c*).

(*a*) Gold and silver of all these qualities are manufactured at London, Chester, Newcastle-on-Tyne, and Birmingham. At Exeter only gold of 22 carats and silver of 11 oz. 2 dwt. are manufactured; at Sheffield only silver of 11 oz. 2 dwt. and 11 oz. 10 dwt. At York and Norwich no plate is now manufactured. At Bristol the powers conferred by 12 & 13 *Wm. III. c.* 4, were never exercised.

(*b*) Except at Newcastle, where the mark of a leopard's head crowned is used.

(*c*) The marks for York and Norwich (now discontinued) were:—York, 5 lions on a cross; Norwich, a castle and a lion passant.

18 & 19 *Vict. c.* 60 (1855).

Gold wedding rings are to be assayed and marked in the same way as other gold plate.

5 & 6 *Vict. c.* 47 (1842) (Customs Act) (*a*).

§ 59. Foreign gold and silver plate imported from abroad shall be of the respective standards required for plate wrought in England, and it shall not be sold, &c., until assayed, stamped and marked in England, Scotland, or Ireland, as plate of the same description made in that country.

5 & 6 *Vict. c.* 56 (1842) (Customs Act).

§ 6 (*b*). Foreign ornamental plate, manufactured before 1800, and imported, is exempted from the operation of the last Act.

39 & 40 *Vict. c.* 35 (1876) (Customs Act).

§ 2 (*c*). Foreign gold and silver plate imported and sent to an assay office in the United Kingdom for assay shall be marked, in addition to the marks ordinarily used at that office for British plate, with an F. on an oval escutcheon, to denote the foreign origin of the plate.

Scotland (*d*).

13 *Geo. III. c.* 59 (1773) (*e*).

§ 2, which provided penalties for counterfeiting, &c., the marks for plate, is unrepealed in Scotland.

38 *Geo. III. c.* 69 (1798) (see p. 463, *suprà*).

§ 7 (*f*), which provided penalties for counterfeiting, &c., the marks for plate, is unrepealed in Scotland.

6 & 7 *Wm. IV. c.* 69 (1836).

§ 1. Gold plate not to be made, sold, or exported, under 18 carats fine, nor silver under 11 oz. 2 dwt. fine. Penalty—Fine not exceeding 100*l.*

(*a*) The entire Act but §§ 59 and 60 is repealed.

(*b*) The remainder of the Act is repealed by 8 & 9 *Vict. c.* 84, § 2.

(*c*) This re-enacts 30 & 31 *Vict. c.* 82, § 24, the whole of which Act is repealed by the present one. See also 46 & 47 *Vict. c.* 55, § 10, as to foreign plate.

(*d*) In the reign of James III. of Scotland (1483) gold 22 carats fine, and silver 11 penny fine were to be marked with the maker's mark, the mark of the deacon of the craft, and the mark of the town.

(*e*) This Act was repealed as to *England* by 7 & 8 *Vict. c.* 22, § 1. The first section was repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1871.

(*f*) Repealed as to *England* by 7 & 8 *Vict. c.* 22, § 1.

SCOTCH HALL MARKS AT THE PRESENT DAY (*a*).

	GOLD.					SILVER.	
	22 CARATS.	18 CARATS.	15 CARATS.	12 CARATS.	9 CARATS.	11 OZ. 2 DWT.	11 OZ. 10 DWT.
Quality Mark	22	18	15	12	9	None.	Britannia.
Standard Mark—							
Edinburgh	Thistle.	Thistle.	None.	None.	None.	Thistle.	Thistle.
Glasgow	Lion rampant.	Lion rampant.	Lion rampant.	Lion rampant.	Lion rampant.	Lion rampant.	Lion rampant.
Date Mark	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.
Maker's Mark	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.
Duty Mark	Sovereign's head.	Sovereign's head.	None.	None.	None.	Sovereign's head.	Sovereign's head.
Assay Town Mark	On all qualities of gold and silver the special mark of the town.						

The special marks of the assay towns are:—Edinburgh, a castle; Glasgow, a tree, fish, and bell.

(*a*) Gold and silver of all these qualities are manufactured at Edinburgh and Glasgow.

§ 2. Scotch goldsmiths to send their names, descriptions, and marks (to consist of the initial letters of their Christian and surnames, or, in the case of a partnership, of the initial letters of the firm name) for registration to the Goldsmiths' Company of Edinburgh, or of Glasgow.

§ 3. Gold plate of 22 carats fine, and silver plate of 11 oz. 2 dwt. to be sent, marked with the maker's mark, to the assay office, and to be there marked with—

The mark of the thistle.

A distinct variable letter to denote the year.

The mark of the assaying company.

Gold plate of 18 carats fine to be marked in addition with 18.

Silver plate of 11 oz. 10 dwt. fine to be marked in addition with the figure of Britannia.

§§ 16 and 17 contain certain exemptions from marking.

§§ 18, 19 and 21 contain penalties for selling or exporting plate not duly marked, counterfeiting marks, &c., marking base metal, &c.

The Act also contains provisions with respect to the assaying, recovering penalties, &c.

The following statutes mentioned above under the head of "England" are also in force in Scotland: 6 *Geo. I. c.* 11; 24 *Geo. III. sess.* 2, *c.* 53; 38 *Geo. III. c.* 69; 5 & 6 *Vict. c.* 47; 5 & 6 *Vict. c.* 56; 17 & 18 *Vict. c.* 96; 18 & 19 *Vict. c.* 60; and 39 & 40 *Vict. c.* 35.

Ireland.

3 *Geo II. c.* 3 (1730), (Irish Act) (*a*).

§ 32. Gold and silver plate not to be sold until assayed, touched and marked.

§ 33. Plate to be assayed by the Dublin Company of Goldsmiths. Gold of 22 carats, and silver of 11 oz. 2 dwt., to be touched by the wardens of the company, and marked with "the marks now usual for that purpose." On payment of duty, the plate to be marked with a mark to be appointed by the Commissioners of His Majesty's Revenue (*b*).

§ 38. Penalties for counterfeiting, &c., provided.

(*a*) This Act was repealed as to gold by 23 & 24 *Geo. III. c.* 23, § 1 (Irish). It fixed a standard of 22 carats for gold (§ 33).

(*b*) The figure of Hibernia was accordingly appointed.

IRISH HALL MARKS AT THE PRESENT DAY (*a*).

	GOLD.						SILVER.
	22 CARATS.	20 CARATS.	18 CARATS.	15 CARATS.	12 CARATS.	9 CARATS.	11 OZ. 2 DWT.
Quality Mark	22	20	18	15·625	12·5	9·375	None.
Standard Mark	Harp crowned.	Plume of 3 feathers.	Unicorn's head.	None.	None.	None.	Harp crowned.
Date Mark	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.	Letter.
Maker's Mark	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.	Initials.
Duty Mark	Sovereign's head.	Sovereign's head.	Sovereign's head.	None.	None.	None.	Sovereign's head.
Dublin Mark	Hibernia.	Hibernia.	Hibernia.	Hibernia.	Hibernia.	Hibernia.	Hibernia.

(*a*) The only assay town in Ireland is Dublin, where gold is manufactured of a standard (20 carats) not used in England or Scotland, but silver only of the earlier standard of 11 oz. 2 dwt., and none of 11 oz. 10 dwt.

23 & 24 *Geo. III. c.* 23 (1783), (Irish Act).

§ 2. No gold plate to be made, sold, &c., except of 22 carats, 20 carats, or 18 carats fine. Penalty—Forfeiture and fine of 10*l.*

§ 3. The following marks appointed for gold of 22 carats:

The mark of the maker, which is the number 22, and the first letter of the maker's Christian and surname. And,

For Dublin, a harp crowned.

For New Geneva (*a*), a like harp with a bar across the strings.

§ 4. Marks for gold of 20 carats:

The number 20.

The maker's initials. And,

For Dublin, a plume with three feathers.

For New Geneva, a plume with two feathers.

§ 5. Marks for gold of 18 carats.

The number 18.

The maker's initials. And,

For Dublin, an unicorn's head.

For New Geneva, an unicorn's head, with a collar round the neck.

§ 6 contains exemptions.

§ 11 provides for the registration of new marks.

§ 28 provides penalties for counterfeiting, &c.

47 *Geo. III. sess.* 2, *c.* 15 (1807).

§ 3. Irish gold plate of 22, 20 or 18 carats, and silver plate of 11 oz. 2 dwt., to be assayed by the Goldsmiths' Company of Dublin, touched and marked with "the marks now or hereafter to be used."

§ 6. On payment of duty, gold and silver plate to be marked with the King's head to denote that this has been done (*b*).

§§ 14, 15 and 16 provide penalties for persons selling or buying unmarked plate, or counterfeiting, &c., the marks used.

The Act also provides for the manner in which duty is to be paid, books kept, &c.

The following statutes mentioned above under the head of "England" are also in force in Ireland: 5 & 6 *Vict. c.* 47; 5 & 6 *Vict. c.* 56; 17 & 18 *Vict. c.* 96; 18 & 19 *Vict. c.* 60; 39 & 40 *Vict. c.* 35.

N.B.—For very full information on all points connected with Hall Marks, see Mr. Chaffers' book on Hall Marks, 6th ed., London, 1883, 8vo.

(*a*) This was a company of Geneva watchmakers, who established themselves in co. Waterford. They carried on operations only from about 1784 to 1790.

(*b*) The figure of Hibernia continued to be used in addition.

PRINTS AND ENGRAVINGS.

8 *Geo. II. c.* 13 (1735).

§ 1. Copyright for fourteen years given to "every person who shall invent and design, engrave, etch, or work, in mezzotinto or chiaro-oscuro, or from his own works and invention shall cause to be designed and engraved, etched, or worked in mezzotinto or chiaro-oscuro" any print, "to commence from the day of the first publishing thereof, which shall be truly engraved with the name of the proprietor on each plate, and printed on every such print or prints" (*a*). Penalties for Piracy.

7 *Geo. III. c.* 38 (1766).

The former Act extended in various respects, including an extension of the term to twenty-eight years.

17 *Geo. III. c.* 57 (1777).

The former Acts further extended in various respects.

6 *& 7 Will. IV. c.* 59 (1836).

The former Acts extended to Ireland.

SCULPTURES.

54 *Geo. III. c.* 56 (1814) (*b*).

§ 1. Copyright for fourteen years given to "every person or persons who shall make or cause to be made any new and original sculpture, or model, or copy, or cast," to commence from the "first putting forth or publishing the same: Provided, in all and every case, the proprietor or proprietors do cause his, her, or their name or names, with the date, to be put on all and every such new and original sculpture, model, copy, or cast, and on every such cast from nature, before the same shall be put forth or published" (*c*).

(*a*) It is clearly settled law that both the date of publication and the name of the proprietor must appear with the engraving, in order to enable the proprietor to assert his statutory rights, notwithstanding *Blackwell* v. *Harper*, 2 Atk. 95, Barnard. 210; and *Roworth* v. *Wilkes*, 1 Camp. 94. See *Sayer* v. *Dicey*, 3 Wils. 60; *Harrison* v. *Hogg*, 2 Ves. Jun. 323; *Thompson* v. *Symonds*, 5 T. R. 41; *Bonner* v. *Field*, 5 T. R. 44; *Macmurdo* v. *Smith*, 7 *ib.* 518; *Newton* v. *Cowie*, 4 Bing. 234; *Colnaghi* v. *Ward*, 12 L. J. Q. B. 1; *Brooks* v. *Cock*, 3 Ad. & Ell. 138; *Graves* v. *Ashford*, L. R. 2 C. P. 410; *Rock* v. *Lazarus*, L. R. 15 Eq. 104. The requirements of 8 Geo. II. c. 13 must be complied with in the case of engravings sought to be protected under the International Copyright Act, 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c. 12, § 4): *Aranzo* v. *Mudie*, 10 Ex. 203.

(*b*) The earlier Act, 38 Geo. III. c. 71 (1798) was repealed by the Statute Law Revision Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 101).

(*c*) By the Registration of Designs Act, 1850 (13 & 14 Vict. c. 104, §§ 6, 7) sculptures, &c., were allowed to be registered under that Act, and penalties were imposed for infringement, but this was subject to the provision that every copy or cast of the sculpture, &c., must be marked with the word "registered" and the date of registration. By the Patents, &c. Act, 1883, the Act of 1850 is repealed, and sculptures, &c., within the protection of the Act of 1814, are excluded from registration for the future (see § 60). Existing registrations at the commencement of the Act are, however, preserved (§ 113). The requirements of 54 Geo. III. c. 56 must be complied with in the case of sculptures, &c., sought to be protected under the International Copyright Act, 1844 (7 & 8 Vict. c. 12, § 4).

CLOCKS AND WATCHES, &c.

39 & 40 *Vict. c.* 36, § 42 (*a*), (1876).

Clocks and watches and other metal articles marked in imitation of British marks are forbidden to be imported into the United Kingdom (*b*).

METAL BUTTONS.

36 *Geo. III. c.* 60 (*c*), (1796).

§ 1 provides penalties for ordering metal buttons to be falsely marked in indication of quality, and for purchasing buttons so marked.

§ 2 provides penalties for falsely marking buttons in indication of quality, and for offering them for sale so marked.

§ 3. No marks indicative of quality are to be placed upon metal buttons, except the words "gilt," or "plated," respectively.

§ 4. The words "double gilt" and "treble gilt" may be placed upon buttons gilt to a specified degree.

§ 7 declares what quality is required to constitute a "gilt" or "plated" button.

The Act also contains provisions with respect to procedure, &c.

GUN-BARRELS.

By *Royal Charter*, 1637, "The Master Wardens and Society of the Mystery of Gunmakers of the City of London" were incorporated, proof marks assigned to them, &c.

53 *Geo. III. c.* 115 (*d*), (1813).

§ 4 incorporates "The Guardians, Trustees and Wardens of the Gun-Barrel Proof House of the Town of Birmingham."

§ 7 appoints the Birmingham proof marks to be—1. Crossed sceptres surmounted by a crown, with the letters B. C. P. 2. The same device, with the letter V. (*e*).

18 & 19 *Vict. c.* 148 (1855) (Local), "The Gun-Barrel Proof Act, 1855."

§ 9 repeals the former Acts.

§ 12 continues the incorporation of the Birmingham Company, under the name of "The Guardians of the Birmingham Proof House."

Many provisions follow for the regulation of the Birmingham Company.

§§ 84—101 contain provisions with respect to the marking of gun-barrels, penalties for falsely marking, &c.

§§ 106—109 relate to foreign gun-barrels.

(*a*) This is a re-enactment, with some variations, of 16 & 17 *Vict.* c. 107, § 44.

(*b*) See p. 454.

(*c*) Repealed in part, Statute Law Revision Act, 1871.

(*d*) Repealed by 18 & 19 *Vict. c.* 148, § 9 (Local).

(*e*) 55 *Geo. III. c.* 59 (1815), further regulated the marking of gun-barrels, but was also repealed by 18 & 19 *Vict. c.* 148, § 9 (Local).

CHAIN CABLES AND ANCHORS.

27 & 28 *Vict. c.* 27 (1864); 34 & 35 *Vict. c.* 101 (1871); 35 & 36 *Vict. c.* 30 (1872); and 37 & 38 *Vict. c.* 51 (1874), regulate the testing, proving, and marking of chain cables and anchors, and provide penalties for falsely marking, &c.

By § 4 of the Act of 1874, every contract for the sale of a chain cable implies, in the absence of an express stipulation to the contrary, that the cable has been duly tested and marked.

PLAYING CARDS.

25 & 26 *Vict. c.* 22 (1862).

§§ 28—37 provide that playing cards are to be sold in separate packs, enclosed in wrappers to be provided by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, on which the duty chargeable and the name of the maker are to be marked. Penalties for frauds, &c.

16 & 17 *Vict. c.* 107 (1853).

§§ 114—115. Imported playing cards are to be sold in separate packs, to be enclosed in proper wrappers to be provided by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue.

§ 116. Penalties for counterfeiting, &c., such wrappers.

PAINTINGS, DRAWINGS, AND PHOTOGRAPHS.

25 & 26 *Vict. c.* 68 (1862), "Copyright for Works of Art Act."

§ 7. By this section it is forbidden to do any of the following acts:—

1. Fraudulently sign any painting, drawing, photograph, or negative with any name, initials or monogram.

2. Fraudulently sell, publish, &c., any painting, &c., marked with the name, &c., of a person who did not execute such work.

3. Fraudulently utter any copy or colourable imitation of any painting, &c., whether the subject of subsisting copyright or not, as having been executed by the author of the original.

4. Where the author of any painting, &c., has parted with the possession of the work, and the work is altered by any other person, it is forbidden, during the life of the author, to make, sell, publish, &c., such work or a copy of it so altered as or for the unaltered work of the author.

The section provides penalties for offenders against its provisions, but limits the time during which they can be incurred to within twenty years after the death of the person whose works have been wrongfully dealt with.

HOPS.

54 *Geo III. c.* 123 (*a*), (1814).

§ 1. Growers of hops are to mark the bags, in letters of specified dimensions, with their names, and the names of the parish and county in which the hops were grown, before putting the hops into the bag. Penalty for putting in the hops before marking the bag.

29 & 30 *Vict. c.* 37 (1866), "The Hop (Prevention of Frauds) Act, 1866."

§ 2. Growers of hops are to mark each bag, in addition to their own names and the names of the parish and county, with the year in which the hops were grown, the progressive number of the bag, and its weight.

Penalties are provided for not marking, falsely marking, wilfully altering marks, &c. (*b*).

§ 18. The vendor is to be deemed to contract that the marks are genuine.

§ 20. The provisions of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862, §§ 23 and 24, are incorporated.

WOOLLEN CLOTHS.

5 *Geo. III. c.* 51 (1765), (West Riding of Yorkshire).

§ 2 provides for the appointment by the justices of the peace for the West Riding of Yorkshire of searchers and measurers of cloth within the riding.

§ 3. After measuring cloths milled at the fulling mill as provided, the searcher and measurer is to affix to one end of each cloth a leaden seal provided by the clothier, and to stamp on the seal or rivet the name of the searcher and measurer, the length and breadth of the cloth, and the number of the piece, according to an annual rotation.

§ 6. After the milled cloth is brought from the fulling mill, and before it is put upon the tenter, the clothier is to seal the other end, and stamp the seal or rivet with the length and breadth of the cloth.

§ 18. Every clothier is to weave or sew into the head of the cloth, at the time of making, his name and place of abode.

Penalties for frauds, &c.

(*a*) This Act is repealed in part. The former Acts, now repealed, were 14 *Geo. III. c.* 68, under which the excise officer was to mark each bag of hops with the weight of hops, the name and place of abode of the grower, and the date of the year; 39 & 40 *Geo. III. c.* 81, under which the grower was himself to mark his name and place of abode, the excise officer the weight, date, and progressive number of the bag; and 48 *Geo. III. c.* 184, under which the owner was in addition to mark the name of the parish and county in which the hops were grown.

(*b*) See *R.* v. *Morgan*, 1 Trade Marks, 313, in which the defendant was convicted at the Wandsworth Police Court, on May 18th, 1878, of selling inferior hops in the bags and as the hops of a well-known grower, under § 6 of the above Act, and fined £10, the maximum penalty; £44, the value of the hops; and £10 10*s.* costs.

6 *Geo. III. c.* 23 (1766), (West Riding of Yorkshire).

§ 2. The searcher and measurer is to measure milled cloths as provided by the last Act, and to rivet on a leaden seal, and to stamp on the rivet his name and the name of the mill where he is stationed, and on the rest of the seal the length, breadth, and number of the cloth.

§ 5. Where cloth is remeasured, as provided, and is found to be of less length, or of less length for above one third of the length than was stated on the previous seal, the last measurer is to affix a new stamp, and place his own name on the rivet, with the words "Inspector" or "Supervisor," and on the same seal the true length and breadth.

§ 13. The clothier may weave or sew his name and place of abode into the cloth, either in distinct letters or words, or in common or usual abbreviations.

Penalties for frauds, &c.

LINEN.

13 *Geo. I. c.* 26 (*a*), (1726), (Scotland).

§ 30. Every trader, dealer, and weaver of linen may weave in any piece of linen of his make his name, or some known mark. Penalty for counterfeiting such mark.

17 *Geo. II. c.* 30 (*b*), (1743).

§ 1. Penalties provided for stamping foreign linens in imitation of British or Irish, and for placing counterfeit stamps on British or Irish linens.

18 *Geo. II. c.* 24 (*b*), (1744).

§ 1. Linens to be stamped must be sworn to be of the manufacture of [Scotland or] Ireland.

§ 2 (*c*). No bounty to be paid on British or Irish linens exported, but on such as are marked at both ends of every piece with the name and place of abode of the maker, the year of manufacture, the number of the piece in rotation, the name and place of abode of the exporter or seller for exportation; and unless the ends are also marked with the month and year when, and the name of the port at which the linens are entered for exportation. The marks to be stamped with lamp black and burnt oil.

Penalties for falsely stamping, &c.

4 *Geo. IV. c.* 40 (1823), (Scotland).

§ 3. Every manufacturer or weaver of linen and dealer in linen in Scotland may weave his name, or fix any mark or seal, in any piece of linen of his make, to denote the length, breadth, or quality of the linen, or the maker's name. Penalties for counterfeiting.

(*a*) This Act is in great part repealed.

(*b*) Repealed as to Scotland by 4 *Geo. IV. c.* 40, § 1.

(*c*) Repealed as to bounty by 6 *Geo. IV. c.* 105.

5 & 6 *Wm. IV. c.* 27 (1835), (Ireland).

§ 4. Across each end of every piece of linen offered for sale in open fair or market in Ireland there are to be woven two coarse threads or cords at a distance of one fourth of an inch, and close to such threads or cords on each end are to be written the Christian name, surname, and place of residence of the weaver or manufacturer, and on the outside fold of every piece its length and breadth.

§ 14. The Lord Lieutenant to appoint a committee of twelve in each county, to superintend the brown linen trade.

§ 19. The committee in each county to prescribe the form and device of the seal or stamp to be used by the county sealmaster of brown linen.

§ 21. The sealmaster shall affix to each piece of brown linen brought for the purpose, and which shall be in accordance with the Act, an impression of the seal, in black, red, or blue; and shall also mark with the same ingredients on the back of each piece its length, breadth, name of sealmaster, and the parish and county where he resides, or the name of the market town to which he is appointed.

Regulations for sales, penalties for frauds, &c.

PUBLIC STORES.

38 & 39 *Vict. c.* 25 (*a*), (1875), "The Public Stores Act, 1875."

§ 4. The marks described in the First Schedule to the Act are appropriated to denote Her Majesty's property. Penalty for unauthorised use of such marks.

§ 5. Penalty provided for obliteration of marks.

§ 6. Penalty for unlawful possession of public stores (*b*).

(*a*) This Act repealed the following Acts, by which the Public Stores had previously been regulated:—9 *Wm. III. c.* 41 (1697); this Act provided penalties for forging the King's marks, or having in possession goods so marked; 9 *Geo. I. c.* 8 (1722); this Act modified the penalties contained in the former Act; 17 *Geo. II. c.* 40, § 10 (1743); this provided for the trial of offences against these Acts before any judge, justice, or justices at assizes, or justices of the peace at general quarter sessions; 39 & 40 *Geo. III. c.* 89 (1800); this Act provided penalties for selling or having in possession goods marked with the marks specified, or defacing, &c., such marks; 54 *Geo. III. c.* 60 (1814); this extended the provisions of the former Acts to cordage wrought with worsted threads; 54 *Geo. III. c.* 159, § 10 (1814); this provided a penalty for sweeping for lost anchors, cables, &c., belonging to the King's service; 55 *Geo. III. c.* 127 (1815); this extended the previous Acts to include all public stores; 30 & 31 *Vict. c.* 128 (1867), "*The War Department Stores Act*, 1867"; and 32 & 33 *Vict. c.* 12 (1869), "*The Naval Stores Act*, 1869." The following Acts have also from time to time regulated Naval Stores: 25 & 26 *Vict. c.* 64, "*The Naval and Victualling Stores Act*, 1862"; 27 & 28 *Vict. c.* 91, "*The Naval and Victualling Stores Act*, 1864"; 30 & 31 *Vict. c.* 119, "*The Naval Stores Act*, 1867"; all of which Acts were previously repealed.

(*b*) It has been repeatedly decided that on an indictment under 9 & 10 *Wm. III. c.* 41, for being unlawfully in possession of marked stores, the prisoner cannot be convicted unless he is in possession with knowledge of the marks. See *R. v.*—,

First Schedule.

Marks appropriated for use in or on Her Majesty's stores:

Stores.	Marks.
Hempen cordage and wire rope.	White, black, or coloured worsted threads laid up with the yarns and the wire respectively.
Canvas, fearnought, hammocks, and seamen's bags.	A blue line in a serpentine form.
Buntin.	A double tape in the warp.
Candles.	Blue or red cotton threads in each wick or wicks of red cotton.
Timber or metal. Any stores not before enumerated, whether similar to the above or not.	The name of Her Majesty, her predecessors, her heirs or successors, or of any public department or any branch thereof, or the broad arrow, or a crown, or Her Majesty's arms, whether such broad arrow, crown, or arms be alone or be in combination with any such name as aforesaid, or with any letters denoting any such name.

Foster Cr. Cas. 439; *R.* v. *Banks*, 1 Esp. 144; *R.* v. *Willmett*, 3 Cox, 281; *R.* v. *Cohen*, 8 Cox, 41; *R.* v. *Sleep*, 8 Cox, 472. In *R.* v. *Banks* it was, indeed, held by Lord Kenyon, C. J., that it was sufficient for the prosecution to prove the finding of the marked goods in the prisoner's possession, the prisoner being allowed to obtain acquittal by proving his ignorance; but it is now for the prosecution to prove the knowledge, in the affirmative (see *R.* v. *Willmett*; *R.* v. *Cohen*; *R.* v. *Sleep*). Thus in *R.* v. *O'Brien*, 15 L. T. N. S. 419, it was held that for a conviction of persons in charge of closed and fastened cases, containing marked goods, to be obtained, it must be proved that they knew that the goods in the cases were marked. Such knowledge may, however, be presumed by the jury from the circumstances attending the possession: *R.* v. *Sleep*. Although a specified certificate was required by 9 & 10 *Wm. III.* c. 41, to justify possession of marked goods, it was held that another form of certificate might be accepted (*R.* v. *Willmett*), or even the certificate be dispensed with altogether (*R.* v. ——; *R.* v. *Banks*), there being no proof of knowledge.

Possession by a railway company for purpose of transfer, on behalf of the prisoner, is such a possession by the prisoner as to justify a conviction: *R.* v. *Sunley*, 8 Cox, 179; and see *R.* v. *Sleep*, 8 Cox, 472, as to the words "receive or have" in 9 & 10 *Wm. III.* c. 41; and *R.* v. *Cole*, 8 East P. C. 767, as to the necessity for the marked articles to be found in the defendant's possession. In *R.* v. *Willmett*, 3 Cox, 281, it was held that a man could not be held criminally responsible for the act of his servants, who had, without his knowledge, improperly taken marked goods into his warehouse.

As to the exception in favour of contractors and contractors' servants, see *R.* v. *Silversides*, 3 Q. B. 406; and *R.* v. *Fitzgerald*, 43 C. C. C. Sess. Pap. 369.

APPENDIX E.

UNITED STATES STATUTE LAW.

Act of Congress of 1870 (*a*).

§ 77 (*b*). *And be it further enacted, that any person or firm domiciled in the United States, and any corporation created by the authority of the United States, or of any State or Territory thereof, and any person, firm, or corporation resident of or located in any foreign country which, by treaty or convention, affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States, and who are entitled to the exclusive use* (*c*) *of any lawful trade mark, or who intend to adopt and use any trade mark* (*d*), *for exclusive use within the United States, may obtain protection for such lawful trade mark* (*e*) *by complying with the following requirements* (*f*), *to wit :—*

First—*By causing to be recorded in the Patent Office, the names of the parties and their residences and place of business* (*g*), *who desire the protection of the trade mark.*

Second—*The class of merchandise* (*h*) *and the particular description of goods* (*i*) *comprised in such class, by which the trade mark has been or is intended to be appropriated.*

Third—*A description of the trade mark itself* (*k*) *with fac-similes thereof* (*l*), *and the mode in which it has been or is intended to be applied and used* (*m*).

Fourth—*The length of time, if any, during which the trade mark has been used* (*n*).

Fifth—*The payment of a fee of twenty-five dollars, in the same manner and for the same purpose as the fee required for patents* (*o*).

Sixth—*The compliance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Commissioner of Patents* (*p*).

Seventh—*The filing of a declaration* (*q*), *under the oath of the person or of some member of the firm or officer of the corporation, to the effect that the party claiming protection for the trade mark, has a right to the use of the same, and that no other person, firm, or corporation, has the right to such use, either in the identical form, or having such near resemblance thereto as might be calculated to deceive* (*r*), *and that the description and*

fac-similes presented for record are true copies of the trade mark sought to be protected.

(*a*) Although this Act is no longer in force, the Act of 1881 having been substituted for it, it is thought advisable to print the earlier Act, in order that the effect of the decisions upon it may not be misapprehended. In *Leidersdorf* v. *Flint* (1), 8 Biss. 327, the validity of the Act of 1870 was questioned by the U. S. Circuit Court, on the ground that the constitution of the United States did not authorise legislation by Congress on the subject of trade marks, except such as had been actually used in commerce with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes; and in *U. S.* v. *Steffens*, 100 U. S. Rep. 82, the Act was formally declared by the Supreme Court to be on this ground unconstitutional and invalid. But this does not entitle persons registered under the invalid Act to recover back the fees paid by them (*Woodman* v. *U. S.*, 15 Ct. of Cl. 541), though they will be credited with such fees when applying for registration under the new Act. See Act of 1881, § 6, *infrd.* Nor does the invalidity of the Act justify the disregard of injunctions granted under the general jurisdiction of the Court: *U. S.* v. *Roche*, 1 McCrary, 385. Since the passing of the Act of 1870, it has been considered in the U. S. Patent Office that, while, on the one hand, the benefits of registration as trade marks were to be reserved for trade marks, and for trade marks only (*e.g.*, in *In re Parker*, 13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 323, registration as a trade mark was refused to that which could at most amount to a design), so, on the other hand, it was only by registering them as trade marks, and not by patenting them as designs (*Ex parte King*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1870, 109; *In re Whyte*, *ib.* 1871, 304) or registering them as labels (*In re Godillot*, 6 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 641; *In re Simpson & Sons*, 10 *ib.* 333; *Ex parte Davids & Co.*, 16 *ib.* 94; *Ex parte Schumacher & Ettlinger* (1), 19 *ib.* 791) that statutory protection could be obtained for trade marks. Descriptive words, not registrable as trade marks, were properly allowed to be registered as labels: *Ex parte Waeferling*, 16 *ib.* 764; *Ex parte Brigham*, 20 *ib.* 891; and see *In re Park*, 12 *ib.* 2, in which it was sought to register as part of a label a device for which the applicant had previously sought registration as a trade mark. In *U. S.* v. *Marble*, 22 *ib.* 1366, however, the Supreme Court of Columbia held that the Commissioner of Patents had no authority to refuse registration to a label merely on the ground that it might have been registered as a trade mark; but in the later case of *Ex parte Schumacher & Ettlinger* (2), 22 *ib.* 1291, the Commissioner has again refused registration as labels to what he considered to be trade marks.

(*b*) See Act of 1881, §§ 1, 2.

(*c*) In *McElwee* v. *Blackwell*, 15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 658, it was held that, although, where registration had been wrongfully granted to one, it might subsequently be properly granted to another who was really entitled to the exclusive *use*, yet it would not be granted to another who was not entitled to the exclusive use, even though he might be entitled to use the mark to some extent. And see *Wright* v. *Simpson*, 15 *ib.* 968; also *Sorg* v. *Welsh*, 16 *ib.* 910, as to admissions of right in another.

(*d*) Under these words a new trade mark might be registered prior to any actual use: *In re Rothschild*, 7 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 220; and see *Hoosier Drill Co.* v. *Ingels*, 14 *ib.* 785. This is not the case under the Act of 1881. See §§ 1 and 2, and *Ex parte Strasburger & Co.*, 20 *ib.* 155.

(*e*) As to what is a lawful trade mark, see *infrd*, § 79. Registration cannot make a lawful trade mark out of that which does not contain the necessary elements: *Moorman* v. *Hoge*, 2 Sawy. 78; but it has been doubted whether the use of a registered trade mark could be restrained: *Decker* v. *Decker*, 52 How. Pr. 218. Separate registration must be obtained for each mark which differs from another by the addition of a symbol; *e.g.*, "X," "XX," "XXX," were held to require separate registration: *In re English*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1870, 142; and see *In re Eagle Pencil Co.*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 981.

(*f*) Absolute compliance with these requirements is necessary on the part of applicants: *In re Hankinson*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 89. But it is not necessary that the very

words of the Act should be cited, so long as the spirit of it is satisfied: *In re Vidvard & Sheehan*, 8 *ib.* 143.

(*g*) The registration of the name, &c., of a firm has been held to be sufficient, without giving the particulars as to each of the partners: *Smith* v. *Reynolds* (2), 10 Bl. C. C. 100.

(*h*) This requirement has been interpreted to exclude from registration the marks of persons other than manufacturers or merchants, *e.g.*, a carpet cleaner: *In re Hanlinson*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 89.

(*i*) It has been held that a description of the class and goods as "paints" is sufficient: *Smith* v. *Reynolds* (2), 10 Bl. C. C. 100; and so with "alcoholic spirits": *In re Boehm & Co.*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 319; but that "fancy goods" is insufficient, as being too general a term: *In re Lisner*, 13 *ib.* 455. Different persons may register the same trade mark for different descriptions of goods even in the same class: *Sorg* v. *Welsh*, 16 *ib.* 910. In *Smith* v. *Reynolds* (2), 10 Bl. C. C. 100, and s. c. (3), 13 *ib.* 458, it was held that a firm who had registered a trade mark for "paints" were not entitled to restrain the use of the mark on white lead by another firm who had used the mark on that variety of paint before the plaintiffs had used or registered their mark; and in the former case it was held that the registration being bad as to white lead was bad *in toto*, though but for that it might have been good.

(*k*) The trade mark must be sufficiently described for it to be possible to clearly distinguish between the essential and non-essential elements in it: *In re Volta Belt Co.*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 144; and see Rule 6, *infrd.*

(*l*) The fac-simile limits the verbal description of the mark: *Duke* v. *Green*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1094.

(*m*) The previous user of the applicants or their derivative title must be stated: *Ex parte Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 679. Only one example of the mode of use will be admitted: *In re Kimball*, 11 *ib.* 1109; and see *Smith* v. *Reynolds* (2), 10 Bl. C. C. 100.

(*n*) See *Ex parte Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 679.

(*o*) A fee paid can only be recovered when it was paid by actual mistake, *e.g.*, a payment in excess, or one not required by law. When, therefore, an application has failed because the proposed mark was not registrable, the fee paid cannot be recovered, although a renewed application for the registration of an essentially different mark has proved successful: *In re Block & Co.*, 14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 235. See note (*a*), *suprd*, as to crediting fees paid under this invalid Act.

(*p*) See § 81, *infrd*, and note thereto.

(*q*) As to the necessity for the filing of this declaration, and for the production of sufficient evidence of it on a trial for infringement, see *Smith* v. *Reynolds* (1), 10 Bl. C. C. 85, where an injunction was refused on the ground of a deficiency of such evidence.

(*r*) A declaration that no other person, firm, or corporation has a right to the use of the same, or substantially the same, mark, is a sufficient compliance with this requirement: *In re Vidvard & Sheehan*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 143.

§ 78 (*a*). *And be it further enacted, that such trade mark shall remain in force for thirty years from the date of such registration, except in cases where such trade mark is claimed for and applied to articles not manufactured in this country, and in which it receives protection under the laws of any foreign country for a shorter period, in which case it shall cease to have any force in this country by virtue of this Act, at the same time that it becomes of no effect elsewhere, and during the period that it remains in force it shall entitle the person, firm, or corporation registering the same to the exclusive use thereof, so far as regards the description of goods to which it is appropriated in the statement filed under oath as aforesaid, and no other person shall lawfully use the same trade mark, or substantially the*

same, or so nearly resembling it as to be calculated to deceive, upon substantially the same description of goods (b). Provided that six months prior to the expiration of the said term of thirty years, application may be made for a renewal of such registration, under regulations to be prescribed by the Commissioner of Patents, and the fee for such renewal shall be the same as for the original registration, certificate of such renewal shall be issued in the same manner as for the original registration, and such trade mark shall remain in force for a further term of thirty years: And provided further, that nothing in this section shall be construed by any Court as abridging or in any manner affecting unfavourably the claim of any person, firm, corporation, or company to any trade mark after the expiration of the term for which such trade mark was registered.

(a) See Act of 1881, §§ 5, 7, 11.
(b) See *Sternberger* v. *Thalheimer*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 120, where the same mark was registered in two names; and *McElwee* v. *Blackwell*, 15 *ib.* 658.

§ 79 (a). *And be it further enacted, that any person or corporation who shall reproduce, copy, counterfeit, or imitate any such recorded trade mark, and affix the same to goods of substantially the same description, properties, and qualities as those referred to in the registration (b), shall be liable to an action on the case for damages for such unlawful use of such trade mark at the suit of the owner thereof in any Court of competent jurisdiction in the United States, and the party aggrieved shall also have his remedy according to the course of equity to enjoin the wrongful use of his trade mark, and to recover compensation therefor in any Court having jurisdiction over the person guilty of such wrongful use (c). The Commissioner of Patents (d) shall not receive and record any proposed trade mark which is not and cannot become a lawful trade mark (e), or which is merely the name of a person, firm, or corporation only (f), unaccompanied by a mark sufficient to distinguish it from the same name where used by other persons, or which is identical with a trade mark appropriated to the same class of merchandise and belonging to a different owner and already registered or received for registration, or which so nearly resembles such last-mentioned trade mark as to be likely to deceive the public (g): Provided, that this section shall not prevent the registry of any lawful trade mark rightfully used at the time of the passage of this Act (h).*

(a) See Act of 1881, §§ 7, 3.
(b) See *Osgood* v. *Rockwood*, 11 Bl. C. C. 310, where it was held that persons who had registered a trade mark for prints made according to a patented process were not entitled under this Act to an injunction against a person who had used the mark on prints not made in accordance with the patent.
(c) It seems that the U. S. Circuit Courts have jurisdiction in cases of infringement of trade mark, even when both parties are citizens of the same State: *Duwel* v. *Bohmer*, 14 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 270; but see *Leidersdorf* v. *Flint* (1), 3 Biss. 327.
(d) As to the validity of the decisions of the acting commissioner, see *Simpson* v. *Wright* (2), 15 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 293.
(e) The question what may be registered as being a "lawful trade mark" has been

considered in many cases. The device of a crown is a good trade mark: *Smith* v. *Reynolds* (2), 10 Bl. C. C. 100. The arms of one of the United States cannot, however, constitute of themselves a good trade mark: *Ex parte Davids & Co.*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 94; and it has been held that the same is the case with the Freemasons' square and compass: *In re Tolle*, 2 *ib.* 415; and the word "masonic": *Ex parte Smith* (3), 16 *ib.* 764; though in *In re Thomas*, 14 *ib.* 821, the Freemasons' symbols were allowed to be registered in combination. A word which has become common, *e.g.*, "Calhoun" plough, cannot be registered: *In re Hall & Co.*, 13 *ib.* 229. Registration has been refused to the following words and expressions, on the ground of descriptiveness:—"Beeswax Oil," *In re Hauthaway* (1), U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 97; S. C. (2), *ib.* 284; "Razor Steel," *In re Roberts* (4), *ib.* 100; "Invisible" face powder, *Ex parte Palmer*, *ib.* 289; "A. Richardson's Patent Union Leather Splitting Machine," *In re Richardson*, 3 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 120; "Für Familien Gebrauch," and "Lawrence Feiner Familien Flannel," *In re Lawrence*, 10 *ib.* 163; "Croup Tincture," *In re Roach*, 10 *ib.* 333; "Crack-proof" india-rubber, *In re Goodyear Rubber Co.*, 11 *ib.* 1062; "Evaporated" articles of food, *Ex parte Alden*, 15 *ib.* 389; "Standard A" cigars, *Ex parte Cohn* (1), 16 *ib.* 680; "Druggists' Sundries" cigars, *Ex parte Cohn* (2), 16 *ib.* 680; "Safety" powder, *Ex parte Safety Powder Co.*, 16 *ib.* 136; "Medicated Prunes," *Ex parte Smith* (2), 16 *ib.* 679; "Swing" scythe-sockets, *Ex parte Thompson, Derby & Co.*, 16 *ib.* 137; "Granulated Dirt-killer" soap, *Ex parte Waeferling*, 16 *ib.* 764; and "Satin Polish" boots and shoes, *Ex parte Brigham*, 20 *ib.* 891. And the same has been the case with respect to the figure of a fish for fishing lines: *In re Pratt & Farmer*, 10 *ib.* 866; and the representation of a twig with 3 leaves and a plum for prunes: *Ex parte Smith* (2), 16 *ib.* 679; and see *Popham* v. *Wilcox*, 66 N. Y. 69. On the other hand, "The Blanchard Churn," *In re Porter Blanchard's Sons*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 97; "Beaverine" boots and shoes, *In re Francis & Mallon*, *ib.* 283; and "Dr. Lobenthal's Essentia Antiphthisica," *In re Rohland*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 980, have been admitted to registration as being non-descriptive. In a series of cases registration has been refused on the ground that the term claimed, if properly applicable to the goods with respect to which it was used, was descriptive, but if not, was deceptive, *e.g.*, "American Sardines," *In re American Sardine Co.*, 3 *ib.* 495; "Egg Macaroni," *In re Dole Bros.*, 12 *ib.* 939; "Cachemire Milano," *In re Warbury & Co.*, 13 *ib.* 44; "French Paints," *Ex parte Marsching & Co.*, 15 *ib.* 294; "London" animal foods, *Ex parte Knapp*, 16 *ib.* 318; but see *In re Green*, 8 *ib.* 729, where registration was granted to "German Sirup." On the latter ground of deceptiveness, the word "patent" cannot be registered as part of a mark for an article made under an expired patent: *In re Richardson*, 3 *ib.* 120. A geographical name is not usually registrable: *Armistead* v. *Blackwell*, 1 *ib.* 603, "Durham" tobacco; *In re Tolle*, 2 *ib.* 415, "Cherry Street Mills," and "Market Street Mills"; *Ex parte Knapp*, 16 *ib.* 318, "London" animal foods; *Ex parte Marsching & Co.*, 15 *ib.* 294, "French Paints"; *Ex parte Farnum & Co.*, 18 *ib.* 412, "Lancaster" goods. But such a name may be registered when arbitrarily selected: *In re Cornwall* (2), 12 *ib.* 312, "Dublin" soap. Similarly, numerals may be registered when arbitrarily selected: *Kinney* v. *Allen*, 1 Hughes, 106; *Ex parte Dawes & Fanning*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 27; but not otherwise: *In re Eagle Pencil Co.*, 13 *ib.* 981. It has been held that a peculiarity in the form of a barrel is not registrable as a trade mark: *Moorman* v. *Hoge*, 2 Sawy. 78; nor a representation of such barrel when applied to the goods contained in it: *Ex parte Halliday Bros.*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 500; nor is a speciality in the hoops of the barrel registrable: *In re Kane & Co.*, 9 *ib.* 105. But see *Cook* v. *Starkweather*, 13 Abb. Pr. N. S. 392. A special collar-box has been refused registration: *Harrington* v. *Libby*, 14 Bl. C. C. 128; and so have a sampler-pattern: *In re Parker*, 13 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 323; and a strip of tobacco intended to be wrapped round the mouthpiece of cigarettes, on the ground that it was intended to serve purposes of convenience rather than of identification: *In re Gordon*, 12 *ib.* 517; but registration has been granted to a peculiarly shaped stick intended to be so placed in a roll of carpet as to show an octagonal ring at each end: *Lowell Manufacturing Co.* v. *Larned*, Dig. 428. Registration cannot be granted to minor and non-essential features in a compound mark: *Ex parte Coats*, 16 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 544. Occasionally a mark has

been allowed to be registered in alternative forms, *e.g.*, "The Star Shirt," the same words with the figure of a star, and "The * Shirt": *Morrison* v. *Case*, 9 Bl. C. C. 548; the figure of a lion, the word "Lion," or both: *In re Weaver*, 10 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 1; and see *In re Park*, 12 *ib.* 2; *In re Thomas*, 14 *ib.* 821; *Ex parte Peper*, 16 *ib.* 678. A bad trade mark does not become a good one by the addition of unobjectionable elements: *In re Blakeslee & Co.*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 284, "Cundurango Ointment, C. O."; *In re Dick & Co.*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 538, "D. D. & Co. Tasteless" drugs; *In re Roder & Co.*, 13 *ib.* 596, "Ironstone" in an oval border; but it appears to be possible for two marks, which separately are not good trade marks, to form one in combination: *Ex parte Davids & Co.*, 16 *ib.* 94. A trade mark cannot be registered for the purpose of being used by all the members of an association on goods of any quality, nor can a mark which is intended to be used in furtherance of a scheme for the restraint of trade: *Ex parte Cigar Makers' Association*, 16 *ib.* 958. It seems that the decision of a competent Court as to the validity of a mark is binding upon the Patent Office: *In re India Rubber Comb Co.*, 8 *ib.* 905. If an application is refused on the ground that the proposed mark is not a registrable trade mark, a renewed application for the registration of a mark not open to objection must be treated as a new application, and it cannot be treated as an amendment of the original application, nor can the fee originally paid be returned: *In re Block & Co.*, 14 *ib.* 235.

(*f*) Thus in *In re Rowe & Post*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 496, the name "The New York Cutlery Co." was refused registration as a new mark. As to the registration of names as old marks, see note (*h*), *infrd.* See also *In re Porter Blanchard's Sons*, U. S. Pat. Comm. Decis. 1871, 97; *In re Roberts* (1), *ib.* 113; S. C. (2), *ib.* 100; S. C. (3) *ib.* 101; *In re India Rubber Comb Co.*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 905; *In re Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.*, 14 *ib.* 269; *Ex parte Davids & Co.*, 16 *ib.* 94. The prohibition does not extend to the registration of the name of a person other than the applicant, and such names may be registered, at all events with their owners' consent, if living: *Ex parte Sullivan & Burke*, 16 *ib.* 765; *Ex parte Pace, Talbott & Co.*, 16 *ib.* 909.

(*g*) Thus in *In re The American Lubricating Oil Co.*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 687, registration was refused to the word "Star" as a trade mark on oil, the device of a star having already been registered for the same article; so in *In re Coggin, Kidder & Co.*, 11 *ib.* 1109, to a device in which the principal feature was the name "Haxall," which had long been the trade mark of another firm; so in *In re Bush & Co.*, 10 *ib.* 164, to a combination mark consisting of the applicants' own registered trade mark and two other devices appropriated by other firms; so in *Ex parte Caire*, 15 *ib.* 248, to the words "Black Swan," the word "Swan" being already registered; so in *Ex parte Smith* (1), 16 *ib.* 679, to "A. S. California Family * Soap," "California" and "*" being already separately on the register; and see *Ex parte Weisert Bros.*, 16 *ib.* 680. On the other hand, in *In re Imbs*, 10 *ib.* 463, registration was granted, notwithstanding that two other marks contained somewhat similar features; and in *In re Cornwall* (1), 12 *ib.* 138, a device of a star and crescent was registered, although there was a star already on the register.

(*h*) Under this proviso registration was granted to a name used as a trade mark before 1870, *e.g.*, "The India Rubber Comb Co. of New York," *In re India Rubber Comb Co.*, 8 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 905; "The Rubber Clothing Co.", *In re Rubber Clothing Co.*, 10 *ib.* 111. See *In re Dole Bros.*, 12 *ib.* 939; *In re Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.*, 14 *ib.* 269; *Ex parte Consolidated Fruit Jar Co.*, 16 *ib.* 679. This saving proviso is, however, omitted from the Act of 1881, so that the prohibition as to names, &c., is universal. See Act of 1881, § 3, and *Ex parte Fairchild*, 21 *ib.* 789, in which case registration was refused to a name which had been used as a trade mark for 20 years, and had been registered under the Act of 1870.

§ 80 (*a*). *And be it further enacted, that the time of the receipt of any trade mark at the Patent Office for registration shall be noted and recorded, and copies of the trade mark and of the date of the receipt thereof, and of the statement filed therewith under the seal of the Patent Office, certified by*

the Commissioner, shall be evidence in any suit in which such trade mark shall be brought in controversy.

(*a*) See Act of 1881, §§ 3, 4.

§ 81 (*a*). *And be it further enacted, that the Commissioner of Patents is authorised to make rules and regulations* (*b*) *and to prescribe forms for the transfer of the right to use such trade marks, conforming as nearly as practicable to the requirements of the law respecting the transfer and transmission of copyrights.*

(*a*) See Act of 1881, § 12.

(*b*) It was formerly decided that the authority given to the Commissioner by § 81 to make regulations, empowered him to declare an interference in a trade mark case, for the purpose of deciding a question of title to the trade mark, on the analogy of the practice in patent cases: *Lautz Bros. & Co.* v. *Schultz & Co.*, 9 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 791; *Duke* v. *Green*, 16 *ib.* 1094. And though it was thought in *Swift* v. *Peters*, 11 *ib.* 1110, that the question whether a registered proprietor of a mark was entitled to the exclusive use of it as against an ex-partner, was a question for a Court of law, and not for the Office, it was held in *Hoosier Drill Co.* v. *Ingels*, 14 *ib.* 785, that, in investigating the title to the mark, all matters relating to the ownership should be gone into; and in *Hanford* v. *Westcott*, 16 *ib.* 1181, the U. S. Circuit Court decided that a decision of the Examiner of Interferences, unappealed, was conclusive as to the right to a mark; and see *Josselyn* v. *Soezey & Dart*, 15 *ib.* 702, as to reopening the evidence taken on an interference, and *Simpson* v. *Wright* (1), 15 *ib.* 248, and S. C. (2), 15 *ib.* 293, as to re-hearing an interference. Since the case of *U. S.* v. *Steffens*, 100 U. S. Rep. 82, however, it has been held that the Patent Office has no longer any authority to decide questions of disputed titles to trade marks, or to declare interferences in such cases: *Braun & Co.* v. *Blackwell*, 19 *ib.* 481; but see *Ex parte Strasburger & Co.*, 20 *ib.* 155, and *Jacoby & Co.* v. *Lopes & Co.*, 23 *ib.* 342.

§ 82 (*a*). *And be it further enacted, that any person who shall procure the registry of any trade mark, or of himself as the owner thereof, or an entry respecting a trade mark, in the Patent Office under this Act, by making any false or fraudulent representations or declarations verbally or in writing, or by any fraudulent means, shall be liable to pay damages in consequence of any such registry or entry to the person injured thereby, to be recovered in an action on the case in any Court of competent jurisdiction within the United States.*

(*a*) See Act of 1881, § 9.

§ 83 (*a*). *And be it further enacted, that nothing in this Act shall prevent, lessen, impeach, or avoid any remedy at law or in equity which any party aggrieved by any wrongful use of any trade mark might have had if this Act had not been passed* (*b*).

(*a*) See Act of 1881, § 10.

(*b*) See *Osgood* v. *Rockwood*, 11 Bl. C. C. 310; *U. S.* v. *Roche*, 1 McCrary, 385.

§ 84 (*a*). *And be it further enacted, that no action shall be maintained under the provisions of this Act by any person claiming the exclusive right to any trade mark which is used or claimed in any unlawful business, or*

upon any article which is injurious in itself, or upon any trade mark which has been fraudulently obtained, or which has been formed and used with the design of deceiving the public in the purchase or use of any article of merchandise (b).

(a) See Act of 1881, § 8.

(b) It seems that this Act provided no means for removing from the register a mark which was wrongly registered, *e.g.*, a mark which did not contain any of the essential particulars. See *Armistead* v. *Blackwell*, 1 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 603; *McElwee* v. *Blackwell*, 15 *ib.* 658; *Wright* v. *Simpson*, 15 *ib.* 968.

Act of Congress of 1875 (a).

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled :—

§ 1. That every person who shall, with intent to defraud, deal in or sell, or keep or offer for sale, or cause or procure the sale of, any goods of substantially the same descriptive properties as those referred to in the registration of any trade mark, pursuant to the statutes of the United States, to which, or to the package in which the same are put up, is fraudulently affixed said trade mark, or any colourable imitation thereof, calculated to deceive the public, knowing the same to be counterfeit, or not the genuine goods referred to in said registration, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or imprisonment not more than two years, or both such fine and imprisonment.

(a) So far as this Act was dependent on the Registration Act of 1870 it fell to the ground when that Act was declared invalid in *U. S.* v. *Steffens*, 100 U. S. Rep. 82.

§ 2. That every person who fraudulently affixes, or causes or procures to be fraudulently affixed, any trade mark registered pursuant to the statutes of the United States, or any colourable imitation thereof, calculated to deceive the public, to any goods of substantially the same descriptive properties as those referred to in said registration, or to the package in which they are put up, knowing the same to be counterfeit, or not the genuine goods referred to in said registration, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished as prescribed in the first section of this Act.

§ 3. That every person who fraudulently fills, or causes or procures to be fraudulently filled, any package to which is affixed any trade mark, registered pursuant to the statutes of the United States, or any colourable imitation thereof, calculated to deceive the public, with any goods of substantially the same descriptive properties as those referred to in said registration, knowing the same to be counterfeit, or not the genuine goods referred to in said registration, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished as prescribed in the first section of this Act.

§ 4. That any person or persons who shall, with intent to defraud any

person or persons, knowingly and wilfully cast, engrave, or manufacture, or have in his, her, or their possession, or buy, sell, offer for sale, or deal in, any die or dies, plate or plates, brand or brands, engraving or engravings, on wood, stone, metal, or other substance, moulds, or any false representation, likeness, copy, or colourable imitation of any die, plate, brand, engraving or mould of any private label, brand, stamp, wrapper, engraving on paper or other substance, or trade mark, registered pursuant to the statutes of the United States, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as prescribed in the first section of this Act.

§ 5. That any person or persons who shall, with intent to defraud any person or persons, knowingly and wilfully make, forge or counterfeit, or have in his, her, or their possession, or buy, sell, offer for sale, or deal in, any representation, likeness, similitude, copy, or colourable imitation of any private label, brand, stamp, wrapper, engraving, mould, or trade mark, registered pursuant to the statutes of the United States, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished as prescribed in the first section of this Act.

§ 6. That any person who shall, with intent to injure or defraud the owner of any trade mark, or any other person lawfully entitled to use or protect the same, buy, sell, offer for sale, deal in, or have in his possession any used or empty box, envelope, wrapper, case, bottle, or other package, to which is affixed, so that the same may be obliterated without substantial injury to such box or other thing aforesaid, any trade mark, registered pursuant to the statutes of the United States, not so defaced, erased, obliterated, and destroyed as to prevent its fraudulent use, shall, on conviction thereof, be punished as prescribed in the first section of this Act.

§ 7. That if the owner of any trade mark, registered pursuant to the statutes of the United States, or his agent, make oath, in writing, that he has reason to believe, and does believe, that any counterfeit dies, plates, brands, engravings on wood, stone, metal, or other substance, or moulds, of his said registered trade mark, are in the possession of any person with intent to use the same for the purpose of deception and fraud, or make such oaths that any counterfeits or colourable imitations of his said trade mark, label, brand, stamp, wrapper, engraving on paper or other substance, or empty box, envelope, wrapper, case, bottle, or other package, to which is affixed said registered trade mark not so defaced, erased, obliterated, and destroyed as to prevent its fraudulent use, are in the possession of any person with intent to use the same for the purpose of deception and fraud, then the several judges of the circuit and district courts of the United States, and the commissioners of the circuit courts, may, within their respective jurisdictions, proceed under the law relating to search-warrants, and may issue a search-warrant authorising and directing the marshal of the United States for the proper district to search for and seize all said counterfeit dies, plates, brands, engravings on wood, stone, metal, or other substance, moulds, and said counterfeit trade marks, colourable imitations thereof, labels, brands, stamps, wrappers, engravings on paper, or other

substance, and said empty boxes, envelopes, wrappers, cases, bottles, or other packages that can be found; and upon satisfactory proof being made that said counterfeit dies, plates, brands, engravings on wood, stone, metal or other substance, moulds, counterfeit trade marks, colourable imitations thereof, labels, brands, stamps, wrappers, engravings on paper or other substance, empty boxes, envelopes, wrappers, cases, bottles, or other packages, are to be used by the holder or owner for the purpose of deception and fraud, that any of said judges shall have full power to order all said counterfeit dies, plates, brands, engravings on wood, stone, metal, or other substance, moulds, counterfeit trade marks, colourable imitations thereof, labels, brands, stamps, wrappers, engravings on paper or other substance, empty boxes, envelopes, wrappers, cases, bottles, or other packages, to be publicly destroyed.

§ 8. That any person who shall, with intent to defraud any person or persons, knowingly and wilfully aid or abet in the violation of any of the provisions of this Act, shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars, or imprisonment not more than one year, or both such fine and imprisonment.

Act of Congress of 1881.

AN ACT TO AUTHORISE THE REGISTRATION OF TRADE MARKS AND PROTECT THE SAME.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States in Congress assembled,

§ 1 (*a*). That owners of trade marks used in commerce with foreign nations or with the Indian tribes, provided such owners shall be domiciled in the United States or located in any foreign country or tribe which, by treaty, convention, or law, affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States, may obtain registration of such trade marks by complying with the following requirements:

1st. By causing to be recorded in the Patent Office a statement specifying name, domicile, location, and citizenship of the party applying; the class of merchandise and the particular description of goods comprised in such class to which the particular trade mark has been appropriated; a description of the trade mark itself, with fac-similes thereof, and a statement of the mode in which the same is applied and affixed to goods and the length of time during which the trade mark has been used.

2nd. By paying into the Treasury of the United States the sum of twenty-five dollars, and complying with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Commissioner of Patents.

(*a*) See Act of 1870, § 77.

§ 2 (*a*). That the application prescribed in the foregoing section must, in order to create any right whatever in favour of the party filing it, be accompanied by a written declaration verified by the person, or by a member of a firm, or by an officer of a corporation applying, to the effect that such party has at the time a right to the use of the trade mark sought to be registered, and that no other person, firm, or corporation has the right to such use, either in the identical form or in any such near resemblance thereto as might be calculated to deceive; that such trade mark is used in commerce with foreign nations or Indian tribes, as above indicated (*b*), and that the description and fac-similes presented for registry truly represent the trade mark sought to be registered.

(*a*) See Act of 1870, § 77.

(*b*) This Act only recognises trade marks actually in use, and not trade marks which it is only intended to use in the future; and the user must be user in commerce with foreign nations or the Indian tribes, and the declaration on oath (see Rule 7, *post*) that there has been such user is strictly insisted on: *Ex parte Strasburger & Co.*, 20 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 155.

§ 3 (*a*). That the time of the receipt of any such application shall be noted and recorded. But no alleged trade mark shall be registered unless the same appear to be lawfully used as such (*b*) by the applicant in foreign commerce or commerce with Indian tribes, as above mentioned, or is within the provision of a treaty, convention, or declaration with a foreign power; nor which is merely the name of the applicant (*c*); nor which is identical with a registered or known trade mark owned by another and appropriate to the same class of merchandise, or which so nearly resembles some other person's lawful trade mark as to be likely to cause confusion or mistake in the mind of the public, or to deceive purchasers (*d*). In an application for registration the Commissioner of Patents shall decide the presumptive lawfulness of claim to the alleged trade mark; and in any dispute between an applicant and a previous registrant, or between applicants, he shall follow, so far as the same may be applicable, the practice of courts of equity of the United States in analogous cases.

(*a*) See Act of 1870, § 80, 79.

(*b*) As to what may be lawfully used as a trade mark, see the cases cited in note (*d*) to § 79 of the Act of 1870, *ante*. Under the present Act it has been decided that "Albany Beef" was no trade mark for canned sturgeon, being descriptive: *Ex parte Ams*, 23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 844; that, on the same ground, "Time-keeper" could not be registered as an essential part of a trade mark for watches: *Ex parte Strasburger & Co.*, 20 *ib.* 155; nor "Cristalline" as a trade mark for artificial brilliants: *Ex parte Kipling*, 24 *ib.* 899; but that "Invigorator" was not descriptive, but a good trade mark for spring bed-bottoms: *Ex parte Heyman*, 18 *ib.* 922. Registration has been refused to the geographical name "Raleigh" (*Ex parte Oliver*, 18 *ib.* 923), but granted to a distinctive band or ribbon, intended to be attached to cigar-boxes, as a trade mark for cigars, it serving no mechanical purpose: *Ex parte Straiton & Storm*, 18 *ib.* 923).

(*c*) This prohibition being so general, registration has been refused to a name which had been used for 20 years as a trade mark, and had been registered as such under the Act of 1870: *Ex parte Fairchild*, 21 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 789. And in *Ex parte Adriance*,

Platt & Co., 20 *ib.* 1820, registration was refused to a name as part of a trade mark which also included a device. But a name has been allowed to be registered as part of an old combination trade mark: *Ex parte Frieberg & Workum*, 20 *ib.* 1164.

(*d*) In *Ex parte Strasburger & Co.*, 20 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 155, registration as part of a trade mark was refused to the word "railway," that having already been registered by another manufacturer.

§ 4 (*a*). That certificates of registry of trade marks shall be issued in the name of the United States of America, under the seal of the Department of the Interior, and shall be signed by the Commissioner of Patents, and a record thereof, together with printed copies of the specifications, shall be kept in books for that purpose. Copies of trade marks and of statements and declarations filed therewith and certificates of registry so signed and sealed shall be evidence in any suit in which such trade marks shall be brought in controversy.

(*a*) See Act of 1870, § 80.

§ 5 (*a*). That a certificate of registry shall remain in force for thirty years from its date, except in cases where the trade mark is claimed for and applied to articles not manufactured in this country, and in which it receives protection under the laws of a foreign country for a shorter period, in which case it shall cease to have any force in this country by virtue of this Act at the time that such trade mark ceases to be exclusive property elsewhere. At any time during the six months prior to the expiration of the term of thirty years such registration may be renewed on the same terms and for a like period.

(*a*) See Act of 1870, § 78.

§ 6. That applicants for registration under this Act shall be credited for any fee or part of a fee heretofore paid into the Treasury of the United States with intent to procure protection for the same trade mark.

§ 7 (*a*). That registration of a trade mark shall be *prima facie* evidence of ownership. Any person who shall reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colourably imitate any trade mark registered under this Act and affix the same to merchandise of substantially the same descriptive properties as those described in the registration shall be liable to an action on the case for damages for the wrongful use of said trade mark at the suit of the owner thereof; and the party aggrieved shall also have his remedy according to the course of equity to enjoin the wrongful use of such trade mark used in foreign commerce or commerce with Indian tribes, as aforesaid, and to recover compensation therefor in any Court having jurisdiction over the person guilty of such wrongful act; and Courts of the United States shall have original and appellate jurisdiction in such cases without regard to the amount in controversy.

(*a*) See Act of 1870, §§ 78, 79.

§ 8 (*a*). That no action or suit shall be maintained under the provisions of this Act in any case when the trade mark is used in any unlawful business or upon any article injurious in itself, or which mark has been used with the design of deceiving the public in the purchase of merchandise, or under any certificate of registry fraudulently obtained.

(*a*) See Act of 1870, § 84.

§ 9 (*a*). That any person who shall procure the registry of a trade mark, or of himself as the owner of a trade mark, or an entry respecting a trade mark, in the office of the Commissioner of Patents, by a false or fraudulent representation or declaration, orally or in writing, or by any fraudulent means, shall be liable to pay any damages sustained in consequence thereof to the injured party to be recovered in an action on the case.

(*a*) See Act of 1870, § 82.

§ 10 (*a*). That nothing in this Act shall prevent, lessen, impeach, or avoid any remedy at law or in equity which any party aggrieved by any wrongful use of any trade mark might have had if the provisions of this Act had not been passed.

(*a*) See Act of 1870, § 83.

§ 11 (*a*). That nothing in this Act shall be construed as unfavourably affecting a claim to a trade mark after the term of registration shall have expired; nor to give cognizance to any Court of the United States in an action or suit between citizens of the same State, unless the trade mark in controversy is used on goods intended to be transported to a foreign country, or in lawful commercial intercourse with an Indian tribe.

(*a*) See Act of 1870, § 78.

§ 12 (*a*). That the Commissioner of Patents is authorised to make rules and regulations and prescribe forms for the transfer of the right to use trade marks and for recording such transfers in his office.

(*a*) See Act of 1870, § 81.

§ 13. That citizens and residents of this country wishing the protection of trade marks in any foreign country the laws of which require registration here as a condition precedent to getting such protection there may register their trade marks for that purpose as is above allowed to foreigners, and have certificate thereof from the Patent Office.

Approved March 3, 1881.

RULES AND FORMS ADOPTED BY THE U. S. PATENT OFFICE FOR THE REGISTRATION OF TRADE MARKS UNDER ACT OF MARCH 3, 1881.

Who may obtain Registration.

1. (a.) Any person, firm, or corporation domiciled in the United States or located in any foreign country which, by treaty, convention, or law, affords similar privileges to citizens of the United States (*a*), and who is entitled to the exclusive use of any trade mark and uses the same in commerce with foreign nations or with Indian tribes.

(b.) Any citizen or resident of this country wishing the protection of his trade mark in any foreign country the laws of which require registration in the United States as a condition precedent.

(*a*) The following countries have treaties with the United States at this time, viz.: Russia, Belgium, France, Austria, the German Empire and Great Britain.

Statutory Requirements.

2. Every applicant for registration of a trade mark must cause to be recorded in the Patent Office—

(a.) The name, domicile, and place of business or location of the firm or corporation desiring the protection of the trade mark, and the residence and citizenship of individual applicants.

(b.) The class of merchandise and the particular description of goods comprised in such class to which the trade mark has been appropriated.

(c.) A description of the trade mark itself, with fac-similes thereof, and the mode in which it has been applied and used.

(d.) The length of time during which the trade mark has been used by the applicant on the class of goods described.

3. A fee of twenty-five dollars is required on filing each application, except in the cases hereinafter named. (See par. 16 and 17.)

The Application.

4. An application for the registration of a trade mark will consist of a statement and specification, a declaration or oath, and the fac-simile, with duplicates thereof.

5. These should be preceded by a brief letter of advice requesting registration and signed by the applicant.

6. The statement should announce the full name, citizenship, domicile, residence, and place of business of the applicant, (or if the applicant be a corporation, under the laws of what State or nation incorporated,) with a full and clear specification of the trade mark, particularly discriminating between its essential and non-essential features. It should also state from what time the trade mark has been used by the applicant, the class of merchandise, and the particular goods comprised in such class to which the

trade mark is appropriated, and the manner in which the trade mark has been applied to the goods.

7. The declaration should be in the form of an oath by the person or by a member of the firm or by an officer of the corporation making the application, to the effect that the party has at the time of filing his application a right to the use of the trade mark described in the statement; that no other person, firm, or corporation has a right to such use, either in the identical form or in such near resemblance thereto as might be calculated to deceive; that such trade mark is used in lawful commerce with some foreign nation (or nations) or some Indian tribe (or tribes), and that it is truly represented in the fac-simile presented for registry (*a*).

(*a*) This statement on oath will be insisted on: *Ex parte Strasburger*, 20 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 155.

8. This oath may be taken within the United States, before a notary public, justice of the peace, or the judge or clerk of any court of record. In any foreign country it may be taken before the secretary of a legation or consular officer of the United States, or before any person duly qualified by the laws of the country to administer oaths, whose official character shall be certified by a representative of the United States having an official seal.

Fac-similes to be Filed.

9. Where the trade mark can be represented by a fac-simile which conforms to the rules for drawings of mechanical patents (*a*), such a drawing may be furnished by applicant, and the additional copies will be produced by the photolithographic process at the expense of the office. Or the applicant may furnish one fac-simile of the trade mark, mounted on a card ten by fifteen inches in size, and ten additional copies upon flexible paper, not mounted; but in all cases the sheet containing the mounted fac-simile or the drawing must be signed by the applicant or his authorised attorney.

(*a*) These rules are furnished on application by letter to the Commissioner.

Proceedings in the Office.

10. All applications for registration are considered in the first instance by the Trade Mark Examiner. An adverse decision by such examiner upon the applicant's right to registration will be reviewed by the Commissioner in person upon petition without fee.

11. No trade mark will be registered unless it shall be made to appear that the same is used as such by the applicant in commerce with foreign nations or with Indian tribes, or is within the provisions of a treaty, convention, or declaration with a foreign power, nor which is merely the name of the applicant, nor which is identical with a known or registered trade mark owned by another and appropriated to the same class of merchandise, or which so nearly resembles some other person's lawful trade

mark as to be likely to cause confusion in the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers,

12. In case of conflicting applications for registration, or in any dispute as to the right to use which may arise between an applicant and a prior registrant, the office will declare an interference, in order that the parties may have opportunity to prove priority of adoption or right; and the proceedings on such interference will follow, as nearly as practicable, the practice in interferences upon applications for patents; but each applicant and registrant will be held to the date of adoption alleged in the statement filed with his application. On the petition of any party dissatisfied with the decision of the Examiner of Interferences the case will be reviewed by the Commissioner without fee (*a*).

(*a*) It has been held that since *U. S.* v. *Steffens*, 100 U. S. Rep. 82, the U. S. Patent Office has no authority to decide disputed questions of title to trade marks, or to declare interferences: *Braun & Co.* v. *Blackwell*, 19 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 481. But see *Ex parte Strasburger & Co.*, 20 *ib.* 155, and *Jacoby & Co.* v. *Lopez & Co.*, 23 *ib.* 342.

13. When these requirements have been complied with, and the office has adjudged the trade mark lawfully registrable, a certificate will be issued by the Commissioner, under seal of the Interior Department, to the effect that applicant has complied with the law, and that he is entitled to the protection of his trade mark in such cases made and provided. Attached to the certificate will be a fac-simile of the trade mark and a printed copy of the statement and declaration.

14. The protection for such trade mark will remain in force for thirty years, and may, upon the payment of a second fee, be renewed for thirty years longer, except in cases where such trade mark is claimed for and applied to articles not manufactured in this country, and in which it receives protection under the laws of any foreign country for a shorter period, in which case it will cease to have force in this country, by virtue of the registration, at the same time that the trade mark ceases to be exclusive property elsewhere.

15. The right to the use of any trade mark is assignable by an instrument of writing, and such assignment of a registered trade mark must be recorded in the Patent Office within sixty days after its execution, in default of which it shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice. No particular form of assignment or conveyance is prescribed, but the trade mark should be identified by the certificate number.

16. Owners of trade marks for which protection has been sought by registering them in the Patent Office under the Act of July 8, 1870, (declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States,) may register the same for the same goods, without fee, on compliance with the foregoing requirements. With each application of this character a specific reference to the date and number of the former certificate is required (*a*).

(*a*) See *Jacoby & Co.* v. *Lopez & Co.*, 23 U. S. Pat. Gaz. 342.

17. Applicants whose cases were filed under the Act of 1870, either prior to or since the decision of the Supreme Court declaring it unconstitutional, which are now pending before the office, are advised to prepare applications in conformity with the law and foregoing rules. On the receipt of such an application, referring to the date of the one formerly filed, all fees paid thereon will be duly applied. Those who have paid only ten dollars as a first fee are advised that the law does not provide for a division of the legal fee of twenty-five dollars, and that the remainder of the entire fee is required before the application can be entertained.

Copies and Publications.

18. Printed copies of the statement and declaration in each case, with a duplicate of the trade mark, can be furnished by the office. The *Official Gazette* of the Patent Office, published weekly, will contain a list of all trade marks registered, with the name and address of the registrant, a brief statement of the essential features of the trade mark, and the particular description of goods to which it is applied.

Fees.

19. On filing an application for registration of trade mark	$25 00
For recording assignments—	
Under 300 words	1 00
Over 300, and less than 1000, words	2 00
Over 1000 words	3 00
For single printed copy of statement and declaration	25
Single copy *Official Gazette*	10
Annual subscription *Official Gazette*	5 00

Correspondence.

20. All letters should be addressed to "The Commissioner of Patents," and all remittances by postal order, check, or draft should be to his order.

21. Letters relating to pending applications should refer to the name of the applicant and date of filing. Letters relating to registered trade marks must refer to the name of registrant, number or date of certificate, and the class of merchandise to which the trade mark is applied.

22. The office cannot undertake to respond to inquiries propounded with a view to ascertain whether certain trade marks have been registered, or, if so, to whom or for what goods; nor can it give advice as to the nature and extent of the protection afforded by the law, or act as its expounder, except as questions may arise upon applications regularly filed. A copy of these rules with this paragraph marked will be regarded as a courteous answer to all such inquiries.

Forms.

The following forms have been prepared to be used in filing applications for registration of trade marks. Their use is not absolutely required, but as they have been made to conform to the conditions of the law, applicants will find their business facilitated by following them closely.

Letter of Advice.

To the Commissioner of Patents:

The undersigned presents herewith a fac-simile of his lawful trade mark, and requests that the same, together with the accompanying statement and declaration, may be registered in the United States Patent Office in accordance with the law in such cases made and provided.

A. B.

Statement.

To all whom it may concern:

Be it known that I, A. B.,* a citizen of the United States, residing at , in the county of and State of , and doing business at , have adopted for my use a trade mark for ,* of which the following is a full, clear, and exact specification.

My trade mark consists of the letters and words (or arbitrary symbols, as the case may be) . These have generally been arranged as shown in the accompanying fac-simile. (Here give a full description of the fac-simile, including all its features.) But may be omitted and changed at pleasure without materially altering the character of my trade mark, the essential features of which are .

This trade mark I have used continuously in my business since , 18 .

The class of merchandise to which this trade mark is appropriated is , and the particular description of goods comprised in such class on which I use the said trade mark is .† It has been my practice to (here state fully the manner of applying it to the goods or the packages containing them.)

A. B.

Witnesses:
C. D.
E. F.

* The first paragraph of the statement should be modified to conform to the circumstances of each applicant. If a firm, the domicile and place of business are required; if a corporation, under what State or other laws incorporated, where located, and place of business; if a person not an American citizen, of what country he is a citizen, (or subject, as the case may be,) &c., &c.

† The description of the goods on which the trade mark is used should be in the same language in the first and last paragraphs of the statement.

Declaration.

State of , County of , ss:

A. B., being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is the applicant named in the foregoing statement; that he verily believes that the foregoing statement is true; that he has at this time a right to the use of the trade mark therein described: that no other person, firm, or corporation has the right to such use, either in the identical form or in any such near resemblance thereto as might be calculated to deceive; that it is used in commerce with (here name one or more foreign nations or Indian tribes, or both, as the case may be;) that the description and facsimiles presented for record truly represent the trade mark sought to be registered; and that he is a citizen of the United States.

Sworn and subscribed before me a this day of , 1881.

G. H., *J. P.*

If the application is made by a firm or corporation, or by a citizen or subject of a foreign power, this declaration should be modified accordingly.

APPENDIX F.

TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES, 1877.

DECLARATION BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES FOR THE PROTECTION OF TRADE MARKS.

The Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Government of the United States of America, with a view to the reciprocal protection of the marks of manufacture and trade in the two countries, have agreed as follows:

The subjects or citizens of each of the contracting parties shall have, in the dominions and possessions of the other, the same rights as belong to native subjects or citizens, or as are now granted or may hereafter be granted to the subjects and citizens of the most favoured nation, in everything relating to property in trade marks and trade labels.

It is understood that any person who desires to obtain the aforesaid protection must fulfil the formalities required by the laws of the respective countries.

In witness whereof the Undersigned have signed the present Declaration, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the 24th day of October, 1877.

(L.S.) DERBY.
(L.S.) EDWARDS PIERREPONT.

INDEX.

"A. C. A." cloths, 54.

ABANDONMENT of trade mark, 11, 46, 99.
intention necessary for, 99.
user with name is not, 101.
by adoption of new mark, 102.
by a retiring partner, 102.
by dismissal of action, 102.

ACCOUNT, 12, 158, 208.
injunction formerly ancillary to, 171.
not so now, 172.
incident to injunction, 209.
wherever another's mark is placed on the goods by the defendant, 209.
not where defendant bought the goods ready marked, 208.
sometimes useless, 210.
none where laches, 189, 210.
where offer of submission, 210.
subdivided, 170, 210.
extent of, 13, 211.
directed at plaintiff's risk, 211, 217.
election between damages and, 211.

ACQUIESCENCE, as a defence, 185.
none where no knowledge, 188.
And see DELAY.

ACQUISITION of trade marks, 74.
by aliens, 74.
length of user formerly required for, 76.
now not required for, 77.
by common repute, 77.
former conditions of, 78.
by registration. *See* REGISTRATION.
by user is only in respect of the goods on which there has been user, 81.

ACTION on the case, 12, 108, 142.

ACTS, repeal of, 338.

ACTUAL FRAUD, infringement without, 8, 11, 12, 109, 147, 151, 201.
always restrained, 49.

ACTUAL USER of title of publication necessary, 267.

ADDITIONAL REPRESENTATION, form of, 386.

ADDITIONS to trade marks, 84, 315.
and alterations of trade marks, punishable when fraudulent, 135.

ADDRESS of applications, to comptroller, 373.
form of application for alteration of, in register, 390.
use of defendant's, together with infringing mark, no defence, 203.

ADVANTAGES of use of trade marks, 5.

ADMINISTRATRIX, action not continued against, 165.

ADVERTISEMENT no trade mark, 59.
expenditure on, gives no right to what is advertised, 78, 267.
in "Trade Marks Journal," 83, 308, 345, 379.
marks incapable of, 343.
form of, 400.
of series of marks, 346, 380.
no obligation to see, 308.

AFFIXED to the article, trade mark must be, 19.

AGENT, question of title between principal and, 168.
cannot acquire his principal's trade mark by user, 76.
application may be made by, 342, 378.
infringement by, 173.
when costs not given against, 214.

AGGRIEVED, person, 327.
foreigner may be, 17, 327.

AGREEMENT will not be enforced when fraudulent, 177.

"AINSWORTH'S THREAD," 29, 31.

"AKRON," 64.

"ALBANY BEEF," 51, 488.

"ALDERNEY" oleomargarine, 64, 123.

ALIENS may acquire trade marks, 15, 74, 303, 333, 334.
new enactments with respect to, 76, 303.

ALMANACK, imitation of, 262.

ALTERATION of registered trade mark, 87, 329.

ALTERNATIVE MARKS, 84, 483.

AMBIGUOUSNESS of defendant's mark, no defence, 120, 201.

AMENDMENT of documents, 352.

AMERICA. *See* UNITED STATES.

"AMERICAN GROCER, THE," 265.

SARDINES," 50, 56, 66, 315, 482.

"AMMONIATED BONE SUPERPHOSPHATE OF LIME," 51, 59.

"AMOSKEAG" cloths, 64.

ANALOGOUS CASES to those of trade mark, 17, 224.

"ANATOLIA LIQUORICE," 51, 63, 65.

"ANCHOR BRAND WIRE," 38, 122.

ANCHORS, chain cables and, 473.

"ANCHOVIES, BURGESS' ESSENCE OF," 27.

"ANGLO-INDIAN TEA CO., THE," 230.

"ANGLO-PORTUGO" oysters, 50, 56, 315.

"ANGOSTURA BITTERS," 50, 64, 77, 123.

ANNUAL report of comptroller, 333.

"ANTIQUARIAN BOOK STORE, THE," 50, 240.

"APOLLINARIS WATER," 64.

APPEAL, delay in, 162.
when not to be brought, 162.
advanced, 163.
costs of, 218.
to Board of Trade, 85, 345.
Form of, 387.
from Cutlers' Company, Form of, 396.

APPLICANT, definition of, 350.

APPLICATION for registration, 82, 302, 341, 342, 377.
representations of trade mark on, 82, 302.

APPLICATION—*continued.*
of old marks, mode of, 82.
Form of receipt of, 399,
by a firm, 83, 342, 377.
by a body corporate, 83, 342, 377.
advertisement of, 83, 308, 345, 379.
in case of Sheffield and cotton marks, 83.
opposition to, 85.
costs of opposed, 86, 222, 223.
by subsequent proprietor, 93, 349, 383.
may be sent by post, 331, 344.
instructions with respect to, 373, 377, and *Addendum.*
Form of, 385.
for alteration of address, Form of, 390.

APPORTIONMENT of costs, 216.

APPROPRIATION of trade marks to special classes of goods, 10, 79, 306.

"ARABIAN BALSAM, HAYNES'," 34.

ARMS, national, 305, 381, and *Addendum.*
of one of the United States, 482.
wrongful assumption of Royal, punishable by fine, 336.

"ARMY AND NAVY CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY, THE," 230.

ASSIGNEE or transmittee, registration of. *See* SUBSEQUENT PROPRIETOR.

ASSIGNMENT of trade marks, 10, 87, 310, 325.
to be registered, 310.

ASSUMED NAME used as trade name, 233.

ATTORNEY'S practice, goodwill of. *See* GOODWILL.

"ATWOOD'S PHYSICAL VEGETABLE JAUNDICE BITTERS," 33.

"AUSTRALIAN MORTGAGE, LAND, AND FINANCE CO., THE," 231.

AUTHORITY, colourable, 202.

BAILEE of goods falsely marked, 174.

"BALM OF THOUSAND FLOWERS," 50, 51, 58.

BAND for cigar boxes, 73.

"BANK OF ENGLAND" sealing wax, 316.

BANKING BUSINESS, 147.

BANKRUPT not restrained from soliciting old customers, after sale of goodwill by trustee, 282.

BANKRUPTCY, transmission of trade mark on, 11, 93.
title of publication on, 266.
goodwill on, 276.
Act, 1883. *See* STATUTES.

"BARON LIEBIG'S EXTRACT OF MEAT," 251.

BARREL, shape of, 72, 482.

"B. B. H." iron, 69.

"BEAVERINE," 52, 57, 482.

"BEDFORDSHIRE EXPRESS AND GENERAL ADVERTISER FOR THE COUNTIES OF CAMBRIDGE, HERTFORDSHIRE, HUNTINGDONSHIRE, AND MIDDLESEX, THE," 264.

"BEEF, BRAND'S ESSENCE OF," 163.

"BEESWAX OIL," 51, 482.

"BEETON'S CHRISTMAS ANNUAL," 247.

"BEET-ROOT SUGAR," 43.

"BELL" mark, 38.

"BELL'S LIFE," 263.

"BETHESDA" mineral water, 66, 123.

"BHÈ HATHI" yarn, 122.

"BIRTHDAY SCRIPTURE TEXT-BOOK," 266.

"BISMARCK" paper collars, 32, 51.

"BLACK SWAN" goods, 314, 483.

"BLACKMAN'S GENUINE HEALING BALSAM," 33.

"BLANCHARD CHURN," 51, 482.

BOARD OF TRADE, jurisdiction of, 151.
comptroller subject to, 324.
appeal from comptroller to, 83, 302, 345.
to appoint officers and clerks, 325.
to make rules, 332.

"BODY CORPORATE," 350.

BOND, form of, 381, 397.

BOOK, title of, registration under Copyright Acts useless, 15. *And see* LITERARY PUBLICATION.

"BOOTH'S THEATRE," 243.

"BORWICK'S BAKING POWDER," 131.

BOTTLES, shape of, 72.
infringement by use of moulded, 128.

"BOUQUET HAMS," 122.

"BOVILENE" pomade, 51, 57, 125.

"BRAIDED FIXED STARS," 46, 316, 318.

BRAND, distinctive, may be a trade mark, 23, 36, 304.

"BRAND'S ESSENCE OF BEEF," 163.
"original maker of," 253.

BRICK WORKS, question of title in respect of, 167.

"BRITANNIA, THE," 428.

BRITISH possession, registration of trade marks originating in, 335.
definition of, 339.

"BROOKLYN WHITE LEAD CO.," 230.

"BROOKMAN AND LANGDON," 295.

"BROSELEY" pipes, 64.

"BROWN CHEMICAL EXTRACT," 51.

"BRUSH MIDLAND ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER CO., THE," 231.

BURDEN of proof is on defendant where essential particular taken, 116.
person alleging a mark to be common, 316, 327.

"BURGESS' ESSENCE OF ANCHOVIES," 27, 125.

BUSINESS. *See* GOODWILL.

BUTTONS, metal, 472.

BYRON, Lord, 244.

CABLES. *See* CHAIN CABLES.

"CACHEMIRE MILANO," 50, 56, 66, 315, 482.

"CALHOUN PLOUGH," 44, 482.

"CALIFORNIA" soap, 314, 483.

"CANADA PLATES," 179.

CANCELLATION of entry in register, 104, 329.
form of application for, 391.
declaration in support of application for, 392.

"CAPITAL AND COUNTIES BANK, THE," 230.

"CAPTAIN'S LIVE AND LET LIVE OYSTER AND DINING SALOON, THE," 241.

CARDS, Great Mogul stamp on, 6.
wrappers for, 473.

CARPET cleaner's mark no trade mark in the United States, 480.

CARPET stick, 72, 482.

"CARRIAGE BAZAAR," 234, 240.

CARRIER of goods falsely marked, 174.

"CASCADE" ale, 58.

CASE, action on the, 12, 106, 142.

CASES analogous to cases of trade mark, 17, 224.

"CAVENDISH HOUSE," 241.

"CELEBRATED STOMACH BITTERS," 51.

"CENTENNIAL" clothing, 52, 58.
wines, 52.

CERTIFICATE of comptroller, 382.
to be evidence, 330, 353.
general, form of, 404.
form of request for, 395.
of registration for use abroad, form of, 403.
form of request for, 393.

CERTIFICATE—*continued.*
in legal proceedings, form of, 402.
form of request for, 394.
of refusal to register, 24, 318.
form of, 405.
form of request for, 390.

CHAIN cables and anchors, 473.

CHANCERY DIVISION administered Trade Marks Registration Acts, 150.

CHARACTERISTICS of registered trade mark, 304.

"CHARBONNEL AND WALKER," 286.

"CHARITY," 266.

"CHARTER OAK" stoves, 51, 58, 123.

"CHEAVIN'S FILTERS," 59.

"CHERRY PECTORAL," 50, 241.

"CHERRY ST. MILLS," 66, 482.

"CHINESE LINIMENT," 51.

"CHLORODYNE," 50, 57.

"CHRISTY'S MINSTRELS," 233.

"CHUBB'S PATENT-LOCK FIRE-PROOF SAFES," 33.

CIRCUIT courts, jurisdiction of, in the United States, 481.

CIRCULARS, deceptive, 235.

CIVIL REMEDY, 143.
not affected by conviction under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862,...136, 180.

CLAIM, forms of statements of, 418, 419, 420.

"CLARIBEL'S" songs, 245.

"CLARKE'S PILLS," 245.

CLASSES of goods, registration must be for particular goods or, 10, 79, 306.
infringement must be by use on same, 127.

CLASSIFICATION of goods, 79, 302, 306, 342, 357.
guide to, 379.
cotton marks, 368.

CLERICAL error in registration, correction of, 87, 329.
form of request for, 393.

CLERKS to be appointed by Board of Trade, 325.

CLOCKS and watches, 454, 472.

CLOTHS, woollen, 474.

"CLUB HOUSE GIN," 50.

"COCK" mark, 38.

"COCOAINE," 51, 57, 125.

"COCOATINA," 125.

"COE'S SUPERPHOSPHATE OF LIME," 33, 125.

COLLAR-BOX, shape of, 482.

COLLATERAL MISREPRESENTATIONS do not disentitle, 13, 193.

COLLIERIES, use of name of, restrained, 244.

"COLLINS CO. HARTFORD CAST STEEL WARRANTED," 33.

"COLONIAL LIFE ASSURANCE CO., THE," 229.

COLONIAL trade marks, registration of, 335.

COLOUR, when it can be claimed, 72.
registration of trade marks in, 307, 313.
protects in all colours, 79, 84, 307.
infringement of marks registered with or without, 117.

COLOURABLE AUTHORITY, 202.
differences, infringement with, 124.

"COLTON DENTAL ROOMS, THE," 254.

COMBINATION marks, 71, 168, 368.
of name with mark, no abandonment, 101, 165.

COMMISSION MERCHANTS, 173.

COMMISSIONERS OF PATENTS, functions of, transferred to Board of Trade, 151.
instructions given by, to Manchester Committee of Experts, 368.

COMMITTAL, motion for, 163.
delay in respect of, 189.
costs of, 164, 217.

COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS FOR COTTON MARKS. *See* MANCHESTER COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS.

COMMON LAW remedy, 12, 106, 142.
development of law of trade marks at, 7.
requisites to entitle to damages at, 7.
fraudulent intention at, 7, 12, 106, 144, 145.
injury to the plaintiff must be shown at, 147.
Equity at first followed the, 152.
mark, no exclusive right in, 11.
removable from register, 308.
burden of proof is on person alleging that mark is, 316.
delay may make mark a, 186.
registrable as an addition, 315.
disclaimer of, 84, 379.
repute, acquisition of trade marks by, 77.
user, statements in application for registration, no evidence of, 47, 316.

COMPANIES ACT, 1862. *See* STATUTES.

COMPANY, name of, 229.
descriptive, 231.
registrable under the Companies' Act, 1862,...231.
application for registry by, 83, 342, 377.

COMPROMISE, costs in case of, 219.

COMPTROLLER-GENERAL, office of, 324.
definition of, 339.
subject to Board of Trade, 151, 324.
discretionary powers of, 330, 344.
may take directions of law officers, 330.
may correct clerical errors, 329.
not to refuse registration without hearing applicant, 85, 330.
costs of, in registration cases, 222.
certificate of, 382. *And see* FORMS.
to be evidence, 330, 353.
annual report of, 333.

CONCURRENT rights in same trade mark, 97, 101.

"CONDY'S FLUID CO., THE," 231.

CONFLICT of laws, 16.

CONFLICTING claims to registration, 87, 310.
mode of trial of, 311.
by special case, 350.

"CONGRESS SPRING" water, 51, 64.

CONNEXION of trade mark with goodwill, 10, 18, 88, 216, 310, 317.

CONSTRUCTION, principle of, 44, 47.

"CONTEMPORARY REVIEW," 262.

CONTEMPT, committal for, 163.

CONTINUANCE of registration, 320.

CONTINUATION of title to trade marks, 11, 97.

CONTRACT, questions of, in respect of trade marks, 176.
names, 247.
trade secrets, 257.
for purchase of marked goods, 178.

"CONVEYANCE COMPANY, THE," 256.
use of name of hotel on, restrained, 243.

CONVICTIONS for false pretences, 136.

COPYRIGHT, trade mark distinguished from, 15.
no, in title of publication, 266.
Acts, registration of trade marks under, is useless, 15, 267.
the word, will not be registered, 305, 380.

"CORN" tobacco, 58.

CORPORATE BODY, 303, 339, 342.

CORRECTION of clerical errors, 329.
form of request for, 393.

COSTS, general rule as to, 214.
nominal damages sufficient to carry, 214.
paid by plaintiff, though relief granted, 215.
not given, though relief refused, 190, 215.
made costs in the cause, 216.
apportionment of, 216.
of unfounded charges, 217.
of an unnecessary account, 217.
scale of, when defendant submits, 217.
of motion to commit, 164, 217.
of appeal, 218.
in case of compromise, 219.
where no previous notice given to infringer, 220.
infancy does not excuse from, 221.
occasioned to a third party by defendant's fraud, 148, 221.
in registration cases, 86, 222, 309.
paid by Sheffield Cutlers' Co., 222.

COSTS—*continued.*
not given where each side partly successful, 222.
paid by successful applicant, 222.
of comptroller, 222.
when he opposes application, 222, 314.
extent of, 223.
of application to rectify the register by removal, 223, 328.
security required for, on opposition to registration, 309.

COTTON CLOTHS, trade mark indicative of printer of, 4, 167.
marks, registration of, 83, 313.
rules as to, now repealed, 367.
Manchester office for exhibition of, 367, 372, 382.
time for applying for registration of, 367.
when combination marks, 367.
classification of, by Manchester Committee of Experts, 368, 369.
instructions for, 368.
in B. list formerly not registered without Order of Court, 369, 372.
added to lists, 369, 372.
in A. list, application for registration of, 370, 372.
advertisement of, 370, 372.
time of registration of, 371, 372.
not to be registered except as prescribed, 371.
application for registration of new, 371.
now on the same footing as other trade marks, 367.
name of, to be stated in application, 378.

"COUGH REMEDY," 50.

COUNTER-CLAIM, injunction granted on, 158.

COUNTER-STATEMENT, 85, 308.
form of, 381, 397.
grounds of, 409.

COURT, definition of the, 337, 339.
in Scotland, 336.
reference of appeal from the Comptroller to the, 302.
manner of bringing opposed case before the, 309.
submission of conflicting claims to the, 311, 350.

COVENANT by servant, benefit of, passes with goodwill, 270.
by vendor of goodwill usual, 283.
to make profitable, 285.
by purchaser of goodwill to keep up business implied, 288.

"CRACK-PROOF" indiarubber, 50, 482.

CREST as a trade mark, 38.
use of, may be restrained, 38.

CRIMINAL PROSECUTION, 131

"CRISTALLINE" brilliants, 51, 488.

"CROMAC SPRINGS," 64, 241.

"CRONICA, LA," 265.

"CRONISTA, EL," 265.

"CROSS COTTON," 38, 122, 164.

"CROUP TINCTURE," 47, 50, 482.

CROWN, representations of the royal, will not be registered as new marks, or parts of new marks, 305, 381.

"CROWN" clothing, 122.

"CROWN SEIXO" wine, 65, 125, 422.

"CUNDURANGO OINTMENT C. O.," 50, 483.

CUSTOMS regulations, 454.

CUTLERS' COMPANY, Acts relating to the, 456.
not affected by the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862,...449.
ordered to pay costs of opposition, 222.
registration of Sheffield marks by the, 83, 321, 353, 381.
form of appeal from, to Comptroller, 396.

CUTLERY, marks on, 456.

DAMAGES, 12, 158, 212.
affected by fraudulent intention, 111.
given, though no fraudulent intention, 146.
special damage proved, 212.
measure of, 148, 213.
at least nominal, where infringement, 149, 212.
withheld in case of delay, 189, 212.
election between an account and, 212.
inquiry as to, given at plaintiff's risk, 213.
under Merchandise Marks Act, 1862,...214.
costs given, though only nominal, 214.
for improper solicitation of old customers after sale of goodwill 285.

DATE of registration, 349.
establishment appropriated, 253.

"DAVE JONES" whiskey, 32, 52.

"DAY AND MARTIN'S BLACKING," 118, 235, 253, 422.

DEAD LANGUAGES, trade marks consisting of words from the, 59.

DEATH, transmission of trade mark on, 96.

DECEPTION, actual, 110, 119.
probable, 110, 120.
must be probable for injunction to issue, 120, 245, 265.
of first purchaser immaterial, 7, 106, 146.

DECEPTIVE MARKS, not protected, 55, 91, 190.
not registrable, 314.
circulars, 235.
labels and notices, 253.
or descriptive, marks which are, 55, 315, 482.

DECLARATION on application by subsequent proprietor, 93, 350.
form of, 389.
on application by registered proprietor for cancellation, 104, 329.
form of, 392.
by infant, lunatic, &c., 331.
how to be made, 354.

DEFENCES, 181.
non-infringement, 181.
plaintiff's trade mark bad, 181.
even though registered for five years, 182.
no registration or certificate of non-registration, 183.
plaintiff not the registered proprietor, 183.
trade mark severed from goodwill, 184.
licence, 184.
may not be used fraudulently, 185.
delay and acquiescence, 185.
marks may become common by, 186
no, where no knowledge, 188.
plaintiff's misrepresentation, 13, 55, 91, 190.
improper allegation of patent by plaintiff, 13, 195.
inoperative, 201.
ignorance, 201.
no intention to sell, 201.
no actual deception or fraud, 7, 151, 201.
immediate purchasers not deceived, 146, 152, 201.
words ambiguous, 120, 201.
only part of mark taken, 201.
name used is defendant's own, 202.
colourable authority, 202.
goods are plaintiff's own of different quality, 202.
equality in quality, 8, 202.

DEFENCES—*continued.*
addition of defendant's name, 202.
address, 203.
user by others, 203.
infringement by others, 203.
a plurality of marks or names, 166, 203.
puffing, 203.
slight delay, 204.
infancy, 204.
defendant's mark registered, 204.
interference with defendant's business, 204.
form of, 421.

DEFINITION of trade mark in Merchandise Marks Act, 1862...22, 439.
Trade Marks Act, 1875...23.
Patents Act, 1883...23, 304, 376.
effect of, 24.
clause in Patents Act, 1883...339.

DELAY, 185.
may make mark common, 186.
on motion for injunction, 186.
at the hearing or on demurrer, 187.
where rights not actively defended, 187.
no, where no knowledge, 188.
may affect rights against unintentional infringer, 111.
by retiring partner, 188.
on appeal, 162.
on motion to commit, 164, 189.
for the purpose of obtaining evidence, 188, 204.
indulgence to defendant by reason of plaintiff's, 189.
no account or damages where, 189, 212.
costs not given by reason of, 190, 214.

DELIVERY up and destruction of spurious marks, 158, 180.

"DEMOCRATIC REPUBLICAN NEW ERA, THE," 265.

"DENT" watches, 32.

DEPOSIT, registration by, 84, 307, 343, 370.

"DERRINGER" pistols, 32.

DESCRIPTIVE WORD no trade mark, 11, 21, 41, 49, 166, 482, 488.
fancy words may become, 100.
list of words which are, 50.
name of patented article is, 47.
new name for new article is, 49.
effect of registration of mark which is, 45.
or deceptive, marks which are, 55, 315, 482.

"DESICCATED COD-FISH," 50.

DESIGNS, trade marks distinguished from, in the United States, 479.
marks to be placed on registered, 453.

DESTRUCTION, delivery up of spurious labels, &c., for, 158, 180.

DETERMINATION of doubt as to classes, 312.

DEVICE, 23, 35, 304.

"DIAMOND POWDER," 122.

DIORAMA, imitation of a, 245.

DIRECTIONS for use, 254.

DISCLAIMER of common marks, 84, 305, 316, 317, 328, 370.

DISCONTINUANCE of trade marks, 97.
by removal from register for non-payment of fees, 98.

DISCOVERY, 158, 204.
principle on which given, 205.
not given where oppressive, 205.
given where necessary, 205.
action for, against carrier, 174, 207.
under Merchandise Marks Act, 1862...207.

DISCRETIONARY POWERS of comptroller, the, 330, 344.

DISENTITLED, plaintiff may be, by his own misrepresentations, 13, 55, 190, 482.
by improper use of word "patent," 13, 195.
not, by use of his name with his mark, 101, 166.
to protection, words which are, not registrable, 66, 314.

DISMISSAL of suit, abandonment of trade mark by, 102.

DISPOSAL of goodwill on dissolution of partnership, 290.

DISPUTED CLAIM of registration, registrar's duty in case of, 310.

DISSOLUTION of partnership, 94, 236, 290.

DISSOLVE, motion to, 162.

DISTINCTION between trade mark and patent, 13.
copyright, 15.

DISTINCTIVENESS requisite, 22, 35, 41.

DISUSED MARK, infringement of, 103, 128.

"DR. McLANE'S PILLS," 31.

"DR. JOHNSON'S OINTMENT," 259.

DOG AND PORRIDGE POT, THE, 122, 314.

"DOG-BRAND" files, 122, 314.

"DOG'S HEAD" beer, 122.

"DOUGLAS & CO.," 234, 280.

DRAWINGS, 473.

"DRUGGIST'S SUNDRIES" cigars, 51, 482

"DUBLIN SOAP," 52, 56, 64, 482.

DURATION of registration, 98, 320.

"DURHAM" tobacco, 52, 66, 123, 482.

"EAGLE" mark, 38.

EARLY use of trade marks, 6.

"ECONOMIC CONVEYANCE CO., THE," 248.

"EDELWEISS" perfume, 52, 56.

"EDINBURGH CORRESPONDENT, THE," 264.
Philosophical Journal, The," 264.

EDITOR, name of, 247.

EFFECT of registration of descriptive mark, 45.

"EGG MACARONI," 50, 56, 166, 315, 482.

ELECTION between account and damages, 211, 212.

"ELECTRO-SILICON," 57, 125.

ELEMENTS necessary to found jurisdiction, 157.

"ELEPHANT" cotton goods, 38.

"ELISE, MADAME," 233.

'ELKINGTON'S A SPOONS," 137.

EMPLOYMENT, former, may be stated, 238, 298.

ENGLAND, hall marks in, 460.

ENGRAVER, infringement by, 129, 173.

ENGRAVINGS, marks to be placed on, 471.

ENLARGEMENT of time, 352.

"ENO'S FRUIT SALT," 123.

"ENTERED AT STATIONERS' HALL," the words, will not be registered, 305, 380.

ENTRIES to be made in register, 320.
fabrication of, 330.

ENTRY of rectification in register, 350.

"EQUAL TO DAY AND MARTIN'S," 253.

EQUALITY in quality no defence, 8, 202.

EQUITY, 8, 106, 150.
remedy in, 12, 158.
principles adopted in, 151, 158.
at first followed the law, 152.
question as to foundation of jurisdiction in, 153.
in what sense fraud is required in, 148, 151, 156.

"ERA, THE," 265.

ERASURE of spurious marks, 159.

"ESSENCE OF ANCHOVIES, BURGESS'," 27.
Beef, Brand's," 163.
original maker of," 253.

ESSENTIAL PARTICULARS of trade mark, 85, 304.
infringement must be of, 116, 304.
of, throws burden of proof on defendant, 116.
may not be altered, 304, 329.

ESTABLISHMENT, fraudulent use of name of, 240.

ETCHINGS, 257.

"ETHIOPIAN" stockings, 51, 64.

ETON ARMS, The, 316.

"EUREKA SHIRTS," 52, 60, 166.
manure," 51, 60.

"EVAPORATED" articles of food, 51, 482.

"EVERETT'S PREMIER BLACKING," 51, 136.

EVIDENCE, 161, 352.
of proprietor's right, registration is, 115, 318.
of common user, statements in applications for registration are not, 47, 316.
must be produced by person alleging it, 316.
of experts as to similarity, value of, 119.
of fraud, 112, 233.
certificate of comptroller to be, 330.
sealed copies of register to be, 326.
delay for the purpose of obtaining, 188, 204.

EXACT FAC-SIMILE not required to constitute forgery, 136.

"EXACTLY 12 YARDS," 62.

"EXCELSIOR" soap, 51, 60, 165.

EXCLUSIVE USE of trade mark, 318.

EXHIBITION medals, 172, 452.
will not be registered as new marks, or parts of new marks, 305, 381.

EXPERT EVIDENCE, value of, 119.

EXPERTS for cotton marks, committee of. *See* MANCHESTER COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS.

EXPORTER, manufacturer and, 4, 168.

EXPRESSIONS generally understood may be employed in marks, notwithstanding the provisions of the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862,...130, 443.

EXPUNGING trade mark from register, 326.

EXTENT of account, 211.

EXTRACTS from register, 325.

EXTRAVAGANCE an advantage in fancy names, 56.

"FABER" pencils, 32.

FAC-SIMILE, to constitute forgery there need not be an exact, 136.

FACT, intentional mis-statement as to, criminally punishable, 141.

"FAIRBANKS' PATENT," 50, 56.

FALSE PRETENCES, 12, 131, 136, 137.
as to weight, 141.
without words, 141.
representations, general law as to, 145.
by plaintiff, a ground of defence, 190.

FALSIFICATION of entries in register, 330.

FAMILY names, no exclusive right in, apart from business, 225.

"FAMILY SALVE," 52, 123.

FANCY WORDS, 23, 41, 304.
list of, 51.
extravagance an advantage in, 56.
specially invented, 57.
composed of existing words, 57.
geographical names, 63.
become descriptive, 100.

FEES for registration, 321, 341, 361.
table of, 355.
how payable, 373.
form of transmission of, 387.
removal of mark from register for non-payment of, 98, 320.

"FERNDALE" coal, 64.

"FERRO-PHOSPHORATED ELIXIR OF CALISAYA BARK," 50.

FIGURES, numerical, 66, 70, 304, 482.

"FINCH AND CO.," 237, 280.

FIRM, application for registry by, 83, 342, 377.
name. *See* TRADE NAME.
part of goodwill, 277.
how continuing partners may use, 295.
former, may be stated, 238.

FIRST PURCHASER, deception of, immaterial, 146, 152, 201.

FLAGS, national, of Great Britain will not be registered as new marks, or parts of new marks, 305, 381, and *Addendum*.

"FLOR FINA PRAIRIE SUPERIOR TABAC," 60.

FOREIGN LANGUAGE, trade marks consisting of words from, 60, 378.
false statement in, 193.
subjects, protection of trade marks of, 15, 74, 303, 333, 334.
new enactments with respect to, 76, 303.
user, not equivalent to English user, 17, 313.
countries, form of certificate of registration for use in, 403.
request for certificate of registration for use in, 393.

FORGERY, at Common Law infringement no, 131.
under Merchandise Marks Act, 1862,...132.

FORM OF application for registration, 385.
additional representation, 386.
receipt of application, 399.
advertisement, 400.
transmission of fee, 387.
notification of registration, 399.
request for copy of, 395.
certificate of registration for use abroad, 403.
request for, 393.
in legal proceedings, 402.
request for, 394.
appeal from Cutler's Co., Sheffield, to comptroller, 396.
to Board of Trade, 387.
certificate of refusal to register, 405.
request for, 390.
special case, 413.
application for settlement of, 394.
notice of opposition, 388.
grounds of, 406.
counter statement, 381, 397.
grounds of, 409.
bond, 381, 397.
notice to applicant to bring opposed application before the Court, 401.
summons for leave to register, 413.
notice of motion for leave to register, 414.
application for alteration of address, 390.
request for correction of clerical error, 393.
notice of motion for leave to add to or alter a mark, 415.
request and declaration by subsequent proprietor, 389.
application for cancellation, 391.
declaration in support of, 392.
notice of motion for rectification of the register, 415.
order for rectification, 391.

FORM OF—*continued.*
general certificate of comptroller, 404.
request for, 395.
writ of summons, with indorsement, 416.
notice of motion for injunction, 417.
statement of claim, 418, 419, 420.
defence, 421.
reply, 421.
summons to stay proceedings, 421.
injunctions and orders, 422—437.

FORMS, 341, 356.
list of stamped, 375.
places where stamped, obtainable, 373.
in which injunctions granted, 162.
and precedents, 384.
And see PRECEDENTS.

FORMER EMPLOYMENT may be stated, 238.

"FRANK LESLIE'S ILLUSTRATED NEWS," 234.

"FRANKS' SPECIFIC SOLUTION OF COPAIBA," 253, 431.

FRAUD, 7, 12, 49, 106, 111, 144, 156, 159, 201.
in what sense there must be, for infringement, 8, 156.
actual, always restrained, 49, 183.
shown by purchasing right to use name, 32.
question of, is for the jury, when there is one, 145.
circumstances pointing to, 112, 233.
to absence of, 114.
disentitling plaintiff, 13, 190.
by defendant, punished by refusal of costs, 215.
unjustifiable charges of, punished in respect of costs, 216, 217.
costs incurred by defendant's, recovered from him, 148, 221.
on the public, 177, 185, 190.
evidence of, 233.

FRAUDULENT ADDITIONS to and alterations of marks, 135.
partnership, 235.
use of name of establishment, 240.

FRAUDULENT INTENTION does not increase injury wrought by infringement, 108.
may affect account or damages, 111.
may render further inquiry unnecessary, 112.
continuance of infringement after complaint shows, 112, 146, 154, 228, 263.
unnecessary, when mark registered, 115.

FRAUDULENT INTENTION—*continued.*
need not be proved in cases of trade mark, 8, 11, 12, 109, 147, 151, 201.
trade name, 226.
title of publications, 263.
must be proved when defendant is using his own name, 25.
agreement will not be enforced, 177.
speculation, no relief given in cases of, 194.
use of testimonials, 253.
secret, 260.

FREEMASONS' EMBLEMS as trade marks, 37, 482.

"FRENCH" PAINTS, 51, 56, 66, 315, 482.

"FRUIT SALT, ENO'S," 43, 50, 123.

"FULLWOOD & CO.," 233.

FUNCTION of trade mark, 2.

"FÜR FAMILIEN GEBRAUCH," 50, 62, 482.

"GALAXY PUBLISHING CO., THE," 231.

"GARNHART'S OLD BOURBON," 125.

"GASEOUS FLUID," 51.

GENERAL PRINCIPLE of trade mark law, 1.

GENUINE MARK, improper use of, 128, 141.

GENUINENESS, misrepresentations of, 252.

GEOGRAPHICAL NAMES, 63.
American rule as to, 65, 482.

"GERMAN SIRUP," 52, 56, 66, 315, 482.

"GLENBOIG" bricks, 170, 171.

"GLENDON" iron, 66.

"GLENFIELD" starch, 63, 126, 424.

"GLENLIVET" whiskey, 208.

"GLOBE" steel, 122.

GOLD and silver plate. *See* HALL MARKS.

GOLD MEDAL, injunction not granted to restrain untrue assertions as to, 53.

"GOLDEN CROWN" cigars, 51.

"GOLDEN LION, THE," 241.

"GOLDEN OINTMENT," 50.

GOODS, registration must be for particular goods or classes of, 10, 306.
guide to classification of, 379.
registration of a series of marks differing only in statements of the, 306.

"GOODS AND CHATTELS," within the Bankruptcy Act, trade mark is, 11, 93.

GOODWILL, value of, 268.
connexion of trade marks with, 10, 18, 88, 268, 310, 317.
trade mark cannot be severed from, 88, 96, 184, 269.
trade mark passes with, 88, 268, 279.
provisions of the Registration and Patents Acts with respect to, 269.
what constitutes, 269.
formerly treated as always local, 270.
not so now, 271.
importance of local connexion to, 271.
of public house, 271.
another view of, 272.
in learned professions, 272, 273.
division of, into personal and local, 272, 289.
into goodwill of profession and of trade, 272.
of a profession held to be assignable, 273.
assignability of, doubted, 273.
sale of, enforced, 274.
devolution of, on dissolution of partnership, 274.
on death, 275.
rights on sale of, 275.
incidents of, 275.
of a trade, incidents of, 276.
universally valuable, 276.
firm name part of, 225, 277.
sale of, specifically enforced, 278.
connected with the business, 279.
vendor of, after sale, may set up new business, 236, 279.
but must not interfere unfairly with the purchaser, 281.
user of old trade name by, 280.
solicitation of old customers by, 281, 283.

GOODWILL—*continued.*
restrained, though no express covenant, 281.
express restrictive covenant by, usual, 283.
damages in respect of improper solicitation by, 285.
covenant by, to make profitable, 285.
rights of purchaser of, 285.
with respect to trade name, 285.
mortgagee of, with respect to trade name, 286, 289.
implied contract by purchaser of, to keep up business, 288.
is partnership assets, 290.
disposal of, on dissolution, 236, 290.
what terms in partnership articles include, 291.
cannot be monopolized by one partner, when no articles, 235, 292.
does not survive to surviving partner, 294.
rights on dissolution of partnership by retirement or death, and sale of, 295.
right of election in respect of, protected, 299.
valuation of, 299.

"GOURAUD'S ORIENTAL CREAM, OR MAGICAL BEAUTIFIER," 33, 52.

"GOURAUD'S SONS," 234.

"GRADUATED GROOVELESS, DRILL-EYED, GROUND DOWN" needles, 59.

"GRANULATED DIRT-KILLER" soap, 51, 482.

"GREAT IXL. AUCTION COMPANY, THE," 241.

"GREAT MOGUL" stamp on cards, 6.

"GRENADE" syrup, 51, 62, 123.

"GROSVENOR LIBRARY, THE," 241.

GROSS, trade mark cannot exist in, 10, 88, 310.

GROUNDWORK, when registration of, will be permitted, 305, 380.

GROWTH of Chancery jurisdiction, 150.

"GUARDIAN FIRE AND LIFE ASSURANCE CO., THE," 230

GUIDE to classification of goods, 379.

"GUINEA COAL COMPANY, THE," 229, 432.

"GUINNESS'" stout, 125.

GUN-BARRELS, 472.

HALL MARKS in England, 460.
table of, 465.
in Scotland, 466.
table of, 467.
in Ireland, 468.
table of, 469.
fraudulent imitation of, 157.

HALLAMSHIRE. *See* CUTLERS' COMPANY.

"HAMBURG TEA," 51.

"HAND" mark, 38.

"HANFORD'S CHESTNUT GROVE WHISKEY," 34.

"HARVEY'S SAUCE," 45, 50, 163.

"HAXALL" goods, 123, 314, 483.

"HAYNES' ARABIAN BALSAM," 34.

HEADING, 23, 36, 40, 304.

"HEGEMAN'S FERRATED ELIXIR OF BARK," 51.

"HEMY'S PIANOFORTE TUTOR," 264.

"HERO" jars, 151.

"HIGHLY CONCENTRATED COMPOUND FLUID EXTRACT OF BUCHU," 59.

"HOLBROOK'S SCHOOL APPARATUS," 44, 50.

"HOLLOWAY'S PILLS AND OINTMENT," 27, 31.

"HOLMES, BOOTH, AND ATWOOD M'F'G. CO., THE," 230.

"HOMEWASHER, THE," 51.

"HOOD & CO.'S SOLUBLE SHEEP-DIP," 34.

HOPS, 474.

"HOSTETTER'S CELEBRATED STOMACH BITTERS," 34.

"HOSTETTER AND SMITH," 125.

HOTEL, exclusive right in name of, protected, 242.

HOUSE, no exclusive right in name of private, 242.

"HOWE" sewing machines, 32.

"HOWQUA'S MIXTURE," 51, 191.

HUMOURIST, name of, 244.

"IXL. GENERAL MERCHANDISE AUCTION STORE, THE," 241.

IDENTICAL, or nearly identical marks not to be registered, 310, 311, 350.

IGNORANCE of plaintiff's rights no defence, 201.

ILLEGAL trade marks not to be registered, 325.

IMMEDIATE purchaser not deceived, no defence, 7, 12, 106, 201.

IMMORAL trade marks not to be registered, 325.

"IMPERIAL" soap, 58, 123.

IMPERTINENT charges disallowed, 159.

IMPORTER of goods, trade mark may indicate, 4.

IMPROVER of goods, trade mark may indicate, 4.

"INDEPENDENT NATIONAL SYSTEM OF PENMANSHIP, THE," 264.

"INDIA AND CHINA TEA CO., THE," 231.

"INDIA RUBBER COMB CO. OF NEW YORK, THE," 483.

INDIAN trade marks, registration of, 325.

INDIVIDUAL, trade name consisting of name of, 232.

INDORSEMENT on writ, form of, 417.

INDULGENCE to defendant who infringed innocently, 111, 159.
plaintiff having delayed, 189.

INFANCY is no defence, 204, 221.

INFANT, declaration by an, 331.

INFERIORITY in quality of spurious goods, not material to relief, 8, 116, 202.

INFRINGEMENT, 11, 105.
requisites for, 105.
fact of, 105.
in a single instance, 106.
fraudulent intention in, 106, 109, 151, 156, 159.
without deception of immediate purchaser, 106, 152.
without proof of actual deception, 110.
indulgence in cases of unintentional, 111, 159.
continuance of, after complaint, shows fraudulent intention, 112, 146, 154, 228, 263.
of registered trade mark, fraud immaterial in cases of, 115.
must be of mark as registered, 115.
essential particular, 116, 304.
of names as old marks, 116.
as new marks, 117.
of marks registered with or without colour, 117.
of numeral, 117.
of title of song, 266.
what constitutes, 118.
tests of, 12, 119, 157.
by actual deception, 119.
delay for purpose of obtaining evidence of, 119.
by probable deception, 120, 201.
without identity of marks, 121, 124.
where ordinary purchasers purchasing with ordinary caution may be deceived, 121.
by use of a mark calculated to give a deceptive name to the goods, 121.
of essential part, 123.
of part of mark only, 201.
of general appearance, 123.
with colourable differences, 123, 124.
by imitation of mode of packing, 126.
in consequence of a trap, 127.
must be in respect of same class of goods, 50, 127.
of disused mark, 103, 128.
by use of a registered mark, 128.
man's own name, 26.
crest, 38.
by improper use of genuine mark, 128.
by use of moulded bottles, 128.
by engraver, 129, 173.
by servant, 172.
by agent, 173.
by commission-merchant, 173.
remedies for, 12, 131.
criminally punishable, 12, 131.
not a forgery at Common Law, 131.
may be false pretences, 131.
is forgery under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862,...132.

INFRINGEMENT—*continued.*
civil remedy for, 143.
measure of damages recoverable for, 148.
entitles to nominal damages at least, 149.
though spurious mark affixed by a third party, 159.
risks incurred by, 180.
by others is no defence, 203.
no notice necessary before taking proceedings for, 220.

INITIALS, 38, 67.

INJUNCTION, 12, 158, 180.
plaintiff entitled to protection of, 219.
formerly ancillary to account, 171.
not so now, 172.
account incident to, 209.
though only one case of infringement, 106.
not granted, where trap laid, 127.
to restrain harmless misrepresentation, 9.
use of word not distinctive, 53.
granted in all cases of actual fraud, 49, 183.
though spurious mark affixed by a third party, 159.
to restrain imitation of mode of packing, 126.
name of hotel, 242.
title of song, 266.
trade libel, 250.
use of trade secret, 257.
untrue assertions of plaintiff's retirement, 238.
not to restrain use of name of private house, 242.
forms in which granted, 162.
interlocutory, 160.
form of notice of motion for, 417.
delay as a defence on motion for, 186.
enlarged, 164.

INJUNCTIONS and Orders, precedents of, 422.

INJURIOUS USE OF NAME, 247.

INJURY to the plaintiff, there must be, at Common Law, 147.

INNOCENT OFFENDER, indulgence to, 111, 159.
vendor of goods falsely marked, 148.
bailee of goods falsely marked, 174.
mortgagee of goods falsely marked, 175.

INOPERATIVE defences, 201.

INQUIRY as to damages given at plaintiff's risk, 213.

INSCRIPTIONS claimed as trade marks, 59.

INSPECTION, 158, 180, 204, 207, 208.
of register, 326, 351.

INSTRUCTIONS to persons applying for registration of trade marks, 373, and see *Addendum.*
to Manchester Committee of Experts, 368.

"INSURANCE" oil, 52.

INTENTION to defraud, formerly necessary at Common Law, 7, 106, 144, 145.
not necessary in Equity, 8, 148, 151, 156.
a particular person need not be alleged in proceedings under the Merchandise Marks Act, 135.

INTERDICT in Scotch law, 162.

INTERFERENCE, declaration of, 484.
with defendant's business caused by injunction, no defence, 204.

INTERLOCUTORY injunction, 160.

INTERNATIONAL arrangements, 17, 333.

"INTIMIDAD" cigars, 60.

INTRODUCTION, general, 1.

"INVIGORATOR" spring bed-bottoms, 52, 488.

"INVISIBLE" face powder, 50, 482.

IRELAND, reservation of remedies in, 337.
Hall marks in, 468.

"IRON-STONE" water-pipes, 50, 483.

"IRON TRADE CIRCULAR, THE," 264.

IRON WORKS, question of title between landlord and tenant of, 167.

"IRVING HOUSE, THE," 242.

ISLE OF MAN, 337.

ISSUE may be directed on proceeding for rectification of register, 87, 326.

"JAMES' HORSE-BLISTER," 50, 436.

"JOHN BULL AND BRITANNIA, THE," 264, 428.

"JOHNSON'S AMERICAN ANODYNE LINIMENT," 50, 59.

JUDICATURE ACTS, effect of, on trade libel, 249.
And see STATUTES.

"JULES JURGENSEN" watches, 32.

"JULIENNE" soup, 50.

"JUNIOR ARMY AND NAVY STORES, THE," 230.

JURISDICTION, elements necessary to found, 157.

JURY, questions for the, 145, 146.
infringement case is properly tried without a, 160.

"KATHAIRON," 51.

"KEYSTONE LINE" of steamships, 169, 243.

"KITCHEN CRYSTAL SOAP," 52.

"LL." whiskey, 68.

LABEL, 23, 37, 304.
deceptive, 253.
trade mark distinguished from, in the United States, 179.

LACHES. *See* DELAY.

"LACKAWANNA" coal, 50, 66.

"LACTOPEPTINE," 52, 57, 125.

"LAFERME" cigarettes, 16.

"LANCASTER" tickings, 56, 66, 482.

LANDLORD AND TENANT, 167, 170.

"LATE OF," or "LATE WITH," 238.

LAW OFFICER, definition of, 339.
Comptroller may take directions of, 330.

LAWS, conflict of, 16.

"LAWRENCE FEINER FAMILIEN FLANNEL," 50 62, 482.

"LAZENBY'S HARVEY'S SAUCE," 163.

LEARNED PROFESSIONS, goodwill of. *See* GOODWILL.

"LEATHER CLOTH COMPANIES' CASE," 191, and *passim*.

LEGAL AUTHOR'S NAME, 244.
personal representative, title of, to trade mark, 11, 96.
action not continued against, 165.
practice, goodwill of. *See* GOODWILL.
proceedings, form of certificate of registration for use in, 402.
request for certificate of registration for use in, 394.

"LEGISLATURE," definition of, 339.

"LEOPOLD" cloth, 52, 58.

"LEOPOLDSHALL KAINIT," 64, 113, 125.

"LESLIE'S ILLUSTRATED NEWS," 234.

LESSEES of brickworks, question between successive, 167.

LETTERS, opening, 235.
as trade marks, 66, 304.

LIBEL, trade, 248.

LICENCE, 184.
proprietor of trade mark may grant, 325.

"LICENSED VICTUALLERS' RELISH," 52, 58.

"LIEBIG'S EXTRACT OF MEAT," 50, 232, 251.

LIEN, wharfingers', 175.

LIMITS to Court's interposition, 9.
registration, 86, 309, 313.

"LINDSEY'S IMPROVED BLOOD-SEARCHER," 33.

LINEN, 474.

LINNELL'S PAINTINGS, 132.

"LINOLEUM," 50.

"LION" mark, 38, 52, 122, 483.

LITERARY PUBLICATION, title of, 260, 263.
value of, 261.
fraudulent intention need not be proved in cases of, 263.
deception must be probable in cases of, 265.
protected generally, 265.
incidents of, 266.
no copyright in, 266.
must be actual user of, 267.
protected, though work out of print, 267.

"LITTLE RED BOOK, THE," 265.

"LIVE AND LET LIVE DINING SALOON, THE," 241.

"LIVERPOOL" cloth, 52, 58.

"LOBENTHAL'S ESSENTIA ANTIPHTHISICA," 33, 52, 482.

LOCAL, goodwill formerly treated as always, 270.
not so now, 271.
connexion still of importance, 271.
and personal goodwill. *See* GOODWILL.

"LOCHGELLY" coal, 64.

"LOCH KATRINE" whiskey, 50.

"LODER'S VIOLIN SCHOOL," 264.

"LONDON" animal foods, 56, 66, 315, 482.
and County Banking Co., The," 230.
and Provincial Law Assurance Society, The," 229.
Assurance Company, The," 229.
Conveyance Company, The," 256, 431.
Journal, The," 264, 427.
Manure Co., The," 229.

"LONE JACK" tobacco, 32, 123.

LOSS of trade mark, 11, 99, 320.

LUNATIC, declaration by, 331.

"MACASSAR" oil, 50.

"McCARDEL HOUSE, THE," 242.

"McGOWAN BROS. PUMP AND MACHINE CO., THE," 230.

"McLANE'S PILLS," 31, 33.

MACHINE, configuration of, 72.

"MADAME ELISE," 233.

MAGAZINE, 261. And *see* LITERARY PUBLICATION.

"MAGNETIC BALM," 52.

"MAGNOLIA" whiskey, 52, 58.

"MAISON BOISSIER DE PARIS, 240.

"MAMMOTH WARDROBE, THE," 50, 241.

MAN, Isle of, 337.

MANCHESTER office for exhibition of cotton marks, 367, 372, 382.
committee of experts, appointment of, 368.
duties of, 368, 369.
instructions given to, 368.
action of, 369.
effect of decisions of, 369.
additions to lists of cotton marks formed by the, 369, 372.

MANUFACTURER OF GOODS, trade mark may serve to indicate, 4.
and printer of cotton goods, 167.
and exporter of cotton goods, 168.
and patentee, 199.

MARK, 23, 36, 304.
with a merely mechanical purpose, no trade mark, 3, 39.
representing the article, no trade mark, 39.
And *see* TRADE MARK, OLD MARKS, NEW MARKS.

"MARK TWAIN," 244.

MARKED GOODS, contract for purchase of, 178.

"MARKET ST. MILLS," 66, 482.

"MARSHALL'S CANADA PLATES," 179.
Celebrated Liniment," 51.

"MASON'S HOTEL," 242.

"MASONIC" cigars, 51.
emblems as trade marks, 37.

MASSACHUSETTS statute as to names of partners, 236.

MEASURE of damages, 148, 213.

MEASURES, weights and, 449, 451.

MEDALS, prize, would formerly not be registered as new marks, or parts of new marks, 305, 381.
not so now, see *Addendum*.
false statements as to, not restrained, 53, 172.
act, the exhibition, 452.

MEDICAL MAN'S NAME, 245.
practice, goodwill of. *See* GOODWILL.

"MEDICATED MEXICAN BALM," 43, 51, 191.
Prunes," 51, 482.

MEDICINE, goodwill of quack, 271.

MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT, 1862,...438.
offences punishable under, 133.
no allegation of intention to defraud a particular person necessary under, 146, 444.
when use of word "patent" allowed under, 200, 443.
discovery under, 207.
damages under, 214.
And *see* STATUTES.

"MERCHANT BANKING CO. OF LONDON, THE," 230.

METAL BUTTONS, 472.
goods, statement to be made on application for registration of trade mark for, 343, 378.

"MEXICAN BALM," 43, 51, 191.

"MIDLAND ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER CO., THE," 231.

MILITARY STORES, 476.

"MINTON BRICK AND TILE COMPANY, THE," 230, 233.

MISDEMEANOUR, forgery of trade marks is now a, 132.

MISREPRESENTATION disentitling plaintiff, 13, 55, 190, 191.
not disentitling plaintiff, 13, 193, 199.
in foreign language may disentitle, 193.
as to manufacturer, 193.
collateral, 193.
as to genuineness, 252.
intentional, as to fact, criminally punishable, 141.

MODE of packing, 126, 255.
trial without a jury, preferable, 160.

MOHUR, device of a, 308, 313.

"MOLINE" ploughs, 66.

MONOGRAM as trade mark, 39.

MONOPOLY not object of trade marks, 5.

"MORISON'S MEDICINES," 430.

MORTGAGE of goods spuriously marked, 159, 175.
goodwill of property subject to, 270.

"MORSE'S INDIAN ROOT PILLS," 51.

MOTION for injunction, 158.
delay as a defence on, 186.
to commit, 163.
delay in regard to, 189.
costs of, 217.
And *see* NOTICE OF MOTION.

MOTIVE of defendant immaterial, if he has acted so that deception is probable, 110.

MOULDED BOTTLES, infringement by use of, 128.

MOUTHPIECE of cigarettes, 72, 482.

NAME, trade mark consisting of, 23, 25, 304.
how it differs from others, 25.
may be used by person who bears it, though another person has used it first, 25.
but not with fraudulent intention, 26, 202, 233.
evidence of fraudulent intention in the use of, 233.
must now be in a distinctive form, 30, 304.
need not be that of the actual manufacturer, 30.
may pass with the business, 31, 90.
of fancy personages, 32.
used alone, 32.
in combination, 33, 165.
geographical, 63.
of patented article is no trade mark, 47.
of new article is no trade mark, 49.
son may not use father's changed, so as to deceive, 28.
fraud to purchase right to use small maker's, because it is the same as that of a maker of reputation, 32.
infringement by use of mark calculated to attract to the goods a deceptive, 122.
trade mark not lost by being habitually coupled with, 166, 203.

NAME—*continued.*
no defence for defendant to say that he uses his own, with the infringing mark, 202.
no exclusive right in, apart from business, 225.
of company, 229.
of individual used as trade name, 232.
assumed, used as trade name, 233.
man's own, used as trade name, 233.
of former firm or employer may be stated, 238.
of establishment, fraudulent use of, 240.
of private house, 242.
of hotel, 242.
of line of steamships, 243.
of collieries, 244.
of waggons, 244.
not used as trade name, 244.
right of property injured by use of another's, 244, 246.
of poet, 244.
of humourist, 244.
of legal author, 244.
of painter, 132, 179, 245.
of medical man, 245.
of editor, 247.
of patentee, 255.
contracts in respect of, 247.
so used as to injure, 247.
of secret manufacture, 258.
cannot be u.. ' in ignorance of the true recipe, 258.
transfer of registered mark into new, 328.
And *see* TRADE NAME.

"NATIONAL ADVOCATE, THE," 265.
arms or flags of Great Britain will not be registered as new marks, or parts of new marks, 305, 381, and see *Addendum.*
Police Gazette, The," 264.
System of Penmanship, The," 264.

NATURAL OBJECT, trade mark consisting of representation of, 37.
product, trade mark indicative of, 4.

NAVAL STORES, 476.

"NEW ERA, THE," 265.
Manny Harvester, The," 50.
marks, 304, 376.
what will not be registered as new marks, or parts of, 305, 381, and see *Addendum.*
may be registered for part of a class, 306.
York Cutlery Co., The," 483.
National Advocate, The," 265.

"NEWCASTLE DAILY CHRONICLE, THE," 265.

NEWSPAPER, TITLE OF. *See* LITERARY PUBLICATION.
registration of, under Copyright Acts, useless, 15, 267.
goodwill of, 271.

"NIGHT-BLOOMING CEREUS, EXTRACT OF," 50.

"NINETEENTH CENTURY, THE," 262.

NOMINAL DAMAGES where right infringed, 149, 212.
sufficient to carry costs, 214.

NON-INFRINGEMENT, 181.

NOTE ON REGISTER, limitation of registration by, 86, 313.

NOTICE need not be given to infringer before proceedings are taken, 220.
may be sent by post, 331, 344.
deceptive, 253.
of registration of trade marks, 349.
of order of Court, 351.
of opposition, form of, 388.
grounds of, 406.
to applicant to bring opposed application before Court, 401.
of motion for leave to register, 414.
leave to add to or alter a mark, 415.
rectification of the register, 415.
of order for rectification, 391.
of motion for injunction, 417.

NOTIFICATION OF REGISTRATION, 399.
request for copy of, 395.

"NOURISHING," the word, no trade mark, 53.

NUMERICAL FIGURES as trade marks, 66, 70, 304, 482.
infringement of, 117.
registration of a series of marks differing only in statements of, 306.

"OAKES' CANDIES," 31.

OBSOLETE BOOK, title of, protected, 267.

OFFER of submission by defendant, 219.

OFFICE in Manchester, 367, 372, 382.

OFFICERS to be appointed by Board of Trade, 325.

OFFICIAL PAPER, 346.
means of advertising trade mark to be supplied to, 346.
stamp can never become a private trade mark, 72, 76.
publications, sale of, 375, and see *Addendum*.

"OLD BOURBON" whiskey, 50.
London Dock Gin," 50.
marks, 66.
become descriptive, 100.
become common if used by more firms than three, 46, 101, 304, 312, 317.
what user necessary to constitute, 305.
must have been used as trade marks, 67, 82, 305.
within the United Kingdom, 67, 82, 305.
mode of applying for registration of, 82, 342.
must be registered as a whole, 305.
in the exact form in which used, 305.
may be registered for part of a class, 306.
sometimes admitted to registration when new marks would not be, 24, 312.
Moore's Pictorial Almanack," 262.
Real John Bull, The," 264.

"OLDFIELD LANE DOCTOR, THE," 233.

OMISSION to give notice at office of proceedings in opposition case, 348.

OMNIBUSES, imitation of line of, 255.

ONUS of proof is on person alleging a registered mark to be common, 316, 327.

OPEN OR COMMON MARKS, disclaimer of, 84, 316, 379.

OPENING LETTERS, 235.

"OPOPONAX" perfume, 51, 58.

OPPOSITION, notice of, 85, 308, 347.
form of, 388.
grounds of, 406.
mode of trial in cases of, 347.
costs of, 309.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL, prolonging time for registration, 319.
forms of injunctions and, 422.

ORDINARY PURCHASER, deception of, 12, 121.

"OREGON CENTRAL RAILWAY CO., THE," 230.

"ORIENTAL CREAM, GOURAUD'S," 33, 52.

"ORIGINAL, THE," 49, 252.
Lazenby's Harvey's Sauce, The," 163.

"OSBORNE HOUSE," 240.

"OTTOMAN CAHVEY CO., THE," 231.

"OUR YOUNG FOLKS," 265.

PACKING, similarity of, 126, 255.

"PAIN KILLER," 33, 51, 58, 123.

PAINTER'S NAME, 132, 179, 245.

PAINTINGS, 473.

"PAINTS," trade mark registered for, 480.

"PARABOLA" eye needles, 51, 59.

"PARAFFIN OIL," 42, 50, 57.

"PARSONS' PURGATIVE PILLS," 50.

PART OF A CLASS, marks may be registered for, 306.

PARTIAL registration, 86, 313.

PARTICULARS directed, 208.

PARTNERSHIP, devolution of trade marks on formation of, 94.
dissolution of, 94.
abandonment of trade marks on dissolution of, 102, 188.
trade mark of, appropriated by one partner, 171.
fraudulent, not permitted, 235.
devolution of title of publication on dissolution of, 266.
of goodwill on dissolution of, 236, 274.
goodwill of, not to be appropriated contrary to articles, 235.
is partnership assets, 290.
And see GOODWILL.
retiring member of, may state his former connexion, 298.

PATENT, trade mark distinguished from, 13.
untrue allegation of, in trade mark, disentitles plaintiff, 13, 195.
though not likely to deceive, 199.
after expiration of patent, 197.
so as not to deceive, 198.
collaterally, 199.
punishable by fine, 200, 335.
the word, would formerly not be registered as a new mark, or part of a new mark, 199, 305, 380.
not so now, see *Addendum*.
allegation of, under Merchandise Marks Act, 1862,...136, 200.
Office to be provided, 324.
to have seal, 325.
days for leaving documents at, 331.
Library, deposit of trade marks at, 308.

PATENTS ACT, 1883, registration of trade marks under, 302.
commissioners of, functions of, transferred to Board of Trade, 151.
instructions given by, to Manchester Committee of Experts, 368.

"PATENTED," the word, would formerly not be registered as a new mark, or part of a new mark, 305, 380.
not so now, see *Addendum*.
wrongful use of, punishable in the United States, 200.
articles, name of, is descriptive, 47.

"PATENTEE, MANUFACTURER AND," 199.
name of, may not be fraudulently used, 199.

PATTERN-MARKS may be trade marks, 54.

"PAYSON, DUNTON, AND SCRIBNER'S NATIONAL SYSTEM OF PENMANSHIP," 264.

"PECTORINE," 52, 57.

"PENNY BELL'S LIFE, THE," 263.

"PEPPER'S SIGNAL OIL," 31, 33.

PERIODICAL, title of, 260. *See* LITERARY PUBLICATION.

"PERRY DAVIS' VEGETABLE PAIN-KILLER," 33.

"PERSIAN THREAD, TAYLOR'S," 31, 33, 51, 63.

"PERSON," definition of, 339.
aggrieved," 327.
foreigner may be, 17, 327.

PERSONAL TRADE MARK, 89, 90.
goodwill, 272. *And see* GOODWILL.

"PESSENDEDE" watches, 60.

"PFEIFFER'S EGG MACARONI," 166.

"PHARAOH'S SERPENTS," 58.

PHOTOGRAPHS, 473.
of Baron Liebig, 38, 232.

"PICTORIAL ALMANACK, THE," 262.

PLACES, registration of a series of marks differing only in statements of names of, 306.

PLAINTIFF must be injured at common law, 147.
not the registered proprietor, 183.
misrepresentation by, 190.

PLATE, 460.

PLAYING CARDS, 473.

"PLUMBAGO CRUCIBLES, PATENT," 195.

"PLUMBER AND DECORATOR AND JOURNAL OF GAS AND SANITARY ENGINEERING, THE," 265.

PLURALITY of marks or names used by plaintiff is no defence, 203.

POET'S NAME, 244.

"POLICE GAZETTE, THE," 264.

"POND LILY WASH," 58.

"POROUS PLASTERS," 47, 50.

PORTRAIT as a trade mark, 38, 232.

POST, applications and notices may be sent by, 331, 344.
Office Directory, The," 265.
offices where stamped forms obtainable, 373.

PRECEDENTS of injunctions, &c.
label on blacking bottles, trade cards, injunction, 422.
brand on casks of wine, injunction, 422.

PRECEDENTS—*continued.*
labels on bottles of ink, injunction, 422.
"Two Elephant" yarn, injunction, 423.
"Dog's Head" beer for exportation, injunction to the hearing, costs, 423.
stamps on shirtings, injunction, 423.
"Glenfield" starch, injunction, 424.
"Eureka" shirts, injunction, 424.
"Apollinaris" water, injunction, 424.
"La Intimidad" cigars, injunction, 425.
"Anchor brand" wire, prayer of bill, injunction, account, delivery up, 425.
engraving blocks for printing forged labels, injunction, 426.
printing forged labels, injunction, 427.
name of newspaper, injunction, 427, 428.
injuring plaintiff's paper, injunction, 427.
soliciting customers, injunction, 428.
publication of magazine as a continuation of plaintiff's magazine, injunction, 428.
in breach of contract, order, injunction, 428.
etchings improperly obtained and published, catalogues improperly published, decree, delivery up, injunction, 429.
name and title page of song, injunction, 429.
name of patent medicine, secret recipe, injunction, 430.
hop essence, secret recipe, trade name, representation of succession in business, manufacturing contrary to agreement, injunction, 430.
fraudulently using another's testimonials, injunction, 431.
imitating a rival line of omnibuses, injunction, 431.
trade name, injunction, 431.
name of company, registration, user, advertisements, &c., injunction, 432.
injunction against user within a certain locality, 432.
name of mineral springs, injunction, 433.
name of collieries, injunction until certain events, 433.
false representation of continuation of business, injunction, 433.
soliciting former customers, injunction, 434.
false representation of continuation of business, trade name, labels, advertisements, circulars, injunction, 434.
soliciting former customers, after sale of business, injunction, 435.
false representation of agency, injunction, 435.
fraudulent disuse of Christian name, claim to be the "only genuine," injunction, 436.
trade libel, representation that the plaintiff's goods are spurious, injunction, 436.
unauthorized and injurious use of a person's name, injunction, 437.
And *see* FORMS.

PREDECESSOR'S NAME, use of, 193.

"PRESCOTT HOUSE," 243.

"PRESCRIBED," definition of, 339.

PRICE OF ARTICLE, no trade mark, 72.
registration of a series of marks differing only in statements of, 306.

"PRIDE" cigars, 50, 125.

"PRIME LEAF" lard, 50.

PRINCIPAL and agent, question of title between, 168.

PRINCIPLE of construction, name indicative of, no trade mark, 44, 47.
of *Millington* v. *Fox* explained by V.-C. Wood, 154.
by Lord Westbury, 155.
on which discovery is given, 204.

PRINCIPLES of equity in trade mark cases, 151.

PRINTER of cotton cloths, trade mark indicative of, 4, 167.

PRINTS and engravings, 471.

PRIVATE HOUSE, no exclusive right in name of, 242.

PRIZE MEDALS would formerly not be registered as new marks, or parts of new marks, 305, 381.
not so now, see *Addendum*.
false statements as to, not restrained, 53, 172.

PROCESS OF MANUFACTURE, name descriptive of, no trade mark, 44, 47.

PROFESSION, goodwill of, 272. *And see* GOODWILL.

"PROFESSOR," assumption of title of, disregarded, 192.

PROPERTY in trade mark formerly denied, 152.
now settled, 1, 80, 115, 153, 157.
when registered, 157, 170, 318.
how acquired, 78, 79.
in name, 246.
in title of publication, 266.

"PROPHETIC BELL, THE," 265.

PROPRIETOR'S name and address need not be stated in mark, 21.

PUBLIC, value of trade marks to the, 5.
house, goodwill of, 271.
licenses of, 271.
stores, 476.
use, registration equivalent to, 7, 21, 75, 99, 317.

PUBLICATIONS, title of, 260. And *see* LITERARY PUBLICATION.
sale of official, 375, and see *Addendum*.

PUBLICI JURIS, no exclusive right in mark which has become, 11, 44, 100.

PUFFING, 192, 203.

"PUNCH," 265.

"PUNCH AND JUDY," 265.

PURCHASER of goodwill, rights of, 288.

"PYRAMID" mark, 38.

"PYRETIC SALINE," 51, 57.

QUACK MEDICINE, goodwill of, 271.

QUALITY, equality in, no defence, 8, 202.
no defence that goods are plaintiff's of a different, 202.
registration of a series of marks differing only in statements of, 306.
mere statement of, is no trade mark, 3, 21, 53.
marks which indicate the maker as well as the, may be trade marks, 3, 53.
trade marks are a sign of, 5.
mark denoting, in one trade, may be distinctive in a different trade, 55.
question as to criminal misrepresentation of, 137.

QUEEN, representations of the, will not be registered as new marks, or parts of new marks, 305, 381.

QUESTION *as to foundation of equitable jurisdiction*, 103.

QUESTIONS for jury, 146.
of contract in respect of trade marks, 176.
names, 247.
trade secrets, 257.
of title, 167.

"RADSTOCK COLLIERIES, THE," 64, 163, 230, 244.

"RADWAY'S READY RELIEF," 34.

"RAGSDALE AMMONIATED DISSOLVED BONE," 33.

"RALEIGH" tobacco, 64, 488.

"RAMSAY" bricks, 31, 32.

"RAZOR-STEEL," 50, 59, 482.

"REAL JOHN BULL, THE," 264.

RECIPE, secret, 169, 252.

RECTIFICATION of register, 326, 351.
by registration, 327.
by removal, 327.
costs of application for, 223, 328.
by varying, 328.
by transferring mark into new name, 328.
by cancellation at request of proprietor, 329.
notice of order for, to be given to comptroller, 326.
entry of, in register, 351.
publication of, 351.
form of notice of motion for, 415.
order for, 391.

"RED AND WHITE BOOK, THE," 265.
Paste," "Red Drench," 51.
White and Blue" tea, 307.

REFERENCE of appeal to the Court, 302.

REFUSAL to register, certificate of, given to unsuccessful claimant of old mark, 9, 24, 79, 84, 318.
form of, 405.
request for, 390.
illegal or immoral trade mark, 325.

REGISTER of trade marks established, 320.
continuation of former, 338.
trust not to be entered in, 325.
inspection of, and extracts from, 326, 351.
sealed copies of, to be evidence, 326.
rectification of, 326.
falsification of entries in, 330.

"REGISTERED," the word, will not be registered, 305, 380.
design," the words, will not be registered, 305, 380.
proprietors alone recognised, 183, 318.
trade mark, assignment and transmission of, 310.
cancellation of, 104, 329.
alteration of, 87, 329.
property in, 157, 170.
transfer of, into new name, 328.
infringement of, must be of mark as registered, 115.
by use of, restrained, 128.
designs, *marks on*, 453.

REGISTRATION of trade marks, 79, 302, 348.
register for, 320.
acquisition by, 79.
steps necessary to obtain, 82.
application for, 79, 302, 342.
when old marks, 82, 342.
form of, 385.
receipt of, 399.
advertisement, 308, 345, 400.
limit of time for proceeding with, 303.
conditions of, 304.
must be for particular goods or classes of goods, 10, 79, 306.
for part of a class of goods, 306, 311.
representative, 84, 306, 312.
in a series, 84, 306, 312, 344, 346, 379.
in colour, 84, 307.
by deposit, 84, 307, 343, 370.
in an alternative shape, 84, 482.
of common marks as additions, 84, 315.
of ground work as part of a mark, 380.
for cotton goods, 83, 313, 367.
at Sheffield, 83, 321, 353.
from foreign countries, 333.
British possessions, 335.
fees for, 321, 355.
form of notification of, 399.
request for copy of notification of, 395.
certificate of, for use abroad, 403.
request for certificate of, for use abroad, 393.
certificate of, for use in legal proceedings, 402.
request for certificate of, for use in legal proceedings, 394.
rules for, 341.
instructions to applicants for, 385, and see *Addendum*.
time of, 348.
date of, 349.
notice of, 349.
restrictions on, 86, 380, and see *Addendum*.
opposition to, 308, 347.
by whom made, 309.
costs in cases of, 222.
conflicting claims to, 87, 310.
mode of trial of, 311, 347.
forbidden, where identical or similar marks already registered, 81, 311.
for five years after removal of similar marks from register, 81, 320.
old marks favoured in the, 312.
the "three mark rule" for the, 46, 101, 312, 317.
with a note of limitation, 309, 313, 349.
mode of comparison in the, 313.
may be refused to a mark which has not been restrained, 22.
refusal of, in America, to geographical names, 66, 482.
to words disentitled to protection, 66, 482.

REGISTRATION—*continued.*
refusal of, to deceptive words or scandalous designs, 314.
cases of, 314.
in America, 314, 481.
cases of non-refusal of, 314.
words which will not be admitted to, 305, 380, 381, and see *Addendum.*
appeal to Board of Trade from Comptroller's refusal of, 85, 302.
certificate of refusal of, 9, 24, 79, 84, 183, 318.
form of, 405.
request for, 390.
effect of, 44, 317.
renders fraudulent intention unnecessary, 115, 317.
equivalent to public use, 7, 21, 75, 99, 184, 317.
is evidence of proprietor's right, 79, 115, 318.
qualifies for suing, 79, 318.
which are descriptive, effect of, 45.
protects in all colours, 79.
which are invalid, does not make them valid after five years, 182.
of defendant's mark is no defence, 15, 204.
duration of, 98, 320.
cancelled after fourteen years, unless fee paid, 320.
of subsequent proprietor by assignment or transmission, 93, 310, 325, 349, 383.
in name of successor to goodwill, 348.
form of application for, by subsequent proprietor, 389.
of joint owners as separate owners, 97, 311.
Acts administered by Chancery Division, 150.
wrongful assertion of, punishable by fine, 130, 141, 336.
in the United States, 478. *And see* UNITED STATES.
rules for the, 491.
of name of company under the Companies Act, 1862,...231.
of title of publication under the Copyright Acts, useless, 15, 267.

REGULATION of customs, 454.

REMEDIES for infringement, 12, 131.

REMOVAL of mark from register, 98, 320, 326.
effect of, 81, 103, 320.
costs of application for, 223.

REPEAL of Acts, 338.
rules, 354.

REPLY, form of, 421.

REPORT, Comptroller to make an annual, 333.

REPRESENTATIONS, general law as to false, 145.
of trade mark on application for registration, 82, 302, 343, 378.
with respect to partnership goodwill, 235.

REPRESENTATIVE registration, 84, 306, 312.

RESTORATION to register of mark removed from it, 98, 320.

RESTRICTIONS on registration of trade marks, 86, 380.

RESTRICTIVE covenant on sale of goodwill. *See* GOODWILL.

RETIREMENT, false representations as to, 238.

RETIRING PARTNER may state his former connexion, 298.

"RICHARDSON'S PATENT UNION LEATHER-SPLITTING MACHINE," 50, 482.

"RISING SUN" stove polish, 52, 125.

"ROBERTS' PARABOLA GOLD-BURNISHED SHARPS," 59.

"ROBERTS' RAZOR-STEEL SCISSORS," 59.

"RODGERS AND SONS'" cutlery, 33, 125.

"ROGER WILLIAMS" longcloth, 32.

ROLT'S ACT. *See* STATUTES.

ROYAL arms, the, will not be registered, 305, 380.
wrongful assumption of, punishable by fine, 336.
baking powder," 58, 125, 305.
crown, representations of the, will not be registered as new marks, or parts of new marks, 305, 381.
family, representations of any member of the, will not be registered as new marks, or parts of new marks, 305, 381.
letters patent," 199.
Station Hotel, the," 242.

"RUBBER CLOTHING CO., THE," 483.

RULES under Trade Marks Acts, repeal of the, 354.
Patents Act, 1883,...341.
power to make, given to Board of Trade, 332.
United States Registration Act, 491.

RUPEE, device of a, 308, 313.

"RYE AND ROCK" liquor, 51.

"SAFETY" powder, 50, 482.

"ST. JAMES'" cigarettes, 64, 66.
Evening Post," 96.

SALE of goodwill, 278. *And see* GOODWILL.
trade mark, 10, 87, 92, 310, 325.

SAMPLER pattern, 72, 482.

"SAPOLIO" soap, 57.

"SATIN-POLISH" boots and shoes, 51, 482.

SCALE of costs in case of defendant's submission, 217.

SCANDALOUS CHARGES disallowed, 159.
designs not registrable as trade marks, 314.

SCHEDULES to rules, 355.

"SCHIEDAM SCHNAPPS," 50, 57.

SCOTLAND, law of trade marks in, 7, 157, 162.
courts in, 336.
hall marks in, 466.

"SCOTT AND CO.," 286.

SCULPTURES, marks on, 471.

SEAL for Patent Office, 325.

SEALED copies of register to be evidence, 326.

SECRET RECIPE, 169, 252. *And see* TRADE SECRET.

SECURITY for costs required on opposition to registration, 309.

"SEFTON" cloth, 58.

"SEIXO" wine, 65, 125, 422.

"SELECTED" steel pens, 316.

SELECTOR, trade mark indicative of, 4, 130

SENTENCES claimed as trade marks, 59.

SERIES of marks, registration of, 84, 306, 344, 346, 379.
can only be assigned and transmitted as a whole, 96, 306.
advertisement of, 346, 380.

SERVANT, infringement by, 172.

SEVERAL PROPRIETORS of the same mark, 97, 170.

SEWING MACHINE cases, the, 48.

"SHAVER" waggons, 244.

SHEFFIELD marks, registration of, 83, 321, 353, 381.
Acts regulating. *See* CUTLERS' CO.'S ACTS.

SHERIFF cannot seize goodwill or title of publication, 266, 276.

SHIPPER and ship owner, 169.

SHORT WEIGHT, 195.

"SHREWSBURY, MARSHALL AND CO., PATENT THREAD," 125.

SIGNATURE, trade mark consisting of, 23, 34, 304.
is transmissible, 35.
in trade mark may not be altered, 304, 330.
of painter, imitation of, not forgery at Common Law, 132.
punishable under 25 & 26 Vict. c. 68, 132, 473.

SIGN BOARD, 241.

"SILICON" polishing powder, 51.

"SILVER GROVE" whiskey, 52.
plate, 460. *And see* HALL MARKS.

SIMILARITY of packing, 126, 255.

"SINGER" sewing machines, 48, 166.

SINGLE LETTERS, 69.

"SLATE ROOFING PAINT," 52, 58.

SLIGHT DELAY, 204.

"SMITH, SNYDER & CO'S." goods, 31

SOLICITATION of old customers by voluntary vendor of goodwill, not allowable, 281.
by involuntary vendor of goodwill, allowable, 282.

SOLICITOR'S practice, goodwill of, 273. *And see* GOODWILL.

SOVEREIGN princes or states may own trade marks, 76.

SPECIAL CASE, conflicting claims to registration tried by, 87, 311.
mode of settling, 350.
form of, 413.
application for settlement of, by Comptroller, 394.
damage, damages may be given without proof of, 212.

"SPECIFIC SOLUTION OF COPAIBA, FRANKS'," 254, 431.

"SPLENDID MISERY," 265.

"SPORTING CHRONICLE AND PROPHETIC BELL, THE," 265.
Life, The," 263.

STAMPED FORMS, list of, 375.
places where obtainable, 373.

"STANDARD A" cigars, 51, 482.

"STAR" oil, 122, 314.
pencils, 51, 58.
shirts, 483.

"STARK" mills, 125.

STATEMENT OF CLAIM, forms of, 418, 419, 420.

"STATION HOTEL, THE," 242.

"STATIONERS' HALL," the words "Entered at ——," will not be registered 305, 380.
registration at, is useless, 267.
is no defence, 15, 204.

STATUTES CITED:
28 Edw. I. c. 20 (Hall marks), 460.
2 Hen. VI. c. 17 (Hall marks), 460.
4 Hen. VII. c. 2 (Hall marks), 460.
18 Eliz. c. 15 (Hall marks), 460.
31 Eliz. c. 5 (Informations), 464.
21 Jac. I. c. 31 (Cutlers' Co.), 456.
8 & 9 Will. III. c. 8 (Hall marks), 460.
9 & 10 Will. III. c. 41 (Public Stores), 476, 477.
12 & 13 Will. III. c. 4 (Hall marks), 460, 465.
1 Anne, c. 3 (Hall marks), 461.
6 Geo. I. c. 11 (Hall marks), 460, 461, 468.

STATUTES CITED—*continued.*
9 Geo. I. c. 8 (Public Stores), 476.
13 Geo. I. c. 26 (Linen), 475.
3 Geo. II. c. 3 (Irish), (Hall marks), 468.
8 Geo. II. c. 13 (Prints and Engravings), 471.
12 Geo. II. c. 26 (Hall marks), 460, 461.
17 Geo. II. c. 30 (Linen), 475.
17 Geo. II. c. 40 (Public Stores), 476.
18 Geo. II. c. 24 (Linen), 475.
5 Geo. III. c. 51 (Woollen Cloths), 474.
6 Geo. III. c. 23 (Woollen Cloths), 475.
7 Geo. III. c. 38 (Prints and Engravings), 471.
13 Geo. III. c. 52 (Hall marks), 462, 463.
13 Geo. III. c. 59 (Hall marks), 466.
14 Geo. III. c. 68 (Hops), 474.
17 Geo. III. c. 57 (Prints and Engravings), 471.
23 & 24 Geo. III. c. 23 (Irish), (Hall marks), 468, 470.
24 Geo. III. sess. 2, c. 20 (Hall marks), 462, 463.
24 Geo. III. sess. 2, c. 53 (Hall marks), 463, 468.
25 Geo. III. c. 64 (Hall marks), 463.
30 Geo. III. c. 31 (Hall marks), 461, 463.
31 Geo. III. c. 58 (Cutlers' Co.), 456, 457.
36 Geo. III. c. 60 (Metal Buttons), 472.
38 Geo. III. c. 69 (Hall marks), 462, 463, 466.
38 Geo. III. c. 71 (Sculpture Copyright), 471.
39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 81 (Hops), 474.
39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 89 (Public Stores), 476.
41 Geo. III. c. 97 (local), (Cutlers' Co.), 457.
47 Geo. III. sess. 2, c. 15 (Hall marks), 470.
48 Geo. III. c. 134 (Hops), 474.
53 Geo. III. c. 115 (Gun-barrels), 472.
54 Geo. III. c. 56 (Sculpture Copyright), 471.
54 Geo. III. c. 60 (Public Stores), 476.
54 Geo. III. c. 119 (local), (Cutlers' Co.), 457.
54 Geo. III. c. 123 (Hops), 474.
54 Geo. III. c. 159 (Public Stores), 476.
55 Geo. III. c. 59 (Gun-barrels), 472.
55 Geo. III. c. 127 (Public Stores), 476.
55 Geo. III. c. 185 (Hall marks), 463.
59 Geo. III. c. 7 (Cutlery), 449, 456.
4 Geo. IV. c. 40 (Linen), 479.
5 Geo. IV. c. 52 (local), (Hall marks), 462, 463.
6 Geo. IV. c. 105 (Customs), 475.
3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 42 (Limitations), 464.
5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 27 (Linen), 476.
5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 62 (Declarations), 389, 392.
5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 83 (Patents), 200, 335.
6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 59 (Prints and Engravings), 471.
6 & 7 Will. IV. c. 69 (Hall marks), 466.
5 & 6 Vict. c. 47 (Customs), 466, 468, 470.
5 & 6 Vict. c. 56 (Customs), 466, 468, 470.
7 & 8 Vict. c. 12 (International Copyright), 471.
7 & 8 Vict. c. 22 (Hall marks), 462, 463, 464, 466.

STATUTES CITED—*continued.*
8 & 9 Vict. c. 84 (Customs), 466.
13 & 14 Vict. c. 104 (Designs), 471.
16 & 17 Vict. c. 107 (Customs), 454, 455, 472, 473.
17 & 18 Vict. c. 96 (Hall marks), 464, 468, 470.
18 & 19 Vict. c. 60 (Hall marks), 466, 468, 470.
18 & 19 Vict. c. 148 (local) (Gun-barrels), 472.
19 & 20 Vict. c. 64 (Statute Law Revision), 460.
23 Vict. c. 43 (local) (Cutlers' Co.), 458.
24 & 25 Vict. c. 101 (Statute Law Revision), 463.
25 & 26 Vict. c. 22 (Customs), 473.
25 & 26 Vict. c. 27 (Rolt's Act), 150, 154, 161, 174, 196.
25 & 26 Vict. c. 64 (Naval Stores), 476.
25 & 26 Vict. c. 68 (Art Copyright), 473.
25 & 26 Vict. c. 76 (Weights and Measures [Ireland]), 451.
25 & 26 *Vict. c.* 88 (*Merchandise Marks*), 438, and *passim.*
25 & 26 Vict. c. 89 (Companies), 231.
26 & 27 Vict. c. 119 (Exhibition Medals), 172, 452.
26 & 27 Vict. c. 125 (Statute Law Revision), 463.
27 & 28 Vict. c. 27 (Chain Cables and Anchors), 473.
27 & 28 Vict. c. 91 (Naval Stores), 476.
29 & 30 Vict. c. 37 (Hops), 474.
30 & 31 Vict. c. 59 (Statute Law Revision), 460, 461.
30 & 31 Vict. c. 82 (Customs), 454, 466.
30 & 31 Vict. c. 119 (Naval Stores), 476.
30 & 31 Vict. c. 128 (Military Stores), 476.
32 & 33 Vict. c. 12 (Naval Stores), 476.
32 & 33 Vict. c. 71 (Bankruptcy), 11.
33 & 34 Vict. c. 99 (Statute Law Revision), 461, 463.
34 & 35 Vict. c. 101 (Chain Cables and Anchors), 473.
34 & 35 Vict. c. 116 (Statute Law Revision), 463, 466, 472.
35 & 36 Vict. c. 20 (Customs), 455.
35 & 36 Vict. c. 30 (Chain Cables and Anchors), 473.
36 & 37 Vict. c. 66 (Judicature), 7, 12, 151, 176, 249, 253.
36 & 37 Vict. c. 91 (Statute Law Revision), 463.
37 & 38 Vict. c. 51 (Chain Cables and Anchors), 473.
38 & 39 Vict. c. 25 (Public Stores), 72, 476.
38 & 39 Vict. c. 91 (Trade Marks Registration), *passim.*
39 & 40 Vict. c. 33 (Trade Marks Registration Amendment), *passim*
39 & 40 Vict. c. 35 (Customs), 466, 468, 470.
39 & 40 Vict. c. 36 (Customs), 454, 455, 472.
40 & 41 Vict. c. 37 (Trade Marks Registration Extension), *passim.*
41 & 42 Vict. c. 49 (Weights and Measures), 449, 451.
42 & 43 Vict. c. 21 (Customs), 454.
46 & 47 Vict. c. 52 (Bankruptcy), 11.
46 & 47 Vict. c. 55 (Revenue), 454, 455, 466.
46 & 47 *Vict.* c. 57 (*Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks*), 301, 453, *and* passim.
United States Act of 1870,...478.
1875,...485.
1881,...487.
repeal of, 338.

STATUTORY declaration, manner of making, 354.
by infant, lunatic, or other person under disability, 331.
by subsequent proprietor seeking registration, necessary, 93, 350.
form of, 389.
by proprietor seeking cancellation, necessary, 104, 329.
form of, 392.

STEAMSHIPS, name of line of, 243.

"STEPHENS' WRITING FLUID," 33, 125, 422.

"STILLMAN MILL," 66.

STORES, Public, 476.

"STRAIGHT CUT" cigarettes, 56, 315.

SUBDIVIDED ACCOUNT, 210.

SUBMISSION, offer of, damages in case of, 213.
scale of costs in case of, 217.
must be complete, 219.

SUBSEQUENT PROPRIETOR after the first, position of, 97.
registration of, 93, 349, 383.
form of request for, and declaration, 389.

SUMMONS for leave to register, form of, 413.
form of writ of, with indorsement, 416,
to stay proceedings, form of, 421.

"SUPERFINE" no trade mark, 53.

"SUPERIOR" no trade mark, 53.

SURVIVING PARTNER may state former connexion, 298.

"SWAN" goods, 314, 483.

"SWEET OPOPONAX OF MEXICO," 51, 58.

"SWING" scythe sockets, 51, 482.

"TAMAR INDIEN," 52, 60.

"TAPER-SLEEVE PULLEY WORKS, THE," 231

"TASTELESS" drugs, 50, 483.

"TAYLOR'S PERSIAN THREAD," 31, 33, 51.

"TEMPLE BAR," 208.

TENANT, landlord and, 167, 170.

TESTS of infringement, 119, 156.

TESTIMONIALS, fraudulent use of another's, 254.

"THOMSONIAN MEDICINES," 50.

"THORLEY'S FOOD FOR CATTLE," 31, 33, 231.

"THREE MARK RULE, THE," 46, 101, 312, 317.
foreign user does not bring a mark within, 17, 313.

TICKET, 23, 37, 304.

"TIDAL WAVE" tobacco, 52.

"TIME-KEEPER" watches, 51, 488.

TIME of registration of trade marks, 348.
enlargement of, 352.

"TIMES, THE," 264, 428.

TITLE to trade marks, 167.
of proprietor of a trade mark, 318.
of subsequent proprietor, 97.
of literary publication, 265.
incidents of, 266.
no copyright in, 266.
of song, 266.

"TIVOLI" lager beer, 52, 123.

"TO COUNTERFEIT THIS IS FORGERY," the words, will not be registered, 305, 380.

"TONGE'S GOODS," 125.

"TOUCHSTONE," 265.

"TOWER PALACE, THE," 241.

TRADE, goodwill of a, 276. *And see* GOODWILL.

TRADE LIBEL, 248.

TRADE MARK, general principles of law of, 1.
property in, formerly doubted, 152, 153.
now settled, 1, 80, 153, 157.
function of, 2.

TRADE MARK—*continued.*
carries a warranty, 3, 5.
may serve to indicate the manufacturer, or improver, or importer, or exporter, or selector, of goods, or the exclusive owner of a natural product, 4, 5, 130.
advantages of use of, 5.
gives no monopoly, 5.
early use of, 6.
sketch of history of law of, 6, 142.
cannot exist in gross, 10, 310.
necessarily connected with goodwill, 10, 268, 310.
distinguished from patent, 13.
copyright, 15.
what is a, 19, 304.
must be affixed to article, 19.
or registered, 21.
descriptive word is not, 21, 482.
need not state proprietor's name or address, 21.
must be distinctive, 22.
may be refused registration though not restrained, 22.
definition of, 23, 304, 376.
a name in a distinctive form, 25, 304.
a signature, 34, 304.
a distinctive device, mark, brand, heading, label, ticket, or fancy word or words not in common use, 35, 304.
representation of natural object, 37.
crest, 38.
initials, 38.
marks representing the article are not, 39.
with a merely mechanical purpose are not, 3, 39.
name of patented article is not, 47, 482.
new article is not, 49.
marks in common use merely indicating quality are not, 3, 53.
which indicate the maker as well as the quality, may be, 3, 53.
containing false representations cannot be protected as, 55.
words from the dead languages as, 59.
modern foreign languages as, 60.
geographical names as, 63, 482.
old marks, 67.
devices and words which will not be registered as, 305, 380.
as new, 305, 381.
Sheffield corporate, 321.
for cotton goods. *See* COTTON MARKS.
official stamps cannot be, 72, 76.
prices cannot be, 72.
may be consumed with the article, 73.
acquisition of, 9, 74, 78.
by alien, 15, 74.
by sovereign princes or states, 76.
by common repute, 77.
by registration, 79, 224, 302.
rules for registration of, 341.
instructions to applicants for registration of, 373, and see *Addendum.*

TRADE MARK—*continued.*
appropriation of, to special classes of goods, 10, 79, 306.
incapable of advertisement in the "Trade Marks Journal," 343, 345.
not used before the passing of the Registration Act, 1875,...376.
in a series, 84, 306, 344, 346, 379.
powers of registered owner of, 325.
two or more, may be used on same goods at same time, 165.
alteration of registered, 87, 329.
transfer of, by assignment or transmission, 10, 87, 268.
transmission of, on bankruptcy, 11, 93.
formation of a partnership, 94.
dissolution of a partnership, 94.
death of owner, 96.
may be bequeathed, together with goodwill, 96.
may belong to several proprietors, 97, 170.
used to indicate goods passed through the hands of several persons, 94.
questions of title to, 167.
discontinuance of, 97.
by removal from the register for non-payment of fees, 98.
by abandonment, 11, 46, 99.
habitual use with name is no, 101, 166.
infringement after, 103.
cancellation of, 104, 329.
infringement of, 11, 105.
tests of, 12, 119, 157.
criminal prosecution for, 131.
civil remedy for, 143.
measure of damages for, 148.
Acts for the registration of, administered by the Chancery Division, 150.
cases analogous to cases of, 224.
in the United States, registration of, 478.
rules for the, 491.
what is a lawful, 481.
distinguished from designs and labels, 479.
And see OLD MARKS, NEW MARKS, REGISTRATION, UNITED STATES, FORMS.

"TRADE MARKS JOURNAL," 346, 376.
Registration Acts, 1875—7...9, 23. *And see* STATUTES.
register to be at the Patent Office, 324.

TRADE NAME, 17, 225, 295.
part of goodwill of business, 225, 268, 277, 288.
no exclusive right in, apart from business, 225.
as meaning the name by which goods are identified, 225.
fraud need not be proved in cases of, 226.
innocent imitation of, may become fraudulent, if continued, 228.
of company, 229.
of individual, 232.

TRADE NAME—*continued.*
assumed, 233.
man's ow ame as, 233.
of old bus..ess may be used by purchaser of goodwill, 285.
does not survive, 295.
And see GOODWILL.

TRADE SECRET, 169, 257.
when, may be used, 257
contract not to use or divulge, 257.
name of article manufactured by means of, 258.
not to be used, without knowledge of, 258.
passes with owner's personal estate, 259.
settlement of, 259.
mode of dealing with, 259.
fraudulent, 260.

TRADE SIGN, 241.

TRANSFER, TRANSMISSION of trade mark, 10, 87, 310, 325.
of signature mark, 35.
on bankruptcy, 11, 93.
on formation of a partnership, 94.
on dissolution of a partnership, 94.
on death of owner, 96.
of a series of marks, 306.

TRANSMISSION OF FEE, form of, 387.
And see TRADE MARK.

TRANSMITTEE, registration of assignee or, 325.

TRAP, no injunction to restrain an infringement resulting from a, 127

"TREASURY," definition of, 339.

TREATY with the United States, 497.

TRIAL of action for infringement, without a jury, 160.
of opposed application, mode of, 347.

"TRIANGLE" beer, 38, 122, 314.

"TRUE BRITANNIA, THE," 264.

TRUST not to be entered on register, 87, 325.

"TUCKER SPRING-BED," 50.

"TURIN" cloth, 58.

"TWIN BROTHERS" yeast, 52.

"TWO ELEPHANT" yarn, 122.
or more marks used on same goods, 165.

ULTIMATE purchaser, deception of, sufficient to constitute infringement, 7, 12, 106, 152, 201.

"UNITED SERVICE" soap, 58.
States, registration of trade marks in, 478.
Act of 1870,...478.
declared invalid, 479.
Act of 1875,...485.
Act of 1881,...487.
rules for registration of trade marks in, 491.
trade marks of aliens protected in, 16, 75.
distinguished from labels and designs in, 479.
jurisdiction of circuit courts in cases of, 481.
what are lawful, in, 481.
descriptive, 482, 488.
or deceptive, 482.
geographical names as, 65, 482.
numerals as, 482.
vessels of peculiar shape, 482.
alternative, 84, 483.
names as, 483.
deceptive, 483.
interferences in cases of, 484.
wrongly registered, no means of removing from register, 485.
treaty between Great Britain and the, 497.

"UNIVERSAL LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, THE," 230.

UNLAWFUL POSSESSION of public stores, 476.

UNNECESSARY LITIGATION, costs of, 146.

USER, length of, formerly required for acquisition of trade mark, 76.
latterly considered unnecessary, 77.
only gives a right in respect of the goods on which the mark has been used, 81, 305.
limits of rights acquired by, 81.
registration of trade mark equivalent to, 7, 21, 75, 99, 317.
of genuine trade mark wrongfully, 128, 141.
of predecessor's name, 193.
of word "patent," 195.
necessary to constitute an old mark, 305.
abroad, not equivalent to British user, 17, 305.
comparison of marks in manner of actual, 313.
of name with trade mark, not abandonment of mark, 101.
by others, no defence, unless mark is common, 203.
of title of publication, necessary for its protection, 267.

VALUATION of goodwill, 299.

"VALVOLINE" oil, 49, 50, 123, 318.

"VANITY FAIR" cigarettes, 58, 164.

VENDIBLE ARTICLE, the mark must be on a, 9, 78, 98.

VENDOR of business and goodwill may recommence business, 236, 270.
but must not interfere unfairly with purchaser, 281.
restrained, though no express covenant, 283.
of goods falsely marked, innocent, 148.

"VICTORIA" lozenges, 50, 166.

"VIENNA" bread, 64, 123.

"VIOLIN SCHOOL, LODER'S," 264.

"VULCAN PARAFFIN MATCHES," 125.

WAGGONS, name of, 244.

"WAMSUTTA" goods, 125.

WAREHOUSEMEN in charge of goods falsely marked, 176.

WARRANTY given by trade mark, 3, 5.
of painting by painter's name, 179.
under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1862,...180.

WATCHES, clocks and, 454, 472.

"WEDGWOOD" pottery, 32.

WEIGHT, false pretences as to, 141.
relief refused to persons who sell short, 195.

WEIGHTS and measures, 449, 451.

"WESTERN OR MASON'S HOTEL, THE," 242.

"WESTON'S WIZARD OIL," 33, 58.

WHARFINGERS, lien of, 175.
costs of, 215.

WHAT is a trade mark? 19.
first class, a name, 25,
second class, a signature, 34.
third class, a distinctive device, mark, braud, heading, label, ticket or fancy word or words not in common use, 35.
fourth class, old marks, 66.

"WHAT CHEER HOUSE, THE," 242.

"WHEELER AND WILSON'S SEWING MACHINES, 48, 435.

"WHITE CHEMICAL EXTRACT," 51.

"WILDER AND CO.'S STOMACH BITTERS," 33.

"WILKIE" ploughs, 32.

"WILLIAM ASH" metal goods, 31.

"WINSLOW'S SOOTHING SYRUP," 33.

"WISTAR'S BALSAM OF WILD CHERRY," 51.

"WOLFE'S AROMATIC SCHIEDAM SCHNAPPS," 33.

"WONDERFUL MAGAZINE, THE," 261, 428.

"WOODS' HOTEL," 242.

WOOLLEN CLOTHS, 474.

"WORCESTERSHIRE SAUCE," 11, 44, 64, 66.

WORDS, in common use or descriptive, no trade mark, 3, 41, 47, 49, 53.
not necessary to constitute false representation, 141.
which will not be registered, 305, 380, 381, and see *Addendum*.
in other than Roman characters to be translated on application, 82, 378.
And see TRADE MARK.

"WOTHERSPOON'S VICTORIA LOZENGES," 166.

WRIT of summons with indorsement, form of, 416.

WRONGFUL USER of genuine trade marks, 128, 141.

"YANKEE SOAP," 51, 58.

"YORKSHIRE RELISH," 64.

THE END.

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