Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
McINTIRE, Director of Tobacco Products
Division, of Tax Commission,
v.
BOROFSKY.
No. 3737.
June 1, 1948.
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1948.
Headnotes
**472 *175
Ernest R. D'Amours, Atty. Gen., and Gordon M. Tiffany, Asst. Atty. Gen., for
plaintiff.
Thomas L. Marble and Morse
& Grant (Geo. R. Grant Jr., orally), all of Concord for defendant.
KENISON, Justice.
This case presents the
constitutionality of the Unfair Sales Act (R. L., c. 204) as applied to the
agreed statement of facts quoted above.
In preliminary summary the act makes it a misdemeanor for any retailer
or wholesaler, 'with intent, or effect, of
injuring competitors or destroying competition,' to advertise or sell
merchandise at less than cost as defined in the Act, § 2. The advertisement or sale at less than
such cost 'shall be prima facie evidence **473 of a violation of this
chapter.' § 2. The statutory base for
determining '*176 cost to the retailer' is invoice cost or replacement
cost, whichever is lower, less trade discounts to which is added freight and
cartage charges and 'a mark-up to cover in part the cost of doing business,
which mark- up, in the absence of proof of a lesser cost, shall be six percent
of the total cost at the retail outlet' (§
1(I). Numerous exceptions are
made by the act (§ 3) so that it does
not apply under stated conditions to isolated transactions, clearance sales,
perishable merchandise, imperfect or damaged merchandise, final liquidation
sales, sales to relief agencies and for charities, sales to state or municipal
agencies, sales in good faith to meet legal competition or sales under court
order. The Act also provides that
violations may be enjoined by the Superior Court. § 4.
The legislative history of
the Act begins in 1939 when an unsucessful attempt was made to obtain an
advisory opinion as to its constitutionality.
Opinion of the Justices, 90 N.H. 567, 6 A.2d 763. At the next session the Act was enacted into
law (Laws 1941, c. 92) and was reenacted in the Revised Laws without
substantial change in its present form.
[1][2] It is
urged specifically that section 2 which prohibits the sale of merchandise below cost with the 'effect, of
injuring competitors or destroying competition' is unconstitutional because it
is unduly oppressive and contrary to accepted economic and social
standards. Loughran Co. v. Lord
Baltimore Candy & Tobacco Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A.2d 201. Similar phraseology is found in several of
the Unfair Sales Acts of the other states.
I Callmann, Unfair Competition & Trade Marks (1945) § 27, 2(a).
It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the Legislature may declare
an act criminal without requiring that it be done with intent. State v. Cornish, 66 N.H. 329, 21 A. 180, 11
L.R.A. 191; State v. Ryan, 70 N.H. 196, 46 A. 49, 85 Am.St.Rep. 629; State v.
Goonan, 89 N.H. 528, 3 A.2d 105; State v. Yosua, 91 N.H. 181, 16 A.2d 370. In case of doubt the statute has frequently
been construed to require intent (Coutremarsh v. Metcalf, 87 N.H. 127, 175 A.
173), but it is clear that the present statute by its express terms requires
either the intent or the effect of injuring or destroying competition. The Legislature deemed it necessary to do
more than condemn a state of mind and provided that sales below cost, except as
provided in § 3, are an economic evil
whether they are intended or have the effect of injuring competition. Such a statute is valid. McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W.
414; Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113 S.W.2d 733. Cf. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 324
U.S. 726, 65 S.Ct. 961, 89 L.Ed. 1320; State v. Tankar Gas, Inc., 250 Wis. 218,
26 N.W.2d 647.
[3][4][5][6] That part of section 2 providing that
advertisements or sales below cost are prima facie evidence of a violation of
the Act is also attacked. *177
Since no conclusive presumption of guilt is created, Wigmore sees no
constitutional problem. 4 Wig. Ev., 2d
Ed., § 1356. So long as there is a rational connection between the fact to be
proved and the fact presumed, the statute is valid. State v. Bozek, 81 N.H. 277, 124 A. 666; 162 A.L.R. 495,
532. This is particularly so in this
jurisdiction since 'prima facie evidence, as here used, means evidence to be
considered by the jury' (State v. Lapointe, 81 N.H. 227, 239, 123 A. 692, 698,
31 A.L.R. 1212), and in the absence of other evidence does not compel a verdict
of guilty. State v. Langley, 92 N.H.
136, 26 A.2d 368. The constituent
elements that make up 'cost to the retailer' are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the retailer as are the facts which bring him within the
exceptions to the Act in section 3. In view of the limited effect given to
prima facie evidence in this jurisdiction, we cannot say that its application
to unfair competition is unreasonable.
Competition may be destroyed or injured by deceptive trade practices,
discrimination, and unfair competition as well as by combinations and
monoplies. They are closely
interrelated and we have been informed recently that the Legislative branch of
the government has a wide latitude in establishing effective and even
duplicating methods of preventing these asserted economic evils. See, Federal Trade Commission v. Morton Salt
**474 Company, 68 S.Ct. 822 Federal
Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 68 S.Ct. 793.
[7] One of the exceptions to the Act is 'where
the price of merchandise is made in good faith to meet legal competition'
§ 3(h). If this required the retailer to examine his competitor's books
to ascertain whether the competition was legal, it would be of doubtful
validity. Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338
Pa. 457, 465, 13 A.2d 67, 128 A.L.R. 1120.
All that is required of the retailer, however, is an endeavor 'in good
faith' to meet the legal prices of his competitor. People v. Pay Less Drug Store, 25 Cal.2d 108, 153 P.2d 9.
[8][9] The
term 'cost to the retailer' the statute provides 'shall mean bona fide
costs'. § 1(IV). This is
proper. However, the rest of this
paragraph states that in computing replacement cost, a cost calculation based
on sales or purchases 'which cannot be justified by existing market conditions
within the state' is disallowed. The
indefiniteness and uncertainty of this latter provision renders it
invalid. State v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57
Ariz. 308, 113 P.2d 650. The Maryland
Act, formerly defective in part for this reason, was amended to remove this
defect and upheld. Blum v. Engelman,
Md., 57 A.2d 421. Since this invalid
provision is separable, the remainder of the Act 'shall not be affected
thereby.' R.L. c. 204, § 6.
[10]
While § 1(I) contains meticulous
detail of the items in 'cost to the *178 retailer,' the defendants
complain that there is no guide to determine
'a lesser cost' than the mark-up of 'six percent of the total cost at the
retail outlet' § 1(I, 3). As the Act now stands the doubt or ambiguity
should be resolved in favor of the defendant.
If this places a temporary obstacle to the effective enforcement of the
Act, it is a defect inherent in the statute and not one manufactured by the
judiciary. The flexibility of cost
accounting procedures makes the determination of cost a difficult one but the
defendant is entitled to offset its benefits against its detriments. The determination of cost must not be in
'bad faith' (Dikeou v. Ford Distributors Ass'n, 107 Colo. 38, 108 P.2d 529),
and it will suffice if it complies with the standard of 'what business men
generally mean[by cost] arrived at by a reasonable rule.' State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 365, 84 P.2d
767.
[11] In
1903, Art. 83, of the Constitution was revised. The Legislature was given the authority of the state to protect
'free and fair competition in the trades and industries' against monopolis 'or
any other unfair means.' Such is the
avowed purpose of unfair sales statutes although there is much controversy
whether they are adapted to accomplish that aim or in fact do so. There are some indications, at least in New
England, that the statutes are used by the large sellers against the small
sellers to prevent local price cutting rather than protecting the small seller
against a concerted campaign of underselling by the larger units. United States v. New York Great A. & P. Tea Co., D.C., 67 F.Supp.
626; 57 Yale L.J. 391, 419 (1948). The vast amount of literature on this
subject attests to its controversial nature both economic and legal. More than half of the states have similar
legislation and, as a result of amendments, a majority of such statutes are
considered constitutional. 118 A.L.R.
506; Com. v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13 A.2d 67, 128 A.L.R. 1126; Blum v.
Engelman, supra. The expediency and
wisdom of such legislation is by the constitution 'hereby granted to the
general court' (Art. 83) and it is not for the judiciary to compete with the
Legislature in matters of opinion 'upon points of * * * expediency.' State v. Moore, 91 N.H. 16, 21, 13 A.2d 143,
147. Since the enactment of Unfair
Sales Acts is within the power of the Legislature granted to it by the
Constitution, its wisdom, effectiveness and economic desirability is not a
judicial question.
Case discharged.
All concurred.
N.H. 1948
59 A.2d 471, 95 N.H. 174
END OF DOCUMENT