Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
NARDINI'S RESTAURANT, Inc.,
v.
STERLING RESTAURANT CO., Inc., et al.
May 1, 1945.
Headnotes
**325 *364
Charles W. Tobey, Jr., of Concord, for plaintiff.
**326 A. W.
Levensaler, Robert W. Upton, and Laurence I. Duncan, all of Concord (Laurence
I. Duncan, of Concord, orally), for defendants.
PAGE, Justice.
The master found that
'Giuseppe Nardini carried on a long-established business at 6 North Main Street
and was known through our Northern New England as a restaurant owner * * * had
built it up so that 'Nardini' was a word of wide reputation and of considerable
value in connection with the restaurant business. Signs bearing his name were scattered widely over this state and
elsewhere. Financial troubles overtook
him * * * and he filed * * * on or about
June 13, 1935, a petition asking * * * for the right to reorganize under sec.
77B of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. §
207. This petition was filed as
treasurer of the G. Nardini Company, which was the name under which * * * the
business * * * was being carried on.' The G. Nardini Company was a corporation.
Further facts found, as
far as is material for this opinion, will be stated in substance. Upon the bankruptcy petition, the United *365
States District Court issued an order permitting the formation of a corporation
to take an assignment, on certain terms, of the assets of the debtor, its good
will, and the right to use the name 'The Nardini Company,' but not the name 'G.
Nardini.' The plan for reorganization
in this manner having failed, the District Court ordered the trustee in
bankruptcy to sell the property of the debtor corporation. The sale was accordingly made on January 28,
1936, to a new corporation called the Nardini Company. The bill of sale, in accordance with
specific authority from the District Court, included 'all the good will of G.
Nardini Company and the exclusive right to use the name G. Nardini Company, but
not to abridge the right of G. Nardini personally to use his own name in his
business or otherwise.' This sale was
formally confirmed by the District Court.
[1] At this point it may be said that the
defendants argue that the plaintiff has no right to use any name but The
Nardini Company, but it is apparent that the
intention was to give them the right to the Nardini good will connected with
the tangible property conveyed, even to the use of the name G. Nardini Company,
if the purchaser wished. The only thing
excluded was the right of G. Nardini to use his own name 'in his business or
otherwise.' The right thus reserved to
him he must use under limitations prescribed by the law of fair competition,
later to be discussed. The order of the
court could not have been intended to remove those limitations.
The purchaser company, The
Nardini Company, in turn, fell upon financial troubles. On April 11, 1939, it made an assignment for
the benefit of its creditors, and on May 24, 1939, the assignees sold the
property to Costas Economu and Costas Canachelos, 'together with all goodwill'
and the right to the use of the name 'The Nardini Company, but not the name G.
Nardini.' Again there is the obvious
intention of conveying everything attached to the good will except the right of
G. Nardini to use his own name. Economu
and Canachelos formed a new corporation, the plaintiff, and conveyed to it,
August 19, 1939, the property and good will, with the same limitation as to the
right of G. Nardini.
Meanwhile, in the spring
or summer of 1936, Giuseppe Nardini began to work for the defendant corporation
in a restaurant known theretofore as the Sterling Cafe, a name appearing upon
an exterior electric sign and also upon the windows. After it employed Nardini, the defendant corporation then placed
upon the top of its electric sign a much
larger sign with the letters 'Nardini' arranged *366 vertically, the
letters being much larger and more prominent than the horizontal 'Sterling
Cafe' below. Within three hundred feet
and diagonally across Main Street, was the electric sign that the old Nardini
Restaurant had long used, in a form that the defendant corporation imitated--
'Nardini' vertically in large letters; below and horizontally, in smaller
letters the word 'Restaurant.' The
master found that the 'natural result is to confuse completely the identity of
the two restaurants * * * to confuse the stranger who has seen the
advertisements both below and above Concord and elsewhere.'
The evidence appears to be
uncontradicted that the restaurant, whose good will was bought by the
plaintiff, had for many years been popularly known as 'The Nardini Restaurant,'
a designation carried in substantial agreement by the electric sign and the
advertising billboards that had been conveyed to the plaintiff's ancestor in
title by the Trustee in Bankruptcy. See
Cain's **327 Lobster House v. Cain, 312 Mass. 512, 45 N.E.2d 397; Wright
Restaurant Co. v. Seattle Restaurant Company, 67 Wash. 690, 122 P. 348. The identical name, 'Nardini Restaurant,'
appears upon the defendants' windows, and the name 'Nardini' is by far the most
prominent feature of the defendants' confusing electric sign.
[2][3] The
master ruled that the purchaser of good will and trade-names in a bankruptcy sale or a sale by assignees
will be protected against unfair competition by the bankrupt, a ruling amply
sustained by the authorities cited in Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade Marks,
3d Ed., 80. He further ruled, and
correctly, that the right of G. Nardini to the personal use of his name did not
carry with it the right to use it in unfair competition of the sort resulting from
the confusing use of signs in this case.
When Nardini went to work
for the defendant corporation in 1936, his duties, as the master found, were
limited; 'he was to advise but had no power to direct. The admitted purpose of his employment at
the Sterling was to draw business from his old stand at 6 North Main Street and
to draw business from out of the state where the name Nardini had a more than
state wide reputation.' G. Nardini
claimed the sole right to the use of the name 'Nardini.' He brought a bill in equity to restrain the
plaintiff from its use, a proceeding pending when he died and not dismissed
until several years subsequent to his death.
After that case was off the docket, the plaintift brought this
proceeding, which the master found under the circumstances is not barred by
laches. Nardini quarreled with the *367
defendant corporation, left its employ, and, consistent with his claim to the
sole right to use the name 'Nardini,' obtained an injunction against the use of
the name by the defendant corporation, in consequence of which the 'Nardini'
part of the defendant corporation's electric sign was covered for a time. Then Nardini went
back to work for the defendant corporation and until he died late in 1939
permitted the use of the name at the defendants' place of business.
After G. Nardini died,
intestate, his children assigned to their mother Sophia all their right, as
inherited from their father (italics supplied), to 'the trade-name Nardini
in connection with the general restaurant business in said Concord.' In consideration of the issue to her of five
shares of the stock of the defendant corporation, Sophia Nardini assigned to
that corporation the 'exclusive right to use the name Nardini in the restaurant
business in said Concord, during the corporate existence of the said Sterling
Restaurant Company, Incorporated.'
[4] The plaintiff's bill sought an unqualified
injunction against the use of the name 'Nardini' by the defendants. The injunction recommended by the master and
ordered by the Superior Court was a qualified one, prohibiting only such use
'as is at present being made by the defendants, or any such use by them as will
create confusion or promote unfair competition with the business of the
plaintiff.' The defendants have waived
all exceptions save that to the denial of their motion to dismiss the bill,
which is the sole point discussed in their brief and argument. Their argument is, in substance, that the
plaintiff had no right to what it did not get--an unqualified injunction
against the use of the name 'Nardini.'
Since the plaintiff has not excepted to the denial of an unqualified
injunction, the question argued by the defendants is not now open to decision. However, the subject is of such interest
that some questions and doubts about the defendants' position may properly be
expressed, by way of dictum.
The main point made by the
authorities cited by the defendants is that though a bankrupt's business good
will and trade-name have been sold to another, the bankrupt still has the right
to use his own name in a competing business, as individual, partner or a
stockholder of a corporation bearing his name. Conceding the point as one of
general truth, it may be doubted whether this personal right, specifically
attempted to be reserved to Nardini by the District Court, can operate in a
vacuum, so that the bankrupt may authorize the use of his name in any business
in which he has no ownership interest.
*368 When G.
Nardini was employed by the defendant corporation, conformably to a written
agreement dated March 27, 1936, it was clear that he was made an employee
without power to do more than advise, and that the corporation was under no
least liability to take his advice, but, on the contrary, Nardini was subject
to the direction of the manager of the corporation. In consideration of the employment thus created, Nardini agreed
that the defendant corporation could use signs 'bearing the name in **328
some form of Nardini * * * it being understood that when once placed the said
sign or signs shall not be removed without the consent of the said Manus.' Manus was the defendant corporation's
manager.
If Nardini could thus convey the right to use his name, this
conveyance seems to be an irrevocable one, by which Nardini lost forever all
his personal right that it was possible for him to convey to another. If it left him with any residuary personal
right to use his name in his own competing business, that right, being purely a
personal one, would appear to have expired with his decease and be of no
advantage to his estate.
There was, it is true, an
agreement that if Nardini's employment by the defendant corporation should
result, within six months, in doubling the defendant's business, Nardini should
have the option of purchasing for cash a half interest in the business at its
them book value. This remote chance of
his becoming part owner or stockholder in a business using his name never came
to anything, and Nardini never had any interest in the business. No case cited by the defendants, or
discovered by us, has ever held that a bankrupt may thus separate his right to
use his name in business from a business in which he has a legal interest, or
that he may convey a trade-name which he has not acquired in business owned at
least partly by him. The trade-name
(except for 'G. Nardini'), that Nardini had acquired in connection with such a
business was already owned by the plaintiff's predecessor in title. Whatever personal right Nardini had to trade
for himself in his own name, it would seem that he had no power to convey that
right, unattached to any business of his.
The obvious motive of the arrangement he made, as found by the master
upon undisputed evidence, was to draw away
from the plaintiff and its predecessors the very good will and trade-name for
which they had paid. Under all the
circumstances, it is at least possible that the agreement made by Nardini with
the defendant corporation was a 'sham' or a 'theft,' a purely fraudulent transaction
that could convey nothing. Chapman v.
L. E. *369 Waterman Co., 176 App.Div. 697, 163 N.Y.S. 1059, 1068;
dissenting opinion of Pitney, J., in Waterman Co. v. Modern Pen Co., 235 U.S.
88, 35 S.Ct. 91, 59 L.Ed. 142; John H. Wigmore in 10 Ill.Law Rev., 178, 185.
[5] However, that may be, the right that Nardini
had after he signed the agreement of 1936 was a purely personal right to use
his own name in his own business. That
personal right, as already suggested, was not an asset of his estate, it did
not descend to his heirs, and the defendant corporation took nothing by the
assignment from Sophia Nardini, however much it gave in return.
[6] But the qualified injunction actually issued
in this case is sustainable even if an unqualified one would not have been, and
we are not called upon to decide that an unqualified injunction against the use
of the name 'Nardini' in any fashion would not have been proper under the
existing facts. The sort of injunction
ordered below is sustainable under the authorities cited by the
defendants. Under very similar
circumstances, the use of an electric sign bearing the name 'Ralph' or
'Ralph's,' the popular name of the plaintiff's business, in which the defendant
had formerly been interested, was enjoined
even though the defendant could still use his own name in a competing business
in which he was a partner. Ralph
Brothers Furniture Co. v. Ralph, 338 Pa. 360, 12 A.2d 573. The name 'Nardini's Restaurant' was what the
plaintiff's place of business was known by for at least twenty years before the
defendant corporation infringed upon its use, with less claim, it seems, than
Ralph had in the case just cited.
In Harson v. Halkyard, 22
R.I. 102, 46 A. 271, also cited by the defendants, the defendant's partner,
named Harson, was held to have the right to engage in a competitive business as
such partner and to authorize the use of his name by his partner. But the court particularly emphasized the
point that there was no resemblance between the signs, labels and
advertisements used by the two concerns, and the only confusion resulted from
the use of the name of the defendant's partner. Obviously, however, the defendants, in the present case, have
been guilty of intentional interference with the plaintiff's business by the
use of designedly confusing misrepresentations.
A third case cited by the
defendants is Horlick's Malted Milk Corporation v. Horluck's, Inc., 9 Cir., 59
F.2d 13, where the defendant, though not prohibited from using his own name in
his own competitive business, was enjoined from causing confusion, **329
not only by advertising in forms similar to the plaintiff's, but also even from
using his name in the possessive form (Horluck's or Horlucks).
*370 Undoubtedly, the most favorable
legal rule for the defendants is as stated in these cases. Even if Giuseppe Nardini had engaged in his
own business, under his own name, he could not have used the forms of unfair competition,
by way of confusing and misleading the public, that the defendant corporation
has been guilty of for nine years. If
he, himself, could not have done so, he could give the defendants no such
right, nor could his heirs, as the master properly ruled.
Exceptions overruled.
BURQUE, J., was absent;
the others concurred.
N.H. 1945
42 A.2d 325, 93 N.H. 364
END OF DOCUMENT