Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
STATE
v.
PAILLE.
Nov. 7, 1939.
Headnotes
*664 Appeal, from a
Municipal Court conviction upon a complaint for violation of an ordinance of
the city of Concord relating to barber shops.
Entitled an ordinance
"to protect the public, the public health, well being and morals by
governing and regulating conditions of barber shops", it excepts
"beauty shoppes or hair dressing establishments serving female customers
exclusively". It forbids the operation of a barber shop in a manner not
permitted by the public health laws and barber law of the State, or in non-
observance of the rules and regulations of the local board of health governing
barber shops, or contrary to the regulations of the ordinance relating to
opening and closing hours. As to such hours, it requires that no shop be opened
before 8 a. m. or remain open after 6, 8 or 9 p. m. for specified days of the week. The closing hours for certain days differ
for different parts of the city. On Wednesdays the closing hour throughout the
city is noon. Exceptions in weeks when public holidays occur are made.
Violations of the ordinance are punishable by a fine of not less than $10 nor
more than $20.
The defendant is charged
with keeping his shop open on a Wednesday afternoon.
The question whether his
motion to quash the complaint on the ground that the ordinance is repugnant to
the state and federal constitutions has been transferred in advance of trial
and without ruling by Connor, J.
Raymond K. Perkins, County
Sol., of Concord, for the State.
Herbert W. Rainie, of
Concord, for defendant.
ALLEN, Chief Justice.
The case presents two
independent issues under the state constitution. One relates to the legislative
grant of authority to enact the ordinance. The other is whether free enterprise
may be fettered in the manner the ordinance enacts.
[1][2][3] I. The
first issue is ordinarily regarded as a statutory one, in view of the statute
(P.L., c. 54, § 12, XIV) providing, in
empowering city councils to make by-laws and regulations which "may seem
for the well-being of the city", that "no by-law or ordinance shall
be repugnant to the constitution or laws of the state". But without this
provision the limitation of municipal power
would be no less. It is superfluous for state legislation to declare that *665
the constitution may not be violated, and it is no less so to declare that
ordinances must not conflict with state legislation. The framework and system
of state government established by our constitution would obviously be attacked
and undermined if municipalities were free to enact unpermitted legislation for
their localized areas. Unauthorized local legislation adding to, detracting
from, or otherwise affecting state legislation is not constitutionally valid.
"In the nature of things, such [local] legislation must be not
inconsistent with the laws of the State * *." State v. Noyes, 30 N.H. 279,
293.
In State v. Angelo, 71
N.H. 224, 51 A. 905, an ordinance of Somersworth requiring peddlers to pay a
monthly license fee was held invalid on two grounds. In respect to one it was
said (71 N.H. page 228, 51 A. at page 907): "By comparing the ordinance
with [state legislation], it will be seen that the statute embraces the whole
subject that is covered by the ordinance, and that the provisions of the one
are inconsistent with those of the other. The statute applies to the whole
state. There is nothing in it which shows or tends to show an intention on the
part of the legislature to exempt any town from its operation under any
circumstances".
[4]
Considering the ordinance under examination in the light of the foregoing test
of validity, its prescription of a penalty for violation of the public health laws of the state and the state
barber law is peculiarly an abortive attempt to interfere with state
legislation. The state barber act (Laws 1937, c. 163, § 21) provides penalties for the violation of
any of its requirements or of any rule or regulation made pursuant to it. The
act applies to all cities and to certain towns. Defining the conditions for
doing business, it permits the conduct of the business upon compliance with
them. Imposing a penalty within fixed limits for violation of the conditions,
it determines how severe the penalty may be. For a municipality to ordain that
an additional penalty for a violation within its borders shall be imposed is in
effect an attempt to amend the statute in local application. Two penalties for
the same offence would be enforceable if the ordinance were to be sustained. A
statute operating in all municipalities where it is in force with no difference
by its terms in application to them would receive unequal effect. If a
municipality might add to the severity of punishment, it would be as arguable
that it might lessen it. The proposition is so absurd in its manifest disregard
of the basic organization of the state government as to make further discussion
needless.
The state act provides for
shop registration. By it the state examining and licensing board is required to
issue to certified operators a shop registration if the local board of health
reports upon investigation that the shop is, "with respect to its location,
appointments, equipment and appliances, suitable and sanitary" for its
purposes. Section 16. The local board is required to enforce the act by inspections from time to time and by
prosecution for its violations, with the general cooperation of the state
board. Section 21.
As has already appeared,
violation of any rule or regulation made under the act is a misdemeanor. The
record does not disclose the state board's rules and regulations, but so far as
that board adopts those of local boards in local application, their violation
is penalized by the statute. While local rules may not be the same in all
places, the state board's authority to adopt them is not to be denied for that
reason. Varying local conditions may well justify special rules therefor.
[5]
In due construction of the statute, suitable and sanitary conditions are to be
found by local boards under the tests of such rules and regulations as may be
established by either the state or a local board, and the acceptance of a local
board's findings implies the adoption of its rules and regulations by the state
board. The general intent of the statute is to vest in the state board final
regulatory power to secure suitable and sanitary conditions in barber shops,
and the implication that local rules specially relating to shops are to be
regarded as a part of the body of state rules is fairly manifest. Regulation of
"the practice of barbering" is the entitled statutory enactment, and
the purpose of the statute to make full and complete provision therefor, with
ultimate authority assigned to the state board in respect to shop
registrations, is to be found. General uniformity of proper conditions may be subject to qualifications to meet reasonable
variations between different municipalities, and local rules in respect to
conditions may therefore vary. To maintain the integrity of the state board's
authority its adoption of such rules is to be assumed.
*666 Before the
passage of the state act all local boards of health were required to promulgate
certain specified regulations for the management of barber shops, the violation
of the regulations or of any other regulation prescribed by such boards for
barber shops as a health measure was made a misdemeanor, and such boards were
under duty to make regular inspections of barber shops and prosecute violations
of the regulations. P.L., c. 133, § §
19-21. By the state act these provisions are not applicable in places
where it is effective. Laws 1937, c. 163, §
22. This distinction is further reason for the inference that the state
act vests in the state board final supervisory and directive authority in
enforcement of the act.
Any local rule or
regulation employed to aid in the determination of proper conditions for the
grant of shop registration or specially relating to the conduct of a shop is
accordingly held to be sanctioned by the state board as an implied adoption of
the rule for the special locality. It follows that the ordinance is invalid in
its provision for a penalty for violation of such a local rule, for the same
reason of invalidity in respect to a penalty for violation of a general rule of
the state board.
In respect to closing hours, the act, as already stated, is
construed to provide in full for special regulation. It leaves open no field
for local regulation of shops classified by themselves. The conduct of a shop
may not be specially regulated by local authority on the ground of its special
business of barbering, since the act was designed as an all-inclusive measure
of regulation upon the subject as a particular business or occupation. In
consequence, the ordinance assumes authority which the legislature has taken
away. The loss of constitutional support for it must therefore be declared.
[6][7][8][9] Theinquiry upon the topic of delegated
authority is not in strict exactness whether the constitution has been
violated, but whether the ordinance may be upheld as passed upon a valid grant
of authority. The mere fact of enactment of an ordinance presupposes no
authority to enact, and the statutes under which the claim of authority is
asserted are subject to no rule of construction requiring the claim to be
sustained if it possibly may be. A municipality having no constitutional powers
except as are expressly or impliedly granted by the legislature, the extent or
character of a grant is to be determined by normal rules of statutory
construction. What the legislature has authorized is not shown by what the
municipality has done. Municipal conduct calls for no conclusion of authority
for it by a rule stretching a statute to a strained meaning. No considerations
of wisdom or policy are invoked. Authority, when issue of it is raised, must
appear from its finding as a fair import of
the statute. The state's "complete legislative control of local
government" (Amyot v. Caron, 88 N.H. 394, 399, 190 A. 134, 138) predicates
a denial of local authority not shown to have been granted.
[10] II. Upon the branch of the case relating to
individual freedom, the broad issue is whether the provisions of the ordinance
for closing hours can be sustained as a permitted exercise of the police power.
The legal standards and tests are well established, and only their application
is here involved. The wisdom and expediency of the ordinance are disregarded.
The rule is observed that a legislative conclusion of the expediency of a
measure is not subject to judicial review, but aside from expediency the character
of the measure as conformable with the constitution is thus subject.
[11][12][13] The constitutional guaranty that "Every
member of the community" shall be protected "in the enjoyment of his
life, liberty, and property" (Const.Pt. I, Art. 12) nullifies arbitrary
legislation passed under the guise of the police power. If the legislation
serves no useful purpose to advance the public welfare, it is void. Also it is
void if the restriction of private right is oppressive while the public welfare
is enhanced only in slight degree. Dederick v. Smith, 88 N.H. 63, 68, 184 A.
595, and cases cited.
The state has urged a
number of propositions in support of its claim of a reasonable character of the
requirement of closing hours.
[14] One position it takes is
that barber shops are sometimes dens of vice where crime and sin in various
forms of evil are fostered and engendered, and more readily under cover of
darkness. This ground of support is utterly without tenable merit. The
complaint is that the defendant kept his shop open on a proscribed Wednesday
afternoon, and that particular proscription has no imaginable efficiency to
purify an atmosphere murky with immorality. But *667 without relying
upon so narrow a point of unreasonable application, the claim of a frequent
tendency of barber shops to breed vice has no factual support. Judicial notice
is taken that they are free from such a stigma and have no characteristic
inherence inducive and productive of iniquity. And there is no evidence, and
hence no assumption, that conditions in Concord are so unusual and exceptional
as to call for their special treatment. "The occupation of being a barber
is an ancient and lawful business." Opinions of the Justices, Mass., 14
N.E.2d 953, 954.
[15][16][17] The public need of regulating the conduct of
the business as the ordinance provides in the interest of law and order is at
best slight. It is not fairly and reasonably appreciable. As to bad
by-products, an occasion is of rare exception and not of frequency. The
constitution permits no excessive encroachment upon the private right. The
private right is unduly invaded unless the ways and means of invasion are in
some fair measure practical and adapted to secure the public interest. With
acceptance of the rule that "The
inclusion of a reasonable margin [of innocuousness], to insure effective
enforcement, will not put upon a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of
invalidity" (Euclid, Ohio, v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365, 388,
389, 47 S.Ct. 114, 118, 71 L. Ed. 303, 54 A.L.R. 1016), yet the ordinance is
invalid if it "passes the bounds of reason and assumes the character of a
merely arbitrary fiat". Purity, etc., Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 204, 33
S.Ct. 44, 47, 57 L.Ed. 184.
[18] To impose upon an occupation a regulation
designed to strike at a condition or practice maintained or pursued by only a
few of those engaging in it gives but scant respect to the force and virtue of
a right having constitutionally equal standing with the public right.
Reasonableness demands that while a few may be sacrificed in order to reach
many, many may not be enjoined in order to reach a few.
It is argued that upon the
point of public morals the view here taken does not conform with the authority
of State v. Freeman, 38 N.H. 426. There an ordinance of Dover requiring
restaurants to be closed after ten o'clock at night was sustained, Restaurants
were regarded as "places of public entertainment", and the ordinance
was thought to be a measure promoting "the common convenience and
safety". The court based its decision on the authority of State v. Clark,
28 N.H. 176, 61 Am.Dec. 611, a case in which an ordinance prohibiting the using
or keeping of intoxicants in any "refreshment saloon or restaurant" was held valid as being in
the interest of "public policy or morals", and on the same standing
as other laws "enacted from a regard to the public peace and safety".
The view was thus taken that restaurants and liquor saloons had common
attributes. That is far from saying that barber shops also have the same
attributes. In view of the extent of the police power over the use and sale of
intoxicants the analogy between restaurants and liquor saloons does not seem
readily acceptable. Moreover, whether to-day, taking into account the changes
in the customs and ways of life from those of nearly a century ago, such an
ordinance as was upheld in the Dover case could be thought to be a reasonable
interference with personal liberty of action in advancing some proper object of
the exercise of the police power, is so doubtful as to be at least debatable.
The need of curfew laws is not as great as it once was.
The state's contention
that the provision for closing hours serves to promote the public health is
equally unconvincing to show a sustaining support for it. It has no
substantially appreciable relation to that subject. Exposure to sickness and
disease from unrestricted hours of opening is not a reasonable assumption.
The view that inspection
may be more difficult and inconvenient, if not impossible, if a barber shop is
open at night as well as in the daytime (Falco v. Atlantic City, 99 N.J.L. 19,
122 A. 610) cannot in good sense be adopted. Daytime inspections being
available, they are unaffected by carrying on
the business at night. The inadequacy of night inspections is a fanciful claim.
If natural light may be a better aid to inspection than artificial light, the
difference is not so great that it can fairly be said that a night inspection
is unduly inefficient in comparison with one by day. Barber shops as a rule are
well lighted at all times of business. And open hours at night have no apparent
tendency to add to the difficulty or to subtract from the efficiency of daytime
inspection. The point of difficulty of inspection at night is further weakened
by the permission of the ordinance for some hours of open shop after daylight.
The argument that a barber is *668 likely to disregard sanitary
requirements when a visit of inspection is not expected likewise has no
reliable force. If a shop is open at night, it is subject to night inspection.
No logic is perceived in the proposition that an expectation that no night
inspections will be made justifies an order forbidding open hours at night. The
statute (Laws 1937, c. 163, § 21)
requires at least four inspections a year. It is a legislative judgment of minimum
sufficiency without regard to closing hours.
On the point that the
provision for closing hours is a health measure as a sort of prescription for
hours of labor, assuming that a city has power to enact an hours of labor
ordinance for employment within its limits, no reasonable correlation exists.
In the application of the ordinance to employes, it does not limit their
service to the weekly schedule of fifty-nine hours which it establishes, since employment during
closing hours may be added, in cleaning a shop and its appointments after the
business of the day is finished and in preparation for the business of the
following day. "The proposed bill does not in terms shorten the hours of
labor of barbers. It does not purport to do that. It merely limits the hours
during which barber shops may be kept open. By hiring more barbers, the hours
of labor of the individual barber could even be shortened without violating the
terms of the proposed bill." Opinions of the Justices, Mass., 14 N.E.2d
953, 954. "*** the statute *** cannot properly be regarded as one to fix
hours of labor. It is by its terms specifically directed solely at regulating
the opening and closing of barber shops. Therefore, cases dealing with statutes
fixing hours of labor are not of assistance ***." Amitrano v. Barbaro,
R.I., 1 A.2d 109, 113. "If a shop remained open twenty hours of the day,
working two shifts of ten hours each, or kept open twenty-four hours of the
day, working *** four shifts of six hours each, there would be no violation of
any regulation as to the hours of labor." Patton v. Bellingham, 179 Wash.
566, 38 P.2d 364, 367, 98 A.L.R. 1076, 1082.
In respect to a proprietor
of a shop, the requirement as an hours of labor measure is even more
indefensible. In curtailing his time for working and doing business it
interferes with his right to earn a living. The state advances the remarkable
theory that this is proper because long hours, exhausting his physical and
mental energies, will lessen his attention to sanitary safeguards for his customers and will disturb his own
well-being. If a glimmer of causative connection between the premise and the
conclusion may be logically inferred, the menace to public health is negligible
while the restriction of private right is severe. The conception confuses
public and private health. What one may do in taking care of himself is his own
affair. Any interest of the public that the individual should attend to his
health is controlled, in action pursuant to the interest, by the guaranty of
personal liberty. The public right to protect public health is not so extensive
and far reaching that it may adopt measures of unlimited and unchecked
regulation of all conduct of an individual affecting his health. It may require
conduct and practices designed to protect the public health in some reasonable
scope of protection, but only in due recognition of one's right to live his own
life without some real prejudice to the rights of others in their collective or
individual aspect. A different order of government would be necessary if one's
ways and habits of life were to be subject to unrestrained public command.
[19] The principle that "it is one of the
fundamental rights and privileges of every American citizen to adopt and follow
such lawful industrial pursuit, not injurious to the community, as he may see
fit" (People v. Marx, 99 N.Y. 377, 386, 2 N.E. 29, 33, 52 Am.Rep. 34) is
elementary, and no less so is its corollary that he may engage in the pursuit
in any manner which likewise and in appreciable measure is not harmful to the
public. A purpose, if any in fact existed,
to protect the public health is not in any observable degree effectuated by the
ordinance in its provision for closing hours as a means therefor. Adaptation of
the means prescribed to a proper end can be found only in disregard of common
sense and practical logic. The "right to pursue any proper vocation to
obtain a livelihood" (Opinions of the Justices, Mass., 14 N.E.2d 953, 954)
and the right to conduct it in a manner not endangering the public safety,
health and morals would be substantially bereft of their vitality if the
contentions of the state were given acceptance.
[20][21][22] In respect to closing hours the ordinance in
necessary effect is a substantial and serious restriction upon the play of
competition. While unfair competition *669 may be enjoined, all
competition may not be regulated merely because of a purpose to control it.
Fairness of competitive conditions and conduct may be sought to be attained by
police measures, but not their equality. The right to conduct a business
connotes the economic right to compete, and a common level of conditions,
methods and practices may not be justifiably ordered for a purpose to stifle or
eliminate competition. In and of itself competition cannot constitutionally be
held unfair, or prohibited.
"*** the ordinance
bears no real or substantial relation to the reasonable protection of the
public. It belongs, rather, in the category of unreasonable restrictions upon
the right of a citizen to engage in a useful and lawful calling and to acquire
and possess property and to so use it as will not interfere with the rights of others. The
ordinance seeks not merely to regulate a business, but to dictate its
operation. *** If the principle thus contended for be upheld, then the city
council could limit the opening and closing hours of shops to any period that
it saw fit, with the view of equalizing the incomes of all." Patton v.
Bellingham, supra.
"*** the
constitutionality of a statute is to be decided by an examination of its real
purpose and its actual effect." Opinion of the Justices, 87 N.H. 496, 497,
179 A. 409. If it could be held that the title of the ordinance attests and
certifies its purpose, its operation does not effectuate the purpose. It arranges
for a weekly half-holiday and daily hours of business solely as matters of
private convenience and comfort. The zoning provisions of the ordinance in
making slight changes of hours for different parts of the city strikingly
illustrate this operative effect.
The conclusions reached
render it unnecessary to pass upon the validity of the provision for closing
hours from the standpoint of discrimination, but it may be noted that the
exemption in the ordinance of "hair dressing establishments serving female
customers exclusively" presents an issue of such nature. It is said in
Opinions of the Justices, Mass., 14 N.E.2d 953, 954: "The proposed bill
does not apply to hair dressers *** nor does it relate to beauty parlors ***
where women resort for cutting the hair and other treatment of the scalp and
face. It has been held, since the acts performed on customers of barber shops and beauty shops are very similar
in their nature, that such an omission renders unconstitutional a statute
because of discrimination between persons belonging to the same class. Ernesti
v. Grand Island, 125 Neb. 688, 251 N.W. 899". More broadly, if keepers of
beauty shops were included, the objection that employers in other kinds of
business were unduly favored would have arguable merit. Discrimination against
one class of employers operating to the advantage of others might be held an
arbitrary classification. There may be as much and as good reason to require
weekly half-holidays and freedom from work during certain hours to be given
other classes of employes as obtains for those of barber shops.
[23][24][25] No other grounds of public welfare than
those herein considered have been urged by the state, or are believed to exist.
The conclusion of invalidity is supported by a great preponderance of authority
from other jurisdictions where the same or substantially same issues have been
examined and decided. It is not one of strict and narrow construction. The
constitutional guaranties stand in equal strength and force with the police
power. They are not subordinate to it. The adjustment between them is not of
preferential order, but is fixed by impartial reasonableness. "The
limitations upon legislative power are for the general welfare, and, so long as
they remain in force, legislation disregarding them is adverse to the public
interest." Goodrich Falls Electric Co. v. Howard, 86 N.H. 512, 521, 171 A.
761, 766. The constitution was designed to
protect and preserve the "common right", considered in Opinion of the
Court, 4 N.H. 565, 566, and mentioned in Re Opinion of the Justices, 82 N.H.
561, 563, 138 A. 284. In summary, proprietors of barber shops enjoy this right
under our constitution. The ordinance seeks to deprive them of it, and the
customary adjectives arbitrary and oppressive are fittingly descriptive of the
ordinance. It enters a field suggestive of unbounded authority. The compulsion
is too drastic. No more than a case of private convenience is shown, and that
is not enough.
The conformity of the
ordinance with the federal constitution needs no decision.
Complaint quashed.
All concurred.
N.H. 1939.
9 A.2d 663, 90 N.H. 347
END OF DOCUMENT