Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
SANBORN
v.
JACKMAN & a.
June, 1881.
*1 In the sale of
chattels there is ordinarily an implied warranty of title, and evidence tending
to show a failure of title is competent in defence of an action for the price,
although the written bill of sale contained no warranty.
ASSUMPSIT, to recover a
balance for goods sold. December 30, 1878, the plaintiff gave to the defendants
a bill of sale, under seal, of all the shafting, pulleys, machinery, tools,
furniture, and fixtures in the second story of the building then occupied by
the plaintiff, in Franklin, with all the patterns and drawings connected or
used with the tools and machinery. Also, two machines not completed and in the
possession of one Stevens, which were to be seasonably completed by Stevens at
the plaintiff's expense, and put in good satisfactory running order in the shop
occupied by the defendants; and in connection with the two last machines were
included all drawings and patterns and
models of all kinds, with the right to a patent therefor if the same or any
part of them were patentable, according to the plaintiff's agreement with
Stevens, at the defendants' expense. Also, all machinery, tools, shafting,
belting, kegs, and furnace for tempering needles, situate in the blacksmith
shop near the plaintiff's shop; also, all the sand and saw-dust in and near the
shop, and the castings for a new press, where they might be; also, the good-
will of the business. The plaintiff also agreed to give the defendants three
weeks' time from the date of the bill of sale, in which he was to render such
assistance by labor, advice, and instructions as he was able, to benefit them
and carry on the business, without other charge or compensation. The plaintiff
also agreed to sell the defendants all the knitting-needles then owned by him
and in his possession, to be finished by the parties, amounting to nearly
100,000, to be paid for in sixty days from date, the amount to be determined by
count. The plaintiff claims in this suit to recover a part of the price agreed
to be paid for the above described property.
The defendants offered to
show that one of the machines which was being constructed by Stevens was an
infringement upon a patented machine owned by one Corey; that they inquired of
the plaintiff whether it was an infringement or not, and the plaintiff told
them it was not; that it was upon the assurance of the plaintiff that it was
not an infringement, and relying upon his representation in this regard, that
they took the bill of sale without anything being
said about it; that the machine was valuable, and that they would not have
bought the property of the plaintiff had it not been for the fact that they
supposed and believed they were getting a good title to the machine. The
plaintiff objected that the evidence was not competent. The court excluded it,
and the defendants excepted. If the evidence was properly excluded, the
defendants are to be defaulted; otherwise, the case is to be discharged, and
the action stand for trial.
Headnotes
Barnard & Barnard,
for the defendants. Corey had a patent upon a certain machine. The case finds
that the defendants desired to use the plaintiff's machine in their business,
which, if an infringement upon Corey's, of course would be valueless to them.
Therefore, before they would purchase this machine and other property of the
plaintiff, they received a warranty from him that this machine was not an
infringement upon Corey's patent. Having received this warranty, that the
machine was not an infringement upon Corey's patent, they took the bill of
sale, and took their own risk as to the patenting of any new invention which
they might discover, or any invention already discovered by the plaintiff, or
any one else except Corey. There is nothing inconsistent between the two. The
warranty does not vary nor control the written bill of sale. The evidence was
not offered for any such purpose. It was offered for the purpose of showing a collateral warranty--an agreement
between these same parties, which was the inducement to and the consideration
for the written bill of sale. We shall assume that the excluded evidence would
have shown a warranty which was broken. It is not the province of this court to
say whether a warranty existed, but the evidence should have been submitted to
the jury to consider, and whether or not there was a warranty was for them to
determine. Sto. Con. (3d ed.), s. 828, b., and cases cited in
notes; Morrill v. Wallace, 9 N. H. 111.
*2 The only questions,
then, to be decided here are, whether evidence as to such a warranty is
competent, and, if it is admissible, whether it constitutes a good defence to
this action. There being a warranty, and the case finding that the defendants
relied upon it and would not have taken the bill of sale had it not been given,
the case really finds that it was the consideration for the bill of sale. By
the breach of warranty, there was a partial failure of consideration. At common
law a total failure of consideration would have been a good defence to the
action, and by the provisions of s. 13, c. 220, Gen. Laws, a
partial failure of consideration is just as good a defence in reduction of
damages. The principle is the same whether fraud or breach of warranty is
pleaded as a defence, the only difference being that in the one case the scienter
must be proved, and in the other not. Nichols v. Hunton, 45 N. H. 470,
and Lytle & Patterson v. Bass, 7 Cold. 303, are exactly in point; Hersom v. Henderson, 21 N. H. 224. See,
also, Reed v. Prentiss, 1 N. H. 176, in which the court say,--"A
breach of warranty also subjects the vender to pay all that is lost by the
breach; and suffering the vendee to avail himself of this breach in answer to a
suit for the consideration, prevents circuity of action, and produces no
difference in the estimation of the damage." Case v. Morey,
1 N. H. 347; Shepherd v. Temple, 3 N. H. 455; Tillotson v. Grapes,
4 N. H. 444; Leach v. Tilton, 40 N. H. 473; Paget v. Wilkinson,
note to 2 East 449, cited 41 N. H. 102; Canaan v. Derush, 47 N. H. 212; Bascom
v. Manning, 52 N. H. 132; Blodgett v. The Berlin Mills Co., 52 N. H.
215.
Albin, for the
plaintiff. This is the case of an attempt to vary or contradict the terms of a
written agreement or contract. The contract made between the parties states
just what the agreement was with reference to the machine in question. Instead
of providing that it should not be an infringement of the
"""patented machine owned by one Corey," it did provide
that the defendants were to take their chances as to its being patentable at
all. The case finds that """in connection with the two last
machines [one of which was the machine in dispute] were included all drawings
and patterns and models of all kinds, with the right to a patent therefor if
the same or any part of them were patentable," thereby implying upon the
face of the contract itself a doubt as to whether either of the machines was
patentable.
CLARK, J.
*3 It was an
incumbrance on the right to use the machine, constituting a defect in the
title, if it was an infringement of Corey's patent. In the sale of chattels,
there is ordinarily an implied warranty of title. The evidence offered by the defendants
was competent as tending to show a defective title, and a breach of such
implied warranty. It was also competent as tending to show an express warranty.
The clause in the bill of sale relating to the patentable character of the
machine, expressed a contract in relation to the right to obtain a patent, and
not in relation to the right to use the machine; and the evidence did not
contradict or vary the terms of the written contract. Hersom v. Henderson,
21 N. H. 224.
Case discharged.
STANLEY, J., did not sit:
the others concurred.
N.H. 1881.
60 N.H. 569
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