Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
GREEN
v.
BICKFORD.
June, 1880.
*1 In an action by
an indorsee against the maker of a promissory note transferred for value before
maturity, the defence of want of consideration, or that the note was given for
a worthless patent, or for an article not patented, but fraudulently
represented to be, cannot be made, if the indorsee, at the time of the
transfer, had no knowledge or notice of the facts relied on as a defence.
Mere suspicion of facts,
which would be a defence to a note in the hands of the payee, is not notice of,
and does not put the indorsee upon inquiry as to, such facts.
ASSUMPSIT, by an indorsee
of a promissory note against the maker. The plaintiff had a verdict, and the
defendant moved for a new trial. The facts are given in the opinion.
Twitchell & Evans
and Ladd & Fletcher, for the plaintiff.
Ray, Drew & Jordan,
for the defendant.
ALLEN, J.
The note was given by the
defendant to the payees for the right to manufacture, sell, and use, in
Minnesota, a patent mop-wringer, and by them, for value, indorsed and delivered
to the plaintiff before maturity. The evidence tended to show that the wringer
was not a new or useful invention, but worthless; and that the defendant was
induced to buy it and give the note on the vendors' fraudulent representations.
The only evidence that the wringer was patented was the recital of the fact in
the deed from the vendors to the defendant. The defendant requested the
instruction to the jury that there was no competent evidence of a patent, and
therefore no evidence of a consideration for the note. The court refused this
request, and gave the instruction that a note given for a patent right for an
invention neither new nor useful, or obtained by fraudulent representations of
its validity, was without sufficient consideration, and void in the hands of
the payees or of an indorsee with notice.
*2 The action being
by an indorsee of the note transferred for value before maturity, want of consideration was not a
defence unless known to the plaintiff, or he was put upon inquiry in regard to
it at the time of the transfer. If the plaintiff had notice of the defect in
the note, and the consideration was not wanting, in the absence of fraud he
still might recover. The signature of the note being unquestioned, the note
itself was prima facie evidence of a consideration. Horn v. Fuller,
6 N. H. 511; Coburn v. Odell, 30 N. H. 540. The plaintiff, having read
the note to the jury, could rest on this evidence of a consideration until it
was rebutted or controlled by evidence of a want of consideration. The deed of
the patent right from the payees of the note to the defendant was read in
evidence by him; and conceding that the recital in the deed that letters patent
had been issued was no evidence of a patent and no evidence of a consideration
for the note, it certainly was not evidence of the want of letters patent nor
of a want of consideration, to contradict or rebut the plaintiff's evidence of
a consideration. No evidence of letters patent was not evidence for the
defendant that no patent existed; and could the jury have inferred, from the
fact that the plaintiff exhibited no evidence of a patent, that none existed,
the court could not have instructed them to disregard the evidence of a
consideration imported by the note itself. The request for instructions was
properly refused, and the instruction given on the subject was sufficiently
favorable to the defendant.
Whether the plaintiff at the time of the transfer had notice of or
was put upon inquiry as to the character of the notes, was a question in
controversy. The plaintiff's evidence was, that he knew the note was given for
the patent right, and before taking it he saw the defendant, who did not want
him to purchase this and another note given at the same time for the same
consideration, because, if he should, he would have to pay both in money,
whereas he had an agreement with the payees to pay one of them in another way.
The defendant gave him no information about any defence to the notes, and told
him they would be paid, and the plaintiff had no knowledge or suspicion of any
defect or want of consideration in the notes. On this evidence the defendant
requested the instruction that the plaintiff could not stand any better than
the payees. The court refused the request, and instructed the jury that the
plaintiff could not recover if he had notice, at the time, of the want of
consideration of the note, or of its fraudulent procurement, or of facts which
put him upon inquiry about any infirmity in the note.
It is not easy to see from
the evidence how the court could have told the jury, as matter of law, that the
plaintiff was chargeable with notice of any want of consideration or defect in
the note. The sale of a patent right is not, as a matter of law, fraudulent and
without legal consideration. Though the business of selling patents and
patented articles may be sometimes accompanied by and intermixed with fraud,
and promissory notes given in such sales may frequently
be the subject of suspicion, mere suspicion of a defect in a note is not notice
of the defect, and does not put one, who seasonably takes it by indorsement,
upon inquiry. Perkins v. Challis, 1 N. H. 254. To charge the holder of a
note taken in the ordinary course of business, before maturity, with notice of
a defence, he must at the time of the transfer have had knowledge of such facts
and circumstances as would have impeached the note in the hands of the payee or
an antecedent holder. Goodman v. Harvey, 4 A. & E. 870; May v.
Chapman, 16 Mees. & W. 355; Goodman v. Simonds, 20 How. 343; Perkins
v. Challis, 1 N. H. 254; Farrell v. Lovett, 68 Me. 326. Whether the
plaintiff had notice of any infirmity in the note at the time of the transfer
was a question of fact, and was submitted to the jury under instructions
sufficiently favorable to the defendant, and to which no exception was taken.
*3 Judgment on
the verdict.
SMITH, J., did not sit:
the others concurred.
N.H. 1880.
60 N.H. 159
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