Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire.
WATSON & a.
v.
WALKER & a.
December Term, 1851.
*1 Wherever the
fact upon which the liability of a party arises, lies peculiarly within the
knowledge and privity of the plaintiff, notice thereof must be alleged in the
pleading, to have been given to the defendant. But where the matter lies as
much within the cognizance of the one party, as the other, notice need not be
given or stated.
Where the plaintiffs
covenanted that they would send an agent to Europe, to make sale of a certain
patent-right, sold to them by the defendants for $1000, and the defendants
covenanted on their part, that if, upon reasonable exertions, sales should not
be effected, they would repay to the plaintiffs, the $1000, or convey to them
one-half the right in the United States,--held, that it was incumbent on
the plaintiffs, to give notice to the defendants that they had failed to effect
sales, before an action could be sustained for the recovery of the $1000. Held,
also, that upon notice being given, the obligation of the defendants was complete to repay the money
or convey the right, and that no special request therefor, was necessary.
Where an obligation to pay
is complete, a cause of action at once arises, and no formal demand is
necessary.
Where notice before suit
is necessary, but a special demand unnecessary, and a plea alleges that notice
was not given, and a demand not made, that part of the plea
stating that a demand was not made, is superfluous, and may, upon general
demurrer, be rejected as surplusage.
When notice is necessary
to be given, before suit brought, and the contract upon which it is founded is
entered into by two jointly, it is sufficient, on general demurrer, if the plea
allege that notice was not given to them. It is not necessary that it
should also allege that it was not given to either of them. Aliter,
if the contract were joint and several.
A memorandum of
transactions reduced to writing immediately after the occurrence of the events
it recites, may be admitted in evidence, in connection with the testimony of
the witness showing the transaction, if the witness shall testify, that he had
no doubt the facts stated in the memorandum were true, and that he should have
sworn to them from recollection a short time afterwards.
Whether a copy of such
memorandum may be used, if the witness swear that at the time he made the copy,
he recollected the facts therein stated, quaere? Quaere, also, whether a
copy, made three years after the original, could be used, even if the witness testify, that at the
time he made the copy, he remembered the facts therein stated, and knew them to
be true.
The written or statute laws
of foreign governments must be verified in the same manner as foreign
judgments, by the exemplification of a copy under the great seal of State, or
by a sworn copy. Unwritten laws may be shown by parol evidence. But witnesses,
to be competent to prove unwritten laws, must be instructed in them.
The national flag and seal
are recognized by all nations. The national seal affixed to the exemplification
of a law or judicial proceeding, proves itself.
*2 If papers that
are passed to the jury are written upon and underscored, by a party or his
counsel, for the purpose of attracting special attention, without the knowledge
of the opposing party or the court, the verdict will be set aside on that
account. But where the matter is known to the opposing counsel, and is not
brought to the notice of the court till after the verdict has been returned, it
will then be too late to take the exception.
COVENANT BROKEN. The
declaration alleged, in substance, that by a certain deed, made at Dover, on
the nineteenth day of August, 1840, between Walker and McIntire, the
defendants, on the one part, and Watson and Austin, the plaintiffs, on the
other, after therein reciting, that Walker had invented a certain improvement,
in a rotary power stocking-loom, for which he had obtained letters patent of
the United States, bearing date the fifth day of December, 1839, and had sold McIntire one undivided half
part of the same, Walker and McIntire for the consideration of one thousand
dollars, paid by Austin and Watson, and of the agreements of Austin and Watson,
in the deed written and hereafter mentioned, assigned, set over and sold to
Watson and Austin, all the right, title, and interest of Walker and McIntire,
in the invention and patent, for, to, and in all parts of the world, without
the limits of the United States, and one of the looms perfect and complete. And
Walker and McIntire further agreed and promised, thereafterwards to furnish
Watson and Austin, at the cost thereof, such other of said looms, as models and
specimens, as might be necessary to enable them advantageously to exhibit the
invention, and sell and dispose of the same. And Watson and Austin, agreed and
engaged, as soon as practicable and convenient, to send an agent to Europe, for
the purpose of exhibiting the invention, and of selling and disposing of the
looms, and the right of making, using and vending the same, and that they and
their agent should make all suitable and proper efforts to do the same to the
best advantage and that whenever they should have sold and disposed of the
right to the amount of twenty-five hundred dollars, they should and would pay
to Walker and McIntire, the further sum of fifteen hundred dollars.
And Walker and McIntire,
further agreed and promised, that in case, after using all proper and
reasonable exertions to sell such right and privilege in Europe, Watson and
Austin, or their agent, should not be able to effect such sales, to the amount of the sum of one thousand
dollars, and all the expenses of such agency, they, Walker and McIntire, would
repay to Austin and Watson the one thousand dollars, and all the reasonable
expenses of the agency, or convey and assure to Watson and Austin, the full undivided
half of the patent-right within the United States; and the plaintiffs in fact
say, that as soon as practicable and convenient, and within a reasonable time
after the signing and sealing of the deed, to wit: on the first day of October,
then next following, they did send an agent to Europe, in pursuance of their
agreement, and engagement aforesaid, and although all suitable and proper
efforts were made by their agent in Europe to sell the looms, and the right of
making, using and vending the same, neither the plaintiffs nor their agent were
able to effect such sales to the amount of one thousand dollars, or for any
other sum, and in prosecuting the agency, they necessarily incurred great
expenses, and paid, and laid out a large sum of money, to wit: the sum of three
thousand dollars, of all which said McIntire and Walker, thereafterwards, to
wit: at said Dover, on the first day of June, 1841, had notice. And although
the plaintiffs have always from the time of making the deed, hitherto, well and
truly kept, performed and fulfilled, all things therein mentioned and
contained, on their part to be kept, fulfilled and performed, according to the
tenor, effect and meaning thereof, the plaintiffs say, that McIntire and Walker
have not re-paid to them the said sum of one thousand dollars, and the
reasonable expenses of the agency,
aforesaid, nor any part thereof, nor conveyed and assigned to them, the one
undivided half part of the patent right within the United States, though
requested so to do, but neglect and refuse so to do, and so the plaintiffs say,
the said McIntire and Walker have not kept their covenants aforesaid, but have
broken the same.
*3 To this
declaration the defendants pleaded five pleas. The first was the general issue.
The second and third set forth, in substance, that the action ought not to be
maintained, because Austin and Watson, after the making the articles of
agreement, did not as soon as practicable and convenient, send an agent to
Europe, for the purpose of exhibiting the invention, and selling and disposing
of the looms, and the right of making, using and vending the same; and further,
that neither they, nor their agent, made all suitable, proper and reasonable
efforts and exertions, to exhibit the invention, and to sell and dispose of the
looms, and the right of making, using and vending the same, to the best
advantage, as by their covenants in the agreement, they were bound to do. And
that the covenants of the plaintiffs, being a condition precedent to the
performance of the covenants of Walker and McIntire, they ought not to be bound
to the performance of their covenants, until the plaintiffs have in all things
performed and fulfilled their covenants. The fifth plea, was one of set-off. To
these several pleas, the plaintiffs replied, and tendered an issue to the
country, which was joined by the defendants.
The fourth plea, was in these words: "and for a further plea
in this behalf, the said Walker and McIntire, by leave of the court here, for
this purpose, first had and obtained, according to the statute, in such case
made and provided, say, the plaintiffs ought not to have or maintain their
action aforesaid, thereof, against them, because they say, that, although said
Austin and Watson, after the making said articles of agreement, did send an
agent to Europe, for the purpose of exhibiting said invention and of selling
and disposing of the said looms, and the right of making, using and vending the
same; yet the said Austin and Watson, did not, within a reasonable time after
the making the said articles of agreement, inform the said Walker and McIntire,
and make known to them, that neither they, or their agent, had been able to
effect such sales, to the amount of one thousand dollars and all the expenses
of such agency, and request of said Walker and McIntire, a re-payment of the
sum of one thousand dollars, and the reasonable expenses of the agency
aforesaid; or a conveyance and assurance to said Watson and Austin, of the full
undivided half of said patent right in the United States, in said declaration
mentioned, as by the tenor of their covenants in said articles of agreement,
they were bound to do; and the covenants of said plaintiffs, being a condition
precedent to the performance of the covenant of said Walker and McIntire, they
ought not to be bound to the performance of their covenants, the said
plaintiffs not having in all things performed and fulfilled their aforesaid covenants; and this they are ready to verify:
wherefore, they pray judgment, if the plaintiffs their action aforesaid,
thereof, against them ought to have or maintain, and for their costs."
*4 To this plea,
there was a general demurrer, and joinder. The agreement upon which the action
was founded, was as follows: "An agreement made this nineteenth day of
August, 1840, between Richard Walker, and Jefferson McIntire, both of Ports
mouth, of the one part, and Benjamin Watson and Elijah Austin of the other
part, witnesseth: that whereas, said Richard Walker has invented a certain
improvement in a rotary power stocking loom, for which he has obtained letters
patent of the United States, bearing date on the fifth day of December, 1839,
and has sold said McIntire, the one undivided half part of the same; now the
said Walker and McIntire for the consideration of one thousand dollars, paid by
said Watson and Austin, and of the agreements of said Watson and Austin,
hereinafter written, have assigned, sold, and set over, and do hereby assign,
sell, and set over to said Watson and Austin, all the right, title and
interest, which we have in the invention and patent aforesaid, for, to, and in
all parts of the world, without the limits of the United States, the same to be
held and enjoyed, by said Watson and Austin, for their own use and benefit, as
fully and entirely as the said Walker and McIntire, or either of them, might
have held and enjoyed the same, had not this assignment or sale been made; and said
Walker and McIntire, for the consideration aforesaid, do hereby sell to said Watson and Austin, one of the said looms,
perfect and complete.
And the said Walker and
McIntire, futher agree and promise hereafter to furnish said Watson and Austin,
at the cost thereof, such other of said looms, as models and specimens, as may
be necessary to enable them advantageously to exhibit such invention, and sell
and dispose of the same.
And the said Watson and
Austin, agree and engage, as soon as practicable and convenient, to send an
agent to Europe, for the purpose of exhibiting said invention, and of selling
and disposing of said looms, and the right of making, using, and vending the same,
and that they and their said agent, shall make all suitable and proper efforts
to do the same to the best advantage, and whenever they shall have sold and
disposed of the right of using, making, or vending said looms, or invention as
aforesaid, to the amount of twenty-five hundred dollars, said Austin and
Watson, shall and will pay said Walker and McIntire, the further sum of fifteen
hundred dollars.
And the said Walker and
McIntire, and each of them, agree and promise to execute and deliver to said
Watson and Austin, or their agent, all such papers, or instruments in writing,
as shall be necessary for the purposes aforesaid. And they further agree and
engage, that they will not sell any of said machines or looms, until said
Watson and Austin shall have had reasonable and sufficient time to make the
aforesaid sales in Europe. And in case of the using all proper and reasonable
exertions to sell such right and privilege in Europe as aforesaid, said Watson and Austin, or their
agent, shall not be able to effect such sales, to the amount of the said sum of
one thousand dollars, and all the expenses of such agency, then, in such case,
said Walker and McIntire, agree and promise to repay said Austin and Watson, said
sum of one thousand dollars, and all the reasonable expenses of the agency
aforesaid, or to convey and assure to them, the full undivided half of said
patent-right within the United States."
*5 A trial was had
upon the issues of fact, during the progress of which, several questions arose.
It was proved, that the
plaintiffs, on the first of October, 1840, sent out to England, a man named
Oliver L. Reynolds, as an agent to effect sales of the machines, described in
the agreement, and the right to make, use and vend the same; and there was
evidence introduced by the defendants, of the nature and character of Reynolds'
previous pursuits and occupations, bearing upon the question of his fitness for
such agency. The plaintiffs offered to prove a conversation between the
parties, before the contract was made, but while it was in agitation, wherein
the defendants said in substance, that Reynolds was a proper and competent
person to go to Europe, to sell such machines and invention. The defendants
objected to the evidence, but it was admitted.
To prove the expenses
attending the agency in England, Reynolds was examined. He stated, that as to certain of the expenses
incurred, he had a distinct recollection; but as to the others, including most
of the smaller expenses, he could not state them from memory. He produced a
bill of those expenses which were incurred from September, 1840, to June, 1841.
He said he made a minute of them about the time they were incurred, in a pocket
memorandum-book. After his return to this country in the fall of 1844, he
copied a bill of those expenses from these minutes, and from that bill he made
another copy. Both these bills were produced, but the witness was unable to
identify the one which was transcribed from the original memorandum. The two
bills were not exact copies of each other. The original memorandum was
not produced, nor shown to be lost; but the witness testified, that after he
made a copy, he effaced the writing on the memorandum-book. He said, that on
examining this bill, he was able to recollect some items, he could not
otherwise remember. He further stated, that at the time he made this bill, he
knew and remembered that the several items mentioned in the bill, were correct.
The defendants objected that the witness could not be permitted to testify,
with a reference to this bill. But the court held, that it was immaterial when
the bill was made, if the witness testified he knew it to be correct at the
time it was made, and admitted the evidence.
A question arose as to the
time when, by the law of England, the specification of a new invention may be
filed after the issuing of a patent. The plaintiffs offered the said Reynolds
as a witness, and he testified, that he knew what
the law of England was, on this subject, having had an interest to ascertain
the law, and having enquired of lawyers reported to be familiar with this
branch of the law; and the court admitted his testimony, subject to exception.
For the purpose of proving
certain charges claimed by the plaintiffs as parts of the expenses of the
agency in England, namely, the charges of money paid to secure a patent-right
in England, the plaintiffs offered in evidence the patent under what purported
to be the great seal of England. The defendants objected to its admission,
unless further evidence was introduced in relation to it, than what the
document and the seal contained; but the court admitted it.
*6 The court
allowed a letter of the defendant, (McIntire,) dated August ninth, 1840, to
Reynolds, to be read to the jury, as evidence of the defendant's assent to
Reynold's appointment to go to Europe, to sell the invention, though objected
to by the defendants. The letter was as follows:
"Portsmouth,
August 9th, 1840.
BROTHER REYNOLDS--Dear
Sir: Why I write, I feel fearful that you will let this chance for a great
bargain, slip; for I do say there is the greatest bargain that I ever knew, or
heard of before. That is my opinion. And I want you and your uncle, to come
down this week and see if we cannot make a bargain. In the first place, I think
there is a great chance to make you rich. In the second, I have never seen a
man so well calculated to go out there, in all my travels, as you are. And in the third place, I had as lief
make you rich, as any brother I have.
Please answer this, or
come down immediately.
Yours with respect,
JEFFERSON MCINTIRE."
The plaintiffs offered to
prove a conversation, which took place between the parties just before the
contract in suit was executed, relative to the taking out of letters-patent in
England, and showing that it was understood by the parties that one of the earliest
things to be done in that country, would be to take out letters-patent there
for the invention. The defendants objected, but the court admitted the
evidence. And the court referred it to the jury to decide, as a matter of fact
upon the evidence, whether the expense of obtaining that patent, was a
reasonable and proper expense attending the agency, or whether it was an
expense incurred by the plaintiffs for their own benefit and security.
The defendants contended
that as soon as the letters-patent were taken out in England, as it appeared
they were in the name of Reynolds, the invention became the property of the
plaintiffs, and the defendants' liability to refund the thousand dollars and pay
the expenses of the agency ceased; and asked the court so to instruct the jury.
But the court instructed the jury that the defendants, having assigned to the
plaintiffs all their right to the invention out of the United States, it was proper the patent should
be taken out in their name, or that of their agent, as they chose; and that the
liability of the defendant for the expense of the agency, and the re-payment of
the thousand dollars, advanced by the plaintiffs, was not affected by that
circumstance, and that their liability for the expense of the patent depended,
not upon the name in which it issued, but upon the question whether that
expense was a reasonable and proper expense attending the agency.
It appearing, by Reynolds'
testimony, that he had done nothing towards effecting a sale until the
letters-patent were issued in England, November 25th, 1840, and that on the
twelfth of January, 1841, he made a contract with Brittle & Co., to improve
the machine, for which, if successful, he was to receive fifteen thousand
pounds sterling; and was to keep the whole matter secret from that time, and
that up to that time, he had never offered the same for less than forty
thousand pounds sterling, and that he had never received any offer whatever
from any person, except the offer of fifteen thousand pounds sterling, in case
the machine could be improved in certain respects; the defendants contended
that the agent did not make such exertions to sell as would entitle the
plaintiffs to recover; that the agent was bound to sell for a sum equal to the
thousand dollars and the expenses of the agency if he could get no more. The
court left it to the jury, upon the evidence, to decide whether the agent had,
or had not made proper efforts to effect sales of
the patent right; and whether the naming of a price, so high as forty thousand
pounds sterling, had, or had not the effect of preventing sales at a lower
rate; at the same time stating to the jury, that if the agent found no person
who appeared desirous to make the purchase, it was not necessary that he should
offer it at any particular price.
*7 The contract
providing that an agent should be sent to Europe, the defendants contended that
the plaintiffs had not performed their part of the contract, the agent sent by
them having made efforts to sell in England only, and in no other part of
Europe. The court, however, instructed the jury, that it was for them to
determine, upon the evidence, whether the attempts made by the plaintiffs'
agent to sell in England, were reasonable and proper efforts, to effect sales
of the invention; or whether it was reasonable and proper, that those efforts
should be extended to any, and what other part of Europe.
Reynolds, the plaintiffs'
agent, testified, that he ceased to be their agent, in June, 1841, but he
continued in England and Scotland, till the autumn of 1844, engaged in his own
private business. The plaintiffs contended that in addition to the other
expenses of the agency, they were entitled to recover the ordinary expenses of
the return of the agent to the United States; and the court so instructed the
jury.
To the several rulings and
instructions of the court, the defendants excepted.
The jury returned a
verdict for the plaintiffs, which the defendants moved might be set aside, and a new trial granted,
on account of said exceptions. They also moved for a new trial, because certain
letters of the defendants, which were put in evidence, were handed to the jury,
although they had been written upon, and the lines in the same underscored, for
the purpose of attracting attention, and although the defendants objected to
their being handed to the jury, with the other evidence. The objection,
however, was not made to the court, but by one counsel to the other, and the
facts in regardto the letters, were not brought to the notice of the court till
after the verdict was returned.
The questions arising upon
the demurrer, and also upon the motion for a new trial, were transferred to
this court for determination.
Headnotes
Emery, with whom
was J. S. Wells, for the defendants.
*8 I shall first
consider the questions arising upon the plaintiffs' demurrer to our fourth
plea. Upon this plea, this question is raised; were the plaintiffs bound,
within a reasonable time after making the agreement, and before the
commencement of this action, to make known to the defendants, their failure to
make sales in Europe, and the amount of the expenses, and make demand on the
defendants, to pay the thousand dollars and expenses of the agency, or convey
to them one half of the patent right in the United States?
The defendants contend, that this duty rested
upon the plaintiffs; and not having been performed, they cannot maintain this
action. Whenever the defendants' liability to perform an act, depends upon
another occurrence, which is best known to the plaintiff; and of which the
defendant is not legally bound to take notice, the plaintiff must allege and
prove that due notice was in fact given; because the request is parcel of the
agreement, and traversable. 1 Chitty's Pl., 496; Com. Dig. Pl., c. 73; Arch.
Pl. & Ev., 91.
Or in other words; when
the contingency upon which a contract is to be performed, or the matter alleged
in pleading is to be considered as lying more properly in the knowledge of the
party pleading, than of the other, there ought to be an averment that the other
party had notice thereof, and the omission of such an averment will be fatal. Holmes
v. Twist, Hob. Rep., 51, note to William's edition; 2 Saund. Rep., 62, a,
note, 4; Lent v. Paddleford, 10 Mass. Rep., 238; Hatch & a. v.
White & a., 22 Pick. Rep., 518.
The defendants were not
bound to pay the plaintiffs any money, except upon the failure of the
plaintiffs to sell the invention in Europe. Whether the plaintiffs did, or not,
fail, the defendants could not know except through the plaintiffs; their
liability, then, depended upon an occurrence, which was best known to the
plaintiffs, and the case comes directly within the principles above stated.
Another principle of law,
applied to this case, sustains the plea. Where, by the express or implied terms of the contract,
it is incumbent on the plaintiff, before the commencement of his action, to
request the defendant to perform his contract, such a request being, as it
were, a condition precedent, must be averred and proved. 1 Chitty's Pl., 323; 1
Arch. N. P., 70, 71; Arch. Pl. & Ev., 153; Com. Dig. Pl., c. 69; Birks
v. Tippet, 1 Saund. Rep., 32, note 2; Bach v. Owen, 5 Durn. &
East, 409; Davis v. Emery, 11 N. H. Rep., 230; Roundtree v.
Hendricks, adm'r., 1 B. Monroe's Rep., 189. This last case, we consider
particularly in point.
The contract between the
parties, does not provide that the defendants are to pay the expense of the
attempt to sell in Europe, or convey one half of the patent right in the United
States, upon demand or request, but such must, we think, be clearly
implied and understood from the agreement. They have an election to pay in
money, or to convey one half of the patent right. How long were they bound to
retain in themselves the patent right? A reasonable time; and if they heard
nothing from the plaintiffs within a reasonable time after making the
agreement, they might well suppose that the plaintiffs had been successful, and
they, therfore, under no liabilities to pay, or convey. It must then have been
understood, as part of the contract, that the plaintiffs were bound to give the
defendants notice of their failure to sell in Europe, and request a conveyance
of one half of the patent right in theUnited States. If so, the notice and
demand, are a condition precedent to the plaintiffs' right to recover.
*9 Again, the
plaintiffs' right, was a contingent one. They had no right, unless they made a
failure to sell. How were the defendants to know that the contingency had
happened, except from the plaintiffs, who were bound to give the defendants the
notice within a reasonable time, because the defendants had their election to
pay money, or convey part of the patent right? Barker v. Jones, 8 N. H.
Rep., 413. For these reasons we say that there should be judgment for the defendants
upon the demurrer.
II. The defendants
contend, that the verdict should be set aside and a new trial granted, by
reason of the exceptions taken upon the trial.
1. The declarations of the
defendants about Reynolds being a fit person to go to Europe, as agent for the
plaintiffs, were inadmissible. The defendants had nothing to do or say, in
relation to employing the agent. It was no concern of theirs, nor were they
answerable for him. The only question arising upon this subject is, did he do
all that a person well qualified for the business could have done to effect a
sale. It would be no answer to the complaint that he had neglected his duty,
that the defendants spoke of him, or recommended him, as a suitable and fit
person to transact the business.
2. The evidence of
Reynolds, with the copies of the bills of expenses, was improperly admitted.
The bill of expenses was admitted to go to the jury as evidence; and it was a
copy, not an original. It does not come within the principle laid down in Haven v. Wendell
& a., 11 N. H. Rep., 112. The cases of Burton v. Plumer, 2 Adol.
& El., and Merrill v. Ithica Railroad Co., 16 Wendell's Rep., 586,
referred to, and commented upon, in Haven v. Wendell, seem to be directly
in point. See also, Doe v. Perkins, 3 D. & E., 754; Jones v.
Stroud, 2 Car. & P., 196; Steinkeller v. Newton, 9 Car. &
P., 313; 1 Stark. on Ev., 178, 179; 2 Phil. Ev., Hill & Cowen's note, 756;
3 Phil. Ev., H. & C. note, 1239. The principal, and only sound reason for
admitting the paper as evidence, in Haven v. Wendell, was, that it was a
record of a fact, made at the time, where the witness was little liable to
mistake, and better than his recollection of the facts long afterwards.
3. Reynolds should not
have been allowed to testify as to what the law of England is, in regard to
filing a specification. It should have been proved by a certified copy of the
law, as it is a statute provision. Reynolds knew nothing upon the subject
except by hearsay. 1 Greenl. Ev., §
§ 486 to 489; 3 Phil. Ev., H.
& C., note, 1142.
4. The seal to the patent
should have been proved, or in some way identified. Our courts will undoubtedly
take notice of the seals of the several States, and of the courts of the United
States, but the rule must be different in relation to foreign countries. How
are the courts of this State to know any thing about the seals of foreign
nations?
*10 5. The letter
of McIntire to Reynolds was improperly admitted. It was not between the parties to this suit. It was
from one of the defendants; and being laid before the jury, affected the rights
and interests of the other defendant, who never assented to it or had any
knowledge of it. The admission or statements of the one are not evidence
against the other. Kelley v. Sanborn, 9 N. H. Rep., 46; Exeter Bank
v. Sullivan, 6 N. H. Rep., 124; Jaggers v. Binnings, 1 Stark. Rep.,
64; Collyer on Partnership, 456, 689.
6. The conversations of
the parties, had about the time of making the contract, about taking out
letters-patent in England, were not properly admitted. The question made, was
this: was the taking out of letters-patent in England, necessary to accomplish
the purposes of the plaintiffs, in sending an agent to Europe, and were the
defendants bound to pay the expenses of the same? This question must be settled
by a reference to, and a construction of, the contract. The contract is in
writing, under seal, and executed by the parties after due deliberation, and
with the usual formalities of a sealed instrument. It is susceptible of
construction, and the conversations of the parties, had at, or about the time
of the execution, were therefore inadmissible. Hasbrook v. Paddock, 1
Barb. Rep., 635; 3 Phil. Ev., C. & H. notes, 1466, 7, and 8; 1 Greenl. Ev.,
§ 275.
7. The court erred in
leaving the construction of the contract to the jury. The several questions
that were left to them in regard to the reasonableness of the expenses, were
not questions of fact, but of law. They depended upon the construction to be given to the contract, and
should, therefore, have been decided by the court, without being left to the
jury. The interpretation as well as the construction of a written instrument,
is for the court, and not for the jury. 1 Greenl. Ev., 400, note 4; Story's
Agency, 63, note 1; Paley's Agency, 198; Thompson & als. v. Giles
& als., 2 Barn & Cress. Rep., 422; Wharf v. Howell, 5
Binney's Rep., 499; 1 Stark. Ev., 525; McBeath v. Haldibrand, 1 D. &
E., Rep., 180.
8. The verdict should be
set aside, on account of the letters being given to the jury after they had
been underscored for the purpose of attracting attention. Upon this point it is
only necessary to refer to the case of Knight v. Colman, decided in
Rockingham county, July term, 1848.
Christie, with whom
was Hale, for the plaintiffs.
The first questions
considered by the defendants, are those arising upon the demurrer to the fourth
plea. This plea is bad, and the demurrer thereto well taken, for several
reasons.
1. It is a rule of
pleading, that a plea in bar must deny, or confess and avoid the facts stated
in the declaration. 1 Chitty's Pl. 525; 5 B. & C., 479; Tidd, 653; Steph.
on Pl., 52, 200. This plea does neither of these.
*11 Again, every
plea should be so pleaded, as to be capable of trial; and therefore must
consist of matter of fact, the existence of which may be tried by a jury, on an
issue, or the sufficiency of which may be determined by the court upon demurrer. And if fact be improperly
confounded or mixed, in the plea, with matter of law, so that it cannot be
tried by the court or jury, the plea is bad. This plea is bad under this rule.
It alleges, that the plaintiffs did not within a reasonable time give notice,
and make demand. This is like the case of a suit on a bond, conditioned that
the defendant will show a sufficient discharge of an annuity, to which a plea
that defendant showed a sufficient discharge, is bad. 9 Co., 25, a.; 19 Johns.
Rep., 371; Lawes Pl., 138; 1 Ch. Pl., 540; 2 Mod. 55.
2. The ground of defence,
stated in this plea is, that the plaintiffs did not, within a reasonable time,
give to the defendants the notice, and make upon them the demand in the
plea mentioned. If then it was not necessary for the plaintiffs, within a
reasonable time, to give the notice and make the demand, to, and upon both
of the defendants, the plea is bad, and the demurrer must be sustained.
The rule in relation to
notice is well settled, and is, that whenever the fact upon which the
defendant's liability is incurred, lies peculiarly within the knowledge and
privity of the plaintiffs, notice thereof must be stated and proved to have
been given to the defendant. But when the matter does not lie more properly in
the knowledge of the plaintiff, than of the defendant, notice need not be
averred. On these points the rule is clear, and all the authorities agree.
When notice is necessary, it ought to appear
that it was given in due time, and to a proper person. And if several are bound
by obligation, or covenant, to do an act, upon notice to them, notice to
one of them is sufficient. Com. Dig. Pl., ch. 74; Do., 71; Do., Condition L.,
9; Holbrook v. Holbrook, 9 Shepl. Rep., 9.
Under the above rule, no
notice from the plaintiffs to the defendants was necessary; for the defendants'
liability depended upon the doings and success of the agent, who was sent to
Europe; and though he was sent by the plaintiffs, the defendants had an
interest in the agency, and a consequent right to be informed and kept advised
by him of his doings; and they had also equal opportunity with the plaintiffs
to be informed of his doings and success.
But if this be not so, and
the events upon which the defendants' liability was dependant, were so
peculiarly within the knowledge of the plaintiffs that they were bound to give
notice to the defendants, still notice to one of them was enough, and
the plea should have alleged that notice was not given to the said Walker and
McIntire, or either of them, as the plaintiffs were not bound to notify both.
But the plea goes upon the
ground, that notice within a reasonble time to both the defendants was
not enough, but that the plaintiffs must also allege and prove that they,
within a reasonable time, requested of the defendants, a re- payment of the sum
of $1000, or a conveyance, &c. But even if the law required the notice claimed by the plea, it did not
require, in addition thereto, a request to perform one or the other
alternatives. The moment the contingency, upon the happening of which the
defendants covenanted to perform one or the other of said alternatives, had
happened, and the defendants were properly informed thereof, their liability
attached and was fixed, and they became liable and bound, upon a good and
executed consideration, to do or perform one or the other, at their own
election, of said alternatives, as matter of debt or duty. 1 Saund., 33; Com.
Dig. Pleader, C., 69; Amory v. Braddick, 5 B. & A., 712; 1 D. &
E., 361; Bul. N. P., 151, C.; Simpson v. Routh, 2 B. & C., 683; Wallis
v. Scott, 1 Strange, 88; Bockenham v. Thacker, 2 Vent., 75; Cro.
Eliz., 85; Lent v. Paddleford, 10 Mass. Rep., 230; Townsend v. Wells,
3 Day's Rep., 327; Smith v. Emery, 7 Halst. Rep., 53.
*12 In the case at
bar, if notice was necessary, then we submit, that when the contingency has
actually happened, and the plaintiffs have seasonably given the notice, the
defendants have the full knowledge of the completion of the consideration of
their promise or undertaking; and that consequently, nothing in addition to the
notice is necessary, to fix their liability.
3. But if it should be
held, that the plaintiffs, in addition to giving the notice within a reasonable
time, were bound to request the defendants to repay the $1000, and the
expenses, or to convey one half of the patent, in order to entitle them to
maintain their action; we submit that it is enough, that such demand was made at any time before the
action was commenced, and that it was not necessary that such request should be
made within a reasonable time after the making of the agreement, as in the plea
is required to be done. We admit that the notice, if any were required, must be
within a reasonable time; but a demand and request at any time before action
brought, is sufficient; more especially when notice of all the facts has been
given within a reasonable time. The case from B. Monroe's Report, as also Barker
v. Jones, and Davis v. Emery, cited by the defendants' counsel, do
not appear to me to have any particular application to the question. With these
few suggestions, we submit the questions arising on the demurrer.
II. The defendants having
introduced evidence tending, or designed to show Reynolds incompetent to
execute the agency contemplated in the contract, the plaintiffs had of course
the right to introduce counter evidence on this point, thus rendered material,
if it were not so before; and what more pertinent evidence could there be than
the declarations of the defendants themselves? Again, in the view the
defendants take of the matter, it was immaterial; and for the admission of
immaterial evidence the court will not set aside a verdict. Clements v.
Brooks, 13 N. H. Rep., 92.
III. The ruling of the
court, admitting the testimony of Reynolds and the bill, to prove the small
expenses, will we think, upon consideration of all the facts and cases, and the
doctrine and practice of this court, be found to be right. In Haven v. Wendell, 11 N. H.
Rep., 112, the matter is very fully and ably discussed, and most of the
important cases commented upon. We rely upon the doctrine of that case as fully
sustaining this ruling. The principle established in that case and in many
others, is, that if the witness swears that the paper or memorandum was made by
him or another in his presence, and under his inspection, and that, at the time
it was made, he knew the statements therein contained to be true, but has now
forgotton them, then, the writing, with this declaration of the witness, became
admissible in evidence. There is, should be, or can be no limitation of the
time, within which, after the occurrence of the events recorded in the
memorandum, the entries should or must be made, other than that they must have
been made while the witness has a recollection and knowledge of their truth.
And we submit and contend that the memorandum of 1844, was as much an original,
as the former one. They were both the offspring of memory, or both sanctioned
and ratified by memory. Benton v. Plumer, 2 Ad. & Ellis, 341.
*13 Though we did
not show the loss of the memorandum-book, yet we did show the utter destruction
and loss of the writing, which was the only material thing about it. We kept
back nothing.
IV. Reynolds' testimony as
to the patent law of England, in the particulars in question, was admissible.
Foreign unwritten laws, customs and usages may be proved, and indeed must be
proved, by parol evidence. Church v. Hurbart,
2 Cranch. 237; Sto. Con. Laws, 530; Kenney v. Vanhorn, 1 Johns,. 384; Woodbridge
v. Austin, 2 Tyler, 367; Livingston v. Maryland Ins. Co., 6 Cranch,
274; Lincoln v. Battell, 6 Wendl., 482; Bagley v. Francis, 14;
Mass. Rep., 453; Bush v. Wilkins, 4 Johns. Ch. Rep., 506, 520; 3
Wendell, 177; 13 Pick. Rep., 293.
The party objecting to
parol evidence of a foreign law, must show it to be a written one, or the
objection will not prevail. Dougherty v. Snyder, 15 Serg. & Rawle,
84, 87; 6 Cranch, 274, 280; Newsom v. Adams, 2 Mill. Lou. Rep., 155.
V. The great seal of
England, proved the patent offered; and the court properly admitted the same. 1
Greenl. Ev., § 4; 2 Cranch, 187, 238; 2
Cowen, 85, 90; 4 Dall., 416; Wheat., 273; 9 Mod., 66; 6 Wendell, 475.
VI. The letter of McIntire
was admissible. He is a party to the record, and the general rule is, that the
declarations of a party to the record, or of one identified in interest with
him, are, as against such party, admissible in evidence. This rule applies to
all cases where the party has any interest in the suit, whether others are
joint parties on the same side with him or not. If the parties have a joint
interest in the matter in suit, whether as plaintiffs or defendants, an
admission made by one, is, in general, evidence against all. There are numerous
authorities that sustain this position. But the defendants' counsel cites and
relies upon the case of Exeter Bank v. Sullivan, 6 N. H. Rep., 124. Although this case, contrary to
many others, holds that an admission, or promise, by one joint debtor, does not
take a case out of the statute as to another joint promissor, still the court,
in giving the opinion, expressly admit and affirm the principle for which we
contend, "that an admission in such case by one, that the debt is unpaid,
is an admission of the fact against all." We think this case settles this
point for the plaintiffs.
VII. As to the questions
left to the jury relative to the expenses of the agency, we think the counsel
upon the other side has taken an erroneous view of the whole matter. We do not
differ from him in the law laid down, but we contend that the court did give
all proper constructions to the contract, and left to the jury only questions
of fact arising upon the same. The court on examining the case will so find.
*14 VIII. The
English patent was properly taken in the name of Reynolds. It was taken to
secure the interests of all concerned, and did no wrong to the defendants. The
charge of the court in this respect, was correct, as were also the instructions
in regard to the expenses of the home passage.
IX. The papers mentioned
in the affidavits went to the jury by the consent of the defendants'
counsel--at least so we regard them. At all events, they were immaterial, and
the verdict cannot be set aside on account of their going to the jury.
EASTMAN, J.
This action was brought
upon an agreement under seal, dated August nineteenth, 1840, which is set forth
at length, in the facts of the case. The declaration sets out the agreement in
full, with the general averments, that the plaintiffs have kept, fulfilled and
performed, all matters to be by them fulfilled and performed, and a general
allegation of request upon the defendants, and neglect and refusal by them.
Several pleas were
interposed to the plaintiffs' right of recovery, upon all of which, excepting
the fourth, an issue of fact was joined. To the fourth, a general demurrer was
filed, and the defendants joined in demurrer. Pursuing the course adopted in
the argument, we will first consider the issue of law.
That part of the
agreement, upon which the questions of law are raised, is substantially as
follows; "And the said Watson and Austin agree and engage, as soon as
practicable and convenient, to send an agent to Europe, for the purpose of
exhibiting said invention, and selling and disposing of said looms, and the
right of making, using and vending the same, and that they and their said
agent, shall make all suitable and proper efforts to do the same to the best
advantage." "And in case after using all proper and reasonable
exertions to sell such right and privilege in Europe, as aforesaid, said Watson
and Austin, or their agent, shall not be able to effect such sales, to the
amount of the said sum of one thousand
dollars, and all the expenses of such agency, then in such case, said Walker
and McIntire agree, and promise to repay said Austin and Watson, said sum of
one thousand dollars, and all the reasonable expenses of the agency, aforesaid,
or to convey and assure to them the full undivided half of said patent right
within the United States."
The plea alleges, in
substance, that although Austin and Watson did send an agent to Europe for the
purpose of making the sales according to the agrement, yet that they did not
within a reasonable time, inform the defendants that neither they nor their
agent had been able to effect sales to the amount of one thousand dollars and
the expenses of the agency, and request of the defendants a re-payment of the
sum of one thousand dollars and the reasonable expenses of the agency, or a
conveyance to Watson and Austin, of the undivided half of the patent right in
the United States; and that the covenants of the plaintiffs, being a condition
precedent to the performance of the covenant of the defendants, the defendants
ought not to be bound to the performance of their covenants, the plaintiffs not
having in all things performed and fulfilled theirs.
*15 The principal
question raised by this plea and demurrer, is, whether notice of the failure to
make sales in Europe, was necessary to be given by the plaintiffs to the
defendants, before an action could be sustained upon the agreement. In relation
to notice the rule is, that whenever the fact upon which the defendant's liability is incurred, lies
peculiarly within the knowledge and privity of the plaintiff, notice thereof
must be stated to have been given to the defendant. But where the matter lies
as much within the cognizance of the one party, as the other, notice is not
necessary. When, however, notice is necessary, either by the terms or nature of
the contract, it is of the gist of the action, and must be specially averred in
the declaration, for without such averment, no complete right of action can
appear. 1 Saund. on Pl. & Ev., 132; Gould's Pleading, ch. 4, § 15; Rex v. Holland, 5 Term Rep., 621,
624; Lent & a. v. Paddleford, 10 Mass. Rep., 230, 238; Clough v.
Hoffman, 5 Wendell's Rep., 500. To these authorities many others might be
added.
By the terms of the
agreement, the thousand dollars, were not to be re-paid by the defendants, till
the plaintiffs had sent to Europe, and made all reasonable exertions to sell
the right there, without success. The effort to sell, was to be made either by
Watson and Austin, or by their agent. It was not confined to the agent alone;
and whether sales were effected or not, was a fact known to Watson and Austin,
or to their agent, or both, and also to the purchasers. In making the sales,
the plaintiffs are to act for themselves, and the agent is theirs. He was
employed by them and is accountable to them. The defendants are interested in
the sales, but the agent is in no way responsible to them or required to make
known to them his doings. The defendants cannot know whether sales have been
effected or not, except through the plaintiffs or their agent, or by enquiries of purchasers. If
the information does not come from them, and they do not see fit to communicate
it, the defendants must remain in entire ignorance of the true state of the
matter, unless they employ an agent themselves, to attend the plaintiffs or
their agent, and note their doings. This, the agreement nowhere contemplates;
and whether sales are made or not, appears to us to to be a fact peculiarly
within the knowledge of the plaintiffs. And the plain and obvious intent of the
instrument is, as we think, that the plaintiffs shall, in case of failure to
make sales, communicate the fact to the defendants before they can have a cause
of action against them.
That the information
should be communicated within a reasonable time seems clear. The condition is
in the alternative. The defendants were to repay the thousand dollars, or to
convey and assure to the plaintiffs the full undivided half of the patent
within the United States; and it cannot be required that they should hold
themselves in readiness to carry out the conditions of the agreement for an
indefinite time. Com. Dig. Pleader, C., 74. The argument of counsel concedes
that if notice is necessary before suit brought, it should be given within a
reasonable time. Thus far, then, the plea is good. Notice should be given, and
within a reasonable time.
*16 Whether it was
necessary to make a special request for a performance of the conditions before
suit, depends upon the question whether, upon notice being given of the failure
to effect sales by the plaintiffs, the obligation
on the part of the defendants was complete. The defendants contracted to repay
the thousand dollars and also pay the expenses of the agency, or to convey one
half of the right in the United States, in case the plaintiffs could not effect
sales to the extent set forth in the contract. If, then, the plaintiffs should
attempt to sell, using all fair and honorable endeavors so to do, and failing,
should give notice of their inability to effect the sales, they do all that is
required of them by the terms of the agreement or a fair construction of the
same, and the obligation of the defendants arises to repay the thousand dollars
or convey one half of the right in the United States. When an obligation to pay
is complete, a cause of action at once arises and no formal demand is
necessary. Gould's Pl., chap. 4, § 15;
Com. Dig. Pleader, C., 69; Birks v. Trippett, 1 Saunders, 33, a.; Bul.
Nisi Pri., 151, C.; 1 Saunders, on Pl. & Ev., 130, 131; Wallis v. Scott,
1 Strange, 88.
Had, then, the declaration
contained an averment of notice, no averment of a special demand would have
been necessary, though it would be improbable, as a matter of fact, that the
plaintiffs should give notice, without, at the same time, making a demand.
The plea alleges that the
plaintiffs did not make known their inability to effect sales and
request a re-payment of the thousand dollars or a conveyance of one half of the
right. As we hold a demand or request to be unnecessary after notice given, the plea might have been
bad on special demurrer, for containing the request in connection with the
notice. But upon general demurrer, the statement that no request was made, may
be regarded as immaterial, and rejected as surplusage. It was superfluous and
unnecessary. If the plaintiffs had replied that they did make known their
inability to effect sales, it would have been sufficient, without making any
reply to the allegation of want of request; and a demurrer to such a
replication would have failed. Or had issue been taken upon the plea, and
notice proved, it would have been sufficient without proving any special
demand.
But it is further objected
to the plea, that it does not confess and avoid the facts stated in the
declaration. But this objection is not well founded in fact. The plea
substantially admits all the averments in the declaration, but avoids them by
the introduction of new matter--by the statement that no notice was given of
the failure of the plaintiffs to make sales, upon which fact the defendant's
liability depended. The plea sets forth matter of fact which is traversable and
upon which issue should have been joined, or a replication have been made
thereto.
*17 The further
objection that the plea does not state that notice was not given to the
defendants or either of them, cannot prevail. The defendants were
jointly interested and the contract on their part was joint. A general
allegation of no notice to them is all that is necessary, especially on general
demurrer, inasmuch as the undertaking was a
joint one by them. A notice to one, is a notice to both. Had the obligation
been joint and several, the objection might perhaps have been good.
Upon the issue of law,
then, the opinion of the court is, that there must be judgment for the
defendants, upon the demurrer.
Quite a number of
questions were raised upon the trial of the issues of fact, which, for the
present disposition of the case, would be unnecessary to settle; but as the
action will probably be tried again, upon a change of pleadings, we have
thought best to state, as briefly as may be, our opinion upon the several
exceptions taken.
The evidence in regard to
the statements of the defendants, touching the qualifications of Reynolds as an
agent to go to Europe and effect the sales, was rightly admitted. It was a part
of the contract that the plaintiffs should send an agent to Europe to sell the
looms and right there. The defendants undertook to show that the agent who was
sent, was not qualified; and to answer this position and rebut this evidence,
the statements of the defendants in regard to the agent were admissible. They
had no connection with the terms of the contract so as to be objectionable, as
varying, in any way, the written agreement between the parties.
Upon the next point
raised, the correctness of the ruling is very questionable. The bill produced
and which was permitted to go to the jury, was a
copy of items taken from a pocket memorandum book, three years after the
original entries were made. And although the witness testifies that at the time
he made the copy, he knew and remembered that the several items mentioned in
the bill were correct, yet none of the cases, so far as our researches have
extended, have gone to the extent that a copy may be admitted, in connection
with the testimony of the witness. But wherever the question has been
distinctly raised the copy has been held inadmissible. This was the case in Merrill
v. Ithica R. R. Co., 16 Wendell, 586; Doe v. Perkins, 3 D. & E.,
749; and Tanner v. Taylor, cited in Doe v. Perkins. And it
appears to us that it would be a rule of very doubtful expediency to allow a
witness to make a copy of an original, years after the transaction, and be
permitted to use that copy as original evidence.
Again, in this case, two
copies were made. Which is to be used? The witness is unable to identify the
one taken from the original, and they are not exact copies of each other. If
not exact copies, how far may they be permitted to vary before losing their
character as original evidence? And further, the original itself was not
destroyed. It is true the witness testified it had been effaced, but it would
have been more satisfactory to have have had it produced, that the court might
inspect it.
*18 The doctrine of
Haven v. Wendell, 11 N. H. Rep., 112, was evidently adopted after a full
examination of the case, and after careful and mature consideration. A reexamination of those cases
and the lucid and pointed remarks of the very able and learned chief justice
who delivered the opinion in that case, satisfy us that the principles there
laid down were entirely correct. It was there held that where a witness reduced
the conversation to writing immediately after it took place, and testified that
he had no doubt that the facts stated in the memorandum were true, the original
memorandum might be used in connection with the testimony of the witness. But
in the case at bar, it is not the original entries, made at the time or
immediately after the transactions, connected with the testimony of the witness
that, at the time he made them, he knows they were true, that were used, but a
copy, made three years after the original, and a recollection that, at that
time, the witness remembered that the entries he had made were correct. As we
view it, this is extending the principle of Haven v. Wendell, to a
considerable extent. Lapse of time, three years for instance, in most cases
impairs the recollection and weakens the confidence that we place in
human testimony. It is one thing to make a memorandum correctly at the time of
a transaction, and quite another to make it three years thereafter. With these
suggestious we pass this point.
The ruling admitting the
testimony of Reynolds to show what the law of England was, as to the filing of
a specification of a new invention, was incorrect. The written or statute laws
of a foreign government must be verified in the same manner as foreign judgments: by the
exemplification of a copy under the great seal of state, or by a sworn copy.
Unwritten laws may be shown by parol evidence. Upon these points the
authorities are numerous and generally uniform. Whether the law proposed to be
proved by Reynolds was written or unwritten does not distinctly appear.
Probably it was statute law, and if so, his testimony would be incompetent on
that account. Some authorities hold that the party objecting to the parol
evidenee must show the law to be a written one. Dougherty v. Snyder, 15
Serg. & Rawle, 84, 87. But assuming that it was unwritten, the testimony of
Reynolds was still incompetent to prove it. The knowledge which he possessed was
not of that character which a court could rely upon. It could not be regarded
as anything more than hearsay. Witnesses to be competent to prove unwritten
laws must be instructed in them. Story's Con. of Laws, 530; Church v.
Hubbard, 2 Cranch's Rep., 237; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 488.
The great seal of England
proved the patent. The national flag and seal are recognized by all nations.
The national seal, affixed to the exemplification of a law or judicial
proceeding, proves itself. Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cranch's Rep., 187; Lincoln
v. Battelle, 6 Wendell's Rep., 475; Griswold v. Pitcairn, 2 Conn.
Rep., 85; State v. Carr, 5 N. H. Rep., 367. The ruling of the court upon
this point was correct.
*19 So, also, we
think the ruling to be right in admitting the letter of McIntire to Reynolds.
It contained evidence tending to show the fitness
of Reynolds to transact the business, and was the sayings of one of the
defendants in regard to him. It was the admission of an independent fact; and
as such was competent to be considered.
Thus, too, in regard to
the next exception. The conversations prior to the execution of the agreement,
as having a bearing upon the expenses of the agency were properly admitted.
They were independent facts and formed no part of the contract and in no way
affected it.
The instructions of the
court in regard to the taking out of the patent in Europe, in the name of
Reynolds, and also in regard to the proceedings of Reynolds in attempting to
effect sales, were, we think, correct. They were mixed questions of law and
fact, and we do not discover any error in the instructions given.
We think, also, that the
court judged correctly in leaving it to the jury to determine whether the agent
had used all proper and reasonable exertions to sell the right in Europe. Both
parties were interested that the sales should be effected if they could be. And
if they could not be, it was certainly for the interest of the defendants that
the expenses should not accumulate. Whether the agent should traverse the
different countries of Europe, and if so to what particular extent; or whether
he should not attempt to go beyond England, in using all reasonable and proper
efforts to effect sales, appears to us to be clearly a question of fact for the
jury. The point was, did he use reasonable and
proper efforts to make the sales? Of that the jury should judge from the
evidence.
We see no objection to the
ruling, allowing the expenses of the return of the agent to the United States.
It is too late to take the
exception that the letters were improperly handed to the jury. Had they been
written upon and underscored for the purpose of attracting any special
attention, and passed to the jury without the knowledge of the opposing counsel
or the court; or had the matter been brought to the notice of the court and the
letters been handed to the jury under their ruling; in either event the verdict
would be set aside. Juries must judge of papers as they are, and not as they
shall be subsequently made by a party or his counsel. But inasmuch as the
situation of the letters was known to the opposing counsel, it was their duty
to have raised the objection to the court, that a ruling might have been had
thereon. Omitting to do this, the exception must be overruled.
Judgment for the
defendants, on the demurrer, and verdict set aside.
N.H. 1851.
23 N.H. 471, 3 Fost. 471
END OF DOCUMENT