Superior Court of Judicature of New Hampshire.
DUNBAR
v.
MARDEN.
December Term, 1842.
*1 The general rule
is, that the best evidence must be produced which the nature of the case can
admit, and which is in the power of the party.
When a note is attested by
a subscribing witness, and such witness resides in another of the United
States, and beyond the reach of the process of the court at the time of the
trial, evidence of the hand writing of the witness, and of the maker of the
note, may be produced, and is competent proof of its execution.
In such case, the fact
that the place of residence of the witness is known at the time, can make no
difference.
A note, given for a patent
right for an invention neither new nor useful, is without sufficient
consideration to sustain it, and is void.
Where the invention
claimed and patented consisted in the application of spiral springs to the
churn dash, in such a manner that it might be operated by a person's foot; it was held, that
evidence that spiral springs were not a modern invention did not show that the
invention was not new.
An invention, in order to
be "useful," within the meaning of the statute of the United States
on the subject of patents, is not required to be of such general utility as to
supersede, or be useful beyond all other inventions in practice, to accomplish
the same purpose, but it is sufficient that it may be applied to practical
purposes with some degree of beneficial use; that it has no pernicious, immoral
or mischievous tendency; and, so far as it is applied, is salutary.
ASSUMPSIT, upon a
promissory note, dated May 13, 1835, and payable to the plaintiff, or order, in
three months.
There was a subscribing
witness to the note, and the plaintiff having offered evidence to show that the
witness was residing out of the state, produced evidence to prove his hand
writing, and that of the defendant.
One of the witnesses,
produced to show that the subscribing witness did not reside in the state, on
his cross-examination stated that he thought that the witness lived in Paris,
in the state of Maine. The counsel for the defendant objected, that as the
place of residence of the subscribing witness was known, he ought to be
introduced; but the court overruled the objection.
It appeared in evidence,
that the note was given for a patent right for an improvement in a churning
machine, by the application of spiral springs to the churn dash, in such a way as that it might be
operated by a person's foot; and a witness for the defendant testified that he
had purchased one of these machines, and that it was useless, and an imposition
on the public. Another witness testified that he was conversant with machinery;
that spiral springs were not a modern invention; that a churn dash might be
raised, and operated in that way; but whether much would be gained by it, he
could not say. He thought it might be more fatiguing than the old mode; but he
had known an elastic pole, fixed to the side of a building, used for the same
purpose, and it was useful.
*2 On the part of
the plaintiff, evidence was introduced that the machine had been used in Oxford
and Lincoln counties in Maine, and approved by several individuals; and that
the defendant, on being applied to for payment of the note, said that the sale
had amounted to about forty dollars; that he did not get more than enough to
pay his expenses; that he was poor and could not pay; but would pay when he
could.
A verdict was taken, by
consent, and judgment is to be rendered thereon, or the verdict set aside and
judgment entered for the defendant, according to the opinion of this court upon
the foregoing case.
Headnotes
Hackett, for the
plaintiff.
Claggett, for the defendant, to the point that the evidence
introduced to prove the execution of the note was incompetent for that purpose,
cited Farnsworth vs. Briggs, 6 N. H. Rep. 561; Webster
vs. Quimby, 8 Ditto 382; 2 Term R. 773. And he contended
that the witness, being within the United States, it was the duty of the
plaintiff to produce him, to prove the execution of the note.
*3 He contended,
farther, that the machine was neither a new nor useful invention, and that the
note was void for that cause. On this point he cited Bliss vs. Negus,
8 Mass. Rep. 46; Dickinson vs. Hall, 14 Pick. 217.
WOODS, J.
It is made a question in
this case whether the evidence offered and admitted at the trial, was competent
to prove the execution of the note in question.
The general rule is, that
the best evidence must be produced which the nature of the case can admit, and
which is in the power of the party. In consequence of that rule, the testimony
of the subscribing witness must be had, if he can be produced and he be capable
of examination. But if the testimony of the subscribing witness cannot be had,
the next best evidence is proof of his hand writing, and is admissible. Was the
evidence offered in this case of the character required by that rule?
It is insisted, in argument, that Farnsworth vs. Briggs,
6 N. H. R. 561, and Webster vs. Quimby, 8 Ditto
382, are authorities that the mere fact that the subscribing witness was
without the limits of the state, was not sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to
introduce evidence of the hand writing of the witness, and of the subscriber;
that in order to let in such evidence, the witness must be shown to be without
the limits of the United States. In Farnsworth vs. Briggs the witness
was out of this state, and that is all that the case finds. But he was, in
fact, at the time in the state of Maine. Such was the proof at the trial of the
cause; and in delivering his opinion, Richardson, C. J., in reference to the
facts reported in that case, says, that when there are subscribing witnesses to
an instrument, they must be called to prove it. "But if the subscribing
witness cannot be produced, the invariable practice has been, in this
state and in other places, to prove the hand writing of the witness." And
in the same case, Parker, J., says, "the rule, that when the testimony of
the subscribing witness cannot be had, the proper proof of the execution
is by giving evidence of his hand writing, seems to have been repeatedly
sanctioned." By the language thus used, and in reference to the facts of
that case, if the point can be regarded as being raised and considered at all,
it clearly appears that it was then considered that "the witness cannot be
produced" and "cannot be had," within the meaning of the rule
admitting proof of the hand writing of the subscribing witness in such cases, when the witness is out of the limits of the
state. If that case can be considered as an authority upon the question at all,
it certainly, at all events, does not sustain the defendant's views. However,
the point of the decision in that case was, that when the subscribing witness
is out of the state, proof of the signature of the subscriber of a note is not
competent proof of its execution, without proof also of the signature of the
witness. And the case of Webster vs. Quimby, cited at the argument, only
recognizes the well settled doctrine, that when the execution of an instrument
is witnessed, and the witness is not produced, and his absence is not accounted
for, other proof of the execution of the instrument is inadmissible.
*4 And it may
safely be said, we think, that the doctrine of neither of those cases militates
with the ruling of the judge at the trial. And, indeed, it is conceived that
the reason which lies at the foundation of the well established rule of
evidence, which admits of the introduction of evidence of the hand writing of
the subscribing witness, and of the subscriber, in proof of the execution of an
instrument, where there is a subscribing witness who is in a foreign country,
applies with equal force in the case of the absence of the witness in another
of the states of this Union. That reason is, that the process of the court
cannot reach the witness effectively, in a foreign government or country, and,
consequently, it is not in the power of the party, legally speaking, to produce
him. And the process of a court of this state is no more operative upon a witness, being or
sojourning in the state of Maine, to compel his attendance as a witness, than
if the witness were a resident in Canada, or in China.
And he can no more be
produced, or be had at court, within the sense of the rule of law dispensing
with his production, and admitting other evidence when the witness cannot be
produced, in the one case than in the other. And it is believed to be the well
established general rule of law on this subject, that proof of the hand writing
of the witness may be given, in all cases, when from physical or legal causes
it is not in the power of the party to produce the witness at the trial.
And, moreover, we believe
it is also well settled, that when the witness is without the jurisdiction of
the court, so as not to be answerable to its process, that fact constitutes the
case of a legal inability, within the principle of the general rule on the
subject; and excuses from the necessity of the production of the witness
himself, and lets in the secondary evidence of his hand writing. In the case of
Homer vs. Wallis, 11 Mass. R. 309, the precise point under
consideration was decided. The subscribing witness to a note was absent, in the
state of New-York, and his place of residence specified and known. To prove the
execution of the note, the hand writing of the subscriber was permitted to be
proved. It was objected, that the witness should have been produced. Parker, C.
J., who delivered the opinion of the court, said,
"it appearing, from the report of the case, that this person was absent,
and out of the commonwealth, we think it was right to suffer the cause to be tried
upon other evidence."
In Cook vs. Husted,
12 Johns. R. 188, it was held, that when, upon a trial in a justice's
court, it appeared that the subscribing witness to a bill of sale resided
neither in the county in which the case was tried, nor in the adjoining
counties, it was sufficient, in proof of the execution of the bill, to prove
the hand writing of the subscriber. The evidence was holden to be competent,
for the reason of "the absence of the witness beyond the control of a
subpoena from the justice." In that case, the residence of the witness was
known.
*5 In Adam
vs. Kerr, 1 B. & P. 360, Buller, J., stated the rule to be,
that when the subscribing witness is beyond the reach of the process of the
court at the time of the trial, the evidence of his hand writing should be
admitted.
So in Prince vs. Blackburn,
2 East 250, the court said, "as the witness was out of the
jurisdiction of the court, so as not to be answerable to its process, the
secondary evidence was properly admitted."
So, also, the rule
admitting evidence of the hand writing of a subscribing witness, where the
witness resides beyond the jurisdiction of the court, was recognized and
applied in the case of Hodnett vs. Forman, 1 Stark. N. P. C.
72. See, also, Ward vs. Wills, 1 Taunt. 161.
Mr. Justice Park is reported to have said, in delivering the
judgment of the court upon a question of this sort: "Formerly, proof of
the hand writing of an attesting witness was only admissible when such witness
was dead; and I can remember the first deviation from that rule, when it was
extended to cases where the party was abroad, or out of the jurisdiction of the
court of this country." Pytt vs. Griffith, 6 J. B. Moore
538.
We are clearly of the
opinion that the fact that the place of residence, or sojourn, of the
subscribing witness, is known to the party, is wholly immaterial, provided it
be beyond the jurisdiction of the court. We believe no case has turned upon any
such distinction. The authorities bearing more or less directly upon the matter
under consideration, are pretty numerous. 1 Phil. Ev. 473, 2d Ed., by
Cowen & Hill; 4 Johns. R. 461, Sluby vs. Champlin;
Holmes vs. Pontin, Peake's Ca. 99; Cooper vs. Marsden,
1 Esp. 1; Burt vs. Walker, 4 B. & A. 697; Dudley
vs. Sumner, 5 Mass. R. 462; Cook vs. Woodrow, 5 Cranch
13; Livingston vs. Burton, 11 Johns. R. 64; Wallis
vs. Delancy, 7 T. R. 266, n; Whittemore vs. Brooks,
1 Greenl. R. 57, and note.
We hold, therefore, that as
the witness, residing in another state, was without the jurisdiction of the
court at the time of the trial, and beyond the reach of its process, so that he
could not be produced, his non-production is well accounted for, and that the
execution of the note by the defendant was proved by competent evidence.
But it is farther contended, that the note
was given for a patent right for a machine which was neither new nor useful,
and that for these reasons the note is without consideration, and void. And if
the facts reported in the case shew the patent right to be for a machine of the
character contended for by the defendant, the note is clearly without any
sufficient consideration to sustain the promise, and the action must fail. Langdon
vs. DeGroot & a., Paine's C. C. R. 203; Dickinson vs. Hall,
14 Pick. 217; Earl vs. Page, 6 N. H. R. 477. Does
it appear that the improvement claimed, and for which the patent right was
granted, was not new? It appears by the case that it consisted in the
application of spiral springs to the churn dash, in such a manner that it might
be operated by a person's foot. The evidence offered by the defendant, to show
that the improvement thus claimed was not new, was the testimony of a witness
who testified that spiral springs were not a modern invention.
*6 But the case
does not find that the note was given for a patent right for an improvement in,
or for the invention of spiral springs, but for the application of such springs
to operate a churn dash by the aid of the foot. And the evidence falls far
short of proving that the application thus claimed is not of modern
invention--is not a new invention.
For aught that appears in
the proof offered, the right claimed, for which the note was given, was a new
application of a known mechanical force, or power, with the view of facilitating the business of
one of the branches of industrial employment. That such an application of a
mechanical force, to such a purpose, is the subject of a patent right, and that
in the present case no proof exists that the invention is not new, can admit of
no doubt. Whittemore vs. Cutter, 1 Gallis. C. C. R. 478; Evans
vs. Eaton, 1 Peters' C. C. R. 322; Holden vs. Curtis,
2 N. H. R. 61. The objection, then, that the invention is not new,
cannot prevail.
It is farther argued, that
although the invention may be determined to be new, yet that it is not useful,
and so not the subject of a patent.
In order to determine the
force of this objection, it is necessary to ascertain what is meant by the term
"useful," as used in the patent law under which the right was
granted, requiring the invention to be useful in order that the patent right
shall be valid.
In Lowell vs. Lewis,
1 Mason's R. 184, it is said, that "all that the law requires is,
that the invention should not be frivolous, or injurious to the well being,
good policy, or sound morals of society, and that it should not be of a
mischievous tendency. The word 'useful' is incorporated into the act, in
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral. For instance: A new
invention to poison people, or to promote debauchery, or to facilitate private
assassination, is not a patentable invention. But if the inventor steers wide
of these objections, whether it be more or less useful is a circumstance very material to the interest of the patentee, but
of no importance to the public."
And in Bedford vs. Hunt
& al. 1 Mason 302, in giving a construction to the term
"useful," as used in the patent act, Mr. Justice Story says: "By
useful invention, in the statute, is meant such a one as may be applied to some
beneficial use in society, in contradistinction to an invention which is
injurious to the morals, the health, or the good order of society. It is not
necessary to establish that the invention is of such general utility as to
supersede all other inventions now in practice to accomplish the same purpose.
It is sufficient that it has no obnoxious or mischievous tendency; that it may
be applied to practical uses; and that, so far as it is applied, it is
salutary.
*7 The law does not
look to the degree of utility; it merely requires that it shall be capable of
use, and that the use is such as sound morals and policy do not discountenance
or prohibit."
In Kneass vs. The
Schuylkill Bank, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 9, Mr. Justice Washington, in
commenting upon the meaning of the word "useful," as used in the
statute, fully recognizes and adopts the construction given it by Mr. Justice
Story, in the case of Lowell vs. Lewis.
In Dickinson vs. Hall,
14 Pick. 217, it was decided that an invention, in order to be useful,
must be capable of some beneficial use, in contradistinction to pernicious, or
frivolous, or worthless.
And Chancellor Kent, in the second volume of
his Commentaries, p. 369, 4th ed., lays down the law, that in order to
be useful, the invention must to a certain degree be beneficial to the
community, and not injurious, or merely frivolous.
The question is not, then,
whether the invention was useful beyond all other machines in use for effecting
the object for which it was designed; but is, whether it is capable in some
degree of beneficial use, or would in some degree subserve the purpose of its
design; or whether, on the contrary, it was merely mischievous and injurious,
or pernicious, or frivolous and worthless.
One witness on behalf of
the defendant stated that he purchased a machine; that it was useless, and an
imposition upon the public. But it does not appear, however, from his testimony,
how he arrived at that result; whether from mere examination of the machine, or
from the application of it to the use for which it was designed. It does not
appear that he was himself a machinist, and an expert in the matter of
machinery, nor that he ever saw the machine attempted to be operated. And it is
apparent that without skill shown, or actual experiment made, his testimony
furnishes no sufficient ground on which safely to arrive at the conclusion that
the machine was merely mischievous, and in no degree useful; or that it was not
capable of use in some degree, for the purpose designed. Case vs. Morey,
1 N. H. R. 347.
But it does appear, from
the testimony of another witness on the part of the defendant, who is skilled in machinery, that a
churn dash might be operated by spiral springs, as applied in this case; but he
could not say whether much would be gained by it or not. No inference certainly
can be made from this evidence, that the machine is at all njurious, or
pernicious in its tendency, or is not useful, within the rule of law found in
the books on this subject. So far from it, his opinion, based on his skill, is,
that it might be used and operated in the manner claimed for its application
and use, and that to some advantage, with some gain. And by the testimony of a
witness on the part of the plaintiff, it appears that the machine had been in
actual use in two counties in the state of Maine, and its use had been approved
by several individuals. Those facts furnish plenary evidence of the usefulness
of the machine, within the rule on that subject. The fact cannot be inferred
that the machine was merely mischievous, or incapable of any use, while at the
same time it was used, and approved by those using it. And indeed we find no
evidence in the report of the case, from which the inference can be legally and
fairly made that the invention in question is in no degree beneficial to the
community; that it is of no practical utility, nor capable of use for the
purpose intended; nor that it is frivolous merely, or its use is either
mischievous, pernicious, or immoral in its tendency. And the degree of its
utility is clearly not material. In no point of view, therefore, can the
invention be considered as not useful.
*8 We regard the invention, therefore,
for which the patent right was granted, and which formed the consideration of
the note in question, as being both new and useful, within the rules of law
upon this subject.
The grounds of exception,
therefore, to the ruling of the court below, fail altogether, and the plaintiff
isentitled to
Judgment on the
verdict.
N.H. 1842.
13 N.H. 311
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