Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
AUTO BODY SPECIALISTS, INC.
v.
Dennis VALLEE d/b/a Vallee's Auto Body
Specialists.
No. 84-500.
Oct. 30, 1985.
Headnotes
**373 *382
Wadleigh, Starr, Peters, Dunn & Chiesa, Manchester (Jeffrey H. Karlin on
brief, and Theodore Wadleigh orally), for plaintiff.
Craig, Wenners &
McDowell P.A., Manchester (Joseph F. McDowell, III, and James W. Craig
(orally)) on brief, for defendant.
SOUTER, Justice.
The defendant appeals an
order of the Superior Court (Wyman, J.) enjoining the use of "auto
body specialists" as a part of his trade name. We affirm.
Since 1972, the plaintiff
has operated an auto body repair business in Manchester under the registered
corporate name of "Auto Body Specialists, Inc." See RSA 293-A:10 (Supp.1983). In May, 1983, the *383 defendant
began to make and repair auto bodies in Manchester, about two miles from the
plaintiff's garage, under the name of "Vallee's Auto Body
Specialists." At about the same
time he registered that name with the Secretary of State as a trade name under
RSA 349:1, :5, and in December, 1983, he registered the name as a trademark
under RSA 350-A:3.
In the meantime Michael
Doerfler, the plaintiff's president, general manager and sole stockholder, had
become aware of his **374 new competitor and objected to the defendant's
use of "auto body specialists."
When the defendant refused to change or modify the name under which he
operated, the plaintiff brought the present petition for an injunction against
infringement of a protected interest in the quoted phrase. Following trial, the superior court
enjoined the defendant's use of "auto body specialists" in his business
name "within a radius of 25 miles from the City of Manchester,"
although the court's order provided that the defendant could advertise that
"his talents include expertise as an auto body specialist in the
singular."
In this appeal the
defendant asserts that the trial court erred in finding that "auto body
specialists" could acquire or had acquired a secondary meaning, which is
necessary to give the plaintiff a protectable interest in its use. The
defendant claims further that even if such secondary meaning existed, the trial
court's award of injunctive relief was improper.
[1] In pressing his first
assignment of error, the defendant points out that "auto body
specialists" is a phrase containing generic and descriptive terms. Generic terms are words that "embrace
an entire class of products or services, not all of which necessarily emanate
from the same source." 3 R.
Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies § 18.03 at 7 (4th ed. 1985). Descriptive terms are words that
"refer to any feature of the product or service--its peculiarities,
appearance, fragrance, character or quality, its effect or purpose, or the
manner of its use and which, as a consequence, might not be considered by the
public as indicia of identification."
Id. (footnote omitted).
In the phrase "auto body specialists," "auto body"
is a generic phrase, and "specialists" a descriptive term. The defendant submits that these words
cannot acquire secondary meaning and hence that "auto body
specialists" is not a protectable trade name.
The defendant is
mistaken. "[S]ome courts [have, to
be sure, adopted] the ill-considered view that generic (or even some
descriptive) terms are inherently incapable of ever becoming
secondary meaning marks. But the
better view is that secondary meaning is *384 purely a question of fact
to be decided independently in each case." Id. § 19.27 at 89
(emphasis in original). The better
view prevails, and the denial of "tradename protection to all words of
descriptive quality [is] a judicial option long foreclosed under common law
precepts." President &
Trustees of Colby Col. v. Colby Col.--N.H.,
508 F.2d 804, 812 (1st Cir.1975) (citation omitted).
Accordingly, words or
phrases may enter commerce as merely generic or descriptive, but commercial
usage can invest them with a secondary meaning associating them with a given
business, so as to entitle that business to protect the association. 3 R. Callmann, supra § 18.03;
see Blastos v. Humphrey, 112 N.H. 352, 353-54, 296 A.2d 918, 920
(1972). Courts have frequently
afforded protection to generic or descriptive terms that have acquired
secondary meaning within the automobile repair industry. See, e.g., Boice v. Stevenson, 66
Ariz. 308, 187 P.2d 648 (1947) ("Motor Supply"); Skinner v.
Martin, 109 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156 (Cal.Super.Ct.1956) ("Four Wheel Brake
Service"); J.C. Penney Co. v.
Walker, 395 S.W.2d 76 (Tex.Civ.App.1965) ("Auto Center"). Indeed, the defendant would be hard pressed
to deny that the phrase in question could acquire secondary significance, since
he obviously thought it worthwhile to register the phrase both as a trade name
and as a trademark. See 3 R.
Callmann, supra § 18.03 at 7.
[2][3] Having concluded that a generic or descriptive
phrase such as "auto body
specialists" may acquire secondary meaning and hence merit protection, we
next consider the defendant's contention that the plaintiff failed to establish
a secondary meaning in this case. On
this issue, certain evidentiary facts can be especially significant: long and exclusive use of the phrase, prominence of the original user's
enterprise, **375 use of the phrase in substantial publicity, and direct
evidence that individuals associate the phrase with the original user. See President & Trustees of Colby
Col. v. Colby Col.--N.H., supra at 807-08. The record before us discloses adequate evidence on each of
these points to support the trial court's finding of a protectable secondary
meaning.
Mr. Doerfler testified
that he had done business under the corporate name of "Auto Body Specialists, Inc." continuously for over ten
years. When he started the business,
no competing firm used the name or phrase, and the record discloses no evidence
that any competitor had used the phrase in its name before the defendant began
to do so. The plaintiff had engaged in
substantial advertising, using the yellow pages, newspapers, the radio and a
variety of promotional objects such as pens and key rings. Mr. Doerfler testified *385 that his
business had participated in community projects to raise funds for charitable
organizations and sponsored local athletic events. There was evidence that at the time of trial the plaintiff
serviced between 300 and 500 customers a year, with an annual gross income of
$225,000 to $250,000. Two witnesses
testified that they associated the plaintiff's business with the words in
question, as an accurate indication of the high quality of the plaintiff's
work. This evidence unquestionably
supports the trial court's finding that the phrase had acquired a secondary
meaning subject to protection.
[4] The defendant asserts, finally,
that it was error to enjoin his use of the phrase. We approach this issue from the vantage point of settled law
governing the standard for the issuance of injunctions in such cases.
"The [plaintiff's] right to an injunction depended upon [a]
showing that substantial likelihood of confusion resulted from defendant's use.
Restatement of Torts, s. 727, Comment c;
ss. 728, 729 (1938); Prosser,
Torts s. 130, at 957, 958 (4th ed. 1971)....
[The plaintiff was] not required to stand by until actual confusion
caused damage. Where an injunction is
sought as is the case here, 'the determinative factor ... is not that
purchasers have, in fact, been deceived, but that there is a reasonable
likelihood thereof.' 3 Callman [sic],
Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies s. 80.6 (3d ed. 1969); Developments in the Law-Trademarks and
Unfair Competition, 68 Harv.L.Rev. 814, 862 (1955). The issue of confusing similarity is one of fact. Restatement of Torts, s. 728, Comment a
(1938)."
Blastos v. Humphrey,
112 N.H. at 354, 296 A.2d at 920. See
RSA 350- A:12.
The record contains
adequate evidence to support the trial court's finding that the defendant's use
of the phrase would probably confuse him with the plaintiff in the public's
mind. While there was testimony that
two deliverymen actually had confused the two businesses, these indications of
actual confusion are not the strongest evidence supporting the plaintiff. More important is the facial similarity of the
two names. See President &
Trustees of Colby Col. v. Colby Col.--N.H., 508 F.2d at 810. The defendant emphasized this similarity by
printing "auto body specialists" on signs and business cards in the
same style of lettering that the plaintiff used on its building, while displaying
"Vallee's" in distinctly different lettering on a line above the
principal phrase. Since the parties
are in the *386 same business, in the same geographical area, and use
the same media of advertising to attract the same customers, the likelihood of
confusion was clearly substantial. The
injunction was proper.
[5]
Finally, we should note that the defendant has remarked upon the trial court's
expressed predisposition to find that the facial similarity between the two
names at issue was alone sufficient to warrant a finding that confusion was
likely. The **376 plaintiff has
suggested that this predisposition vitiated the court's finding in this
regard. There are two answers to this
suggestion. The first is that the
evidence amply supports the court's finding, whatever the judge's preliminary
sentiments may have been. The second
is that the issue of the trial judge's state of mind is not properly before us,
because the defendant failed to raise the matter at trial. We will not consider issues raised on
appeal that were not presented in the trial court. Daboul v. Town of Hampton, 124 N.H. 307, 309, 471 A.2d
1148, 1149 (1983). We do not,
therefore, question the propriety of the injunction.
JOHNSON, J., did not
sit; the others concurred.
N.H.,1985.
500 A.2d 372, 127 N.H. 382, 229 U.S.P.Q. 314
END OF DOCUMENT