Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
OPINION OF THE JUSTICES.
No. 7804.
June 20, 1977.
Headnotes
**119 *543
Donald L. Stone, Pelham, N. Y., for Exxon Corp.
William C. Whittemore,
Scarsdale, N. Y., for Mobil Oil Corp.
*535 The following
resolution was adopted by the Senate on May 19, 1977, and filed with the
supreme court on May 23, 1977:
"Whereas, there is
pending in the Senate, Senate Bill Number 75 'An Act imposing certain
limitations on oil suppliers doing business in the state'; and
"Whereas, the Senate
Committee on Energy and Consumer Affairs has recommended that the bill be
passed with an amendment; and
"Whereas, doubt has
been expressed as to the constitutionality of the provisions of said bill and
the proposed amendment; now, therefore, be it
"Resolved by the
Senate:
"That the justices of
the supreme court be respectfully requested to give their opinion on the following important
questions of law:
"1. Can the General
Court within the provisions of the constitution of New Hampshire enact a
statute as proposed in Senate Bill Number 75 with its amendments?
"2. Would any
provision of the Constitution of the United States be violated by the provision
of this bill and its amendment?
"Further resolve that
the clerk of the Senate be instructed to transmit to the clerk of the Supreme
Court 6 copies of this resolution and 6 copies of Senate Bill Number 75
together with the proposed amendment."
The following answers were
returned:
To The Honorable Senate :
The undersigned justices
of the supreme court submit the following answers to the questions contained in
your resolution submitted to this court on May 23, 1977. Memoranda on behalf of various interested
individuals and corporations were filed on or before June 1, 1977, in
accordance with the previous order of this court.
The questions submitted to
this court are: "Can the general court within the provisions of the
constitution of New Hampshire *536 enact a statute as proposed in Senate
Bill Number 75 with its amendments?" and "Would any provision of the
Constitution of the United States be violated by the provisions of this bill
and its amendments?"
1. N.H.Const. pt. II, art. 83.
[1]
Under N.H.Const. pt. II, art. 83, the general court may enact laws ". . .
to prevent the operations within the state of all . . . trusts and corporations . . . who endeavor to raise the price of any
article of commerce or to destroy free and **120 fair competition . . .
." This broad mandate allows the
general court to enact laws which prevent abuse in the marketplace and promote
free competition. Senate bill 75, which
imposes certain limitations on oil suppliers doing business in the state, is within
the power of the general court. Other
statutes have been enacted by the legislature to promote free competition. See RSA 356:2, which outlaws all trusts
which restrict trade or commerce, and RSA 358, the Unfair Sales Act,
prohibiting wholesalers and retailers from selling below the wholesale or
retail price, and which parallels the requirement of RSA 339-C:12 of the
proposed bill. This bill will amend
various provisions of RSA 339-C (Supp.1975), regulating gasoline
franchises. The existence of other
non-conflicting statutes which promote free and fair competition does not
preclude the general court from enacting the proposed bill. Brunswick Corporation v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat.,
Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977).
2. Due Process of Law.
[2][3] The function of courts in reviewing state
economic legislation is limited; the wisdom and expediency of statutes are not
subject to judicial review. If there is an evil to be corrected, and the
legislative measure enacted in response is rational and does not abridge
fundamental rights, the statute is constitutional. Opinion of the Justices, 102 N.H. 106, 108, 151 A.2d 236, 238
(1959); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99
L.Ed. 563 (1954). Although some contend
that the bill may not succeed completely in achieving its purpose of promoting
free and fair competition, the general court may reasonably conclude that
suppliers' control of the retail gasoline market would adversely affect free
competition. Statistics presented to the Senate Committee on Energy and
Consumer Affairs show a 300% increase in company-operated stations from 1974 to
1976. (Mobil Oil Corporation exhibit B,
at 2.) This increase, coupled with a 25% decrease in the number of stations *537
leased to dealers, may well indicate to the general court that suppliers'
operation of retail outlets is an increasing danger to free competition and
thus merits curtailment. Limiting
suppliers in the retail marketplace is a rational means of preventing
monopolistic control of the retail gasoline market. The bill's requirements of uniform extension of voluntary
allowances to dealers and equitable allocation of petroleum products would
prevent suppliers from giving favorable treatment to some retail dealers to the
detriment of others, thus promoting fair competition.
3. Equal Protection of the
Law.
[4][5] Unless a legislative classification is drawn
upon an inherently suspect distinction, or
abridges fundamental personal rights, the sole requirement is that the
challenged classification rationally relates to a legitimate state
interest. Valley Bank v. State, 115
N.H. 151, 154, 335 A.2d 652, 654 (1975); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976). Senate bill 75, which prohibits suppliers of petroleum products
as a class from operating retail gasoline stations, involves neither a suspect
classification nor a fundamental right.
Because the legislation may promote free and fair competition by
eliminating suppliers from the retail marketplace, the classification is
rational and sufficiently related to the achievement of the legislative goal.
4. Just Compensation
Clause.
[6]
Senate bill 75 if applied prospectively only is not a compensable taking, but
rather a permissible legislative regulation.
A regulation becomes a taking when it rises to the level where private
property is appropriated for public use.
The amended bill would bar suppliers from one particular phase of
business retail operations. They may
still lease or sell their retail outlets.
Deprivation of the most profitable use of property does not necessarily
constitute a taking. United States v.
Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168, 78 S.Ct. 1097, 2 L.Ed.2d 1228
(1958). The restrictions imposed by
Senate bill 75 applied prospectively would not constitute a taking, because **121
suppliers may use their property for retail purposes so long as they do not operate the stations themselves or
through company employees. The property
may still be owned; only its mode of operation is altered.
In our opinion, however,
the proposed legislation, if applied retrospectively to the thirteen retail
gasoline stations which are presently operated by suppliers would violate
N.H.Const. pt. I, *538 art. 2 and N.H.Const. pt. I, art. 23 because it
takes away the property right of suppliers in existing retail businesses and is
not justified under N.H.Const. pt. II, art. 83. Although they may still own the stations and may lease them, they
must nevertheless divest themselves of their existing retail businesses which
in themselves are property rights.
5. Commerce Clause.
[7][8] The state may regulate matters of local concern
if there is no discrimination against interstate commerce, a state interest is
being served, and that interest outweighs any national interest in the
prevention of state restrictions.
Cities Service Co. v. Peerless Co., 340 U.S. 179, 186-87, 71 S.Ct. 215,
95 L.Ed. 190 (1950). Unlike the
statutes struck down in H. P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct.
657, 93 L.Ed. 865 (1949), and Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, 294 U.S. 511, 55
S.Ct. 497, 79 L.Ed. 1032 (1935), the purpose of Senate bill 75 is to preserve
free competition, not to protect local economic interests by discriminating
against interstate commerce. In Dean
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 71 S.Ct. 295, 95 L.Ed. 329 (1951), a statute which effectively raised
an economic bar to protect local industries was struck down as a violation of
the commerce clause. Here, the statute
even-handedly excludes all New Hampshire and out-of-state suppliers from retail
operations. Products may flow
unrestrictedly in interstate commerce under the proposed bill; the only
limitation is placed upon the mode of retail operation within the state. An out-of-state non-supplier may operate
retail gasoline stations. Thus, there
is no discrimination against out-of- state interests, no burden on the free
flow of goods in commerce, and the state's goal of promoting free competition
is furthered. The Maryland Court of
Appeals, in upholding a similar statute, stated, ". . . it has long been recognized that the states
have the power to pass legislation to promote competition bypreventing
monopolistic activity in restraint of trade." Governor of Maryland v.
Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d 1102, 1116 (Md.1977).
6. Preemption.
a. Federal Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act.
[9]
Senate bill 75 is proposed to promote free competition, provide for the uniform
availability of voluntary allowances and rental equipment, and require that
petroleum products be allocated on an equitable basis during periods of shortage. The Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation
Act, 15 U.S.C. ss 751- 756 (Supp.1975), provides that regulations for the
equitable allocation of refined *539 petroleum products will be
promulgated. Under 15 U.S.C. s 753(c)(1)(A), the mandatory allocation program
must be structured so as to allocate among marketers an amount based on the
amount sold to them during a specified base period, with a pro-rata reduction
in allocation when there is an insufficient supply to meet the demand for the
amount purchased during the specified base period. The act attempts to ensure the ". . . equitable distribution of . . . refined petroleum products at equitable
prices among all . . . sectors of the
petroleum industry." 15 U.S.C. s
753(b)(1)(F). Senate bill 75's proposed RSA 339-C:11, similarly would require
that suppliers and distributors allocate all petroleum products during periods
of severe shortage on a nondiscriminatory and equitable basis."
The federal act
specifically preempts only those state regulations and laws which directly
conflict with regulations promulgated under the act. 15 U.S.C. s 755(b).
Allocation under the proposed bill would be on an equitable and
nondiscriminatory basis. As long as
enforcement of this general **122 standard is accomplished in accordance
with federal regulations promulgated under the Federal Petroleum Allocation
Act, the proposed bill does not conflict with the act and is not
preempted. The existence of a conflict
cannot be assumed where no specific rules for the enforcement of the standard
have been promulgated. Rice v. Board of
Trade of City of Chicago, 331 U.S. 247, 255, 67 S.Ct. 1160, 91 L.Ed. 1468
(1947). A similar statute was upheld as
harmonious with the federal act which ". . . expressly preserves the power of the
states to regulate the allocation of refined petroleum products." Governor
of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d 1102, 1120-21 (Md.1977).
b. Robinson-Patman Act.
[10]
RSA 339-C:11 of the proposed bill would require that suppliers and distributors
extend voluntary allowances and equipment rentals uniformly to all of their
dealers. "Voluntary
allowances" have been construed to mean ". . . temporary price reductions in the wholesale
price to a retail dealer to enable the dealer to meet the lower price of a
competing retail dealer." Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d
1102, 1122 (Md.1977). Section 2(a) of
the Clayton Act, amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. s 13(a), states
that persons cannot discriminate in price between different purchasers when the
effect of the discrimination will lessen competition. A defense to a charge of price discrimination is provided to a
seller by s 2(b). The seller may show that his *540 lower price ".
. . was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor."
The bill's requirement of uniform extension of voluntary allowances does
not conflict with this federal defense.
The s 2(b) defense is not
available to a supplier granting a discriminatory price cut to a dealer
enabling it to meet a second dealer's lower price where the second dealer did
not receive a price cut from its supplier.
Federal Trade Commission v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 529, 83 S.Ct.
358, 9 L.Ed.2d 466 (1963). The Supreme Court did not decide, however,
if the s 2(b) defense could be raised when a seller lowers the price for its
dealer to meet a price cut made by the seller's competitor to the dealer of
that competitor. Lower federal courts
have disagreed on this point. See
Enterprise Industries v. Texas Company, 136 F.Supp. 420 (D.Conn.1955), reversed
on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965, 77 S.Ct.
1049, 1 L.Ed.2d 914 (1957), and Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466
F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1972). We adopt the
conclusion of the Maryland Court of Appeals that ". . . the s 2(b) defense is available only where
the discriminatory price reduction is to meet the equally low price offered to
the same buyer by a competing seller," (citing Enterprise, supra at 421.)
Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d 1102, 1124 (Md.1977).
Senate bill 75 requires
that voluntary allowances, which are the price reductions granted to retail
dealers to meet the lower price of other retail dealers, be extended uniformly
to all dealers purchasing from the supplier. The s 2(b) defense is available
only when a seller lowers the price to meet the price offered to the same
dealer by a competitor of the seller.
Thus there is no conflict with the provisions of the Robinson-Patman
Act.
7. Void for Vagueness.
[11] "The constitutional requirement of
definiteness is violated by a criminal statute that fails to give a person of
ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617,
74 S.Ct. 808, 812, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). The statute need not be precise, but
simply ". . . be expressed in
language as specific as the subject will (allow)." State v. Hewitt, 116 N.H. 711, 366 A.2d 487
(1976). When a statute regulates
business activity, the standard of ordinary intelligence is ordinary commercial
knowledge. Courts may reasonably
construe the statute to render it constitutionally definite. United States v. Harriss, supra, 347 U.S. at
618, 74 S.Ct. 808. The provisions of
the proposed bill are defined with *541 sufficient precision for a
person **123 with ordinary commercial knowledge to determine what
conduct is required or prohibited. We
agree with the determination of the Maryland Court of Appeals that the various
terms of the act such as "voluntary allowances,"
"nondiscriminatory and equitable basis," and "equipment
rental" are sufficiently understandable so as not to be unconstitutionally
vague. Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d 1102, 1126 (Md.1977). Two definitions may need clarification: the
definition of "distributor" in the amendment to the proposed bill may
still be subsumed by the definition of "supplier." This confusion can be remedied by changing
definition VI, "supplier," from ". . . petroleum products or the sale . . ." to ". . . petroleum products for the sale . . ."
(emphasis added).
To the extent that the
proposed bill would apply retrospectively to gasoline stations already operated by suppliers, it is
unconstitutional. Otherwise, the answer
to your first question is, "Yes, the general court may enact the statute
proposed in Senate bill 75 as amended under the constitution of New
Hampshire." The proposed bill
raises many constitutional questions that may be more sharply focused in the
context of a litigated case with a record, and, hopefully, some legislative
findings or history. Your second
question is answered, "No, the proposed bill does not violate any
provision of the Constitution of the United States. The second question would be definitively answered by the federal
judicial system should the Supreme Court review the decision of the Maryland Court
of Appeals in Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d 1102 (1977), now on
appeal.
d t
William A. Grimes
Maurice P. Bois
Charles G. Douglas III
To the Honorable Senate :
The undersigned justices
of the supreme court return the following reply to the questions presented in
your resolution adopted on May 19, 1977, and filed in this court on May 23,
1977.
We conclude that the
proposed statute is constitutional in all respects and therefore the answer to
your first question is "Yes"; the answer to your second question is "No." For the purpose of determining whether the
proposed bill violates the "just compensation" clause of the fifth
amendment to the United States Constitution as it applies to the states through
the fourteenth amendment *542 and part I, article 12 of the New
Hampshire Constitution, the majority advisory opinion states that to the extent
that the bill applies prospectively it is a "permissible legislative
regulation" and not an unconstitutional taking of property without just
compensation. However, as applied
retrospectively, that is, to the suppliers which presently operate thirteen
retail gas stations in the state, the proposed statute is, according to the
majority, unconstitutional.
The majority's treatment
of this issue is unsound. A
comprehensive and award- winning law review article, which the majority does
not cite, clearly concludes that even statutes requiring suppliers to divest
themselves completely of retail outlets they already own do not violate the
prohibitions against taking property without just compensation. Note, Gasoline Divestiture Statutes: A
Preliminary Constitutional and Economic Assessment, 28 Vand.L.Rev. 1277,
1297-98 (1975). A fortiori, Senate bill
75, which is substantially less restrictive (in that it only requires present
suppliers to cease "operating" the stations themselves) is
constitutional.
In explaining why Senate
bill 75 is a "permissible legislative regulation," the majority
states "(t)hey may still lease or sell their retail outlets." The "they" can only refer to the
suppliers who already operate the thirteen stations. It is analytically difficult to understand how the majority can
state first that the proposed statute would be a constitutional regulation as
applied to those suppliers in a position to "lease or sell their retail
outlets" and then turn around in the next paragraph and assert that the **124
statute, if applied to those very same suppliers, would be unconstitutional.
The majority does not
distinguish Opinion of the Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1961). In that case this court unanimously agreed
that a statute requiring the removal of existing billboards and signs located
along interstate highways would be constitutional. We stated "(t)he argument that the proposed law would
deprive owners of property without compensation and would operate
retrospectively does not require extended consideration." Id. at 271, 169 A.2d at 765. No substantive distinction exists between
the impact of that legislation and the consequences of the statute proposed in
this case.
Recently, in a
comprehensive, well-reasoned opinion, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
sustained a statute virtually identical to Senate bill 75 against the same
constitutional objections raised in this case.
Governor of Maryland v. Exxon Corp., 370 A.2d 1102 *543
(1977). That opinion, although
consistently cited by the majority, is square authority for the position that
the proposed statute is constitutional in all respects.
Frank R. Kenison
___k R
Edward J. Lampron
N.H. 1977.
376 A.2d 118, 117 N.H. 533, 1977-2 Trade Cases P 61,600
END OF DOCUMENT