Supreme Court of New Hampshire.
Michael E. J. BLASTOS et al., d.b.a. Mr.
Pizza,
v.
Daniel HUMPHREY.
No. 5725.
Nov. 3, 1972.
Headnotes
*352 **919
Edward J. O'Brien, Keene, by brief and orally, for plaintiffs.
Howard B. Lane, Keene, by
brief and orally, for defendant.
DUNCAN, Justice.
The plaintiffs, who are
husband and wife, operate a restaurant on Main Street in Keene under the name
of 'Mr. Pizza', which they registered with the secretary of state in 1962. They sell pizzas and foods to be taken out
from the same premises. In 1966 the
defendant under the name of 'Mr. Take Out' opened a take-out store on the
opposite side of Main Street, from which he sold pizza and other products. The plaintiffs by bill in equity sought an injunction against use by the defendant of the
word 'Mister' and the abbreviation 'Mr.', or 'any words colorably similar to
names or abbreviations used by the petitioners as a part of their trade name.'
The Superior Court (Grant,
J.) found that 'confusion has arisen and is likely to arise in the future' from
continued use by the defendant of 'Mr. Take Out', and enjoined him *353
'from using the abbreviation 'Mr.' in conjunction with the words 'Take
Out" in the conduct of his business in Keene. The questions of law raised by the defendant's exceptions were
reserved and transferred by the presiding justice.
RSA ch. 349 provides for
the registration of trade names, and at pertinent times during this litigation
RSA ch. 350 provided for the registration of trademarks. Each statute expressly provided that nothing
contained therein should 'adversely affect the rights or the enforcement of
rights . . . acquired in good faith at any time at common law', in either trade
names or trademarks, as the case might be.
RSA 349:11; RSA 350:15. Since
the decree herein was entered, RSA ch. 350 has been replaced by enactment of
the Model State Trademark Act, effective September 1, 1969. RSA ch. 350-A(supp.). This likewise preserves common-law rights,
in identical language. RSA 350-
A:14(supp.).
The defendant cannot be
held to have violated RSA ch. 349, by use of the trade name 'Mr. Pizza' registered
by the plaintiffs. However, the
evidence disclosed that the plaintiffs' trade
name was exhibited both over the door of their place of business and in their
advertising with the capital M of 'Mr.', and the capital P of **920
'Pizza' in script, and the balance of the printing in block letters. The defendant, in the sign displayed over
his place of business used script letters in the abbreviation 'Mr.', and block
letters in the words 'Take Out'.
Additionally, the plaintiffs' sign bore a caricature of a man over the
word 'Pizza', while the defendant's sign bore a sketch of a man with a chef's
cap, to the left of the abbreviation 'Mr.' and above the word 'Pizza'.
There was evidence of
confusion on the part of the public concerning the source of the parties'
products. The plaintiffs claimed that a
secondary meaning or significance attached to their trade name by reason of its
use over a period of five years in Keene, in part as a result of advertising in
which a photograph of the plaintiff husband appeared in conjunction with the
name 'Mr. Pizza'. See Trademarks,
Tradenames, and Trade Practices, 52 Am.Jur. s. 130 (1944); Armstrong Paint
& Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S. 315, 59 S.Ct. 191, 83 L.Ed.
195 (1938).
It could reasonably be
found upon the evidence that the *354 plaintiffs' trade name, by reason
of its use for five years as a trade or service mark, had acquired a secondary
meaning or significance in the eyes of the public sufficient to entitle it to
protection. Bogosian v. Fine, 99 N.H.
340, 111 A.2d 190 (1955); Nardini &c.
Co. v. Sterling, 93 N.H. 364, 42 A.2d 325 (1945);
see Developments in the Law-Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 68 Harv.L.Rev.
814, 823-24 (1955); RSA 350:9(ii), 12 and 17; cf. RSA 350-A:11(I)(supp.),
12(supp.).
Since the words 'pizza'
and 'take out' are in common use upon restaurant signs, what served to
distinguish the plaintiffs' place of business from other pizza and take-out
shops was the use of the prefix 'Mr.' and the outlince of a man. Cf. Mr. Travel, Inc. v. VIP Travel Service
Inc., 268 F.Supp. 958 (N.D.Ill.1966).
These salient features were adopted by the defendant. Weiss v. Stork and
Gift Shop, 137 N.J.Eq. 475, 45 A.2d 688 (1946); 1 Nims, Unfair Competition and
Trademarks s. 221(f) (4th ed. 1947).
The plaintiffs' right to
an injunction depended upon their showing that substantial likelihood of
confusion resulted from defendant's use. Restatement of Torts, s. 727, Comment
c; ss. 728, 729 (1938); Prosser, Torts s. 130, at 957, 958 (4th ed. 1971). While there was evidence of actual confusion
on the part of the public during the few weeks that the defendant's store had
been in operation before hearing, the plaintiffs' rights were not solely
dependent upon this proof. They were
not required to stand by until actual confusion caused damage. Where an injunction is sought as is the case
here, 'the determinative factor . . . is not that purchasers have, in fact,
been deceived, but that there is a reasonable likelihood thereof.' 3 Callman, Unfair Competition, Trademarks
and Monopolies s. 80.6 (3d ed. 1969); Developments
in the Law--Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 68 Harv.L.Rev. 814, 862
(1955). The issue of confusing
similarity is one of fact. Restatement of Torts, s. 728, Comment a (1938).
As in Nardini &c. Co. v. Sterling Co., 93 N.H. at 367, 42 A.2d
at 327, the injunction issued by the trial court was a qualified one,
prohibiting only use of 'the abbreviation 'Mr.' in conjunction with the words
'Take Out' as presently used in the conduct of defendant's business conducted
on Main *355 Street in Keene'.
We hold that the court's finding, that 'certain confusion has arisen and
is likely to arise in the future . . . particularly as the defendant is
currently using the abbreviation . . . in a certain script identical with, or
closely imitative of the 'Mr.' used by the plaintiffs. . . .', is sustainable upon the
evidence. Accordingly the limited
injunction based thereon is likewise sustained.
Exceptions overruled.
GRIFFITH, J., did not sit;
the others concurred.
N.H. 1972.
296 A.2d 918, 112 N.H. 352, 176 U.S.P.Q. 431
END OF DOCUMENT